A  PRACTICAL  TREATISE 


ON 


Title  to  Real  Property 


INCLUDING  THE 


COMPILATION  AND  EXAMINATION 
OF  ABSTRACTS 


WITH   FORMS 


By 

GEORGE  W.  THOxMPSON 

Author  of 
A  TREATISE  ON  WILLS 


INDIANAPOLIS 

THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


T 

r3735p 
191? 


Copyright  1919 
By  The  Bobbs-Merrill  Company 


n 


5^ 


PREFACE 

The  law  of  real  property  may  be  said  to  be  the  backbone  of 
American  law.  The  estates  and  interests  involved,  both  present 
and  future,  exhibit  the  most  intricate  of  all  questions  known  to 
the  legal  profession.  Modern  statutes  and  the  standardization  of 
deeds  and  other  instruments  relating  to  real  estate  have,  in  some 
degree,  reduced  the  number  of  such  questions;  but  they  often 
arise  when  least  expected  and  require  the  most  careful  and  pains- 
taking treatment. 

Every  transaction  in  real  estate  should  be  under  the  supervision 
of  a  competent  legal  adviser,  and  no  title  can  be  safely  accepted 
without  a  proper  examination.  To  facilitate  such  examination, 
counsel  should  be  furnished,  in  proper  form,  all  the  record  infor- 
mation which  he  is  required  to  know  concerning  the  title  to  the 
particular  real  estate  in  question.  He  should  be  familiar  with  the 
method  of  compiling  such  information,  and  insist  on  its  proper 
and  orderly  presentation  before  he  undertakes  to  apply  legal 
principles  to  the  various  instruments  and  transactions  in  the  chain 
of  title. 

Counsel  often  encounter  trouble  and  embarrassment  in  the 
perusal  of  an  abstract,  owing  to  the  confused  and  ambiguous 
manner  in  which  the  material  parts  of  instruments  are  stated,  and 
the  illogical  mode  of  arrangement  sometimes  adopted.  Many 
advantages  will  result  to  the  profession  from  observing  a  more 
careful  and  systematic  preparation  of  abstracts  of  title  by  persons 
and  corporations  engaged  in  compiling  them. 

In  this  treatise  the  author  has  prepared  for  the  special  use 
of  attorneys,  as  well  as  conveyancers,  a  practical  guide  to  the 
proper  preparation  and  examination  of  abstracts,  together  with 
an  epitome  of  the  law  applicable  to  questions  arising  in  the  pe- 
rusal of  such  documents.  A  general  outline  is  given  of  the  most 
approved  methods  of  making  indices  and  abstract  books;  a  gen- 
eral scheme  is  given  of  arrangement  or  grouping  of  the  various 
instruments  and  transactions  forming  the  chain  of  title,  and  the 

iii 


66^461 


iv  PREFACE 

essential  parts  of  instruments  required  to  be  noted  are  given,  to- 
gether with  illustrative  forms. 

All  instruments  and  transactions  afifecting  the  title  to  real  es- 
tate are  treated,  not  only  with  respect  to  their  proper  exhibition 
in  the  chain  of  title,  but  more  particularly  with  reference  to  their 
legal  effect  and  operation  as  muniments  of  title  or  incumbrances. 
Special  care  has  been  exercised  to  point  out  the  numerous  pitfalls 
in  the  chain  of  title,  and  to  indicate  a  remedy  for  correcting  or 
curing  defects  therein. 

A  digest  of  the  statutes  of  the  various  states  pertaining  to  the 
execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds  and  mortgages,  the  exe- 
cution and  probate  of  wills,  and  the  law  of  descent  and  distribu- 
tion has  been  included  for  the  convenience  of  counsel  not  having 
access  to  the  statutes  of  the  various  states.  From  the  great  num- 
ber of  decisions  only  those  have  been  selected  that  best  illustrate 
particular  topics  and  indicate  modern  tendencies. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  work  the  author  has  combined  his 
own  experience  with  the  experience  of  a  number  of  eminent  con- 
veyancers and  lawyers  with  whom  he  has  been  privileged  to  con- 
sult, and  to  whom  he  acknowledges  many  obligations  for  advice 
and  suggestions.  ^^^^^^  ^^  Thompson. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL 

SEC. 

1.  Abstracts  defined. 

2.  Origin  and  history  of  abstracts. 

3.  The  object  of  an  abstract. 

4.  American  and  EngHsh  methods  distinguished. 

5.  General  requisites  of  an  abstract, 

6.  Sufficiency  of  abstract  between  vendor  and  vendee. 

7.  Abstract  showing  good  title. 

8.  Period  for  which  title  should  be  shown. 

9.  Qualifications  of  abstracters. 

10.  Scope  of  abstracters'  undertaking. 

11.  Relation  of  trust  and  confidence. 

12.  Who  may  make  abstracts. 

13.  Compensation  of  abstracters. 

14.  Bond  of  abstracters. 

15.  Nature  of  abstracter's  liability. 

16.  Liability  for  negligence  or  mistake. 

17.  Liability  for  failure  to  show  liens  or  incumbrances. 

18.  Measure  of  damages  against  abstractee. 

19.  Actual  damages  sustained. 

20.  Limiting  liability  of  an  abstracter. 

21.  Liability  of  public  officers  examining  title. 

22.  To  whom  an  abstracter  may  be  liable. 

23.  When  right  of  action  accrues. 

24.  Pleadings  in  action  against  abstracter. 

25.  Agreement  to  furnish  abstract. 

26.  Duty  to  furnish  abstract  irrespective  of  agreement. 

27.  Contract  by  broker  to  furnish  abstract. 

28.  Requiring  abstracts  of  parties  to  real  actions. 

29.  Abstract  where  records  destroyed. 

30.  Property  in  the  abstract. 

31.  Delivery  of  abstract. 

32.  Tender  of  abstract  after  expiration  of  agreed  time. 

33.  Merger  in  deed  of  contract  to  deliver  abstract. 

34.  Waiver  of  objections  to  title  by  taking  possession. 

35.  Time  in  which  to  examine  abstract. 

36.  Taxation  of  abstract  books. 

CHAPTER  n 

ESTATES,  INTERESTS  AND  RIGHTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY 
SEC. 

40.  Estates  defined  and  distinguished. 

41.  General  classification  of  estates. 

42.  Estates  in  fee  simple. 

43.  Modified  fees. 


yj  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 

44.  Conditional  fees  at  common  law. 

45.  Creation  of  fee  simple  estate  by  deed. 

46.  Creation  of  fee  simple  estate  by  will.  .  .        •      i       .  .^^ 

47.  Limitations  and  restrictions  m  transfers  of  fee  simple  estates. 

48.  Estates  in  fee  tail. 

49.  Life  estates. 

50.  Estates  for  years. 

51.  Estates  at  will.  | 

52.  Estates  at  suffrance.  ,  \ 

53.  Estates  from  year  to  year.  y 

54.  Estates  upon  condition.  • 

55.  Estates  upon  limitation. 

56.  Estates  upon  conditional  limitation. 

57.  Legal  and  equitable  estates.  ; 

58.  Uses.  ■ 

59.  Trusts. 

60.  Powers. 

61.  Easements. 

62.  Licenses. 

63.  Profits  a  prendre. 

64.  Curtesy. 

65.  Dower. 

66.  Homestead. 

67.  Widow's  quarantine.  i 

CHAPTER  III  1 

) 

TITLE  TO   REAL   ESTATE   IN    GENERAL 
SEC. 

70.  Title  defined  and  distinguished. 

71.  Various  estates  to  which  title  relates. 

72.  Allodial  titles. 

73.  Color  of  title. 

74.  Legal  and  equitable  titles. 

75.  Complete,  perfect,  good  and  clear  titles.  _ 

76.  Bad,  defective,  imperfect,  and  doubtful  titles. 

77.  Marketable  titles. 

78.  Evidences  of  title. 

79.  Title  insurance. 

CHAPTER  IV 

METHODS   OF   ACQUIRING   TITLE 
SEC. 

85.  Title  by  descent  and  by  purchase. 

86.  Title  by  descent  based  on  laws  of  inheritance. 

87.  Common-law  canons  of  descent. 

88.  Rules  of  descent  under  the  civil  law. 

89.  Consanguinity  and  affinity. 

90.  Fact  of  death. 

91.  Fact  of  intestacy. 

92.  Title  by  purchase  classified. 

93.  Title  by  private  deed. 

94.  Official  grants. 

95.  Public  grants. 

96.  Devise. 

97.  Title  by  estoppel  in  general. 

98.  Estoppel  by  record. 

99.  Estoppel  by  deed. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  Vll 

100,  Estoppel  in  pais. 
,101.  Relation. 
,  102,  Prescription  and  limitation, 

103.  Accretion  and  alluvion. 

104.  Title  to  riparian  lands. 

105.  Dedication. 

106.  Confirmation. 

107.  Occupancy. 

108.  Abandonment. 

109.  Eminent  domain. 

110.  Title  and  rights  acquired  by  condemnation. 
HI.  Escheat. 

112.  Confiscation. 

113.  Forfeiture. 

CHAPTER  V 

THE    PUBLIC    RECORDS 

SEC. 

115.  Public  records  generally. 

116.  Style  of  office  under  which  recording  is  done. 

117.  What  constitutes  recording. 

118.  Object  of  recording  acts. 

119.  Particular  instruments  which  may  be  recorded. 

120.  Proper  execution  and  acknowledgment  as  a  prerequisite  to  recording. 

121.  Books  in  which  instruments  must  be  recorded. 

122.  Time  of  recording. 

123.  Time  allowed  by  statute  for  recording  deeds  and  other  instruments. 

124.  Place  of  recording. 

125.  Effect  of  a  record  duly  made. 

126.  The  doctrine  of  notice. 

127.  Actual  notice. 

128.  Implied  notice. 

129.  Constructive  notice. 

130.  Official  tract  indexes. 

131.  General  index  of  records. 

132.  Whethifer  the  index  is  a  part  of  the  record. 

133.  Records  of  attachment  and  lis  pendens. 

134.  Index  of  judgment  records. 

135.  Tax  records. 

136.  Records  of  vital  statistics. 

137.  Abstracters'  use  of  public  records. 

138.  Loss  or  destruction  of  records. 


CHAPTER  VI 

abstracter's   indexes   and   REFERENCE   BOOKS 

SEC. 

145.  Importance  of  indexes  and  reference  books. 

146.  The  government  tract  book. 

147.  Surveyor's  field  notes. 

148.  Books  of  original  entries. 

149.  Instrument  number  index. 

150.  The  tract  index. 

151.  Index  of  irregulars. 

152.  Index  of  tax  sales. 

153.  Index  of  judgments. 

154.  Miscellaneous  indexes  and  reference  books. 


Vill  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII 

COMPILATION   OF   AN   ABSTRACT^ 

SEC. 

160.  Introductory  remarks. 

161.  Scope  and  extent  of  the  examination. 

162.  Preliminary  sketch  of  chain. 

163.  Formal  parts  of  the  abstract. 

164.  The  caption. 

165.  Arrangement  of  the  abstract. 

166.  Synopsis  of  instruments  and  proceedings. 

167.  FuUness  of  synopsis. 

168.  Abstracter's  notes. 

169.  E.xhibiting  instruments  for  reference. 

170.  Showing  irregular  instruments. 

171.  Showing  mistakes  made  in  transcribing  instruments. 

172.  Abbreviations. 

173.  Preserving  copy  of  abstract. 

174.  Abstracter's  certificate. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

BEGINNING   OF    TITLE 

SEC. 

180.  Inceptive  stages  of  title  generally. 

181.  Source  of  title  shown  by  complete  chain. 

182.  Methods  of  transfer  under  government  land  laws. 

183.  Who  may  acquire  title  to  public  lands. 

184.  Power  of  congress  to  dispose  of  public  lands. 

185.  Disposal  of  state  lands. 

186.  Direct  legislative  grants. 

187.  Form  and  construction  of  direct  legislative  grants. 

188.  Abstracting  legislative  grant. 

189.  Confirmation  acts  and  decrees. 

190.  Transfer  by  public  sale. 

191.  Appropriation  by  private  entry. 

192.  Nature  of  entryman's  title. 

193.  Lands  subject  to  entry. 

194.  Statement  of  the  entry. 

195.  Receipts,  certificates,  etc.,  issued  by  register  or  receiver, 

196.  Pre-emption. 

197.  Pre-emptor's  right  or  title. 

198.  Contracts  and  conveyances  before  entry. 

199.  Graduation  acts. 

200.  Homestead  and  free  grants. 

201.  Nature  of  rights  acquired  by  homesteader. 

202.  Donations  and  bounty  lands. 

203.  Land  warrants  and  scrip. 

204.  Desert  land  entries. 

205.  Timber  and  stone  lands. 

206.  Timber  culture  claims. 

207.  Swamp  land  grants. 

208.  School  and  university  land  grants. 

209.  Statement  where  title  founded  on  school  land  grant. 

210.  Grants  for  internal  improvement. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  IX 

211.  Initial  statement  of  abstract  where  title  based  on  grant  for  internal  im- 

provements. 

212.  Land  grants  to  railroads. 

213.  Grant  for  public  highway. 

214.  Private  land  claims. 

215.  Town  site  entry. 

216.  Initial    statement   of    abstract   where   title    obtained    through   town   site 

entry. 

CHAPTER  IX 

FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS 
SEC. 

220.  Patents  in  general. 

221.  Necessity  of  patent  to  pass  title. 

222.  Form  and  requisites  of  patents. 

223.  Delivery,  acceptance  and  recording  of  patents. 

224.  Validity  of  patents. 

225.  Patents  issued  after  death  of  claimant. 

226.  Operaition  and  effect  of  patents. 

227.  Construction  of  patents. 

228.  Conclusiveness  of  patents. 

229.  Rescission,  cancelation  and  correction  of  patents. 

230.  Abstracting  patents. 

CHAPTER  X 

SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND   SUBDIVISIONS 

SEC. 

235.  Historical  view  of  government  land  survey. 

236.  Laying  off  the  land  into  townships. 

237.  Laying  off  the  townships  into  sections. 

238.  Subdividing  the  sections. 

239.  Plats  and  subdivisions. 

240.  Maps  and  plats  as  evidence. 

241.  Effect  of  reference  in  descriptions  to  maps  or  plats. 

242.  Abstracting  plat  and  subdivision. 

243.  Vacation  of  plat. 

244.  Dedication  by  maps  or  plats. 

CHAPTER  XI 

ASCERTAINMENT    OF    QUANTITY    OF   LAND 
SEC. 

250.  Computation  of  land  areas  and  distances. 

251.  Tables  of  measure. 

252.  To  find  the  area  of  a  tract  in  shape  of  a  parallelogram. 

253.  To  find  the  area  of  a  triangle. 

254.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezoid. 

255.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezium,  or  any  other  irregular  polygon. 

256.  To  find  the  area  of  irregular-shaped  tracts. 

257.  Effect  of  the  use  of  the  words  "more  or  less"  in  a  description. 


X  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XII 

THE  FORMAL   PARTS  OF  DEEDS 
SEC. 

260.  Formal  parts  of  a  deed  enumerated  and  described. 

261.  Names  and  descriptions  of  parties. 

262.  Grantors. 

263.  Grantees. 

264.  Designating  nature  and  kind  of  conveyance. 

265.  Date  of  the  deed. 

266.  Consideration. 

267.  Operative  words. 

268.  Words  of  inheritance. 

269.  Description  and  boundaries. 

270.  Sufficiency  of  description. 

271.  Identification  of  description  by  act  of  the  parties. 

272.  How  description  construed. 

273.  Recitals  in  deeds. 

274.  Habendum,  or  the  estate  created. 

275.  Exceptions  and  reservations. 

276.  Conditions  precedent  and  subsequent. 

277.  Restrictions  as  to  the  use  of  land. 

278.  Covenants  for  title. 

279.  Defective  covenants. 

280.  Signature  to  the  deed. 

281.  Sealing. 

282.  Attestation. 

283.  Acknowledgment. 

284.  Examples  of  defective  acknowledgments. 

285.  How  acknowledgment  shown  in  abstract. 

286.  Delivery. 

287.  Registration, 

288.  Correcting  errors  in  record,  and  re-recording. 

289.  Ancient  deeds. 

290.  Technical  and  particular  words  and  phrases. 

291.  Repugnant  or  conflicting  parts  of  a  deed. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

GENERAL   CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES 

SEC. 

295.  Modern  kinds  of  deeds. 

296.  Indentures  and  deeds  poll. 

297.  Construction  of  deeds. 

298.  Validity  of  conveyances. 

299.  Warranty  deeds. 

300.  Abstracting  warranty  deeds. 

301.  Quitclaim  deeds. 

302.  Abstracting  quitclaim  deeds. 

303.  Deeds  with  special  warranties. 

304.  Statutory  forms  of  deeds. 

305.  Common-law  deeds. 

306.  Deed  of  release. 

307.  Deeds  of  confirmation. 

308.  Deeds  of  surrender. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XI 

309.  Deeds  of  assignment. 

310.  Deeds  of  defeasance. 

311.  Conveyances  to  take  effect  in  the  future. 

312.  Deeds  conveying  base,  qualified,  and  conditional  estates  or  interests. 

313.  Conveyances  with  restrictive  conditions  and  covenants. 

314.  Conveyances  of  land  in  the  adverse  possession  of  another. 

315.  Fraudulent  conveyances. 

316.  Conveyances  subject  to  incumbrance. 

317.  Dedicatory  deeds. 

318.  Deeds  creating  resulting  trusts. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SPECIAL    CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES 
SEC. 

320!  Conveyances  for  the  sole  and  separate  use  of  married  women. 

321.  Deed  to  husband  and  wife. 

322.  Conveyances  for  married  women. 

323.  Conveyance  between  husband  and  wife. 

324.  Acknowledgment  by  married  woman. 

325.  Release  of  dower.  ,     .   . 

326.  Conveyances  creating  estates  in  common  and  m  jomt  tenancy. 

327.  Voluntary  partition  deeds. 

3z8.  Conveyances  to  and  by  partnerships. 

329.  Conveyances  to  private  corporations. 

330.  Acknowledgment  of  corporate  deeds. 

331.  Conveyances  by  public  and  quasi  corporations. 

332.  Conveyance  by  private  corporations. 

333.  Conveyances  by  charitable  or  religious  corporations. 

334.  Conveyance  of  an  expectancy. 

335.  Conveyance  by  attorney  in  fact. 

336.  Power  of  attorney  to  convey. 

337.  Ratification  and  revocation  of  powers  of  attorney. 

338.  Conveyances  in  trust. 

339.  Declaration  of  trust  in  deeds. 

340.  Revocation  of  trust. 

341.  Death,  resignation,  or  removal  of  trustee. 


CHAPTER  XV 

OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES 

SEC. 

345.  Official  conveyances  generally. 

346.  Recitals  in  official  deeds. 

347.  Sheriff's  deed  on  execution  sale. 

348.  Description  of  premises  sold  on  execution. 

349.  Acknowledgment  of  sheriff's  deed. 

350.  Construction  and  operation  of  sheriff's  deeds. 

351.  Statutory  sheriff's  deeds. 

352.  Sheriff's  deed  in  execution  of  decree. 

353.  Deeds  by  masters,  commissioners  and  referees. 

354.  Powers  and  duties  of  trustees  to  make  conveyances. 

355.  Trustee's  conveyance  of  legal  title. 

356.  Testamentary  trust   distinguished   from  power,   charge,   and   estates  on 

condition  subsequent. 


Xll  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 


357.  Trustees'  deeds. 

358.  Mortgagee's  deed  under  power  of  sale. 

359.  Executor's  deed. 

360.  Administrator's  deed. 

361.  Administrator  with  the  will  annexed. 

362.  Guardian's  deed. 

363.  Fiduciaries  purchasing  at  their  own  sales. 

364.  Caveat  emptor  as  applied  to  judicial  and  ministerial  sales. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY 
SEC. 

370.  Assignments  generally. 

371.  Voluntary  assignments  for  the  benefit  of  creditors. 

372.  Validity  of  assignments. 

2)73.  Formal  requisites  of  assignments. 

374.  Assignee's  title. 

375.  Construction,  operation,  and  effect  of  assignments. 

376.  What  laws  govern. 

Z77.  Bankruptcy  and  insolvent  laws. 

378.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure  prior  to  adjudication. 

379.  Voluntary  and  involuntary  bankruptcy. 

380.  The  petition,  process,  etc. 

381.  Effect  of  adjudication  in  bankruptcy. 

382.  Procedure  after  adjudication. 

383.  Abstracting  bankruptcy  proceedings. 

384.  Deed  of  trustee  in  bankruptcy. 

385.  Discharge  in  bankruptcy. 

CHAPTER  XVn 

CONTRACTS  TO  SELL  AND  CONVEY  REAL  ESTATE 

SEC. 

390.  Land  contracts  and  bonds  for  deed. 

391.  Relation  of  vendor  and  vendee  under  contract  or  bond  for  deed. 

392.  Title  or  interest  of  vendor  and  vendee. 

393.  Formal  requisites. 

394.  Record  of  contract  of  sale. 

395.  Construction  of  the  contract. 

396.  Abstracting  the  contract. 

397.  Assignment  of  contract. 

398.  Agreement  as  to  title  and  its  performance. 

399.  Forfeiture  of  contract  of  sale. 

400.  Title  bond. 

401.  Agreement  to  devise  real  estate. 

CHAPTER  XVni 

LEASES 

SEC. 

405.  Leases  defined  and  distinguished. 

406.  Formal  parts  of  leases. 

407.  Covenants  in  leases. 

408.  Assignments  of  lease. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XIU 

CHAPTER  XIX 

MORTGAGES 

SEC. 

415.  Definition,  origin,  and  nature  of  mortgages. 

416.  Legal  and  equitable  theory  of  mortgages. 

417.  Equitable  mortgages. 

418.  Mortgages  distinguished  from  other  transactions. 

419.  Absolute  deed  as  mortgage. 

420.  Equity  of  redemption. 

421.  Form  of  mortgage  in  general. 

422.  Description  of  the  parties. 

423.  Description  of  the  premises. 

424.  Description  of  the  debt  secured  or  obligation  to  be  performed. 

425.  Covenants  of  a  mortgage  generally. 

426.  Special  covenants  and  conditions. 

427.  Estoppel  of  mortgagor  subsequently  acquiring  title. 

428.  Merger  as  applied  to  mortgages. 

429.  Payment  or  discharge  of  mortgage. 

430.  Purchase-money  mortgages. 

431.  Mortgages  of  the  homestead. 

432.  Mortgages  of  after-acquired  property. 

433.  Record  of  mortgages. 

434.  Possession  as  notice. 

435.  Correction  of  errors  in  record  and  re-recording  mortgage. 

436.  Assignment  of  mortgages  and  deeds  of  trust. 

437.  Form,  requisites,  and  method  of  assignment. 

438.  Record  of  assignments  of  mortgages. 

439.  Equitable  assignments  of  mortgages. 

440.  Abstracting  mortgage  and  assignment  of  mortgage. 

441.  Trust  deeds. 

442.  Power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust. 

443.  Release  or  satisfaction  of  record. 

444.  Foreclosure  by  entry  and  possession. 

445.  Foreclosure  by  writ  of  entry. 

446.  Foreclosure  by  exercise  of  power  of  sale. 

447.  Foreclosure  by  equitable  suit. 


CHAPTER  XX 

WILLS 
SEC. 

450.  Introductory  remarks. 

451.  Nature  of  title  acquired  by  will. 

452.  Wills  and  related  words  defined. 

453.  Distinguishing  characteristics  of  a  will. 

454.  Kinds  of  wills. 

455.  Codicils. 

456.  What  laws  govern  devises. 

457.  Capacity  to  make  a  will. 

458.  Capacity  to  take  under  a  will. 

459.  Construction  of  wills. 

460.  False,  erroneous,  conflicting,  and  repugnant  descriptions. 

461.  Repugnant  provisions  and  conditions. 

462.  Void  conditions  and  provisions. 

463.  Operative  words  of  a  will. 


xiv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

464.  Words  of  purchase  and  limitation. 

465.  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. 

466.  How  particular  words  and  phrases  are  mterpreted. 

467.  Words  passing  real  estate. 

468.  Estates  in  remainder. 

469.  Executory  devises. 

470.  Gifts  of  the  use,  possession,  rents,  profits,  and  uicome  of  real  property. 

471.  Devise  to  a  class. 

472.  Devise  of  life  estate  with  power  of  disposition. 

473.  Devise  charged  with  payment  of  dchts,  legacies,  and  support. 

474.  Devise  on  condition  precedent  or  subsequent. 

475.  Conditional  limitations. 

476.  Gifts  over  on  death  of  beneficiary  or  death  without  issue  or  heirs. 

477.  Conditions  restraining  marriage. 

478.  Conditions  against  alienation. 

479.  Devise  to  separate  use  of  married  woman. 

480.  Devises  in  trust. 

481.  Designation  of  the  devisee. 

482.  Perpetuities. 

483.  Lapsed  devises. 

484.  Equitable  conversion. 

485.  Residuary  devises. 

486.  Revocation  of  wills. 

487.  Form  and  language  of  wills. 

488.  Abstracting  the  will. 

489.  Method  of  abstracting  will  and  proof  of  probate. 

490.  Example  of  an  abstract  of  a  will. 

491.  Probate  of  wills. 

492.  Effect  of  probate. 

493.  Probate  of  foreign  wills. 

494.  Abstracting  probate  proceedings. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS    AFFECTING   TITLE 
SEC. 

500.  General  considerations. 

501.  Municipal  ordinances. 

502.  Approval  and  publication  of  ordinances. 

503.  Operation  and  effect  of  ordinances. 

504.  Resolutions  of  municipal  bodies. 

505.  Official  certificates. 

506.  Easements  and  servitudes. 

507.  Party-wall  agreements. 

508.  Letters,  receipts  and  memoranda. 

509.  Affidavits. 

510.  Unrecorded  evidence. 

CHAPTER  XXn 

LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES 

SEC. 

515.  Liens  defined  and  classified. 

516.  Equitable  liens  generally. 

517.  Statutory  liens. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XV 


518.  Operations  and  effect  of  liens. 

519.  How  liens  exhibited  in  abstract. 

520.  Mortgage  liens. 

521.  Dower  rights  as  liens. 

522.  Judgment  and  execution  liens. 

523.  Attachment  not  strictly  a  lien. 

524.  The  lien  of  decedent's  debts. 

525.  Liens  arising  under  devises. 

526.  Liens  for  taxes. 

527.  Lien  of  municipal  or  corporation  taxes. 

528.  Lien  of  officials'  bonds. 

529.  Lease  not  strictly  a  lien. 

530.  Grantors'  or  vendors'  liens. 

531.  Vendee's  implied  lien  for  purchase-money. 

532.  Liens  arising  under  trusts. 

533.  Mechanics'  liens  in  general. 

534.  Mechanics'  liens  of  subcontractors. 

535.  Priority  of  mechanics'  liens. 

536.  Estates  or  property  subject  to  mechanics'  liens. 

537.  Assignment  of  a  mechanic's  lien. 

538.  Assertion  and  enforcement  of  mechanics'  liens. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

LIS    PENDENS    AND  ATTACHMENTS 
SEC. 

545.  The  doctrine  of  lis  pendens. 

546.  Proceedings  to  which  doctrine  applies. 

547.  Commencement  and  duration  of  lis  pendens. 

548.  Elements  necessary  to  constitute  a  lis  pendens. 

549.  Statutory  provisions  for  record. 

550.  Requisites  of  a  valid  notice. 

551.  Persons  charged  with  notice. 

552.  Attachment. 

553.  Proceedings  to  procure  attachment. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

JUDGMENTS   AND    DECREES 
SEC. 

560.  Judgments  in  general. 

561.  Effect  of  judgments  and  decrees. 

562.  Lien  of  judgments. 

563.  Territorial  extent  of  lien. 

564.  Duration  of  judgment  lien, 

565.  Rank  and  priority  of  lien. 

566.  Property  or  interest  liable  to  lien. 

567.  Docketing,  indexing  and  recording  judgments. 

568.  Requisites  as  to  form  of  judgments. 

569.  Points  to  be  noticed  in  the  examination  of  a  judgment  record. 

570.  Judgment  against  deceased  partj'. 

571.  Judgments  against  infants  and  insane  persons. 

572.  Exemption  of  real  estate  from  judgments. 

573.  Satisfaction  and  discharge  of  judgments. 

574.  Decrees  in  general. 


XVI  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

575.  Operation  and  eflfect  of  decrees. 

576.  Effect  of  decree  in  the  absence  of  personal  service. 

577.  Lien  of  decrees. 

578.  Form  of  decrees. 

579.  Abstracting  the  decree. 

580.  Effect  of  misnomer  of  parties  generally. 

581.  Kffect  of  error  or  omission  of  middle  name  or  initial. 

582.  Doctrine  of  idem  sonans. 

583.  Operation  and  effect  of  decrees  of  probate  courts. 

584.  Foreign  judgments  and  decrees. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

JUDICIAL   SALES 

SEC. 

590.  Judicial  sales  defined  and  distinguished. 

591.  Validity  and  effect  of  judicial  sales. 

592.  Purchaser's  title  under  judicial  sale. 

593.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  judicial  sale. 

594.  Rights  of  grantee  of  purchaser. 

595.  Refusal  to  complete  purchase. 

596.  Order  confirming  the  sale. 

597.  Effect  of  confirmation. 

598.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  judicial  sale. 

599.  Proof  of  title  under  judicial  sales. 

600.  Presumptions  pertaining  to  judicial  sales. 

601.  Sales  under  orders  and  decrees  of  probate  courts. 

602.  Probate  procedure  to  sell  real  estate. 

603.  How  probate  sales  shown  in  abstract. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

EXECUTION    SALES 
SEC. 

610.  Execution  sales  defined  and  distinguished. 

611.  Validity  and  effect  of  execution  sales. 

612.  Title  under   execution    sale. 

613.  When  title  vests  in  purchaser  at  execution  sale. 

614.  The  writ  of   execution. 

615.  Levy  and  return  of  execution. 

616.  Notice  of  sale. 

617.  Proof  of  publication  of  notice. 

618.  Effect  of  death  of  judgment  plaintiff  on  defendant  before  execution. 

619.  Exemption  of  real  estate  from  execution. 

620.  Effect  of  execution  sale  on  dower  rights. 

621.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  execution  sale. 

622.  Assignment  of  officer's  certificate. 

623.  Proof  of  title  under  execution  sale. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XVll 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

TAXES  AND    TAX    TITLES 


SEC. 

630.  Taxes  and  taxation  in  general. 

631.  Property  subject  to  taxation. 

632.  The  tax  lien. 

633.  Tax  titles. 

634.  Assessment  of  taxes. 

635.  Description  of  land  in  assessment  roll. 

636.  The  tax  sale. 

637.  Collection  by  proceedings  of  forfeiture. 

638.  Who  may  be  purchaser  at  tax  sale. 

639.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  tax  sale. 

640.  Redemption  from  tax  sale. 

641.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  tax  sale. 

642.  The  tax  deed. 

643.  Formal  parts  of  the  deed. 

644.  Tax  deeds  as  evidence  in  support  of  title. 

645.  Legislation  to  strengthen  tax  titles. 

646.  Judgment  for  taxes. 

647.  Local  assessments. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

ACTIONS    AND    PROCEEDINGS    AFFECTING    TITLE    TO    REAL   ESTATE 
SEC. 

650.  Jurisdiction  in  general. 

651.  Legal  or  equitable  jurisdiction. 

652.  Jurisdiction  in  rem.  and  jurisdiction  in  personam. 

653.  Probate  jurisdiction. 

654.  Lands  in  another  county  or  in  several  counties. 

655.  Lands  in  another  state. 

656.  Jurisdiction  of  particular  actions. 

657.  Record  of  equitable  proceedings  as  notice. 

658.  Process. 

659.  Style  and  contents  of  process. 

660.  Service  of  the  process. 

661.  Service  by  publication. 

662.  Return  and  proof  of  service. 

663.  Effect  of  appearance  without  process. 

664.  Reports  of  referees  and  masters  in  chancery. 

665.  Verdicts. 

666.  Abstracting  equitable  proceedings. 

667.  Injunctions. 

668.  Ejectment. 

669.  Action  to  quiet  title. 

670.  Partition. 

671.  Action  for  specific  performance. 

672.  Redemption  by  bill  in  equity. 

673.  Rescission  and  cancellation. 

674.  Foreclosure  in  equity. 

675.  Assignment  of  dower. 

676.  Divorce  proceedings. 

677.  Condemnation  proceedings. 

678.  Construction  of  wills. 


Xviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

ADVERSE   TITLE 

SEC. 

685.  General  considerations. 

686.  Instruments  affecting  title  adversely. 

687.  Adverse  possession  in  general. 

688.  Color  of  title.  _ 

689.  Actual  possession. 

690.  Constructive  possession. 

691.  Tacking  possessions. 

692.  How  far  possession  is  notice. 

693.  Estates  or  property  subject  to  adverse  possession. 

694.  Who  may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession. 

695.  Adverse  title  against  reversioners  and  remaindermen.^ 

696.  Title  by  adverse  possession  between  cotenants  and  joint  owners. 

697.  Persons  under  legal  disability. 

698.  Adverse  title  against  state  or  municipality. 

699.  Effect  of  adverse  possession. 

700.  Evidence  in  support  of  title  by  adverse  possession. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

TITLE    BY   DESCENT 
SEC. 

705.  General  considerations. 

706.  Civil  death— Casting  descent  by  imprisonment  for  life. 

707.  Ancestors. 

708.  Ancestral  estates. 

709.  When  seisin  of  ancestor  essential. 

710.  Per  stirpes  and  per  capita. 

711.  Taking  by  representation. 

712.  Issue. 

713.  Descendants. 

714.  Heirs. 

715.  Forced  heirs. 

716.  Surviving  spouse  as  heir. 

717.  Children  and  children's  children. 

718.  Adopted  children. 

719.  Illegitimate  children. 

720.  Pretermitted  children. 

721.  Posthumous  children. 

722.  Property  subject  to  descent. 

723.  Devolution  of  real  property  to  heir. 

724.  What  laws  govern. 

725.  Lines  of  descent. 

726.  Computing  degrees  of  kindred. 

727.  Descent  of  estates  of  minors  not  having  been  married. 

728.  Brothers  and  sisters. 

729.  Next  of  kin. 

730.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood. 

731.  Inheritance  by  parents  of  intestate. 

732.  Inheritance  by  and  through  aliens. 

733.  Right  of  persons  causing  death  of  intestate  to  inherit  his  property." 

734.  Descent  of  estate  of  devisee  who  dies  before  testator. 

735.  Release  of  expectant  share  to  ancestor. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  XIX 


736.  Inheritance  liable  for  debts  of  decedent. 
Til .  Advancements. 

738.  Proof  of  heir-ship. 

739.  Proof  of  death  of  ancestor. 

740.  Proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy. 

741.  Abstract  of  descents. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

PERUSAL   OF   ABSTRACT    AND   OPINION    OF   TITLE 

SEC. 

745.  Precautionary  measures  against  insertion  of  pages  after  examination. 

746.  Perusing  abstract. 

747.  Making  memoranda. 

748.  Examining  the  muniments  of  title. 

749.  Beginning  point  of  examination. 

750.  Printed  copies  of  abstracts. 

751.  Government  Land  Receiver's  receipt. 

752.  Patent  from  the  federal  government. 

753.  Patent  from  state  government. 

754.  Private  deeds. 

755.  Acknowledgments. 

756.  Official  deeds. 

757.  Trust  deeds  and  mortgages. 

758.  Deed  of  release. 

759.  Deed  executed  under  power  of  attorney. 

760.  Dedications. 

761.  Sale  under  foreclosure. 

762.  Judicial  sales. 

763.  Tax  sales. 

764.  Sales  by  executors,  administrators,   and  guardians. 

765.  Wills. 

766.  Descents. 

767.  Contract  of  sale. 

768.  Judgment  Hens. 

769.  Mechanic's  liens. 

770.  Miscellaneous  incumbrances. 

771.  Examination  of  matters  in  pais. 

772.  Examination  of  abstracter's  certificate. 
nZ.  Opinion  of  title. 


CHAPTER  XXXn 

DIGEST  OF  STATUTES  PERTAINING  TO  EXECUTION  AND  ACKNOWL- 
EDGMENT  OF   DEEDS 
SEC. 

780.'  Alabama. 

781.  Alaska. 

782.  Arizona. 

783.  Arkansas. 

784.  California. 

785.  Colorado. 

786.  Connecticut. 

787.  Delaware. 


XX 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 


788. 

District  of  Columbia 

789. 

Florida. 

790. 

Georgia. 

791. 

Hawaii. 

792. 

Idaho. 

793. 

Illinois. 

794. 

Indiana. 

795. 

Iowa. 

796. 

Kansas. 

797. 

Kentucky. 

798. 

Louisiana. 

799. 

Maine. 

800. 

Marj-land. 

801. 

Massachusetts. 

802. 

Michigan. 

803. 

Minnesota. 

804. 

Mississippi. 

80.S. 

Missouri. 

806. 

Montana. 

807. 

Nebraska. 

808. 

Nevada. 

809. 

New  Hampshire. 

810. 

New  Jersey. 

811. 

New  Mexico. 

812. 

New  York. 

813. 

North  Carolina. 

814. 

North  Dakota. 

815. 

Ohio. 

816. 

Oklahoma. 

817. 

Oregon. 

818. 

Pennsylvania. 

819. 

Rhode  Island. 

820. 

South  Carolina. 

821. 

South  Dakota. 

822. 

Tennessee. 

823. 

Texas. 

824. 

Utali. 

825. 

Vermont. 

826. 

Virginia. 

827 

Washington. 

828 

West  Virginia. 

829 

Wisconsin. 

830 

Wyoming. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII 


DIGEST  OF  STATUTES  OF  DESCENT 


SEC. 

835.  Alabama. 

836.  Alaska. 

837.  Arizona. 

838.  Arkansas. 

839.  California. 

840.  Colorado. 

841.  Connecticut 

842.  Delaware. 

843.  District  of  Columbia. 

844.  Florida. 

845.  Georgia. 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 


XXI 


846. 
847. 
848. 
849. 
850. 
851. 
852. 
853. 
854. 
855. 
855. 
857. 
858. 
859. 
860. 
861. 
862. 
863. 
864. 
865. 
866. 
867. 
868. 
869. 
870. 
871. 
872. 
873. 
874. 
875. 
876. 
877. 
878. 
879. 
880. 
881. 
882. 
883. 
884. 


Idaho. 

Illinois. 

Indiana. 

Iowa. 

Kansas. 

Kentucky. 

Louisiana. 

Maine. 

Maryland. 

Massachusetts. 

Michigan. 

Minnesota. 

Mississippi. 

Missouri. 

Montana. 

Nebraska. 

Nevada. 

New  Hampshire. 

New  Jersey. 

New  Mexico. 

New  York. 

North  Carolina. 

North  Dakota. 

Ohio. 

Oklahoma. 

Oregon. 

Pennsylvania. 

Rhode  Island. 

South  Carolina. 

South  Dakota. 

Tennessee. 

Texas. 

Utah. 

Vermont. 

Virginia. 

Washington. 

West  Virginia. 

Wisconsin. 

Wyoming. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 


DIGEST   OF   STATUTES   OF   WILLS 


SEC. 

890.  Alabama. 

891.  Alaska. 

892.  Arizona. 

893.  Arkansas. 

894.  California. 

895.  Colorado. 

896.  Connecticut. 

897.  Delaware. 

898.  District  of  Columbia. 

899.  Florida. 

900.  Georgia. 

901.  Hawaii. 

902.  Idaho. 

903.  Illinois. 

904.  Indiana. 

905.  Iowa. 


Xxii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS 


906.  Kansas. 

907.  Kentucky. 

908.  Louisiana. 

909.  Maine. 

910.  Maryland. 

911.  Massachusetts. 

912.  Micliigan. 

913.  Minnesota. 

914.  Mississippi. 

915.  Missouri. 

916.  Montana. 

917.  Nebraska. 

918.  Nevada. 

919.  New  Hampshire. 

920.  New  Jersey. 

921.  New  Mexico. 

922.  New  York. 
92.3.  North  Carolina. 

924.  North  Dakota. 

925.  Ohio. 

926.  Oklahoma. 

927.  Oregon. 

928.  Pennsylvania. 

929.  Philippine  Islands. 

930.  Porto  Rico. 

931.  Rhode  Island. 

932.  South  Carolina. 

933.  South  Dakota. 

934.  Tennessee. 

935.  Texas. 

936.  Utah. 

937.  Vermont. 

938.  Virginia. 

939.  Washington. 

940.  West  Virginia. 

941.  Wisconsin. 

942.  Wyoming. 


! 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

REGISTRATION  OF  TITLE  UNDER  TORRENS  SYSTEM 
SEC. 

950.  Origin  and  adoption  of  Torrens  System. 

951.  Miscellaneous  provisions  common  to  all  statutes. 

952.  Provisions  as  to  which  statutes  vary. 

953.  Purpose  and  advantages  of  title  registration. 

954.  General  principles  of  registration. 

955.  Procedure  for  registration. 

956.  Notice  and  hearing. 

957.  Decree  and  certificate  of  title  and  incumbrances. 

958.  Conclusiveness  of  certificates. 

959.  Subsequent  dealings  with  the  land  appear  on  the  registry. 

960.  Acquiring  title  to  registered  land  by  adverse  possession. 

961.  Transmission  of  title  on  death  of  owner  of  registered  land. 

962.  Constitutionality  of  acts. 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Abbott   V.   Frost,    185   Mass.    398  639 

V.  Holway,   72   Maine  298  311 

V.   Lindenbower,    42    Mo.    162  644 

Abdil  V.   Abdil,  26   Ind.   287  660 

Abeel  v.   Hubbell,  52  Mich.  37  52 

Abel  V.   Abel,  201   Pa.   543  466 
Aberaman    Iron    Works   v.    Wickens,    L. 

R.    4    ch.    101  531 

Abney  v.  De  Loach,  84  Ala.  393  718 

V.  Ohio  Lumber  &c.  Co.,  45  W.  Va. 

446  330 

Abraham    v.    Mayer,    7    Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

250  121 
Abrams  v.  State,  45  Wash.   327  111 
Acer  V.   Westcott,   46   N.   Y.   384  118,   129 
Acker  v.   Trueland,   56   Miss.   30  66 
Acord   V.    Western   Pocahontas   Corpora- 
tion, 156  Fed.  989  669 
Acreback  v.  Myer,  165  Mo.  685  66 
Adair   v.    Craig,    135    A!a.    332  96,  453 
V.   Davis,   71   Ga.   769  123 
V.  Lott,   3   Hill   (N.   Y.)    182  64 
Adam  V.   McClintock,  21    N.   Dak.  483     427 
Adams  v.  Adams,   154  Mass.  290  466 
V.   Akerlund,   168   111.   632  714 
V.   Betz,    167   Ind.    161  434 
V.   Buchanan,  49   Mo.   64  349 
V.   Buhler,    131    Ind.    66  116,   121 
V.  Burke,  3  Sawy.   (U.  S.)  415  202 
V.   Burton,   43    Vt.    36  62 
V.  Clark,  48  Fla.  205  66 
V.   Edgerton,   48   Ark.    419  120 
V.   Frothingham,   3   Miss.   352  227 
V.  Hartzell,   18  N.  Dak.  221  376 
V.  Hayden,  60  Tex.  223  124 
V.  Hopkins,    144    Cal.    19  70 
V.  Kellogg,   63   Mich.   105  315 
V.  Mclntyre,   22    N.    Dak.    337  419 
V.  Medsker,  25  W.  Va.  127  262,  280 
V.   Merrill,  45   Ind.  App.   315  45 
V.   Parker,    12    Gray    (Mass.)    53  437 
V.   Pratt,    109   Mass.    59  122 
V.  Ross,    30   N.    T.    L.    505         45,  48,  64 
V.   Valentine,  33   Fed.   1  277 
Adams    Express    Co.    v.    McDonald,    21 

Kans.   680  53 

Addis   V.    Graham,   88   Mo.    197  138 

Adee  v.  Campbell,  79  N.  Y.  52  711 

Advance  Thresher  Co.  v.  Esteb,  41  Ore. 

469  433 
/Etna    Life    Ins.    Co.    v.    Corn,    89    111. 

170  428 

v.  Broecker,  166  Ind.  576  416 

v.  Hesser,  77  Iowa  381         565,  567,  580 
./^tna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  68   N.   H. 

20  374 

Ahem  v.   Freeman,  46  Minn.   156  118 

Aiken  v.   Bridgeford,  84  Ala.  295  446 

Akers   v.    Clark,    184    111.    136  462 

Alabama   Conference   v.    Price,   42  Ala. 

39  601 
Alabone's    Estate,    In   re,    75    N.   J.    Eq. 

527  484 

Albany  v.  Lvnch,  119  Ga.   491  536 
Albee   v.   Vose,   76   Maine   448     87,   708,   727 

Alhin   v.   Parmele,   70   Nebr.   740  465 

Albers  v.  Kozeluh,  68  Nebr.  522  594 


Alcorn  v.   Morgan,   77  Ind.    184  406 

Alden's  Appeal,   In  re,  93   Pa.    St.    182        63 

Alderman  v.  New  Haven,  81   Conn.  137    693 

v.  Wells,  85   S.   Car.  507  630 

Alderson  v.  Ames.  6  Md.   52  119 

V.  Alderson,  46  W.   Va.  242  64 

Aldridge  v.   Montgomerv,  9  Ind.   302       730 

Allemong  v.   Gray,   92   Va.   216  303 

V.  Alexander,  31  Ala.  241  719 

V.   Alexander,    156   Mo.   413  474 

V.  Howe,   85   Va.    198  590 

V.  Jackson,   92   Cal.   514  66 

V.  Jones,  64  Iowa  207  337 

V.  Mortgage     Co.     of     Scotland,     47 

Fed.    131  417 

V.  Owen  County,   136  Ky.   420  575 

Alexander's  Estate,  In  re,  149  Cal.  146     477 
Alexandria  &c.   F.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexandria 

&c.  R.  Co.,  75  Va.   780  677 

Alferitz  V.  Arrivillaga,  143  Cal.  646  93 

Alford  V.   McCormac,   90  N.   Car.   151        509 
Algonquin     Coal    Co.    v.     Northern    S:c. 

iron  Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  114  689 

All  V.  Day.  133  Mo.  337  710 

Allaire  v.  Allaire,  37   N.  J.  L.   312  492 

Allen   v.   Allen,   48   Minn.   462  263 

v.   Allen,   121   N.   Car.  328  474 

V.  Allen,  13  S.  Car.  512  737 

v.  Atkinson,   21    Mich.   351  35 

V.  Austin.  21  R.  I.  254  65 

V.  Bartlett,    20   W.    Va.   46  53 

v.  Cadwell.  55  Mich.  8  126 

v.  Clark,  7  L.  T.  N.  S.  781  18 

V.  Craft.    109    Ind.    476  48,  466 

V.  De  Groodt,  98  Mo.   159  695 

V.   Gates,    73    Vt.    222  434 

V.   Hawley,    66    111.    164  66 

V.  Hazen,  26  Mich.  142         264,  295,  299 
V.   Holton,  20  Pick.    (Mass.)   458  301 

V.   Hopkins,   62   Kans.    175  12,   14 

V.   Hooper,    50    Maine   371  323 

V.  Hughes,    106   Ga.    775  338 

V.   Lenoir,    53    Miss.    321  324 

V.   McCalla,   25    Iowa   464  127 

V.   Mandaville,   26   Miss.    397  547 

V.   Markle,    36    Pa.    St.    117  466 

V.  Poole,    54   Miss.    323  128,  545 

Allen's  Appeal,   99  Pa.    St.    196  86 

Allen-West     Commission     Co.     v.     Mill- 
stead,  92  Miss.   837  565 
Allin     V.     Connecticut     River     Lumber 


655 
578 
691 
714 
360 
328 


Co.,   150  Mass.   560 
Ailing   v.    Nelson,    55    Nebr.    161 
Allis  V.   Field,  89  Wis.   327 
Allison   V.   Allison,    101   Va.    537 

V.   Kurtz,    2   Watts    (Pa.)    185 

V.  Perry,    130    111.    9 
Alma  V.   Guaranty  Sav.   Bank,   60  Fed. 

203 
Almond  v.  Bonnell,  76   111.   536 
Alsop  V.   Cowan,  66  Miss.   451 
Alston  V.   Alston,   114   Iowa   29 

V.   Alston.   4    S.    Car.    116 
Altgelt   V.    Mernitz,    37   Tex.    Civ.   App. 

397  364 

Altringer  v.   Capeheart,  68  Mo.   441  278 

Altschul  V.   O'Neill,   35   Ore.   202  75 

Alvis  V.  Morrison,  63  111.   181  138 


504 
321 
618 
719 
138 


XXI 11 


XXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


A.    L.   &   E.    F.   Goss   Co.   v.   Greenlcaf, 

98  Maine  436  536 
American   Cannel   Coal   Co.   v.   Clemens, 

132    Ind.    163  451 
Anieric.in  Dramatic  Fund  Assn.  v.  Lett, 

42    N.   J.    Eq.    43  481 
American    Freehold   Land   Mortgage   Co. 

V.    Turner,    95    Ala.    272  408 
American   Ins.  Co.   v.  Gibson,   104   Ind. 

336  562 
American  Inv.  Co.  v.  Beadle,  5  S.  Dak. 

410  633 
American  Land  Co.  v.  Zeiss,  219  U.  S. 

47  962 
American  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hill,  92  Ga. 

297  567 

V.  Hopper,  56  Fed.  67  192 
American  Sav.  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Hel- 

gesen,    64    Wash.    54  421 
American   Trust    Inv.    Co.    v.    Nashville 
Abstract  Co.    (Tenn.),   39   S.   W.   877 

5,  16 

Ames  V.  Ames,  46  Ind.  App.  597  393 

V.  Holmes,    190    111.    561  714 

V.   Miller,  65   Ncbr.  204  119 

V.   Norman,  4   Sneed    (Tenn.)    683  321 

Ammidown    v.    Ball,    8    Allen    (Mass.) 

293  290 

Amos  V.  Amos,  117  Ind.  37  727 

Amsden  v.  Atwood,  67  Vt.  289  53 

Amy  v.  Amy.  12  Utah  278                 708,  717 

Amy,  In  re,  12  Utah  278  730 
Anderson    v.    Baughman,    7    Mich.    69 

120,  297 
V.  Burnham,  52  Kans.  454 

688,  689,  698 

V.  Cary,  36  Ohio  St.  506  47 
V.  Cascv-Swasey      Co.      (Tex.      Civ. 

App.),   120  S.  W.  918  348 

V.  Culbert,    55    Iowa   233  431 

V.  Culver,   63   Hun    (N.   Y.)    633  429 

V.   Messinger,   146   Fed.   929  468 

V.   Northrop,   30   Fla.    612  341 

V.  Pemberton,  89  Mo.   61  677 

V.  Post  (Tenn.),  38  S.  VV.  283     633,  639 

V.  Spriestersbach,    69    Wash.    393  22 

v.   Strassburger,   92   Cal.    38  35 

V.  Thompson,   3   Ariz.    62  447 

V.   Tydings,    8    Md.    427  566 

V.  Yoakum.   94   Cal.   227  301 

Andrews  v.  Andrews,  8  Conn.   79  65 

V.   Burdick,   62   Iowa  714  534 

v.  Cone,    124   U.    S.    720  417 

v.   Powers,   35   Wis.   644  439 

v.   Spurlin     35    Ind.    262  48 

Angus   v.    Noble,   73   Conn.    56  470 

Ankeny  v.  Clark,   148  U.   S.  345  74 

Anson    v.    Stein,    6    Iowa    150  714 

Anthony  v.  Anthony,  55  Conn.  256  466 

v.   Anthony,   161   Mass.   343  429 

Appeal    of    Alden,    In    re,    93    Pa.    St. 

182  63 

Baily,  In  re,  32  Pa.  St.  40  583 

Barnett,  In  re,  46  Pa.   St.   392  58 

Bickel,   In   re,  86  Pa.   St.   204  318 

Campbell,   64   Conn.   277  741 

Clark,  In  re,  70  Conn.  195     58,  456,  584 

Clarke,   In   re,   79  Pa.   St.   376  64 

Churchman,  In  re,  9  Sad.   (Pa.)  423  466 

Deake,    In    re,    80    Maine    50  456 

De  Haven,  In  re,  38  Pa.  St.  373  349 

Dickinson,    In    re,   42   Conn.   491  719 

Doeblcr,   In   re,  64   Pa.   St.  9  47 

Dutch,    In   re,    57    Pa.    St.   461  737 

Ferguson,   In   re,    117    Pa.    St.   426  241 
Francis,   In   re,   96   Pa.    St.   200           .     61 

Grid,  In  re,  7  Sad.    (Pa.)    137  535 

Groves,  In  re,  68  Pa.   St.  143  676 


Appeal  of 

Gunn,  In  re,  55  Conn.  149  419 

Hacker,  In  re,  121  Pa.  192  281 

Hayes,  In  re,  123  Pa.  St.  110  654 

Ileil,  In  re,  40  Pa.  St.  453  582 

Hutchinson,  In  re,  92  Pa.  St.  186  580 

Lr.ch,  In  re,  44  Pa.  St.  519  121 

McCur.ly,  In  re,  65  Pa.  St.  290  674 

Neil,  In  re,  92  Pa.  St.  193  719 

Obe-.holtzer,  In  re,  124  Pa.  St.  583 

Opdyke,  In  re,  49  Pa.  St.  373  719 

Persons,  In  re,  74  Pa.  St.   121       87,  737 

Powers,  In  re,  63  Pa.   St.  443  737 

Kankin,  In  re,  1  Monag  (Pa.)  308  667 

TUiff,   In  re,   124   Pa.   St.    145  463 

Ridgway,  In  re,   15   Pa.   St.   177  581 

Russell,   In   re,   15   Pa.   St.   319  119 

Tappan,  In  re,  52  Conn.   412  474 

Thompson.  In  re.  101  Pa.  St.  225  313 

Varncr,  In   re,  80  Pa.   St.   140  59 

Waltemate,   In  re,  86  Pa.   St.   219  719 

Woodcock,   In    re,    103    Maine   214  466 

Woods,  In  re,  82  Pa.  St.  116       117,  122 

Apcl    V.    Kelsey,    47    Ark.    413            360,  596 

Apperson  v.   Bolton,  29   Ark.  418  456 

Apple   V.    Apple,    38   Tenn.    348  86 

Applegarth  v.   Wagner,  86  Md.  468  374 

Arbour  v.   Nettles,   12  La.  Ann.  217  197 

Armington   v.   Armington,   28  Ind.    74  730 

Arms  V.    Burt,    1   Vt.    303  45 

Armstrong  v.   McCoy,  8  Ohio   128  346 

V.  Stovall,   26   Miss.   275  280 

V.  McLaughlin.  49   Ind.   370  618 

V.  Mudd,   10  P..   Mon.    (Ky.)    144  297 

V.  Vroman,    11    Minn.    220  621 

V.  Wilson    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   109  S. 

W.   955  429 
Armstrong's  Estate,  In  re,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

166  487 

Arndt  v.  Griggs,  134  U.  S.  316         652,  962 

Arneson  v.   Spawn.  2   S.   Dak.  269  147 

Arnold   v.   Alden,    173   111.   229  466 

V.   Lincoln,   8   R.    I.    384  46 

v.  Patrick,  6  Paige  ch.   (N.  Y.)   310  516 

119 


V.   Stevenson,    2    Nev.    234 
Arrington    v.    Arrington,    114    N.    Car. 


151 


Arthur  v.   Screven,  39  S.  Car. 

V.  Weston,    22    Mo.    378 
Ashby    V.    McKinlock,    271    111. 


77 


128,  545 
120 
328 
254 

46.  464,  469 
Ashcroft  V.   Eastern  R.  Co.,   126  Mass. 

196  61,  275,  506 

Ashe   V.   Yungst,   65   Tex.    631  66 

Asheville  Division  v.  Aston,  92  N.  Car. 

578  263,  329 

Ashhurst  v.  McKinzie,  92  Ala.  484  651 

Aspen  v.   Rucker,   10  Colo.   184     .  215 

Astor  V.  Wells,  4  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  466  124 
Atcheson  v.  Broadhead,  56  Ala.  414  420 
Atchinson    Sav.    Bank    v.    Wheeler,    20 

Kans.   625  66 

Atchison  v.  Atchison,  89  Ky.  488  712 

Atherton  v.  Essex  Junction,  83  Vt.  218     631 
v.   Fowler,  96  U.   S.  513  196 

Atkin   v.    Merrell,    39    111.    62  65 

Atkins  V.   Atkins,    18   Nebr.   474  325 

Atkinson  v.   Miller,  34   W.  Va.    115         417 
Atlanta    Nat.    Bldg.    &    Loan    Assn. 
Gilmer,    128   Fed.   293 


Atlanta   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Atlanta   &c.    R. 
Co.,    125   Ga.    529 
v.  McHan,   110  Ga.   543 
V.  McKinney,    124   Ga.   929 
Atmore   v.    Walker,    46    Fed.    429 
Atteberry   v.    Blair,   244   111.   363 
Attorney-General    v.     Delaware    &c.     R. 
Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  631 


434 

240 
51 
93 

473 

5 

214 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXV 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


203, 


Attwater  v.  Attwater,   18   Beav.   330 
Atvvood  V.  Arnold,  23   R.  I.   609 

V.  Beck,    21    Ala.    590 
Aucker   v.    McCoy,    56   Cal.    524 
Aukam  v.   Zantzinger,   94  Md.  421 
Aumiller  v.   Dash,   51   Wash.   520 
Austin   V.   Austin,    SO   Maine   74 

V.   Bailey,    37    Vt.    219 

V.   Barnum,    52    Minn.    136 

V.   Bristol,    40   Conn.    120 

V.  Brown,  37  W.   Va.   634 

V.   Chambers,    33    Okla.    40 

V.  Clifford,   24   Wash.    172 

V.   Davis,    128    Ind.    472 

V.  Dolbee,    101    Mich.    292 
Avery  v.   Everett,   110   N.   Y.   317 

V.   Dufrees,    9    Ohio    145 

V.   Stewart.    136    N.    Car.    426 
Axman  v.  Smith,  156  Mo.  286 
Ayer  v.   Philadelphia  &  Boston   B.   Co., 
159  Mass.  84  97, 

Ayers   v.    Hays,   60   Ind.   452 

V.   Reidel,    84    Wis.    276 

V.  Roper,  111  Ala.  651  600, 

V.  Watson,   113   U.   S.   594 
Ayling  v.    Kramer,    133   Mass.    12 
Ayres  v.   United  States,  42  Ct.  CI.   (U. 
S.)    385 

B 


Baart   v.   Martin,   99   Minn.    197 

955,  956,  957 


57, 


47 
620 
722 

66 
595 

54 
675 
723 

77 
476 
695 
359 

66 
401 
270 
706 
722 

59 
441 

316 
439 

687 
623 
272 
313 

200 


Babbitt  V.  Day,  41   N.  J.   Eq.   392 
Babcock   v.    Wilson,    17    Maine    372 


65 
398 


Bachop   v.    Critchlow,    142    Pa.    St.    518  228 

Bacon   v.   McBride,   32   Vt.    585  719 

V.  Thornton,    16  Utah    138  736 
V.  Van    Schoonhoven,    19    Hun    (N. 

Y.)     158  443 
V.  Woodward,      12      Cray      (Mass.) 

376  46 

Bacon's  Estate,  In  re.  202  Pa.  535  714 

Bader  v.   Dyer,   106  Iowa   715  696 

Bagley  v.  Kennedy,  85  Ga.  703  668 

V.   Ward,    37    Cal.    121  615 
Bagnell   v.    Broderick,    13   Pet.    (U.   S.) 

436  220 

Bailey  v.   Bailey,   25   Mich.    185  707 
V.  Block    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    125    S. 

W.    955  611 

V.  Butler,    138   Ala.    153  426 

V.  Galpin,  40  Minn.  319  120 

V.  Gilliland,  2  Kans.  App.   558  437 

V.  Myrick,   50  Maine   171  118 

v.  Rinker,    146   Ind.    129  359 

V.  Ross,    32    N.    J.    Eq.    544  711 

V.   Sanger,    108    Ind.    264  461 

Baily's  Appeal,   In   re,   32   Pa.   St.   40  583 

Bains  V.   Bullock,    129   Mo.    117  321 

Baker  v.   Baker,   8   Gray    (Mass.)    101  713 

V.  Baker,   239   111.    82  283 

V.  Bliss,    39    N.    Y.    70  127 

V.  Bourne,    127    Ind.    466               87,  710 

V.  Central  Nat.  Bank,  86  Kans.  293  443 

V.  Griffin,   50   Miss.   158  433 

v..  Heiskell,  1  Coldw.   (Tenn.)   641  728 

V.  Lee,  49  La.  Ann.  874  121 

V.  Mattocks,   Ouincy    (Mass.)    69  48 

V.  Mott,    78   Hun    (N.   Y.)    141  54 

V.  Scott,    62    111.    86  465 

V.  Stewart,  40  Kans.   442  321 

V.   Woodward,    12   Ore.   3  306 
Baker's    Appeal,    In    re,    107    Pa.    St. 

381  487 

Balch  V.  Arnold,  9  Wyo.   17  99 

V.  Johnson,    106   Tenn.    249  718 

V.  Stone,    149    Mass.    39  87 


Baldridge  v.   Cook,  27  Tex.   565  400 

Baldwin  v.   Bean,  59  Maine  481  46 

V.   Hewett,   88   Ky.   673  636 

V.    Jenkins,   23    Miss.    206  421 

v.  "Keith,    13    Okla.    624  201 

V.  Ratliff,    125    111.    376  73 

v.  Taylor,    166   Pa.    St.    507  62 

Balkema  v.  Searle,  116  Iowa  374  27 

Balkum  v.  Wood,  58  Ala.  642  431 

Ball  V.   Belden,   59  Tex.   Civ.  App.   29       399 


V.   Chadwick,    46    111.    28 


V.   First   Nat.    Bank,   80   Ky.    501 


309,  370 


597 


V.   Phelan,   94   Miss.   293  459 

V.  Tompkins,  41   Fed.  486  480 

Ballard  v.  Caniplin,   161   Ind.   16       709,  734 

V.   Carmichael,    83    Tex.    355  262 

V.   Child,    46    Maine    152  312 

V.  Hunter,   204   U.    S.    241  962 

V.  Ross.    38   Wash.    209  527 

V.  Ward,   89   Pa.   St.   358  718 

Ball,    In   re,    153    Wis.    27  457 

Ballou  V.  Bergvendsen,  9  N.  Dak.  285         27 

Baltimore  v.   Chester,   53   Vt.   315  706 

V.   Fear,    82    Md.    246  244 

V.  Williams,  6  Md.   235  127 

Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Algire,  63  Md. 

319  62 

V.  Berkeley    &c.    R.    Co.,    168    Fed. 

770  417 

V.   Brubaker,    217    111.    462  119 

V.   Patterson,    68    Md.    606  44 

V.  West,   57   Ohio   St.    161  S3 

Banbury  v.   Sherin,  4  S.   Dak.   88  53 

Bancroft  v.   Cambridge,   126  Mass.  438        72 

Banes   v.   Finney,   209   Pa.    191  730 

Banker  v.  Caldwell,  3  Minn.  94 

1,  3,  9,  10,  36 
Bank   of    Ada    v.    Gullikson,    64    Minn. 

91  287 

Bank  of  America  v.   Banks,    101    L^.    S. 

240  99 

Bank  of  Dillon  v.   Murchison,   213   Fed. 


147 


378 


Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Haggin,   1   A.   K 

Marsh.    (Ky.)    306 
Bank  of  Lemoore  v.   Fulgham,  151  Cal 

234 
Bank  of  Mobile  v.  Dunn,  67  Ala.  381 
Bank  of  Suisun  v.   Stark,   106  Cal.  202 
Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Benning,  4  Cr.  C.  C 
81 
V.  Housman,  6  Paige  (N.  Y.)   526 
Banks  v.  Amnion,  27  Pa.  St.  172 
V.  Lee,   73   Ga.   25 
V.   Speers,   97   Ala.    560 
Bank's    Will,    In    re,    87    Md.    425 
Bantley  v.   Finney,  43  Nebr.  794 
Banton   v.   Shorey,   77   Maine  48 
Banzer  v.   Banzer,   156   N.   Y.   429 
Barasch   v.    Kramer,   62    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

475 
Barbe  v.   Hyatt,   50  Kans.   86 
Barber  v.  Barber,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.)   72 
v.  Brundage,  50  App.   Div.    (N.  Y.) 

123 
V.  Brundage,   169  N.   Y.  368 
V.   Crowell,    55    Nebr.    571 
V.   Morris,  37  Minn.    194 
v.  Pittsburg  &c.    R.   Co.,    166   U.    S. 

83 
V.  Robinson,    78   Minn.    193 
v.   Rorabeck,    36   Mich.    399 
V.  Taylor.   9   Dana    (Kv.)    84 
V.   Williams,    74   Ala.    331 
Barber   Asphalt   Pav.    Co.   v.   Hezel,    155 

Mo.   391  647 

Barbieri  v.  Messner,  106  Minn.  102  100 


122 

641 

375 

54 


99 

318 
120 
262 
451,  723 
469 
509 
433 
326 


550 

66 

359 

87 
728 
416 
662 

466 
688 

66 
737 

67 


XXVI 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[Rcfcrotccs  arc  to  Sections.] 


Barbour  v.   Nichols,  3  R.   I.   187  125 

V.  Tompkins,  58  W.  Va.  572  575 

Barclay  v.  Cameron,  25  Tex.  232  714 

V.   Piatt,   170   111.   384  468 

Barden  v.  Grace,   167  Ala.  453  263 

Bardsley  v.  Hines,  33  Iowa  157  661 

Barke  v.    Early,   72   Iowa   273  633 

Barkenthein    v.    People,    77    Misc.  (N. 

Y.)    395  956 

Barker  v.  Flood,  103  Mass.  474  428 

V.   Harvey,    181    U.    S.    481  189,  214 

V.  Muehler,   55   Wash.    411  641 

V.   Pearce,   30    Pa.    St.    173  721 

Barksdale    v.    Capital    City    Realty  Co., 

88   Miss.   623  59 

Barlow   V.    WainwriRht.   22   Vt.   88  53 

Barnard  v.  Bailey.  2  Har.  (Del.)  56  47 

V.   Barnard,    119    III.    92  718 

V.   Brown,   112   Mich.   452  77 

V.  Duncan,  38   Mo.    170  355 

V.   Gantz,    140    N.    Y.    249  281 

Barnard  &  Leas  Mfg.  Co.  v.   Smith,   77 

Ark.   590  516 

Barnes  v.  Allen,  25  Ind.  222  718,  737 

V.  Boardman,   149  Mass.   106  437 

V.  Henshaw,  226  III.  605  591 

V.  Long  Island  Real  Estate  &c.  Co., 

88  App.   Div.   (N.  Y.)   83  438 

V.  Loyd,  37  Ind.  523  708 

V.  Marshall,   102  Mich.  248  480 

V.  Morris,  39  N.  Car.  22  594 

Barnes'  Estate,  In  re,  47  Okla.   117  724 

Barnett  v.   Barnett,   104   Cal.   298  48 

V.   Barnett,   9   N.   Mex.   205  676 

V.  Gaines,   8  Ala.   373  34 

V.  Wheeler,  7  M.  &  W.  363  34 

Barnett's  Appeal.  In  re,  46  Pa.  St.  392       58 

Barnewall  v.   Murrell,   108  Ala.   366  487 

Barney  v.  Dolph,  97  U.  S.  652  202 

V.  Havs,    11    Mont.    571  455,  487 

V.  Kebkuk,  94  U.   S.   324  104 

V.   Lincoln    Park,    203    111.    397  62,  317 

V.  Little,    15    Iowa    527  120 

V.   McCarty,    15    Iowa    510  132 

Barnhizel  v.  Ferrell,  47  Ind.  335  718 

Barnitz    v.    Casey,    7    Cranch    (U.    S.) 

456  725 

Barnum  v.  Barnum,  42  Md.  241  718,  719 

V.  Barnum,   119  Mo.   63  708 

V.  Le   Master,   110  Tenn.   638  320 

Barr  v.   Gardner,  259   111.   256  721 

V.   Schroeder,  32  Cal.   609  106 

Barre  v.   Perry,  82  Vt.  301  501 

Barrett  v.   Cox,   112   Mich.   220  51 

V.   Furnish,    21    Ore.    17  618 

V.   Hinkley,    124    111.    32  429 

V.   Lewis,   106   Ind.    120  530 

V.  Prentiss,   57   Vt.  297  132 

Barrett's  Will.  In   re.  111   Iowa   570  46 

Barringer   v.    Davis    (Iowa),   112   N.   W. 

208  228 

V.  Ryder.   119  Iowa   121  671 

Barron    v.    Barron,    122    Ala.    194  437,  439 

Barrow  v.   Baughman,   9  Mich.   213  120 
Barry  v.  Adams,  3  Allen   (Mass.)   493       314 

Barson  v.   Mulligan,   191   N.   Y.  306  91 

Barth   V.    Backus,   140   N.   Y.   230  376 

Barthell  v.  Syverson,  54  Iowa  160  426 
Bartholomew   v.    West,   2    Dill    (U.    S.) 

290  66 

Eartlett  v.  Bangor,  67  Maine  460  317 
V.  Blanton,    4    J.    T.    Marsh.     (Ky.) 

426  287 

Barton  v.   King.  41   Miss.  288  458 

Eascomhe    v.    Marshall,    129    App.  Div. 

(X.  Y.)   516  578 

Bass   V.    Estill,   50  Miss.   300  120,  283 

Bassett  v.   Bassett,   55   Maine   125  318 


Batchelder  v.   Dean,   16  N.  H.  265  50 

Batchelor  v.  Brereton,  112  U.  S.  396        262 

Hateman,   In   re,    11    R.   I.   585  324 

Bateman,   Petitioner,    11   R.   I.   585  284 

Bates  V.  Brown,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  710  87 

V.  Coe,    10  Conn.   280  371 

V.  Cotton,    32    Miss.    266  717 

V.   Foster,    59    Maine   157  301 

V.  Gillett,   132   111.   287  713,  717 

V.   Herron,    35   Ala.    117  192,   195 

V.  Shrader,   13   Johns.   (N.  Y.)   260      709 

V.   Sparrell,    10    Mass.    323  40 

Bates  Mach.   Co.,   In  re.  91   Fed.   625       379 

Batjer    v.    Roberts    (Tex.     Civ.     App.), 

148   S.    W.    841  674 

Battery    Park    Bank    v.    Loughran,    122 

N.   Car.   668  400 

Batty   v.    Fout,    54    Ind.   482  19,  24 

Bauer  v.   Glas,  244    III.   627  29 

V.  Word.    135    Ala.    430  570 

Baum  V.   Birchall,    150  Pa.   St.   164  395 

Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548  119 

Baxter  v.  Cradburv.  20  Maine  260  91 

Bay   V.   Posner,   78   Md.   42  263,  422 

V.   Posner    (Md.),   29   Atl.    11  99 

Beach  v.  Cooke,  28  N.  Y.  508        443 

V.  Osborne,  74  Conn.  405         433 

V.  Shaw,  57  111.  17  446 

Beal   V.    Blair,   33    Iowa   318  357 

V.   Gordon,   55   Maine  482  692 

V.   Harrinston,    116    111.    113  530 

Beaman  v.  Whitnev,  20  Maine  413  328 

Bean  v.  Atkins   (Vt.),  89  Atl.  643  475 

V.   Bean,    163    Mich.    379  61 

V.  Kenmuir,    86    Mo.    666  45 

V.  People,    7    Colo.    200  137 

Beard   v.   Allen,   141    Ind.    243  646 

V.  Mosely,   30  Ark.    517  708 

Beard's  Succession,   14  La.  Ann.   121         487 

Beardslee  v.  Beardslee,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

324  65 

Beardsley   v.   Knight,    10   Vt.    185  327 

Be.-ir    Lake   County   v.    Budge,    9    Idaho 

703  576 

Bear  Lake  River  W^aterworks  &  Irr.  Co. 

V.   Garland.   164  U.    S.    1  432 

Beaslcy   v.    Phillins,   20    Ind.    App.    185     304 

Beattie   v.    Crewdson,    124   Cal.    577  434 

V.   Dickinson.    39    Ark.    205  392 

V.   National   Bank.    174   III.    571  581 

V.   Whipple,    154   111.   273  138 

Beatty  v.   OTIarrow,  49  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

404  645 

Beaver  v.   Frick  Co..   S3   Ark.    18  124 

V.  Ross,   140  Iowa  154  484 

Bechtel   v.   Wier,    152   Cal.   443  591 

Becker  v.  Church,   115   N.  Y.  562  314 

Beckett  V.  Cuenin,  15  Colo.  281  661 

v.  Selover.    7    Cal.    215  360,  723 

Beckwith  v.   Beckwith.  61  Mich.  315  65 

Beebee  v.  Griffing.  14  N.  Y.  235  730 

Beechwood    Park    Land   Co.   v.    Summit, 

78  N.   1.  L.  182  677 

Beeman    v.    Beeman,   88    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

14  59 

Beers  v.   Narramore,  61   Conn.   13  720 

Beidleman  v.  Koch,  42  Ind.  App.  423       418 
Belcher  v.   Chambers,    53   Cal.   635  652 

Balding  v.  Texas  Produce  Co.,  61  Ark. 
377  53 

Belford  v.  Crane,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  265           623 

Belknap  v.   Sealev,  14  N.  Y.   143  257 

Bell  v.  Bell,  84  Ala.  64  66 

V.  Chandler.  23   Ga.   356  611 

V.  Dozicr,   12   N.   Car.   333  708 

V.  Duncan.    11    Ohio    192  224,  753 

V.  McDuffie,   71   Ga.   264  267,  394 

V.  Ohio  R.   Co.,  25   Pa.    St.  161             63 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XX  VU 


[References  are  to  Seclions."] 


Bell 


V.  Pelt,    51    Ark.   433  417 

V.  Redd.    133    Ga.    5  272 

V.   Watkins,    104    Ga.    345  473 

V.   Woodward,  46   N.   H.   315  270 
Bellas  V.   Lloyds,  2  Watts   (Pa.)   401 

125,  433 
Bell  County  v.  Felts   (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

120  S.  W.   1065  611 
Bell   County   Land  &  Coal  Co.  v.  Hen- 

drickson,   24   Ky.   L.   371  240 
Bellfountain   Imp.  Co.  v.   Niedringhaus, 

181  111.  426  272 

Bell,  In  re,   34  N.  Y.   S.   191  730 

Bellows    V.    Cheek,    20   Ark.    424  400 

V.   Litchfield,   81    Iowa   36  636 

V.   McGinnis,   17   Ind.   64  360 

Belo  V.   Mayes,  79  Mo.  67  324 

Belton  V.   Summer,   31   Fla.   139  492 

Bemis   v.    Plato,    119   Iowa    127  638 
Bender    v.    Brooks,    61    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

464  100 

Benedict  v.   Beurmann,  90  Mich.   396  87 

Benham  v.  Potter,   52  Conn.  248  503 

Beniost  v.   Rothschild,   145   Mo.   399  696 
Benjamin  v.   Cavaroc,  2  Woods   (U.  S.) 

168  447 
Bennett  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  R.  Co., 

126   Ga.   411  108 

V.   Davis,   90   Maine   457  279 

V.   Harms,    51    Wis.    251  325 

V.  Kovarick,  23   Misc.    (N.  Y.)    73  687 

V.   Littlefield,    177    Mass.    294  59 

V.  Packer,   70  Conn.   357  477 

V.   Robinson,   27    Mich.    26  52 
V.   United    States    Land    &c.    Co.,    16 

Ariz.    138  674 

Benson   v.    Morrow,   61   Mo.   352        103,  104 

V.   Shotwell.   87    Cal.   49  6,  26 

v.  Swan,    60   Maine    160  87 

Benson's    Estate,    In    re,    169    Pa.    St. 

602  481 
Bent  V.  Maxwell  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  N.  Mex. 

(Gild.)    227  654 

V.   St.   Vrain,  30  Mo.   268  719 

V.  Thompson,  5   N.   Mex.  408  491 

Bentley  v.   Cavallier,   121   La.   60  640 

V.   Deforest,   2   Ohio   221  309 
V.   Napier     (Ky.    App.),    122    S.    W. 

180  272 

Benton  v.  Sentell,  50  La.  Ann.  869  99 

V.   Shafer,    47    Ohio    St.    117  548 

V.  Williams,    202    Mass.    189  52 

Bent's  Appeal,  35   Conn.    523  492 

Beranek    v.    Beranek,    113    Wis.    272  66 

Bercaw  v.  Cockerill,  20  Ohio  St.   163  122 

Bergen  v.   State,   58  Miss.   623  563 

Beringer  v.  Lutz,  188  Pa.  St.  364  74 

Bernier  v.  Bernier,  147  U.  S.  243  157 

Bernstein  v.  Humes,  71  Ala.  260       420,  692 

Berry    v.    Billings,   44    Maine    416        45,  312 

V.   Boggess,    62   Tex.    239  392 

v.  Potter,   52  N.   J.   Eq.  664  62 

v.  Reed,   73   Ind."  235  563 

v.  Seawall,   65    Fed.   742  327 

Bertles  v.  Nunan,  92  N.  Y.  152      _  321 

Bethany    Hospital    Co.    v.    Philippi,    82 

Kans.    64  665 

Bethell  v.  Bethell,  54  Ind.  428  724 

Betsey  v.  Torrance,  34  Miss.   132  314 

Bettison   v.    Budd,    17    Ark.    5 •16  346 

Betts  v.   Letcher.   1   S.   Dak.    182  687 

Belz  V.  MulHn,  62  Ala.  365  123 

v.   Snvder,  48  Ohio  St.  492  122 

Beverly  v.   Waller,   115   Kv.   596  620 

Bickel's  Appeal,   In   re,  86  Pa.   St.  204  318 

Bicknell   v.   Comstock,   113   U.   S.   149  226 

Bidleman  v.  Brooks,  28  Cal.   72  644 


Biddle  v.  Ramsey,  52  Mo.   153  667 

Bieber  v.    Porter,   242   111.    616  669,  678 

Biedler   v.    Biedler,    87    Va.    300  462 

Bigelow   V.    Blake,    18    Wis.    520  195 

v.   Brewer,    29    Wash.    670  546 

V.   Morong,    103    Mass.    287  712 

V.  Topliff,  25  Vt.   273  122 

Bigley  v.  Jones,   114  Pa.  St.   510  128 

Biles  v.   O.   &   G.   H.   R.   Co.,   5   Wash. 

509  275 

Bill  V.   Payne,  62   Conn.   140  471,  483 

Billings   V.    Head,    184    Ind.    361  718 

V.   Kothe,   49   Iowa   34  652 

V.  Parsons,   17   Utah  22  372 

Billingsley  v.  Bates,  30  Ala.  376  147 

Bills  V.    Bills,   80   Iowa   269  472 

Bingham   v.    Salene,    15    Ore.   208  63 

Bingham's   Appeal,   64   Pa.    St.   345  456 

Binns  v.   Dazey,   147   Ind.   536  719 

Bird  V.   Burgsteiner,   100  Ga.   486  615 

V.  Gilliam,    125   N.   Car.   76  547 

Birge  v.   Bock,  44  Mo.  App.  69  75 

Birnie   v.    Main,   29    Ark.    591  430 

Biscoe  V.  Coulter,   18  Ark.  423  633 

Bishop  V.  Cook,  13  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   326      11? 

V.   Hampton,  11  Ala.  254  721 

V.   O'Conner,    69    III.    431  364,  592 

V.  Rider,   31   Ohio  C.  C.   332  729 

V.   Schneider,   46   Mo.   472 

120,   122,   132 
V.  Woodward,  103  Ga.  281  675 

Bismark  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Bol- 
ster, 92  Pa.  St.   123  566 
Bissell  v.   Foss,   114  U.   S.   252  638 
Bisson  V.  West  Shore  R.  Co.,  143  N.  Y. 

125  710 

Bivings  V.   Gosnell,.   133   N.   Car.   574       124 
Bixby   V.   Smith,  49   How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.) 

50  661 

Bjmerland  v.   Elev,  15  Wash.   101  583 

Black    V.    Cartmell,    10    B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

188  719 

V.   Cartmell,   49   Ky.   188  714 

V.   Elkhorn     Mining     Co.,     49     Fed. 

549  63 

V.  Hills,    36    111.    Z76  119 

V.   Sharkey,    104    Cal.    279  286 

V.   Skinner  Mfg.   Co.,  53   Fla.   1090        124 
V.  Tennessee   Coal   &c.   Co.,   93   Ala. 

109  73 

Blackborough  v.  Davis,  1  P.  Wms.  41         86 
Blackburn   v.   Nelson,   100   Cal.   336  272 

Blacklaws   v.    INIilne,   82   111.    505  717 

Blackman  v.  Preston,  123  111.  381  311 

V.  Wadworth,   65    Iowa   80  734 

v.   Wright.    96    Iowa    541  584 

Blacksher    Co.    v.     Northrup,    176    Ala. 

190  456 

Blackstone     Bank    v.     Davis,     21     Pick. 

(Mass.)    42  47 

Blackwell    v.     Blackwell,     124     N.     Car. 

269  291 

Blaine    County   v.    Brewster,    32    Nebr. 

264  109 

Elalr   v.   Blair,   82   Kans.   464  473 

V.  Whitaker,  31  Ind.  App.   664  125 

Blaisdell  v.   Portsmouth  &c.  R.   Co.,   51 

N.   H.  483  62 

Blake  v.    Blake,  85    Ind.    65  710 

V.   Fash,    44    111.    302  265 

V.   Tones,    7    Mass.    28  663 

Blake's  Estate.  In  re,  134  Pa.  St.  240       473 
Blalock  V.   Miland,  87  Ga.   573  282 

Blanchard    v.    Floyd,    93    Ala.    53     263,   328 
Blanton   v.    Nunley,    55    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

477  640 

Blatchley  v.  Osborn,  33  Conn.   226  127 


XXVI 11 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[Rcfcmiccs  arc  to  Sections.] 


Fitts,    47    Tex.    Civ.    App. 


Hennion,    23     N.    J.     Eq. 


Vt.   27 
&    St.    P. 


C.) 

75, 


R. 


Bledsoe 

578 
Bltccker 

\2i 
Blinn  V.   Schwartz,   177   N.   Y.   252 
r.liss   V.   Titirick,   25   S.    Dak.    533 
Bloch    V.    Ryan,    4    App.    Cas.    (D. 

283 
niodget    V.    Brinsmaid,    9 
Blodgett    V.    Sioux    City 

Co.,   63    Iowa   606 
Elondeau  v.   Sheridan.  81   Mo.   545 
r.Iood  V.   Blood,   23   Pick.    (Mass.)   8 

V.  Light,   38   Cal.   649 
Bloom  V.    \'an   Rensselaer,   15   111.    503 
Blose   V.    Bear.   87    Va.    177 
Blount   V.    Walker,    31    S.    Car.    13 
Bludworth  v.  Lake,  35  Cal.  255 

V.  Poole.   21   Tex.   Civ.   App.   551 
Blum   V.    Robertson,   24   Cal.    127 
Bhinie  v.  White,   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Ill 

S.   W.    1066 
Blumenthal    v.    Brainard,    38   Vt.   402 
Blythe  v.   Ayres.   96  Cal.   532 
Boal   V.    King,   6   Ohio    11 
Board    of    Education    v.    Berry,    62    W. 

Va.  433 
Boa-d    of    Health    v.    Van    Hoesen,    87 

Mich.   533 
Board  of  Regents  v.  Linscott,  30  Kans. 

240 
Boas  V.  Farrington,  85  Cal.  535 
Boatman  v.  Lasley,  23()hio  St.  614 
Boaz  V.    Swinney,   79   Kans.   332 
Bob!)  V.  Barnum,  59  Mo.  394 

262,  346, 
V.  Woodward,   42    Mo.    482 
Boden    V.    Mier,    71    Nebr.    191 
Bodine  v.   Arthur,   91    Ky.    53 

V.  Brown,    12    App.    Div.     (N. 

335 
V.  Wavne    Title     S:c.     Co.,     33 
Super.    Ct.    68 
Boe  V.   Filleul,   26  La.   Ann.   126 
Boehly   v.    Mansing,    52    Misc.    (N. 

382 
Boeing  v.   Owsley,  122  Minn.   190 
Bogan     v.     Edinburgh     American 

Mtg.  Co.,  63  Fed.  192 
Bogard  v.   Barhan,  52  Ore.   121 
Bogardus    v.    Trinity    Church,    4 

(N.    Y.)     178 
Boggan   v.    Somers,   152    N.    Car.    390 
Boggs  V.   Fowler,   16   Cal.    559 
Bohall  V.   Dilla,   114   U.   S.   47 
Bohlman    v.    Green    Bay    &c.    R.    Co., 

40   Wis.    157 
Boise     City     v.     Wilkinson,     16     Idaho 

150 
Bolard  V.  Mason,  66  Pa.   St.   138 
Bolin  V.   Bolin,  245   III.   613  735, 

Bolinger   v.    Beacham,   81    Kans.   746 
Bollcs   V.    Smith,   39   Conn.   217 
Boiling   V.    Tones,    67    Ala.    508  364., 

Bolton   V.    Branch,   22   Ark.   435 

V.  London  School  Board,  7  Ch.  Div. 

766 
V.  Roclnick,    77    Miss.    710 
Boltz   V.    Colsch,    134    Iowa    480 
Bonati  v.   Welsch,  24   N.   Y.    157 
Bonetti  v.  Treat,  91   Cal.  223 
Bonnell  v.   Holt,  89  111.   71 
Bonner    v.    Ware,    10    Ohio    465 
Bonney  v.   Morrill,   52  Maine   252 
Booker  v.  Tarwater,   138  Ind.   385 
Boone  v.   Armstrong.   87   Ind.    168 
Booraem    v.    North    Hudson   County    R. 

Co.,  40  N.  J.  Eq.   557 


45, 
Y.) 
712, 
Pa. 


Y.) 
393, 

Land 
183, 

Paige 


129, 

263, 
99, 


67 

307 
120 

77 
89 

27 
506 
120 
615 
442 
572 

58 
203 
351 
336 

283 
128 
719 
349 

592 

109 

642 
25 
61 

718 

360 
661 
737 
274 

714 

23 
90 

671 

724 

196 
270 

72 
268 
364 
196 

677 

192 
662 
737 

87 
471 
601 

26 


434 
687 
724 
408 
663 
222 
290 
714 
427 

317 


Booth  V.  Bradford,  114  Iowa  562  636 

V.  Clark.    17    How.    (U.    S.)    322  655 

V.  Hoskins,   75   Cal.   271  419 

V.   Opel,    244    111.    317  630 

V.   Phelps,  8  Wash.   549  36 

Bopp   V.    Fox,   63    II!.    540  65 

Borden  v.   Smith,  20  N.   Car.  27  616 

Borders  v.    Vance,    134   Ca.   85  622 

Boreel   v.   Lawton,  90   N.   Y.  293  278 

Borcham    v.    Byrne,    83    Cal.    23  66 

Borel  V.   Rollins,  30  Cal.   408  337 

Borgncr   v.   Brown,   133   Ind.   391  463 

Borst   V.   Simpson,  90  Ala.   373  54,  276 

Bosley    v.    Wyatt,    14    How.     (U.    S.) 

390  455 

Boss  V.  Jordan,   118  Iowa  204  546 

Boston    Safe   Deposit   &c.    Co.   v.    Stich, 

61    Kans.    474  46 

Boswcll  V.   Goodwin,  31   Conn.   74  127 

V.   Sharp,   15   Ohio  447  576 

Botsford  V.  O'Connor,  57  111.  72  721 

Bourke   v.    Boone,   94   Md.   472  460 

Bourn    v.    Robinson    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

107  S.  W.  873  562 

Bouton  V.   Doty,  69  Conn.   531  424 

Bovvden  v.   Bland,   S3   Ark.   53  289 

v.  Hadlev,    138    Iowa    711  620 

Bowen  v.   Beck,  94   N.   Y.   86  296 

V.  Chase,   94   U.    S.   812  58 

V.   John,    201    111.    292  42 

V.   Tulius.    141   Ind.   310  429 

V.   Swander,    121    Ind.    164  644 

Bower  v.  Cooper,  2  Hare   (Eng.)  408       395 

Bowers  v.   Johnson,  49   N.   Y.   432  436 

V.   Keesecker,    14    Towa    301  196 

V.   Pomeroy.    21    Ohio    St.    184  467 

Bowery  Nat.   Bank  v.  Duncan,   12  Hun 

(N.    Y.)    405  722 

Bowling  V.  Bowling  (Ky.  App.),  118  S. 

W.    923  350,  612 

V.  Breathitt   Coal   &c.    Co.,    134    Ky. 

249  669 

Bowman    v.    Officer   &   Pusev,    53    Iowa 

640  638 

Bowne  v.  Wolcott,  1  N.   Dak.  415,  497 

191,  192,  279 

Bowser  v.    Westcott,   145    N.   Car.    56       193 

Box   V.    Goodbar,    54   Ark.    6  373 

Box,   In  re,   11   Wash.    St.   90  595 

Boyce   v.    Danz,   29   Mich.    146  183 

V.  Grundy,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  210  673 

Boyd  V.   Boyd,   176  111.  40  696 

V.   Ellis,    11    Iowa    97  423 

V.  Ellis,   107   Mo.   394  646 

V.  Redd,   118   N.   Car.  680  98 

V.   Schlesingcr,   59   N.   Y.   301  639 

Boylan   v.    Warren,   39   Kans.    301  137 

Boyle   V.    John    Boyle   &   Co.,    136   App. 

Div.    (N.    Y.)    367  481 

Boynton  v.  Recs,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  329       434 
P>ozcman  v.   Bishop,  94  Ga.  459  49 

Bozza  V.  Rowe,  30  111.   198  595 

Brace  v.   Superior  Land  Co.,  65   Wash. 

681  430 

Bracken  v.   McAlvey,  83   Iowa  421  658 

Brackenridge   v.    Dawson,    7    Ind.    383        345 
Brackett  v.  Ridlon.  54  Maine  426  42 

Bracklee  Co.  v.  O'Connor,  67  Misc  (N. 

Y.)    599  382 

Bradfield    v.    Newby,    130    Ind.    59  564 

Bradford  v.  Anderson,  60  Nebr.   368  535 

V.   Durham.    54    Ore.    1  644 

Bradlee  v.  Whitney,   108  Pa.  St.   362  127 

Bradley   v.    Chester   Valley    R.    Co.,    36 

Pa.    St.    141  358 

V.  Dells  Lumber  Co.,  105  AVis.  245       229 
V.   Dike,    57    N.    T.    L.    471  526,  632 

V.  Merrill,  88  Maine  319  301,  417 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXIX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Bradley  ^_- 

V.  Richmond,   110  Va.   521  630 

V.   Slater,    50   Nebr.    682  53 

V.   Whilesides,    55    Minn.   455  336 

Bradshaw  v.   Bradburv,   64  Mo.  334  290 

V.   Edelen,  194  Mo.  640  220 

Bradt  v.   Hodgdon,  94  Maine  559  60 

Brady  v.   Johnson,   75   Md.   445  432 

V.   Kreuger,   8   S.    Dak.   464  66 

Brakken    v.    Minneapolis    &c.    R.    Co., 

29   Minn.   41  ^^     105 

"n<-amell  v.   Cole,   136  Mo.   201  472,  653 

Bramlett  v.  Roberts,  68  Miss.  325  99 

Branch   v.    Doane,    17    Conn.   402  50 

Brandies  v.   Atkins,   204   Mass.   471  70o 

Branham  v.  San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585 

106,  307 
Brannock    v.     Magoon,     141     Mo.     App. 

316  59 

Brannon   v.   Pringle,   94  Miss.   215  643 

Branson  v.   Studabaker,   133   Ind.    147       267 
V.   Yancy,    16   N.    Car.    77  67 

Brasfield  v.   Brasfleld,   96  Tenn.   580         322 
Brattle     Square     Church     v.     Grant,     3 

Gray    (Mass.)     142,    156  56,  475,  482 

Braun   v.    Mathieson,    139    Iowa    409 

192,  206,  225 

Bray  v.   Adams,   114   Mo.   486  346 

V.   Neill,    21    N.    J.    Eq.    343  602 

Brazee  v.   Schofield,   124  U.   S.  495  202 

Breaux  v.  Hanson  Lumber  Co.,  125  La. 

Ann.   421  100 

Breed   v.    Osborne,    113   Mass.    318     45,  274 
Breeden   v.    Moore,   82   S.   Car.    534  700 

Brega    v.    Dickey,    16    Grant's    Ch.    (N. 

Car.)   494  18 

Breg's  Estate,  In  re,  71  Minn.  11     710,  711 
Breit   V.    Yeaton,    101    III.    242  263 

Brem   v.    Lockhart,   93    N.   Car.    191  118 

Bremerton     Development    Co.     v.     Title 

Trust    Co.,    67    Wash.    268  15,  22 

Brewer   v.    Atkeison,    121    Ala.    410  439 

V.  Blougher,   14   Pet.   (U.   S.)    178 

87,  719 

V.   State,   59   Ala.    101  740 

V.  Watson,    71    Ala.    299  137 

Brewster  v.  Carnes,   103  N.  Y.  556  438 

V.  Ludekins,    19   Cal.    162  659 

V.   McCall,    15    Conn.    274  481 

Bridge  v.  Wellington,   1  Mass.   219  267 

Bridger  v.  Exchange  Bank,  126  Ga.  821 

545,  547 
Bridges  v.  Arnold,  37  Iowa  221  662 

V.   Linder,    60   Iowa    190  419 

Brier  v.  Traders'   Nat.   Bank,  24  Wash. 

695  562 

Briggs  V.   Greene,   10  R.   I.   495  719 

V.   Murray,    29    Wash.    245  100 

V.   Sncghan,    45    Ind.    14  659 

V.   Walker,    171    U.    S.    466  466 

Brigham  Citv  v.   Rich,  34  Utah   130  184 

Brigham   Young  Trust   Co.   v.   Wagner, 

12  Utah   1  100 

Bright  V.   Buckman,  39  Fed.   243 

120,  433,  551,  692 
Brighton   v.   White,    128    Ind.    320  651 

Briilhart  v.    Mish,   99   Md.  447  338 

Brinckerhoff    v.    Lansing,    4    Johns.    Ch. 

(N.   Y.I    65  125 

Bringhurst  v.   Orth,   7  Del.   Ch.   178  455 

Brinkman  v.  Jones,  44  Wis.   498        127,  692 

Bristol  V.   Atwater.   50  Conn.   402  469 

V.   Austin,    40   Conn.    438  708 

Broadwell  v.   Phillips,   30  Ohio   St.   255       99 

Brobst  V.  Brock,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.)   519       429 

Brock  V.   Frank,  51   Ala.  85  491.  492 

V.   Sav/ver.    39    N.    H.    547  479 

V.  State,   85   Ind.  397  719 


Brockenborough     v.     Melton,     55     Tex. 

493  117 

Brockway  v.   McClun,  243   111.    196  429 

Brodhead  v.   Reinbold,  200  Pa.   618  399 

Brodie   v.   Watkins,   31   Ark.    319  278 

Broemsen  v.  Agnic,  70  W.  Va.   106  671 

P.roliar  v.  Marquis,  80  Iowa  49  465 
Brombacher    v.    Berking,    56    N.    J.    Eq. 

251  470 

Brooke  v.  Gregg,  89  Md.  234  668 

Brookfield    v.    Goodrich,    32    111.    363  122 

Brookhaven   v.   Baggett,   61    Miss.   383  407 

Brooklin   St.,  In  re,   118  Pa.    St.   640  244 
Brooks    V.    Burlington    &    Southwestern 

R.   Co.,   101   U.    S.   443  535 

V.   Garner,    20    Okla.    236  638 

V.  Kearns,    86    111.    547  323 

V.   Rooney,   11   Ga.  423  346 

V.   Woods,   40   Ala.    538  675 

Brosnan  v.   Kramer,   135   Cal.   36  408 
Brower  v.   Hunt,   18  Ohio   St.   311 

87,  708,  722 

V.  Witmeyer,    121    Ind.    83  430 
Brown  v.  Addison  Gilbert  Hospital,  155 

Mass.    323                                     48,  464 

V.  Baraboo.    90    Wis.    151  89 

V.   Belmarde,  3  Kans.  41  719 
V.  Boston  &   M.   R.   Co.,   106   Maine 

248  671 

V.  Bragg,   22   Ind.   122  50 

V.  Brown,   41    Ala.    215  583 

V.   Brown,    101    Ind.   340  718 

V.   Brown,    103    Ind.    23  417 

V.   Brown,    133    Ind.    476  670 

V.   Brown,    86   Tenn.    277  652 

V.   Brown,   1   D.   Chip.    (Vt.)   360  730 

V.   Bryant,   17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  454  465 

V.  Combs,  29  N.  T.  L.  36  329 

V.  Covilland,  6  Cal.  566  398 
V.   Cranberry    Iron   &c.    Co.,   59    Fed. 

434  275 

V.  Critchell,   110  Ind.   31  724 

v.   Dickey,    106   Maine  97  281 

V.   Farran,    3    Ohio    140  283 

V.   Finlev,    157    Ala.    424  718 

V.   Henry,    106   Pa.    St.    262  443 

V.  Hitchcock,   173   U.   S.  473  207 

v.  Hooks,   133   Ga.   345  697 

V.   Kayser,    60    Wis.    1  51 

V.   Knapp,    54    Mich.    132  137 

V.  Kndpp,   79    N.    Y.    136  525 

V.   Lunt,    37    Maine    423  120 

V.   Manter,   21    N.    H.    528  267 

V.   Markham,    56    F!a.    202  52 

V.   Morrill,    91    Mich.    29  147 

V.  Morrisey,    124   N.   Car.   292  693 

V.   Norman,    65    Miss.    369  673 

V.   O'Brien,    168    Mass.    484  425 

V.  O'Connor,   1   Cal.   419  214 

V.   Oldham.    123    Mo.    621  699 

V.  Pforr,   38   Cal.   550  337 
V.  Reeder,    108    Md.    653               297,  338 

V.  Renshaw,    5'    Md.    67  60 

V.   Richards,    17   N.   J.    Eq.   32  65 

V.  Rodgers,    125    Mo.    392  48 
V.  Sims.    22    Ind.    App.    317        9,  16,  22 

V.   Smith,    83    HI.    291  52 

V.   Stark,   47    Mo.    App.    370  678 

V.   Steele,   23    Kans.   672  724 
V.  Tavlor,    62    Ind.    295                710,  737 

V.  Throckmorton,    11    111.    529  197 

v.  Trent,   36   Okla.   239  434 

V.  Veazie,  25   Maine  359  636 

V.  Webster,    87    Nebr.    788  723 

V.   Vv'haley,    58   Ohio    St.    654  708 
V.  Widen   (Iowa),  103   N.  W.   158 

7,  77 

V.  Wood,  17  Mass.  68  696 


XXX 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Browne     v.      Bowdolnham,     71      Maine 

144  317 

V.   Davis,    109    N.    Car.    23  443 

Brownell.   In   re,   60  Hun    (N.   Y.)    586  443 

Browning  v.    Harriss,   99   111.   456  431 

Brown,    In    re.    22   t)kla.    216  720 

Brownsville  v.   Basse,  36  Tex.  461  221 

Bruce  v.   Bissell,    119   Ind.    525  87 

V.   Mcintosh    (Okla.),    159   Pac.   261  727 

V.   Patton.    54    Ark.    455  207 

Bruch's  Estate,  In  re.  185  Pa.  St.  194  477 

Brumfield  v.    Drook,   101    Ind.    190  359 

Brunson   v.    Henrv,    140   Ind.    455  59 

Brush  V.  Ware,  16  Pet.   (U.  S.)  93  95 

Bryan  v.   Bliss-Cook  Oak  Co.,   178  Fed. 

217  276 

V.  Bradley,    16   Conn.   474  58 

V.   Bryan,   62   Ark.    79  65 

V.  Harviy,    18    Md.    113  129 

V.   Ramirez.   8   Cal.   461  330 

V.   Spires,   3   Brewst.    (Pa.)    580  55 

V.  Uland.    101    Ind.    477  306 

Bryant   v.    Fairfield,   51   Maine   149  611 

V.   Main,    25    Kv.    L.    1242  434 

V.   Richardson.    126   Ind.    145  443 
Brvant   Timber    Co.    v.    Wilson,    151    N. 

Car.   154  550 

Brvdolf  V.  Wolf.  32  Iowa  509  660 

Buchanan   v.   Balkum,   60   N.   H.  406  129 

V.   Curtis,   25   Wis.   99  105 

V.  International    Bank,    78    111.    500 

118,  125 

V.  Tennant,   55   Ore.   116  640 
Buckingham    v.    Buckingham,    81    Mich. 

89  66 

V.  Hanna,    2    Ohio    551  97,  99 

V.    Taques.    37   Conn.    402  707 

Bucklen  v.   Hasterlik,   155  111.  423  6 

Buckley   V.   Buckley,    11    Barb.    (N.   Y.) 

43  64 

V.  Frasier,    153    Mass.    525  712 

V.  Gray,  110  Cal.  339  22 

Bucklin  V.   Crampton,  20  Vt.  261  553 

Buckner  v.   Buckner.   120  Ky.   596  717 

V.   Street,    15    Fed.    365  303 

Budd  V.  Gallier,   50  Ore.  42  192 

Buehler   v.    McCormick.    169   III.   269  438 

Buell   V.   Cross.  4   Ohio   327  345 

V.   Irwin.   24    Mich.    145  284 

Buffalo  V.   Ilarling,  50  Minn.   551  •  215 

Buffalo    Sav.    Bank   v.    Hunt,    64    Misc. 

(N.   Y.)    643  565 

Bull  V.   Coe,  77  Cal.   54  419 

Bullard  V.   Barksdale,   33   N.   Car.   461  698 
Bullitt  V.  Eastern  Ky.  Land  Co.,  99  Ky. 

324  656 

Bullock  V.   Rouse,  81   Cal.   590  208 

V.  Wallingfo-d,    55    N.    11.   619  122 

V.  Whipp,   15   R.   I.    195  126 

Bumstead   v.   Cook,   169   Maps.   410  506 

Bunch    V.    (irave.    111    Ind.    351  428 

V.   Nicks,    50    Ark.    367  311 

Burbank  v.   Wiley,   66   N.   Car.   58  578 

Burchinell  v.   Koon,  25   Colo.   59  371 

Burden    v.   Taylor,    124    Mo.    12  643 

Eurdick  v.  Wentworih,  42   Iowa  440  192 

Burdis    v.    Burdis.    96    Va.    81               54,  474 

Burgess  v.   Hargrove,  64  Tex.   110  717 

Burk  V.    Johnson,   146   Fed.   209  93 

Burke  v.   Brown,   148  Mo.   309  639 

V.   Burke,  142  Invva  206                  .  560 

V.   Burke,    34    Mich.    451  727 

V.   Chamberlain,    22   Md.   298  467 

V.   McCov.en,    115    Cal.   481  239 

V.   Snell,   42   Ark.    57  443 

Burkett  v.  Clark,  46   Nebr.  466  61S 

Burkhard  v.   Mitchell,   16   Colo.   376  53 


(U.    S.) 


Biirkitt   V.    Twvman    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

35  S.  W.  421  99 

Burleigh   v.  Clough.   52   N.   H.   267  469 

Burlington   v.    Fos1)y.   6   Vt.   83  719 

Burnaby   v.    Equitable    Reversionary   In- 
terest  Soc.  28   Ch.   Div.   416  3 
V.   Equitable     Reversionary     Interest 

Soc.  54  L.  T.  Ch.  466  10 

Burnes  v.   Burnes.  137  Fed.  781  463 

V.  Daviess    County     Bank    &    Trust 

Co..   135   Kv.  355 

Burnett   v.    Caldwell.    9    Wall 

290 

V.  Wright,  135  N.  Y.  543 

Burnham    v.    Farmers'    Loan    &c.    Co., 

44    Nebr.    438 
Burnley  v.  Stevenson,  24  Ohio  St.  474 
Burns  v.    Burns    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    126 
S.   W.   333 
V.  Keas,   21    Iowa   257 
V.   Scoggin,    16    Fed.    734 
V.  Tiffer,    49    Okla.    262 
V.  Travis.    117    Ind.    44 
Burnside   v.    Terry.   45    Ga.    621 
V.  United     Sawmill     Co.,     92 
118 
Burr  V.   Stenton.  43  N.  Y.  462 
Burris  v.    Kennedy.   108  Cal.   331 
Burt  V.   Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,   106  Mass. 

356  85,  109 

Burton    v.     Baxter,     7    Blackf.     (Ind.) 
297 
v.  Tuite.    78    Mich.    363 
Burton-\\'havne  Co.  v.  Farmers'  &  Dro- 
vers'   Bank,    130    Ky.    389 
Burwell  v.   Jackson,   9   N.   Y.   535 
Bury   V.    Young.   98   Cal.    446 
Bush    V.    Bush,    5    Del.    Ch.    144  42,  65 

V.  Golden,   17  Conn.   594  119,  125 

Bussing    V.    Grain,    8    B.    Mon.     (Ky.) 

593 
Bussman  v.  Ganster,  72  Pa.   St.  285 
Butler  V.   Fitzgerald,  43   Nebr.    192 

V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.,  14  Ala.  777 
Butler,  In   re,  66  Misc.    (N.   Y.)   406 
Butlers  v.    Stevens.   26   Maine  484 
Butterfield    v.    Beall,    3    Ind.    203 
v.  Hamant,   105   Mass.  338 
V.  Sawyer.    187    111.    598 
Button  V.  American  Tract  Soc,  23    /t. 

336 
Butts  V.   Andrews.  136  Mass.   221 

V.   Cooper.    152    Ala.    375 
Buzard  v.   Houston,   119  U.   S.   347 
Buzby  V.  Roberts.   53   N.   T.   Eq.   566 
Buzon   V.    Licauco.    13   Philippine    354 
Bye  V.  Atlantic  Citv,  73  N.   T.  L.  402 
Byers  v.   Byers.   183   Pa.    509 
Byington   v.    Stone.   51    Iowa   317 
Byrd    v.    Belding,    18    Ark.    118 
Byrne  v.    Morehouse,   22   111.    611 
Bvrnes  v.  Palmer,  18  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.) 
1  16,  19 


375 

391 
424 

117 

655 


676 
66 

426 
717 

486,  492 
421 

Ark. 

667 
407 
600 


437 
13 

.''83 
299 
311 


117 
406 
620 
737 
466 
127 
336 
487 
714 

481 
7 
328 
651 
471 
957 
501 
327 
642 
736 
196 


Cabell    V.    Grubbs,    48    Mo.    353        234,  283 

Cadell  V.  Allen,  99   N.   Car.   542       335,  336 

Cadwalader  v.   Bailey.   17  R.   I.  495     61,  63 

Cady  V.   Barnes,  208   Fed.   361  597 

V.   Cady,   67    Miss.    425  483 

V.  Eaghmey,    54    Iowa    615  198 

V.  Purser,   131   Cal.   552  287 

Cagle  V.    Parker.   97   N.    Car.   271  61 

Cagliostro  v.  Galgano,  69  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

321  421 

Cahill  V.   Cahill,   75   Conn.   522  668 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXXI 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Cairo    &    Vincennes    R.    Co.    v.    Fack- 

ney,   78   111.    116  537 

Calame  v.  Calame,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  440  65 

Calder  v.   Chapman,   52  Pa.    St.   359 

8,  99,  121,  126 

Caley  v.  Portland,  12  Colo.  App.  397       408 

Caldwell  v.   Bush,  6  Wyo.   342  195 

V.  Matthewson,   57   Kans.  258  59 

V.   Miller,    44    Kans.    12  225 

Caldwell  Land  &  Lumber  Co.  v.  Smith, 

146   N.   Car.    199  636 

California     Canneries    Co.    v.     Scatena, 

117  Cal.  447  280 

California   Domestic   Water   Co.   v.   Los 

Angeles  County,   10  Cal.  App.   185         634 
Calkins  v.  Miller,   55   Nebr.   601  576 

Call    V.     Los    Angeles-Pacific    Co.,    162 
Fed.    926  193,  200 

V.   Shewmaker,  24  Ky.   L.   686  478 

Callaghan,  In  re,  119  Cal.   571  720 

Callahan  v.  Davis,  90  Mo.  78  197 

Callahan   Co.   v.   Michael,  45   Ind.   App. 

215  407 

Callaway  v.  Harrold,  61   Ga.   Ill  660 

Callerand    v.    Plot,   241    111.    120  286 

Callicott  V.  Callicott  (Miss.),  43  So.  616    7i7 
Calumet  Canal  &   Dock  Co.   v.   Russell, 

68   111.   426  126 

Calvo  V.  Davies,  8  Hun   (N.  Y.)   222       316 

Camp  V.    Cleary,   76  Va.    140  55 

V.  Shaw,    52    111.   App.    241  455 

V.  Smith,  2  Minn.    (Gil.   131)    155 

196,  198 
Campbell  v.  Baker,  51  N.  Car.  255  598 

V.  Brackett,  45   Ind.   App.   293  501 

V.  Keys,   130  Mich.    127  433 

V.   Knights,  26  Maine  224  602 

V.  McCahan,  41   111.  45  657 

V.  McClure,   45    Nebr.    608  526,  632 

V.  Porter,    162    U.    S.    478  491,  492 

V.  Roach,    45    Ala.    667  128 

V.  Southwestern    Tel.    &c.    Co.,    108 

Ark.   569  434 

V.  Swasey,  12  Ind.   70  663 

V.  Vedder,   3   Keys    (N.   Y.)    174         316 
V.  Wiggins,    1    Rice's    Eq.    (S.   Car.) 

10  462 

Campbell's  Appeal,   64  Conn.  277       87,  711 
Canfield  v.  Canfield,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  578      734 
V.  Hard,    58    Vt.    217  66 

Canning  v.   Fibush,   77   Cal.    196  51 

Cannon   v.   Williams,   14   Colo.   21  538 

Canton  Co.  v.   Baltimore,   106  Md.  69      698 
Capek  V.   Kropik,    129   111.    509  66 

Carbine  v.   Pringle,  90   111.    302  126 

Carbrey    v.     Willis,     7    Allen     (Mass.) 

368  102 

Card  V.   Dean,  84  Nebr.   4  668 

Cardwell  v.  Crumley  (Tenn.),  35  S.  W. 

767  633,  639 

Carey-Lombard    Lumber     Co.    v.     Bier- 

bauer,    76    Minn.    434  536 

Carino   v.    Insular  Government,   212   U. 

S.   449  214 

Carlin  v.   Cavender,   56  Mo.   286  646 

Carlisle  v.   Carlisle,   78  Ala.   542  283 

Carlson    v.    Curren,    48    Wash.    249  669 

Carlton   v.    Byers.    70   N.   Car.   691  736 

Carman    v.    Johnson,    29    Mo.    84        192,   195 
v.  Newefl,   1   Denio   (N.   Y.)   25  89 

Carmichael     v.     Carmichael,     72     Mich. 

76  401 

Carnall  v.   Duval,  22  Ark.   136  119,  120 

v.   Wilson.    21    Ark.    62  325 

Carner     v.     Chicago     &c.     R.     Co.,     43 

Minn.   375  206 

Carnes  v.  Bingham,   134  Ky.  96  727 

Carney  v.  Hadley,  32  Fla.  344  667 


Carolina    Sav.    Bank    v.    McMahon,    37 

S.  Car.  309  699 

Carpenter  v.   Buller,  8  Mees.  &  W.  209  99 

V.   Mitchell,    54    111.    126  530 

v.   Perkins,    83    Conn.    11  466 

V.  Plagge,    192    III.    82  447 

V.   Sherfy,    71    111.    427  347 

Carpenter's  Estate,  In  re,  170  Pa.  203  733 

Carr   v.    Dooley,    119    Mass.    294  632 

V.  Givens,    9    Bush    (Ky.)    679  64 

V.  Roach,  2  Duer.   (N.  Y.)  20  26 

Carrier   v.    Eastis,    112   Ala.   474  397 

Carrigan  v.  Drake,  36  S.  Car.  354  465 

V.  Rowell,    96    Tenn.    185  108 

Carroll  v.   Tomlinson,    192   111.   398  419 

Carson  v.   Fuhs,   131   Pa.   St.  256  465 

V.  Sheldon,    51    Mo.    436  659 

V.  Smith,    5    Minn.    78  95 

v.  Smith,   12   Minn.   543  215 

Carter  v.   Carter,   39  Ala.   579  43 

V.  Carter,    234    111.    507                   87,  730 

V.  Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.,  26  W.  Va. 

644  104 
V.  Couch,    157    Ala.    470  64 
V.  Goodin,   3   Ohio    St.    75  325 
V.  Hobbs,   92    Fed.    594  381 
V.  Randolph,  47  Tex.   376  108 
V.  Ruddy,   166  U.   S.  493  221 
V.  Wingard,  47  111.   App.   296  62 
Carthage   Tissue   Paper   Mills  v.    Carth- 
age, 200  N.  Y.   1  434 
Cartwright  v.   Ruffin,  43   Colo.   377  393 
Gary  v.    Whitney,   48   Maine   516  185 
Case  v.   Edgeworth,  87  Ala.   203  201 
Casey   v.    Casey,    107   Iowa   192  696 
V.  King,   98   Mass.   503  _  50 
Cashman   v.   Cashman's  Heirs,   123   Mo. 

647  700 

Casler  v.  Gray,  159  Mo.   588  64 

Casper   v.    Klippen,    61    Minn.    353  581 

Cass  County  v.  Cowgill,  97  Mich.  448  50 
Cass    Farm    Co.    v.    Detroit,    139    Mich. 

318  698 

Cassedy  v.  Jackson,  45   Miss.   397  314 

Cassidy  v.   Caton,   47   Iowa  22  426 

V.   Woodward,    77    Iowa    354  576 

Caswell    v.    Black    River    Mfg.    Co.,    14 

Johns.    (N.   Y.)    453  34 
Cathey   v.    Buchanan    Lumber    Co.,    151 

N.    Car.    592  270 
Catholic  Mutual  Ben.  Assn.  v.  Firnane, 

50  Mich.   82  721 

Catlin  Coal  Co.  v.  Lloyd,   180  111.  398  266 

Catron   v.    Laughlin,    11    N.    Mex.   604  214 
Caujolle    V.    Ferrie,    26    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

177  719 

Cauley  v.  Sfitton,  150  N.  Car.  327  638 

Cautley  v.  Morgan,  51  W.  Va.  304  100 

Cave    V.    Crafts,    53    Cal.    135  506 

Cavender   v.    Smith,    5    Iowa    157  349 

Caverly  v.   McOwen,  123   Mass.   574  773 

Caw  V.  Robertson,  5  N.  Y.   125  458 
Cazort   &   McGehee   Co.    v.    Dunbar,   91 

Ark.    400  424 

Cecil  v.  Beaver,  28  Iowa  241  286 
Centenary  M.   E.  Church  v.  Parker,  43 

N.    T.    Eq.    307                                   263,  329 
Central    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Beal,    47    Cal. 

151  290 

Cerney  v.   Pawlot,  66  Wis.   262  443 
C.    G.    Earned    Mercantile,    Real    Estate 
&    Live    Stock   Co.   v.    Omaha   &c.    R. 

Co.,  56  Kans.   174  677 

Chace  v.  Lamphere,   148  N.  Y.  206  460 

v.  Morse,   189   Mass.   559  446 

Chadbourne  v.   Sumner,   16  N.  H.   129  662 
Chadwick    v.    Chadwick,    37    N.    J.    Eq. 

71  483 


XXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


ChaflFee  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  71  Maine 

514  376 

Challefoux  v.  Ducharme,  4  Wis.  554  106 
Challiss    V.    Atchison    &c.    R.    Co.,    16 

Kans.    117  110 

Chamberlain  v.  Bell,  7  Cal.  292           120,  288 

Chambers   v.   Chambers,  249    111.    126  711 

V.  Chambers,   227    Mo.   262  266 

V.   Chambers.    92    Tenn.    707  321 

V.  Haney,  45  La.  Ann.  447  124 

Chambers,    In    re,   44   Fed.    786  13 

Champion  v.  Hinkle,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  162  674 

Chancellor    v.    Windham,    1    Rich.     (S. 

Car.)    161  311 

Chandler  v.  Clark,  151  Mich.  159  639 

V.  Hart,  161  Cal.  405  405 

V.  Morey,  195  111.  596  595 

V.  Von  Roeder,  24  How.  (U.  S.) 

224  315 

Chandos  v.  Mack,  77  Wis.  573  272 
Chapin    v.    School    Dist.    No.    2,    35    N. 

H.    445  475 
Chaplin    v.    Simmons,    7    T.    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)    337  67 

Chapman   v.   Chapman,   92  Va.   537  65 

V.   Dougherty,   87    Mo.   617  70 

V.  Hamblet,   100  Maine  454  272 
V.  Lee,     55     Ala.     616                        26,  30 

V.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487  147 

V.  Price,   83   Va.   392  64 

V.   Schroeder,   10  Ga.    321  65 
V.  White    Sewing    Machine    Co.,    78 

Miss.    438  66 
Chappell  V.   Chappell   (Ky.),   119  S.  W. 

218  47 
V.  New  York  &c.  R.   Co.,   62   Conn. 

195  275 
Charland  v.  Trustees  of  Home  for  Aged 

Women,    204    Mass.    563  643 
Charleroi    Timber    &    Cannel    Coal    Co. 
V.   Spaulding   (Ky.  App.),   117   S.   W. 

291  699 

Charles  v.  Charles,  8  Grat.   (Va.)  486  64 
Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge, 

11    Pet.    (U.   S.)    420  297 
V.  Warren    Bridge,   7   Pick.    (Mass.) 

346  227 
Charleston    C.    &   C.    R.    Co.   v.    Leech, 

33   S.   Car.    175  266 
Charlotte  v.   Pembroke  Iron  Works,  82 

Maine    391  693 

Charter  v.   Graham,   56  111.   19  123 
Chase  v.  Heaney,  70  III.  268 

10,  IS,   16,  17,  18,  20,  174 

V.  Peck,   21    N.    Y.    581  531 

V.   Williams.    71    Maine    190  615 

V.  Woodruff,    133    Wis.    555  91 

Chase's  Case,  1  Bland  (Md.)  227  65 

Chatham   v.   Bradford,    50   Ga.   327  132 

Chattahoochie   &   G.   R.   Co.   v.    Pilcher, 

163  Ala.  401  270 
Chauvin  v.  Louisiana  Oyster  Commis- 
sion, 121  La.  10  228 
Cheely  v.  Clayton,  110  U.  S.  701  676 
Chenault  v.  Scott,  23  Ky.  L.  1974  43 
Cheney  v.  Bilby,  74  Fed.  52  671 
V.  Harding,  21  Nebr;  65  662 
Cherokee  Const.  Co.  v.  Harris,  92  Ark. 

260  66 

Cherry  v.  Mitchell,   108  Ky.   1  719 

Chew  V.   Hyman,   7   Fed.   7  356 

V.   Kellar,    171    Mo.    215  291 

V.  Tome,  93   Md.  244  493 

Chicago  V.   Middlebrooke,   143   111.   265  73 

V.  Pittsburg    &c.     R.     Co.,     146    111. 

App.  403  503 

V.  Witt,  75  111.  211  127 


Chicago  &c.  Rolling  Mill  Co.  v.  Scully, 

141    III.   408  672 

Chicago    &•    N.    W.    R.    Co.    v.    Garrett, 

239    111.    297  547 

V.   Morrison,    195    111.    271         ^  325 

Chicago    Dock   &   Canal   Co.    v.    Kinzie, 

93   111.  415  621 

Chicago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Vaughn, 

206  111.  234  125 

Chicago   Terminal   T.    R.    Co.    v.    Wins- 
low,  216  111.   166  59 
Chicago   &c.    R.    Co.    v.    Clapp,    201    111. 

418  110 

V.   Kecgan,   152   111.   413  99 

V.  Pontiac,   169   111.   155  109 

Chick  V.   Rollins,   44   Maine   104  429 

V.   Willetfs,    2    Kans.    384  416 

Chickering  v.    Failes,   26   111.    508  7i 

Chidsey  v.  Brookes,   130  Ga.   218       491,  493 

Chilcott  V.   Hart,   23   Colo.  40  469,  491 

Childers    v.     Bumgarner,     53     N.     Car. 

297  64 

V.  Wm.  H.  Coleman  Co.,  122  Tenn. 

109  284 

Childress  v.  Cutler,  16  Mo.  24  708 

Childs  V.   Alexander.   22   S.   Car.    169       352 
V.  Lanterman,  103  Cal.  387  571 

Chiles  V.   Conlev,   2   Dana   (Ky.)    21  299 

Chinoweth   v.    Haskell,    3    Pet.    (U.    S.) 

92  185 

Chirac    v.    Reinecker,    2    Pet.    (U.    S.) 

613  87 

Chisholm   v.    Caines,   67    Fed.   285  185 

V.  Georgia,  2  Dall.   (U.  S.)   419  72 

Chittenden  v.  Hobbs,  9  Iowa  417  660 

Chitty  V.  Gillett,  46  Okla.   724  736 

Chotard    v.    Pope,    12    Wheat.     (U.    S.) 

587  191,   193 

Choteau  v.  Thompson,  2  Ohio  St.   114 

535,  536 
Chowning  v.  Stanfield,  49  Ark.  87  723 

Christain     v.     Cabell,     22     Grat.     (Va.) 

99  34 

Christal  V.  Kelly,  88  N.  Y.  285  663 

Christopher     v.     Curtis-Attalla     Lumber 

Co.,    175   Ala.   484  434 

Christy  v.  Burch,  25  Fla.  942  118 

V.   Dana,    34    Cal.    548  99,  427 

Church    V.    Adams,   37   Ore.   355  206 

V.  Vcnable,    159    111.    215  722 

Churchill  v.    Monroe,   1    R.    I.   209  283 

V.   Reamer,  8  Bush   (Ky.)   256  708 

Churchman's    Appeal,    In    re,    9    Sad. 

(Pa.)   423  466 

Chute  V.   Washburn,  44  Minn.    312,   46 

N.    W.    555  276 

Cihak  V.   Klehr,   117  111.  643  61 

Cincinnati,    I.,    St.    L.    &    C.    R.    Co.    v. 

Smith,  127  Ind.  461  129 

Citizens'    Bank    of    Stanton    v.    Young, 

78   Nebr.   312  134 

Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Abbott,  72  Wash. 

73  447,  654 

V.  Dayton,   116   111.   257  120 

Citizens'   Sav.   Bank  v.   Bauer,  49   Hun 

(N.    Y.)    238  596 

Citizens'     State    Bank    v.    Harris,     149 

Ind.  208  619 

City  Loan  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Poole,  149 

Ala.   164  393 

Clabaugh  v.  Byerly.  7  Gill  (Md.)  354  125 
Claflin   V.    Dunne,    129   111.   241  570 

Clairborne  v.  Holmes,  51  Miss.   146  123 

V.  Holland,   88   Va.    1046  355 

Glamorgan  v.  Lane,  9  Mo.  446  119,  122 
Clancey  v.  Houdlette,  39  Maine  451  104 
Clapp   V.   Boston,    133    Mass.   367  62 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xxxin 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Clark  V.  Baker,  14  Cal.  612  42 

V.  Campau,   92    Mich.    573  690 

V.  Clark,  84  Hun   (N.   Y.)   362  65 

V.  Clark,   56   N.   H.    105  321 

V.  Condit,  18  N.   T.  Eq.  358  442 

V.   Cox,    115    N.    Car.   93  710 

V.  Farrow,  10  B.  Mon.    (Ky.)  446  546 

V.   Fuller,    39    Conn.    238  128 

V.   Gilbert,    39    Conn.    94  694 

V.  Glidden,  60  Vt.   702  61 

V.  Hall,    19    Mich.    356  192 

V.  Henne,   127   Fed.   288  380 
V.   Hillis,     134    Ind.    421                  360,  617 

V.  Holland,   72   Iowa  34  129 

V.  Kingsley,   37  Hun   (N.   Y.)   246  737 

V.  Kirkland,  64  Misc.   (N.  Y.)   585  634 

V.  Kittenplan,  63  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  122  466 

V.  Landon,  90  Mich.  83  419 

V.  Lumbert.   55   W.   Va.   512  99 
V.  Mack,    161    Mich.    545              466,  729 

V.   Marlow,   149   Ind.  41  473 

V.  Miller,  65   Kans.   726  458 

V.  Muzzey,  43  N.  H.  59  675 

V.  Neumann,  56  Nebr.  374  399 
V.  Northern    Coal    &c.    Co.,    33    Ky. 

L.    1047  263 

V.  Sawyer,  48  Cal.  133  347 
V.  Shailer,  46  Conn.  119                 707,  708 

V.  Thias,   173   Mo.  628  66 

V.  Titus,   2  Ariz.    147  215 

V.  Wav,    11    Rich.    (S.    Car.)    621  290 

V.  Wilson,    53    Miss.    119  60 
Clark  &   Leonard  Inv.   Co.  v.   Way,   52 

Nebr.  204  592 

Clarke  v.  Clarke,  178  U.  S.   186       456,  584 

V.  White,   12  Pet.   (U.   S.)    178  123 

Clarke's  Appeal,  In  re,  79  Pa.   St.  376  64 

Clark's  Appeal,  In  re,  70  Conn.   195 

58,  456,  584 

Clarkson    v.    Clarkson,    125    Mo.    381  48 
V.  Hatton,    143    Mo.    47                712,  718 

V.  Louderback,  36   Fla.   660  537 

Clary  v.   Watkins,   64   Nebr.   386  711 

Clason  V.  Shepherd,  6  Wis.  369  119 
Classen    v.    Chesapeake    Guano    Co.,    81 

Md.   258  62 

Clay  V.   Ballard,  87  Va.   787  115 

V.  Chenault,    108   Ky.   77  46 

V.  Cousins,  1  T.  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   75  730 

V.  Field,   lis  U.   S.  260  602 

V.  Hammond.   199  111.   370  307 

V.  Kagelmacher,    98    Ga.    149  595 

Claypoole    v.    Houston,    12    Kans.    324  661 

Clayson    v.    Clayson,    24    Ore.    542  584 

Clayton  v.  Drake,  17  Ohio  St.  367     707,  711 

Clearwater    v.    Rose,    1    Blackf.    (Ind.) 

^  137  45 

Clegg   V.    Lemessurier,    15    Grat.    (Va.) 

^  108  281 

Clement    v.    Bank    of    Rutland,    61    Vt. 

298  272 

Clements  v.  Hunt,  46  N.  Car.  400  740 

V.  Pearce,    63    Ala.    284  272 

Clendening  v.   Wyatt,   54   Kans.   523  334 

Cleveland  v.   Bergen  Bldg.  &c.  Co.    (N. 

J.    Eq.),    55   Atl.    117  531 

V.  Choate,   77   Cal.   73  241 
Cleveland,    C,    C.    &    St.    L.    R.    Co.    v. 

Mitchell,  74  111.  App.  602  408 

V.  Peirce,  34  Ind.  App.  188  581 
Clifford    V.    Hyde    County,    24    S.    Dak. 

237  641 

Clift  V.  Clift,  87  Tenn.  17  65 

V.  White,  12  N.  Y.  519  40 
Clifton    Heights    Land    Co.    v.    Randell, 

82    Iowa   89                                          263,  329 

Cliver  v.  Sanders,  8  Ohio  St.  501  707 

Clizer  v.  Krauss,  57  Wash.  26  636 


Close  V.  Close,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  472  563 
V.  Farmers'    Loan    &c.    Co.,    195    N. 

Y.  92  59 

V.  Stuyvesant,   132   III.   607              77,  198 

V.  Wheaton,    65    Kans.   830  656 

V.  Zell,  141  Pa.  390  33 

Clotilde  Lutz,  In  re,  157  Mo.  439  473 

Cloud    V.    Bruce,    61    Ind.    171               87,  726 

V.   El   Dorado   County,   12  Cal.   128  623 

Clough  V.  Clough,   10  Colo.  App.  433  491 


Cloyd   V.   Trotte~r,    118   111.    391 
Clubb   V.   Wise,   64   111.    157 
Coates  V.  Cheever,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  460 
Cobb  V.  Hines,  44  N.  Car.  343 

V.  Lucas,   15   Pick.    (Mass.)    7 
Cobbey  v.   Wright,   29   Nebr.   274 
Cobbs  V.  Coleman,   14  Tex.   594 
Cockey  v.  Milne,  16  Md.  200 
Cochran  v.  Adler,  121  Ala.  442 
Cockrill  V.  Armstrong,  31  Ark.   580 
Cocks  V.   Simmons,  57   Miss.   183 
Codman  v.  Bradley,  201  Mass.  361 
Coe  v.  Harahan,  8  Gray  (Mass.)   198 

■^.  Winters,    15    Iowa   481 
Coffee    v.    Gates,    28    Ark.    43 
Coffey   v.   Hendricks,   66   Tex.   676 
Coffman  v.   Bartsch,   25   Ind.  201 
V.  Coffman,  85   Va.   459 
V.  Coffman,  41  W.  Va.  8 
Cofran  v.  Cockran,  5   N.  H.   458 
Cogan    V.    Cook,    22    Minn.    137 
Cogel   V.   Raph,   24   Minn.    194 
Coggins,  V.   Flythe,   113  N.  Car.   102 

V.  Stephens,  73  Ga.  414 
Coggswell  V.  Griffith,  23  Nebr.  334 
Cogswell  V.   Tibbetts,   3   N.   H.  41 
Cohee  v.  Baer,  134  Ind.  375 
Colbert's  Estate,   In  re,   44   Mont.   259 
Colburn  v.   Mason,  25   Maine  434 
Cole  V.   Clark,   85   Maine  336 
V.  Cole,    126    Mich.    569 
V.  Cunningham,  133  U.  S.  107 
V.   Killam,    187    Mass.    213 
V.  Lake  Co.,  54  N.   H.  242 
V.  Taylor,    132   Tenn.   92 
Coleman  v.  Billings,  89  111.   183 
V.  Commonwealth,    25     Grat. 

865 
V.  Foster,   112   Ala.    506 
V.  McCormick,    37    Mo.    179 
V.   O'Leary,    114   Ky.    388 
V.  Pickett,   82   Hun    (N.   Y.)    287 
V.  St.    Paul    &c.    R.    Co.,    38    Minn. 

260 
V,  Thomson,  6  Pa.  County  Ct.  126 
Coles  V.  Berryhill,  37  Minn.   56 
Coler  V.   Alexander,  60  Tex.   Civ.   App. 
573  ^ 

Colescott  V.  King,  154  Ind.  621 
Collamore   v.    Collamore,    158   Mass.    74 
Collier  v.  Grimesey,  36  Ohio  St.  17 

359,  470 
V.  Slaughter,  20  Ala.  263  477 

Collins  v.  Aaron,   162  Pa.   St.  539  123 

v.  Capps,  235   111.   560  460 

V.   Miller,    64   Tex.    118  611 

v.  Moore^    115    Ga.    327  434 

V.  Rowe,    1    Abb.    N.    Cas.    (N.    Y.) 

.   97  316 

V.   Sanitary     Dist.     of    Chicago,     270 

III.    108  722 

V.  Smith,   75  Wis.  392  522 

Colomer  v.  Morgan,  13  La.  Ann.  202         121 
Colorado    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Allen,    13 

Colo.   229  677 

Colorado    Coal    &    Iron    Co.    v.    United 
States,   123  U.   S.   307  229 


576,  661 

66 

65 
267 
263 
656 

66 
120 
119 

65 
670 
722 
326 
126 
660,  662 
283 
717 
491 
737 
331 
118,  120 
298 
471 
373 
128 

65 
571 

86 
696 
533 

66 

371 

395 

45,  268 

86 
324 

115 
730 
201 
456 
687 

212 

61 

119 

28 

137 

48 


(Va.) 


XXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Columbia    Bank    v.    Jacobs,     10    Mich. 

349  118 

Columbian    Ins.    Co.    v.    Ashby,    4    Pet. 

(U.    S.)    139  52 

Colt  V.   Colt,  32  Conn.  422  455 

V.  O'Connor,  59  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  83       401 

Colton    V.    Colton,    21    Fed.    594  59 

V.  Colton.    127    U.    S.    300  452,  463 

Combs  V.  Combs,  67  Md.   11  472 

V.  Dodd,   4    Rob.    (La.)    58  224 

V.  Jolly,   28   Cal.   498  192 

Comegys  v.   Emerick,  134  Ind.   148  363 

Comer  v.   Baldwin,   16  Minn.   172  286 

Comet    Con.     Min.    Co.     v.     Frost,     15 

Colo.   310  658 

Comley   v.    Ford,   65   W.   Va.   429  281 

Commercial    Bank    v.    King,    107    Ala. 

484  438 

V.  Prichard,   126   Cal.   600  433 

Commonwealth      v.      Andre,      3      Pick. 

(Mass.)    224  100 

V.  Harmer,    6    Phila.    (Pa.)    90        21,  22 
V.  Nancrede,  32   Pa.   St.   389  718 

V.  New    York   &c.    R.    Co.,    132    Pa. 

St.    591  113 

V.  Owen,    2    Wkly.    N.    Cas.    (Pa.) 

200  582 

V.  Pollitt,  25  Ky.  L.  790  43 

V.  Reading    Sav.    Bank,    137    Mass. 

431  332 

Commonwealth   Title   Ins.   &  Trust   Co. 

V.  Ellis,   192   Pa.   St.  321  430 

Comparet  v.    Randall,   4   Ind.   55  602 

Compton   V.   Bagley,   1   Ch.   313  31 

V.  McMahan,   19   Mo.   App.  494  452 

Comstock  V.  Adams,  23   Kans.   513  450 

V.  Kerwin,    57    Nebr.    1  668 

V.  Son,   154   Mass.   389  266 

Conant   v.   Kent,   130  Mass.    178         87,  711 

V.   Stone.     176    Mich.    654  474 

Conard    v.    Atlantic    Insurance    Co.,    1 

Pet.    (U.    S.)    386  562 

Concord  Mfg.   Co.   v.  Robertson,  66  N. 

H.    1  272 

Condit  V.  De  Hart,  62  N.  J.  L.  78  481 

Conduitt   V.    Ross,    102    Ind.    166  507 

Congdon   v.    Morgan,    14   S.   Car.    587      687 
Conger  v.   Babcock,   87   Ind.  497  347 

V.  Cook,    56    Iowa    117  736 

V.  Lowe,    124   Ind.   368  47,  465,  478 

Congregational   Church   v.   Walker,    124 

Mass.    69  423 

Congregational    Church    Bldg.     Soc.    v. 

Everett.   85    Md.    79  54 

Congregational    Soc.    v.    Stark,    34    Vt. 

243  45 

Conklin    V.    Foster,    57   111.    104  66 

Conley  v.   Murdock.   106   Maine  266  100 

Conn  V.   Davis,  33  Tex.  203  715 

Connar  v.   Leach,   84   Md.   571  263 

Connecticut  'iMut.   L.   Ins.   Co.  v.  Bulte, 

45   Mich.   113  638 

V.  Jones,  8  Fed.   303  441 

V.  King,   47   Ind.   App.   587  90 

V.   Smirh,    117    Mo.    261  127 

V.  Talbot,    113    Ind.    373  438 

Conner  v.   Shepherd,  15  Mass.   164  65 

Connor   v.    Connor,    59    Fla.   467  421 

v.  Dillard,    129   N.   Car.   SO  656 

V.  McCormick    (Iowa),    117    N.    VV. 

976  619 

V.  McCoy,  83  S.  Car.  165  597 

Conover  v.   Smith,   17   N.   J.   Eq.   51         407 

Conrad  v.   Everich.  50  Ohio  St.  476         676 

V.  West    End    Hotel    &c.    Land    Co., 

126  N.   Car.   776  -244 

Constantine  v.  East,  8  Ind.  App.  291       1,  6 


Consumers'   Gas   Trust   Co.   v.    Harless, 

131   Ind.  446  677 

Contee  v.   Lyons,   19   D.   C.  207  262 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reeve,  135  App. 

Div.   (N.  Y.)   737  595 

Converse   v.    Kellogg,   7   Barb.    (N.   Y.) 

590  75 

V.  Starr,  23  Ohio  St.  491  491 

Conway  v.  German,  166  Fed.   67  380 

V.  Owensboro    Sav.    Bank     &     Trust 

Co.,  165  Fed.  822  665 

Cook  V.   Chicago   &c.   R.   Co.,   40  Iowa 

451  61 

V.  Cook,   28   Ala.   660  51 

V.  First   Univcrsalist   Church,   23   R. 

I.   62  714 

V.  French,  96  Mich.  525  126 

V.  Hall,  6  Gil.  (III.)  579         117 

v.  Hammond,   4    Mason   467  72 

V.   Hart.    135    Ky.    650  459 

V.  Jennings,    40    S.    Car.    204  560 

V.   Norton,    43    111.    391  73,  688 

V.   Patrick,    135    111.    499  318 

V.  Rogers,   31    Mich.   391  377 

V.  Stearns,    11    Mass.    533  62 

V.  Travis,  20  N.   Y.   400  126 

V.  Tullis,   18  Wall.   (U.   S.)   332  532 

V.   Walker,    70    Maine   232  65 

V.  Webb,   18  Ala.  810  67 

Cooke  V.  Avery,  147  U.   S.   375  563 

Coolidge  v.  Burke,  69  Ark.  237  708,   722 

Coomler   v.    Hefner,   86   Ind.    108  52 

Coon   v.   McNelly,   254   III.   39  466 

Cooney  v.  Coppock,   119  Iowa  486  546 

Cooper  V.  Adams,  6  Cush.   (Mass.)   87        51 

V.   Denison,  13  Sim.  290  730 

V.   Emery,    1    Phil.    388  8 

V.   Flesner,    24    Okla.    47  138 

V.  Hargis,    20    Ky.    L.    41  593,  595 

V.  Hayes,   96   Ind.   386  584 

V.  Ives,    62    Kans.    395  724,  736 

V.   Tackson,   99    Ind.    566  638 

V.   Merritt,   30  Ark.   686  531 

V.   Sunderland,   3    Iowa    114  650 

v.  Wilder,    111    Cal.    191  206,  225 

Copertini   v.    Oppermann,    76   Cal.    181       76 

Copley  V.  Ball,  176  Fed.  682  465 

Coray  v.   Matthewson,  7  Lans.   (N.  Y.) 

80  6 

Corby  v.  Corby,  85  Mo.  371  49 

Corbin  v.   Dale,   57   Mo.  297  317 

V.  Ilealy,  20  Pick.   (Mass.)   514     48,  291 
Corbitt    V.    Clcnny,    52    Ala.    480        129,  316 
V.   Corbitt,    54    N.    Car.    114  714 

Cordova  v.   Hood,   17  Wall.   (U.   S.)    1       273 
Core  V.  Wigner,  32  W.  Va.  277  699 

Corey  v.   Springer,   138   Ind.   506  43 

Corley  v.  McElmeel,   149  N.   Y.  228 

492,  583 
Cormack  v.  Wolcott,  37  Kans.  391  137 

Cormerais  v.   Genella,   22   Cal.    116  442 

Cornelius   v.    Kissel,   128  U.   S.   457  195 

Cornell   v.    Hall.   22    Mich.   377  418 

V.   Maltbv,   165   N.   Y.   557  434 

Cornett  v.   Hough,  136  Ind.   387       707,  708 
Corning   v.    Gould,    16   Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

531  108 

Cornwall    v.    Falls    City    Bank,    92    Ky. 

381  476 

Cornwell  v.   Orton,   126  Mo.   355  59 

Corwine  v.  Corwine,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  579       453 
Cosby    V.    Buchanan,    81    Ala.    574  419 

Cosner  v.   McCrum.  40  W.  Va.   339  281 

Coster  V.   Monroe  Mfg.   Co.,   1   Gr.  Ch. 

(N.  J.)   467  326 

Cotting  V.  DeSartiges,  17  R.  I.  668  456 

Cotton  V.  Citizens'  Bank,  97  Ark.  568      737 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXXV 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Cottrell    V.    Adams,    2    Biss.     (U.     S.) 

351 
Coudert   v.    Sayre,   46    N.   J.    Eq.    386 
Coulter  V.   Crawfordsville  Trust  Co.,  45 

Ind.    App.    64 
Coulthard    v.    Stevens,    84    Iowa    241 
Council  V.  Averett,  95  N.  Car.  131 
Council   Imp.    Co.    v.    Draper,   16   Idaho 

541 
Courtner  v.  Etheredge,  149  Ala.  78 
Courtright  v.    Cedar  Rapids  &c.   R.   Co., 

35   Iowa   386 
Cover  V.   Manaway,   115  Pa.   St.  338 
Coverdale  v.   Wilder,    17   Pick.    (Mass.) 

178 
Cowan    V.    Green,    2    Hawks    (N.    Car) 
384 

V.  Radford    Iron    Co.,    83    Va.    547 

V.  Withrow,    111    N.    Car.    306 
Cowell    V.    Colorado    Springs    Co.,    100 

U.   S.   55 
Cowles  V.  Hardin,  91   N.  Car.  231 
Cowley  V.  Knapp,  42  N.  T.  L.  297 
Cox  V.   Arnold,   129   Mo.   237 

V.  Clark,   93   Ala.   400 

V.  Co.x,  18  D.  C.   1 

V.   Cox,   44   Ind.    368 

V.   Cox,    101   Mo.    168 

V.  Crockett,   93   Va.   50 

V.   Easter,    1    Port.    (Ala.)    130 

V.   Garst,    105    111.    342 

V.   Hart,    145    U.    S.   376 

V.  Ledward,   124  Pa.   St.  435 

V.  Matthews,   17  Ind.  367 

V.  Rash,   82   Ind.    519 

V.  Von  Ahlefeldt,   105   La.   543 

V.  Ward,    107    N.    Car.    507 

V.  Wayt,  26  W.  Va.  807 
Cozzens  v.  Jamison,  12  Mo.  App.  452 

V.  Joslin".    1    R.    I.    122 
Crabbe  v.   Hardy,  77  Misc.    (N.  Y.)    1 
Crabtree    v.    Bank    of    Winchester,    108 

Tenn.    483 
Cragin  v.  Powell,  128  U.  S.  691 
Craig  v.  Fox,  16  Ohio  563 

v.  Leslie,   3   Wheat.    (U.   S.)    563 

V.  Wells,   11   N.   Y.   315 
Grain  v.  Mallone,  130  Ky.   125 

V.  Wright,    114    N.    Y.    307 
Cramer  v.   Mooney,   59   N.   J.   Eq 
Cramond,   In  re,   145   Fed.  966 
(Trane   v.   Aultman-Taylor   Co.,   61   Wis. 

110  428 

V.   Crane,    31    Iowa    296  719 

V.   Reeder,  21  Mich.  24  111,  282,  314 

V.   Turner,  67  N.  Y.  437  99 

V.  Turner,   7  Hun    (N.  Y.)    357  427 

Crassen  v.    Swoveland,   22   Ind.   427  127 

Craver  v.    Spencer,   40    Fla.    135  397 

Crawford  v.    Engram,    157  Ala.   314  100 

v.  McDonald,   88   Tex.    626  583 

V.   Morris,    5    Grat.    (Va.)    90  53 

V.  T^icheson,    101    111.    351  528 

V.  Thomas,    114    Ky.    197  456 

Crawford    County    Bank    v.    Bolton,    87 

Ark.    142  363 

Creamer    v.    Briscoe,    101    Tex.    490  192 

Creech   v.   Johnson.    116   Ky.    441  187 

Cremer's     Estate,    In     re,     156    Pa.     St. 

40  87 

Crews   V.    Taylor,    56   Tex.    461  122 

Criley   v.    Cassel,    144   Iowa    685  100 

Crim   V.    Umbsen,    155    Cal.    697  398 

Crisfiel   V.    Murdock,    55    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

143  528 

Crisfield  V.   Storr,  36  Md.   129  721 

Crislip  v.   Cain,   19  W.  Va.  438  290 


437 
313 

466 
103 
359 

722 
417 

212 
286 

375 

123 
51 

128 


47 
138 
487 
103 
730 
591 
87,  717 
492 

98 
195 

65 
297 
428 
721 
719 
715 
734 
120 
486 
731 
956 


100 
147,  241 

352 
516 
313 
737 
46 
395 
517 


164 


Crist  v.   Cosbv,    11    Okla.   635  722 

Croan  v.   Phelps'  Admx.,  94  Ky.  213  717 

Crocker  v.   Balch,   104  Tenn.   6  718 

Crockett  v.   Maguire,   10  Mo.   34  99 

Croft   v.    Thornton,    125    Ala.    391  99 

Cromelien   v.    Brink,   29   Pa.    St.    522  640 

Crommelin  v.  Thiess,  31   Ala.   412        53,  408 

Cromwell  v.   MacLean,    123   N.   Y.  474  634 

Crook  V.  Chilvers,  99  Nebr.  684            16,  162 

v.  Rindskopf,    105    N.    Y.    476  375 

Crooks  V.   Whitford,  47   Mich.   283  270 

Cropsey  v.   Ogden,    11    N.    Y.   228  65 

Crosby   v.    Covington,   24   Miss.    619  737 

V.  Dowd,   61   Cal.   557  723 

V.  Parker,   4    Mass.    110  290 

V.   Roub,    16   Wis.   616  439 

Cross  V.   Armstrong,  44   Ohio   St.   613  652 

V.   Hoch,    149   Mo.   325  465 

V.  Noble,   67  Pa.   St.   74       _  529 

Crossett     Lumber     Co.     v.     Files,     104 

Ark.     600                                                 456,  724 

Crouch  V.   Fowle,  9   N.  H.   219  407 

Grouse   v.    Mitchell,    130   Mich.    347  119 

V.  Murphy,   140  Pa.   St.   335  581 

Crouter  v.   Crouter,   133   N.   Y.   55  398 

Crow  V.    Beardsley,   68   Mo.   435  371 

v.  Kightlinger,    25    Pa.    St.    343  64 

V.   Powers,   19  Ark.  424  491 

Crowley   v.    C.    N.    Nelson   Lumber    Co., 

66    Minn.    400                    _             _  521 
Cruger    v.    Ginnuth,    3    Wills.    Civ.    Gas. 

Ct.    App.    (Tex.)    24  278 
Cruikshank    v.     Home    for    Friendless, 

113    N.    Y.   337  485 

V.  Luttrell,  67  Ala.  318  596 

Crump  v.  Faucett,  70  N.  Car.  345  717 

Culberson   v.    Culberson,   37    Ga.   296  65 

Culbertson  v.  Coleman,  47  Wis.  193  191 
Culbertson    Irr.    &    Water-Power    Co.    v. 

Olander,    51    Nebr.    539                      95,  201 

Cullum   v.    Emanuel,    1    Ala.    23  428 

Culver  V.  Waters,  248  111.   163  955 

Cumberledge  v.  Brooks,  235  111.  249  272 

Gumming  v.  McDade,  118  Ga.  612  672 
Cummings     v.     Cummings,     123     Mass. 

270  583 

V.  Cummings,   76   N.   J.    Eq.    568  49 

V.   Black,    65    Vt.    76  423 

V.   Dearborn,    56    Vt.    441  301 

V.   Dolan,    52    Wash.    496  77 

V.   Lohr,   246    111.    577  43 

V.  National  Bank,   101  U.   S.   153  651 

V.   Wilson,   99   Minn.    502  31 
Cummins     v.     Bovle,     1     J.     J.     Marsh. 

(Ky.)    480  673 

V.   Woodruff,    5    Ark.    116  281 

Cunningham    v.    Blake,    121    Mass.    333  7 
V.   Boston    &c.     R.    Co.,    153    Mass. 

506  241 

V.   Cunningham,    72    Conn.    157  473 

V.   Holton,    55    Maine    33  SI 

V.   Pattee,    99    Mass.    248  692 

Cunninggim    v.    Peterson,    109    N.    Car. 

33                          _  116 
Cunnins   v.    Reading    School    Dist.,    198 

U.    S.   458  90 

Currell  v.   Villars,   72   Fed.   330  119 

Curren   v.   Taylor,    19   Ohio    36  708 

Currier  v.  Gale,  9  Allen   (Mass.)   522  429 

v.  Perley,    24    N.    H.    219  53 
Curry   v.    Lehman,    55    Fla.    847 

562.  563,  584 

Curry's   Estate,  In  re,   39   Cal.   529  717 

Curtis  V.   Curtis,  40   Maine  24  737 

v.   Flinn,    46   Ark.    70  424 

V.  Hewens,    11    Mete.    (Mass.)    294  719 

V.   Lyman,    24    Vt.    338  132 

V.  Moore,    152    N.    Y.    159  433 


XXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Curtis    Land    &    Loan    Co.    v.    Interior 

Land    Co..    137    Wis.    341  393,  398 

Curyea    v.    Berry,    84    III.    600  138 

Cittlar   V.   Cutlar.  9   N.   Car.   324  728 

Cutler  V.   Meeker,  71   Nebr.  732  722 

V.  Smith,    57    III.    252  62 

Cutter    V.    Waddiugton,    22    Mo.    206 

708,  730 
Cutting  V.  Harrington,  104  Maine  96  611 

Cutright    V.    Stanford,    81    111.    240  736 

Cyrus  V.   Holbrook,  32  Ky.   L.  466  314 


Daggett   V.    Bonewitz,    107    Ind.    276 

208,  209 

Dailey   v.    Kastell,   56  Wis.   444  129 

V.   Kennedy,   64    Mich.   208  663 

Dale  V.  Griffith,  93  Miss.  573  192 

Dalton  V.  Taliaferro,  101  III.  App.  592      278 

Dana  v.  Wentworth,   111   Mass.  291  277 

Daniel  v.   Leitch,   13   C.rat.    (Va.)    195       657 

V.  Weaver,   5   Lea    (Tenn.)    392  536 

Daniels  v.   Densmore,  32  Nebr.  40  443 

V.   Lansdale,    43    Cal.    41  95 

Daniher    v.    Daniher,    201    III.    489  65 

Danlcy   v.    Rector,    10   Ark.    211  611 

Danncr   v.    Brewer,   69   Ala.    191  375 

V.   Shissler,    31    Pa.    St.    289  708 

Darby    v.    Mayer,    10    Wheat.    (U.    S.) 

465  492,   724 

Dart  V.  Woodhbuse.  40  Mich.  399  36 

Daugherty   v.    Deardorf,    107    Ind.    527     714 
D'Autremont     v.     Anderson     Iron     Co., 

104    Minn.    165  581 

Davenport  v.   Lamb,    13   Wall.    (U.    S.) 

418  198,  303 

V.  Sargent,   63   N.   H.    538  473 

Davenport,    In    re,    172    N.    Y.   454  711 

David    V.    Rickabaugh,    32    Iowa    540         119 

Davidson  v.   Coon,   125   Ind.   497 

459,  473,  525 
V.  Davidson    Real    Estate    &c.    Inv. 

Co.,  226  Mo.    1  678 

V.   Richmond,    24    Kv.    L.    699  722 

Davie     V.     Davie     (Ark.),     18     S.     W. 

935  722 

Davies  v.   Leete,   111   Ky.   659  583 

Davis  V.  Abstract  Construction  Co.,   121 

III.    App.    121  130 

V.  Bogle,  11  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  315  324 
V.   Davis,    61    Maine    395  325 

V.  Davis,    81    Vt.    259  578 

V.  Davis,    43    W.    Va.    300  458 

V.   Fogle,    124    Ind.    41  712 

V.  Green,    102    Mo.    170  65 

v.  Hayden,   9    Mass.    514  735 

v.   Headlcy.   22   N.   J.    Eq.    115  671 

V.   Hollingsworth,    113   Ga.   210  263 

V.  Hoover,    112    Ind.    423  361 

V.  Lane,    10   N.   H.    156  337 

V.  Laning,  85  Tex.  39  706 

V.   Lutkiewiez,    72    Iowa    254  118 

V.   McCullouch,    192    111.    277  66 

v.   Pursel,    55    Colo.    287  434 

V.  Steeps,  87  Wis.  472  580 

V.  Vanderveer,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  558  711 
V.  Van  Sands,  45  Conn.  600  451,  524 
V.  Ward,   109   Cal.    186  287 

V.   Watson,    54    Miss.    679  594 

V.  Whitaker,  114  N.  Car.  279  122,  132 
V.  William  Rosenzweig  Realty  Op- 
erating Co.,  192  N.  Y.  128  531 
V.  Windsor  Sav.  Bank,  46  Vt.  728  337 
V.  Wood.  161  Mo.  17  289 
Davis'   Estate,   In   re,    151    Cal.   318          -491 


Davis-Henderson    Lumber    Co.    v.  Gott- 

schalk,   81    Cal.   641  533 

Dawley   V.   Ayers,   23   Cal.    108  66 

V.   Brown,    79    N.     Y.    390  314,  688 


107 


327 
225 


Dawson  v.    Lawrence,   13   Ohio   543 
V.  Mayall,   45    Minn.   408 
V.   Western     Maryland    R.     Co., 
Md.    70 
Day   V.   Adams.   42   Vt.    510 
V.  Clark,   25    Vt.    397 
V.   Davey,    132    Mich.    173 
V.   Reynolds,  23   Hun    (N.   Y.)    131 
Deake's   Appeal,    In    re,   80    Maine   50 
Dean   v.    liittner,   77   Mo.    101 

V.  Long,    122    111.    447  58,  129,  273 

Dcane  v.  Hutchinson,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  83     121 
Dearnaley   v.   Chase,   136   Mass.   288  358 

Deason   v.   Taylor,    53   Miss.   697       129,  273 
Dcavitt   v.   Washington   County,    75   Vt. 

156 
De  la  Croix  v.  Chamberlain,  12  Wheat. 

(U.  S.)    599 
De    Lancey    Stables    Co.,     In     re,     170 

Fed.    860 
De  Land  v.  Dixon  &c.  Lighting  Co.,  225 

111.   212 
DeLane    v.    Moore,    14    How.    (U.    S.) 

253 
Delano  v.    Bruerton,   148   Mass.   619 
Delaplaine   v.   Jones,   8   N.   J.^  L.    340 
Delashmutt    v.    Parrent,    40    Kans.    641 
De  Lassus  v.   Faherty,   164   Mo.   361 
Delaunay  v.   Burnett,   9   III.   454 
Delavan   v.    W'right,    110   Mich.    143 
Delaware   &    H.    Canal    Co.    v.    Hughes, 

183   Pa.    St.   66 
Delaware  &c.  R.  Co's.  Tax  Assessment, 

In   re,  224  Pa.   240 
De  Leon  v.  Higuera,  15  Cal.  483 
Delles    v.    Second    Nat.    Bank,    7    Wyo. 

66 
Del   Notaro  v.   Douglas,  55  Wash.  493 
Den    v.    Drake,    14    N.    T.    L.    523 
V.   Durham,   29    N.    Car.    151 
V.  Roberts,   4    N.   J.    L.    315 
V.  Smith,    10   N.    J.    L.   46 
V.  Urison,   2   N.  J.   L.   212 
Dendy  v.  Waite.  36  S.  Car.  569 
De  Nefe  v.  Agency  City,  143  Iowa  237 
Denison    v.    Denison,    185    N.    Y.    438 
Dennis   v.    Atlanta    Nat.    Bldg.    &    Loan 
Assn.,    136    Fed.    539 
V.  Holsapple,    148    Ind.    297 
Dennison  v.  Page,  29  Pa.  St.  420 
Denny    v.    Cotton,    3    Tex.    Civ.     App. 
634 
V.  Dodson,  32   Fed.   899 
Densmore  v.   Savage,   110  Mich.  27 
Denton     v.     Nashville     Title     Co.,     112 

Tenn.  320  15,  19 

Denver  v.  Knowles,  17  Colo.  204  647 

Denver   &    R.    G.    R.    Co.    v.    Doelz,    49 

Colo.  48  694 

Denzler  v.  O'Keefe,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  361       428 
DeCamp  v.  Dobbins,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  671     458 
De  Castro  v.    Barrv,   18  Cal.   96 
Decker  v.   Boice,  83   N.   Y.  220 
V.   Fessler,    146   Ind.    16 
V.   Freeman,    3    Maine    338 
V.   Patton,    120   III.    464 
Decoster  v.   Wing,   76   Maine   450 
Dee  V.    King,    77   Vt.   230 
Deem  v.   Millikin,   53  Ohio   St.   668 
Deere  v.  Chapman.  25   III.   610 
Deering   v.    Tucker.    55    Maine    284 
De   Farges  v.    Ryland,  87   Va.   404 
De   France  v.  Johnson,  26   Fed.   891 
De  Geoffrey  v.  Riggs,   133  U.   S.  258 


275 
66 
126 
638 
22 
456 
186 


110 
189 


380 

698 

123 
89 
730 
714 
103 
197 
315 

693 

630 
421 

229 
669 

51 
615 
123 

48 
730 
357 
244 

59 

434 
481 
719 

103 
191 
436 


728 
110 
593 
331 
672 
708,  727 
61 
733 
66 
40 
99 
65 
458 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXXVU 


St. 


De  Hatre  v.  Edmonds,  200  Mo.  246 
De   Haven's  Appeal,   In   re,   38   Pa.    St 

37i  349 

De  Mares  v.  Gilpin,  15  Colo.  76  106 

Deming  v.   Miles,   35   Nebr.   739  64 

Demps  V.  Hogan,  57  Fla.   60  668 

Dempsey  v.   Poore,   75   \V.  Va.   107  736 

Depere  v.   Reynen,   65   Wis.   271  408 

Depue  V.  Miller,  65  W.  Va.  120  64,  699 
Dequindre  v.  Williams,  31  Ind.  444  650 
Dersheimer    v.    Maloney,    143    Pa.    St. 

532  534 

Des    Moines    &c.    Real    Estate    Co.    v. 

Beale,   78  111.  App.  40  25 

Despatch    Line   Co.    v.    Bellamy   Manuf. 

Co.,   12   N.   H.  205  337 

Detrick  v.    Migatt,    19   111.    146  721 

Detroit  v.  Jepp,   52   Mich.   458  636 

Detroit  &  B.   Plank  Rd.   Co.  v.   Detroit 

Suburban   R.    Co.,    103    Mich.    585  62 

Detroit  City  R.   Co.  v.   Mills,  85   Mich. 

634 
DeVaughn    v.    Hutchinson,    165    U.    S. 

566 
Devereux    v.    McMahon,    102    N.    Car. 
284 
V.  McMahon,   108  N.   Car.   134 
Devine  v.   Lord,   175  Mass.   384 
Devine's  Estate,  In  re,  199  Pa.  250 
Devinney    v.    Reynolds,    1    Watts    &    S. 

(Pa.)    328 
Devlin   V.    Commonwealth,    101    Pa 

273 
Dew  V.   Kuehn,   64   Wis.   293 
Dewey  v.   Sugg,   109   N.   Car.   328 

V.   Kimball,    89    Minn.    454 
DeWitt    V.    Elmira    Transfer    Co.,    134 

N.   Y.   495 
DeWolf  V.  A.  &  W.  Sprague  Mfg.  Co., 
49   Conn.    282 
V.  Lawson,    61    Wis.    469 
V.   Pratt,   42   111.    198 
Dexter  v.  Arnold,   Fed.   Cas.  No.  3857 
V.  Evans,   63   Conn.   58 
V.  Hayes,   88   Iowa  493 
V.  Nelson,   6   Ala.    68 
V.  Tree,    117   111.    532 
Dey  V.  Dunham,  2  Johns.  Ch.   (N.  Y.) 

182 
Dezendorf  v.   Humphreys,  95  Va.   473 
De  Zeng  v.    Beekman,   2   Hill    (N.   Y.) 

489 
Diament  v.  Lore,  31  N.  J.  L.  220 
Diamond    v.    Turner,    11    Wash.    189 

347,  622 
Diana  Shooting  Club  v.  Lamoreux,  114 

Wis.  44 
Dickens  v.    Mahana,   21    How.    (U.    S.) 

276 
Dickerson  v.  Bowers,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  295 
V.   Carroll,    76    Ala.    377 
v.  Colgrove,   100  U.   S.   578 
V.  Talbot,    53    Ky.    60 
Dickerson,   In  re.   111   N.   Car.   108 
Dickinson   v.    Chesapeake   R.   Co.,   7   W. 
Va.  390 
_  V.   Hayes,   31    Conn.   417 
Dickinson's    Appeal,    In    re,    42    Conn. 

491 
Dickie  V.  Abstract  Co.,  89  Tenn.  431 

9    15    22 
V.  Nashville  Abstract  Co.,   89  Tenn. ' 

431  27 

Dickman   v.    Rirhauser,    16   Nebr.   686         66 
Dieterlen  v.    Miller,    114  App.    Div.    (N 

Dietrich   v.    Hutchinson,   73   Vt.    134 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 
697 


110 

456 

282 
280 
110 
466 

335 

90 

49 

134,  567 

955,  956 

227 

441 
484 
119 
672 
480 
451 
314 
102 

673 
320 


331 

470 


207 

208 
117 
530 
97 
99 
362 

25 
583 

719 


190 


286 

99 

663 

108 
471 
525 
385 
128 
737 
196 
595,  597 
433 

75 
126 
534 
546 

12 


378 
433 
483 
669 
66 


277 
322 


Dietz   v.    Farish,   44    N.    Y.    Super.    Ct 

190 
Digman  v.  McCollum,  47  Mo.  372 
Dikeman   v.    Struck,   76   Wis.   332 
Dikes  v.   Miller,   24  Tex.  417 
Dildine  v.    Dildine,   32    N.   J.    Eq.    78 
Dill  V.  Wisner,  88  N.  Y.   153 
Dillard,   In   re,   2   Hughes    (N.    S.) 
Dillaway  v.   Butler,   135   Mass.  479 
Dille  v.  Webb,  61   Ind.   85 
Dillingham  v.  Fisher,  5  Wis.  475 
Dills   v.    Jasper,    33    111.    262 
Dimon   v.    Dunn,    15    N..  Y.   498 
Dingey   v.   Paxton,   60   Miss.    1038 
Dingley  v.   Bon.   130  N.   Y.  607 

v.   Greene,    54   Cal.    333 
Di  Nola  V.  Allison,   143  Cal.   106 
Dirks   V.    Collin,    37    Wash.    620 
Dittemore  v.   Cable   Mill  Co.,    16   Idaho 

298 
Dixie  Grain  Co.  v.  Quinn,  181  Ala.  208 
Dixon  V.   Cooper,  88  Tenn.   177 

V.   Hunter,    204    Mo.    382 
Doane   v.    Doane,    46    Vt.    485 

V.  Willcutt,  5  Gray   (Mass.)   328 

279,  303 
Dochterman  v.  Marshall,  92  Miss.  747  272 
Dodd     v.     Bartholomew,     44    Ohio     St. 

171  262 

V.  Williams,  3  Mo.  App.  278 

8.  9,  10,  18,  161 

Dodge  v.  Beeler,  12  Kans.  524  87 

v.   Davis,    85    Iowa    77  692 

V.  Silverthorn,   12   Wis.   644  119 

Dodson  V.  Cincinnati,  34  Ohio  St.  276     110 

Doe  v.  Bates,  6  Blackf.   (Ind.)   533 

111,  719 
V.  Beck,    108    Ala.    71  196,  197 

V.  Carrol,    16   Ala.    148  67 

V.  Considine,   6   Wall.    (U.   S.)   458     469 
V.  Doe,  52  Hun   (N.  Y.)  405  676 

V.   Dugan.    8    Ohio    87 
V.   Errington,    6    Bing.    N.    Cas.    79 
V.   Henderson,   4    Ga.    148 
V.    Jackson,    51    Ala.    514 
V.   Lazenby,    1    Ind.  234 
V.  Reed,  5   111.   117 
V.   Stephenson,  9   Ind.    144 
V.  Willetts,  7  Mann.  Gr.  &  S.  709 
Doebler's  Appeal,   In  re,   64  Pa.   St.  9 
Dolan   V.    Scott,   25    Wash.    214 
Donahue  v.   Hubbard,   154   Mass 

V.   Mills,    41    Ark.   421 
Donald  v.   Beals,  57  Cal.  399 

v.  Hewitt,   33   Ala.    534 
Donaldson  v.  Lamprey,  29  Minn.   18 

V.   Winningham,   48   Wash.   374 
Donegan  v.   Donegan.  103  Ala.  488 
Donlon  v.   Evans,  40  Minn.   501 
Donnan     v.     Intelligence     Printing    &C- 

Co.,  70  Mo.  168 
Donnell    v.    Wright,    147    Mo.    639 
Donnelly  v.  Eastes,  94  Wis.  390 
Donnelly,   In   re,    125   Cal.   417 
Donnelly's   Estate,   In   re,   125   Cal.  417 
Donogan  v.   Griffith,   215   Mo.   149 
Donohue  v.   McNichol,  61   Pa.   St.   73 
Donough   V.    Garland,   269   111.    565 
Donovan   v.   Griffith,  215   Mo.    149 
V.     Major,  253  111.   179 
V.   Pitcher,    53    Ala.    411 
Dooley  v.   Greening,   201   Mo.   343 

V.  Watson,   1   Gray    (Mass.)   414 
Doolittle  V.   Cook,   75   111.   354 
Doran   v.    Beale,    106   Miss.   305 

V.   Kennedy,    122    Minn.    1 
Doren  v.   Gillum,   136  Ind.   134 


537 


288 

99 

360 

362 

732 

306 

195 

467 

47 

51 

321 

126 

122,  128 

417 

66 

66 

321 

398 


423 

98,  575 

54 

706 

706 

64 

54 

737 

64 

90 

75 

65 

671 

692 

724 

722 

274,  312 


XXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.'] 


Dorkray   v.    Noble,   8   Greenl.    (Maine) 


278 


601 


Ind. 


Dorr  V.  Johnson,   170   Mass.    540 
Dorrance    v.    Ravnsford,    67    Conn.    1 
Dorsey   v.    Dodson.   203    III.   32 
Doswell    V.    Buchanan,    3    Leigh    (Va.) 

365 
Doton  V.  Russell,   17  Conn.   146 
Doty  V.   Deposit  Bldg.  &  L.  Assn.,   103 
Kv.   710 
V.  Hulibard,    55   Vt.    278 
V.   Sandusky    Cement    Co.,    46    Ind. 

App.   440       • 
V.  Teller,    54    N.    J.    L.    163 
Douglas  V.   Cameron,  47   Nebr.   358 
V.  Lewis,   131   U.   S.   75  278, 

V.   St.   Louis  Zinc   Co.,   56  Mo.   388 
Douglass  V.   Dickson,  31   Kans.   310 
V.  Douglass    Bagging    Co.,    94    Mo. 

226 

t.  Durin,    51    Maine    121 

V.   Lowell,    64    Kans.    533 

V.  McCrackin,   52   Ga.    596 

Dousman    v.    Hooe,    3    Wis.    466 

Douthitt  V.   MacCuIsky,   11   Wash. 

V.   Stinson,    63    Mo.    268 
Dow   V.   Dow,   36   Maine   211 
Dowdy  V.    McArthur,   94  Ga.   577 
Dowell    V.    Talbot    Pav.    Co.,    138 

675 
Downend  v.  Kansas  City,   156  Mo.  60 
Downer    v.    Smith,    38    Vt.    464 
Downing  v.   Nicholson,   115   Iowa  493 
Doyle    V.    Hays    Land    &    Inv.    Co.,    80 
Kans.    209 
V.  Mellen.    15    R.   I.    523 
V.  San    Diego    Land    Co.,    46    Fed. 

709 
V.  Stevens,  4  Mich.  87 
V.  Wade,    25    Fla.    90 
Drain  v.  Violett,  2  Bush   (Ky.)    155 
Drake   v.    Drake,    134    N.    Y.    220 
V.   Ellman,    80    Ky.    434 
V.  Hale,    38    Mo.    346 
V.  McLean,   47   Mich.    102 
V.  Moore,   66   Iowa   58 
V.  Reggel,   10  Utah   376 
V.  Root,   2   Colo.   685 
V.  Steele,    242    111.    301 
Draper   v.   Bradley,    126   N.   Car.   72 
Dresel  v.  Jordan,  104  Mass.  407 

V.  King,    198    Mass.    546 
Drew  V.  Wakefield,  54  Maine  291 
Drey  v.   Doyle,  99  Mo.  459 
Driscoll  V.   Green,  59   N.   H.   101 
V.   New  Haven,  75  Conn.  92 
Driskell    v.    Hanks,    18    B.    Mon. 

855 
Driver   v.    Spence,   1    Ala.    540 
Dronillard  v.   Whistler,   29   Ind.   552 
Druccker   v.    McLaughlin,    235    111.    367 
Drury  v.    Drury,   271    111.    336 

V.   Mickelberrv,   144   Mo.   App.   212 
Dryer  v.   Crawford.  90  Ala.    131 
Dublin  y.  Chadbourn,  16  Mass.  433 
Dubreuil    v.    Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,    130 

Ind.    137 
Dubuque   Nat.   Bank  v.   Weed,   57   Fed. 

513 
Dudley    v.    Dudley,    76    Wis.    567 

V.  Strain    (Tex.   Civ.    App.),    130    S. 
W.    778 
Duff  V.  Combs.   132  Ky.   710 
Duffy    V.    Jarvis.    84    Fed.    731 

V.   Shirden,    139    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.) 
755  955. 

Dufphey  v.  Frenaye,  5  St.  &  P.   (Ala.) 
215 


437 
476 
599 
483 


563, 


(Ky.) 


99 

429 

654 
362 

390 
48 
710 
304 
538 
639 

443 
437 
639 
545 
186 
536 
329 
463 
262 

647 
239 
638 

471 

669 

423 

329 
125 
723 
712 
712 
375 
617 
621 
66 
121 
520 
470 
725 
265 
483 
485 
692 
291 
110 

708 
348 
553 
276 
722 
25 
471 
492 

655 

310 
65 

100 

568 

48 

956 

120 


Dugan   v.   Follett,   100  111.   581  657 

v.   Harman,   80   Kans.    302  614 

Duke  V.   Culpepper,   72   Ga.   842  421 

V.   Harper,    6    Yerg.     (Tenn.)     280  51 

Dukes  V.  Faulk,  37  S.  Car.  255  714 
Dulin  V.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  69  S. 

W.    94  46 

Dull's  Estate,  In  re,  222  Pa.  208  484 
Duluth  &  I.  R.  Co.  V.  Roy,  173  U.   S. 

587  222 

Dun  v.  Dietrich.  3  N.  Dak.  3  278 

Duncan  v.   De  Yampert,   182  Ala.   528  466 

V.   Cainev,   108   Ind.   579                  359,  602 

v.   Stewart,  25  Ala.   408  90 

V.   Tcrrc    Haute,    85    Ind.    104  325 

V.   Wallace,    114    Ind.    169  473 

Duncklee   v.   Webber,    151    Mass.    408  50 

Dundee   Mtg.    Co.    v.    Hughes,   20    Fed. 

39  15,  22 

Dungan  v.  American  Life  Ins.  &c.  Co., 

52    Pa.    St.    253  123 

Dunham  v.  Averill,  45   Conn.  61  455 

V.  Hartman,    153    Mo.    625  595 
v.  W.    Steele    Packing   &c.    Co.,    100 

Mich.   75  439 

Dunkle  V.   Elston,   71   Ind.   585  660 

Dunklec  v.   Crane,   103   Mass.  470  535 

Dunlap    V.    Green.    60    Fed.    242  328 

V.   Robinson,   28   Ala.    100  458 

Dunn  V.   Eaton,  92  Tenn.   743  699 
V.  Houghton    (N.    J.    Eq.),    51    Atl. 

71  453 

V.  Ketchum,   38  Cal.   93  185 

V.  Oettinger,  148  N.  Car.  276  446 

V.   Rothermel,    112    Pa.    St.    272  51 

V.   Snell,    74    Maine    22  638 
V.   Taylor    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    107    S. 

W.  952  270 

v.   White,    1    Ala.    645  651 

Dunning,   In  re,  48  Misc.    (N.  Y.)   482  87 

Dunster   v.   Kelly,   110   N.   Y.    558  70 

Dupce  v.    Rose,    10  Utah    305  442 

V.   Salt     Lake     &c.     Trust     Co.,     20 

Utah   103  545 

Duperier   v.    Berard,    107   La.    91  491 

Dupont  V.   Wortheman,   10  Cal.   354  309 

Durant  v.   Crowd],  97  N.  Car.  367  127 

v.   Mullcr,    88    Ga.    251  48 

v.   Ritchie,   Fed.   Cas.    No.   4190  58 

Durfee  v.  McNeil,  58  Ohio  St.  238  476 

v.   Pomeroy,    154    N.    Y.    583  470 

Durkheimer  v.  Copperopolis  Copper  Co., 

55    Ore.    37  533 
Durkin   v.   Cobleigh,    156   Mass.    108 

105,  244 

Durling  v.   Stillwell,  74  N.   T.   Eq.  697  565 

Durr   v.    Wilson,    116   Ala.    125  60 

Durrett   v.   Stewart,   88   Ky.   665  636 

Dutch's  Appeal.  In  re.  57  Pa.   St.  461  737 

Dutro  v.   Kennedy,  9  Mont.   101  593 

Dutton  v.   Ives,   5   Mich.    515  '428 

Duval   V.    Wilmer,   88   Md.    66  434 

Duvale    v.    Duvalc,    54    N.    T.    Eq.    581  401 

Duvall   V.    Parker,   2    Duv.    (Kv.)    182  699 

Dwenger  v.  Geary,   113  Ind.   106  354 

Dwight   v.    Merritt,   4    Fed.    614  659 

v.  Newell.  3  N.  Y.   185  565 

Dwinel  v.   Perley,   32  Maine  197  437 

Dve  v.   Thompson,    126   Mich.   597  99 

Dyer    v.    Brannoch.    66    Mo.    391  719 

v.  Clark,    5    Mete.    (Mass.)    562  65 

v.   Eldridge.     136     Ind.     654  699 

Dyson  v.   Simmons,  48  Md.  207  417 


E 

Earle  v.  Fiske,  103  Mass.  491 
Earlv    Tinies    Distillery    Co.    v.    Zeiger, 
n'  N.   Mex.  221 


118 
119 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


XXXIX 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


711, 

718, 


122,  125, 


East   V.   Pugh,    71    Iowa    162 

Eastern    Oregon    Land    Co.    v.    Brosnan, 

147    Fed.    807 
Easterling  v.    Chiles,   93   Ky.   315 
Eastes   v.    W'alley,   51   Colo.    166 
East    Jersey    Iron    Co.    v.    Wright,     32 

N.  J.   Eq.  248 
East   Lewisburg  Lumber  &   Mfg.   Co.   v. 

Marsh,   91   Pa.   St.   96 
Eastman  v.   Perkins,   111   Mass.  30 
Easton    v.    Montgomery,    90    Cal.    307 

25,  26,  27,  395, 
East   Tennessee   Iron   &c.    Co.    v.    \\'ig- 

gin,  68   Fed.   446 
East  St.  Louis  v.   Davis,  233   111.   553 
Eatman  v.   Eatman,  83   Ala.  478 
Eaton  V.  Cheseborough,  82  Mich.  214 

V.   Robbins,   29    Minn.    329 

V.   Straw,    18    N.    H.    320 

V.  Trowbridge,    38    Mich.    454 

V.  Whiting,  3   Pick.    (Mass.)   484 
Eayrs    v.    Nason,    54    Nebr.    143 
Eble  V.   State,   77  Kans.   179 
Economy   Bldg.  &c.   Assn.  v.   West  Jer- 
sey  Title   Co.,    64    N.   J.    L.    27 
Ector    V.    Grant.    112    Ga.    557 
Eddie  V.    Eddie,   8   N.   Dak.    376 
Eddy  V.   Winchester,   60   N.   H.   63 
Edmundson   v.    State,    17   Ala.    179 
Edwards   v.    Barksdale,   2   Hill   Eq.    (S 
Car.)   416 

V.  Barwise,    69   Tex.    84 

V.  Bender,   121   Ala.   77 

V.   Bibb,    54   Ala.    475 

V.   Butler,    89    Miss.    179 

V.  Clark,    83    Mich.    246 

V.  McKernan,    55    Mich.    520 
Edwardsville     R.     Co.     v.     Sawyer,    92 

111.    377 
Effinger  v.  Hall,  81  Vt.  94 
Ege   V.    Hering,    108    Md.    391 
Eggers   V.    Busch,    154    111.    604 
Eggleston     v.     Harrison,    61     Ohio     St. 
397  119, 

V.  Watson,   53   Miss.   339 
Ehle    V.    Quackenboss,    6    Hill    (N.    Y.) 

537 
Ehmer  v.  Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co., 

156  N.  Y.  10 
Ehrenstrom  v.  Phillips,  9  Del.  Ch.  74 
Ehrman  v.  Alabama  Mineral   Land   Co., 

109  Ala.   478 
Eichengreen  v.  Appel,  44  111.  App.  19 
Eikelman  v.   Perdew,   140  Cal.   687 
Eisendrath    Co.    v.     Gebhardt,    222     111. 

113 
Eldridge  v.  Binghamton,  120  N.  Y.  309 
Elizabethtown    Sav.   Inst.  v.   Gerber,   34 

N.   J.   Eq.    130 
Ellerd  V.   Cox,   52  Tex.   Civ.  App.   60 
Ellerson   v.   Wescott,    148   N.   Y.    149 
Ellicott  V.  Pearl,   10  Pet.    (U.   S.)   412 
Ellinger  v.   Thomas,   64   Kans.   180 
Elliott   V.    Delaney,   217   Mo.    14 

V.  Dvcke,   78  Ala.    150 

V.  Elliott,   117   Ind.   380 

V.  Osborn,    1   Harr.   &   McH.    (Md.) 
146 

V.  Sackett,   108  U    S.   132 

V.  Wood,  45   N.   Y.   71 
Ellis  V.    Bashor,    17   Idaho   259 

V.  Davis,    109    U.    S.    485 

V.   Dumond,    259    111.    483 

V.  Harrison,    140   N.    Car.   444 

V.   Kyger,    90   Mo.    600 

V.  Leek,   127  III.   60 

V.  Sisson,  96   111.    105 

V.  Smith,    112    Ga.    480 


492, 


289 

210 
562 
716 

62 

334 
406 

398 

108 
502 
730 
632 
66 
60 
286 
441 
576 
698 

16 
730 
719 
376 
581 

730 
129 
466 
65 
208 
529 
119 

45 
434 
474 

77 

124 
120 

75 

773 
671 

428 
52 

421 

538 
694 

584 
185 
733 
690 
66 
47 
623 
458 

335 
390 
442 
443 
651 
734 
87 
65 
447 
546 
699 


Ellis 

V.  Young,   31    S.   Car.   322  692 

Ellison  V.   Barnstrator,   153   Ind.    146  240 

V.  Jackson   Water   Co..    12   Cal.    542     533 

Ellsworth    V.    Hale,    33   Ark.    633  51 

V.  Low,   62   Iowa   178  640 

Elmslie's    Estate,    In    re,    10    Pa.    Dist. 

397  483 

EI  Paso  Gas,  Electric  Light  &  Power 
Co.  V.  El  Paso,  22  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
309  504 

EIrod    V.    Owensboro    Wagon    Co.,    128 

Ga.   361  639 

Elterman  v.  Hyman,  192  N.  Y.  113  531 

Eltzroth  V.   Ryan,  89   Cal.   135  223 

Elwell   V.    Universalist   General   Conven- 
tion,  76  Tex.   514  481 
Ely  v.   Ellinton,   7   Mo.   302  183 
V.   Ferguson,   91    Cal.    187  109 
V.   Mathews,  58  Misc.   (N.  Y.)   365       664 
V.   Wilcox,    20   Wis.    523  132 
Elyton    Land    Co.    v.    Denny,    108    Ala. 

553  687 

V.  South   &  N.   A.   R.   Co.,   100  Ala. 

396  276 

Emblen,  In  re,  161  U.   S.  52  229 

Emerson  v.   Burgin,   76  Cal.   197  62 

V.  Galloupe,   158  Mass.   146  339 

V.   Mooney,   50  N.   H.   315  506 

V.   White,   29   N.   H.   482  738 

Emerson's   Homestead,   In  re,   58   Minn. 

450  66 

Emeric  v.  Alvarado,  90  Cal.  444  126,  644 
Empire   State  Surety  Co.  v.   Ballou,   66 

Wash.    76  654 

Emslie   v.   Young,   24   Kans.    732  196 

Enewold  v.   Olsen,   39   Nebr.   59  581 

Engel  v.  Ayer,  85  Maine  448  275,  506 
Engel's  Estate,  In  re,  180  Pa.  St.  215  476 
English  v.  Waples,   13  Iowa  57  126 

Enslen  v.   Allen,    160   Ala.    529  671 

Ensley    v.    Coolbaugh,    160    Mich.    299      643 

v.   Page,    13    Colo.    App.    452 
Entwhistle  v.   Plenke,  211   111.  273 
Enyard   v.    Enyard,    190   Pa.    St.    114 
Enyeart  v.    Kepler,   118   Ind.   34 
Equitable    Bldg.    &c.    Assn.    v.    Bank   of 
Commerce,    118   Tenn.    678 

5,  16,  17,  19,  22 
Equitable   Securities   Co.   v.    Green,    113 

Ga.    1013 
Equitable    Sureties     Co.     v.     Sheppard, 

78   Miss.    217 
Erck  V.   Church,   87  Tenn.   575 
Erickson    v.    ConniflF,    19    S.    Dak.   41 
Erie   R.   Co.   v.    Steward,    59   App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   187 
Ernst  v.    Freeman,   129   Mich.    271 
Erskine   v.    Moulton,    66    Maine  276 

104,  241 
Erwin  v.  Lewis,  32  Wis.   276  126 

Estate  of  Alabone,  In  re,  75  N.  J.  Eq. 

527  484 

Alexander,  In  re,  149  Cal.  146  477 

Armstrong,    In    re,    2    Pa.    Co.    Ct. 

166  487 

Bacon,  In  re,  262  Pa.   535  714 

Barnes,    In   re,   47    Okla.    117  724 

Benson,  In  re,   169  Pa.   St.   602  481 

Blake,  In  re,   134   Pa.   St.   240  473 

Breg,   In  re,   71   Minn.   11  710 

Bruch,  In  re.   185   Pa.   St.   194  477 

Carpenter,    In    re,    170    Pa.    203  733 

Colbert's,   In   re,   44  Mont.   259  86 

Cremer's,   In   re,   156   Pa.    St.   40  87 

Curry,   In   re,   39   Cal.    529  717 

Davis,    In    re,    151    Cal.    318  491 

Devine,  In  re,  199  Pa.  250  466 


357 

62 

521 

321 


546 

594 
691 
284 

677 
87 


xl 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Seclious 


Estate  of 

Donnelly,  In  re.  125  Cal.  417  706 

Dull.    In    re.    222    Pa.    208  484 

Elnislie,    10   Pa.    Dist.   397  483 

Engel,   In   re,    180   Pa.   St.   215  476 

Eair,    In    re,    132    Cal.    523  59 

Gill,    In    re,    79    Iowa    296  732 

Grandjean,   In  re,  78  Nebr.  349  722 

Granniss,   In   re,    142   Cal.    1  485 

Hatch.    In    re,    62    Vt.    300  66 
Hevwood,    In   re,    148   Cal.    184     59,  480 

Glass,    In    re,    164    Cal.    765  458 

Icreniy,   In  re,   178  Pa.   St.   477  46 

kane.  In  re,  38  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  276  87 

Kininnl.   In  re.  226  Pa.  47  100 

Kissel,  In  re.  65  Misc.  (N.  Y.)  443  631 

Kuhn,   In    re,    125    Iowa   449  733 

Kurtz,   In   re,   145   Pa.   St.  637  466 

Lawrence,  In   re,   136  Pa.   St.  354  482 

Learned.    In   re,   70  Cal.    140  456 

Lewis,   In  re,   32   La.   Ann.   385  456 

McGraw.   In  re.   Ml   N.   Y.   66  458 

McKenna,   In   re,    168   Cal.   339  730 

Markle,   In  le,   187  Pa.   St.  639  471 

Marrow,    In    re,    204    Pa.    479  487 

Nevins,   In   re,    192    Pa.    St.    258  59 

North,   In   re,  48  Conn.   583  727 

Noyes,  In  re,  40  Mont.    178  457 

Pappleton,  In  re,  34  Utah  285  477 

Peet,    In    re,    99    Iowa    314  473 

Phillip,   In   re,   205   Pa.    504  459 

Pluiiiel,   In  re,   151   Cal.   77  455 
Rash,  In  re  (Pa.),  2  Pars.  Eq.  Cas. 

160  40 

Reith,   In   re,   144   Cal.   314  480 

Robert,    In    re,    84   Wash.    163  717 

Roberts,   In   re,   163    Pa.   St.   408  473 

Robinson,   In   re.   149  Pa.   St.  418  48 

Rogers,  In  re,  131  Pa.   St.  871  87 

Rose,   In   re,    63    Cal.    346  583 

Russell,   In   re,   150  Cal.   604  483 
Ryan,    In   re,    14   Wkly.    Notes   Cas. 

(Pa.)    79  716 

Schedel,   In   re,   73   Cal.   594  466 

Shillaher,   In  re.   74  Cal.    144  487 

Smith,   In  re,   131   Cal.  433  730 
Smith,   In   re,   144  Pa.   St.   428 

59,  338,  339,  480 
Soulard,  In  re,  141  Mo.   642  59,  480 

Spring,   In   re,   216   Pa.    529  59 

Sternberg,   In   re,   94   Iowa  305  491 

Sullivan,  In  re,  48  Wash.  631  726 

Swenson,  In  re,  55   Minn.  300  471 

Thompson,  In  re,  6  S.  Dak.  576  735 

Tobin,   In  re,   139   Wis.   494  436 

Tomlinson,  In  re,  133  Pa.  St.  166  487 

\\alin,   In  re,   189  Pa.   St.  631  483 

Walker,  In  re,  5  Ariz.   70  719 

Walker,  In  re,   110  Cal.   387  457 
Walkerly,  In  re,  108  Cal.  627 

43.  482,  484 

Wells,  In  re,  69  Vt.  388  583 

Young,   In   re,    123   Cal.    337  487 

Esterly's   Appeal,    109   Pa.    St.   222  90 

Estes  V.   Nicholson,   39   Fla.   759  731 

V.  Odom,   91   Ga.   600  257 

Estlow  V.   Hanna,  75   Mich.  219  553 

Espy    V.    Anderson,    14    Pa.    St.    308 

26,  27,  30 

Esty  V.   Baker,  48  Maine  495  408 
E.  T.  Arnold  &  Co.  v.  Earner,  91  Kans. 

768  14 

Ettridge  v.  Bassett,  136  Mass.  314  535 

Eubanks  v.  Becton,  158  N.  Car.  230  442 

Evans  v.  Anderson,  15  Ohio  St.  324  492 

V.  Ashe,  50  Tex.  Civ.  App.  54  394 

V.   Fisher,   40   Miss.    643  7-36 

V.  Frisbie,  84  Tex.  341  614 


Evans 

V.  Holinan,   244    111.    596  426 

V.   Mcngel,  3  Pa.   St.  239  120 

V.   Taylor,    177    Pa.    St.    286  6 

Evansville    Ice   &    Cold    Storage   Co.    v. 

Winsor,    148    Ind.    682  119,  456 

Everitt   v.   Evcritt,   71    Iowa  221  65 

Everson   v.    State,   66   Nebr.    154  350 

Evitts   V.    Roth,   61    Tex.    81  119 

Ewing  V.  Burnet,  11  Pet.   (U.  S.)   41  689 

V.   Nesbitt,   88   Kans.   708  48 

V.  Shannahan,    113    Mo.    188 

45,  338,  340 
Exchange  Bank  Tax  Cases,  21  Fed.  99  645 
Ex  pane  Clark,  87  Cal.   638  718 

Foster,    2    Story    (U.    S.),    131     523,   552 
Gordan,   92   Cal.   478  650 

Harris,    26    Fla.    77  89 

Howard-Harrison   Iron  Co.,   119  Ala. 

484  580 

Karish,   32   S.    Car.   437  66 

Rice,   102   Ala.   671  98 

Watkins,  3  Pet.    (U.  S.)    193  650 

Yarborough,    110   U.    S.    651  .       650 

Exploration    Mercantile    Co.    v.    Pacific 

&c.    Steel    Co.,    177    Fed.    825  380 

Exum   V.   Brister,   35   Miss.   391  222 


Factors'  &  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Murphy, 

lll.U.  S.  738  428 

Fagan   v.    Hook,    134   Iowa   381  3,  7 

V.  Stuttgart     Normal     Institute,     91 

Ark.    141  100 

Fail  V.   Goodtitle,   1   111.   201  349 

l-'air   V.    Brown,    40   Iowa   209  638 

Fairbanks  v.   San  Francisco  &c.  R.  Co., 

115   Cal.   579  693 

l-"airman  v.   Bacon,  8  Conn.  418  98 

Fair's  Estate,  In  re,  132  Cal.  523  59 

Faith  V.   Bowles,   86  Md.   13  276 

Faivre  v.  Daley,  93  Cal.  664  291 

Falkner   v.   Jones,    12   Ala.    165  119 

I'allon   V.    Chidester,   46   Iowa   588  492 

Falls    City     Lumber    Co.    v.     Watkins, 

53    Ore.    212  100 

Falls  of  Neuse  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Brooks,  106 

N.   Car.   107  73 

Falcon  v.   Flannery,  74  Minn.  38  60 

Fannin  Co.  v.  Riddle.  51  Tex.  360  100 

Fanning   v.    Doan,    128    Mo.    323  48 

V.   Krapfl.   61    Iowa   417  581 

Faran   v.    Robinson.    17   Ohio    St.   242        736 
Fargo  V.   Miller,   150  Mass.  225  729 

Farish   v.   Coon,   40  Cal.   33  100 

Farley   v.    Eller,    29    Ind.    322  322 

V.  McKeegan,    48    Nebr.    237  53 

Farmer  v.  Ward,  75  N.  J.  Eq.  33  638 

Farmers'  Bank  v.   Ileighe,  3   Md.   357     566 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust   Co.  v.   Carroll, 

5    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    613  59 

V.   Iowa  Water   Co.,   80   Fed.   467  89 

V.  Maltby.   8  Paige   (N.   Y.)   361       8,  99 
Farmers  &  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
sen,   58   Nebr.    522  58 
Farmers    &    Merchants'    Nat.    Bank    v. 

Wallace,  45   Ohio  St.  152  321 

Farmers'    Nat.     Bank    v.     Fletcher,    44 

Iowa  252  551 

Farnam  v.  Farnam,  83  Conn.  369  473 

Farnan  v.  Borders,  119  HI.  228  108 

Farnum  v.   Peterson,  111   Mass.   148  314 

Farr    v.    Flood,    11    Cush.    (Mass.)    24       89 
Farrar  v.    Dean,  24   Mo.    16  732 

Farrell  v.   Bouck,  60  Nebr.   771  578 

V.   Enright,    12    Cal.   450  732 

V.  Lewis,    56    Conn.    280  436,  439 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xli 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Farrell  ^  „ 

V.   Lockhart,    210   U.    S.    142  108 

Farrell,    In    re,    176    Fed.    505  375 
Faught   V.    Faught,   98    Ind.    470 

492,  651,  678 

Faulkner  v.   Adams,    126   Ind.   459  265 
Fauntleroy's  Heirs  v.  Dunn,  3  B.  Mon. 

(Ky.)    594                                             106,  307 

Fawcett  v.  Mitchell,  133  Ky.  361  371 

Faxon  v.  United  States,  171  U.  S.  244  214 
Fayette  L.  Co.  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co., 

93    Va.    274  113 
Fechheimer    v.     Hollander,     21     D.     C. 

76  375 
Federal    St.    &    P.    V.    Pass.    R.    Co.    v. 

Pittsburg,   226  Pa.  419  630 

Feinberg  v.   Stearns,  56  Fla.  279  565 

Feit  V.   Richard,   64   N.   J.    Eq.    16  46 
Feld    V.    Roanoke    Inv.    Co.,    123    Mo. 

603  443 

Fellows  V.   Little,  46   N.   H.   27  737 

Felton  V.   Brown,    102   Ark.    658  735 

Fenn  v.  Holme,  21  How.    (U.  S.)   481  202 

Fenno  v.   Sayre,  3  Ala.  458  417 

Fenton  v.   Miller,   94   Mich.   204  286 

V.  Way,  44   Iowa  438  673 

Fereday  v.  Mankedick,  172  Pa.  St.  535  244 

Ferguson    v.    Dent,    8    Mo.    667  273 

V.  Herr,  64  Nebr.  649  718 

V.  Spencer,   127  Ind.   66  62 

V.  Thomason,    87    Ky.    519  476 

V.  Tweedy,  43  N.  Y.   543  64 

Ferguson's   Appeal,   In   re,    117   Pa.    St. 

425-  241 

Ferrell  v.   Gill,   130  Ga.   534  455 

Ferris  v.   Smith,  24  Vt.  27  117 

V.  Van  Vechten,  73  N.  Y.  113  532 

Fetes  V.  Volmer,  55  Hun   (N.  Y.)   604  661 

Field  V.  Morris,  88  Ark.  148  722 
Fields    V.    Burnett,    49    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

446  722 

Fies  V.  Rosser,  162  Ala.  504  669 

Fifield  V.  Sperry,  20  N.  H.  338  444 

Fike   V.    Green,    64    N.    Car.    665  723 

Filbert,    In   re,    195    Pa.    St.    295  91 

Filmore  v.   Reithman,  6  Colo.   120  722 

Finch  V.  Garrett,   102  Iowa  381  737 

Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.   (U.  S.)  346     54,  276 

Finley  v.   Abner,   4   Ind.   Terr.   386  87 

V.  Hogan,    60    Ark.    499                   73,  688 

V.   Isett,    154   U.    S.    561  339 

V.  Prescott,    104    Wis.    614  280 

Finn   v.    Tones,    80   Kans.    431  643 

Finney  v.   St.  Louis,  39  Mo.   177  53 

Firebaugh   v.   Ward,   51   Tex.   409  566 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bell  &c.  Mining  Co., 

8  Mont.   32  441 

V.   Bennett,  40  Iowa   537  566 

v.   De   Pauw,   86    Fed.    722  476 

v.   Edgar,  65   Nebr.   34  119 
v.  Farmers  &  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank, 

171  Ind.  323                             550,  553 

V.  Jacobs,    50    Mich.    340  66 

v.  Jaggers,    31    Md.    38  580 

v.   Kreig,   21    Nev.   404  358 

v.   Paul,    75    Va.    594  324 

V.   Pearson,    119   N.   Car.   494  355 

V.  Woburn,    192    Mass.    220  956 
First   LTniversalist    Soc.    v.    Boland,    155 

Mass.   171                                                43,  482 

Fischer  v.   Johnson,    106   Iowa   181  62 
Fiscus   V.    Moore,    121    Ind.    547 

524,  602,  736 

Fish  V.  Capwell,  18  R.  I.   667  62 

V.   First    Nat.    Bank,    150    Fed.    524  438 

Fisher   v.    Edington,    80   Tenn.    189  308 

V.  Fields,    10   Johns.    (N.    Y.)    495  59 


Fisher 

V.  Hampton    Trans.    Co.,    136    Mich. 

218  59 

V.  Pender,   52    N.    Car.    483  93 

V.  Wister,  154  Pa.  St.  65  469 

Fisk  V.   Chandler,   30  Maine   79  316 

V.  Fisk,   60    N.   J.    Eq.    195  87 

V.  Norvel,   9  Tex.   13  90 

Fitch   v.    Boyer,    51    Tex.    336  138 
V.   Creighton,      24      How.      (U.      S.) 

159  527 

V.  Pinckard,    5    111.    69  621 

V.   Seymour,    9    Mete.    (Mass.)    462  61 

V.  Willard,    73   111.   92                        6,  398 

Fitzpatrick    v.     New    Orleans,    27    La. 

Ann.   457  658 

Flagg  V.   Dow,  99  Mass.    18  308 

V.  Mann,   14   Pick.    (Mass.)    467  418 

V.  Teneick,   29   N.   J.    L.    25  722 

Flannigan    v.    Howard,    200    111.    396 

718,  720 

Fleming  v.  Bumgarner.  29  Ind.  424  535 

V.  Burnham,   100  N.   Y.   1  77 

V.  Charnock,  66  W.  Va.  50  634 

V.   Greener,    173    Ind.    260  537 
V.  Katahdin  Pulp  &c.  Co.,  93  Maine 

110  326 

V.  Ray,   86   Ga.   533  468 

Flemister  v.  Flemister,  83  Ga.  79  451 
Fleschner    v.    Sumpter,    12    Ore.    161 

120,  123 

Fletcher  v.  Carpenter,  37  Mich.  412  436 

V.  Fuller,   120  U.   S.   534  699 

V.   Holmes,    32    Ind.    497  716 

V.   Monroe,    145    Ind.    56  65 

V.  Root,   240   111.   429  678 

Flinn   V.    Barber,   64   Ala.    193            395,  398 

Flint  V.   Sheldon,   13  Mass.   443  419 

Flomerfelt  v.   Siglin,  155  Ala.  633  722 

Flood  v.  Pilgrim,  32  Wis.  376  723 

Flora  V.  Anderson,  67  Fed.  182  466 

Floto  V.  Floto,  213  111.  438  491 

Flower  V.  Elwood,  66  111.  438  429 

V.   Myrick,  49  La.  Ann.  321  737 

Flowers  v.   Flowers,  89  Ga.   632  325 

Floyd   V.    Ricks,    14   Ark.    286  265 

Floyd  County  v.  Wolfe,  138  Iowa  749  66 

Flye  V.   Berry,   181   Mass.   442  429 

Fogarty  v.  Sawyer,  17  Cal.  589  442 

Fogg  V.  Clark,  1   N.  H.   163                  46,  467 

Fogler  V.  Titcomb,  92   Maine   184  470 

Folden   v.    State,    13    Nebr.    328  406 

Foley    v.    Harrison,    15    How.    (U.    S.) 

433  187 

v.  McDonald,  46  Miss.   238  736 

Folk  V.    Brooks,   91    S.   Car.    7  434 

v.   Varn,  9  Rich.   Eq.    (S.  Car.)   303  290 

Folts  V.  Ferguson   (Tex.  Civ,  App.),  24 

S.  W.  657  335 

Fontaine  v.  Houston,  58  Ind.  316  661 

Foorman  v.  Wallace,  75  Cal.   552  621 

Foote   v.    Clark,    102    Mo.    394            304,  345 

Forbes   v.    Hyde,    31    Cal.    342  661 

v.  Scannell,    13    Cal.    242  372 

Ford    V.    Ford,    80    Mich.    42  456 

v.   Ford,    70   Wis.    19  456 

v.  Gill,    109    Ga.    691  46 

v.   Kennedy,    1    Ore.    166  202 

V.  Ticknor.    169    Mass.    276  472 

V.  Unity   Church   Soc,   120  Mo.   498 

99,  125,  126 
V.  Walsworth,    15    Wend.     (N.    Y.) 

449  602 
Fordyce  v.   Woman's  Christian  Nat.   Li- 
brary Assn.,  79  Ark.  550  226 
Fore  V.   Fore,  2   N.   Dak.   260  66 
Forest  v.   Farley,   62   N.   Y.   628  592 


xlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Forrest  v.  Camp,  16  Ala.  642  611 

V.   Porch.   100  Tenn.   391  "14 

Forsaith   v.   Clark,   21    N.    H.   409  46 
Forsvthe  v.  Ballance,  6  McLean  (N.  S.) 

562  227 

Ft.    Smith    V.    McKibbon,    41    Ark.    45  102 

Fortune  v.  Hunt.  149  X.  Car.  .^58  286 

Fosdick  V.  Fosdick.  6  Allen  (Mass.)  41  482 

V.  Hempstead,   55  Hun   (N.   Y.)   611 

467,  484 

Foss  V.  Atkins.  204  Mass.   337  954 

Foster   v.    Birch,    14    Ind.   445  602 

V.   Browning,    4    R.    I.    47  61 

V.  Foster,    62    N.    H.    46  277 

V.  Joice,    3    Wash.    (U.    S.)    498  49 

V.  Jordan.    130    Kv.    445  493 

V.  Marshall,   22   N.   H.   491  49 

V.  Mitchell.   15   Ala.   571  119 

V.   Stallworth,    62    Ala.    547  127 

V.   Stewart.    18    Pa.    St.    23  46 

V.   Wick.    17    Ohio   250  43 

Fowler  v.   Black,   136   111.   363  465 

V.  Chadima,    134    Iowa    210  325 

V.   Duhme,    143    Ind.    248               466,  476 

V.  Micklev.   39   Minn.   28  618 

V.   Poor,   93   N.   Car.   466  594 

Fowlkes  V.  Wagoner  (Tenn.),  46  S.  W. 

586                                                     47,  56,  475 

Fox  V.   Frazer,   92   Ind.   265                338,  441 

V.  Palmer.    25    N.    J.    Eq.    416  417 

V.  Thibault,    33    La.    Ann.    32  18,  21 

V.  Western  Pac.  R.  Co.,  31  Cal.  538  110 

V.   Zimmcrmann,  77  Wis.   414  616 

Francie's  Appeal,  In  re,  96  Pa.  St.  200  61 

Frank  v.   Hudson.  39  N.   T.   L.  347  534 

V.   Stratford-Handcock,    13    Wyo.    37  54 

Franklin  v.   Kelley.   2   Nebr.   79  196 

Franklin    Savings    Bank    v.    Taylor,    131 

111.   376                                         138,  355,  547 

Franzen  v.  Hutchinson.  94  Iowa  95  376 

Frazer  v.   Frazer,  24   Ky.   L.   2517  468 

Frazicr    v.    Boggs,    37    Fla.    307  456 

V.   Swain,   36   N.    T.   Eq.    156  664 

Frazin,    In    re.    174    Fed.    713  381 

Frederick  v.  Buckniinster,  83  Nebr.  135  568 

V.   Emig,    186    111.    319  430 

V.  Wilcox,    119   Ala.    355            ^       ^  422 

Freedman    v.    Oppenheim,    187    N.    Y. 

101  398 
V.   Safran,    131    App.    Div.     (N.    Y.) 

675  549 
Freedman's  Sav.  &  Trust  Co.  v.   Earle, 

110   U.   S.    710  566 

Freeman  v.  Atwood,  50  Maine  473  444 

V.  Hawkins,   77  Tex.  498  661 

V.      Peay,   23    Ark.    439  120 

V.  Prcndergast.   94   Ga.    369  60 

Freeman,  In  re,   146  Iowa  38  709 

Frellsen   v.   Crandell,  217   U.    S.    71  224 

Fremont   Cultivator   Co.   v.    Fulton,    103 

Ind.    393  553 

French   v.    Fyan,   93   U.   S.    169  207 

V.  Mehan,  56  Pa.  St.  286  321 

Frey   v.   Thompson.   66   Ala.   287  43 

Freydendall  v.   Baldwin,   103   111.  325  375 
Frick    Coal    Co.    v.    Laughead,    203    Pa. 

168  85 

Friedman  v.  Janssen,  23  Ky.  L.  2155  546 

V.   Steiner,    107    III.    125  42 
Friedrichs  v.  New  Orleans,  B.  &  T.  Co., 

114  La.  95  109 

Frisk  V.   Reigelman,   75   Wis.   499  661 

Fritsche  v.  Fritsche.  77  Wis.  270  668 
Frost  V.  Beekman,  1  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

288  120 

V.  Courtis.   167   Mass.   251  471 

Frow  V.    Downman.   11   Ala.   880  .^75 

Fry  V.  Morrison,  159  111.  244  455 


Fryer   v.   Rockefeller,   63    N.    Y.   268 

120,  284 

Fuhr  V.    Dean,   26   Mo.    116  61,  62 

Fulghum  V.  Strickland,   123  Ca.  258  471 

Fulkerson  v.  Taylor,  100  Va.  426       522,  567 

Fuller    V.    Arms,    45    Vt.    400  313 

V.   Fuller,  84  Maine  475  46 

V.  Missroon,    35    S.    Car.    314  59 

V.   Scribner,    76    N.    Y.    190  547 

Fullmer  v.    Proust,    155    Pa.    St.   275         536 

Fulmer    v.    Williams,    122    Pa.    St.    191     272 

Fulton  V.   Doe.   5   How.    (Miss.)    751  192 

Funk    V.    Egglcston.    92    111.    515  46 

V.   Halderman.    53    Pa.    St.    229  63 

Funke   v.    St.    Louis,    122   Mo.    132  239 

l'"urgeson  v.   Jones,    17   Ore.   204  718 

Furrcr   v.    I'erris,    145    U.    S.    132  664 

G 

Gage    V.    Consumers'    Elect.    Light    Co., 

194    111.    30  955 

V.  Cage,   12   N.   H.   371  487 

V.  Gage,   30  N.   H.   420  336 

V.   Pirtle,    124    111.    502  633 

V.  Porter,   64   N.    H.    619  445 

Gaines  v.   Fuentes,  92   U.    S.   10  652 

V.   Green    Pond    Iron    Co.,    33    N.    J. 

Eq.    603  65 

V.   Kennedv,  S3   Miss.   103  600 

V.   Saunders,    50   Ark.    322  127 

V.   Strong.   40   Vt.   354  711 

Galloway  v.  Darby,  105  Ark.  558 

46,  464,  483,  485 
Galpin  v.   Abbott,  6  Mich.   17  120 

Galvin   v.   Critton.   151    Ind.    1  653 

Gamble    v.     Black     Warrior     Coal     Co., 

172  Ala.   669  434 

V.  Martin    (Tex.   Civ.   App.),   151   S. 

W.  327  674 

V.  Ross,  88  Mich.   315  397 

Gambril  v.  Doe,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  140  267 
Games  v.  Stiles.  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  322  581 
Gannon   v.    Allbripht.    183    Mo.    238  46 

V.   Moore,    83    Ark.    196  645 

Gano  V.  Aldridge,  27  Ind.  294  297 

Cans  V.   Renshaw,   2   Pa.    St.   34  34 

(lanter   v.   Atkinson,    35    Wis.    48  53 

Garbutt  V.   Mavo.   128  Ga.  269  434 

Garcia  v.  Callender,  125  N.  Y.  307  196 
Garden    City    Sand    Co.    v.    Miller,    157 

111.    225  ^_  524 

Gardenhire  v.  King,  97  Tenn.  585  564 

Gardiner  v.    Miller,   47   Cal.    570  102 

Gardner  v.  Brown,  21  Wall.  (U.  S.)  36     447 

V.   Cohn.    191    111.    553  424 

V.  Collins,    2    Pet.    (U.    S.)    58 

87,  707,  708,  730 
v.  Dakota,   21    Minn.    33  53 

V.   Gardner,  13   Ohio   St.  426  729 

V.   Gardner,    42    Utah    40  87 

V.  Moore.    51    Ga.    268  120 

Garland  v.  Harrison,  8  Leigh   (Va.)   368 

86,  705,  719 

V.  Smith,   164  Mo.    1  60 

Garner  v.   Wills,   92   Kv.   386  64 

V.  Wood.    71    Md.    37  708 

Garnsey  v.   Rogers.  47   N.  Y.  233  316 

Garrard  v.  Kendall   (Ky.  App.),  121   S. 

W.  997  678 

Garrett  v.   Clark,   5   Ore.   464  49 

V.  Cohen,  63  Misc.   (N.  Y.)   450  568 

V.   Fernauld,   63    Fla.   434  438 

v.  Puckett,    15    Ind.    485  129,  316 

Garrison    v.     Haydon,     1    J.    J.     Marsh. 

(Ky.)    222  124 

Garry  v.  Newton,  201  111.   170  737 

Garvin  v.   Garvin,  34  S.  Car.   388  563 

Garwood  v.  Garwood,  244  111.  580  66 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xliii 


[References  arc  to  Sections.} 


Gassert  v.   Bogk,   7   Mont.   585  415 

V.   Strong,    38    Mont.    18  561 

Gaston   v.    Gaston,    114   Cal.    542  676 

V.   Weir,    84   Ala.    193  262 

Gate  City  Abstract  Co.  v.  Post,  55  Nebr. 

742  22,  26 

Gates  V.    Boston   &c.   R.   Co.,   53    Conn. 

_  333  447 

V.  Labeaume,   19   Mo.    17  375 

V.   Parniley,   93    Wis.    294  6 
Catling    V.     Carteret    Co.,    92     N.     Car. 

536  636 
Gauch   V.    St.    Louis   Mut.    L.    Ins.    Co., 

88  111.  251  716 

Gault  V.   Stormont,   51   Mich.   636  51 

Gavin  V.  Gaines,  5  Ky.  L.  247  737 

V.   Sanders,    5    Ky.    L.    321  66 

Gaylord  v.   Gaylord,   150  N.  Car.  222 

286,  318 

V.  Goodell,    173    Mass.    140  363 

V.   Lafavette,    115    Ind.    423  59 

V.   Sanitarv    Dist.,   204    111.    576  109 

Gazlay   v.    Williams,    210    U.    S.    41  408 

Gee   V.    Moore,    14    Cal.    472  308 

Geer   v.    Missouri    Lumber   &c.    Co.,    134 

Mo.  85  124 

Geithman   v.    Eichler,    265    111.    579  1 

Gelstrop  v.   Moore,   26   Miss.   206        360,  583 

Geneva   v.    Henson.    195    N.    Y.   447  297 

George    v.    Cole,    109    La.    816  637 

v.   George,    47     N.     H.     27              491,  492 

Gerard    v.    Buckley,    137    Mass.   475  59 

Gerhardt    v.    Ellis,    134    W=s.    191  447 

V.  Tucker,    187    Mo.   46  672 
German    v.    Machin,    6    Paige    (N.    Y.) 

288  696 
Germania   Life   Ins.    Co.   v.    Potter,    124 

App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)   814  674 

Gessner  v.  Pah-ateer,  89  Cal.  89       407,  417 

Gest  v.   Pack-wood,  39   Fed.   525  417 

Getchell    v.    Benedict,    57    Iowa    121  317 

Ghazal,   In  re,   163   Fed.  602  382 

Gholson   v.    Desha,   32    Ky.    L.   996  695 
Gibson  v.   Chouteau,   39    Mo.    536 

182,   184,  224,  226  301 

V.  Garst,   81    Kans.    741  643 

V.   Holden,    115    111.    199  407 

v.   Leonard,    143    111.    182  62 

V.   Sexson,    82    Nebr.    475  638 

V.  Thomas,    180   N.   Y.   483  119 

Giddings  v.  Giddings,  65  Conn.   149  485 

V.   Smith,     15    Vt.    344  48 

Gilbert   v.    Baxter,    71    Iowa    327  27 

V.  Peteler,    38    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    489  61 

V.   Richards.    7    Vt.    203  326 

Gilchrist  V.  Gough,  63  Ind.  576            123,  132 

Gile    V.    Hallock,    33    Wis.    523  572 

Giles    V.    Anslow,    128    111.    187  43 

V.   Little,    104    U.    S.    291  477 

V.   Miller,    36    Nebr.    346  66 

V.  Wilhoit    (Tenn.),   48   S.   W.   268  713 

Gill  V.   Grand   Tower  Min.   &c.   Co.,  92 

111.    249  720 

V.  Hardin,   48   Ark.    409  692 

V.   Lydick,   40    Nebr.    508  103 

V.   Pinney,    12   Ohio   St.   38  122 

Gillen   V.    Hadley    (N.   J.    Err.   &  App.), 

73   Atl.    849  678 
Gillespie    v.    Broas,    23    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

370  70 

V.  Rogers,    146    Mass.    610            122,  263 

Gillett   V.    Gaffney,    3   Colo.    351  467 

Gillig  V.    Maass,   28    N.    Y.    191  428 

Gill's  Estate,   In   re,   79   Iowa  296  732 
Gilman    v.    Hovey,    26    Mo.    280 

10,  15,  16,  24 

Gilmore  v.  Hamilton,  83  Ind.   196  49 

V.  Sapp,    100    III.    297  229 


Gilpin  v.   Hollingsworth,   3   Md.    190         462 
Gilroy   v.    Richards,   26   Tex.    Civ.    App. 

355  483 

Gingrich   v.    Gingrich,    146   Ind.   227         474 
Girardin   v.    Lampe,    58   Wis.    267  120 

Gittings  v.   Worthington,   67   Md.    139        327 
Givan   v.    Doe.    7   Blackf.    (Ind.)    210  437 

Given  v.   Hilton,   95    U.   S.    591  460 

Givens    v.    Ott,    222    Mo.    395  93,  483 

Glading  v.    Frick,   88   Pa.    St.   460  122 

Gladson  v.   Whitney,   9   Iowa  267  723 

Glascott   v.    Bragg,    111    Wis.    605  718 

Glass  V.   Gilbert,   58   Pa.   St.   266  635 

Glasscock   v.   Tate,    107   Tenn.   486  43 

Glass'  Estate,   In  re,   164  Cal.   765  458 

Glawatz    v.    People's    Guaranty    Search 

Co.,  49  App.   Div.    (N.   Y.)   465  12 

Gleason    v.    Spray,    81    Cal.    217  431 

Glendinning    v.    Superior    Oil    Co.,    162 

Ind.   642  99 

Glenn   v.   Thistle,   23   Miss.   42  197 

Glidden  v.   Strupler,   52   Pa.   St.   400         322 
Globe  Mill  Co.  v.  Bellingham  Bay  Imp. 

Co.,    10  ^^■ash.    458  227 

Glore  V.    Scroggins,   124  Ga.   922  472 

Glos  V.   Cass,   230  111.   641  643 

V.  Cessna,    207    III.    69  955,  957 

V.  Grant    Bldg.    &c.    Assn.,    229    111. 

387  955 

V.  Holberg,  220  111.   167  955 

V.  Kingman,  207   HI.   26  955 

Gloss  V.    Sankey,    148   111.    536  718 

Glover  v.   Condell.    163   111.   566  469 

V.   Reid,    80    Mich.    228  678 

v.  Shields,    32    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    374     270 
Glyn    V.    Title    Guarantee    &c.    Co.,    132 

App.    Div.    (N.   Y.)    859  11 

Glynn   v.   George,   20   N.   H.    114  62 

Goad   V.   Montifomery,   119   Cal.    552  678 

Godding  v.  Deker,  3  Colo.  App.  198  195 

Godfrey  v.  Humphrey,  18  Pick.   (Mass.) 

537  46 

Godwin  v.   Davis,   74  Miss.   742  210 

Goebel  v.   Wolf.   113   N.   Y.  405  483 

Goettlicher  v.   Wille,   76  Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

361  437 

Goetz,  In  re,   13   Cal.   App.   292  708 

Goff  v.   Anderson,   91    Ky.   303  64 

V.  Goff,  60  W.   Va.   9  676 

Goldberg  v.   Kidd,   5   S.   Dak.   169  215 

V.  Sisseton  Loan  &c.  Co.,  24  S.  Dak. 

49  14,  22 

Golden  v.   Hardesty,  93  Iowa  622  286 

V.   Murphy,    31    Nev.    395  693 

Goldsborough  v.  Hewitt,  23  Okla.   66  676 

Goldsmith     v.     Goldsmith,     46     W.     Va. 

426  291 

Gomez  v.   Higgins.    130  Ala.  493  487 

Good    v.    Norley,    28    Iowa    188  652 

V.   Zercher,     12    Ohio     364  322 

Goodell   V.    Sanford,    31    Mont.    163  35 

Goodgion    V.    Gilreath,    32    S.    Car.    388     580 
Goodrich    v.    Adams,    138    JNIass.    552 

708,  727 

V.  Lambert,    10    Conn.    448  465 

Goodright     v.     Morningstar,     1     Yeates 

(Pa.)    313  48 

Goodtitle   V.    Gibbs,    5    B.   &    C.    709  45 

Goodwin  v.   Colbv,  64  N.  H.  401  734 

V.  Keerl,  3  Harr.  &  M.   (Md.)  403       728 

V.  Owen,   55    Ind.    243  120 

Gordon    v.    Constantine    Hydraulic    Co., 

117   Mich.   620  121 

V.  Ross-Higgins   Co.,    162   Fed.    637     200 

V.  Ware    Savings    Bank,    115    Mass. 

588  429 

Gorham  v.   Daniels,  23  Vt.   600  58,  311 

V.  Farson,   119   111.   425  638 


xliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Goring  v.   McTaggart,   92   Ind.   200 
Gonnrey   v.   Clark,   134   U.   S.   338 
Glossard   v.    I'erguson,    54    Ind.    519 
Gossett    V.    Tolon,    61    Ind.    388 
Gotham   v.   Cotliam.   55    X.    H.   440 
Gotthelf  V.    Stranahan,    138   N.   Y.   345 
Goudy  V.  Shank,  8  Ohio  415 
Gough   V.    Manning,   26   Md.    347 
Gould    V.    Howe.    131    111.    490 

V.  Tucker,   20   S.    Dak.   226 
Gourley   v.   Countryman,   18   Okla.   220 
Gove   V.    Cathcr,    2i    111.    634 
Gowdy   V.    Sanders,   88    Ky.    346 
Grace  v.  Cox,   16  Ind.  App.   150 
Grady  v.  Warrell,   105  Mich.  310 
Graeflf  v.  DeTurk,  44  Pa.  St.  527 
Graham   v.    DeYampert,    106    Ala.    279 

460, 

V.  Hawkins,    38   Tex.    628 

V.   Meek,    1    Ore.    325 
Grand    Gulf    R.    &c.    Co.    v.     Bryan,    8 

Smed.  &  M.    (Miss.)   234 
Grandin  v.  Anderson,  15  Ohio  St.  286 
Grandjean's    Estate,    In    re,    78    Nebr. 

349 
Grand  Rapids  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kritzer,  116 

Mich.   688 
Grand   Rapids   &c.   R.    Co.   v.   Alley,   34 
Mich.    18 

V.  Butler,   159  U.   S.  87 
Granger  v.   Granger,   147  Ind.  95 
Grannis's    Estate,    In    re,    142    Cal.    1 
Grant   v.    Bustin,   21    N.   Car.    77 

V.   Grant,    63     Conn.     530 

V.  Mosely   (Tenn.)   52  S.  W.  508 
Grantier   v.    Rosecrance,    27    Wis.    488 
Graton  v.  Holliday  Koltz  Land  &  Lum- 
ber   Co.,    189    Mo.    322 
Grattan    v.    drattan,    18    111.    167 
Gratz   V.    Land   &c.    Co.,    82    Fed.    381 
Graves   v.    Deterling,    120   N.    Y.    447 

276, 

V.  Ewart,   99   Mo.    13 

V.  Ward,    2    Duv.     (Ky.)     301 
Graves,    In    re,    242    111.   212  457, 

Gray  v.   Brignardello,   1   Wall.    (U.    S.) 
627 

V.  Denson,   129   Ala.   406 

V.  Holmes.    57    Kans.    217  718, 

V.   Jones,    14   Fed.   83 

V.  Pash,    24   Ky.    L.    963 

V.  Smith,   76    Fed.    525 

V.  Swerer,  47  Ind.  App.  384  708, 
Graydon  v.  Graydon,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  229 
Great  Falls  Nat.  Bank  v.  McCIure,   176 

Fed.    208 
Greeley   State   Bank   v.   Line,   50   Nebr. 

434 
Green   v.   Alden,  92   Maine   177 

v.   Barker,    47    Nebr.    934 

V.  Cross,    45    N.    H.    574 

V.  Garrington,  16  Ohio  St.  548 


V.  Gaston,    56    Miss.    748 

V.  Gordon,  38   App.   D.   C.  443 

V.  Grant,    134    Mich.    462 


442, 


V.  Green,    103    Cal.    108 
V.  Lane,   45    N.   Car.    102 
V.  Liter,  8  Cranch.    (U.   S.)  229 
V.   Pettingill,  47   N.   H.   375 
v.  Rick,    121    Pa.    St.    130  133, 

V.  Tcnold,    14    N.    Dak.    46 
v.  Witherspoon,    37    L.^..    Ann.    751 
Greene   v.    Huntington,   7i   Conn.    106 
Greenlee    v.    Davis.    19    Ind.    60  707, 

Greenstreet   v.    Thornton,    60   Ark.    369 
Greenwood   v.   Jenswold,    69    Iowa   S3 
v.  La    Salle,    137    111.    225 
V.  Marvin,   111   N.   Y.  423 


647 
105 
595 
121 

99 
527 
670 
477 
275 
722 
183 

65 
658 
656 
451 

60 

464 
583 
322 

197 
125 

722 

611 

677 
103 
714 
485 
728 
401 
476 
660 

668 

737 
119 

277 
570 
119 

705 

592 

592 
727 
203 
471 
508 
731 
477 

552 

439 
456 
215 
444 
132 
447 

43 
426 
124 
455 

95 
444 
551 
536 
120 
466 
708 
570 
289 
646 

65 


firecnwood 

V.  Trigg,     Dobbs    &    Co.,     143 
617 

V.  Warren,   120  Ala.    71 
Greer   v.    Higgin.s,    20    Kans.    420 

V.    Tackson,    127    (ia.    47 

V.   Wilson,    108    Ind.    322 
Gregley   v.   Jackson,   38  Ark.   487 
Gregory   v.    Oates,   92    Ky.    532 

V.  Taber,    19   Cal.  '397 
Greist   v.   Gowdy,   81    Conn.    351 
Grellet  v.   Heilshorn,   4   Nev.   526 
Gresham    v.    Johnson,    70   (ia.    631 
Grevemberg,    v.    Bradford,    44    La. 


Ala. 

562,  566 

546 

127 

501 

43 

86,  719 

456 

602 

429 

121 

66 

400 

98,  561 
429 


Gribben  v.   Clement,   141    Iowa   144 

Grid's  Appeal,  In  re,  7  Sad.  (Pa.)   137  535 

Griffin   V.    Arlt,   96   N.    Y.    S.    1033  13 

V.   Dutton,    165    Fed.    626  370 

V.   Franklin,    224    Mo.    667  669 

V.   Nicholas,    224    Mo.    275  472 

Griffith    V.    Frazier,    8    Cranch    (U.    S.) 

9  90 

Grigg  V.    Landis,   21    N.   J.    Eq.   494  313 
Grim   v.    Weissenburg   School    Dist.,    57 

Pa.    St.   433  645 

Grimm   v.   Tittman,    113    Mo.    56  458 

Grissom    v.    Moore,    106    Ind.    296  65 

Gritten   v.    Dickerson,  202    111.   372  65 

(irogan    v.    Garrison,    27    Ohio    St.    SO  65 

Groome,    In    re,   94   Cal.    69  183 

Gross   v.    Bennington,    52   Wash.   417  568 

v.   Grossdale,    177   111.   248  581 

V.   Howard,    52    Maine    192  601 

V.  Sheeler,    7    Houst.    (Del.)    280  473 

V.  Watts,    206    Mo^    373  284 

Grosscup  V.  German  Sav.  &c.   Soc,  162 

Fed.    947  674 

Grove  v.  Todd,  41  Md.  633  324 

V.  Zumbro,    14   Grat.    (Va.)    501  283 
Grover    v.    Wakeman,    11    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)    187  375 

Groves'  Appeal,  In  re,  68  Pa.  St.  143  676 

Grubb  V.   Grubb,   74   Pa.    St.  25  63 

(jrubbs   V.    Leyendecker,    153    Ind.    348  67 

Grube  v.   Lilicnthal,   51   S.  Car.  442  374 

Guerin   v.    Bagneries.   18   La.    590  740 

Guidry   v.   Woods,    19   La.   334  198 

Guicr  V.   liridgcs,   114   Ky.    148  727 

Guilfoil   V.   Arthur,    158   111.    600  341 

Guion   V.    Burton,   Meigs    (Tenn.)    565  87 

Gunn  V.   Brown,   63   Md.   96  478 

V.  Brown    (Md.),    23    Atl.    462  57 

Gunn's  Appeal,   In   re,   55   Conn.    149  419 
Gurney  v.    Minneapolis   Union   Elevator 

Co.,   63   Minn.   70  110 

Guthrie  v.   Beamer,  3  Okla.  652  95 

Gwin  V.  Cale^ari.s,  139  Cal.  384  214 

Gwynne  v.  Niswanger,  20  Ohio  556  633 

H 

Habig  V.   Dodge,   127   Ind.   3l'  334 

Hacker's   Appeal,    In   re,    121    Pac.    192  281 

Hackett   v.    Moxley,   68   Vt.    210  320 

Hadden    v.    Johnson,    7    Ind.    394  350 

Haden   v.   Goodwin,  217   Mo.   662  668 

Haeseig    v.    Brown,    34    Mich.    503  439 

Hafner   v.    Irwin,   20   N.    Car.   433  291 

Hagaman  v.   Moore,  84  Ind.   496  110 

Hagan   v.   Ellis,  39   Fla.  463          95,   192,  226 
Hagcr   v.    Spect,    52    Cal.    579 

119,  125,  336,  433 

Hagerty  v.   Hagerty,   12  Tex.  456  715 

Haggerty   v.   Brower,   105   Iowa  395  420 

v.   Wagner,    148    Ind.    625  325 

Hagler  v.   Simpson,  44  N.  Car.  384  279 

Hague  v.  Aherns,  53   Fed.  58  475 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xlv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Haight  V.   Hall,  74  Wis.   152  64 

Haijek  v.  Luck,  96  Tex.  517  377 

Hale   V.    Baker,    60   Tex.    217  530 

V.  Cottle,   21    Ore.    580  272 

V.   Marquette,  69   Iowa  376  601 

Haley   v.    Boston,    108   Mass.    576  714 

Hall   V.   Alford,    114   Mich.    165  272 

V.  Ashby,    9    Ohio    96  306 

V.   Craig,    125    Ind.    523  663 

V.  Dean,   13  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   105  518 

V.   Denison,    17   Vt.    310  372 
V.   Farmers'  Nat.   Bank,  53  Md.  120     375 

V.   Fields,   81    Tex.    553  66 

V.  Hall,   76  Kans.  806  59 

V    Hall,   98   Wis.    193  451 

V.  Jarvis,     65     111.     302  185,   186 

V.  Law,    102    U.    S.    461  73 

V.   Lawrence,   2    R.    I.    218  63 

V.  Livingston,  3   Del.   Ch.  348  127 

V.   Miller,    150   Mich.   300  645 

V.   Moore,  32  Kv.   L.   56  64 

V.  Moore,  70  Miss.  75  616 

V.   Priest,    6   Gray    (Mass.)    18  468 

V.  Russell,    101   U.    S.   503  202 
V.   St.  Louis  Mfg.  Co.,  22  Mo.  App. 

33  535 

V.  Smith,   61    N.   H.    144  483 

V.  Tunnell,  1  Houst.   (Del.)   320  122 

V.   Turner,    110    N.    Car.    292  43 

V.  Vandegrift,   3    Bin.    (Pa.)    374  48 

Halle  V.   Newbold,  69  Md.  265  277 

Halleck  v.  Guy,  9  Cal.   181  595 

Haliett  V.    Hallett,   8   Ind.   App.   305  65 

V.   Parker,   68   N.    H.    598  65 

Hal!   Safe  &  Lock  Co.  v.  Scites,  38  W. 

Va.    691  536 

Hallyburton  v.  Slagle,  130  N.  Car.  482       99 

Halsey  v.   Goddard,   86   Fed.   25  462 

Halstead   v.    Lake   Co.,    56   Ind.   363  111 

Ham  V.  Miller,  20  Iowa  450  527 

Hamberger  v.   Eastes,  57  Ga.  71  577 

Hamby  v.   Hamby,   165   Ala.   171  675 

Hamilton  v.  Browning,  94  Ind.  242  436 

V.   Downer,    152    111.    651  59 

V.   Hamilton,    149    Iowa    321  354 

V.  Hubbard,    134   Cal.    603  320 

V.   Nutt,   34   Conn.   501  129 

V.   Pitcher,    53    Mo.    334  261 

V.   Steele  (Ky.),  117  S.  W.  378  224 

Hamilton  Trust   Co.   v.   Clemes,   163  N. 

Y.   423  417 

Hamlet  v.  Johnson,  26  Ala.  557  483 
Hamlin   v.    Osgood,    1    Redf.    Surr.    (N. 

Y.)   409  713 

Hammann   v.    Mink,   99   Ind.    279  362 

Hammon    v.    Douglas,    50    Mo.    434  53 

Hammond   v.   Croxton,    162   Ind.   353  60 

V.  Gordon.   93    Mo.   223  349 

Hampe  v.  Higgins,  74  Kans.  296  33 
Hancock   v.    Beverly,   6   B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

531  118 

V.  King,    133    Ga.    734  100 

Hand  v.   Weidner,    151   Pa.   St.   362  325 

Handford   v.    Edwards,   89   Ark.    151  565 

Handley    v.    Palmer,    91    Fed.    948  458 

v.   Palmer,    103    Fed.    39  456 

Handley,    In    re,    208    Pa.    388  467 

Hanley  v.   Kraftczyk,   119  Wis.   352  450 
Hanlon  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  40  Nebr. 

52  694 
Hanna    v.    Hanna,    10    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

97  ^'^    714 

Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.   v.   Green,  68 

Mo.   169  297 

Hannon  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  12  Cal. 

App.   350  705 

Hannum  v.   Day,   105   Mass.   33  602 


Hanover  Nat.   Bank  v.   Moyses,   186  U. 

S.   181  377 

Hanrick  v.   Patrick,   119  U.   S.   156  302 

Hanscom  v.  Hanscom,  6  Colo.  App.  97  676 

Hansford  v.   Tate,   61   W.  Va.  207  593 

Hanson  v.   Franklin,   19  N.   Dak.  259  646 

V.  Johnson,    62    Md.    25  52 

Hantz  V.   May,   137   Iowa  267  509 

Haraden    v.    Larrabee,    113    Mass.    430  729 

Harbaugh  v.   Costello,   184  111.    110  377 

Hardage  v.   Stroope,   58  Ark.   303  465 

Hardie   v.    Bissell,    80   Ark.    74  700 

Hardin  v.   Boyd,   113   U.   S.   756       391,  392 

V.  Crate,  78  111.  533  265 

v.  Day,    29    ^\'ash.    664  564 

V.  Hardin,    32    S.    Car.    599  263 

Harding  v.   Allen,    70  Md.   395  123 

V.  Guaranty  &c.  Trust  Co.,  3  Kans. 

App.  519  553 

v.   Harding,    16   S.    Dak.   406  676 

v.   LeMoyne,    114    111.    65  723 

Hardy  v.   Beaty,  84  Tex.  562  662 

V.  Galloway,   111   N.  Car.  519  47 

v.   Samuels,   92  Ark.   289  699 

Hargis   v.   Ditmore,    86   Ky.    653  262 

Hargreaves  v.   Menken,   45   Nebr.   668  612 

Hargroves   v.    Redd,   43    Ga.    142        456,  458 

Haring   v.    Murphy,    60   Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

374  565 

v.  Shelton,    103    Tex.    10                 43,  477 

v.  Van   Buskirk,  8   N.   J.   Eq.   545  708 

Harkey  v.  Day,  61  Tex.  Civ.  App.  244  614 

Harkness  v.   Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476  663 

V.  Lisle,    132    Kv.    767  47 

Harley  v.  Harley,   140  Wis.  282  668 

V.   State,  40  Ala.   689  732 

Harlow  V.   Lake   Superior  Iron   Co.,   36 

Mich.    105  63 

V.  Thomas,    15    Pick.    (Mass.)    66  316 

Harlowe  v.  Hudgins,  84  Tex.   107  309 
Harmon  v.  Grant's  Pass  &c.  Trust  Co., 

60    Ore.    69  418 

V.   Harmon,    61    Maine   222  62 

V.   Thompson,    119    Ky.    526  399 

Harper  v.   Clayton,   84   Md.   346  620 

V.  Tapley,   35    Miss.    506  124 

Harral   v.    Leverty,   50   Conn.   46       434,  692 

Harriman  v.  Woburn  Electric  Light  Co., 

163  Mass.  85  121 

Harrington   v.   Allen,   48   Miss.    492  126 
V.  Erie    County    Sav.    Bank,    101    N. 


Y.  257 
Harris  v.  Arnold,   1  R.  L   125 

V.  Chicago,    162    111.    288 

V.  Elliott,    10   Pet.    (U.    S.)    25 

V.  Hiscock,   91    N.   Y.    340 

v.  Ingalls,    74    N.    H.    339 

V.  Jones,    83    N.    Car.    317 

V.  Lester,   80   111.    307 

V.  McCrary,    17   Idaho   300 

V.   Mason,   120  Tenn.  668 

V.  Oakley,   130   N.   Y.   1 
Harris,    In    re,   2   Ann.    B.    R.    359 
Harrison   v.   Alexander,    135   Ala.   307 

V.  Boyd,    36    Ala.    203 

V.   Foote,    9   Tex.    Civ.    App.    576 

V.   Harrison,    105    Ga.    517 

V.   McMurray,     71     Tex.     122 

V.  Palo    Alto    Co.,    104    Iowa   383 

v.   Ray,   108   N.   Car.  215 

V.   Shaffer,    60   Kans.    176 

v.   Simons,    55    Ala.    510 

V.  Trustees  of  Philip's  Academy,   12 

Mass.    456.  310 

V.  Weatherly,   180  111.   418  119 

Harrison's    Estate,    18    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 
„588  '^  734 

Harryman  v.  Starr,  56  Md.  63  353 


118 

434 
110 
503 
308 
359 
421 
509 
697 
613,  668 
271 
385 
668 
67 
54 
43,  474 
138 
331 
321 
548 
280 


xlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hart  V.  Eppstein,  71   Tex.   752  419 
V.  Farmers'   &c.    Bank,    i3   Vt.    252 

118,  128 

V.  Cihbons,   14  Tex.  213  185 

V.  Gregg,  32  Ohio   St.   502  714 

V.   HeiKlerson.    17    Mich.   218  634 

V.   Kendall.    82    Ala.    144  723 

V.   Sevtnoiir,    147    111.    598  58 

V.   Sniith,   44    Wis.    213  633 

V.  West,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  395  486 

V.   White.    26    Vt.    260  467 

Hartliekl   v.    Brown,   8  Ark.   283  578 

Hartigan   v.    Hartigan.   65    W.    Va.   471  64 

Hartley   v.   Boynton,   17    Fed.   873  661 

V.  Keokuk  &c.   R.,   85   Iowa  455  677 

Hartmann,   v.    Hartniann,    59    111.    103  670 

Harton   v.    Little,    176   Ala.    267  358 

Hartshorn    v.    Cleveland,    52    N.    J.    L. 

473  632 

Hartwell  v.  Parks.  240  Mo.  537  491 

Hartv  V.  Harris,   120  N.  Car.  408  53 

Harvey    v.    Hall.    32    Ind.    98              719,  724 

V.  Gunzbcrg,   148  Pa.   St.   294  53 

V.  Holies,  160  Fed.  531  698 

V.  Steptoe,   17  Grat.   (Va.)   289  722 

Harvill   v.   Holloway,  24  Ark.   19  65 

Hascall    v.    Cox,    49    Mich.    435  714 

Haseltine  v.  Donahue,  42  Wis.  576  331 

Haskell   v.    Bissell,    11    Conn.    174  122 

Hassaurek    v.    Hassaurek,    68    Ohio    St. 

554  676 

Hassey  v.   Wilke,   55   Cal.   525            119,  129 
Hastings  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitney,   132 

U.   S.  357  200 

Hatch   V.   Haskins,   17   Maine   391  122 

Hatch's    Estate,   In   re,   62   Vt.   300  66 

Hatchett   v.    Hatchett,    103    Ala.    556  60 

TIatelv   v.    Myers,   96   111.    App.    217  53 

Hatfie'l  V.   Sneden,   54   N.  Y.  280  64 

Hathaway  v.   Howell,   54   N.   Y.   97  567 

Hathorn  v.   Maynard,  65   Ga.    168  118 
Haughwout    V.    Murphy,    22    N.    J.    Eq 

531  547 

Hauxhurst  v.  Lobree,  38  Cal.  563  52 

Haven   v.   Adams,   4   Allen    (Mass.)    80  332 
Havens  v.  Seashore  Land  Co.,  47  N.  T. 

Eq.    365  289,  312 

Havighorst  v.  Bowen,  214  Til.  90  433 
Hawcs   V.   United   States  Trust  Co.,   142 

App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    789  956 

Hawkins   v.   Chapman,   36   Md.   83  363 

V.   Hansen,   92   Kans.    73  474 

V.  Hughes.  87  N.  Car.  115  650 

V.   Tones,   19  Ohio   St.  22  719 

V.   Pugh,   91    Ky.   522  431 

V.  Taylor,    128   Ind.   431  575 

Hawley  v.  Bullock,  29  Tex.  216  124 

V.   Northampton,  8  Mass.  3  48 

Haworth  v.   Taylor,   108   III.   275  122 

Haxtum.    In   re.    102    N.    Y.    157  602 

Hay  V.  Hav   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),   120  S. 

W.'  1044  678 

V.   Hill,   24    Wis.    235  122 

Hayden  v.  Barrett,  172  Ma.ss.  472       714,   719 

V.   Peirce,   165   Mass.   359  64 

v.   St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    222    Mo. 

126  297 

Hayes  v.  Hayes,  242  Mo.  155  480 

V.  Martz,  173  Ind.  297  466 
V.  Southern  Home  Bldg.  &c.  Assn., 

124  Ala.  663  426 

V.  Tabor,  41  N.  H.  521  59 

Haves  Appeal.  In  re.  123  Pa.  St.  110  654 

Hay,  In  re,  89  Pa.  St.  256  711 

Haymond  v.   Murphy,  65  W.  Va.  616  562 

Haynes  v.   Bourn,  42  Vt.  686  42 

V.   Meeks,   20   Cal.   288  -  653 

V.  Walker,    111    Tenn.    106  87 


Hays  V.  Goldman,  71  Ark.  251  308 

V.   Hall,   4   Port.    (Ala.)    374  397 

V.   Peavey,   54   Wash.    78  622 

V.   Wilstach,   82    Ind.    13  621 

Hayward  v.  Kinney,  84  Mich.  591  49 

Havwood  v.   Haywood,  80  N.  Car.  42  601 

V.   Wright.    152    N.    Car.    421  59 

Hazelton  v.    F.ogardus,  8  Wash.   102  723 

V.   Putnam,    3    Pinney    (Wis.)     107  61 

Hazcn   v.    Webb,   68   Kans.    308  616 

H.  B.  Claflin  Co.  v.  King,  56  Fla.  767  566 

Heacock   v.    Lubuke,    107    111.    396  138 

Heacock  v.   Van    Dusen,   80   Mich.   359  73 

Headen   v.    Hcaden.    Al    N.    Car.    159  737 

Heald   v.    Heald,    56    Md.    300  720 

Heard   v.    Brooklyn,    60    N.    Y.    242  503 

V.   Heard,    181    Ala.    230  417 

Hcarn  v.  Purnell,   110  Md.  458  286 

Heath   v.    Nutter,   50   Maine   378       335,  336 

v.   White,    5    Conn.    228  64 

v.  Williams,  30   Ind.   495  418 

Hebron    v.    Centre    Harbor,    11    N.    H. 

571  120 

Heflin  v.  Phillips.  96  Ala.   561  278 

Heidlebaugh  v.   Wagner,   72   Iowa  601  461 

Heiland  v.   Ertel,  4   Kans.  App.   514  393 

Heil's  Appeal.  In  re,  40  Pa.   St.  453  582 

Heinlen   v.    Martin,    53    Cal.    321  336 
Heinsen  v.   Lamb,   117  111.   549 

1,  5,  10,  194 

Heist  V.  TBaker,  49  Pa.  9  516 

Helfenstein    v.    Garrard.    7    Ohio    275  58 

Heller  v.  Cohen,   154  N.   Y.  299  700 

v.  Cohen,   15   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    378  76 

Helm  v.   Board,   114  Ky.   289  620 

v.   Leggett,  66  Ark.   2i  477 

Helms   v.    Elliott,   89   Tenn.   446  718 

Hemphill   v.    Flynn,  2   Pa.    St.    144  53 

Henderson  v.   Bonar,    11   Ky.   L.  219  90 

V.   Carbondale    &c.    Co.,     140    U.     S. 

25  663 

V.  Ford,  46  Tex.  627  337 

V.  Hays,  41   N.  J.  L.  387  616 

V.  Hunter,    59   Pa.   St.   335  55 

V.   Pilgrim,   22   Tex.   464  119,  437 

V.   Sherman,  47  Mich.  267  708 

Henderson,   In   re,   161    Cal.   353  471 

Hendon   v.   White,   52   Ala.   597  623 

Hendricks   v.    Gillespie,   25   Grat.    (Va.) 

181  34 

V.  Stark,   37  N.  Y.   106  507 
Hendrickson   v.    Woolley,   39    N.   J.    Eq. 

307  126 

Hendrix  v.  Cawthorn.  71  Ga.  742  662 

V.  McBeth,   61   Ind.   473  65 

Henninger  v.   McGuire.   146   Iowa  270  419 

Henry  v.  Atkison,  SO  Mo.  266  331 

v.   Bradshaw,    20    Iowa    355  286 

V.   Brannan,    149    Ala.    323  207 

v.   Henderson,    81    Miss.    743  451 

V.  McKerlie,    78    Mo.    416  360,  596 

Hensley    v.    Rose,    76    Ala.    373  662 

Henszey  v.   Gross,   185   Pa.   St.   353  730 

Hentig  v.  Redden,  46  Kans.  231  575 

Herbert    v.    Wren,    7    Cranch    (U.    S.) 

370  675 

Herkimer   v.   McGregor.   126   Ind.   247  737 
Herman   v.   Somers,    158   Pa.   St.   424 

16,  398 

Hermocilla  v.   Hubbell,   89   Cal.    5  208 

Herndon   v.    Kimball,   7   Ga.   432  120 

Herod   v.    Carter,   81    Kans.    236  643 

Heron  v.   Weston,   44   Colo.    379  665 

Ilerr  v.    Broadwell,   5   Colo.   App.   467  615 

Herrick  v.   Ammerman,  i2  Minn.   544  348 

V.   Morrill,   37   Minn.   250  659 
Herrmann  v.  New  York,   136  App.  Div. 

(N.   Y.)   28  552 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xlvii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hersey  v.   Purington,   96   Maine   166  43 

Hershey    v.    Dennis,    S3    Cal.    77  577 

Hershiser    v.   Ward,    29    Nev.    228 

16,  19,  24 
Herzog  v.  Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co., 

177  N.  Y.  86  455 

Heslop  V.   Heslop,  82  Pa.   St.   537  35 

Hesnard  v.    Plunkett,   6   S.    Dak.   73  66 

Hess  V.  Chenev,  83  Ala.  251  104 

Heyer   v.    Alexander,    108    111.    385  376 

Heyvvood's    Estate,    In   re,    148    Cal.    184 

59,  480 
Hibbard  &c.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  173  111.  91  62 
Hibberd  v.  Smith,  67  Cal.  547  101,  613 
Hibler   v.    Hibler,    104   Mich.   274 

45,  459,  483 
Hickie  V.  Starke,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  94  196 
Hicklin    V.    Marco,    56    Fed.    549  672 

Hickman   v.   Green,    123    Mo.    165  128 

Hickox   V.   Lowe.    10   Cal.    197  424 

Hicks  V.    Phillips,    148   Ky.    670  722 

V.  Texas     Loan     &    Investment    Co., 

51  Tex.  Civ.  App.  298  431 

Hickson  v.   Lingold.  47  Ala.   449  531* 

Hickson    Lumber    Co.    v.    Gay    Lumber 

Co.,   150  N.   Car.  281  432 

Hiestand  v.   Meyer,   150  Pa.   St.  501         461 

Hiestes  v.   Green,  48   Pa.   St.  96  316 

Higgins   V.   Breen,      9    Mo.   497  65 

V.   Dennis,    104   Iowa  605  8,   10 

V.   Eaton,    188    Fed.    938  456 

V.  Higgins,    57    Ohio    St.    239  722 

V.   Manson,    126    Cal.    467  417 

V.  West,    5    Ohio    554  447 

Highstone  v.    Burdette,    54   Mich.   329        687 

Higinbotham  v.   Stoddard,  72  N.  Y.  94      272 

Hildreth   v.   Googins,   91    Maine  227  61 

V.   Thompson,    16    Mass.    191  675 

Hill  v.  Alexander,  2  Kans.  App.  251       437 

V.  Bacon,     110     Mass.     387  526 

V.  Eldred,   49    Cal.    398  417 

V.  Gray,    160   Ala.   273  47 

V.  Heard,    104   Ark.    23  722 

V.  King,  48   Ohio   St.   75  569 

V.   Lund,    13    Minn.    451  637 

V.  McNichol,    76    Maine   314  126 

V.   Meeker,    24    Conn.    211  118 

V.   Miller,   36   Mo.    182  224 

V.   Pike,     174    Mass.    582  65 

V.  Pixley,    63   Barb.    (N.    Y.)    200  428 

V.   Reynolds,   93    Maine   25  347 

V.   Swihart,    148    Ind.   319  347 

V.  Taylor,    77    Tex.    295  120 

V.  Williams,   104  Md.   595  633 

Hillen  v.  Iselin,  144  N.  Y.  365  713 

Hillhouse    v.    Chester,    3    Day     (Conn.) 

166  )  87 

Hillman  v.   Stephens,   16  N.  Y.  278  723 

Hillman    Land   &    Iron    Co.    v.    Marshall 

(Ky.   App.),    119   S.   W.   ISO  699 

Hillock  V.  Idaho  Title  &c.  Co.,  22  Idaho 

440  9,  16, '17,  23 

Hills  V.  Miller,  3  Paige   (N.  Y.)   254         61 
Hilpir3    V.    Claude,    109    lov/a    159  718 

Hilton  V.  W^oodman's  Estate,  124  Mich. 

326  436 

Hinchliffe  v.   Shea,   103  N.  Y.  153  65 

Hingham  &   Q.   Bridge  &  Tpk.   Corp.   v. 

Norfolk,   6  Allen    (Mass.)    353  677 

Hinton  V.   Hicks,    156  TST.   Car.   24  430 

Hinzie    v.    Hinzie,    45    Tex.    Civ.    App. 

297  485 

Hiss  V.  McCabe,  45  Md.  77  284 

Hitchcock   V.    Merrick,    18   Wis.    375  426 

Hitner  v.   Ege,   23    Pa.    St.   305  64 

Hoadly   v.    Wood,    71    Conn.    452        471,  476 
Hoagland  v.   Becklev,   158   Mich.   565  286 

Hobart  V.   Hobart,  45   Iowa  501  676 


(N. 


Hobbs  V.   Batory,   86  Md.   68  S3 

Hobson   V.   Hale,  95   N.   Y.   588  456 

Hochlander  v.  Hochlander,  73  111.  618  659 
Ifochstein  v.  Berghauser,  123  Cal.  681  714 
Hockaday  v.    Lvnn,   200   Mo.   456  718 

Hockett    v.    Burns,    90    Nebr.    1  426 

Hockman  v.  McClannahan,  87  Va.  33  324 
Hodgdon  v.  Shannon,  44  N.  H.  572  424 

v.   Wight,    36    Maine   326  637 

Hodge  V.   Donald,   55  Tex.   344  227 

Hodgen   v.    Guttery,    58   111.    431  658 

Hodges   v.    Spicer,   79   N.    Car.   223  101 

v.   Williams,   95    N.    Car.    331  104 

Hodgkins  v.  Farrington,  150  Mass.  19  507 
Hodgman  v.  Kittredge,  67  N.  H.  254  458 
Hoffman  v.   Hoffman,   26  Ala.   535  456 

V.   Stigers,    28    Iowa    302  321 

Hoft'man  Burneston  &  Co.  v.  Mackall,  5 

Ohio    St.    124  117,  338,  441 

Hoffsass   V.    Mann,   74   Md.   400  49 

Hogan   V.    Hogan,   19   Kv.    L.    1960  719 

V.    Taques,    19   N.   J.    Eq.    123  318 

Hohn  V.   Bidwell,  27   S.    Dak.   249  724 

Hoit  V.  Hoit,  40  N.  J.   Eq.   551  574 

Holbrook  v.   Debo,  99   111.   372  303 

Holcomb  V.  Lake,  24  N.  J.  L.  686  48,  724 
Holden   v.   Alexander,  82   S.   Car.  441        272 

V.   Butler.    173    Mich.    116  434 

Hole   V.    Robbins,    53    Wis.    514  718 

Holland  v.   Rogers,   33   Ark.   251_ 
Hollenback     v.     Fleming,     6     Hill. 

Y.)    303 
Holley  V.  Horton,  164  Mich.   31 
Holliday   v.   Cromwell,   26  Tex.    188 

V.   Hively,    198    Pa.     St.    335         320,  479 
Hollifield    V.    Landrum,     31    Tex.     Civ. 

App.    187  1,  25 

Hollingshead    v.    Nauman,    45    Pa.    St. 

140 
HoIIister  v.  Butterworth,   71   Conn.   57 
Hollowav    V.    Tones,    143    Pa.    St.    564 

V.   McCnrmick,   41    Okla.    1 
Holm  V.   Wust,    11   Abb.   Prac.    (N.   S.) 

(N.   Y.)    113 
Holman  v.   Riddle,  8   Ohio  St.   384 
Holme  V.    Strautman,    35    Mo.   293 
Holmes  v.   Adams,   110   Maine   167 

V.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  Dec. 
416 

v.   Jordan,    163   Mass.    147 

v.   Walter,    118   Wis.    409 

V.  Woods,  168  Pa.  St.  530 
Holmes,  In  re,  131  N.  Y.  80 
Holt  V.   Agnew,   67   Ala.   360 

V.  Classen,    19    Okla.    131 

V.  Murphv,    15    Okla.    12 

V.  Pickett',    111    Ala.    362 

V.  Thacher,    52    Vt.    592 

V.   Watson,    71    Ark.    87  89 

Home  for   Incurables  v.   Noble,   172  U. 

S.    383  452,  455 

Homestead     of     Emerson,     In     re,     58 

Minn.   450  66 

Hone   V.    Fisher,   2   Barb.    Ch.    (N.    Y.) 
559 

V.  Woolsey,  2  Edw.  Ch.  (N.  Y.) 

289  298 

Hood  V.  Hood,  110  Mass.  463  652 
Hooper  v.  Henry,  31  Minn.  264       428 

V.  Scheimef.  23  How.  (U.  S.)  235   751 

v.  Smith,  88  Md.  577  471 

V.  Van  Husen,  105  Mich.  592      397 

v.  Young,  140  Cal.  274  224 

Hoover  v.  King,  43  Ore.  281  668 

V.  Smith,  96  Md.  393  714 

v.  Weesncr,  147  Ind.  510  28 

Hope  v.  Blair,  105  Mo.  85  568 

V.  Hoover  (Miss.),  21  So.  134     719 


398 

282 

66 

120 


688 

476 

73 

733 

30 
487 
202 
724 


108 
611 

59,  480 
77 
564 
86 
200 
201 
465 
570 


674 


XlVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hope 

V.  Shevill.  137  App.  Div.  86  447 

Hopkins   V.    Bryant.   85   Tenn.   520  65 

V.  C;iunt,    111    Pa.    St.    287  59 

V.  C.rimshaw,  165  U.  S.  342  482 

V.   Ratliff,   115   Ind.   213  405 

V.  Sanders.    172    Mich.   227  638 

V.   Smith,    162    Mass.    444  474 

Hopper  V.   Dcmarest,  21    N.  J.  L.  525  64 

lloppock  V.  Tucker,  59  N.  Y.  202  471 

Horbach  v.   Hill,  112  U.   S.   144  418 

Horn  V.   Butler,  39  Minn.  515  6,  77 

Hornblower  v.  Banton,  103  Maine  375  690 

Home  V.  Rogers,   110  Ca.   362  400 

Horner    v.    Doe,    1    Ind.    130             600,  617 

V.  Leeds,  25   N.  J.   L.   112  50 

Horsley  v.  Grath,    2  Grat.   (Va.)  471  122 

Horton  v.   Earle,    162   Mass.  448  471 

V.   Sledge,  29  Ala.  478  56 

Hosack    V.    Rogers,    6    Paige.  (N.    Y.) 

415  724 

Hoselton   v.    Hoselton,   166   Mo.    182  55 

Hosleton  v.  Dickinson,  51   Iowa  244  257 

Hosmer   v.    Campbell,   98   111.   572  364 

V.  Wallace,  97  U.  S.  575  196 

Hotchkin  V.  Bussell,  46  Wash.  7  722 

Hottenstein  v.   Lerch,   104  Pa.  St.  454  687 

Houck  V.  Yates,  82   111.    179  104 

Hough   V.    Buchanan,   27   Fed.   328  100 

Houghton  V.  Dickinson,  196  Mass.  389  719 

V.   Kern  Val.  Bank,  157  Cal.  289  643 

V.  Wilhelr.iy,  157  Mass.  521  689 

Hoult  V.  Donahue,  21   W.  Va.  294  74 

House  V.  Lockwood,   137  N.  Y.  259 

561,  575 
Houseman   v.    Girard   Bldg.   &c.    Assn., 

81    Pa.    St.    256  21,  22 

V.  International    Nav.    Co.,    214    Pa. 

552  103 

Houston  V.   Blackman,  66  Ala.   559  266 

V.  Davidson,  45   Ga.   574  719 

V.  McKinney,  54  Fla.  600  717 

Houzik  V.  Delglise,  65  Wis.  494  434 

Hovey  V.   Blanchard,   13  N.  H.   145  128 

V.   Edmison,   3   Dak.   449  426 

V.  Hobson,    51    Maine  62  314 

V.  Walbank,  100  Cal.  192  461 

Howard  v.   Chase,   104  Mass.   249  129 

V.   Grant,    107    Ark.    594  722 

V.  Harrington,   27   R.   I.    586  734 

V.  Iron  &c.  Co.,  62  Minn.  298  417 

V.  Kennedy,    4    Ala.    592  668 

V.  Rumble,   4   Ga.    App.    327  565 

V.  Turner,  125   N.  Car.   107  266 

Howard    Ins.    Co.    v.    Halsey,    8    N.    Y. 

271  129 
Howard  Inv.   Co.  v.   Benton  Land   Co., 

5  Kans.  App.  716  638 

Howe  V.   Coates,   97   Minn.   385  77 

V.  Harrington,   18  N.  J.   Eq.  495  336 

V.   Howe,    152   111.   252  461 

V.  Hutchinson,     105     111.     501 

25,  31,  35 

V.  Thayer,  49  Iowa   154  132 

Howell    V.    Jones,    91    Tenn.    402  66 

V.  Shepard,   48   Mich.   472  658 

Hower    v.    Weiss    Malting   &c.    Co.,    55 

Fed.  356  651 

Howes  V.   Barmon,   11   Idaho   64  61,  62 

Howland  v.   Slade,   155   Mass.  415  471 

Hoxie  V.  Payne,  41   Conn.   539  659 

Hoy  V.   Varner,    100   Va.    600  325 

Hoyt  V.  Jones,  31  Wis.  389  118 

V.  Ketcham,  54  Conn.  60  306 

V.  Tuxbury,    70    111.    331  35 

V.  Weyerhauser,    161    Fed.   324  184 

Hronska  v.  Janke,   66   Wis.   252  262 


Hubbard  V.  Hubbard,  12  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

148  454 

V.  Tones,  61  Kans.  722  566 

V.  Kiddo,   87    111.   578  687 

V.   Norton,    10   Conn.   422  425 

V.  Whitehead,  221   Mo.  672  272 

V.  Worcester      Art      Museum,      179 

Fed.  406  458 

Huber  v.  Brown,  57  Wash.  654  643 

V.  Hess,    191    111.   305  592 

Huckabee  v.   Swoope,  20  Ala.  491  43 

lludnall  V.   Ham,   172   111.  76  722 

V.  Ham,    183    III.   486  719 

Hudson  V.  Gray,  58  Miss.  882  720 

V.  Hudson,    222    III.    527  735 

V.  Hudson's  Admr.   (Ky.  App.),  121 

S.    W.    973  297,  321 

V.  Webber,   104   Maine  429  283,  289 

V.  Wright,  204  Mo.  412  669 

Huene  v.  Cribb,  9  Cal.  App.  141  421 

Huff  V.  Hastings  Express  Co.,   195   111. 

257  272 

V.  McCauley,   53   Pa.   St.    206  61 

V.  Sweetser,  8  Cal.   App.   689  565 

V.  Webb,  64  Tex.  284  284 

Huffman  v.  Leslie,  23  Ky.  L.  1981  315 

llugg  V.  Hintrager,  80  Iowa  359  538 

Huggins   V.    Huggins,   71   Ga.    66  737 

Hughes  V.   Decker,  38   Maine   153  719 

V.  Edwards,  9  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  489       429 

V.  Farmers'  Nat.   Bank,  83  Vt.  386     552 

V.  Fitzgerald,    78    Conn.    4  59,  480 

V.  Hammond,    136   Ky.   694  274 

V.  Noyes,    171    111.   575  315 

V.  Sellers,   34   Ind.   337  571 

V.   State.    41    Tex.    10  HI 

V.  Wilkinson,    27    Miss.   482  119 

Hughes   Bros.   v.    Hoover,   3    Cal.   App. 

145  538 

Hulick  V.  Scovil,  9  111.  159  222 

Iluling  V.    Fenner,   9   R.    I.  410  60 

Hull  V.  Diehl,  21   Mont.  71  438 

V.  Hull,   35   W.   Va.    155  312 

V.  Sullivan,    63    Ga.    196  129,  316 

Hulme  V.   Montgomery,   31   Miss.   105         87 
Huls  V.   Buntin,  47   111.   396  73 

Humboldt    Bldg.    Assn.    v.    Ducker,    26 

Ky.  L.  931  773 

Humphrey  v.  Wade,  84  Ky.  391  364 

Humphreys  v.   Newman,   51   Maine  40       125 

Humphries   v.    Davis.    100   Ind.   274  89 

Hunt  V.   Boston,   183   Mass.  303  639 

v.   Dunn,    74   Ga.    120  127 

V.  Evans,   134  111.  496  487 

V.   Hayes,    19    Ohio   C.    C.    151  473 

V.   Hunt,    14    Pick.     (Mass.)     374  428 

V.  Hunt,  4   N.    H.   434  487 

V.  Johnson,   19  N.  Y.  279  119 

V.  Rousmanier,    8    Wheat.     (U.    S.) 

174  337 

V.  Tuttle,  133  Iowa  647  27 

Hunter  v.  Whitworth,  9  Ala.  965  64 

Huntington  v.  Asher,  96  N.   Y.   604     61,  63 

V.  Meyer,   92   Wis.    557  567 

Hurd  V.  Gushing,  7  Pick.   (Mass.)   169       49 

V.  Shelton,  64  Conn.  496  54 

Hurdle    V.    Stockley,    6    Houst.     (Del.) 

447  90 

Hurley  v.  O'Sullivan,  137  Mass.  86  720 

Hurst  V.   Hurst,  7  W.  Va.  289  40 

V.  Leckie,    97    Va.    550  372 

Hurt  v.   Nave,  49  Ala.   459  611 

Hussey  v.   Roquemore,  27  Ala.  281  399 

Hussman  v.   Durham,  165  U.  S.  114  226 

Huston  V.   Scott,  20  Okla.   142  314 

Hutchings  V.   Clark,  64  Cal.   228  443 

V,  Low,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  77  196 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


xlix 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Hutchins    v.    Byrnes,    9    Gray    (Mass.) 

367  280 

V.  Carleton.    19   N.   H.   487  290 

V.  Heywood.   50   N.   H.   500  58 

V.   Van  Vechten,   140  N.  Y.   115  339 

Hutchinson   v.   Ainsworth,   63   Cal.   286  324 

V.  Hutchinson,   16   Colo.  349  126 
Hutchinson  Investment  Co.  v.  Caldwell, 

152   U.   S.  65  85 
Hutchinson's  Appeal,  In  re,  92  Pa.  St. 

186  580 

Huyser   v.    Chase,    13    Mich.   98  51 

Hyatt   V.    Cochran,   69    Ind.    436  138 

Hyde   v.   ^^'arren,   46   Miss.    13  442 

Hyland  v.  Baxter,  98  N.  Y.  610  653 


Iglehart   v.    Crane,   42 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v 


111.   261 
,  Hatter,  207  111. 


129 


691 
687 


V.  Houghton,   126   111.   233 
Illinois  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Bonner,  75 

111.   315  740 

Indiana    v.    United    States,    148    U.    S. 

148  210 

Indianapolis  v.  Kingsbury,  101  Ind.  200 

244,  670 
Indiana    School     Dist.    v.    Werner,    43 


562 

491 

67 

66 

696 

432 

39,  471 

V.  Wilkinson,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  268     103 

Ingram  v.   Kirkpatrick,   41   N.  Car.  463 

Inhabitants  of  Trenton  v.  Standard  Fire 

Ins.    Co.,    76   N.   J.    L.    79 
Innes  v.   Crawford,  2  Bibb   (Ky.)   412 


Iowa    643 
Inge  V.  Johnston,   110  Ala.   650 

V.   Murphy,    14    Ala.    289 
Ingels  V.  Ingels,  50  Kans.  755 
Inglis  V.  Webb,   117   Ala.  387 
Ingraham    v.    Ingraham,    169    111. 


375 


631 
185 


182 
146 


Co. 


In  re  Alabone's    Estate,    75    N.    J.    Eq 

527 
In  re  Alden's  Appeal,  93   Pa.   St. 
In  re  Alexander's  Estate,  149  Cal. 
In  re  Amy,   12  Utah  278 
In  re  Armstrong's    Estate,    2    Pa, 

Ct.   166 
In  re  Bacon's   Estate,   202   Pa.   535 
In  re  Baily's  Appeal,  32  Pa.  St.  40 
In  re   Ball,   153   Wis.   27 
In  re  Bank's  Will,  87  Md.  425 
In  re  Barnes'  Estate,  47  Okla.  117 
In  re  Barnett's  Appeal,  46  Pa.  St.  392 
In  re  Barrett's  Will,   111   Iowa  570 
In  re  Bateman,   11   R.    I.    585 
In  re  Bates  Mach.  Co.,  91   Fed.  625 
In  re  Bell,  34  N.   Y.   S.    191 
In  re  Benson's  Estate,  169  Pa.  St.  602 
In  re  Bickel's  Appeal,  86   Pa.   St.  204 
In  re  Blake's  Estate,  134  Pa.  St.  240 
In  re  Box,   11    Wash.    St.    90 
In  re  Breg's  Estate,  71   Minn.  11     710,  711 
In  re  Brooklyn   St.,   118  Pa.   St.   640       244 
In   re  Brown,    22    Okla.    216 
In  re  Brownell,  60  Hun    (N.  Y.)   586 
In  re  Bruch's  Estate,  185  Pa.  St.  194 
In  re  Butler,   66   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    406 
In  re  Callaghan.    119    Cal.    571 
In  re  Carpenter's    Estate,    170   Pa. 
In  re  Chambers,    44    Fed.    786 
In  re  Churchman's      Appeal,      9 

(Pa.)    423 
In  re  Clark's   Appeal,    79    Pa.    St. 
In  re  Clark's   Appeal,   70   Conn.    195 

58,  456,  584 
In  re  Colbert's  Estate,  44  Mont,  259  86 
In  re  Cox,  93  Ala.  400  730 


203 
Sad. 


376 


484 

63 

477 

730 

487 
714 
583 
457 
469 
724 
58 
46 
324 
379 
730 
481 
318 
473 
595 


720 
443 
477 
466 
720 
733 
13 

466 
64 


In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

373 
In  re 

860 
In  re 

men 
In  re 

250 
In  re 
In  re 

491 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

397 
In  re 
In  re 

450 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

426 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

349 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

In  re 
In  re 

186 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

276 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

443 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 
In  re 

354 


Cramond,    145    Fed.   966 
Cremer's   Estate,    156   Pa.   St.   40 
Curry's   Estate,   39   Cal.    529 
Davenport,    172    X.    Y.    454 
Davis'   Estate,   151   Cal.  318 
Deake's  Appeal,   80   Maine   50 
DeHaven's    Appeal,    38    Pa.     St. 


De  Lancey  Stables  Co.,  170  Fed. 

Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.'s  Tax  Assess- 

t,    224    Pa.    240 

Devine's     Estate,       199  Pa.      St. 

Dickerson,   111   N.  Car.   108 
Dickinson's     Appeal,     42      Conn. 

Dillard,   2   Hughes    (U.    S.)    190 
Doebler's  Appeal,   64   Pa.    St.   9 
Donnelly's  Estate,   125  Cal.  417 
Dull's    Estate,   222   Pa.    208 
Dunning,    48    Misc.    (N.    Y.)    482 
Dutch's  Appeal,    57   Pa.   St.   461 
Elmslie's     Estate,     10     Pa.     Dist. 

Emblen,   161  U.  S.   52 
Emerson's   Homestead,    58   Minn. 

Engel's  Estate,   180  Pa.    St.  215 
Fair's   Estate,    132   Cal.   523 
Farrell,   176   Fed.   505 
Ferguson's    Appeal,    117    Pa.    St. 

Filbert,    195   Pa.    St.   295 
Francies'  Appeal,  96  Pa.  St.  200 
Frazin,   174   Fed.    713 
Freeman,    146    Iowa   38 
Ghazal,  163  Fed.  602 
Gill's   Estate,    79   Iowa   296 
Glass'  Estate,  164  Cal.  765 
Goetz,   13  Cal.  App.  292 
Grandjean's    Estate,    78    Nebr. 

Granniss'  Estate,  142  Cal.   1 
Graves,    242    111.    212  457, 

Oriel's  Appeal,  7  Sad.   (Pa.)  137 
Groome,   94   Cal.    69 
Grove's   Appeal,   68   Pa.    St.    143 
Gunn's   Appeal,   55    Conn.    149 
Hacker's  Appeal,  121  Pac.   192 
Handley,  208  Pa.  388 
Harris,   2   Am.    B.   R.   359 
Hatch's   Estate,   62  Vt.   300 
Haxtum,   102   N.   Y.    157 
Hayes'  Appeal,  89  Pa.   St.  256 
Hayes'  Appeal,  123  Pa.  St.  110 
Heil's   Appeal,   40   Pa.    St.   453 
Henderson,    161    Cal.    353 
Heywood's   Estate,    148  Cal.   184 

59, 
Holmes,  131  N.  Y.  80 
Hutchinson's  Appeal,   92   Pa.    St. 

Irwin,    177   Fed.   284 
Jeremy's  Estate,   178  Pa.   St.  477 
Johnson,    164    Cal.    312 
Johnson,    30    Ch.    Div.    42 
Kane's   Estate,  38  Misc.    (N.  Y.) 

Kepecs.   123   N.   Y.   S.   872 
Kimmel's   Estate,  226  Pa.  47 
Kissel's  Estate,  65  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

Kopmier's    Will,    113    Wis.    233 
Kuhn's   Estate,    125    Iowa  449 
Kurtz's  Estate,  145  Pa.  St.  637 
Lawrence's    Estate,    136    Pa.    St. 


517 

87 

717 

711 

491 

456 

349 

380 

630 

466 
362 

719 
385 

47 
706 
484 

87 
737 

483 
229 

66 

476 

59 

375 

241 
91 
61 

381 
709 
382 
732 
458 
708 

722 

485 
705 
535 
183 
676 
419 
281 
467 
385 
66 
602 
711 
654 
582 
471 

480 
564 

580 

378 

46 

718 


87 
379 
100 

631 
453 
733 
466 

482 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


In  re  Learned's  Estate, 
111   re  Lee,   163   Ky.  418 
Jii   re  Lcnien,   208    Fed.    80 
In  re  Lewis,  32   La.  Ann.   385 
In  ro   Lewis,   29   Ont.    609 


{References  arc  to  Sections.'] 
70  Cal.  140 


456 
724 
378 
456 
■Ji7 


In   re  Lewis    1".    Perry   &    Whitney    Co., 

Fed.    745  372,  375,  379 


172 


In   re   Logan,   131    N.   Y.   456  471 

In  re  Luch's  Appeal,  44  Pa.   St.   519  121 

In  re  Clotilde   Lutz,   157   Mo.  439  473 

In  re  Lynch,    132    Cal.    214  730 

In  re  McCabe,    15    R.    I.    330  708 

In  re  McCrea,  180  Pa.  St.  81  714 
In  re  McCurdy's    Appeal,    65    Pa.    St. 

290  674 

In  re  McGraw's  Estate,  111  N.  Y.  66  458 

In   re   Machu,    21    Ch.    Div.    838  55 

In  re  AIcKenna's  Estate,  168  Cal.  339  730 

In  re   Magee,   63    Cal.    414  719 

In  re   Maher,    169    Fed.    997  515 

In  re  Majot,  199  N.  Y.  29  705,  724 
In  re  Markle's    Estate,    187    Pa.    St. 

639  471 
In  re  Mason-Seaman  Transportation  Co., 


467 


235    Fed.    974 
In  re  Middleton,    72    Iowa   424 
In  re  Miller,    64    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 
In   re   Moore,    14    R.    I.    38 
In  re  Moran,    151    Mo.    555 
In  re  Morrow's    Estate,   204   Pa.    479 
In  re  Mutual   Benefit  Co.,   174   Pa.   St 

1 
In  re  Nepus,  7  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  499 
In  re   Neil's  Appeal,  92  Pa.   St.   193 
In  re   Kevin's   Estate,    192   Pa.    St.   258 
In  re   Newman,    75   Cal.    213 
In  re   Nichol,    128    Pa.    St.    428 
In  re  Nicholson,    115    Iowa   493 
In  re  North's  Estate,  48  Conn.   583 
In  re  Noye's    Estate,    40    Mont.    178 
In  re   Oberholtzer's  Appeal,   124  Pa.   St 

583 
In  re  Olson,   63   Iowa   145 
In  re  Opdyke's  Appeal,  49  Pa.   St.  373 
In  re  Overdieck,    50    Iowa    244 
In  re  Peacock,    178    Fed.    851 
In  re  Pearl   Street,   111   Pa.   St.   565 
In   re  Pearson.    110    Cal.    524 
In   re  Peet's  Estate,  99  Iowa  314 
In   re   Pennsylvania    Consol.     Coal     Co., 

163   Fed.   579 
In  re  Person's  Appeal,  74  Pa.  St.  121 

87, 
In  re  Phillips'  Estate,  205   Pa.   504 
In  re  Pirie,     133    App.    Div.     (N.    Y.) 

431 
In  re  Plumel's    Estate,    151    Cal.    77 
In  re  Popplcton's  Estate,  34  Utah  285 
In  re  Powers'  Appeal,  63  Pa.  St.  443 
In  re  Prasser's   Will,    140   Wis.    92 
In   re  Proctor,   103    Iowa  232 
In  re  Oualitications   of   Electors,    19   R. 

I.    387 
In  re  Raab,   79   Misc.    (N.   Y.)    185 
In  re  Rankin's  Appeal,  1  Monag.   (Pa.) 

308 
In  re  Rash's  Estate   (Pa.),  2  Pars.   Eq. 

Cas.   160 
In  re  Reiff's  Appeal,   124  Pa.    St.    145 
In  re  Reith's   Estate.    144   Cal.    314 
In   re   Renton.    10   Wash.    533 
In   re  Reynolds,    57    Maine    350 
In  re  Ridgway's     Appeal,     15     Pa.     St. 

177 
In  re  Riesenberg,   116   Mo.   App.   308 
In  re  Roberts'  Estate,  163  Pa.  St.  408 
In  re  Roberts'   Estate.   84  Wash.   163 
In  re  Robinson,    6    Mich.    137 


380 
491 

550 
718 
718 
487 

90 

15 

719 

59 

712,  718 

714 

471 

727 

457 

124 
491 
719 
716,  734 
381 
317 
708 
473 

378 

737 
459 

602 
455 
477 
7i7 
459 
708 

S7 
471 

667 

40 
463 
480 
734 
711 

581 
466 
473 
717 
662 


47 
734 
712 
382 
471 
119 
483 

372 

716 

100 

466 

87 

719 

65 

87 

487 

473 

708 


In  re  Robinson's    Estate,    149    Pa.    St. 

418  48 

In   re  Rogers,    131    Pa.    St.    382  87,   711 

In  re  Rose's    Estate,   63   Cal.    346  583 

In   re   Rosher,    26    Ch.    Div.    801 
In  re  Ro.ss,    140   Cal.    282 
In  re  Rowan,  6  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  461 
In   re  Rubel,    166    Fed.    131 
In  re   Russell,    168    N.    Y.    169 
In   re  Russell's  Appeal,   15   Pa.   St.  319 
In   re  Russell's    Estate,    150    Cal.    604 
In  re  Rutaced   Co.,    137  App.   Div.    (N. 

Y.)    716 
In  re  Ryan's    Estate,    14    Wkly.    Notes 

Cas.    (Pa.)   79 
In  re  Saunders,     129     App.     Div.     (N. 

Y.)    406 
In  re  Schedel's    Estate,    73    Cal.    594 
In  re  Schlosser,   116   N.  Y.   796 
In  re  Scholl,    100    Wis.    650 
In  re   Seagcr,    92    Mich.    186 
In  re  Shedaker,   74   N.  J.    Eq.   802 
In   re   Shillaber's  Estate,  74  Cal.   144 
In  re  Simons'  Will,   55   Conn.   239 
In  re  Simpson,   144  N.  Y.   S.   1099 
In  re  Smith,    131    Cal.    433  708,  730 

In   re  Smith,   4   Nev.   254  349 

In  re  Smith's  Estate,   144  Pa.   St.  428 

59,  339.  480 
In  re  Soulard's    Estate,    141    Mo.    642 

59,  480 
In  re  Spring's  Estate,  216  Pa.   529  59 

In  re  Standard  Fuller's  Earth  Co.,  186 

Fed.    578 
In  re  Starbuck,    63    Misc.    (N.   Y.)    156 
In  re  Steckel,  64  Pa.   St.  493 
In  re  Steel,   L.    R.    (1903)    1    Ch.    135, 
In  re   Sternberg's  Estate,  94  Iowa  305 
In  re   Stickney's    Will,    85    Md.    79 
In  re   Stoner,    105    I-'ed.    752 
In  re   Sullivan's   Estate,   48   ^^'ash. 
In  re  Sunderland,   60   Iowa    732 
In  re  Swenson's   Estate,   55   Minn. 
In   re  SwofFord    Bros.    Dry    Goods 

180    Fed.    549 
In  re  Tappan's    Appeal,    52    Conn.    412 
In  re  Taylor,    20    N.    Y.    S.    960 
In   re  Thomas,    199    Fed.    214 
In   re  Thompson,   57  Hun    (N.   Y.)   419 
In  re  Thompson's    Appeal,    101    Pa.    St. 

225 
In  re  Thompson's    Estate,    26    S.    Dak. 

576 
In   re  Thorne,    155    N.    Y.    140 
In   re  Title  (Guarantee  &  Trust  Co.,  195 

N.   Y.   339 
In   re  Tobin's    Estate.    139   Wis.   494 
In  re  Tomlinson's    Estate,    133    Pa.    St. 

245 
In  re  Tupper,  163  Fed.  766 
In   re  Turner,   82    Misc.    (N.   Y.)    25 
In   re  Tuttle,    77    Conn.    310 
In  re  Ulfelder    Clothing    Co.,    98    Fed. 

409 
In  re  Underbill.  62  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  456 
In   re  Union  College,  129  N.  Y.  308 
In   re  Varner's  Appeal.  80  Pa.   St.   140 
In   re  Verplanck,  91    N.  Y.   439 
In   re  Vigilancia,    68    I'ed.    781 
In  re  Walkerly's    Estate,    108   Cal.    627 

43,  482,  484 
In  re  Walker's  Estate,  5  Ariz.  70  719 

In  re  Walker's  Estate,  110  Cal.  387  457 
In  re  Wain's  Estate,  189  Pa.  St.  631  483 
In   re  Walter's   Will.   64   Wis.   487  487 

In   re  Wardell,    57   Cal.   484  720 

In  re  Weir,  9   Dana    (Ky.)    434  714 

In  re  Wells,    113    N.    Y,    396  734 


631 


300 
Co., 


378 
64 

719 
467 
491 
482 
385 
726 
718 
471 

377 
474 
90 
385 
110 

313 

735 
718 

459 
436 

487 
380 
456 
708 

381 
711 
645 
59 
653 
433 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


li 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


In  re  Well's  Estate,  69  Vt.  388  583 

In  re  West,   128  Fed.  205  385 

In  re  White,    135    Fed.    199  380 

In  re  Williams,   62   Mo.   App.    339  737 

In  re  Witter,   15   N.   Y.   S.    133  720 
In  re  Woltemate's    Appeal,    86    Pa.    St. 

219  719 
In  re  Woodcock's    Appeal,    103    Maine 

214  466 
In  re  Wood's  Appeal,   82   Pa.   St.    116 

117,  122 

In  re  Woodward,   81   Conn.    152  718 

In  re  Young's    Estate,    123    Cal.    337  487 

In  re  Zeile,    74    Cal.    125  452 
Interior  &  W.  Va.  R.  Co.  v.  EpHng,  70 

W.  Va.   6  722 
International    Harvester    Co.    v.    Myers, 

86   Kans.   497  434 

Iowa  V.   McFarland,  110  U.   S.  471  210 
Iowa    Land    Co.    v.    Douglas    Co.,    8    S. 

Dak.  491  630 

Irvine  v.   McCreary,   108  Ky.  495  506 

V.  Marshall,  20  How.   (U.  S.)   558  180 

V.  Tarbat,    105    Cal.    237  220 

Irving  V.    Diamond,   23    Okla.    323  724 

V.  Ford,   183   Mass.  448  719 

Irwin   v.    Teffers,    3    Ohio    St.    389  592 

v.  Welch,    10    Nebr.    -179  120 

Irwin,   In   re,   177   Fed.   284  378 

Iseman  v.  McMillan,  36  S.  Car.  27  591 

Ison   v.    Halcomb,    136   Kv.   523  705 

Ives  V.  McNicoll,  59  Ohio  St.  402  719 

v.   Sanguinetti,    10    Ariz.    83  370 

Izard  V.   Bodine,   9   N.   J.   Eq.   309  664 


Jack  V.   Weiennett,   155   III.   105  630 

Jackson   v.    Aldrich,    13   Johns.    (N.   Y.) 

106  _        51 

V.  Alexander,     3     Johns.      (N.     Y.) 

484  299 

V.  Alsop,    67    Conn.    249  85 

V.  Bank  of  United  States,  5  Cranch 

C.   C.   1  566 

V.  Bard,  4  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   230  101 

V.  Bull,  10  "Tohns.   (N.  Y.)   148  46 

V.  Conlin,    50   III.   App.    538  30,  31 

■  -v.   Dines,  13   Colo.   90  212 

V.   Embler,   14  Johns.    (N.  Y.)    198  49 

V.  Fish,  10  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  456 
V.  Fitzsimmons,    10   Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

9 
V.  Green,   112  Ind.   341 
V.   Hendricks,    3    Johns.    Cas.    214 
V.  Hocke,   171   Ind.   371 
V.  Jackson,    78   Ky.    390 
V.  Jackson,   6   Dana    (Ky.)    257 
V.  Jackson,   56   S.   Car.   346 
V.  Johnson,   5  Cow.   (N.   Y.)    75 
V.   Littell,    213    Mo.    589 
V.  Lynch,    129   111.    72 
V.  McCarron,   77   Kans.    776 
V.  Merrill,   6   Tohns.    (N.   Y.)    185 
V.   Moore,  8   Dana    (Kv.)    170 
V.  Newton,  18  Tohns.  '(N.  Y.)   355 
V.  Parker,   9   Cow.    (N.   Y.)    72 
V.  Rogers,    1    Johns.    Cas.     (N.    Y.) 

33 

V.  Root,   18  Johns.    (N.  Y.)   60 

106,  299,  306 
V.  Rowell,  87  Ala.   685 
V.  Scott,  67  Ala.  99 
V.   Stackhouse,   1   Cow.   (N.  Y.)    122 
V.  State,   104   Ind.    516 
V.  Tribble,   155  Ala.   480  28,  442 

V.  Van    Zandt,    12    Johns.     (N.    Y.) 

169  48 


299 

732 

278 

709 

717 

719 

487 

470 

64 

46 

419 

643 

46 

719 

73 

40 

51 


595 
306 
650 


Jackson 

V.  Weaver,    138    Ind.    539  674 

V.  Wells.   9    Tohns.    (N.   Y.)    222  46 

v.  Winslow,  "9   Cow.    (N.   Y.)    13  99 

V.  Wood.   12  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   73  93 

Jacobs  V.  All  Persons,  12  Cal.  App.  163  274 

V.  Knapp,   50   N.   H.   71  518 

V.   Miller,    50    Mich.    119  321 

V.  Roach,   161  Ala.  201      _  275 
Jacob  Tome  Institute  v.  Davis,  87  Md. 

591                                          _  70 
Jacobus  V.   Mut.   Benefit  Life  Ins.   Co., 

27   N.   J.    Eq.    604  53J 

Tacowav   v.    Gault,   20   Ark.    190          120,  330 

Taeger  v.  Hardy,  48  Ohio  St.  335       127,  692 

Jaffray  v.   McGehee,   107  U.   S.   361  373 
James  v.   Germania  Iron  Co.,   107   Fed. 

597  228 

v.    fames,  51   Wash.  60  676 

v.  Morey,  6  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  417  121 

Jameson  v.  James,   155  Cal.  275  229 

Jamieson  v.   Knights  Templar  &c.  Assn., 

9    Ohio    Dec.    (Reprint)    388  _  714 

Jamison  v.  Fopiana,  43  Mo.  565          503,  504 

V.  Hay,   46   Mo.    546  734 

Janes  v.  Wilkinson,  2  Kans.  App.  361  229 

V.   Williams,   31    Ark.    175  492 

Tanney  v.  Sprigg,  7  Gill   (Md.)   179  64 

Jarboe  v.   Hey.    122   Mo.   341  714 

Jarrell  v.  Crow,  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  629  263 

V.   French,    43    W.    Va.    456  325 

Jarrett  v.    Stevens,   36   W.   Va.   445  222 

Tarvais  v.   Moe,   38  Wis.   440  66 

jarvis  v.    Aikens,   25   Vt.    635  99 

v.  Armstrong,    94    Miss.    145  431 

v.  Lynch,   157   N.   Y.   445  668 

Tasper  v.   Wilson,    14   N.   Mex.   482  27 

Tecko    v.    Taussig,    45    Mo.    167  42 

Jefferson  v.  Burhans,  85  Fed.  924  443 

v.  Coleman,   110   Ind.   515  674 

v.   Currv,    71    Mo.    85  611 

v.  Whipple,   71   Mo.   519  527 

Jencks  V.   Smith,   1   N.  Y.  90  124 

Tenkins  v.   Dewev,  49  Kans.  49  699 

V.   Harrison,   66   Ala.    345  508 

V.  Trager,   40    Fed.    726  224 

Jenkins   Land  &  Live   Stock  Co.   v.   Att- 

wood,   80   Nebr.   806  597 

Jennings   v.    Dixey,    36    N.    T.    Eq.    490  129 

V.   Dockham,    99    Mich.    253  288 

V.  Jenkins,    9    Ala.    285                    592,  597 

V.  Jennings,   21    Ohio    St.    56  456 

Jennisons  v.  Leonard,  21  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

302  74 

Tensen   v.   ^^'oodbury,    16   Iowa   515  616 

Jeremy's  Estate,  In  re,   178  Pa.   St.  477  46 

Terome  v.    Ortman,   86   Mich.    668  280 
Jersey   Citv   v.    Bayonne    (N.   J.    L.),    76 

Atl.    1010  677 
Tessop  v.   Kittanning  Borough,   225    Pa. 

583  578 
Tewell  v.  Jewell,  28  Cal.   232               87,  713 
v.   Knight,    123    U.    S.    426  371 
v.  Porter,    11    Fost.    (N.    H.)    34  99 
Jobson,    In    re,    164    Cal.    312  718 
Jochumsen  v.   Suffolk   Sav.   Bank,   3   Al- 
len  (Mass.)   87  90 
Jockheck  v.  Board  of  Comrs.,  53  Kans. 

780  109 
Tohanson    v.    Washington,    190    U.    S. 

179  208 

Tohnes   v.   Jackson,   67   Conn.    81  491 

Tohnson   v.    Adams,   92    Ga.    551  371 

V.   Antrikin,    205     Mo.     244  737 

V.   Bantock,    38    111.    Ill  347 

V.   Beard,    93    Ala.    96  436 

V.   Bodine,    108    Iowa    594  719 

V.  Brasington,   156  N.   Y.   181  464 


Hi 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Johnson 

V,  Brauch,  9  S.  Dak.  116         99 
V.  Brewer,  134  Ga.  828       370,  371 


V.  Bush.  3  Barb.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  207 

V.  Carter,    16    Mass.    443 

V.  Collins,     116    Mass.     392 

V.  Cooper,   56  Miss.   608 

V.  Delome  L.  &c.  Co.,  77  Miss.   15 

V.  Elwood,  53  N.  Y.  431 

V.  Giltillan,   8    Minn.    395 

V.  Harrison,    41    Wis.    381 

V.  Hart,  6  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)   319 

V.  Hess,    126   Ind.   298 

V.  Hines.  61   Md.   122 

V.  Holknsworth,  48  Mich.   140 

V.  Jacob,    11    Hush    (Ky.)    646 

V.  Tohnson,   14   Idaho   561 

V.  Tohnson.    170    Mo.    34 

V.  Tohnson,    13    R.    I.    467 

V.  jouchert,    124    Ind.    105 

V.  "Knights  of  Honor,  S3  Ark.  255 

V.  Lewis,   47   Ark.    66 

V.  Longmire,  39  Ala.  143 

V.  Lybrook,   16   Ind.   473 

V.  McKay,    119   Ga.    196 

V.  Mcrithcw,    80    Maine    111 

V.  Pacific    Coast    Steamship    Co.,    2 

Alaska    224 

V.  Perley,  2  N.  H.  56 

V.  Phillips,    85    Ark.    86 

V.  Poulson,   32    N.   J.    Eq.   390 

V.  Robinson,  68  Tex.   399 

V.  Thweatt,     18     Ala.     741 

V.  United  R.  Co.,  227  Mo.  423 

V.  United    States,    163    Fed.    30 

V.  Van    Velsor,   43    Mich.    208 


330 

52 
523 
106 

46 
644 
203 

66 
321 
580 
353 
278 

65 
227 
334 

53 
263 
714 

61 
678 
708 
423 

90 


226 
65 

730 
451 
372 
262,  315 
673 
378 
120 


V.  Washington  Loan  &c.  Co.,  224  U. 
S.   224 

V.   Webber,   65   Conn.   501 

V.  White,   76  Kans.   159 

V.  Williams,  37  Kans.   179 
Johnson.   In   re,   30   Ch.   Div.   42 
Johnston   v.   Camby,   29   Md.   211 

V.  Chesson,  59  N.  Car.  146 

V.  Mcintosh,  8  Wheat.   (U.  S.)  543 

V.  Mendenhall,   9   W.   Va.    112 

V.  Sutton,  45  Fed.  296 
Joliet    Stove   Works   v.    Kiep,    230    111. 

550 
Jones   V.    Allen,    88    Ky.    381 

V.   Billstein,    28    Wis.    221 

V.  Bragg,   33    Mo.    337 

V.   Byrne,   149   Fed.   457 

V.  Cable,    114    Pa.    St.    586 

V.  Chandler,    40    Ind.    588 

V.  Clifton,    101    U.    S.    225 

V.  Davis,  121  Ala.  348 

V.  Devore,   8   Ohio    St.   430 

V.  Fisher,   88   Nebr.   627 

V.  French,   92    Ind.    138 

V.  Gardner,   10  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   269       75 

V.  Habersham,  107  U.  S.  174       456,  458 

V.  Hartford    Ins.    Co.,    88    N, 
499 

V.  Tones,   37   Ala.   646 

V.  Jones,   28  Ark.    19 

V.  Jones,  46   Iowa  466 

V.  Jones^  223   Mo.   424 

V.  Jones,   108   N.   Y.   415 

V.  Leeds,   41    Ind.    App.    164 

V.  Manly,   58   Mo.    559 

V.  Minogue,    29   Ark.    637 

V.  Parker,    163    Mass.    564 

V.  Petaluma,    38    Cal.    397 

V.  Porter,    59    Miss.    628 

V.  Powers,  65  Tex.  207 

V.  Rees,   6   Pennew.    (Del.)    504 

V.  Smith,  55  Tex.  383 


459 
466 
460 
278 
8 
126 
711 
107 
398 
645 


633 

615 

723 

65 

59 

326 

321 

320,  323 

430 

633 

438 

593 


Car. 


660 

734 

65 

737 

59 

663 

718 

67 

578 

408 

215 

673 

124 

465 

348 


Jones 

V.  Stites,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  324  49 

V.  Taylor,  7  Tex.  240        74,  360 

V.  Warnock,  67  Ga.  484     364,  601 

V.  Webb,  22  Ky.  L.  1100  622 

V.  Williams,  155  N.  Car.  179  595 
Joplin  Brewing  Co.  v.  Payne,  197  Mo. 

422  73 

Jordan  v.   McClure.  85  Pa.  St.  495  45 

v.   Mead,   12   Ala.   247  126 

v.  Roach,    32    Miss.    481  48 

v.  Sayre,    29    Ma.    100  638 

Joslin  v.  Joslin   (Iowa),  75  N.  W.  487  87 

Jossey  V.  White,  28  Ga.  265  49 

Tournell  v.  Lcighton,  49  Iowa  601  716 

joy  V.  McKay,   70  Cal.  445  51 

Joyce  V.    Hamilton,    111    Ind.    163  737 

Tudd  V.   Fairs,  53  Mich.   518  53 

juhan  V.   Tuhan,   104  Ga.  253  618 

Justen  V.  'Schaaf,  175  111.  45  240 

Justice  V.  Souder,  19  N.  Dak.  613  431 

K 

Kahn  v.  Kuhn,  44  Ark.  404  659 

Kaiser  v.  Earhart,  64  Miss.  492  99 
Kane   v.   Rippey,   22   Ore.   296 

3,  6,  10,  35,  75,  77 
Kane's  Estate,  In  re,  38  Misc.  (N.  Y.) 

276  87 

Kanne  v.  Otty,  25  Ore.  531  227 
Kansas  City  v.  Marsh  Oil  Co.,  140  Mo. 

458  109 
Kansas  City  Land  Co.  v.  Hill,  87  Tenn. 

589  129 
Kansas  City  L.  &  S.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Attor- 
ney-General,  118  U.   S.  682  212 
Kaphan  v.  Toney  (Tenn.  Ch.  App.)   58 

S.    W.    909  59 

Karchner  v.  Hoy,  151  Pa.  St.  383       45,  274 

Karr  v.  Burns,  1  Kans.  App.  232  547 

Kaser  v.  Haas,  27  Minn.  406  572 

Kaufman  v.  Anderson,  31   Ky.  L.  888  466 

V.  Cook,    114    111.    11  51 
Kawananakoa  v.   Polyblank,   205   U.    S. 

349  674 
Kay  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  65  Pa.  St. 

273  62 

V.  Scates,   37   Pa.   St.   31  58 

Kazebeer  v.   Nunemaker,  82  Nebr.  732  363 

Keagy   v.    Trout,   85    Va.    390  424 

Kearnes   v.    Hill,   21    Fla.    185  118 

Kearney  v.  Kearney,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  59  49 

v.  Taylor,   15   How.    (U.    S.)    494  645 

Keaton  v.   Snider,    14   Ind.   App.   66  656 

Keech   v.    Enriquez,   28    Fla.    597  120 

Keegan   v.    Geraghty,    101    111.    26  718 

V.  Kinnare,    123    111.   280  53 

Keen  v.  Board,  8  S.  Dak.   558  213 

Keepfer  v.  Force,  86  Ind.  81  643 

Keever  v.  Hunter,  62  Ohio  St.  616  736 

Keith  V.   Ault,    144   Ind.    626  718 

v.  Eaton,  58  Kans.  732  456 

v.  Keith,  97   Mo.   223  119 
Keith  &  Perry  Coal  Co.  v.  Bingham,  96 

Mo.    96  126 

Keller  v.  Auble,  58  Pa.   St.  410  722 

v.  Harper,  64  Md.  74  87 

Kelleran  v.  Brown,  4  Mass.  443  419 

Kellett  V.    Shepard,    139   111.   433  464 

Kelley  v.  Dearman,  65  W.  Va.  49  323 

V.  Kelley,  80  Wis.   486  651 

v.  Meins,   135   Mass.   231  472 

Kelly  V.  Calhoun,  95  U.  S.  710           283,  330 

V.  Cotton  Belt  Lumber  Co.,  74  Ark. 

400  207 

V.  Donahoe,  2  Mete.    (Ky.)   482  110 

V.  Kelly,   126  111.   550  575 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


liii 


[References  are  to  Sections.\ 


87, 


Kelly 

V.  McGuire,     IS    Ark.     555 
V.   Neely,     12    Ark.    657 
V.   Nichols,   18  R.  I.  62 
V.  Richardson,    100  Ala.   584 
Kelsey  v.   Crouther,   7  Utah   519 
V.  Dunlap,    7    Cal.    160 
V.  Remer,   43    Conn.    129 
Kenaston   v.    Riker,    146   Mich.    163 
Kendall  v.  Clapp,  163  Mass.  69  46, 

Kendrick  v.  Latham,  25   Fla.  819  73, 

Kennard  v.   Louisiana,  92  U.   S.  480 

V.   Mabry,    78    Tex.    151 
Kennedy  v.  Alexander,   21   App.    D.   C. 
424 
V.  Duncan,    157   Mo.   App.   212 
V.  Harden,   92  Ga.   230 
V.  Haskell,    67    Kans.    612 
V.  Kennedy,  29  N.  J.   L.   185 
V.  Northup,    15    111.    148 
Kennedy     Stave     &     Cooperage     Co.     v. 
Sloss-Sheffield  Steel  &c.  Co.,  137  Ala. 
401 
Kennett  v.  Kidd,  87  Kans.   652 
Kenney    v.    Parks,    125    Cal.    146 
Kenny  v.   McKenzie,  25   S.   Dak.  485 
Kent  V.  Barker,  68  Mass.   535 
V.  McCann,  52  111.  App.  305 
V.  Owensboro  Deposit  Bank,  91   Ky. 

70 
V.  Williams,    146    Cal.    3 

119,  121,  394, 
Kentucky    Distilleries    Co.    v.    Blanton, 

149  Fed.  31 
Kentucky  Lumber  Co.  v.  Green,  87  Ky. 

257 
Kenyon    v.    Charlevoix    Imp.    Co.,    135 
Mich.    103  13, 

Kepecs,  In  re,   123  N.  Y.  S.  872 
Kerfoot  v.   Cronin,   105  111.   609 
Kernan  v.   Griffith,   27   Cal.   87 
Kerner  v.  McDonald,  60  Nebr.  663 
Kerr   v.    Freeman,    33    Miss.   292        301, 
V.  Hoskinson,   5   Kans.   App.   193 
V.   Kingsbury,   39    Mich.    150 
V.  Moon,    9   Wheat.    (U.    S.)    565 
v.  Moore,   54   Miss.   286 
V.  Russell,   69   111.   666 
V.  West    Shore    R.    Co.,    127    N.    Y. 
269 
Kessler   v.    State,   24   Ind.    313 
Ketchin  v.  McCarley,  26  S.  Car.   1 
Keuthan    v.    St.    Louis   Trust   Co.,    101 

Mo.   App.    1 
Kew   V.    Trainor,    150   111.    150 
Kidd  V.   Central  Trust  &c.  Co.,  23   Ky. 

L.     1402  187,  224 

Kidder's   Exrs.   v.   Kidder    (N,   J.   Eq.), 

56  Atl.    154  720 

Kidwell  V.   Kidwell,   84   Ind.  224  723 

Kieser  v.   Baldwin,   62  Ala.   526  429 

Kiger  v.  Terry,  119  N.  Car.  456  7Z7 

Kihlken  v.  Kihlken,  59  Ohio  St.  106  708 
Kilbourn  v.  Sunderland,  130  U.  S.  505  651 
Kilburn  v.  Adams,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  33  102 
Kilgore  v.   KilE;ore,   127   Ind.  276  87,   710 

Kilpatrick  v.    Baltimore,  81    Md.    179  54 

Kih-oy    V.    Mitchell,    2    Wash.    407  578 

Kimball  v.  Blaisdell,  5  N.  H.  533  303 

V.  Connolly,  3  Keyes  (N.  Y.)   57 

12,  16,  18,  19,  21 
V.  Semple,    25    Cal.    440 

284,  297,  301 
Kimm  v.  Griffin,  67  Minn.  25  507 

Kimmell  v.  Meier,  106  111.  App.  251  350 
Kimmel's  Estate,  In  re,  226  Pa.  47  100 
Kimmerly  v.  McMichael,  83  Nebr.  789  568 
Kincaid   v.   Howe,    10   Mass.   203  422 


730 
726 
720 
455 

35 
120 
523 
501 
464 
691 

65 
121 

477 
66 

124 

325 
65 

118 


61 

458 
453 
100 
717 
65 

714 

433 

32 

272 

750 
379 
433 
207 
321 
306 
528 
434 
724 
537 
324 

109 
122 
572 

773 
408 


&c. 


Kinder  v.    Scharff,   125  La.   594 
King  V.    Booth,   94   Ark.   306 
V.   Boyd,  4   Ore.    326 
V.  Clark,   7  Mo.   269 
V.  Cole,    6    R.    I.    584 
V.   Gunnison,    4    Pa.    St.    171 
V.   Kilbride,    58    Conn.    109 
V.   Middleborough     Town 

106    Ky.    7i 
V.  Mullins,  171  U.  S.  404 
V.   Pillow,    90   Tenn.    287 
V.  Portis,    77    N.    Car.    25 
V.  Rea,   56   Ind.    1 
V.  Rhew,    108    N.    Car.    696 
V.   Samuel,   7   Cal.   App.    55 
V.   Savage,    121    Mass.    303 
V.  Sears,  91   Ga.   577 
Kingsbury   v.    Cornelson,    122    111. 

495 
Kingsley  v.   Kingsley,   39   Cal.    665 
Kingston  v.   Guck,   155  Mich.   264 
Kinna  v.  Smith,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  14 
Kinney  v.   Keplinger,   172  111.  449 
V.   Lee,   10  Tex.    155 
V.  Vinson,   22   Tex.    125 
Kinports  v.   Boynton,   120  Pa.   St. 
Kintner   v.   Jones,    122    Ind.    148 
Kipp  V.   Cook,  46  Minn.   535 
Kirby  v.   Harrison,  2   Ohio   St.  326 
V.  Kirby,  236  111.   255 
V.  Runals,   140   111.   289 
V.  Tallmadge,   160  U.   S.  379 
Kirkland   v.   Cox,   94   III.   400 

V.  Trott,  75  Ala.  321 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Kirkpatrick,   197  111. 
Kirskey   v.    Cole,   47    Ark.    504 
Kirsch  v.  Tozier,  143  N.  Y.  390 
Kiser  v.   Heuston,   38   111.   252 
Kissel's  Estate,  In  re,  65  Misc. 

443 
Kissinger   v.    Zieger,    138   Wis. 


575 
634 
723 
581 

46 

345 

316 

Co., 

87,  730 

113 

655 

124 

322 

262 

642 

712 

314 

App. 

393 

66 
687 
437 
476 
658 
960 
566 
339 
654 
673 
688 
577 
434 

58 
546 

65 

66 
129,  338 
122 
(N.  Y.) 

631 


306 


144 


368 
611,  613,  616 
Kister  v.    Reeser,   98   Pa.    St.    1        275,  506 
Kisterson  v.  Tate,  94  Iowa  665  565 

Kitchell  V.  Young,  46  N.  J.   Eq.   506       473 
Kitsmiller  v.   Kitchen,   24   Iowa    163  659 

Kittell   V.    Steger,    121   Tenn.   400  690 

Kittredge  v.   Bellows,   7  N.   H.   399  522 

Klabunde  v.  Casper,  139  Wis.  491  286 

Klauber  v.  Higgins,  117  Cal.  451       224,  226 
Kleespies    v.    McKenzie,    12    Ind.    App. 

404 
Kleimann  v.   Gieselman,   114  Mo.   437 
Kling  V.   Schnellbecker,   107  Iowa  636 
Klondyke   Lumber   Co.   v.   Williams,   71 

Ark.  334 
Klumpke  V.  Baker.  68  Cal.   559 
Klussman  v.   Wessling,  238  111.   568 
Knabe    v.    Burden,    88    Ala.    436        192,  228 
Knapp  v.  Alexander-Edgar  Lumber  Co., 
145  Wis.   528 
V.  Bailey,   79  Maine  195 
V.  Lee,    3    Pick.    (Mass.)    452 
V.  Smith,   27   N.   Y.   277 
v.  Windsor,  6   Cush.    (Mass.)    156 
Knight   v.    Coleman,    117   Ala.    266 
v.  Hollings,   73   N.   H.  495 
V.  Indiana    Coal    &c.    Co.,    47    Ind. 

105 
V.  Rothschild,    132    App.    Div.     (N. 

Y.)    274  561 

V.  Thayer,   125   Mass.  25  99,  322 

v.  Thomas,    35    Utah   470  503 

Knighton    v.    Smith,    1    Ore.    276  283 

Knost   v.    Knost,    229    Mo.    170  477 


53 

459 

533 
99 

401 


192 
127 
398 
336 
711 
424 
491 

51 


Knoth 
243 


V.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  187  N.  Y. 


109 


liv 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


[Rcfcnviccs  arc  to  Sections.] 


Knott   V.    Shcpherdstown   Mfg.    Co.,   30 

VV.   Va.    790 
Knowles  v.   Knowlcs,   132  Ga.  806 
Knowlson   v.    I-"lcniing,    165    Pa.    St.    10 
Knowlton  v.  Walker,   13  Wis.  264 
Knox  V.   Knox,   59   Wis.    172 

V.  Paull,  95  Ala.  505 
Knox  Co.  V.   Brown,   103  Mo.  223 
Knudscn  v.  Hannberg,  8  Utah  203 
Koch    V.    Briggs,    14    Cal.    256 

V.   Streutcr,    232    111.    594  210, 

KocherspergtT  v.   Drake,   167   111.   122 
Koelle   V.   Knccht,   99   111.   396 
Koerper  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn. 

132 
Kohl  V.  Kohl,  143  Wis.  214 

V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  367       85, 
Kohn  V.   Lapham,   13   S.   Dak.   78 
Komnier  v.   Harrington,  83   Minn.   114 
Kondolf  V.   Britton,   160  App.   Div.   (N. 

Y.)   381 
Kopmier's   Will,   In   re,    113   Wis.   233 
Kopp  V.    Herrman,   82   Md.   339 
Korn    V.   Cutler,   26   Conn.   4 
Kortright  V.   Cady,  21   N.   Y.   343 
Kjountz  V.    Davis,  34  Ark.   590 
Kraft  V.  Holzman,  206  111.  548 

V.   Welch,   112   Iowa   695 
Krechter  v.   Grofe,   166  Mo.  385 
Krueger   v.    Knab.   22    Wis.   429 
Krug  V.   Davis,  87   Ind.   590 
Kruse  v.  Wilson,  79  III.  233 
Kuby   V.   Ryder,    114   Minn.   217 
Kuecken   v.   Voltz,    110   111.   264 
Kuhn   V.   Smith,    125    Cal.   615 
Kuhn's    Estate,    In    re,    125    Iowa    445 
Kunes  v.   McCloskey,    115    Pa.    St.   461 
Kurtz  V.   Hollingshead,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.   S.)    180 
Kurtz's  Estate,  In  re,  145  Pa.   St.  637 
Kuteman   v.   Carroll    (Tex.),   80    S.    W. 

842 
Kutz  V.   McCune,   22   Wis.    628 
Kyle  V.   Kavanagh,  103  Mass.  356 

V.   Kyle,  50  Ind.   387 

V.  Thompson,  11  Ohio  St.  616 


La   Barre  v.   Bent,    154   Mich.    520 
Lacassagne  v.  Chapuis,   144  U.   S.   119 
Lacey  v.   Floyd,   99   Tex.    112 
Lachman  v.  People,  127  N.  Y.  S.  912 


955, 


Hal- 


Ladd  V.   Dickey,   84  Maine   190 
Ladies    Seamen's    Friends'    Soc.    v 

stead,    58   Conn.    144 
Latferty    v.    Milligan,    165    Pa.    St.    534 

527, 
Lagrave    v.    Hellinger,    144    App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   39 
Lahr  V.   Ulmcr,   27   Ind.   App.    107 
Laidley  v.  Kline,  8  W.  Va.  218 
Lain   v.   Cook,   15   Wis.   446 
Lake  v.  Doud,  10  Ohio  415 
V.   Cray,   35   Iowa  44 
V.  Hood,  35  Tex.   Civ.  App.   32 
V.  Jarrett,    12    Ind.    395 
Lake   Erie   &    W.    R.    Co.   v. 
117   Ind.   465 
V.   Priest,    131   Ind.   413 
V.  Whitham,  155  111.  514 
Lake    Shore    &c.    R.    Co.    v, 

Ohio    St.    254 
Lakin  v.  Ames,  10  Cush.   (Mass.)   198 
Lally   V.    New   York   Cent.   &c.    R.    Co., 
123  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)   35 


Michener, 


105, 
Piatt,    53 


516 
481 
311 
121 

59 
491 
120 

66 
337 
289 
724 
506 

124 
676 
109 
545 
656 

466 
453 

73 
467 
429 

87 
119 
407 
467 
643 
719 
297 
955 

61 

51 
733 
633 

265 
466 

434 
506 
301 
660 
433 


698 
133 
483 

956 
636 

104 

632 

578 
623 
723 
643 
287 
640 
491 
670 

62 
313 
265 

272 
62 

669 


Lamar    v.    Scott,    3    Strob.    (S.    Car.) 

562  675 

Lamar   Water   Co,   v.    Lamar,    128   Mo. 

188  647 

Lamb  v.   Danforth,  59  Maine  322  506 

V.  Pierce,   113  Mass.   72  127,  692 

Lambe  v.    Drayton,   182   111.    110  468 

Lambert  v.    Newman,   56   Ala.   623  127 

V.   Paine,    3    Cranch    (U.    S.)    97  46 

Lament  v.    Cheshire,   65    N.   Y.   30  546 

Lampcrt  v.   Ilaydel,  96  Mo.  439  478 

Lampmau   v.    Milks,   21   N.   Y.   505  61 

Lamprey  v.  Slate,  52  Minn.  181         103,  104 
Lamson  v.   Hutchings,   118   Fed.   321  560 

Lancaster  v.   Lancaster,    187   111.   540  471 

Land    V.    Jeffries,    5    Rand.    (Va.)    211, 

599  315 

Landes    v.    Brant,    10    How.     (U.    S.) 

348  360 

V.  Perkins,   12   Mo.   238  618 

Landreaux   v.    Foley,   13   La.   Ann.    114     347 
Lane  v.   McKinstry,  31   Ohio  St.  640       716 
V.   Utz,    130    Ind.    235  465 

Lane's   Appeal,    57    Conn.    182  456 

Lang    V.     Everling,    3    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

530  356 

V.  Stansel,    106  Ala.   389  442 

Langdean   v.    Hanes,   88   Wall    (U.    S.) 

21  95,  221 

Langdon  v.   Ingram,  28   Ind.    360  47 

v.  New  York,  93  N.  Y.  129  227 

V.   Sherwood,    124    U.    S.    74  221 

Lange  v.  Waters,   156  Cal.   142  393 

Laiigley  v.  Chapin,   134  Mass.  82       633,  642 
Langslow  v.  Cox,  1  Chit.  98  30 

Lanhani  v.   Wilson,   15   Ky.  L.   109  48 

Lanier  v.   Booth,  50  Miss.  410  61 

Lanigan  v.  Sweany,  53  Ark.  185  437 

Lanman   v.    Crooker,   97    Ind.    163  272 

La  Plante  v.   Lee,  83   Ind.   155  601 

Lara  v.  Peterson,  56  Wash.   70  643 

Large   v.    Fisher,   49    Mo.    307  636 

Lariverre  v.   Rains,   112   Mich.  276  442 

Larkin   v.   Avery,   23   Conn.   304  53 

Larkins  v.   Bullard,  88  N.  Car.   35  660 

Larned  v.  Hudson,  60  N.  Y.   102  51 

Larrabee  v.    Hascall,   88   Maine   511  339 

v.  Tucker,    116    Mass.    562  87 

Larwill  v.   Ewing,   73   Ohio  St.   177  734 

Lash   v.   Lash,    57   Iowa   88  731 

Lathers  v.   Keogh,   109   N.  Y.   583  632 

Lathrop  v.   Young,  25  Ohio   St.  451  718 

Latta  v.   Clifford,   47    Fed.   614  687 

V.  Wiley    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    92    S. 

W.   433  545,  549 

Lattin    v.    Gillette,    95    Cal.    317 

10,  15,  16,  23 
Lauer  v.  Lee,  42  Pa.  St.  165  399 

Laughlin   v.   Reed,  89   Maine  226  374 

Laughlin  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Fream,  14  W. 

Va.   322  324 

Laughran  v.  Smith,  75  N.  Y.  205  53 

Laumier  v.   Francis,  23   Mo.   181  61 

Lavery  v.   Egan,   143   Mass.  389  707 

Lavin  v.  Dodge,  30  R.  I.  8  668 

Law  V.  Douglass,   107  Iowa  606  461 

V.   Smith,  2   R.   I.   244  737 

La   Wall    V.    Groman,    180   Pa.    St.    532 

18,  23 
Law   Guarantee   &   Trust   Co.   v.  Jones, 

103  Tenn.  245  60 

Lawless  v.  Stamp,  108  Iowa  601  346 

Lawley  v.  Keyes,   172  Iowa  320  731 

Lawrence    v.    Lawrence,    181    111.    248 

341,  354 
V.  Lawrence,   145  Ky.   61  638 

V.   Lawrence,   82    S.    Car.    150  665 

v.  Springer,   49    N.   J.    Eq.   289  506 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Iv 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Lawrence's   Estate,   In   re,    136   Pa.    St. 


354 


482 

590 

122,   127 

719 


Law5;on  v.  De  Bolt,  78  Iiid.  563 
Lawton  v.  Gordon,  37  Cal.  202 
Lay  V.   Fuller   (Ala.),   59   So.  609 

Layton  v.  Herr,  45  Ind.  App.  203  334 

Leach  v.   Beattie,  33   Vt.   195  125 

V.   Burr,    1S8   U.    S.   510  491 

V.  Minick,    106   Iowa   437  535 

Learned's  Estate,   In  re,  70  Cal.   140  456 

Leathers   v.    Greenacre,    53    Maine    561  454 

Leavell   v.    Poore,    91    Ky.    321  548 
Leavitt  v.  Thornton,  123  App.  Div.  (N. 

Y.)  683  106 

Le  Beau  v.  Armitage,  47  Mo.  138  106 

Le  Blond  v.  Peshtigo,  140  Wis.  604  61 

LeBreton  v.   Cook,   107  Cal.   410  470 

Lecomte   v.    Pennock,    61    Kans.    330  420 

Lecroix   v.    Malone,    157    Ala.    434  354 
Ledbetter    v.    Borland,    128    Ala.    418 

224,  228 

Leddy  v.  Enos,   6  Wash.  247  304 

Ledoux  V.   Lavedan,   52  La.  Ann.   311  112 

Lee  V.    Belknap,    163   Ky.   418  724 

V.  Bermingham,   30   Kans.    312     117,  122 

V.  Evans,   8   Cal.   424  420 

V.  Giles,  161  N.  Car.  541  434 

V.  Lee,  161  Mo.  52  719 

V.   Lindell,    22    Mo.    202  65 

V.  Richmond,   90   Iowa  695  286 

Leeper  v.   Neagle,   94   N.   Car.   338  49 

Leese  v.   Clark,  20  Cal.   387  221 

Leger    v.    Doyle,    11    Rich.     (S.    Car.) 

109  123 

Lego   V.   Medley,   79   Wis.  211  674 
Lehigh  Valley   R.   Co.   v.   McFarlan,   31 

N.  J.   Eq.  706  102 
Lehigh   &    N.    E.    R.    Co.   v.    Hanhauser, 

222   Pa.   248  566 
Lehman    v.    Chambersburg    &c.    R.    Co., 

224  Pa.   276  677 

V.  Collins,   69   Ala.   127  417 
Lehman-Durr    Co.    v.    Griel    Bros.    Co., 

119   Ala.   262  371 

Lehndorf  v.    Cope,   122   111.   317          48,  304 

Leigh   V.   Leigh,   15  Ves.   92  89 

Leknd   v.    Adams,    9   Gray    (Mass.)    171  46 
Le    Marehel     v.     Teagarden,     152     Fed. 

662  228 
Lembeck    &    Bretz    Eagle    Brewing    Co. 

V.   Kelly,    63    N.   J.    Eq.   401  119 

Lemen,   In  re.   208   Fed.   80  378 
Lemon    v.    Graham,    131    Pa.    St.    447 

45,  268,  309 

V.  Staats,  1  Cow.   (N.  Y.)   592  122 

Lenders  v.  Thomas,  35  Fla.  518  546 

Lenfers  v.   Henke,   73   III.  405  675 

Lenning  v.  White   (Va.),  20  S.  E.  831  637 

Lenox  v.   Reed,   12   Kans.  223  358 

Leonard  v.  Adams,   119   Mass.   366  61 
V.  Leonia    Rights   Land    Co.,   81    N. 

J.    Eq.    489  438 

V.  Lining,   57  Iowa  648  87 
Leon     Loan    &c.     Co.    v.     Equalization 

Board,   86   Iowa    127  36 
Leprell    v.    Kleinschmidt,    49    Hun.    (N. 

Y.)   605  668 

Le  Roy  v.  Beard,  8  How.   (U.  S.)  451  336 

V.  Jamison,    3    Sawy.    (U.    S.)    369  223 
Les   Bois  v.    Bramell,   4   How.    (U.    S.) 

449  214 

Lese  V.   Lamprecht,  196   N.   Y.   32  399 

Leslie  v.    Hinson,   83   Ala.   266  122 

Lessell  v.   Goodman,   97   Iowa   681  66 

Lessenich  v.   Sellers,  119  Iowa  314  735 

Lester  v.  Brown,  57  (ja.  79  568 


Levengood's   Estate,   38   Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

491 
Levi  V.  Thompson,  4  How.   (U.  S.)    17 
Leviston    v.    Swan,    33    Cal.   480 
Levy  v.  McCartee,  6  Pet.   (U.  S.)    102 

v.   McDonnell,   92   Ark.   324 
Lewis  V.  Baird,  3  McLean  (U.  S.)  56 

V.   Boskins,    27    Ark.    61 

V.  Chamberlain,    61    Ore.    150 

V.   Gorman,   5   Pa.   St.   164 

V.   narrower,    197    111.    315 

V.   Hawkins,   23    Wall.    (U.   S.)    119 

V.   Hinman,   56  Conn.   55 

V.   Shaw,    70    Fed.    289 

v.   Shearer,    189    111.    184 

V.   Ward,    99    111.    525 
Lewis'  Estate,   In  re,   32   La.  Am.  385 
Lewis    F.    Perry    &c.    Co.,    In    re,    172 
Fed.    745  372,  375, 

Lewis,   In  re,   29  Ont.   609 
Liberty  v.    Burns,    114   Mo.   426 
Lich  v.   Lich,   158   Mo.   App.   400       466, 
Lichter  v.  Thiers,    139  Wis.  481 
Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  6  East.  20,  24 
Lidgerding  v.   Zignego,   77  Minn.   421 
Ligare  v.   Semple,   32   Mich.   438 
Lightcap    V.    Bradley,    186    111.    510 

416,   520, 
Liglitfoot    V.    Horst    (Tex.    Civ.    App.), 

122   S.   W^    606 
Liginger  v.   Field,   78  Wis.  367 
Lignoski    v.    Crocker,    86   Tex.    324 
Likens  v.   McCormick,   39   Wis.   313 
Lilly   V.    Boyd,   72    Ga.    83 

_  V.  Wooley,  94   N.  Car.  412 
Lime    Rock    Nat.    Bank    v.    Mowry, 

N.   H.    598_ 
Lincoln  V.    Lincoln,    107   Mass 

V.   Perry,    149   Mass.   368 

V.  Thompson,  75   Mo.  613 
Lincoln    Bldg.    &    Sav.    Assn. 

10   Nebr.    581 
Lind  V.   Burke,  56  Nebr.  785 
Lindenmayer  v.  Gunst,  70  Miss.  693 
Lindley  v.   O'Reilly,   50   N.  J.   L.   636 

V.    Smith.    46    111.    523 
Lindsay  v.   Eastwood,  72  Mich.   336 

_  V.   Wilson,   103   Md.  252  460, 

Lindsey  v.  Booge,   144  Iowa  168 
Lindt  V.  Uihlein,   116  Iowa  48 
Linebeck  v.   Vos,   160  Fed.   540 
Lineberger  v.  Tidwell,  104  N.  Car.  506 
Lines  v.   Darden,   5   Fla.   51  59, 

Lingen  v.  Lingen,  45  Ala.  410  718, 

Link   v.   MacNabb,   111    Md.   641 
Linton  v.  Wanke,  118  N.  Y.  S.  965 
Lippincott   v.    Lippincott,    19    N.    J.    Eq. 
121 

V.  Mitchell,   94   U.    S.    767 

V.  Ridgway,   10  N.  J.  Eq.  164 

V.  Tilton,    14   N.   J.   L.    364 
Lippitt    V.    Thames    Loan    &c.    Co.,    88 

Conn.    185 
Lisenby  v.    Newton,   120  Cal.   571 
Litsey  v.   Phelps,   5  Ky.   L.   513 
Little  V.  Bennett.   58  N.  Car.   156 

v.   Downing,   37   N.   H.    355 

V.  Paddleford,   13   N.   H.   167 
Littlefield   v.   Tinsley,   26  Tex.    353 
Livermore  v.   Maxwell,   87  Iowa  705 
Livingston  v.   !Murphy,   187   Mass.   315 

V.   Ruff,    65    S.    Car.    284 

V.  Tanner,   14   N.   Y.   64 
Lloyd  V.  Tench,  2  Vesey  215 
Lockerby  v.   Anion,   64  Wash.   24 
Lockie   v.    Mutual   Union  Tel.    Co.,   103 

HI.  401 
Lockridge  v.  McCemmon,  90  Tex.  234 


66 


590 
456,  464, 

V.  Hass, 


612 
197 
578 
732 
297 
124 
417 
957 
708 
470 
392 
122 
205 
306 
638 
456 

379 
737 
147 
713 
466 
518 
61 
325 

598 

622 
737 
122 
661 
18 
736 

428 

46 

466 

101 

132 
719 
694 
584 
324 
526 
734 
642 
687 
193 
324 
480 
719 
274 
634 

359 

320 

60 

310 

316 

397 

722 

479 

690 

299 

74 

439 

301 

70 

52 

86 

397 

110 
475 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Lockwood   V.    Lockwood,   22    Conn.    425 

51,  53 

V.  Noble,   113    Mich.   418  374 
V.  Title  Ins.  Co.,  73   Misc.    (N.   Y.) 

296  22 

Lodge  V.  Fitch,  72  Nebr.  652  737 

V.   Swampscott,    21b    Mass.    260  277 
Loeser     v.     Savings     Deposit     Bank     & 

Trust  Co.,  163   Fed.  212  568 

Loftis  V.   (.ilass,   15   Ark.   680  731 

Logan  V.   Davis,    147   Iowa  441  100 

V.  Pannill,   90   Va.    11  563 

Logan,  In  re,  131  N.  Y.  456  471 

Logansport   v.    Case,    124   Ind.   254  633 

Logue  V.   Hutson,  24   Ore.   528  699 

Loniax  V.   Pickcrinj;,   173  U.  S.  26  223 

V.   Pickering,    165    111.    431  119 
Lombard    v.    Chicago    Sinai    Cong.,    64 

111.  477  333 

V.  Culbertson,  59  Wis.  433  135 
Lone    Tree     Ditch    Co.    v.     Rapid    City 

Electric  &c.   Co.,  16  S.   Dak.  451  665 

Long  V.  Abeles,  11  Ark.   156  535 

V.   Barnes,   87    X.    Car.    329  321 

V.  Barton,  236   III.   551  676 

V.  Boast,    153   Ala.   428  645 

V.  Brown,   4   A'.a.    622                    208,  209 

V.  Buchanan,  27  Md.  502  62 

V.  Langsdale,    56   .Xrk.   239  692 

V.   Long,   142  N.  Y.   545  601 

V.  Mostyn,  65  Ala.  543  431 
Long    Beach    Land    Co.    v.    Richardson, 

70    Cal.    206                                            104,  272 
Long-Bell    Lumber    Co.    v.    Martin,    11 

Okla.   192  215 

Longshore  v.  Longshore,  200  111.  470  735 

Looker  v.  Peckwell,  38  N.  J.  L.  253  432 

Looniis  V.  Jackson,  130  Mich.  594  36 

Loosing  V.   Loosing,  85   Nebr.   66  47 

Lord  V.   Comstock,  240  111.   492  338 

Lorenz  v.   Orlady,  87   Pa.   St.   226  375 
Lorimer   v.    Wayne   Circuit   judge,    116 

Mich.    682  738 

Loring  V.   ('.roomer,   110  Mo.   632  129 

V.   Oxford,   18  Tex.   Civ.   App.   415  25 

V.  Taylor,    50   Mo.   App.    80  50 

Loser    v.     Plainfield     Sav.     Bank,     149 

Iowa   672  433 
Losey    v.    Simpson,    11    N.    J.    Eq.    246 

126,  128 

Lothrop  V.  Foster,  51  Maine  367  325 

Lott  V.  Wykoff.  2  N.  Y.  355  42 
Lougheed    v.     Dykeman's    Baptist 

Church,  129  N.   Y.  211  458 
Loughridge   v.    Bowland,    52    Miss.    546 

687,  692 
Louisiana   'Ry.   &   Nav.    Co.   v.    Madere, 

124  La.  635  630 
Louisiana    Western    R.    Co.    v.    Cross- 
man,    111    La.    611  677 
Louisville    &    N.    R.    Co.   v.    Cullen,    32 

Ky.  L.   1110  270 

V.  Philyaw,   88   Ala.   264  691 

V.  Smith,   128   Fed.   1  694 

V.  Smith,  31  Ky.  Law  1  693 

Love  V.  Love,  8  Ore.  23  202 

Lovejoy  v.  Albcc.  33  Maine  414  655 

V.   Lunt,   48   Maine   Zll  661 

V.  Raymond,  58  Vt.  509  119 

Loveland  v.  Loveland,  136  IH.  75  311 

Lovell  V.  Wall,  31   Fla.  73  201 

Loveren  v.  Donaldson,  69  N.  H.  639  734 

Lovett    V.    Steam    Saw    Mill    Assn.,    6 

Paige   (N.  Y.)   54  330 

Lovin  V.   Carver,    150  N.   Car.   710  185 

Lovingston  v.  St.  Clair  Co.,  64  111.  56  103 

Low  V.  Fox,  56  Iowa  221  443 


\Rcfcrcnccs  are  to  Sections.] 
Lowe 


730 
737 

955 
201 
720 
720 
392 
49 

119 
117 
456 
730 
957 
131 
444 
583 
436 
307 
137 
336 
124 


733 
436 
699 
12,  21 
709 
43 
437 

668 


Macciibbin,     1     Harr.     &     J. 
(Md.)    550 
v..  Wiseman,   46   Ind.   App.   405 
Lowenstun  v.  Page,  16  Pliilippine  84 
Lowery  v.  Baker,  141  Ala.  600 
V.   ITarlow,  22  Colo.   App.   73 
V.   Hawker,  22   N.   Dak.  318 
V.  Peterson,    75   Ala.    109 
Lowrie  v.   Ryland,   65   Iowa  584 
Lowry  V.    Harris,   12   Minn.    (Gil.    166) 

255 
Lucas  V.    Clafflin,   76   Va.   269 

V.  Tucker,    17   Ind.  41 
Luce  V.  Harris,  79  Pa.  St.  432 

V.  Parsons.    192    Mass.    8 
Luch's  Appeal,   In  re,  44  Pa.   St.   519 
Lucier  v.  Marsales,  133  Mass.  454 
Ludlow  V.  Park,  4  Ohio  5 
Luetchford  v.   Lord,   132   N.  Y.  465 
Luhrs  v.   Hancock,  181   U.   S.   567 
Lum  V.  McCarty,  39  N.  J.  L.  287 
Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31 
Lumpkin   v.    Muncey,  66  Tex.   311 
Lundy    v.    Lundy,    24    Can.    Sup.    Ct. 

650 
Lunt  V.  Lunt,  71  Maine  377 
Lurman  v.  Hubner,  75  Md.  268 
Lusk  V.  Carlin,  4  Scam.    (111.)    395 
Lyell  V.   Kennedy,   14  App.   Cas.   437 
Lyford  v.  Laconia,  75  N    H.  220 

V.   Rcss,   33   IMaine   197 
Lyman    v.    Suburban    R.    Co.,    190    111. 

320 
Lynch  v.   Livingston,   8   Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

463  299 

V.  Lynch,   132  Cal.  214  730 

V.  ISIelton,    150   N.   Car.   595  54 

V.   Pfeiffer,   110   N.   Y.   33  428 

V.  United    States.   13   Okla.   142  229 

Lynch,  In  re.   132  Cal.  214  730 

Lynde  v.   Williams,   68  Mo.   360  689 

Lyon   V.    Clark,    132   Mich.    521  530 

V.  Harden,   129  Ala.   643  66 

V.  Kain,  36  111.  362  91,  262 

V.  Lyon,  88  Maine  395  714 

Lytle    V.    Arkansas,    9    How.     (U.    S.) 

314  117 

V.  Lvtle,  48  Ind.   200  676 

V.  Lytle,  10  Watts  (Pa.)  259  45 

M 

Martta  v.  Kippola,  102  Mich.   116  66 

Mabbett  v.   Vick,   53   Wis.    158  659 

McAfee  v.   Reynolds,   130  Ind.   33  564 

McAlister  v.   Burgess,   161   Mass.   269      466 
McAllister     v.     Okanogan     County,     51 

Wash.    647  213 

V.  Tate,   11   Rich.  L.    (S.   Car.)    509      46 
McAlpine  v.  Reicheneker,  56  Kans.  100 

31    32 

V.  Smith,  68  Maine  423 
McArthur     v.     Allen,     Fed. 
8659 

V.  Gallaher,  8  Ohio  512 

v.  Scott,    113    U.    S.    340 
Macauley   v.    Smith,    132    N.    Y. 
McBreen    v.    McP>reen,    154    Mo. 
McCabe   v.   Grey,   20  Cal.    509 
McCabe,  In   re,   15   R.   I.  330 
McCalla  v.  Bane.  45  Fed.  828 
McCallister   v.    Ross,    155    Mo.   87 
McCall's    Admr.    v.    Hampton,    98    Ky. 

166 
McCampbell  v.   Mason,   151    HI.   500 

138,  548 
McCan,  Succession  of,  48  La.  Ann.  145  480 
McCann  v.  Rathbone,  8  R.  I.  403  51 


Cas.     No. 


524 
323 


659 

48 
203 

49 
566 

64 
125 
708 
311 
357 

334 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ivii 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


McCaraher  v.    Commonwealth,    5   Watts 

&  S.    (Pa.)   21  21 

McCartney    v.    Osburn,    118    III.    403 

456,  466,  584 

McCauley  v.  Fulton,  44  Cal.  355  328 

V.  Mahon,  174  111.  384  668 

McCaw  V.  Biirk,  31  Ind.  56  7i7 

McClain  v.   Capper,   98   Iowa   145  483 

McClanahan   v.    Williams,    136   Ind.    30       91 

McClaskey   v.    Barr,    54    Fed.    781  491 

McClave  v.   McClave,   60   Nebr.   464  737 

McCleery  v.   Lewis,   104  Maine  33  289 

McCIellan  v.  Mackenzie,  126  Fed.  701       476 

V.  Taylor,   54   S.    Car.   430  667 

McClelland    v.    Gasquet,    122    La.    241        676 

McClenahan  v.  Stevenson,  118  Iowa  106    318 

McClintock   v.    Joyner,    77    Miss.    678        408 

McClung  V.  Steen,  32   Fed.   373  192 

McClure   V.    Fairfield,    153   Pa.    St.    411        65 

V.  Raben,   125   Ind.    139  334,  714 

V.   Smith,    14    Colo.    297  419 

V.  Spivey,    123    N.    Car.    678  491 

McComas  v.  Amos,  29  Md.   132  711 

McConihe  v.   Fales,   107   N.   Y.  404  316 

McConnel  v.   Smith,   23   111.   611  46 

McCord    V.    Eastern    R.    Co.,    136   Wis. 

254  109 

V.  Hames,  38  Tex.  Civ.  App.  239       722 
V.  Massey,    155    111.    123  521 

McCorraack    v.     First     Nat.     Bank,     53 

Ind.  466  662 

McCormick  v.   Parsons,   195   Mo.   91  426 

V.   Stephany,    57    N.    J.    Eq.    257  722 

V.   Wheeler,     36     111.     114  128 

McCorry    v.    King,    3    Humph.    (Tenn.) 

267  54 

McCoy  V.  Barns,   136  Ind.   378 

273    321    470 
McCracken  v.  Flanagan,  127  N.  Y.' 493  '  661 
v.   Rogers,    6    Wis.    278  87,   730 

McCrae  v.   McCrae,    103  Tenn.    719  66 

McCraney  v.  McCraney,  5  Iowa  232  65 
McCrea  v.  Newman,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  473  316 
McCrea,   In   re,   180  Pa.   St.   81  714 

McCready   v.    Sexton,    29   Iowa    356 

643,  644 
McCullough  V.   Lee,   7  Ohio   15  731 

McCune  v.   Essig,   118   Fed.   273  200 

V.   Goodwillie,    204    Mo.    306  638 

McCurdy    v.    Neall,    42    N.    J.    Eq.    333      455 
v.  Otto,    140   Cal.   48  58 

McCurdy's    Appeal,    In    re,    65    Pa.    St. 

290  674 

McCusker  v.  McEvey,  9  R.  I.  528  8,  99 

McDaniel    v.    Texarkana     Cooperage    & 

Mfg.   Co.,   94  Ark.  235  631 

McDill  v.  Meyer,  94  Ark.  615  268,  274 

McDonald  v.  Cooper,  32  Fed.  745  661 

V.   Dexter,   234   III.    517  655 

V.  Dodge,    97    Cal.    112  502 

V.  Eggleston,    26    Vt.    154  337 

V.   Hannah,   51    Fed.   73  633 

V.  Rankin,  92   Ark.   173  551 

V.   Shaw,    81     Ark.    235  481 

McDonough  V.  Martin,  88  Ga.  675     278,  301 

McDougal  V.  Musgrave,  46  W.  Va.  509     291 

McDowell   V.    Addams,   45    Pa.    St.   430 

87,  89 

V.  People,  204  111.  499  504 

McDuffie  v.   Montgomery,  128  Fed.   105    480 

McEndree   v.    McEndree,    12    Ind.    97        571 

McFarland   v.   McFarland,    177    111.   208 

43,  46 
McFarlane  v.   Kerr,   10   Bosw.    (N.   Y.) 

249  689 

McFarran  v.  Knox,  5  Coin.  217  119 

McGahan  v.    Bank,    156   U.   S.   218 

262,  328 


McGarrahan    v.    New    Idria    Min.    Co., 

49    (^ai     331  222 
McGary  v.  McGary   (Ky.  App.),  105  S. 

W.    891  363 

McGaw  v.  Gortner,  96  Md.  489  576 

McGonigal   v.    Colter,    32    Wis.    614  714 

McGovern  v.   Knox,  21   Ohio  St.   551  318 

V.  McGovern,  75  Minn.  314  460 

McGraw's  Estate,  In  re,  111   N.  Y.  66  458 

McGreal  v.  Taylor,   167  U.   S.  688  307 

McGregor   v.    Comstock,   3    N.    Y.    408  732 

McGriff    v.    Porter,    5    Fla.    373  60 
McGugin  V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  33  W. 

Va.   63  534 

McGuire  v.  Brown,  41  Iowa  650  719 

v.  Bryant  Lumber  &c.  Co.,  53  Wash. 

425  560 

v.  Westmoreland,    36    Ala.    594  717 

McGunnigle  v.   McKee,  77  Pa.   St.  81  719 

Machold  v.   Farnan,   20  Idaho  80  672 

Machu,    In   re,    21    Ch.    Div.    838  55 

Mcllhinny  v.    McIIhinny,   137   Ind.   411  48 

Mcllvaine   v.    Smith,   42   Mo.   45  57 

Mcllwrath   v.    Hollander,    73    Mo.    105  546 

Mclnery  v.  Reed,  23   Iowa  410  636 

Mcintosh  v.   Bowers,    143  Wis.   74  434 

V.  Thurston,  25   N.  J.   Eq.  242  535 

Mclntyre  v.   Gelvin,   77   Kans.    779  730 

V.   Mclntvre,    147    Mich.    365  101 

v.   Park,    11    Gray    (Mass.)     102  337 

v.  Thompson,     4     Hughes     (U.     S.) 

562  73 
Mack  v.    Hill,   28   Mont.   99  672 
McKean  &  Elk  Land  Imp  Co.  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 35  Pa.  St.  269  120 
McKee  v.   Jones,   6   Pa.   St.   425  64 

v.   Perchment,    69    Pa.    St.    349  108 

V.   Wilcox,     11     Mich.     358  66 

McKeithen   v.    Blue,    149   N.   Car.   95  350 

Mackellar  v.  Pillsbury,  48  Minn.  396  375 
McKelvey  v.   McKelvey,  75  Kans.  325 

65,  620 

McKenna's  Estate,  In  re,  168  Cal.  339  730 

McKenzie  v.    Budd,    125   Cal.   600  583 

Mackey  v.   Mackey,   71   N.   J.    Eq.   686  491 
McKinnev   v.    Mellon,    3    Houst.    (Del.) 

277  730 

V.  Miller,    19   Mich.    142  129 

V.  Rodgers    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  29   S. 

W.   407  335 

V.   Settles,    31    Mo.    541  290 

McKinny  v.   Abbott,   49  Tex.   371  731 

McKinzie   v.    Perrill,    15    Ohio    St.    162  127 

V.   Stafford,    8    Tex.    Civ.    App.    121  284 
McLanahan   v.   Reeside,  9   Watts    (Pa.) 

508  99 

McLane  v.  Paschal,  47  Tex.   365  35S 

McLaren  v.  Clark,  80  Ga.  423  417 

V.   Jones,  89  Tex.   131  100 
McLaughlin    v.    McLaughlin,    22    N.    J. 

Eq.  505  67 

McLean  v.  McLean,  92  Kans.  326  724 

McLeod   v.    Lloyd,   43    Ore.    260  93 

McLeran   v.    Benton,   73   Cal.    329  51 

McLouth    V.    Hurt,    51    Tex.    115  120 

v.   Rathbone,    19    Ohio    21  345 

McMahan    v.    Bowe,    114    Mass.    140  314 

V.   Tacoway,    105    Ala.    585  408 

V.   Kimball,    3    Blackf.     (Ind.)     1  65 

McMahon  v.   McGraw,   26   Wis.   614  f38 

V.  Rowley,    238   111.    31  957 

V.  Russell,    17    Fla.    698  520 

McMaken  v.   Niles,   91   Iowa  628  128 

McMamee  v.  Hiickabee,  20  S.  Car.  190  123 

?ttcManus   v.    Carmichael,    3    Iowa    1  272 

McMasters   v.    Np^Iey,    152   Pa.    St.    303  64 
McMichael    v.    McMichael,    51    S.    Car. 

555  49 


Iviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


McMichael 

V.  Murphy,   12  Okla.    155  200 

McMicken   v.   United    States,   97   U.    S. 

204  180 

McMillan  v.  Cox.   109  Ca.  42  472 

V.  Edwards,   75   N.   Car.   81  348 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  56  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

45  1 

V.  Peacock,   57  Ala.   127  320 

V.   Richards,    9    Cal.    365  520 

V.  State,    160    Ala.    115  723 

McMillen  v.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  37  42 
McMinn    v.    O'Connor,   27   Cal.    238  120 

McMulIen  v.  Eagan,  21  W.  Va.  233  284 
McMurphy  v.  Adams,  67  N.  H.  440  316 
McXally  v.  McN'ally,  23  R.  I.  180  467 
McNamara   v.    Culver,    22    Kans.    661        418 

V.   I'ink,   71   Minn.  66  646 

V.   Seaton,   82   111.   498  271 

McNaught  V.  McAllister,  93  Ind.  114  664 
McNeal   v.    Sherwood,   24   R.   I.   314  730 

McNeely  v.  Langan,  22  Ohio  St.  32  691 

Mrxoml)  V.  Miller,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  265  731 
l\Iacon  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Riggs,  87  Ga.  158  109 
McParland   v.    Peters,   87    Nehr.    829  434 

McPhectcrs  v.  Ronning,  95  Minn.  164  119 
McPherson  v.  Hayward,  SI   Maine  329     420 

V.   Rollins,    107    N.    Y.    316  125 

McPike   V.    Pen,    51    Mo.    63  636 

McQuerry  v.   Gilliland,   89   Ky.   434  671 

McOuesten  v.  Commonwealth,  198  Mass. 

172  954,  955 

McOuinn  V.  McQuinn,   110  Ky.   321  65 

Macrae   v.    C.oodbar.   80   Miss.    315  119 

McRee  v.   Means,   34   Ala.    349  59 

McSurley  v.  Venters,  31  Ky.  L.  963  719 
McVay  v.  Tousley,  20  S.  Dak.  258  549 

McVeigh    V.    Chicago   Mill   &c.    Co.,    96 

Ark.    480  13 

McWhirter  v.  Roberts,  40  Ark.  283  633 
Maday   v.    Roth,    160   Mich.    289  399 

Madison  v.   Larmon,   170   111.   65  712 

Maeck   v.    Sinclair,    10   Vt.    103  602 

Magaw  V.  Lothrop,  4  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.) 

316  34 

Magee   v.    Doe,   9    Fla.    382  87,  214 

Magee,    In    re,    63    Cal.    414  719 

Magness    v.    Arnold,    31    Ark.    103  87 

Magruder   v.    Esmay,    35    Ohio    St.    221 

192,  644 
Magsocay    v.    Fernando,    17    Philippine 

120  957 

Maguire   v.    Bissell,    119    Ind.    345  423 

V.  Moore,    108    Mo.    267  710 

Mahan  v.   Smith,   151   Ala.   482  314 

Maher    v.    James    Hanley    &c.    Co.,    23 

R.    I.    323  51 

Maher,  In  re,  169  Fed.   997  515 

Mahoney    v.    Middleton.    41    Cal.    41  126 

V.   Neff,    124    Ind.    380  564 

Maitlen  v.  Maitlen,  44  Ind.  App.  559  705 
Major  V.  Buklev,  51  Mo.  227  45,  274 

Ma'iot,   In   re,    199   N.   Y.   29  705,  724 

Mallett  V.   Page,  8   Ind.   364  443 

Mallory  v.  Ferguson,  50  Kans.  685  21,  22 
Malone  v.   Marriott,   64   Ala.   486  546 

Malsby  v.   Gamle,  61   Fla.   310  93 

Manaudas  v.   Mann.   25   Ore.    597  126 

Mandlcbaum  v.  McDonell,  29  Mich.   78 

47,  478 
Mangold  v.  Barlow,  61  Miss.  593  117,  122 
Manifold  v.  Jones,   117  Ind.   212  525 

Manly  v.   Slason,  21   Vt.   271  530 

Mann  v.  Hyde,  71   Mich.  278  709 

V.  Jackson.    84    Maine   400  477 

Manners  v.   Manners.   20  N.   T.   L.    142   -  722 

Jilanning  v.   Pipiien.  86  Ala.   357  671 

V.   Perkins,   86   Maine   419  281 


Mansfield  v.  Neff,  43  Utah  2S8  720 

V.  Shelton,   67   Conn.   390  461 

V.  Turpin,    32    Ga.    260  493 

Manson   v.    Duncanson,    166   U.    S.    533     600 
Manternach  v.  Studt,  240  111.  464  364 

Marbury    v.    Ehlen,    72    Md.    206  129 

V.  Madison,  1  Cranch  (U.  S.)   137       223 
Mardt  V.  Scharmach,  65  Misc.   (N.  Y.) 

124  676 

Marionneaux  v.  Dupuv,  48  La.  496  719 

Markey  v.   Markey,   108  Iowa  373  719 

Markle   v.   Akron,    14   Ohio   586  652 

Markle's  Estate,  In  re,  187  Pa.  St.  639     471 
iMarkoe  v.  Andras,  67   111.   34  516,   530 

Marks    V.    Dickson,    20    How.    (U.    S.) 

501  198 

Marlow  v.   King,    17   Tex.    177  87,  730 

Marr  v.  Given.  23  Maine  55  336 

Marscllis    v.    Thalhimer,    2    Paige    (N. 

Y.)    35  721 

Marsh  v.   Nelson,   101  Pa.   St.    51     635,  692 

V.  Waupaca   County,   38   Wis.   250        723 
Marshall   v.    Rench,    3    Del.    Ch.    239 

V.   Rose,    86    111.    374 

V.  Trumbull,    28    Conn.    183 
Marston   v.   Catterlin,   239   Mo.    390 
Martel    v.    Somers,    26    Tex.    551 
Martin  v.   Baird,   175   Pa.   St.   540 

V.  Bates,    20    Ky.    L.    1798 

V.   Berry,    37   Cal.   222 

V.   Bonsack.    61    Mo.    556 

V.   Caldwell,   49   Ind.    App.    1 

V.   Castle,    193    Mo.    183 

V.  Cauble,   72   Ind.   67 

V.  Evansville,    32    Ind.    85 

V.  Gray,    142    U.    S.    236 

V.   Harris    (Te.x.    Civ.    App.),    26    S 
W.  91 

V.   Hoff,    7   Ariz.    247 

V.  Hunter's    Lessee,    1    Wheat 
S.)    304 

V.  Kelly,    59    Misc.    652 

V.  Marks.    97    U.    S.    345 

V.   Mercer    University,    98    Ga.    320     471 

V.   O'Brien,    34     Miss.    21 

V.   Perkins,    56    Miss.    204 

V.  Poague,    4    B.    Mon.    (Ky.)    524 

V.   Pond,   30   Fed.    15 

V.   Renaker,    10    Kv.    L.    469 

V.   Roberts,    127    Iowa    218 

V.   Roberts,    57    Tex.    564 

V.  Royse,    21    Ky.    L.    775 

V.  Splivalo,   69    Cal.    611 

V.   Stovall,    103    Tenn.     1 

V.  Thomas,   56  W.   Va.  220 

V.  Turner    (Ky.    App.),    115    S.    W 
833 

V.  Walker,   102   Ga.   72 

v.   Ward,    60    Ark.     510  442,  447 

v.   Wilbourne,  2  Hill   (S.  Car.)    395      346 
Martindale   v.    Palmer,    52    Ind.    411  502 

V.   Price,    14   Ind.    115  408 

V.   Waas,    8    Fed.    854  395 

Martinet  v.  Duff,  178  111.  Anp.  199  672 

Marvin   v.   Brewster  Iron   Min.   Co.,   55 

N.   Y.   538  63 

Maryland   v.  West  Virginia,  217   U.   S 

577 
Mashburn  v.   Dannenberg  Co.,   117   Ga 

567 
Mason  v.    Baily,  6  Del.   Ch.    129 

V.  Black,   87   Mo.   329 

v.   Brock,    12    III.    273 

v.   Daly,    117    Mass.    403 

v.   Mullahy,    145    Hi.    383 

V.   Ross,   75   N.   J.    Eq.    136 
Mason-.Seanian    Transportation    Co.,    In 
re,  235   Fed.   974  380 


737 
705 
275 
11 
127 
339 
117 
377 
346 
266 
446 
129 
104 
662 

336 

215 
(U. 

650 

595,  597 

207 

471 

104 

491 

354 

674 

64 

31 

533 

90 

316 

493 

399 

314 
429 


694 


364 
714 
129 
283 
578 
127,  692 
100 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


lix 


[References,  arc  to  Sections.] 


Masterson  v.  Munroe,  105  Cal.  431 

V.  Townshend,   123   N.   Y.   458 
Massey   v.    Huntington,    118   111.    80 
Massie   v.    Hiatt,   82   Ky.    314 
Mather  v.   McMillian,  60  Wis.   546 

V.  Mather,   103   111.   607 
Mathews  v.   Blake,    16  Wyo.   116 
Matlock  V.   Lock,   38   Ind.  App.   281 
Matson  v.  Johnson,  48  Wash.  256 
Matt  V.   Matt,    156   Iowa   503 
Matter    of   Kiernan,    38   Misc.    (N.    Y.) 
394 
McGraw,  111  N.  Y.  66 
McMillan,    126    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.) 

155 
Nichols'    Estate,    60    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

299 
Underhill,   62    Misc.    (N.    Y.)    456 
Matthews    v.    Goodrich.    102    Ind.    557 
V.   Ward,    10    Gill    &   J.    (Md.)    443 
Matthewson   v.    Hevel,    82    Kans.    134 
Mattlage    v.    Mulherin,    106    Ga.    834 
Mattocks   V.    Brown,    103    Pa.    St.    16 

V.  Stearns,    9    Vt.    326 
Mattox  V.  Hightshue,  39  Ind.  95 
Maul   V.    Hellman,    39    Nebr.    322 
Mauzy   v.    Hinrichs,   89    Nebr.   280 

V.   Hinrichs,    90    Nebr.    735 
Maxwell    v.    Campbell,   45    Ind.    360 
V.  Harper,    51    Wash.    351 

286,  297, 
Maxwell    Land-Grant    Case,    121    U.    S. 

325 
May  V.   Dobbins,   166   Ind.   331 
V.   Lewis,    132    N.    Car.    115 
V.   May,    28    Ala.    141 
V.  Parham,    68    Ala.    253 
Mayburry  v.  Brien,   15  Pet.   (U.  S.)   21 
Maver  v.   Wilkins,   37   Fla.   244 
Mayham  v.   Coombs,   14  Ohio  428 
Maynard   v.   Davis,    127   Mich.    571 

V.   Maynard,    10    Mass.    452 
Mayo  V.   Wood,   50  Cal.    171 
Maywood  &c.   Co.  v.   Maywood,   118  III. 

61 
Meacham  v.  Bunting,  156  111.   586 
Mead  v.    Fox,   6   Cush.    (Mass.)    199 
Meader  v.  Archer,  65   N.  H.  214 

V.   Norton,    11    Wall.    (U.    S.)    442 
Meadowcroft     v.     Winnebago     Co.,     181 
111.    504  111,   714, 

Meagher  v.  Drury,  89  Iowa  366 
Mechanics'  Bldg.  Assn.  v.  Whitacre,  92 
Ind.    547  21 

M.  E.  Church  v.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L. 
13 
V.  Mayor  &c.  of  Hoboken,  33   N.  J. 
L.   13 
Meddock  v.  Williams,   12  Ohio  377 
Mee    V.    Benedict,    98    Mich.    260 
Meech  v.   Fowler,   14  Ark.   29 
Meeker  v.  Draffen,  137  App.  Div.  537 

V.  Wright,  76  N.  Y.  262 
Megerle  v.  Ashe,  33  Cal.  74 
Meier  v.   Lee,   106  Iowa   303  458, 

V.  Meier,    105    Mo.   411 
Meigs  V.  Roberts,  162  N.  Y.  371 
Mellen   v.   Molina   Iron   Works,    131   U. 

S.  352 
Mellon  V.  Reed,   114  Pa.   St.  647 
Melross   v.    Scott,    18    Ind.    250 
Melton  V.   Davidson,   86  Tenn.    129   721, 
V.  St.    Louis,    I.    M.    &    S.    R.    Co., 

99    Ark.    433 
v.  Turner,    38    Tex.    81 
Melvin  v.  Martin,  18  R.  I.  650 
V.   Melvin,    8    Cal.    App.    684 
Memmert  v.  McKeen,   112  Pa.  St.  315 


241 
463 

59 
721 
373 
470 
643 

43 
364 
433 

724 
113 

708 

711 
711 
192 

72 
638 
433 
49 
49 
100 
601 
722 
722 
362 

311 

229 
687 
714 
678 
736 
65 
375 
126 
325 
120 
317 

105 

64 

35 

718 

106 

719 
124 


105 

105 
284 
121 
265 
466 
321 
196 
731 
446 
289 

651 
327 
119 

728 

568 
124 
718 


Memphis   Land   &   Timber   Co.    v.    Ford, 

58   Fed.  452  394 

Menage    v.    Tones,    40    Minn.    254  362 

Menard  v.   Campbell,    180  Mich.    583  322 

Menger  v.  Carruthers,  3  Kans.  App.  75  112 
Mercantile    Nat.     Bank    v.     Parson,     54 

Minn.   56  129 
Mercantile    Safe    Deposit   Co.    v.    Hunt- 
ington.  89   Hun    (N.   Y.)    465  286 
Merchants'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  North- 
ern   Trust    Co.,    250    111.    86  354 
Merchants'    Nat.    Bank   v.    Greene,    130 

Mass.    317  674 
Merchants'    &    Farmers'    State    Bank    of 

Sullivan   v.    Dawdy,   230    111.    199  434 
Mercier     v.     Missouri    &c.     R.     Co.,     54 

Mo.    506  45 

Meredith   v.   Joans,    3   Cro.    Cas.    244  58 

Meriden    v.    Maloney,    74    Conn.    90  632 
Merillat   v.    Hensey,    34   App.    (D.    C.) 

398  575 

Merriam  v.   Bachioni,  112   Cal.   191  183 

Merrick   v.    Merrick,    37    Ohio    St.    126  272 

V.  Wallace,    19    111.   486  117 

Merrifield    v.    Western    Cottage    Piano 

&c.   Co.,  238  111.   526  614 

Merrill  v.   Dearing,  32  Minn.  479  640 

V.   Hartwell.    11    Mich.    200  203 

V.  Houghton,   51    N.    H.    61  671 

V.   Luce,     6     S.     Dak.     354              119,  438 

Merriman   v.    Hyde,   9    Nebr.    113  118 

Merritt  v.    Brown,   19   N.  J.   Eq.  286  418 

V.   Bunting,    107    Va.    174  187 

v.   Harris,    102    Mass.    328  301 

V.   Merritt,    62    Mo.    150  736 

v.   \\'esterman,    165   Mich.   535  691 

Meserve  v.   liaak,   191   Mass.   220  483 

Mesick  v.    Sunderland,   6   Cal.   297  394 

Meskimen   v.    Day,   35   Kans.   46  120 

Messer   v.    Tones,   88   Maine,   349        719,  724 

V.  Oestfeich,    52    Wis.    684  278 

Messmore    v.    Williamson,    189    Pa.    St. 

73  40 
IMetcalf  V.  First  Parish  in  Framingham, 

128    Mass.    370  487 
Methodist  Church  v.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J. 

L.   13  105 

Mette  V.   Feltgen    (111.),  27   N.   E.   911  326 

Mever    v.    Kinzer,    12    Cal.    247  320 
Meyers  v.  Croft,   13  Wall.   (U.   S.)   291 

193,  196,  198 
ISIichigan  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Con- 
ant.   40   Mich.    530  127 
Michigan  Trust  Co.  v.  Ferry,   175  Fed. 

667  576 

Michoud   V.   Girod,   45    U.    S.    502  363 

Middlecoff  v.   Cronise,   155   Cal.    185  654 

Middleton   v.    Findla,   25   Cal.    76  262 

Middleton,    In    re,    72   Iowa   424  491 
Middletown     Savings     Bank     v.     Bach- 

arach,  46  Conn.   513  638 

V.     Fellowes,  42  Conn.   36  535 

Middleworth  v.  Ordway,  191  N.  Y.  404  718 

Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  122  Ind.  84  537 

Midyette   v.   Grubbs,    145    N.   Car.   85  722 

Milburn   v.    Beatv,   81    Kans.    696  643 

Miles  v.   Stehle,  22   Nebr.   740  447 

Milheim   v.    Baxter,   46   Colo.    155  407 

Miller   V.    Anderson,    1    S.    Dak.    539  632 

V.  Bayless,    194    Mo.    630  303 

V.   Carlisle,    90   Ky.   205  466 

V.  Cooch,    5    Del.    Ch.    161  473 

V.  Davis,    106   Mich.   300  73 

V.   Emans,    19    N.    Y.    384  306 

v.  Goodin  (Ky.  App.),  124  S.  W. 

818  350 

V.  Grunsky,  141  Cal.  441  228 

V.  Hanna,  89  Nebr.  224  736 


Ix 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


^^'"^'hoU.  68  Mo.  584  ^^^  487 

I.   Indianapolis.  123  Ind.  196  105,  244 
V.  Levi,  44  N.  Y.  489  56 

V.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.,  83  Ala. 


274 


673 

90 

66 

466 

676 

346 

466 

715 

719 

346 

185 

310 

353 

87 

535 

67 

203 

221 

273 


467 
536 
318 
691 
429 
193 


687 
719 

550 
73 
372 
636 
291 


54 

65 

694 

458 

59 


650 
265 
27 
670 
457 

633 

34 

723 

713 

61 


V.  McElwee,   12  La.   Ann.   476 

V.  Marx,   55   Ala.   322 

V.   Metcalf,  77  Conn.   176 

V.   Miller.   234    111.    16 

V.  Miller,  63   Iowa  387 

V.  Miller,   151   Ky.    563 

V.  Miller,    105    La.    257 

V.   Miller,   91    N.    Y.   315 

V.   Miller,   89   N.   Car.  402 

V.   Moss,   65   Tex.    179 

V.  Quick,   158   Mo.  495 

V.  Sherry,    2    Wall.    (U.    S.)    237 

V.  Speer,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  567 

V.  Stoddard,  50  Minn.  272 

V  Talley,    48   Mo.    503 

V  Texas  &c.  R.  Co..  132  U.  S.  662 
V.  Tobin,    16  Ore.   540 

V  Tunica   County,   67   Miss.    651 
V.  Warren,    94    App.    Div.    (N.    V.) 

192 
V.  Williams,  66   111.   91 
Miller.    In   re,   64   Misc.    (N.   Y )    467 
Millett   V.   Lagomarsino.    107   Cal.    102 
Milligan  V.   O'Conor,   19   111.  App.  487 
Millikan    v.    Patterson,    91    Ind.    515 
Mills  V.   Catlin,  22  Vt.  98 

V.  Davison,    54    N.    J.    Eq.    659     55,  482 
V.  Dow's  Admr.,  133  U.   S.  423  266 

V.  Seattle    &c.    R.    Co.,    10    Wash. 

520 
V    Van  Vnorhies,  20  N.  Y.  412 
v.  Zion  Chapel,   119   Md.   510 
Milne  V.   Milne.    17   La.   46 
Minis  v.    Machlin,   53    S.   Car.    6 
Minneapolis    Mill    Co.    v.    Tiffany,    22     ^^ 
Minn.   463  '^ 

Mires  v.  Laubenheimer,  271  111.  296         735 
Missouri-American    Elec.    Co.    v.    Ham- 
ilton-Brown   Shoe   Co.,    165    Fed.    283 

370,   37o 
Missouri   River   Tel.    Co.   v.    First    Nat. 

Rank,   74    111.   217 
Mitchell  v.  Bartlett,  51  N.  Y.  447 

V.  Hagge    (Iowa),    160    N.    W.    287 

v.   Tones,    50    Mo.    438 

V.  kimbrough,  98  Tenn.   535 

V.  Minnequa    Town    Co.,    41     Colo 

367 
V.  Pinckney,  13  S.  Car.  203 
v.   State,   63    Ind.    574 
V.  Thorne,   134   N.  Y.   536 
v.   Warner,    5    Conn.    497 
V.  Winslow,   2    Story    (U.    S.)    630     432 
Mittcl   V.   Karl.   133   111.   25  321 

Mix   V.    Hotchkiss,    14   Conn.   32  426 

Mizell  V.   Burnett,  49  N.   Car.   249  .54 

Moale  V.   Baltimore,   5   Md.   314  105 

Mobile    Tr.-insportation    Co.    v.    Mobile, 

187  U.   S.  479  214 

Mobley  v.  Mobley,  85  S.  Car.  319  471 

Moen  V.  Moen,  16  S.  Dak.  210  719 

Mofat   V.    Henderson,    18   J.    &    S.    (N. 

Y.)   211 
Mohr  V.   Tulip,  40  Wis.   66 
Molineaux   v.    Raynolds,    55    N.    J.    Eq. 

187  ''85 

Mollyneaux    v.    Wittenberg,    39    Nebr. 

547  313 

Monmouth   County  Electric   Co.   v.   Mc- 

Kenna,  68   N.   J.    Eq.    160  432 

Monnett  v.  Turpie,  132  Ind.  482       652,  671 


527 
583 


Monroe   v.    lones,   8   R.   I.    526 

V    West,    12    Iowa    119 
Monson   v.    Hutchin,   194   IH-   431 
Montague   v.    Marunda,   71    Nebr.   8U5 

V.   Priester.    82    S.    Car.    492 
Montana  v.   Rice,  204  U.   S.   291 
Montana  Nat.  Bank  v.  Schmidt,  6  Mont. 

609  ,,       ,,  ill 

Montandon  v.  Deas,  14  Ala.   3o  5J6 

Montgomery   v.    Dorion,   7    N.    H.    475     111 

V.  Johnson,   31   Ark.    74  600 

V.   Keppel,    75    Cal.    128  126,  127 

V.   McCuniber,    128    Ind.    374  301 

V.   Roliinson,   49   Cal.    258 

V.   Sturdivant,    41    Cal.    290 

V.   United    States,   36    Ted     4 

Montignani   v.    Blade.    145    NY.    Ill 

Moody  v.   Farr,   33  Miss.   195 

v.  Macomber,    158    Mich.    209 

V.  Moody,    11    Maine    247 

V.  Walker,   3  Ark.   147 

V.  Wright,   13   Mete.    (Mass.)    17 

Mooers    v.    White,    6    Johns.    Ch 

Y.)     360 
Mooney  v.  Olsen,  21   Kans.  691 
Moore  v.   Carey,   116   '^a.   28 
V.  Childress,   58  Ark.   510 
V.   Cottingham,    113    Ala.    148 
V.   Coulter.    31    Ga.    278 
V.   Crandall,    146    Iowa    25 
V.   Crose,    43    Ind.    30 
v.  Empire   Land   Co.,   181   Ala.   344 
V.  Flack,    77    Nebr.    52 
V.   Tourdan.   14   La.   Ann.   414 
V.   Kerr,    46    Ind.    468 
v.   Moore,   99   Cal.    18 
v.  Moore,    155    Ind.    261 
V.  Moore,    30    Ky.    L.    383 
V.  Moore,    169   Mo.   432 
V.  Moore,    35   Vt.    98 
V.  Morrow,   28   Cal.   551 
V.  Neil,  39   111.   256 
V.  Page,    11^.   U.    S.    117 
V.   Perry,    42    S.    Car.    369 
V.  Rake,  26  N.  J.  L.  584 
V.  Ransdel,    156   Ind.    658 
V.   Sharpe,   91    Ark.   407 
V.  Trott,    156   Cal.    353 
V.  Williams,    115    N.    Y.    586 
Moore,    In    re,    14   R     I.    38 
Moot  V.   Business  Men's  Assn.,   157   JN. 

Y     201  6,  0  3 

MooV   V.    Gallagher.   36   R.    L   405  472 

Moran  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  83  Nebr. 

680  o93 

V.  Stewart,   132   Mo.   73  718 

Moran,   In  re,   151   Mo     555  718 

Morange   v.    Mix,   44    N.    \      31.i  17,   18 

Morano  v.    Shaw,   23   La.   Ann.   379 
More   V.    Smedburgh,   8   Paige    (N.   Y.) 

Moreland  v.  Houghton,  94  Mich.  548 
Morgan  v.  Dalrymple,  59  N.  J.   Eq.  22 

v.   Eaton.    59    Fla.    562 

V.   Mason,    20    Ohio    402 

v.   Meuth,     60     Mich.     238 

v.  Mitchell,    104    Ga.    596 

V.   Robbins,    152    Ind.   362 

V.   Rogers,    79    Fed.    577 

V.   Spangler,    14    Ohio    St.    102 

V.   Wattles,     69     Ind.    260 

V.  Wickliffe.    115    Ky.    226 
Morgan   County   School  v.   Schroll,   120 

111.   509  ^  ^,  ^       ^'^^ 

Morganton  Hardware  Co.  v.   Morganton 

Graded   School,   150  N.  Car.   680  536 

Morin    v.    Holliday,    39    Ind.    App.    201     714 
Morrill  v.  Hopkins,  36  Tex.  686  66 


350 

45,  274 

205 

714 

40 

669 

602 

469 

432 

(N. 

Ill,  732 

722 

363 

695 

600 

192,  195 

447 

61 

11 

719 

692 

327 

668 

360,  524 

719 

719 

718 

52 

350 

323 

54 

99 

59 

314 

286 

75 

718 


22 

26 
436 
530 
671 

61 

61 
696 
471 

58 
100 
363 
620 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixi 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


MorriU 

V.  Mackman,    24    Mich.   279  61 

V.   Morrill,    53    Vt.    74  126 

V.   Phillips,    142    Mass.    240  710 

Morris  v.   Goodwin,   1   Ind.  App.  481  362 

V.   Gregory,    80    Kans.    626  638 

V.   Lirton,    61    Nebr.    537  395 

V.   Linton,    74    Nebr.    411  59 

V.  Mowatt,  2  Paige    (N.  Y.)    586  74 

V.   Peck.    73    Wis.    482  436 

V.  Potter,    10  R.    L    58  708 
V.  Schollsville  &c.  Tpk.  Rd.,  6  Bush 

(Ky.)    671  110 
V.  Wadsvvorth,    17    Wend.    (N.    Y.) 

103                                               125,  433 

V.  Williams,   39   Ohio   St.   554  719 

Morrison  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  81  Ind 


335 

V.   Bartlett,    148    Ky.    833 
V.  Chambers,  122  N.  Car. 


689 


638 

487 
400 


58, 


Clarksburg    C.    &c.    Co.,    52    W. 
Va.    331  46 

V.  Kinstra,   55    Miss.    71  362 

V.   Morrison,    38    Iowa    73  316 

V.  Roehl,   215   Mo.   545  436 

V.   Schorr,    197    111.    554  470 

V.  Session's    Estate,   70   Mich.   297        718 
V.  Waggy,   43    W.    Va.   405  77 

Morrow  v.   Dows,  28  N.  J.   Eq.   459         632 
V.  Scott,  7  Ga.  535  721 

V.  Whitney,    95    U.    S.    551 

186,  221,  272 
Morrow's  Estate,  In  re,  204  Pa.  479  487 
Morse  v.    Blood,   68   Minn.    442  47 

V.  Carpenter,    19    Vt.    613 

261,  263,  328 
V.  Curtis,    140    Mass.    112  8,   126 

V.   Hayden.   82   Maine   227  474,   734 

V.  Hill,    136    Mass.    60  363 

V.   Lam.be,   23   Ont.   608  13 

V.  Lowe    (White),   182   Mich.   607 

91,  466 
V.  Osborne,  75  N.  H.  487  712 

Morsell   V.    First    Nat.    Bank,   91    U.    S 

357 
Morton  v.   Barrett,  22  Maine  257 
V.  Morton,    120    Ky.    251 
V.   Morton,    62    Nebr.    420 
V.   Woodbury,    153    N.    Y.    243 
Moseley  v.   Rambo,   106  Ga.   597 
Moser  V.    Cochrane,    107   N.   Y.   35 
Moses  V.    Johnson,   88   Ala.   517 
Moss   V.    Helsley,    60   Tex.    426 

V.  Jenkins,    146    Ind.    589 
Mossestad  v.  Gunderson,  140  Iowa  290 
Mott  V.  Ackerman,  92   N.   Y.   539 
Moulton   V.    Cornish,    138    N.    Y.    133 

447,  674 
Mt.    Pleasant    v.    Eversole,    29    Ky.    L. 

830  501 

Mudge  V.  Livermore  (Iowa),  123  N.  W. 

199  613 

Muhle    V.    New    York    &c.    R.    Co.,    86 

Tex.   459  110,  677 

Muir  V.  Gallowav,  61  Cal.  498  324 

Muldrow   V.    Robinson,    58   Mo.    331  124 

Mulford   V.    Le    Franc,   26   Cal.    88  227 

V.  Rowland,  45  Colo.   172  335 

Mullan    V.    United    States,    118    U.    S. 

271  208 

Muller  V.   Dows,  94  U.   S.  444  655 

Mulliken  V.  Graham,  72  Pa.   St.  484         127 
Mullin   V.  Atherton.   61    N.   H.   20  611 

Mulvane   v.    Rude,    146    Ind.    476  472 

Munger  v.  Curtis,  42  Hun   (N.  Y.)   465    53  5 
Munson   V.    Cole,   93   Ind.    502  359 

V.   Munson.    30    Conn.    425  429 

V.  Wray,    7    Blackf.    (Ind.)    403  406 


566 
714 
467 
718 
485 
357,  442 
524 
391 
485 
619 
737 
359 


Murdock  V.  Murdock,  74  N.  H.  77  712 

Murphey   v.    Harker,    115    Ga.    77  667 

Murphy    v.    Adams,    71    Maine    113  537 

V.  Crowley,    140   Cal.    141  91 

V.  Delano,    95    Maine    229  354,  359 

V.   Doyle,   37   Minn.    113  687 

V.   Hendricks,    57    Ind.    593  120,  423 

V.  Henry,    35    Ind.    442         87,  707,  708 
V.  McKeon,   53   N.   J.   Eq.   406  483 

V.   Myar,    95    Ark.    32  405 

Murray   v.    Beal,   23    Utah    548  330 

V.   Brokaw,   67   111.   App.   402  443 

V.   Cazier,   23    Ind.   App.    600  722 

V.   Cherrington,     99     Mass.     229  50 

V.   Green,   64   Cal.    363  313 

V.  Hill,   60  111.   App.   80  531 

V.  Montana  &c.  Mfg.  Co.,  25   Mont. 

14  228 

Murray  Ferris  &  Co.  v.   Blackledge,   71 

N.    Car.    492  328 

Murto  V.  Lemon,  19  Colo.  App.  314  443 
Musconetcong  Iron  Works  v.   Delaware 

&c.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  J.  L.  717  100 

Musgrove  v.  Bonser,  5  Ore.  313  127,  132 
Mushback  v.  Ryerson,  11  N.  J.  L.  346  616 
Mutual  Benefit  Co.,  In  re,   174  Pa.   St. 

1  .  90 

Mutual   Benefit  Life  Ins.   Co.   v.   Grace 

Church,    53    N.   J.    Eq.    413  47 

V.   Huntington,    57    Kans.    744  439 

Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corey,  54  Hun 

(N.    Y.)    493  97,  282 

V.  Dake,   87   N.    Y.   257  122,  132 

V.   Nicholas,   144  App.   Div.    (N.   Y.) 

95  419 

Myers  v.   Croft,   13   Wall.    (U.    S.)    291 

197,  198 

V.  Myers,    167   111.   52  58 

V.   Norman,    20    Ky.    L.    343  467 

V.   Pierce,    86    Ga.    786  451,   524 

Mynes  v.  Mynes.  47  W.  Va.  681  429 

Myrick  v.   Bill,  5   Dak.   167  66 

N 

Nagle  V.  Hirsch,  59  Ind.  App.  282  477 

Nail  V.  Conover,  223   Mo.  477  698 

Narron   v.   Wilmington  &c.   R.   Co.,   122 

N.   Car.  856  694 

Nash  V.  Cutler,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  491  727 
Nason      v.       First       Bangor      Christian 

Church,   66    Maine    100  481 

National   Bank   v.    Matthews,    98   U.    S. 

621  113 

V.  Scriven,  63  Hun   (N.  Y.)   375         328 
V.  Tenn.    Coal   &C.   R.   Co.,   62   Ohio 

St.   564  421 

National     Broadway   'Bank    v.     Denny, 

133   Ga.   227  350,  612 

National   Ins.    Co.   v.    Butler,   61    Nebr. 

449  426 

National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Minch,  S3  N. 

Y.   144  128 

National    Safe    Deposit    Co.    v.    Stead, 

250  111.   584  86 

National    Sav.    Bank   v.    Ward,    100   U. 

S.   195  16,  17 

National     Shoe     &     Leather     Bank     v. 

Small,  7  Fed.  837  432 

National    Surety    Co.    v.    Walker,    127 

Iowa  518  638 

Naylor  v.  Godraan,  109  Mo.  543  476 

Neal  V.   Davis,   53  Ore.   423  699,  720 

V.   Kayser,    12   Ariz.    118  200 

V.   Wideman,   59  Ark.   5  643 

Neeley  v.    Wise,   44   Iowa   544  730 

Neff  V.   Elder,  84  Ark.  277  428 

Negus,  In  re.  7  Wend.    (N.   Y.)    499  IS 


Ixii 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


600 
719 
717 
338 
48 
710 
695 
363 


526 
426 
420 
493 

427 


Neill  V.  Cody,  26  Tex.  286 

Neil's  Appeal,  In  re,  92  Pa.  St.  193 

Neilson  v.  Hrett,  99  Va.  673 

V.  Lagow,   12   How.    (U.   S.)    98 
Nellu  V.  Nellis,  99  N.  Y.  505 
Nelson  v.   Bush,  9  Dana  (Ky.)    104 
V.   Davidson,   160   HI.   254 
V.   Hayner,   66    111.   487 
V.  Murfee,  69  Ala.  598         524,  602,  736 
V.   Nelson,  36   Ind.   App.   331  484 

Nesbit  V.  Stevens,  161  Ind.  519  508 

Nesbitt  V.  Delamar's  Nevada  Gold  Mm. 

Co.,  24  Ncv.  273  _,    613 

Neslin  v.  Wells,  104  U.  S    428  121,  .125 

Nesmith  v.  Dinsmore,  17  N.  H.  515  737 

Nevada    Nickle    Syndicate    v.    National 

Nickle  Co.,  103  Fed.  391  591 

Nevin's  Estate,  In  re,  192  Pa.  St.  258         59 
Newark   Sav.    Inst.   v.   Jones,   37    N.   J. 

Eq    449  ^-^° 

Newberry  v.  French,  98  Va.  479         74,  531 
New    Britain    v.    Marines'    Sav.    Bank, 

67  Conn.   528 
Newbury  v.  Rutter,  38  Iowa  179 
Newcomb  v.  Bonham,  1  Vern.  7 

V.   Newcomb,    108    Ky.    582 
Newell   V.    Burnside   Banking  Co.,    (Ky. 

App.),  118  S.  W.  267 
New    En^^land   Hospital   v.   Boston,    113 

Mass.  3l8  ^  107 

New  Eng.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Starin,  60  Conn. 

369  659,  663 

New    England    Mtg.    Sec.    Co.    v.    Clay- 

ton,   119  Ala.  361  437,  439 

New    Haven     County    v.     New    Haven 

Trinity  Church,  82  Conn.  378  73,  462 

Ncwhouse  v.   Siniino,   3   Wash.   648  215 

Newkirk  V.  Marshall.  35  Kans.  77  201 

Newlin  V.  McAfee,  64  Ala.  357  417 

Newman  v.   Fidelity  Savings  &c.  Assn., 

14   Ariz.   354  4.^8 

V.  Samuels,  17  Iowa  528  358,  441 

Newman,    In   re.    75    Cal.    213  712,  718 

Newman's  Estate.   75   Cal.  213  6/6 

Newnam  v.  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio  323  661 

New  Orleans  v.  Baltimore,  13  La.  Ann 
162 
V.  Hardie,  43  La.  Ann.  251 
v.  United    States,    10    Pet.    (U.    S.) 
662 
New   Orleans   Nat.   Bank   Assn.   v.    Ad- 
ams, 109  U.  S.  211 
Newport  V.  Cooper,   10  La.   155 
Newton  v.   Emerson,   66  Tex.    142 
V.  Fisher,  98  N.   Car.  20 
V.  McKay.  29   -Mich.   1 
V.   Newton,   11   R.   I.   390 
New  Vienna  Bank  v.  Johnson,  47  Ohio 

St.   306 
New  York  v.  Carleton,  113  N.  Y.  284 
V.  Goss,     124    App.     Div.     (N.    Y.) 

680 
V.  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443 
V.  Stone,  20  Wend.   (N.  Y.)    139 
New    York    &c.    Gas    Coal    Co.    v.    Plu- 

mer,  96  Pa.  St.  99  392 

New  York  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Aldridge,   135 
N.  Y.  83 
V.  Long,  69  Conn.  424 
V.  Untermyer,    133    App.    Div.    (N. 
Y.)    146 
New    York    Mutual    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Armstrong,  117  U.   S.   591 
Niblack   V.   Goodman,   67   Ind.    174 
Nicholls  V.  V/entworth,  100  N.  Y.  455 
Nichols  V.  H.-impton,  46  Gn.  253 

V.  New  England  Furniture  Co.,   100 
Mich. '230 


462 
483 

72 

424 
195 
280 
137 
263 
418 

417 
694 

631 
104 

40 


224 
109 

677 

733 
658 
102 
123 

241 


Nichols 

V.  Nichols,  28  Vt.  228 
V.  Patten,  18  Maine  231 
V.   Reynolds,    1    R.    I.    30  117, 

Nichols,  In  re,  12S  Pa.  St.  428 
Nicholson  V.  Bettle,  59^Pa.  St.  384 
V.   Caress,    59    Ind.   39 
V.  Congdon,    95    Minn.    188 
V.  Lieber    (Te.x.   Civ.  App.),    153   S. 
W.   641 
Nicholson,  In  re,  115  Iowa  493 
Nicodemus  v.  Young,  90  Iowa  423 
Nicoll  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,   12  N. 

Y.  121 
Nicrosi  V.  Phillipi,  91  Ala.  291  64, 

Nidevcr  v.  Ayers,  83  Cal.  39 
Nightingale      v.       Burrell,       15       Pick. 
(Mass.)   104,  111 
V.  Hidden,  7  R.  I.    115 
Niles  V.   Cedar  Point   Club,    175   U.   S. 
300  192,  195, 

V.  Cooper,  98  Minn.  39 
Ni.xon    V.    Hyserott,    5   Johns.    (N.    Y.) 

58 
Noble  V.  Grandin,  125  Mich.  383 

V.  McGinnis,    55    Ind.    528 
Noland  V.   BarreU.   122  Mo.   181  590. 

V.  Chambers,   84   Ky.    516 
Norman   v.    Beckman,   58   Fla.   325 
V.   Eastburn,    230    Mo.    168 
V.  Heist,  5  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)    171 
Non-She-Po     v.     Wa-Win-Ta,    37     Ore. 

213 
Noon  V.   Finnegan,   29  Minn.   418 
Nordyke    &    Marmon    Co.    v.    Hawkeye 

Woolen   Mills  Co.,   53   Iowa   521 
Norris  v.   Dains,  52  Ohio   St.  215 

V.  Henslev,   27   Cal.   439  465, 

V.   Kidd,  28  Ark.  485 
V.  Letchworth,   140  Mo.   App.   19 
V.  Moulton,  34  N.  H.  392 
North  V.  Graham.  235   111.   178 
V.  Knowlton,    23    Fed.    163 
North    Birmingham    St.    R.    Co.   v.    Cal- 

derwood,  89  Ala.  247 
Northcraft  v.   Oliver,   74  Tex.    162 
Northcut  V.  Whipp,   12   B.   Mon.    (Ky.) 
65  64 

North    Dakota    Horse   S:    Cattle    Co.    v. 

Serumgard,    17   N.   Dak.   466 
Northern   Bank  v.  Roosa,  13  Ohio  334 
Northern    Lumber    Co.    v.    O'Brien,    124 

Fed.    819 
Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Majors,    5 
Mont.   Ill 
V.  Musser  &c.  Co.,  68  Fed.  993 
Northern   Trust    Co.    v.    Buck,    263    111. 

222 
North's  Estate,  In  re^  48  Conn.  583 
Northwestern    Nat.    Bank    v.    Stone,    97 

Iowa   183 
Nortnass   v.    Pioneer   Townsite   Co.,    82 

Nebr.  382 
Norton    V.    Birge,    35    Conn.    250 

133,  546, 
V.  McDevit,  122  N.  Car.  755 
V.  Reardon,   67   Kans.   302  345, 

Norwood  V.  Cobb,  37  Tex.  141 

V.  Leeves  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  115  S. 

W.  53 
V.  Mills,  3  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec. 
356 
Nothe  V.  Nomer,  54  Conn.  326 
Nottingham  v.  McKendrick,  38  Ore. 

495 
Nowlin  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wilson,  119 

Mich.  406 
Noyes  v.  Hall,  97  U.  S.  34      447, 


670 
662 
122 
714 
48 
737 
192 

1 
471 

262 

54 
458 
301 

469 
274 

226 
434 

336 
655 
653 
601 
479 
643 
611 
724 

718 
723 

536 
280 
472 

66 
100 

66 
722 
433 

503 
723 

,  65 

446 
566 

182 

106 
212 

727 

429 

65 

551 

64 

590 

737 

667 

734 
33 

537 

62 
692 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Noyes 

V.  Johnson,    139    Mass.    436  7,  395 

V.   Sturdivant,    18  Maine   104  119 

Noyes'  Estate,   In  re.  40  Mont.   178  457 

Nugent  V.   Cloon,    117   Mass.   219  60 

V.   Powell,   4   Wyo.    173  718 

V.   Riley,   1   Mete.    (Mass.)    117  419 

Nye  V.  Moody,  70  Tex.  434  120,  567 

O 

Oak  Creek  Valley   Bank  v.  Helmer,   59 

Nebr.    176  428 

Oakes   V.    DeLancey,    71    Hun    (N.    Y.) 

49  104,  257 

V.  Yonah  Land  &  Alin.  Co.,  89  Fed. 

243  673 

Oakey  v.  Cook,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  350  75 

Oakland   v.   Oakland   Water   Front   Co., 

118  Cal.   160  187,  227 

Oakley   v.    Shaw    (N.    J.    Eq.),    69   Atl. 

462  591 

Oakman   v.   Walker,   69   Vt.   344  54 

Oaksmith's    Lessee    v.    Johnston,    92    U. 
■    S.   343  693 

Oats  V.  Walls,  28  Ark.   244  117,  122 

Ober  V.  Gallagher,  93  U.  S.  199  530 

Oberholtzer's    Appeal,    In    re,    124    Pa. 

St.  583  124 

Oblenis  v.  Crecth,  67  Fed.  303  272 

O'Brian  v.  Fry,  82  111.  87  598 

O'Brien  v.  Bugbee,  46  Kans.  1  714 

V.   Moffitt,   133   Ind.  660  674 

O'Connell   v.    Pinnacle    Cold   Min.    Co., 

140   Fed.    854  722 

O'Connor  v.  Current  River  R.  Co.,  Ill 

Mo.    185  537 

V.  Nadel,   117  Ala.   595      _  424 

Oconto  Co.  V.   Terrard,  46  Wis.  317  132 

Ogden   V.    Ogden,   60   Ark.    70  64 

V.   Walters,    12    Kans.    282 

125,  349,  592 
Ogden   City   St.    R.    Co.    v.   Wright,   31 

Ore.    150  354 

Ogilvie  V.  Copeland,  145  111.  98  147 

Ogle  V.  Tayloe,   49  Md.   158  463 

Oglesby  Coal  Co.  v.  Pasco,  79  111.  164     730 
Ohio   River   R.   Co.   v.   Johnson,   50   W. 

Va.   499  694 

V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  222  Pa.  573         668 
Okanogan     County     v.      Cheetham,      37 

Wash.    682  213 

Olcott  v.  Gabcrt,  86  Tex.   121  45,  268 

V.  Tope,  115  111.  App.   121  338 

Old     Town     Bank     v.     McCormick,     96 

Md.  341  277 

Olin  V.  Denver  &c.  R.  Co.,  25  Colo.  177    272 

Oliver  v.   Dougherty,  8  Ariz.   65  347 

V.  Hook,  47  Md.  301  61 

V.  Pitman,   98   Mass.   46  61 

V.  Robinson,   58  Ala.  46  636 

V.   Vance.   34   Ark.    564  708 

Olson  v.  Leibpke,   110   Iowa   594  547 

V.   United  States,   133  Fed.  849  20S 

Olson,   In  re,  63   Iowa  145  491 

O'Mara    v.     McCarthy,    45    Ind.    App. 

147  28 

Ommen  v.  Talcott,  180  Fed.  925  578 

O'Neal  v.  Wilson,  21  Ala.  288  345 

Ontario    Land    &   Imp.    Co.    v.    Bedford, 

90  Cal.   181  426 

Opdyke's  Appeal,  In  re,  49  Pa.  St.  373     719 
Opel   v.    Shoup,    100   Iowa   407  477 

Ordway  v.   Smith,   53   Iowa  589  362 

Oregon  Mtg.  Co.   v.   Hersner,   14  Wash. 

515  431 

Oregon  &  W.  Trust  Inv.  Co.  v.  Shaw, 
5  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  336  438 


Orford  v.  Benton,  36  N.  H.  395  64 

Orgain  v.   Irvine,    100  Tenn.    193  487 

Ormsby  v.  Graham,   123  Iowa  202  77 

Orr    V.    Hodgson,    4    Wheat.     (U.  S.) 

453  732 

V.  O'Brien.  55  Tex.   149  492 

v.   Sutton,   119   Minn.   193  117 

V.   White,    106   Ind.    341  729 

V.  Wiley,   19  W.  Va.  150  642 

Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  127  111.  554  719 

Osborne  v.   Gordon,   86  Wis.   92  60 

Osgood  v.  Abbott,   58  Maine  73  276 

Ostrom  v.   San  Antonio,  77  Tex.  345         693 

Oswald  v.   Wolf,    129   111.   200  638 

Otis  V.   Epperson,   88  Mo.   131  661 

V.  McMillan,   70  Ala.  46  308 

V.   Smith,   9   Pick.    (Mass.)    293  290 

O'Toole   V.   Omlie,   8  N.    Dak.   444  434 

Otto    V.    Young,    227    Mo.    193  671 

Ouerbacker  v.   Claflin,   96  Ky.   235  371 

Oury   v.    Duffield,    1   Ariz.    509  723 

Outland  v.  Bowen,   115  Ind.   150  56 

Overall  v.  Taylor,  99  Ala.   12  127 

Overdieck,   In   re,    50   Iowa  244  716,  734 

Overing   v.   Russell,   32   Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

263  687 
Overland    Machinery   Co.   v.    Alpenfels, 

30  Colo.   163  .        272 
Overseers    of    Poor    v.    Sears,    22    Pick. 

(Mass.)    126  45 

Overstreet  v.  Baxter,  30  Kans.  55  419 

Overton  v.  Lea,  108  Tenn.  505  478 
Overturf  v.  Dugan,  29  Ohio   St.  230 

86,  360,  723 

Owen  V.   Baker,   101   Mo.   407  349,  350 

V.   Brookfort,   208   111.   35  99 

V.  Field,    102    Mass.    90  43,  55 

V.  Western  Sav.   Fund,  97  Pa.  47         23 

Owens  v.  Claytor,  56  Md.   129  525 

V.  Jabine,  88  Ark.  468 

V.   McNally,   113   Cal.   444 

V.   Owens,   100   N.   Car.   240 

Owensboro  &-  N.  R.   R.   Co.  v.  Griffith, 

92  Ky.   137  291 

Owings  V.  Hunt,  53  S.  Car.  187  722 

Ownes  V.  Ownes,  23  Ti.  J.  Eq.  60  59 

Owsley  V.  Matson,  156  Cal.  401  73,  699 
Oxley  V.   Tryon,  25   Iowa  95 


64 
671 
733 


298 


Ozark    Land    &c. 
Mo.    673 


Co.    V.    Franks,    156 


101 


718 


Pace  V.  Klink,  51  Ga.  220 

Pacific    Live    Stock    Co.    v.    Gentry,    38 
Ore.  275  183 

Pack  V.  Whitaker,  110  Va.  122  297 

Packard    v.    Cleveland    &c.    R.    Co.,    46 

111.  App.  244  53 

V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  92     338 
v.  Tisdale,  50  Maine  376  636 

v.  Usher,  7  Gray   (Mass.)    529 

Packer  v.  Bird,   137  U.   S.  661 

Paddock  v.   Wallace,    117   Mass.   99 
V.   Wells,  2  Barb.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)   331 

Page   V.    Ellsworth,    44    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

636  408 

V.  Foust,  89  N.  Car.  447  467 

V.  Greely,   75   111.   400  6,  395,  398 

V.  Hobbs,   27   Cal.   483 
V.   Parker,   61    N.    H.   65 
V.   Rogers,    31    Cal.    294 
V.  Trutch,  Fed.   Cas.  No.  10668 
V.  Waring,   76  N.  Y.  463 

Pahlman  v.   Shumway,   24   111.   127 

Paige  V.  Akins,   112  Cal.  401 

Paine    v.    Consumers'    Storage    Co.,    71 

Fed.   626  272 


35 
104 
363 

89 


183 
711 
78 
22 
547 
566 
405 


Ixiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  ore  to  Sections.] 


Paine 

V.  Meller,   6  Ves.   347 

V.  Root,   121  111.  77 

V.  Woods,  108  Mass.  160 
Paldi  V.  Paldi,  84  Mich.  346 
Paliu  V.  Cooke,  125  Ca.  442 
Palmer  v.   Ekins,   2   Ld.   Raym.   1550 

V.  Mead,  7   Conn.    149  ^      ,,, 

Pancake  v.  Couffman,  114  Pa.  St.  113 
Panton  v.   TctTt.   22   111.   366 
Panin  V.  Goodrich,  103  111.  86 
Park  V.  P.-.rk,  71  Ark.  283 
Parke  v.  Keeley,  90  Pa.  St.  52 
Parker  v.  Allen,  4  Atl.   (N.  J.)   300 

V.  Bctts,   47   Colo.   428 
Churchill,   104   Ga.    122 


V.  Tones,    57    Ga.    204 
V.  Meredit 


......Jith  (Tenn.)   59  S.  W.  167 

V.  Nickerson.  137  Mass.  487 

V.  Page,   41   Ore.   579 

V    Parker,   S   Mete.    (Mass.)    134 

V.  Parker,    10   Tex.   83 

V.  Porter,  11   111.  App.  602 
Parkey  v.  Ramsey,   111  Tenn.   302 
Parkhurst  v.   Ilarrower,   142  i'a.  4JJ 
Parks  V.  Kimes,   100  Ind.   148 
Parlin  v.   Ware,  39   Maine  363 
Parmenter  v.   Lomax,   68   Kans.   61 

V.  Oakley,  69  Iowa  388 
Parmenter   Mfg.   Co.   v.    Hamilton,    172 

Mass.    178  ^^  ,,„  f/. 

Parnell  v.  Thompson,  81  Kans.  119  493 

Parret  v.  Shaubhut,  5  Minn.  323  120 

Parsons  v.    Baltimore   Bldg.   &c.   Assn., 


8 

546 
104 
634 
517 
99 
654 
118 
290 
25 
431 
129 
583 
723 
471 
99 
119 
664 
53 
46 
715 
6 
100 
712 
719 
623 
315 
438 


Peabody  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v.  Houseman, 

89  Pa.   St.   261 
Peabody    Heights    Co.    v.    Wilson,    82 

Md.    186  ,    ^     T.    -.n  ^      17 

Peacock  v.  Eastland,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  1/ 

V.   Smart,   17    Mo.   402 
Peacock,  In  re,  178  Fed.  851 
Peadro  v.   Carriker,   168  111.   570 
Peagler  v.  Stabler,  91  Ala.  308 
Peake  v.  Jenkins.  80  Va.  293 

V  Young,   40   S.    Car.    41 
Pearce  v.   Moore,  H^  NY.  256 
Pearl  Street,  In  re.  111  Pa.  St.  565 
Pcarsol   V.    Maxwell,    68    led.    513 
Pearson  v.  Carlton,  18  S.  Car.  4/ 

V  Go"c'i.  69   N.   H.  208 
V.  Hartman.   100  Pa.   St.   84 
V.  Howey,  11  N.  J.  L.  12 
V.  Seay,   38  Ala.  643 

Pearson,  In  re,   110  Cal.   524 
Pease   v.   Christ,   31   N.  Y.   141 
Peasley  v.    Mcl-adden,   68   Cal.   6H 
Peck  V.   Clapp,   98  Pa.   St     581 

V.  Jenness,   7   How.    (U.    S.)    61J 

V.  Peck,  66  Mich.   586 

V.   Smith,    1    Conn.    103 
Peckham  v.   Lego,  57  Conn.   553 

V.  Stewart,  97  Cal.  147 
Peden  v.  Chicago  &c.   R.   Co.,  73  Iowa 


21 

313 
58 
703 
381 
73 
420 
453 
353 
314 
317 
714 
721 
442 
62 
65 
418 
708 
529 
692 
687 
522 
676 
61 
472 
262 


86 


119 

326 
121 

420 
737 
718 


44   W.   Va.   335 

V.  Boyd,  20  Ala.  112 

V.  Lent,  34  N.  J.   Eq.  67 

V.  Noggle,  23   Minn.   328 

V.  Parsons,  52  Ohio  St.  470 

V.  Parsons,    101    Wis.    76 

V.  Prudential    Real    Estate    Co., 
Nebr.   271 
Paschal  v.  Perez,  7  Tex.  348 
Pascoe  V.  Green,  18  Colo.  326 
Pasquay  v.  Pasquay,  23?  III.  48 
Paterson   v.    Ellis,    11    Wend.    (N.   Y.) 
259 

V.  Ogden,   141  Cal.  43 
Paton  V.   Robinson,  81  Conn.  547 
Patrick   V.   Patrick,   135   Ky.    307  59,  480 

Patterson    y.    Carneal,    3    Marsh   A.    K. 


640 

76 

215 

484 

44 
228 
314 


Ken- 


113 
417 
375 
473 
203 
119 
53 


623 
653 
376 


(Ky.)   618 
V.  De   La   Ronde,   8  Wall.    (U.    S.) 

292 
V.  Earhart,  6  Ohio  S.  &  C.  P.  Dec. 

16 
V.  Harlan,  124  Pa.   St.  67 
V.  Langston,  69   Miss.   400 
V.  Patterson,    135    Ky.   339 
V.  Tatum,   3   Sawy.    (U.   S.)    164 
V.  Trabue,    3    J.    J.    Marsh.     (Ky.) 
598 
Pattison  v.  Dryer,  98  Mich.  564 
Patton  V.  Ludington,  103  Wis.  629 
Patton's  Exr.  v.   Smith,   130  Ky.  819 
Patty  V.   Middleton,   82  Tex.    586 
Paul  V.  Cragnaz,  25   Nev.  293 
V.   Davis,   100   Ind.   422 
V.  Philbrick,  73   N.   H.  237 
Paulding  v.   Grimsley,   10  Mo.   210 
Paxson    V.    Brown,    61    Fed.    874 

V.  Heron,  41   Colo.    147 
Payne  v.  Parker,  10  Maine  178 
V.  Sheets,   75   Vt.   335 
Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  348 


290 
118 

476 

423 

223 

54 

210 

185 

52 

459 

614 

70 

405 

718 

476 

197 

125,  138 

347 

280 

63 

417 


Peabody    v.    Brown,    10    Gray    (Mass.) 
45  '*22 


328 
Peers  v.  McLaughlin,   88  Cal.  294 
Peet  V.  Spencer,  90  Mo.  384 
Peet's  Estate,   In  re.   99  Iowa  314 
Peevy  v.  Hurt,  32  Tex.  146 
Pegram  v.  Owens,   64  Tex.  475 
Peirce  v.  Grice,  92  Va.  763 
Pekin    Mining   &    Milling   Co. 

nedy,  81   Cal.   356 
Pelham  v.  Murray,  64  Tex.  477 
Pemberton  v.  Klein,  43  N    J.  Eq.  98 
Pembroke    Academy    v.    Epsom    School 

Dist.,  75  T^.  H.  408  59,  480 

Pendergrass  v    Burns    77  Cal.  19  418 

Pendleton  v.  Kinney,  65  Conn.  222  4/i 

Pengra  v.    Munz,   29   Fed.   830  212 

Peninsular    Naval    Stores    Co.    v.    L-ox, 

57   Fla.   505  ,,      „„„  ^7i 

Penn  v.  Rhoades,  124  Ky    798  363 

Pennington    v.    Martin,    146    Ind.  ^63^5  ^^^ 

Pennisson    v.    Pennisson,    22    La.    Ann. 

Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  US.  714         658    661 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.     Pittsburgh,    226 

Pa.  322 
Pennsylvania   Consol.   Coal   Co.,    In   re, 

163   Fed.   579  378 

Pennsylvania   Ins.   Co.   v.   Bauerle,   143 

111    459 
Pennsylvania  Min.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  204 

Pa.  325  ^  ^.,,      ^      "'^ 

Pennsylvania  Mtg.   Inv.  Co.  v.  Gilbert, 

13  Wash.  St.  684         ^     .,       .     „      p    ^" 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  K. 

Co.,   118  U.   S.   290 

Penrose  v.  Cooper,  86  Kans    597 

Penzel  Co.  v.  Jett,  54  Ark.  428 

People  v.  Bristol,  .^5   Mich.  28 

V.  Conklin,  2  Hill    (N.  Y.)   67 

v.  C-reiger,   138   111.   401 

V.  Crissman,  41  Colo.  450  955,  956 

V.  Duffy-Mclnnery    Co.,     122     App.  ^^^ 

V.  EdwL"ds"56   Hun    (N.   Y.)  377     640 

V.  Folsom,   5   Cal.   373  lo" 

V.  Huber.   20   Cal.    81  661 

V.  Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich.  95  645 

V.  Irwin,    14   Cal.   428  418 


331 
434 
371 
117 
111 
503 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixv 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


People 

V.  Liscomb,  3  Hun   (N.  Y.)   760  650 

V.  Livingston,  8  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  253     180 
V.   McClay,    2    Nebr.    7  66 

V.  Madison   Co.,    125   111.   9  104 

V.   Miller,    79    Mich.   93  301 

V.   O'Brien,   111   N.  Y.   1  677 

V.  O'Loughlin,    136   N.   Y.    S.   339       957 
V.  O'Loughlin,     79    Misc.     (N.    Y.) 

650  443 

V.  Pearis,  37  Cal.  259  634 

V.  Rardin,   171   111.  App.  226  736 

V.   Richards,  99   N.   Y.   620  137 

V.  Simon,    176    111.    165  955.  956,  957 

V.   Snyder,  41   N.  Y.  397  120 

V.   Sperry,    116   Cal.    593  244 

V.   Storms,  97  N.   Y.  364  120 

V.   Swift,  96   Cal.    165  229 

V.   Warner,    116   Mich.  228  207 

V.   Watkins,   106  Mich.  437  93 

People   ex   rel.   Underbill   v.    Saxton,    15 

App.   Div.   (N.   Y.)   263  227 

Peoples  V.   Evens,  8  N.  Dak.   121  53 

People's  Bldg.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Billing, 

104   Mich.    186  321 

People's   Trust    Co.    v.    Tonkonogy,    144 

App.    Div.    (N.   Y.)    333  438 

Perciful  v.   Piatt,  36  Ark.  456  328 

Perdue  v.   Perdue,    124   N.   Car.   161  473 

Perine  v.  Teague,  66   Cal.   446  51 

Perkins  v.   Dibble,   10  Ohio  433  346 

V.  George,  45   N.   H.  453  456 

V.   Simonds,   28   Wis.   90  727,  730 

V.  Strong,  22  Nebr.   725  122,  132 

Perre  v.  Castro,   14  Cal.  519  429 

Perrin  v.   Reed,  35   Vt.   2  124 

Perry   v.    Baker,   61    Nebr.   841  439 

v.   Big  Rapids,   67   Mich.    146  36 

V.  Clark,   157  Mass.  330  270 

v.   Fisher,    30   Ind.   App.   261  438 

V.  Morris,  65  N.  Car.  221  563 

V.  Paschal,    103   Ga.    134  393,  397 

V.   Selma  &c.  R.   Co.,  58  Ala.   546         636 

V.  Strawbridge,  209  Mo.  621  733 

Person's  Appeal,  In  re,  74  Pa.  St.  121 

87,  737 

Peter  v.  Byrne,  175  Mo.  233  325 

Peters  v.   Cartier,   80   Mich.   124         278,  301 

V.   Duluth,    119  Minn.   96  952,  957 

V.   Farnsworth,    15    Vt.    155  336 

V.   Ham,    62    Iowa   656  120,   126 

V.   Lohr,  24  S.   Dak.   605  643 

Peterson  v.   Bean,  22  Utah  43  109 

V.  Jackson,  196  111.  40  48 

Petray  v.   Howell,  20  Ark.   615  562 

Pettibone   v.   Griswold,   4   Conn.    158  424 

Pettit  v.   Black,   13   Nebr.    142  491 

Petty   V.    Ducker,    51   Ark.   281  491 

v.  Malier,   15   B.   Mon.    (Ky.)    591  87 

Peugh  v.  Davis,  96  U.  S.  322  420 

Peyton   v.   Desmond,    129    Fed.    1  182 

Pfeiffer  v.   Lindsay,   66  Tex.    123  347 

Pharis  v.   Leachman,   20  Ala.   662  67 

Phelan  v.   Anderson,   118  Cal.   504  51 

V.  Boylan,  25  Wis.  679  638 

V.   Fitzpatrick,    84    Wis.    240  419 

Phelps  v.   Funkhouser,   39   111.  401  723 

V.  Grady,    168    Cal.    73  723,  736 

V.  Phelps,  17  Md.  120  270 

V.  Phelps,  143  N.  Y.  197  65 

V.   Robbins,    40    Conn.    250  455 

V.  Townsley,  10  Allen   (Mass.)   554     437 

Philadelphia    v.    Anderson,    142    Pa.    St. 

357  12,  20,  174 

Philadelphia  Co.  v.   Dickinson,  33  App. 

D.   C.   338  669 

Philbrick   v.    Ewing,   97  Mass.    133  61 

V.  Spangler,   15   La.   Ann.   46  487 


Phillips  V.  Brown,  16  R.  L  279  459 

V.   Carpenter,    79    Iowa   600  714 

V.  Carter,    135   Cal.   604  204 

V.   Ferguson,  85   Va.   509  477 

V.   Gannon,  246  111.  98  276 

V.  Grayson,    23    Ark.    769  478 

V.  McConica,  59  Ohio  St.   1         712,  718 

V.   People,   11    111.   App.    340  283 

V.   Phillips,    30   Colo.    516  325 

V.  Schall,   21    Mo.   App.   38  530 

V.   Warner,  4  Tex.   Civ.   App.    147  66 

Phillips'   Estate,   In   re,  205   Pa.    504  459 

Phillis  V.   Gross,   32   S.   Dak.   438  434 

Philly   v.    Sanders,    11    Ohio    St.   490  99 

Phinizy  V.   Foster,   90  Ala.  262  466 

Phinney  v.   Donahue,   67    Iowa    192  659 

Phoenix    Ins.    Co.    v.    Rowe,    117    Ind. 

202  28 

Pickett  V.  Gleed,  39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  71  66 

Pierce  v.  Jackson,   56  Ala.   599  119 

V.   Keator,   70  N.   Y.   419  61,  63 

V.  Knight,  182  Mass.  72  471 

V.   Low,    51    Cal.    580  644 

V.  Parrish,    111    Ga.    725  417 

Pierson  v.  Armstrong,   1  Iowa  282  290 

Pike   V.    Collins,    33    Maine   38  129 

V.   Galvin,  29  Maine   183  99 

Pillow  v.   King,   55   Ark.   633  655 

Pimel  v.   Betjemann,  99  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)    559  734 

Pina  v.   Peck,   31   Cal.   359  719 

Pinckney    v.    Pinckney,    114    Iowa    441  119 

Pinkham   v.    Pinkham,    55    Nebr.    729  65 

Pinney  v.  Fellows,  15  Vt.  525  339 

Pique  v.  Arendale,  71  Ala.  91  692 
Pirie,    In   re,    133    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.) 

431  602 
Pitkin  V.  Reibel,  104  Mo.  505  643 
Pitman  v.  Thornton,  66  Maine  469  445 
Pitts  v.  Melser,  72  Ind.  469  492 
V.  Sheriff,  108  Mo.  110  323 
Pittsburgh  Junction  R.  Co.  v.  Alle- 
gheny R.  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  297  109 
Pittsburg  &c.  Co.  V.  Reed,  44  Ind.  App. 

635  87 
Pittsfield    Sav.    Bank    v.    Berry,    63    N. 

H.    109  58 

Pitzman  v.  Boyce,  111  Mo.  387  62 

Pizzala  v.   Campbell,   46  Ala.   35  67 

Place  V.  People,   192   111.   160  76 
Planters'   Bank  of  Tennessee  v.   Davis, 

31    Ala.    626  64 
Planters'    Loan    Sr    Sav.    Bank   v.    Dick- 
inson, 83  Ga.   711  431 
Platner  v.   Sherwood,   6  Johns.   Ch.    (N. 

Y.)    118  706 

Piatt  v.  Brickley,  119  Ind.  333  602 

v.   Eggleston,    20   Ohio    St.   414  507 

v.  Piatt,    42    Conn.    330  276 

Plumb  v.  Robinson,  13  Ohio  St.  298  640 

Plume  v.  Bone,   13  N.  J.  L.  63  123 

Plumel's  Estate,   In  re,   151   Cal.  77  455 
Plummer    v.     Russell,    2    Ribb.     (Ky.) 

174  262 

v.   Shepherd,    94    Md.    466  464 

Plunkett  V.  Meredith,  72  Ark.  3  506 
Policemen's   Benevolent  Assn.  v.   Ryce, 

213    111.    9  90 

Pollak   v.    Davidson,   87   Ala.    551  127 
Pollak  Co.   v.   Muscogee  Mfg.   Co.,    108 

Ala.    467  375 

Pollard  V.  Barnes.  2  Cush.  (Mass.)   191  102 

V.   Hagan,    3    How.    (U.    S.)    212  180 

V.   Merrill,    15    Ala.    169  479 

V.    Slaughter.    92    N.    Car.    72  65 

Pollock  V.   Speidel,   17  Ohio  St.  439    48,  464 

Pomeroy    v.    Mills,    3    Vt.    279  61 

V.  Pomeroy,  93  Wis.  262  737 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


[RcfcroiCi-s  arc  to  Sections.] 


Pond  V.  Bergh.   10  Paiije   (X.   Y.)    140     87 

V.   Irwin.    11,1    Ind.    243  87 

V.   Sheean,    132    111.    312  401 

Pool   V.    Blakie,   53    111.   495  479 

V.   Ellis,    64    Miss.    555  596 

V.   Simmons,    134   Cal.    621  109 

Poole  V.   Engelke,  61  N.  J.  L.  124  52 

V.  Koons,  252  111.  49  671 

Pope  V.   Henry,   24   Vt.    560  120 

Poplin   V.   Hawke,  8   N.   H.   124  492 

Poppers   V.    Meagher,    148   III.    192  50 

Poppleton's  Estate,  In  re,  34  Utah  285    477 
Porch  V.   Fries,   18  N.  J.   Eq.  204  64 

Porcher    v.    Daniel,    12    Rich.    Eq.    (S. 

Car.)    349 
Porter  v.  Armour,  241  111.   145 

V.  Askew,   11  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)   346 

V.  Frenchman's     Bay     &c.     Co.,     84 
Maine     195 

V.   Oiirada,  51   Xehr.  510 

V.  Perkins,    5    Mass.    233 

V.   Porter,    51    Maine    376 

V.   Read,    19   Maine   363 

V.  Rice   (Ky.),   128  S.   W.   70 
Portington's  Case,   5   Coke  41 
Portis    V.    Cummings,    14    Tex.    171 
Portsmouth    v.    Shackford,    46    N.    H. 

423 
Posner  v.  Bayless,  59  Md.  56 
Post  V.  Weil,  115  N.  Y.  361 
Postal    Telegraph-Cable    Co.    v.    Chicago 

&c.   R.  Co.,  30  Ind.  App.  654 
Potlatch    Lumber    Co.    v.    Runkel,    16 

Idaho    192 
Potomac    Power    Co.    v.    Burchell,    109 

Va.    676 
Potrero    Neuvo    Land    Co.    v.    All    Per- 
sons Claiming,   155  Cal.   371 
Potter  V.   Couch,   141   U.   S.   296 

V.   Doolcy,    55   Vt.    512 

V.  Rowland,   8    N.   Y.    448 

V.   Small,    47    Maine    293 

V.   Stransky,    48    Wis.    235 

V.  W'orlcy,   57   Iowa   66 
Potts  V.  Reynolds,  131  La.  421 
Powe  V.   McLeod.    76   Ala.    418 
Powell    V.    Campbell,    20    Nev.    232 

V.  Cosby,  28   Kv.   L.   619 

V.   Huey,    241    111.    132 

V.  Powell,    30   Ala.   697 

V.  Woodcock,    149    N.    Car,   235 
Power   V.    Dougherty,   83   Ky.    187 

V.  Hafiey,    85    Ky.    671 

V.  Lester.  23   N.   Y.  527 
Powers  V.   Harlow,   53   Mich.   507 

V.  Kite,  83   N.  Car.   156 

V.   Sharling,  64  Kans.   339 
Powers'  Appeal,   In  re,  63  Pa.   St, 
Prairie   Development  Co.  v.  Leiberg,   15 

Idaho    379 
Prasser's   Will,    In   re,    140   Wis.    92 
Prather  v.   Hairgrove,  214  Mo.    142 

V.   Prather,    58    Ind.    141        713,  716,   729 
Pratt   V.    Atwood,    108    Mass.    40        707,   719 

V.   Douglas,  38  N.  T.   Eq.  516 

V.  McGhee.   17  S.   Car.  428 

V.  Pratt,    96   III.    184 

V.   Skolfield,    45    Maine    386 
Prentice     v.     Duluth     Storage     & 

warding  Co.,  58  Fed.  437 
Presby  v.   Benjamin,   169   N.  Y.  377         408 
Presbyterian  Church  v.  Allison,   10  Pa. 

St.   413  536 

Prescott  V.  Beyer,  34  Minn.  493       118,  119 

V.  Carr,   29   N.    IL   453  708,  730 

Preston  v.  Bosworth,  153  Ind.  458  276 

V.  Hirsch,   5   Cal.   App.   485  641 


322 
667 
711 

651 

439 
301 
737 
309 
552 
55 
715 

60 

335 
290 

109 

552 
54 


669 
47 
122 
550 
444 
120 
722 
672 
66 
676 
476 
398 
456 
467 
708 
89,  718 
428 
62 
719 
487 
737 


443 


399 
459 

565 


456,  724 

734 

302 

65,  436 

For- 

290 


Preston 

V.  Preston,   202  Pa.   St.    515  339 

V.   Smith,    26    Fed.    884  48,  667 

Prestwood   v.    Carlton,    162    Ala.   327       407 

Price   V.    Bell,   91    Ala.    180  692 

V.   Dennis,    159    Ala.    625  203 

V.  Griffin,   ISO  N.   Car.   523  714 

V.   Price,    52    N.    J.    Eq.    326  473 

V.   Price,    124    N.    Y.    589  65 

Prichard   v.    James,   93    Kv.    306  48 

V.   Mulhall,   140   Iowa    1  671 

Prickctt  V.   Parker,   3   Ohio   St.    394 

707,  708 
Prichitt  V.  Kirkman,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  390  730 
Priddy  v.   Smith,   106  Ark.   79  415 

Primm  v.    Stewart,   7   Tex.    178  739 

Prince  v.   Antle,  90  Ky.   138  98,   561 

V.   Barrow,     120    Ga.     810  59,  480 

V.   Case,     10    Conn.     381  62,   99 

Princeton  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Munson, 

60   111.   371  446 

Prindle  v.  Beveridge,   7   Lans.    (N.   Y.) 

225  48 

Pringle  v.  Dunn,  37  Wis.  449  120,  132 

Pritchard  v.   Elton.  38  Conn.   434  420 

V.   Pritchard,  76  W.  Va.  91  735 

Pritchett  v.  Jackson,   103   Md.   696  291 

Proctor  V.    Dicklow,   57    Kans.    119  480 

V.   Nance,   220  Mo.    104  643 

V.   Proctor,    215    111.    275  671 

V.   Walker,    12    Ind.    660  660 

Proctor,   In   re,    103   Iowa  232  708 

Prosser  v.   Warner,  47  Vt.   667  676 

Protestant    Episcopal    Church    v.    E.    E. 

Lowe  Co.,  131  (Ja.  666  430 

Prout  V.   Burke,   51   Nebr.   24  431 

Providence    County    Sav.    &c.    Bank    v. 

Hall,    16   R.    I.    154  53 

Provident    Inst,    for    Savings    v.    Jersey 

City,  113  U.   S.   506  527 

Provident    Loan    Trust    Co.    v.    Wolcott, 

5    Kans.    App.   473  23 

Pruitt  V.    Holland,   92   Ky.   641  48 

Prutsman  v.    Baker,   30  Wis.   644  101 

Puckett   V.    Waco   Abstract   &c.   Co.,    16 

Tex.     Civ.     App.     329  16,   19,  24 

Puget    Sound    Nat.    Bank   v.    Fisher,    52 

Wash.    246  329,  654 

Pugh  V.  Pugh,   105   Ind.  552  466 

Pulitzer   v.    Livingston,   89    Maine   359     482 

Pulliam   V.    Pulliam,    10    Fed.    25  40 

Purdy   V.    Evans,    156    Ky.    342  457 

Purser  v.   Cady,   120  Cal.   214  592 

Putbrees  v.  James,   162   Iowa  618  724 

Putnam   v.   Story,   132   Mass.   205  359 

v.  Tvler,  117  Pa.  St.  570  635 

V.  White,    76    Maine    551  119 

Putzel  V.  Van   Brunt,  40  N.   Y.   Super. 

Ct.   501  297 

Q 

Oualifications  of  Electors,  In  re,   19  R. 

L    387  57 

Ouarles  v.  Ouarles,  4  Mass.  680  735,  737 
Quartcrmous'  v.  Kennedy,  29  Ark.  544  420 
Quick    V.    Milligan.    108    Ind.    419     118,  692 

v.  Rufe,   164  Mo.  408  697 

Quimbv    v.    Dill,    40    Maine   528  54 

v.  Wood.   19   R.   I.   571  527 

Ouinby  v.  Conlan,   104  U.   S.  420  198 

v.   Higgins.     14    Maine    309  711 

Ouincy   v.    Attorney-General,    160   Mass. 

431  458 

Quinn  v.  Quinn,  5  S.  Dak.   328  718 

V.   Shields,    62    Iowa    129  59,  480 

V.   Valiquctte,    80    Vt.    434  407 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixvii 


[References  arc  to  Sections.'] 


R 


Raab,   In  re,   79  Misc.    (N.   Y.)    185  471 

Rabb    V.    Griffin,    26    Miss.    579  64 

Racine  v.  Case  Plow  Co..  56  Wis.  539       241 
Rackemann  v.  Taylor,  204  Mass.  394 

456,  724 
Rackley  v.  Roberts,  147  N.  Car.  201  592 
Racouillat  v.   Sansevain,  32   Cal.   Z76  120 

Raggio  V.   Palmtag,   155   Cal.   797  66 

Ragland    v.    Conqueror    Zinc    Cas.,    136 

Mo.    App.    631  407 

Ragle  V.   Dedinan,   50   Ind.  App.   359       278 
Ragley-McWillianis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Hare, 

61  Tex.   Civ.   App.   509  100 

Railsback  v.   Walke,   81   Ind.   409  53 

Raines   v.   Walker,    77   Va.    92 

99,  120,  265 

Raleigh  v.  Peace.  110  N.  Car.  32  630 

Rambo    v.    Bell,    3    Ga.    207  67 

Ramsey  v.  Jones,  41  Ohio  St.  685  118 

V.   Ramsey,    7    Ind.    607  85 

Ranck's  Appeal,  In  re,   113  Pa.   St.  98       87 

Rand   v.    Davis    (Tex.),   27    S.    W.    939      128 

Randal   v.    Gould.   225   Pa.   42  616 

Randall   v.    Bradlev,    65    Maine   43  444 

V.  Ghent,   19  Ind.  271  266 

V.  Lingwall,   43   Ore.   383  434 

V.  Sanders,   87    N.    Y.    578  313 

Randall    Co.    v.    Glendenning,    19    Okla. 

475  438 

Randel    v.    Chesapeake    &c.    Canal    Co., 

1   Har.    (Del.)    151  278 

Randell  v.   Chubb,  46  Mich.   311  408 

Randolph    v.    State,    82   Ala.    527  137 

V.  Vails,    180  Ala.    82  723 

Rankin  v.   Schaeffer,   4   Mo.   App.    108 

IS,  23 
Rankin's  Appeal,  In  re,  1  Monag.  (Pa.) 

308  667 

Ransdell   v.    Boston,    172    111.   439  474 

Ransom  v.  Ransom,  30  Mich.  328  323 

Rapp  V.    Matthias,   35    Ind.    332  602 

Rash's  Estate,  In  re   (Pa.),  2  Pars.  Eq. 

Cas.    160  40 

RatcliiT   V.    Marrs,    87   Ky.    26  312 

Ratcliffe   V.   Ratcliffe,    7    Mart.    (N.    S.) 

335  711 

Ratteree  v.  Conley,  74  Ga.   153  127 

Rauer  v.    Fay,    110  Cal.   361  537 

Raulet   V.    Northwestern   Nat.    Ins.    Co., 

157   Cal.    213  723 

Ravvlings  v.  Bailey,   15  111.   178  353 

Ray   V.   Alexander,    146    Pa.    St.    242  48 

V.   Murdock,    36   Miss.    692  644 

v.  Pease,   95   Ga.    153  271 

Raymond  v.    Pauli.   21   Wis.   531  119 

Read  v.   French,  28  N.  Y.  285  660 

v.   Loftus,    82    Kans.    485  33,   34 

Reading  v.   Waterman,  46   Mich.    107       446 
Ready  v.   Schmith,  52  Ore.   196  671 

Reasoner   v.    Edmundson,    5    Ind.   393        123 
Reaume  y.  Chambers,  22  Mo.  36  45,   309 

Reclamation    District    No.    70    v.    Sher- 
man,   11   Cal.   App.    399  207 
Rector   v.   Gaines,    19  Ark.    70  95 
v.  Waugh,    17    Mo.     13                    45,  268 
Rector    &    Wilhelmy    Co.    v.     Maloney, 

15    S.    Dak.    271  643 

Reddick  v.  Lord,  131  Ind.  336  46,   464 

Redmond  v.  Burroughs,  63  N.  Car.  242     729 

Reed   v.   Acton,    120   Mass.    130  117 

V.   Crocker,   12   La.   Ann.   436  715 

V.  Gannon,  50  N.  Y.   345  127 

V.  Lewis,    74   Ind.   433  50 

V.   Merriam,    15    Nebr.    323  642 

V.  Siddall,    89    Minn.    417  956,  957 

V.  Woodward,   11   Phil.    (Pa.)    541       487 


Reel  V.  Elder,  62  Pa.  St.  308  65 

Reeves  v.  Brayton,  36  S.  Car.  384  58 

v.   Brooks,   80   Ala.   26  67 

V.   Estes,   124  Ala.   303  119 

V.  Hayes,    95    Ind.    521  438,  439 

V.  Reeves,    117    Mich.    526  676 

V.   School  Dist.  59,  24  Wash.  282  46 

Reichert  v.   Missouri  &c.  Coal  Co.,  231 

111.   238  .  341,  354 

Reichle  V.   Steitz,  64  N.   J.   Eq.   789  734 

Reid  V.   Abernethy,   77   Iowa  438  429 

V.   Corrigan,    143    III.    402  451,  473 

V.  Gordon,    35    Md.    174  58,  60 

V.   Hart,   45    Ark.   41  289 

V.  Holmes,    127    Mass.    326  570 

Reiff's  Appeal,  In  re,   124  Pa.   St.   145     463 

Reilly    v.    Union    Protestant    Infirmary, 

87  Md.  664  481 

Reilley   v.    Wright,    117  Cal.   77  613 

Reinders  v.  Koppelman,  68  Mo.  482  718 
Reindollar  v.  Flickinger,  59  Mil.  469  538 
Reinhart   v.   Lugo,   86  Cal.   395  662 

Reis  V.  Graff,  51   Cal.  86  634 

Reitenbaugh   v.    Chester  Valley   R.   Co., 

21   Pa.   St.   100  677 

Reith's    Estate,    In    re,    144    Cal.    314  480 

Remey  v.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  Co.,  116  Iowa 

133  .  110 

Remington   v.    Metropolitan    Sav.    Bank, 

76    Md.    546  ,        456 

Rcmmington  v.  Lewis,  8  B.  Mon.   (Ky.) 

606  719 

Renfro   v.   Adams,    62   Ala.   302  443 

Renick   v.    Dawson,    55    Tex.    102  129 

Renkert    v.    Title    Guaranty    Trust    Co., 

102    Mo.    App.    267  16,  17 

Renton,    In    re,    10   Wash.    533       "     ^         734 
Republican    River    Bridge    Co.    v.    Kan- 
sas   Pac.    R.    Co.,    12    Kans.    409      186,   187 
Rerick    v.    Kern,    14    Serg.    &    R.    (Pa.) 

267 
Renter   v.    Stuckart,    181    111.    529 
Reydell    v.    Reydell,    10    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

273 
Reynolds    v.    Atlanta    Nat.     Bldg.     &c. 
Assn.,   104  Ga.   703 
V.   Borel,   86    Cal.    538 
v.   Kirk,    105    Ala.    446 
v.   Shaver,     59    Ark.    299 
v.  Strong,   82   Hun    (N.   Y.)    202 
Reynolds,    In    re,    57    Maine   350 
Rhea  v.    Bagley,   63   Ark.   374 

v.  Planters'     Mut.     Ins.     Assn.,     77 
Ark.    57 


62 
289 


674 
75 
434 
301 
77 
711 
737 


R.    H.    Herron    Co.    v.    Superior    Court, 

136  Cal.  279 
Rhinehart  v.    Schuyler,    7    III.    473 
Rhoades  v.  Barnes,  54  Wash.   145 
Rhoads  v.   Rhoads,  43   111.   239 


286 

377 
119 

693 
457 
Rhode  Island  v.   Massachusetts,  4  How. 

(U.    S.)    591  694 

Rhode  Island  Hospital  Trust  Co.  v.  Har- 
ris,   20    R.    I.    408  61,  65 
Rhodes  v.   Bouldrev,   lo8  Mich.    144  48 
V.   Dutcher,  6  Hun    (N.   Y.)   453            593 
V.   Gunn,  35   Ohio   St.   387                         644 
Rice  V.   Boston  &c.   R.   Corp.,   12   Allen 


(Mass.)    141 

54 

V.  Minnesota    &c.    R.    Co.,    1    Black 

(U.   S.)    358 

212 

V.  Rice,   36   Fed.   858 

530 

V.  Rice,    68   Ala.    216 

452 

V.  Rice,    108    111.    199 

66 

V.  Sioux  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S. 

695 

207 

V.  White,  8  Ohio  216 

641 

Richard  v.  Boyd,   124   Mich.   396 

655 

IXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  arc  to  Sections.^ 


Kichnrds  v.  McClelland,  29  Pa.  St.  385  Z22 

V.   Richards,   90   Iowa   606  54 
Richardson    v.     Clements,    89    Pa.     St. 

5C3  61 

V.  De    Civerville,    107    Mo.    422  320 

V.  Martin,   55    N.   H.   45  716 

V.  Stodder,    100    Mass.    528  58 

V.  Tobey,   121   Mass.  457  507 

V.   Wren,    11    Ariz.    395  417 

Richcy   v.    Sinclair,    167   111.    184  422 

Richmond    v.    Brookings,    48    Fed.    241  662 

V.   State,    5    Ind.    334  467 

Rico  V.   Brandenstein,  98  Cal.   465  323 

Ridgely  v.  Iglehart,  3  Bland  (Md.)   540  515 

V.  Stilhvell,  25   Mo.   570  51 

Ridgway's    Appeal,    In    re,    15    Pa.    St. 

177  581 

Riegel  v.  Riegel,  243  111.   626  286 

Riehl  V.   Bingenheimer,  28  Wis.  88  66 

Riesenberg,    In    re,    116    Mo.    App.    308  466 

Riggin   V.    Love,    72   111.    553        45,  274,  312 

Riggs  V.    Cragg,   89    N.    Y.   479  C53 

V.  Palmer,    115    N.    Y.    506            458,  733 

V.  Sally.   15   Maine  408  48 

Rigncy  v.  Chicago,  102  111.  64  109 

Riley    v.    Kepler,    94    Ind.    308           364,  601 
Rines  v.  Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394 

45,  274,  312 

Ringgold   V.   Bryan,   3   Md.    Ch.   488  127 

Ringrose  v.  Gleadall,   17  Cal.  App.   664  59 

Ringo   V.   Rotan,   29  Ark.    56  207 

Rioux  V.   Cormier,  75   Wis.   566  272 

Ripley  v.   Seligman,  88  Mich.    177  318 

Ritch  V.  Talbot,   74  Conn.   137  734 

Ritchie  v.   Criffiths,   1   Wash.   429        122,  132 

V.  Kansas  &c.   R.  Co.,  55   Kans.  36  54 

Ritter  v.   Phillips,   53   N.   Y.   586  316 

V.  Worth,    58    N.    Y.    627  120 
Riverbank    Imp.    Co.    v.    Bancroft,    209 

Mass.  217  667 

Rivers  v.   Rivers,   36   S.   Car.   302  709 

Rixev   v.    Stuckey,    129  Mo.    377  471 

Roach  v.   Roach,  25   R.    I.   454  720 

v.  Sanborn  Land  Co.,  135  Wis.  354  436 

Roads  V.  Symmes,  1  Ohio  281  221 

Roan  V.  Holmes,  32   Fla.   295  620 

Roane   v.    Baker,    120   111.    308  118 

Robards  v.  Brown,  167  Mo.  447  476 

Robbins  v.    Barron,   32   Mich.    36  633 
v.  Boulder  County  Comrs.,  50  Colo. 

610  462 

v.  Bunn.    54   111.   48  198 

Rober   v.    Michelsen,    32    Nebr.   48  655 

Robersonv.  Downing  Co.,  120  Ga.  833  287 

v.   Simons,    109    Ga.    360  53 

Robert  v.   Corning,   89   N.   Y.   225  43 

v.  West,    15    Ga.    122  465 

Roberts  v.    Bassett,   105   Mass.   409  75 

V.  Bauer,   35   La.   Ann.   453  120 

v.   Flanagan,    21    Nebr.    503  491 

V.  Lion    Loan   &c.    Co.,   63    Iowa    76 

16,  18 

V.  McFadden,  32  Tex.  Civ.  App.  47  77 

V.   Press,  97  Iowa  475  371 

V.  Robinson,    49    Nebr.    717  596 

V.   Sterling,    4    Mo.    App.    593  17 

V.   Stevens,    84    Maine    325  478 

V.   Vornholt,     126     Ind.     511  '28 

v.   Wyatt,   2  Taunt.   268  30 

Roberts'  Appeal,  92   Pa.    St.   407  339 

Roberts'  Estate,  In  re,  163  Pa.  St.  408  473 

Roberts'   Estate,   In   re.   84   Wash.    163  717 

Robertson  v.   Burrell,  40  Ind.  328  730 

v.  Fleming,    57    N.   Car.   387  722 

v.  Hefley,  55  Tex.  Civ.  App.   368  266 

V.   Howard,    82    Kans.    588  385 

v.   Moore,    10   Idaho   115  538 

V.  Robertson,   25    Iowa   350  22i 


51 


40,  70 

533 

714 

582       423 

59,  480 

668 

561 

183 

955,  956,  957 

462 

408 

46,  478 

647 

49 

568 

662 


520 


St. 


Robertson 

V.   Vanclcave,    129_  Ind.    217 
Robins  V.   Bunn,  34  N.  J.  L.  i2'. 

V.  Ouinliven,    79    Pa.    St.    333 
Robinson   v.    Brennan,    115    Mass 

V.   Cogswell,    192   Mass.   79 

V.  Gantt,   1    Neb.    (Unoff.) 

V.  Covers,    138   N.   Y.   425 

V.  Jones,    31    Nebr.    20 

V.   Kerrigan,   151   Cal.  40 

V.  Le  Grand,  65  Ala.   Ill 

V.   Perry,    21    Ga.    183 

V.  Randolph,    21    Fla.    629 

V.   Rippev,    111    Ind.    112 

V.   Robinson,    89     Va.     916 

V.   Salt    Lake    City,    37    Utah 
Ro1)inson,    In    re,    6   "Mich.    137 
Robinson's    Estate,   In    re,    149    Pa 

418 
Robison  v;  Miller,  158  Pa.   St.   177 
Roliley   V.   W'ithcrs,   95   Miss.   318 
Robscn  V.  Thomas,  55   Mo.   581 
Rochester  v.   Rochester  R.   Co.,   182   N. 

Y.   99 
Rocker  v.   Metzger,   171  Ind.  364 
Rock   Island   &    IPac.    R.    Co.   v.    Dimick, 

144   111.    628 
Rock    Island    Nat.    Bank   v.    Thompson, 

173   111.   593 
Rockwell  v.  Rockwell,  81  Mich.  493 
Rockv    Mountain    Fuel    Co.    v.    Kovaics, 

26  'Colo.  App.  554 
Rodefer    v.    Pittsburgh    &c.    R.    Co 

Ohio   St.    272 
Rodgers  v.  Bonner,  45  N.  Y.  379 

v.  Cavanaugh,   24   111.   583 

V.  Palmer,   33   Conn.    155 
Rodman  v.   Robinson,   134   N 


Car 


Roe  V.  Roe,  52  Kans.  724 

V.  Vingut,  117  N.  Y.  204 
Roger,  In  re,  131  Pa.  St.  382 
Rogers   v.    Clark    Iron    Co.,    104 


48 
349 
433 
582 

647 

705 

127 

563 
65 

714 

62 

562 

120 

70 

503 

65,  325 

676 

470 

711 

Minn. 


72 


198  192,  223,  224 

V.  Cox,  96  Ind.   157  62 

V.  Coy,    164    Mass.    391 

V.  Hillhouse,    3    Conn.    398 

V.  Tones,   8   N.   H.  264 

V.   Palmer,    102    U.    S.    263 

V.  Pell,    154    N.    Y.   518 
Rogers'  Estate,  In  re,  131  Pa.  St.  382 
Rohrbach    v.    Sanders,    212    Pa.    636 
Roll   V.   Rea.   50   N.   J.   L.   266 
Rollins  V.   Henry,  78  N.   Car.   342 
Rolph  V.  Fargo,  7  N.  Dak.  640 
Roney   v.    Moss,    76   Ala.    491 
Ronk  V.  Higginbotham,  54  W.  Va.  137 
Root  V.   Monroe,  5   Blackf.   (Ind.)    594 
Ropes  V.   Upton,   125   Mass.  238 
Rose   V.    Hale,    185    111.    378 

V.   Munie,   4   Cal.    173 

V.   Rose,    104   Kv.   48 

V.  Watson,  10  H.  L.  Cas.  672 
Rose's   Estate,    In   re,   63    Cal.   346 
Roscboom    v.    Van    Vechten,    5    Denio 

(N.    Y.)    414 
Rosenthal  v.   Mounts   (Tc.x.   Civ. 

130  S.  W.   192 
Rosher,   In   re,   26   Ch.    Div.   801 
Ross   V.    Ross,    129   Mass.    243 

v.  Wilson,    58    Ga.    249  _ 

V.  Worthington,     11     Gil 
438 


Ross,    In    re,    140   Cal.    282 
Rossbach   v.   Micks,   89   Nebr.  821 
Rosser  v.  Cheney,  61  Ga.  468 
Roth  v.  Michalis,   125   Md.  325 
Rothe  V.    Bellingrath,   71   Ala.    55 


405 
306 
127 
128 
283 

87 

43 
118,  577 
546 
647 
324 
353 
553 

57 
477 
535 

49 
531 
583 

49 

App.), 

612,  613 

47 

718,  719 

65 

(Minn.) 

129.  316 
734 
435 
129 
338 
536 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixix 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Roth    Grocery   Co.   v.    Hotel   Monticello 

Co.,    148   Mo.   App.   513  372 
Rothschild    v.    Title    Guarantee   &c.    Co., 

139    App.    Div.    (N.    Y.)    672  100 

Rotmanskey  v.  Heiss,  86  Md.  633  710 

Koulston    V.    Hall,    66    Ark.    305  65 

Roundtree   v.    Denson,    59    Wis.    522  327 
Rountree  v.   Pursell,   11   Ind.  App.   522 

86,  87,  714 

Rourke  v.   McNally,  98  Cal.   291  201 

Roush  V.   Wensel,   15   Ohio  C.   C.    133  487 

Rowan,    In   re,   6   Pa.    Co.    Ct.    461  712 

Rowe  V.  Allison,   87   Ark.   206  720 

V.  Ware,    30   Ga.    278  335 

Rowell  V.    Tewett,  69   Maine  293  672 

V.   Williams,    54    Wis.    636  126 

Rowland  v.   Miller,   139   N.   Y.   93  313 

V.   Rowland,  9i  N.  Car.  214  312,  326 

Rowley  v.   Stray,  32   Mich.   70  730 

Rowsey   v.    Lynch,   61    Mo.    560  15 

Roy  V.  Moore,  85  Conn.   159  667 

V.   Segrist,    19    Ala.    810  491 

Royce  v.  Adams,   123   N.   Y.   402  354 

Rozier  v.   Graham,   146   Mo.   352  714 

Rubeck  v.  Gardner,   7  \\atts   (Pa.)   455  111 

Rubel    V.    Title   &c.    Co.,    101    111.    App. 

439  546 

Rubel,    In    re,    166   Fed.    131  382 

Ruch   V.    Biery,    110   Ind.    444  737 

Rucker  v.   Jackson,    180   Ala.    109  729 

V.  Tennessee    Coal    &c.    R.    Co.,    176 

Ala.  456  723 

Rudd  V.  Thompson,  22  Ark.  363  660 
Rudolph  V.  Rudolph,  207  111.  266       483,  734 

V.   Saunders,    111    Cal.    233  553 

Rufner  v.    McConnel,   14  111.   168  279 

Rugg   V.    Lemley,    78    Ark.    65  516 
Ruggles    V.    Lesure,    24    Pick.    (Mass.) 

187  62 

Ruleman  v.   Pritchett,  56  Tex.   482  284 

Runey  v.   Edmands,   15   Mass.  291  708 

Runlet  V.  Otis,  2   N.  H.   167  419 

Runyan  v.    Snyder,   45   Colo.    156  261 

Russ    V.    Steel,    40    Vt.    310  61 

Russell   V.    Bates,    181    Mass.    12  59 

V.   Bell,    160    Ala.    480  640 

V.   Bruer,   64   Ohio   St.   1  708 

V.   Cole,    167   Mass.   6  315 

V.  Doyle,    84    Ky.    386  314 

V.   Hudson,    28    Kans.    99  633 

V.   Mandell,    73    111.    136  29 

V.  Nail,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  60  118 

V.  Polk     County    Abstract     Co.,     87 

Iowa    233  15,  23 

V.  Roberts,   121    N.   Car.   322  722 

V.   Russell,    84    Ala.    48  466 

V.  Tucker,    136   Ga.    136  672 

Russell,   In   re,    168   N.   Y.    169  471 

Russell's  Appeal,  In  re,  15  Pa.  St.  319  119 

Russell's   Estate,    In   re,    150   Cal.   604  483 

Rust     V.     Electric     Lighting     Co.,     124 

Ala.   202  432 
Rutaced  Co.,  In  re,  137  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)    716                                   '^  372 

Rutter  V.  Carothers,  223   Mo.   631  560 

Ryan  v.  Andrews,  21   Mich.  229       708,  730 

V.   Carter,    93    U.    S.    78  189 

V.   Egan,    156    111.    224  458 

V.   Freeman,   36  Miss.   175  64 

V.  Martin,   91   N.   Car.   464  263 

Ryan's   Estate,   In   re,    14   Wkly.    Notes 

Cas.    (Pa.)    79  716 

Rydalch  v.  Anderson,  37  Utah  99  669 

Ryder  v.  Lyon,  85  Conn.  245  480 

Ryker  v.   Vawter,    117   Ind.   425  593 

Ryland  v.  Banks,  151  Mo.   1  322 


Sabichi  v.  Chase,   108  Cal.  81  371 

Sackett  V.  Rose  (Okla.),   154  Pac.   1177       22 
Saeger   v.    Bode,    181    111.    514  46 

Safe   Deposit  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Marburg, 

110  Md.  410  699 

Saitord  V.   Stubbs,  117  111.  389  73 

Sage  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  99  U.  S.  334       578 
V.  Rudnick,  67  Minn.  362  108 

Sahler  v.  Signer,  44  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   606    428 
St.   Clair  V.  Cox,   106   U.  S.  350  652 

V.   Craig,   77   Kans.    394  638 

St.  Croix  Land  &  L.  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  73 

Wis.  409  122 

St.  John  V.  Andrews  Institute,    191   N. 

Y.  254  481 

V.  Conger,  40  111.  535  124 

V.   Dann,   66   Conn.   401  469 

V.  East  St.   Louis,  50  111.  92  647 

St.    John's    Parish    v.    Bostwick,    8   App. 

D.  C.   452  487 

St.  Joseph   V.    Seel,  122   Mich.   70  687 

St.   Louis  V.    Gorman,   29   Mo.   593  73 

St.    Louis    Smelting    &    Refining    Co.    v. 

Kemp,  104  U.  S.  636  224 

St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Nugent,  152  111. 

119  690 

V.  Ramsey,    53    Ark.    314  103,  272 

St.    Paul    V.    Chicago    &c.    R.    Co.,    45 

Minn.    387  694 

St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Brown,  24  Minn. 

517  227 

V.  Greenhalgh,  26   Fed.   563  212 

V.  Hinckley,  53   Minn.   398  698 

V.   Northern   Pac.   R.   Co.,   139  U.   S. 

1  212 

St.    Peter's    Roman    Catholic    Congrega- 
tion V.   Germain,   104  111.   440  329 
St.      Stephen's      Evangelical      Lutheran 

Church  V.  Pierce  (Del.),  68  Atl.   194     270 
Salina   Stock   Co.   v.    United    States,   85 

Fed.   339  183 

Salisbury  Sav.  Soc.  v.  Cutting,  50  Conn. 

113  97,  99,  125,  427 

Sallee  v.   Corder,  67  Cal.   174  204 

Saltonstall   v.    Riley,   28   Ala.    164  617 

Salvage  v.  Haydock,  68  N.   H.  484  428 

Samish     River     Boom     Co.     v.     Union 

Boom   Co.,   32   Wash.    586  109 

Sampson  v.   Randall,   72   Maine   109  470 

San  Antonio  v.  Gould,  34  Tex.  49  503 

Sanborn    v.    Rice,    129    Mass.    387  313 

Sanders  v.  Betts,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  287    303 
V.  Cassady,  86  Ala.   246  437 

V.  Richardson,     14     Pick.      (Mass.) 

522  52 

V.  Sutlive,   163   Iowa   172  434 

San    Domingo    Gold   Min.    Co.   v.   Grand 

Pac.  Gold  Min.  Co.,  10  Cal.  App.  415     350 

Sandon   v.    Sandon,    123    Wis.    603  720 

Sands  v.    Davis,   40   Mich.    14  119 

v.   Lynham,   27   Grat.    (Va.)    291  111 

Sanford   v.    Dick,    17   Conn.   213  658 

V.  Johnson,   24   Minn.    172  51 

V.  People,   102   111.   374  634 

V.   Sanford,    139   U.   S.  642  224 

San  Francisco  v.  Buckman,  111  Cal.  25    502 

V.  Lawton,    18   Cal.   465  301 

San     Francisco     Mut.     Loan     Assn.     v. 

Bowden,   137  Cal.  236  443 

San       Francisco       Protestant       Orphan 

Asylum  v.   Superior  Ct.,   116  Cal.   443  491 
Sansberry    v.    McElroy,    6    Bush    (Ky.) 

440  721 

Santa  Cruz  v.  Enright,  95  Cal.   105  109 


Ixx 


TAT.LE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Saranac  Land  &  Timber  Co.  v.  Roberts, 

195    N.    V.    303  634 

Sargent   v.    Hubbartl,    102   Mass.   380  129 

V.  Tultle,    67    Conn.    162  047 

Sartwcll   V.   Sowlcs,    72   Vt.   270  51 

Satcher  v.  Grice,  53   S.  Car.   126  451 

Saticrfiold  V.  Malonc,  35  Fed.  445     127,  128 

V.  Tale,    132   Ga.   256  469 

Saunders  v.   Blythe,   112   Mo.    1  266 

V.  Hart,   57   Tex.   8  100 

V.  Niswanger,  11  Ohio  St.  298  203 

V.  Saunders,   109   Va.    191  471 

Saunders.    In    re,    129    App.    Div.    (^•       „ 

Y.)   406  If'O 

Sauter  v.  Dollman,  46  Minn.  504  236 

Savage  v.   Savage,   19  Ore.   112  670 

Savings    &    Loan    Soc.    v.    Deering,    66 

Cal.    281  357 

Savings  Hank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S.  195       22 

Sawyer    v.    Adams,    8   Vt.    172  121 

V.   Freeman,    161    Mass.    543  483 

V.  Hanson,    24    Maine   542  50 

Saxton   V.    St.   Joseph,   60   Mo.    153  502 

Savers  v.   Hoskinson,    110   Pa.    St.   473       05 

Saylor    v.    Frantz,    17    Okla.    37  193 

Sayre   v.    Mohney,   30   Ore.   238  57 

V.  Sage,   47    Colo.    559  643 

Say  ward   v.   Thompson,    11   Wash.    706 

119,  223 
Scadden   Flat    Gold   Min.    Co.    v.    Scad- 
den,   121   Cal.   33  59 
Scaulan  v.   Grimmer,   71   Minn.   352            422 
V.   Wright,    13    Pick.    (Mass.)    523        111 
Scarboroug  v.   Holder,    127   Ga.   256            593 
Scarborough   v.   Arrant,  25   Tex.   129          119 
Scha.ile  v.  Wasey,  70  Mich.  414                 617 
Schade  v.  Gehner,   133   Mo.  252              22,   23 
Schaefer  v.  Bernhardt,  76  Ohio  St.  443    734 
V.   Schaefer.    141    111.    337  49 
V.  Eneu,    54    Pa.    St.    304                       718 
Schaeffer  v.   Bond,  70  Md.   80                    355 
v.  Messersmiih,  IC  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  366     475 
Schaub  v.   Griffin,  84  Md.   557  90 
bchedda  v.  Sawyer,  4  McLean   (U.   S.) 
.     181                                                                    225 
Schedel's  Estate,  In  re.  73  Cal.  594         466 
Scheerer  v.  Cuddy,  85  Cal.  270                   692 
Scbeid  v.   Rapp,   121   Pa.   St.   593                534 
Schell    V.    Leland,    45    Mo.    289                     661 
Schcnck   V.    Wicks,    23    Utah    576  77 
Schermerhorn    v.    Negus,    1    Denio    (N. 

Y.)    448  47 

Schierl  V.  Newberg,  102  Wis.  552  424 

Schissel  v.  Dickson,  129  Ind.   139  670 

Schley    v.    Pullman    Car    Co.,    25    Fed. 

890  322 

V.  Pullman   Palace   Car   Co.,    120   U. 

S.  575  284 

Schlosser   v.    Hemphill,    118    Iowa   452     207 
Schlosser,  In  re,  116  N.  Y.  S.  796  87 

Schmaunz  v.  Goss,  132  Mass.  141  713 

Schmelzer     v.     Chicago     Ave.     Sash     & 

Door   Mfg.   Co.,   85    111.   App.   596  534 

Schmidt  v.   Zahrndt,   148   Ind.   447  433 

Schmidtke   v.    Miller,   71   Tex.    103  736 

Schmitt  V.   Weber,   239  III.   377  350 

Schmucker    v.    Adams,    45    Pa.    Super. 

Ct.    58  708 

Schnebly  v.   Schnebly,  26  HI.   116  65 

Schneer    v.    Greenbaum,    27    Del.    97 

46,  464 

Schneider  v.   Botsch,  90  111.   577  691 

V.   Detroit,    135    Mich.    570  698 

v.  Holtzhauer,    134    Ky.    33  43 

V.   Hutchinson,    35    Ore.    253  208 

Schofield  v.  Jennings,   68   Ind.  232        -   581 

Scholl,   In   re,    100   Wis.    650  719 


School   District  No.   11   v.   Batsche,    106 

Mich.   330  52 

Schoonmaker    v.    Sheely,    3    Dcnio    (N. 

Y.)   485  714 

Scli.v.t   V.   Linscott,  80   Kans.    536     100,  611 
Scbreyer     v.     Schreyer,     91     N.     Y.     S. 

1065  340 

Schroeder    v.    Merchants    &c.    Ins.    Co  , 

104    111.    71  658 

Schultz    V.    Hastings    Lodge    No.    50,    I. 

O.    O.    F.,   90    Ncbr.   454  405 

Schurtz  V.   Colvin,   55   Ohio   St.   274         286 

Schuylkill  v.   Boyer,   125    Pa.   St.   226       663 

Scoit    v.    Austin,    36    Minn.    460  364 

v.   Fowler,    227    111.    104  393 

v.   Tordan    ((Jkla.),    155    Pac.   498  22 

V.  Key,  11  La.  Ann.  2i2  718,  719 

v.  Michael,  129  Ind.  250  291 

V.  Scott,  80  Kans.  489  676 

V.  Trustees     I-"irst     M.     E.     Ch.,     50 

Midi.  528  333 

V.  West,    03    Wis.    529  359 

Scottish  American  Mortg.  Co.  v.  But- 
ler, 99  Miss.  56  694 
Scoville  v.  Mason,  76  Conn.  459  467 
Scriver  v.  Smith,  100  N.  Y.  471  506 
Scrivncr  v.  Dietz,  84  Cal.  295  428 
Scroggs  V.  Stevenson,  100  N.  Car.  354  737 
Scruggs  v.  Driver's  Exrs.,  31  Ala.  274  673 
Seaboard  Air   Line   R.   Co.   v.   Anniston 

Mfg.    Co.,    186   Ala.   264  277 

V.  Harby,  55  Fla.  555  568 

Seager,    In   re,    92   Mich.    186  65 

Seals  v.   Perkins,  96   Miss.    704  643 

Seaman  v.   Harmon,   192   Mass.   S  340 

V.   Hax,  14  Colo.   536  420 

Seattle  &  L.  W.  Waterway  Co.  v.  Se- 
attle Dock  Co.,  35  Wash.  503  182 
Seaverns  v.  Costcllo,  8  Ariz.  308  643 
Seay  v.  Cockrell,  102  Tex.  280  465 
Sebald  v.  Mulholland,  155  N.  Y.  455  507 
Seberg   v.    Iowa   Trust    fi:c.    Bank,    141 

Iowa  99  100 

Sebring  v.   Mersereau,  9  Cow.    (N.  Y.) 

344  670 

Security   Abstract  &c.    Co.   v.    Longacre, 

56   Nebr.   469  16,   17,   18 

Security  Trust  Co.  v.   Dodd,  173  U.   S. 

624  376,  377 

Sedgwick    v.    Laflin,    10   Allen    (Mass.) 

430  45 

Seegcr   v.    Mueller,    133    111.    86  100 

Scil)el  v.   Bath,  5  Wyo.  409  546 

Selden     v.     Illinois     Trust     &     Savings 

Bank,   239   111.   67  722 

Sellers  v.   Corwin,    5    Ohio   398  563 

v.  Sellers,    35    Ala.    235  40 

V.  Sellers,   98   N.   Car.    13  280,  288 

Selman  v.    Robertson,  46   S.   Car.   262      476 

Semon  v.   Terhune,  40  N.   J.    Eq.   364 

99,  132 
Semper  v.   Coates,  93   Minn.   76  321 

Semple    v.    Scarborough,    44    La.    Ann. 

257  432 

Sena  v.  American  Turquoise  Co.,  14  N. 

Mex.   511  214 

Sengfelder   v.    Hill,    21    Wash.    371  297 

Senter  v.   Lambeth,   59  Tex.   259  530 

Sergeant  v.  Steinberger,  2  Ohio  305  326 
Service  v.  McMahon,  42  Wash.  452  538 
Sessions    v.    Peay,    23    Ark.    39  590 

Seton    v.    New    York,    130    App.    Div. 

(N.  Y.)   148  677 

Sewall  v.  Wilmer,  132  Mass.  131  60,  456 
Sewell  V.    Drake,  27   Ky.   L.   571  566 

Sexton  v.   Rhames,  13  Wis.  99  661 

Seymour  v.    Darrow,   31   Vt.    122  129 

V.  Laycock,    47    Wis.    272  443 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixxi 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Seymour 

V.  McKinstry,    106    N.    Y.    230  692 

V.  Seymour,   22   Conn.   272            600,  653 
V.  Slide    &     Spur    Gold    Mines,    42 

Fed.    633  530 

Shackelford   v.    Hall,    19    111.    212  477 

V.  Planters'  &c.   Bank,  22  Ala.   238  372 

Shackelton   v.    Sebree,   86    111.    616  311 

Shackleford   v.    Beck,    80    Va.    573  538 

Shafer    v.    Shafer,    85    Md.    554  653 

Shaffer   v.    Sutton,   5   Binn.    (Pa.)    228  50 

Shaffner  v.    Briggs,   36   Ind.    55  571 

Shaft   V.    Carey,    107   Wis.    273  278 

Shamp  V.   White,   106   Cal.   220  407 

Shanks  v.   Mills,  25   S.   Car.   358  717 

Sharp   V.    Barker,    11    Kans.    381  426 

V.   Humphreys,    16    N.   J.    L.    25  46 

SharpeTy   v.    Plant,    79    Miss.    175  341 

Shaw    V.    Canfield,    86    Mich.    1  357 
V.  Hoadley,    8    Blackf.    (Ind.)    165 

360,  723 

V.  Kellogg,   170  U.   S.   312  186 

V.   Lindsey,   60   Ala.    344  420 

V.   ProfRtt,   57   Ore.    192  61 

V.  Wilshire,   65   Maine  485  119 

Shays   v.    Norton,   48   111.    100  418 

Sheafe  v.   Cushing,   17   N.   H.   508  49 

Sheaffe  v.  O'Neil,  1   Mass.  256  111 

Shearer  v.   Clay,   1    Litt.    (Ky.)    260  185 

Shedaker,   In   re,    74   N.   J.    Eq.   802  87 

Sheehan  v.    Davis,   17   Ohio    St.    571  119 

Sheehv   v.    Miles,    93    Cal.    288  6,  7 

V.   Scott,    128   Iowa  551  66 

Sheffey  v.  Bank,  33   Fed.  315  126 

Sheffield  v.   Franklin,   151  Ala.  492  718 

V.   Lovering,    12   Mass.   490  730 

Sheldon  v.  Carter,  90  Ala.  380  262 

Shellenberger  v.  Ransom,  41   Nebr.  631  733 

Shelton  V.  Franklin,  224  Mo.  343  643 

V.   Price,    174    Fed.    891  385 

V.  Wright,   25    Ga.   636  718 

Shepard  v.   Shepard,   36  Mich.    173  127 

Shepard  Drainage  District  v.  Eimerman, 

140  Wis.  327  677 

Shepherd   v.    Burkhalter,    13    Ga.   443  120 

V.  Kahle,    120   Wis.    57  99 

Sheridan  v.   Schimpf,   120  Ala.  475  364 

Sherin   v.    Brackett,   36   Minn.    152  691 
Sherman  v.   American   Cong.   Assn.,   98 

Fed.   495  474 

V.  Buick,  45   Cal.   656  208 

V.   Sherman,   23    S.   Dak.   486  301 
Sherrer    v.    Harris     (Ark.),    13    S.    W. 

730  419 

Sherry  v.   Sampson,   11   Kans.   611  215 

Sherwood  v.    Dunbar,   6  Cal.    53  443 

V.   Sherwood,   45    Wis.    357  678 

V.   Waller,   20  Conn.   262  314 

Shields  v.   Norfolk  &c.   R.   Co.,   129   N. 

Car.  1  110 

V.  Shiff,   124  U.   S.   351  113 

V.   Walker,   2   Overt.    (Tenn.)    118n  196 

Shillaber's  Estate,   In   re,   74   Cal.    144  487 

Shindler  v.  Robinson,  15  App.  Div.   (N. 

Y.)    875  470 

Shine  v.   Olson,   110   Minn.   44  642 

Shipley   v.    Fox,   69   Md.    572  429 

Shipman    v.    Mitchell,   64   Tex.    174  53 

V.   Rollins,    98    N.    Y.    311  484 

Shirey  v.   Postlethwaite,   72   Pa.    St.   39  46 

Shirk   V.   Thomas,    121    Ind.    147  118 

V.  Whitten,   131   Ind.  455  546 

Shiveley  v.  Gilpin,  23   Kv.   L.  2090  124 

Shively  v.   Bowlby,   152   U.   S.   1        104,  272 
Shockley    v.    Parvis,    4    Houst.     (Del.) 

568  43 

Shoemaker  v.  McMonisrle,  86  Ind.  421  270 

Shortall  v.   Hinckley,   31   111.   219       64,  314 


Short  V.   Caldwell,   155  Mass.   57  419 

V.   Conlee,   28   111.    219  284 

V.   Fogle,  42   Kans.    349  126 

V.   Galway,    83    Ky.    501  584 

Shouse  V.  Taylor,   115   Ky.   22  656 

Shrcveport  Creosoting  Co.  v.  Shreveport, 

119  La.  637  631 

Shrigley  v.   Black,   66  Kans.   213  638 

Shriver  v.   Shriver,  86  N.   Y.   575  77 

V.   State,  65   Md.  278  721 

Shrvock  V.  Cannon,  39  Ark.  434  324 

ShuU  V.  Johnson,  55  N.  Car.  202       466,  730 

Shultz  V."  Houck,   29   Md.   24  491 

V.   Sanders,   38   N.   J.    Eq.    154  611 

Shuman  v.   Shuman,  80  Wis.  479  730 

Shute   v.    Patterson,    147    Fed.    509  380 

V.   Shute,  82  S.   Car.  264  286 

Sibly   V.    England,    90   Ark.    420  287 

Sicard's  Lessee  v.  Davis,  6  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

124  283 

Siders  v.   Siders,  169  Mass.  523  711 

Siedschlag  v.   Griffin,   132   Wis.    106  669 

Sielbeck   v.    Grothman,    248    111.    435  91 
Siewers    v.    Commonwealth,    87    Pa.    St. 

15  21,  22 

Sikes  V.  Work,  6  Gray   (Mass.)   433  328 

Silcox   V.   Jones,   80    S.   Car.    484        654,  674 

Sillyman   v.    King,   36   Iowa  207  192 

Silsby  V.   Allen,   43   Vt.    172  53 

Silverman  v.   Kristufek,   162   III.   222  263 

Simis  v.   McElroy,   160  N.  Y.   156  699 
Simmons    v.    Augustin,    3    Port.    (Ala.) 

69  44 

V.  Cabanne,    177    Mo.    336  468 

v.  Jacobs,     52     Maine     147  664 

v.   McCarthv,    118    Cal.    622  643 

V.  Richardson,    107    Ala.    697  668 

v.   Spratt,    26    Fla.    449                   451,  480 

V.  Wagner,    101    U.    S.    260  193 
Simmons  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Doran,   142 

U.    S.   417                                       128,   129,  692 

Simon  V.  Richard,  42  La.  842  696 

V.   Sewell,    64    Ala.    241  117 

V.   Simon's    Estate,    158    Mich.    256  737 

Simonds   v.    Simonds,    168    Mass.    144  46 

Simons  v.   McLain,  51   Kans.    153  326 

Simon's   Will,   In   re,   55   Conn.   239  473 

Simonton   v.   White,   93  Tex.    50  478 

Simpson  v.   Blaisdell,   85   Maine   199  271 

V.   Erisner,    155    Mo.    157  341 

V.  Pearson,    31    Ind.    1  97 

V.   Simpson,     114    111.    603  737 

V.  Stoddard  Co.,  173  Mo.  421  207 

Simpson,  In   re,   144   N.   Y.   1099  708 

Sims  V.   Boynton,   32  Ala.  353  91 

V.   Morrison,   92   Minn.    341  182 

Simson   V.   Eckstein,   22   Cal.    580  358 

Sinclair   v.    Sinclair,   79   Va.   40  532 

V.   Slawson,    44    Mich.    123  122 

Singletary   v.    Hill,  43   Tex.    588  48 

Singleton  v.  Close,   130  Ga.   716  676 

Singly  V.   Warren,   18   Wash.   434  594 

Sioux  City  &  I.  F.  Town  Lot  &  Land  Co. 

V.    Griffey,    72   Iowa   505  212 

Sisk   V.    Smith,    1   Gil.    (111.)    503  65 

Sistrunk   v.    Ware,   69   Ala.    273  473 

Sitler  V.  McComas,  66  Md.   135  120 
Sixth  Ward   Bldg.  Assn.  v.  Wilson,  41 

Md.   506  123 

Sjoli  V.  Dreschel,   199  U.   S.   564  212 

Skelton   V.    Sacket,   91    Mo.   377  581 

Skinner  v.   Conant,  2  Vt.   453  664 

V.   Crawford,   54    Iowa   119  689 

V.   Dayton,    19    Johns.    (N.   Y.)    513  328 

V.  Fulton,  39  111.  484  714 

V.  Skinner,    38    Nebr.    756  50 

Skvrme    v.    Occidental    Mill    &    Mining 

Co.,  8  Nev.  219  537 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Scctious.] 


Slack  V.  Ray,  26  La.  Ann.  674  636 
Slater  v.  Breese,  36  Mich.  77  ^  423 
Slatterly    v.    Schwannecke,    118    N.    Y. 

543  128 

Slaughter  v.   Cunningham,  24   Ala.   260    298 

Slayton  v.   Blount.   93  Ala.   575  714 

Slegcl   V.   Laucr,    148   Pa.    St.   236  43 

Slcnimer    v.    Crampton,    50    Inwa    302        465 

Sloan  V.   Owens  &   Co.,    70   Mo.   206  328 

Sloane  v.  Stevens,  107  N.  V.   122  455 

Slocum  V.   Bracy,   55   Minn.  249  390 

V.   McLaren,   109   Minn.   49  643 

Small  V.    Field,    102   Mo.    104  323 

V.  Small.    16   S.   Car.   64  531 

V.  Sproat,    3    Mete.    (Mass.)    303  375 

V.  Thompson,   92    Maine   539  472 

Smalley    v.    Renken,    85    Iowa    612  426 

Smallridge  v.    Hazlett,    112   Ky.   841  65 

Sniallwood  v.  Lewin.  15  N.  J.  Eq.  60       126 

Smith  V.  Adams,  130  U.  S.  167  650 

V.   Allen,    101    Iowa    60S  27 

V.   Ayer,   101   U.   S.   320  128 

V.   Barr,    76    Minn.    513  656 

V.   Bateman,    25    Colo.    241  393 

V.   r.ccker,    62    Kans.    541  706 

V.   Bradley,    154    Mass.    227  313 

V.   P.ranch    Bank,   21    Ala.    125  118 

V.   Brown,   99    N.   Car.   377  736 

V.   Cannell,    32    Maine    123  425 

V.  Chad  wick.   111   Ala.   542  468 

V.   Clark,   100   Iowa   605  330 

V.  Crandall,    118   La.    1052  226 

V.   Crcmer,    71    111.    185  397 

V.  Crosby,    86   Tex.    15  348 

V.  Curtis,  29  N.  J.  L.  345  459 

V.  Dail,   13   Cal.    510  120 

V.   Davis,  90  Cal.  25  655 

V.   Day,    2    Pennew.    (Del.)    245  457 

V.   Dennis,    163    III.    631  467 

V.  Derr,  34  Pa.   St.   126  719 

V.   Du   Bose,  78  Ga.  413  458 

V.   Farr,    46    Colo.    364  630 

V.  Gaines,    35    N.    J.    Eq.    65  87 

V.  Gale,    144   U.    S.    509  549 

V.   Glover,    50    Minn.    58  354 

V.  Godwin,  145  N.  Car.  242  381 

V.  Green,   41    Fed.    455  423 

V.  Greenop,    60   Mich.    61  692 

V.  Hamilton     County     Comrs.,     173 

Ind.  364  630 

V.  Holden,    58    Kans.    535  487 
V.   Holmes,   54   Mich.    104 

15,  16,  17,  21 

V.  Howard,  86  Maine  203  653 
V.   Hunter,    241     III.    514                359,  480 

V.  Hutchinson,   61    Mo.   83  467 

V.    Tones,    97    Ky.    670  278 

V.   Kelley,    27    Maine    237  437 

V.  Kelly,   23   Miss.    167  718 

V.  Kennedy,  89   III.   485  533 

V.  Lindsey,   89   Mo.    76  138 

V.  Littlefield,    51    N.    Y.    539  52 

V.   Lowry,   113   Ind.  37  433 

V.  McClain,    146    Ind.    77  301 

V.  May,  3  Pennew.    (Del.)   233  49 

V.  Mitchell,    21    Wash.    536  213 

V.  Moore,  102  Va.  260  516 

V.  Mundy,   18  Ala.   182  611 
V.  Myers,    109    Ind.    1                   650,  663 

V.  Neilson,   13  Lea   (Tenn.)   461  119 
V.  North     Canyon     Water    Co.,     16 

Utah   194  696 

V.  Osage,   80   Iowa  84  100 

V.  Perry,   80   Va.    563  719 

V.  Phillips,    131    Ala.    629  46 

V.  Pipe,    3    Colo.    187  224 
V.  Pitts    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    122    S.    • 

W.  46  568 


99,  427 
265 
642 
417 
301 
467 
433 
564 
127 
323 
98 
476 
419 
312 
474 
429 
121 


597,  657 
716 
692 

708,  730 
349 


Smith 

V.  Pollard,   19  Vt.  272 

V.    Porter,    10    Gray    (Mass.)    66 

V.    Pial),    113    111.   308 

V.   Rainey,   9   .Xriz.    362 

V.   Rudd,   48    Kans.   296 

V.   Runnels,  97    Iowa   55 

V.  Russell,    20   Colo.    554 

V.   Schwartz,  21  Utah  126 

V.   Schweigerer,    129    Ind.    363 

V.   Seiberling,    35    Fed.    677 

V.  Sherwood,  4   Conn.   276 

V.  Smith,   157  Ala.   79 

V.  Smith,   80  Cal.    323 

V.   Smith,   71    Mich.   633 

V.   Smith,    64    Nebr.     563 

V.  Smith,  25  Wend.   (N.  Y.)   405 

V.  Smith,   13   Ohio  St.   532 

V.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533 

1,  5,  6,  10,  25,  35 

V.  Trimble,  27   111.    152  578 

V.   Wert,  64  Ala.  34  360,   596,  600 

V.  Winn,  38  S.  Car.  188 

V.  Winsor,  239  111.  567 

V.   Yule,  31   Cal.   ISO 
Smith,    In    re,    131    Caf.    433 
Smith,    In    re,   4    Nev.    254 
Smith's  Estate,  In  re,  144  Pa.  St.  428 

59,  339,  480 
Smith's  Lessee  v.  Hunt,  13  Ohio  260  284 
Smithwick  v.    Jordan,   15   Mass.   113  480 

Smullin    v.    Wharton.    73    Nebr.    667  59 

Snecd    v.    Ewing,    5   J.    J.    Marsh    (Ky.) 

460  719 

Snelling   v.    Bryce,   41    Ga.    513  553 

Snider   v.    Snider,    160   N.    Y.    151  464 

Snow  v.   Lake,   20   Fla.   656  427 

v.   Snow,    111    Mass.    389  87 

V.  Stevens,    15    Mass.    278  65 

Snowden  v.   Wilas,   19  Ind.  10  506 

Snyder   v.   Ncsbitt,   77   Md.   576  46 

V.  Pike,    30    Utah     102  654,  674 

V.   Snovcr,   56   N.   J.   L.   20  693 

V.  Thieme  &  Wagner  Brew.  Co.,  173 

Ind.  569  517 

Solis  v.  Williams,  205   Mass.   350     640,  669 
Solt    v.   Anderson,    71    Nebr.    826  93 

Souder  v.    Morrow,   33   Pa.    St.   83  125 

Soulard's  Estate,  In  re,  141   Mo.  642 

59,  480 
Soule  V.  Borelli.  80  Conn.   392  537 

v.  Corbley,    65    Mich.    109  438 

South    Baltimore    Harbor    &    Imp.    Co. 

V.    Smith,   85    Md.    537 
Southern    Cotton    Oil   Co.    v.    Henshaw, 

89  Ala.  448 
Southern    Pac.    R.    Co.    v.    Lipman,    148 
Cal.   480 

V.  Southern    Cal.    R.    Co.,    Ill    Cal. 
221 
Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Hayes,  150  Ala.  212 
Southgate  v.  Annon,  31   Md.   113 
South    Mahoning   Tp.    v.    Marshall,    138 

Pa.    St.   570  473 

Southwestern    Bldg.    &    Loan    Assn.    v. 

Acker,    138    .Ma.    523  443 

Southwestern   Mfg.   Co.  v.   Swan    (Tex 

Civ.   App.),   43    S.    W.   813 
Southworth  v.  Scofield,  51   N.  Y.  513 
Sowden   v.    Craig,   26    Iowa    156 
Sowles  v.  Butler,  71  Vt.  271 
Spalding  v.   Hall.  6  D.   C.   123 

V.  Kelly,   66   Mich.   693 
Sparkman     v.     Davenport     (Tex.     Civ. 

App.),   160   S.   W.   410 
Sparks   V.   Pierce,    115   U.    S.    -108 
Spaulding   v.    Elsworth,    39    Fla.    76 

V.  Scanland,  6  B.   Men.    (Ky.)   353 


394 

328 

212 

109 
109 
719 


676 
428 
125 
434 
52 
654 

1 

224 
639 
122 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixxiii 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Spawr  V.  Johnson.  49  Kans.   788  147 
Speakman    v.     Forepaugh,    44    Pa.     St. 

363  "7 

Spear   v.    Orendorf,   26   Md.    37  407 

V.   Robinson,    29    Maine    531  89 

Spect  V.  Gregg,  51  Cal.   198  276 

Speer   v.    Phillips,   24   S.    Dak.   257  399 

Speidel  v.   Schlosser,   13   W.  Va.   686  66 
Spence  v.  Widney   (Cal.),  46  Pac..463 

340,  341 

Spencer  v.  O'Niell,  100  Mo.  49  64 

V.  Winselman,   42   Cal.   479  74 

Speyrer    v.    Miller,    108    La.    204  66 

Spiers  V.  Halstead,  71   N.  Car.  209  661 

Spivey  V.   Rose,   120   N.   Car.    163  122 

Splahn    V.   Gillespie,   48    Ind.    397  592 

Spofford  V.  Hobbs,  29  Maine  148  337 

V.   True,    33    Maine    283  276 

Sprague  v.   Birchard.    1   Wis.   457  658 

V.   Cochran,    144   N.   Y.    104            417,  444 

V.   Lovett,    20    S.    Dak.    328  439 

V.   Sprague,    13    R.    I.    701  58 

Sprayberry  v.   State,   62   Ala.   459  208 

Springer  v.    Fortune,   2    Handy    (Ohio) 

52  728 

Spring's  Estate,  In  re,  216  Pa.   529  59 

Sproul   V.   McCoy,   26   Ohio   St.    577  66 
Sproule    V.    Davies,    69    App.    Div.    (N. 

Y.)   502  77 

Sproull  V.   Miles,   82  Ark.   455  397 

Spurr  V.  Andrew,  6  Allen   (Mass.)  420  316 
Squint    Eye    v.    Crooked   Arm    (Okla.), 

155    Pac.    1147  731 

Squires   v.   Kimball,   208   Mo.    110  434 

V.  Squires,  65   W.  Va.   611           334,  735 

Staacke   v.    Bell,    125    Cal.    309  656 

Stafford   v.   Woods,    144   111.   203  66 

Stahl   V.    Mitchell,   41    Minn.    325  341 

Stall   V.    Macalester,   9   Ohio    19  616 

Stalworth  v.   Blum,  41   Ala.  319  426 

Stamm   v.    Bostwick,    122    N.    Y.   48  458 

Stanclift   v.    Norton,    11    Kans.    218  426 
Standard     Fuller's    Earth    Co.,    In    re, 

186   Fed.    578  378 

Stang  V.   Redden,  28  Fed.   11  597 
Stanley    v.    Chamberlin,    39    N.    J.    L. 

565  128 

V.  Colt,   5   Wall.    (U.    S.)    119  356 

Stannard   v.   Case,  40  Ohio   St.   211  708 

Stanwood  v.   Stanwood,   179   Mass.   223  483 

Staples  V.  Fenton,  5  Hun  (N.  Y.)   172  434 

V.  Mead,    152    App.    Div.     (N.    Y.) 

745  471 

V.  White,    88    Tenn.    30  547 

Starbuck  v.  Avery,   132  Mo.  App.  542  408 

Starbuck,  In  re,  63  Misc.   (N.  Y.)    156  64 

Stark   V.    Conde,    100   Wis.    633          462,  474 

V.  Stark,    55    Pa.    St.    62  87 

V.   Starrs.  6  Wall.    (U.  S.)   402       95,  202 

Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  Car.  1                55,  465 

Starrett    v.    McKim,    90    Ark.    520  717 

State  V.  Beackmo,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  488  732 

V.   Blasdell,    4    Nev.    241  208 

V.   Bradish,    14    Mass.    296  8 

V.   Chrisman,  2   Ind.    126  653 

V.  Cross  Lake  &c.  Fishing  Club,  123 

La.  208  185 

V.  Cunningham.   88  Wis.   81  208 

V.   De   Hart,    109    La.    570  89 

V.   Delesdenier,    7   Tex.    76  504 

V.  District    Court,    85    Minn.    283  656 

V.   District   Court,   34   Mont.   96  584 

V.  Engle,    21    N.    T.    L.    347  714 
V.   Fidelity    &c.     Co.,     35     Tex.     Civ. 

App.   214  40 

V.  Flint  &c.   R.   Co.,   89   Mich.   481  100 

V.  Fort,    24    S.    Car.    510  53 

V.  Grimes,    29    Nev.    50  137 


State 

v.  Higgins,    60   Minn.    1                262,  581 

v.   Holcomb,    81    Kans.    879  631 

v.  Jennings.    47    Fla.    307  208 
v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  45   Iowa 

139  102 

V.  Kennard.    57    Nebr.    711  180 

V.  Lanier,  47    La.   Ann.   568  185 

V.   Little,    94   Ark.    217  630 

V.  McDonald,    59   Ore.    520  724 

V.  McDowell,  101  N.  Car.  734  719 

V.  McMillan,    49    Fla.    243  13 

V.   Meyer,   63    Ind.    33  111 

v.   Milk,    11    Fed.    389  100 

V.   Morgan,    52    Ark.    150  222 

V.  Myers,    52    Wis.    628  645 
V.  Nashville    LTniversity,    4    Humph. 

(Tenn.)    157  185 

V.  Newton,    5    Blackf.    (Ind.)    455  208 

V.   Oritz,    99   Tex.    475  214 
V.  Portsmouth    Sav.   Bank,    106   Ind. 

435  207 

V.  Record,    80   Ind.    348  563 

v.   Reeder,  5  Nebr.  203  111 

V.  Reeves,    97    Mo.    668  706 

V.   Riley,   219   Mo.   667  574 

V.  Rusk,   55   Wis.   465  212 

V.   Salyers,    19    Ind.    432  611 

V.   Sargent,    12    Mo.    App.    228  112 

V.  Soonaugle,  45   W.   Va.  415  637 

V.   Sijringfield   Tp.,    6    Ind.    83  208 

V.   Stark,    111    La.    594                      208,  209 

V.   Stringfellow,    2    Kans.    263  208 
V.   Superior     Court,     13     Wash.     St. 

187  656 
V.  Superior    Court   of   King  County, 

63  Wash.  312  674 

V.  Tanner,  73  Nebr.  104  208 
V.  Twelfth     Judicial     Dist.     Ct.,     34 

Mont.  96  491 
V.  Unknown   Heirs  of  Goldberg,   113 

Tenn.  298  638 

V.  Wells,    142   N.    Car.    590  109 
V.  Westfall,   85    Minn.  437 

954,  955,  956,  957 

V.  Wyman,    59    Vt.    527  730 

State  Bank  v.   Chapelle,  40  Mich.  447  441 

V.   Frame,    112    Mo.    502                   127,  439 

State    Land    Co.    v.    Mitchell,    162    Ala. 

469  634 
State  Savings  Bank  v.   Stewart,  93  Va. 

447  241 

Staubitz  V.  Lambert,  71   Minn.   11  87 

Staunton  v.  Wooden,  179  Fed.  61  378 

Steacy   v.   Rice,   27   Pa.    St.   75  58 

Stearns   v.    Edson,   63   Vt.    259  621 

V.  Godfrey,   16  Maine   158               55,  475 

V.  United    States,   152    Fed.   900  201 
Stearns  Ranches  Co.  v.  McDowell,   134 

Cal.   562  561 

Stebbins  v.   Duncan,   108  U.    S.   32  138 

Steckel,  In  re,  64  Pa.   St.   493  719 

Steele    v.    Boone,    75    111.    457  138 

V.   Bryant,    132    Ky.    569        185,  272,  654 

V.   Friarson,    85    Tenn.    430  334 

V.  Williams,    12    Ky.    L.    770  423 

Steel,   In  re,   L.   R.    (1903)    1   Ch.    135  467 

Steeple    v.    Downing.    60    Ind.    478  224 

Steifel   V.    Barton,    73    Md.   408  119 

Stein    V.    Ashby,    24   Ala.    521  227 

Steinberg   v.    Salzman,    139    Wis.    118  697 

Stciner   v.    Coxe,    4    Pa.    St.    13  224 

S'ein's  Admr.  v.  Stein,  32  Ky.  L.  664  719 

Stcll   V.    Barham,    87    N.    Car.    62  45 

Stengel  v.   Sergeant,   74   N.   J.   Eq.   20  393 

Stephens  v.   Mansfield.   11   Cal.  363  108 

V.  Motl,   82   Tex.   81  98 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  in  Sections.'] 


Stephenson   v.    Cove,   24    S.    Dak.    460 

5,   10,   15,  16 

V.  Davis,    56    Maine    73  576 

V.  Thompson,    13    111.    186  349 

Sterling  v.    Park.   129  T.a.    3C9  262 

V.  Warden,   51    N.   H.   217  62 

Stern  v.  Fountain,  112  Iowa  96  103 

Sternberg's  Estate,  In  re,  94  Iowa  305     491 

Stetson  V.   Eastman,  84  Maine  366  326 

Stevens  v.    Dennett,   51    N.    H.    324  61 

V.   Ferrv,   48    Fed.    7  6.S4 

V.  Flower,  46  N.  J.  Eq.   340  473 

V.   Geiser,    71    Tex.    140  119 

V.  Gladding,  17  How.   (U.  S.)  447         36 

V.  Hampton,    46    Mo.    404  118 

V.  Morse,  47   N.   H.   532  118 

V.  Owen,   25    Maine   94  65 

V.   Shannahan,    160    III.    330  358 

V.  Watson,    4    Abb.    Dec.     (N.    Y.) 

302  565 

Stevenson  v.  Abington,  31  Beav.  303  Afid 
V.  Grav,  46  Ind.  App.  412  87.  708,  730 
V.  McReary,    12    Sm.   &   M.    (Miss.) 

9  360 

V.  Montgomery,   104   N.    E.    1075  90 

V.  Polk,   71   Iowa  278 

1,  3,  6,  25,  35,  429 
Steward  v.  Knight,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  232  46 
Stewart    v.    Beard,    69    Ala.    470  282 

V.   Blalock,  45   S.   Car.   61  66 

V.  Clark,    13    Mete.    (Mass.)    79  49 

V.   Devries,    81    Md.    525  595 

V.  Hurd,    107    Maine    457  429 

V.  McLaughlin,  11   Colo.  458  417 

V.   McSweeney,   14  Wis.  468  124 

V.   Matheny,  66  Miss.   21  6.18 

V.  Mav,  111   Md.   162  669 

V.  Perkins,   110   Mo.   660  348 

V.  Ross,   50  Miss.   776  64 

V.   Smiley,    46    Ark.    373  723 

V.  Stewart,    5    Conn.    317  65 

V.   Stewart,    177   Mass.   493  455 

V.  United  States,  206  U.   S.   185  184 

V.  Wells,   47    Ind.   App.   228  724 

V.  Wood,  63  Mo.  252  531 

Stewart  Contracting  Co.  v.  Trenton  &c. 

R.   Co..   71   N.   T.  L.  568  536 

Stickney's  Will,  In  re,  85   Md.   79  482 

Stidham   v.    Matthews,   29   Ark.   650  316 

Still  v.  Lansingburgh,  16  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

107  331 

Stillings  v.   Stillings,  67  N.  H.   584  434 

Stilphen  v.   Stilphen,   65   N.   H.    126  321 

Stimson    Land    Co.   v.    Rawson,    62    Fed. 

426  220 

Stincbaugh    v.    Wisdom,     13     B.     Mon. 

(Ky.)    467  64 

Stinnett  v.  House,  1  Posey  LTnrep.  Cas. 

(Tex.)   484  124 

Stinson   v.   Call,    163   Mo.    323  220 

V.  Connecticut     Mut.     L.     Ins.     Co., 

174    111.    125  638 

V.   Doolittle,    50    Fed.    12  435 

V.   Ross,    51    Maine    556  347 

Stitt    V.    Rat    Portage    Lumber    Co.,    96 

Minn.   27  672 

Stobaugh  V.  Irons,  243  111.  55  363 

Stockbridge    Iron    Co.    v.    Hudson    Iron 

Co.,  107  Mass.  290  63 

Stockton  V.   Frazier,  81   Ohio  St.   227 

87,  730 
V.  Weber,   98   Cal.   433  54 

Stockwell  V.  Bowman,  23  Ky.  L.  2304  485 
V.  McHenrv,   107   Pa.   St.  2i7  132 

V.   Shalit,  204   Mass.   270  286 

V.   State,    101    Ind.    1  126 

Stogdon  V.  Lee,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  669         479 


Stokes  V.  Stokes,  240  111.  330  670 

V.  Weston,    142   N.   Y.   433  476 

Stoltz   V.    Doering,    112    111.    234        687,  719 
Stone  V.   Ashley,   13   X.   H.   38  336 

V.   Griffin.   3   Vt.  400  458 

V.   Houghton,    139    Mass.    175  277 

V.  Perkins,    217    Mo.    586  224,  568 

Stonehill    v.    Hastings,    135    App,    Div. 

(N.   Y.)    48  286 

Stoner    v.    Royar,   200    Mo.   444  180 

Stoner,   In   re,   105   Fed.    752  385 

Stones! reet  v.  Doyle,  75  Va.  356  720 

Stonewall    Phosphate  Co.  v.   Peyton,   39 

]'la.    726  228 

Storch  V.  McCain,  85  Cal.  304  443 

Storcr   V.    Freeman,   6   Mass.    435  104 

Story   V.    Palmer,   46    N.    J.    Eq.    1  59 

.Stoughton  V.   Leigh,   1  Taunt.  402  65 

Stout  V.   Young,   217   Pa.   427  491 

Stow  V.   Wyse,   7   Conn.   214  99 

Stowe  V.    Stowe,   140   Mo.   594  491 

Strain    v.    Murphy,   49    Mo.    337  621 

Stramann  v.  Seheeren,  7  Colo.  App.  1       516 
Strand  v.   Stewart.   51   Was'->.   685  457 

Strasburger   v.    Hof.'.nan,    175    111.   App. 

120  737 

Strause  v.  Josephthal.  77  N.  Y.  622         439 
Streeter  v.   Paton,  7   Mich.   341  723 

Stribling  v.   Ross,   16   111.   122  65 

Stringfellow  v.   Cain,  90   V.   S.  ^610  215 

Strode  V.   Magowan,  2   Bush    (Ky.)    64 

719,  740 
Strong  V.  Smith,  84  Mich.  567  734 

Strother  v.  Lucas,  12  Pet.  (U.  S.)  454     186 
Stroup   v.    Stroiip,    140   Ind.    179  65 

Strunk  v.    Pritchett,   27   Ind.   App.   582     244 
Stuart    v.    Allen.    16    Cal.    473  360 

Slubblcfield   v.    Boggs.   2   Ohio    St.   216     225 
Studdard   v.    Wells,    120   Mo.    25  54 

Studebaker   v.   Johnson,    41    Kans.    326      662 
Studer   v.    Seyer,   69   Ga.    125  401 

Studsfill   V.   Willcox,  94   Ga.   690  73 

Stumpf   V.    Osterhage,   94    111.    115  689 

Sturgis    V.    Work,    122    Ind.    134        460,  471 
Stutt  V.   Building  Assn.,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

344  632 

Stuyvesant  v.  Western  Mtg.  &c.  Co.,  22 

Colo.  28  424 

V.  Woodruff.  21   N.   T.  L.   133  61 

Succession   of   Caldwell.'  114   La.    195        718 
Succession   of   Davis,    126   La.    178  724 

.Succession  of  Earhart,  50  La.  Ann.  524  491 
Succession   of  Herber,    128    La.    Ill  456 

Succession  of  Hoggatt,     36     La.     Ann. 

2,?>7  570 

Succession  of  McCan,  48  La.  Ann.  145     480 

Succession  of  Meyer,  44  La.  Ann.  871     737 

Succession  of  Nash,   48   La.    1573  595 

Sudbury   v.    Stow,    13    Mass.    462  40 

Sugg  V.  Thornton,   132  U.   S.   524  660 

Sullivan  v.   Chambers,   18  R.   I.   799  58 

V.  Garesche,    229    Mo.    496  468,  469 

V.  Solis,    52   Tex.    Civ.    App.   464  193 

V.   Sullivan,  66  N.  Y.  37  670 

Sullivan-Sanders  Lumber  Co.  v.  Reeves, 

58   Tex.    Civ.    App.   488  276 

Sullivan's  Estate,  In  re,  48  Wash.  631     726 
Sulphur    Mines    Co.    v.    Thompson,    93 

Va.   293  358 

Sulzberger  v.  .Sulzberger,  50  Cal.  385  66 

Summer  v.    Mitchell,   29   Fla.    179  120 

Summerfield  v.   White,  54  W.   Va.   311     322 
Summers     v.     Kilgus,     14     Bush     (Ky.> 

449  443 

v.  Smith.    127    111.    645  476 

Summit   V.   Yount,    109   Ind.    506  475 

Sumner  v.    Rhodes,    14   Conn.    135  120 

Sumpter   v.   Carter,    115   Ga.   893  459 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixxv 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Sunderland,   In   re,   60   Iowa   732  718 

Sundermann    v.    People,    148   App.    Div. 

(N.    Y.)    124  956 

Sutherland  v.  Goodnow,  108  111.  528         408 
V.  Rose,    47    Barb.    (N.    Y.)    144  672 

Sutphen  v.   Ellis,   35   Mich.   446  492 

Sutton    V.    Calhoun,    14    La.    Ann.    209     635 
Swain   V.    Duane,   48   Cal.    358  479 

V.   Mitchell,   27  Tex.   Civ.   Aop.   62        357 
Swallow  V.   Swallow,  27   N.  J.   Eq.  278     466 

-  ■     ---  66 

227 
186 
570 
729 


Swan   V.    Walden,    156   Cal.    195 
Swann  v.  Jenkins,   82   Ala.   478 

V.   Lindsey,    70   Ala.    507 
Swasey   v.    Antram,    24   Ohio    St.    87 

V.  Jaques,    144    Mass.    135 
Sweezey    v.    Willis,    1    Bradf.    (N.    Y.) 
495 


89 


Swenson's  Estate,  In  re,  55  Minn.  300  471 

Sweringen  v.  St.  Louis,   151   Mo.  348  103 

Swift   V.    Boyd,   202    Mass.    26  52 

V.  Lee,    65    111.    336  348 

V.  Mulkey,    14    Ore.    59  73 

V.   Smith,   102   U.   S.   442  439 

Swinney  v.   Klippert,   20   Kv.   L.   2014  719 

Swisher   v.    Sensenderfer,    84    Mo.    104  203 

Swofford    Bros.    Dry   Goods   Co.,    In    re, 

180   Fed.    549  377 

Symns  v.   Cutter,  9  Kans.  App.  210  26 


Tabler   v.   Tabler.   62   Md.    601  487 

Taft  V.  Taft,  130  Mass.  461  339 

Taggart  v.   Risley,   3   Ore.   306  99 

Talbott  V.   English,   156   Ind.   299  407 

V.  Woodford,  48  W.  Va.  449  696 

Tallmadge   v.    East   River   Bank,   26   N. 

Y.    105  277 

Talpey  v.   Wright,  61   Ark.   275  22 

Tankard  v.   Tankard.   79   N.   Car.    54  692 

Tanton  v.  Van  Alstine,  24  111.  App.  405     53 
Taplev  V.  Tapley,   115   Ga.   109  355 

Tapp'v.    Nock,    89    Ky.    414  25 

Tappan's  Appeal,   In   re,   52  Conn.   412     474 
Tarbell  v.   West,  86   N.  Y.  280         125,  126 
Tarpey  v.  Desert  Salt  Co.,  5  Utah  205     282 
V.  Madsen,  178  U.  S.  215  196 

Tartt   v.    Clayton,    109    111.    579  357,  358 

V.  Negus,    127   Ala.   301  66 

Tarver  v.    Depper,   132   Ga.   798  699 

Tasker  v.   Garrett  County,  82   Md.   150      25 
Tate  V.  Jay,  31  Ark.  576  521 

V.  Pensacola  Land  &c.   Co.,   37   Fla. 

439  434 

Tatro   V.    French,    33    Kans.    49  183 

Tatum  V.   Tatum,   81   Ala.   388  93 

Tavshanjian    v.    Abbott,    59    Misc.    (N. 

Y.)    642  720 

Tax    Assessment    of    Delaware    &c.    R. 

Co.,   In   re,   224   Pa.    240  630 

Taylor   v.    Albemarle    Steam    Nav.    Co., 

105  N.  Car.  484  119 

V.  Benham,   5   How.    (U.   S.)   233         356 
V.   Birmingham,   29  Pa.   St.   306  321 

V.  Cleary,   29   Grat.    (Va.)   448  45 

V.  Collins,   51   Wis.    123  *  674 

V.  Coots,    32    Nebr.    30  661 

V.   Cribbs,    174    Ala.    217  87 

V.   Hargous,   4    Cal.    268  66 

V.   Harrison,   47   Tex.    454  264,  301 

V.   Heitz,   87    Mo.    660  529 

V.  Lane,   18  Tex.  Civ.  App.   545  355 

V.  McGrew,   29   Ind.   App.   324  564 

V.   Mitchell,    58   Kans.    94  433 

V.  Russell,   65   W.   Va.   632  668 

V.   Stephens,    165    Ind.    200  466 

V.  Tavlor,    223    111.    423  66 

V.  Taylor,    54   Ore.    560  676 


Taylor 

V.  Waters,    7    Taunt.    374  61 

V.   Weston,    77    Cal.    534  198 

v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  App.  559 

1,  3,  5,  6,  10 

V.  Williams,  45  Mo.  80  25 

V.  Winona  R.   Co.,   45   Minn.    66         215 

Taylor,   In  re,   20   N.   Y.    S.   960  90 

Tavs    v.    Robinson,    68    Kans.    53        87,  730 

Teague  v.   Sowder,   121  Tenn.   132  297 

v.  Whaley,  20  Ind.  App.   26  506 

Teal   V.    Walker,    111   U.    S.   242  419 

Tecumseh    Iron    Co.    v.    Camp,    93    Ala. 

572 
Tegarden   v.   Phillips    (Ind.),   39    N.    E. 

212 
Temple  v.   Ferguson,   110  Tenn.  84 
Templeton    v.    Falls    Land    &c.    Co.,    77 
Tex.   55 
V.  Twitty,    88    Tenn.     595 
Tenbrook  v.  Jessup,  60  N.  J.   Eq.  234 
Tendick  v.  Evetts,  38  Tex.  275 
Tennant  v.   Tennant,   43   W.   Va.    547 
Tennessee    Coal,    I.    &    R.    Co.    v.    Tut- 

wiler,   108  Ala.  483 
Tepper    v.    Supreme    Council    of    Royal 

Arcanum,   59   N.  J.   Eq.   321 
Terrell   v.    Martin,   64   Tex.    121 
Territory   v.    Lee,  2   Mont.    124 
Terry   v.    Cole,    80   Va.    695 
Testart  v.    Belot,   31   La.   Ann.   795 
Teverbaugh  v.   Hawkins,  82  Mo.   180 
Tewksbury    v.    Howard,    138    Ind.    103 
Tewksbury    Tp.    v.    Readington    Tp.,    8 

N.   J.    L.   319 
Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Blalock,  76 

Tex.    85  431,  692 

Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  159  U.  S 

66 
Thalls  V.   Smith,   139  Ind.   496 
Tharpe   v.   Holcomb,    126   N.   Car.   365 
Thatcher  v.  Thatcher,   17  Colo.  404 
Thaxton  v.   Roberts,  66   Ga.   704 
Thayer  v.   Finnegan,   134  Mass.  62 
V.   Roberts,   44    Maine   247 
v.   Spratt,     189    U.     S.     346 
V.   Thaver,    14   Vt.    107 
V.  Wellington,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  283 
Thebaut   v.    Canova,    11    Tla.  '  143 
Thieband   v.    Sebastian,    10    Ind.    454 
Thiele   v.    Thiele,    57    N.    J.    Eq.    98 
Thielman  v.   Carr,   75   111.   385 
Thissell  v.   Schillinger,   186   Mass.    180 
Thomas  v.   Bland.  91   Ky.   1 
V.  Caldwell,    50    111.     138 
V.  Carson,   46   Nebr.    765 

5,  10,  14,  15,  17,  20,  22,  174 
V.  Feese,    21    Ky.    I..    206  516 

V.   Fulford,    117    N.    Car.    667  66 

v.  Glazener,   90   Ala.   537  611 

V.   Hanson,    59    Minn.    274  124 

v.   Higgins,   47    Md.    439  465 

v.  Ireland,    88    Kv.    581  662 

v.  Johnson,    137    Ind.    244  553 

V.   Livingston,    155    Ala.    546  419 

V.   Miller,     161     111.     60  85,  710 

V.  Schee,  80  Iowa  237 

10,  11,  15,  16,  22,  174 
V.  Stuart's  Exr.,  91  Va.  694  287 

V.  Thomas,    97    Miss.    697  466 

V.  Thomas'    Estate,    64   Nebr.    581        719 
V.  Title  &c.   Co.,  81   Ohio   St.  432 

IS,  22 

V.  Woods,  173   Fed.  585  378,  381 

V.  Wyatt,  31  Mo.    188  224 

Thomas,   In   re,    199   Fed.    214  385 

Thomassen  v.  De  Goey,  133  Iowa  278     397 


651 

89 
338 

597 

64 

620 

465 

59 

225 

717 
349 
180 
590 
118 
583 
398 

40 


220 
97 
696 
729 
419 
525 
616 
193 
325 
485 
671 
493 
516 
535 
473 
593 
280 


Ixxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  ore  to  Scctious.] 


Thompson  v.   Easier,   148  Cal.   646 


192, 
73, 
45, 


V.  Browne,   10  S.   Dak.   344 

V.  Burhans,    79    N.   Y.   93 

V.  Burns,   15    Idaho   572 

V.  Carl,    51    Vt.    408 

V.  Carr,    5    N.    H.    510 

V.  Churchill,  60  Vt.  371 

V.   Dulles,     5     Rich.     Eq.     (S.     Car.) 
370 

V.  Ellcnz,  58  Minn.   301 

V.  Garwood,    3    Whart.    (Pa.)    287 

V.  Kauffelt,   110  Pa.   St.   209 

V.   Kenvon,    ICO   Mass.    108 

V.   Maxwell,    16    Fla.    773 

V.   >Tiner,   30   Iowa   386,    571 

V.  Morgan,  6  Minn.   (Gil.  199)  292 

V.  Penn,    149    Ky.    158 

V.  Pioche,  44   Cal.   508 

V.   Sanford,    13    Ga.    238 

V.   Shaw,    104   Maine   85 

V.  Simpson    (Mo.  App.),   127   S.   W. 
620 

V.  Southern    California   Motor    Road 
Co.,  82  Cal.   497 

V.  Thompson,    132    Ind.    288 

V.  Thompson,  27  Kv.  L.  949 

V.  Thornton,    197    Mass.    273 
Thompson,  In  re,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.)  419 
Thompson's  Appeal,  In  re,   101   Pa.   St. 

225 
Thompson's    Estate,    In    re,    6    S.    Dak. 

576 
Thomson  v.   Locke,   66  Tex.   383 
Thorn  v.   Maurer,   85   Mich.   569 

V.  Mayer,  12  Misc.   (N.  Y.)  487 
Thornburg  v.    Doolittle,    148   Iowa   530 

V.   Wiggin,    135    Ind.    178 
Thorndike   v.    Norris,   24   N.   H.   454 
Thorne,   In   re,    155    N.   Y.    140 
Thornton  v.   Ferguson,  133  Ga.  825 

V.  Krepps,  37   Pa.   St.   391 

V.  Miskimmon,    48    Mo.    219 

V.  Thornton,   3   Rand.    (Va.)    179 
Thorp    V.    Hanes,    107    Ind.    324 
Thorpe   v.    Durbon,   45    Iowa    192 
Thrasher   v.    Ballard,    33    W.    Va 


Threat  v.  Moody,  87  Tenn.  143 
Thrift  V.  Delaney,  69  Cal.  188 
Throckmorton    v.    Price,    28   Tex. 


285 
60, 


605 
117, 


Thrush   v.    GrayWlI,    110   Iowa   585 
Thurber  v.   Dwyer,   10  R.   I.   355 
Thygerson  v.  Whitbeck,  5  Utah  406 
Tichenor    v.     Brewer's    Exr.,     98    Ky. 

349 
Tidd  V.  Rines,  26  Minn.   201 
Tiddy  v.   Graves,   126   N.   Car.  620 
Tiernan  v.   Miller,  69   Ncbr.   764 
Tiffin   V.    Shawhan,    43    Ohio    St.    178 

324 
Tifft  V.   Buffalo,  82  N.  Y.  204 
Tilley  v.   Bridges,    105   111.   336  364, 

V.   King,    109    X.   Car.   461  54, 

Tillinghast  v.   Champlin,  4  R.  I.   173 

V.  Coggeshall.   7   R.   I.   383 
Tillis   V.   Treadwell,    117   Ala.    445 
Tilton  V.  Tilton,    196   Mass.   562 
Timpson    v.    New    York,    5    App.    Div. 

(N.   Y.)   424 
Tindal  v.  Drake,  51   Ala.   574 
Tinder  v.  Tinder,  131  Ind.  381         262, 
Tinicum   Fishing  Co.   v.   Carter,   61   Pa. 

St.  21 
Tinker  v.    Forbes,    l'<6   111.   221 
Tinsley  v.  Atlantic  Mines  Co.,  20  Colo. 

App.  61 


201 
374 
688 
671 
312 
331 
455 

34 
376 

60 
691 
444 
126 

61 
120 
456 
127 

87 
372 

552 

270 
676 
467 
483 
110 

313 

735 
654 
654 
122 

34 
321 
436 
718 
614 

64 
348 
321 
715 
392 

493 
66 

201 

132 

239 

53 

74 

713 

192 

64 

201 

503 
645 

601 
474 
128 
708 
506 
734 

60S 

58 

263 

63 
277 

639 


436 
425 
375 
315 


Tippecanoe  Loan  S:  Trust  Co.  v.  Carr, 

40  Ind.  App.   125  360,  723 

Tischler  v.   Robinson.   56   Fla.   699  611 

Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Wrenn, 

35   Ore.   62  535 

Title    Guarantee    &    Trust    Co.,    In    re, 

195   N.   Y.  339  459 

Title  &c.  Co.  V.  Kerrigan,  150  Cal.  289     962 
Toan  V.  Pline,  60  Mich.  385  51 

Tobin's  Estate,  In  rt-,   139  Wis.  494 
Todd  V.  Johnson,   51   Iowa   192 
V.   Johnson,  99   Ky.    548 
V.  Nelson,  109  N.  Y.  316 
V.  Outlaw,   79    N.    Car.   235  120,  549 

V.  Pittsburgh    &c.    R.    Co.,    19    Ohio 

St.    514  105 

V.  Sawyer,   147  Mass.   570  47 

V.  Union    Dime    Sav.    Inst.,    118    N. 

Y.  337  281 

Todhunter  v.  Klemmer,   134  Cal.  60         570 
Tognazzini  v.   Morganti,  84  Cal.   159  147 

Toledo    D.    &    B.    R.    Co.    V.    Hamilton, 

134  U.   S.   296  432 

Tolle  V.  Orth,  75   Ind.  298  53 

Tolleston  Club  v.   State,   141   Ind.   197     207 
Tolman  v.   Hobbs,  68  Maine  316 

V.  Smith,   85   Cal.   280  . 

Tombstone    Town    Site    Cases,    2    Ariz. 

272 
Tomkins  v.  Henderson,  83  Ala.  391 
V.  Hyatt,  28  N.  Y.  347 
V.  Little   Rock  &   F.   S.   R.   Co.,   18 

Fed.   344  ,    „  ^  o32 

V.  Verplanck,  10  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 

572  466,  713 

Tomlinson's  Estate,  In  re,   133  Pa.   St. 

245  ^^^ 

Tompson  v.  Tappan,  139  Mass.  506  444 

Toms  V.  Williams,  41  Mich.  552  339 

Toney  v.  Knapp,   142  Mich.  652  687 

Tonopah     Banlcing     Corp.     v.     McKane 
Min.   Co.,   31    Nev.   295  364,  611 


637 

577 

215 

127 

34 


Toomey  v.   McLean,   105   Mass.   122 
Torrans  v.   Hicks,   32  Mich.   307 
Torrence  v.   Shedd,  112  111.  466 
Torrey  v.  Deavitt,  53  Vt.  331 
Totten  v.  Pocahontas  Coal  &  Coke  Co., 

67  W.  Va.  639 
Toupin  v.   Peabody,  162  Mass.  473 
Tousley  v.  Tousley,   5  Ohio  St.  78 
Tower  v.  Tower,  141  Ind.  223 
Town  v.   Greer,   53  Wash.   350 
Townsend  v.   Coxe,   151   111.   62 

v.  Driver,   5   Cal.   App.   581 

v.  I,ittle,    109   U.    S.    504 

v.   Meneley,    37    Ind.    App.    127 

v.  Tallant,   33   Cal.   45 
Townsend  Sav.  Bank  v.  Todd,  47  Conn. 

190 
Townshend    v.    Frommer,    125    N.    Y. 
446 

V.  Goodfcllow,    40    Minn.    312 
Township   of   Walcott  v.   Skauge,  6   N. 

Dak.  382 
Toy  v.  McHugh,  62  Nebr.  820 
Trafton  v.    Hawes.   102   Mass.   533 
Trail  v.  Turner,  22  Ky.  L.   100 
Train    v.    Boston    Disinfecting    Co.,    144 


65 
596 
314 
437 

274 
434 
120 
670 
272 
371,  376 
669 
692 
719 
661 

100 

479 
328 

213 
632 
266 
693 


Mass.  523 
Trammell  v.  Hudmon,  78  A'a.  2^2 
Tranum  v.  Wilkinson,  81  Ala.  408 
Trapnall  v.   Brown,   19  Ark.  39 
Travis  v.   Supply  Co.,  42  Kans.  625 
Traver  v.   Setzcr,   72   Ncbr.  84  S 
Traynor  v.   Palmer.   86   111.  477 
Treadwell  v.  Revnnlds,  47  Cal.  171 
V.  Salisbury      Mfg.      Co.,      7      Gray 

(Mass.)  393  332 


527 
534 
120 
59 
553 
719 
279 
265 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixxvii 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 


Tremmel  v.  Kleiboldt,  75  Mo.  255  479 

V.   Kleibolt,  6  Mo.  App.   549  64 

Trenouth   v.    San    Francisco,    100   U.   S. 

251  196 

Trenton  v.  Toman,  74  N.  J.  Eq.  702  61 

Trimble  v.   Hunter,   104  N.  Car.   129  566 

V.   King,   131   Ky.   1  100 

V.   Puckett,  93   Ky.  218  516 

V.  Stewart,  35  Mo.  App.  537  16 

Trine   v.   Pueblo,   21    Colo.    102  105 

Tripe  v.   Marcy,   39   N.   H.   439  125 

Triplett   V.    Williams,    149    N.    Car.    394 

297,  671 
Tripp  V.   Hopkins,   13  R.   I.  99  20,  21 

Trodick   v.    Northern   Pac.   R.    Co.,    164 

Fed.    913  200 

Trout  V.   Drawhorn,  57  Ind.   570     ^  89 

Trowbridge    v.    Cunningham,    63    Kans. 

847  611 

Troy  &-C.  R.  Co.  v.  Potter,   42  Vt.  265     110 
Troyer   v.    Wood,   96    Mo.    478  661 

Trucks  V.  Lindsey,  18  Iowa  504  418 

Truelove    v.    Truelove,     172    Ind.    441 

86,  719,  728 
Truman  v.  Truman,  79  Iowa   506  428 

Trusdell  v.  Lehman,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  218        49 
Trustees    of    Presbytery    of  _  New    York 
V.    Westminster   Presbyterian   Church, 

67   Misc.    (N.    Y.)    317  333 

T.  S.   Faulk  &  Co.  v.  Steiner,  165  Fed. 

861  382 

Tualatin    Academy   v.    Keene,    59    Ore. 

496  481 

Tubbs  V.   W^ilhoit,   73   Cal.   61  207 

Tuck  V.    Calvert,   3i    Md.    209  392 

Tucker  v.  Adams,  52  Ala.  254  405 

V.  Clarke,  2  Sandf.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  96       97 

V.  Harris,   13  Ga.   1  653 

V.  Jones.  8  Mont.   225  506 

V.  Moreland,   10  Pet.   (U.  S.)   58         298 

V.  Sellers,  130  Ind.  514  650 

V.   Whitehead,    58    Miss.    762  492 

Tug  River  Coal  and  Salt  Co.  v.  Brigel, 

86   Fed.   818  674 

Tulare  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Shepard,  185 

U.   S.   1  647 

Tull  V.  Royston,  30  Kans.  617  632 

Tuller  V.  Leaverton,   143   Iowa  162  417 

Tupper,   In  re,   163    Fed.   766  380 

Turk  V.   Funk.  68   Mo.   18  8 

V.  Skiles.  45   W.  Va.   82  106,  307 

Turley    v.    Massengil,    7    Lea    (Tenn.) 

353  47 

V.  Turley,  11   Ohio   St.   173  713 

Turner  v.   Dupree.   19  Ala.   198  578 

V.   First    Nat.    Bank,    78    Ind.    19  622 

V.  Houpt.   53   N.   T.   Eq.   526         545,  547 

V.  McDonald,  76  Cal.   177  7.  491 

V.  St.   John,  8  N.  Dak.  245  '  509 

V.   Strinzel,    70   Cal.   28  534 

V.   Watkins,   31   Ark.  429  420 

Turner.   In   re,  82  Misc.    (N.   Y.)   25  456 

Turner's  Appeal,  48   Mich.   369  737 

Turpie  V.  Lowe,   114  Ind.  37  420 

V,  Lowe,   158   Ind.   314  622 

Turpfn   V.   Derickson,    105   Md.   620  438 

Tusfh  V.   German   Sav.   Bank,  20  Misc. 

(N.  Y.)   571  339 

Tustin  V.  Faught,  23  Cal.  237  262 

Tuttle,   In  re,  77  Conn.   310  708 

Twining  v.  New  Jersev.  211  U.  S.  78       962 

Tydings  v.  Pitcher,  82'  Mo.  379  129 

Tyler  v.  Jewett,  82  Ala.  93  66 

V.  Judges,  175  Mass.  71 

'  952,  954,  955,  956,  oq; 

V.  Moore.  42  Pa.   St.   374  45,  312 

V.   Reynolds,    53    Iowa    146  718 

Tyrrel  v.  Wheeler,  123  N.  Y.  76  633 


U 


Uedelhofen    v.    Mason,    201    III.   465         426 
Uhl  v.  Uhl,  52  Cal.  250  676 

Ulfelder   Clothing   Co.,   In   re,   98   Fed. 

409  381 

Underbill,    In    re,    62    Misc.    (N.    Y.) 

456  711 

Underwood  v.  Curtis,  127  N.  Y.  533         484 
Unfried  v.  Heberer,  63  Ind.  67  716 

Union  Co.  v.  Sprague,  14  R.  I.  452  441 

Union    College    v.    Wheeler,    59    Barb. 

(N.  Y.)    585  318 

Union  College,  In  re,   129  N.  Y.  308       645 
Union    Mill    &    Mining    Co.    v.    Ferris, 

24   Fed.   Cas.  6  182 

Union    Nat.    Bank   v.    Bank   of   Kansas 

City,   136  U.  S.  223  421 

Union  Nat.  Sav.  Assn.  v.  Helberg,  152 

Ind.  139  538 

Union  Pac.   R.   Co.   v.   Colorado   Postal 

Tel.   &c.   Co.,   30  Colo.    133  110 

V.  DeBusk,  12  Colo.  294  663 

v.   Karges,    169    Fed.    459  _  184 

Union    Safe    Deposit    Co.    v.    Chisholm, 

33   111.  App.   647  1,  5,  6,  25,  194 

Union    Safe    Deposit    &    Trust    Co.    v. 

Dudley,  204  Maine  297  466 

Union    Stock    Yards    Co.    v.    Nashville 

Packing  Co.,  140  Fed.  701  277 

Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Electric  Park 
Amusement  Co.,  168  Mich. 
574  591 

V.  W^eber,   96   111.    346  632 

United  States  v.  Arredondo,  6  Pet.  (U. 

S.)   691  227 

V.  Ashton,    170   Fed.    509  184 

V.   Berrigan,   2   Alaska  442  180 

V.   Braddock,    50    Fed.    669  205 

v.   Budd,   43    Fed.    630  205 

v.  Budd,    144  U.   S.   154  205,  229 

v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  98  U.   S. 

334  229 

V.  California  &c.   Land   Co.,   148  U. 

S.  31  306 

V.  Chamberlin,  156  Fed.  881  630,  646 
V.  Crosby,  7  Cranch  (U.  S.)  115  724 
v.   Dastervignes,    118    Fed.    199  698 

v.  Ducros,    15   How.    (U.   S.)    38  214 

V.   Dunnington.   146  U.   S.  338  112 

v.  Elliott,  12  Utah  119  208 

V.  Healy,    160   U.    S.    136  204 

V.  Hyde,   132  Fed.   545  42 

V.  Illinois   Cent.   R.   Co.,   154  U.    S. 

225  244 

V.  King,    3    How.    (U.    S.)    773  180 

V.   Lair,   118  Fed.  98  202 

V.   Mackintosh,  85   Fed.   333  204 

V.   McLaughlin,  30  Fed.   147  100 

V.   Morant,    123    U.    S.    335  214 

V.  Mullp.n,  10  Fed.  785  220 

V.  Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.,    41    Fed. 

842  212 

V.  Pcna.    175    U.    S.    500  214 

V.   Perkins,    163    U.    S.    625  457 

V.  Railroad    Bridge    Co.,    6    McLean 

(U.    S.)    517  193 

V.   Schurz,  102  U.  S.  378  223,  752 

V.   Shannon,    151   Fed.   863  184 

V.  Southern    Pac.    R.    Co.,    39    Fed. 

132  212 

United    States   Fidelity  &c.   Co.   v.   Len- 

tilhon,  64  Misc.    (N.  Y.)   299  615 

United    States    Pipe    Line    Co.    v.    Dela- 
ware  &c.    R.    Co.,    62    N.   J.    L.    254 

110,  668 
United   States  Trust  Co.  v.   Maresi,   33 
Misc.    (N.   Y.)    539  480 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


United  States  Wind   Engine  &c.  Co.  v. 

Linville.   43    Katis.    455  17,   ly,  24 

University    of    Lcwisburg    v.    Reber,    43 

Pa.   St.   305 
L'pington  V.  Corrigan,  69  Hun   (N.   \  .) 

320 
Upper    Appomattox     Co.     v.     Hamilton, 

83  Va.  319 
Upson  V.  Noble,  35  Ohio  St.  655 
Urniston  v.   Lvans,   138  Iiid.  285 
Urton  V.  Woolsey.  87  Cal.   38 
Utassy  V.  Geidinghagen,  132  Mo.  53 
Utterback  v.  Terhune,   75   Ind.  363 


536 

54 

406 
718 
056 
656 
458 
715 


Valentine  v.  Piper,  22  Pick.  (Mass.) 

85  119 

V.  Witherill,  31    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    655 

707,  730 
Valle  V.   Fleming,   19   Mo.  454  353 

Valletta  v.  Tedens,  122  111.  607  11 

Valley    Falls    Co.    v.    Dolan,    9    R.    I. 

489  61 

Vamplew  v.   Chambers,  29   Nebr.   83  60 

Van  Aken  v.  Gleason,  34  Mich.  477  126 
Vanatta  v.   Brewer,   32   N.  J.   Eq.   268  55 

Van    Bibber   v.   Julian,   81    Mo.    0l8  736 

Van  Brocklin  v.  Wood,  38  Wash.  384  720 
Vance  v.   Maroney,  4  Colo.  47  600,  653 

Vandercook  v.   Baker,   48   Iowa   199 

99,  427,  439 
Van  Derlyn  v.  Mack,  137  Mich.  146  718 
Van  Deusen  v.  Frink,  15  Pick.   (Mass.) 

449  443 

Vandiveer  v.   Stickney,  75  Ala.  225  637 

Van  Dyck  v.   Bloede,  128  Md.  330  722 

Van  Horn  v.  Van  Horn,  107  Iowa  247  719 
Van    Home    v.    Campbell,    100    N.    Y. 

287  43,  47 

Van  Husan  v.  Heames,  96  Mich.  504  118 
Van    Kleek    v.    O'hanlon,    21    N.    J.    L. 

582  111 

Van  Matre  v.  Sankey,  148  111.  536  718 

Van   Meter  v.  Knight,  32  Minn.   205  124 

Van  Rensselaer  v.   Hays,   19  N.  Y.  68         72 
V.   Kearncv,   11   How.    (U.   S.)   297  97 

V.  Radclirf,   10  Wend.   (N.  Y.  639         63 
Van    Reynegan    v.    Bolton,    5    Otto    (U. 

S.)   33  214 

Van    Schaick    v.    Sigel,    58    How.    Pr. 

(N.   Y.)    211  12 

V.  Sigel,  60  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   122       18 
Van  Sickle  v.  Gibson,  40  Mich.  170  730 

Van    Slooten    v.    Wheeler,    140    N.    Y. 

624  443 

Van    Svckel   v.    Van    Syckel,    51    N.    J. 

Eq.   194  466 

Van   Thorniley  v.    Peters,  26   Ohio    St. 

471  120,   121 

Van    Valkenburg   v.    McCloud,    21    Cal. 

330  210 

VanVleet  v.   DeWitt,  200  HI.    153  676 

Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand,  19  Iowa 

422  278,  304 

Van    Wickle    v.    Landry,    29    La.    Ann. 

330  431 

Vardeman    v.    Lawson,     17    Tex.     10 

393,  398,  400 
Varn   v.   Varn,  32   S.   Car.   77  326 

Varner's  Appeal,  In  re,  80  Pa.  St.  140  59 
Varnon  v.  Varnon,  67  Mo.  App.  534  487 
Vary    v.    Sensabaugh,    156    Ala.    459  314 

Vattier  v.  Hin.Ie,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.)  252  298 
Vauphan  v.   Marable,  64  Ala.  60  442 

Vaughn  V.   Loveiov,  34  Ala.  437  477 

V.  Moore,  89' Va.   925  122 

V.  Vaughn,  100  Tenn.  282  531 


Vaughn 

V.  Yawn,   103   Ga.   557  667 
Vecder  v.   McKinley  &c.  Trust  Co.,  61 

Nebr.   892  727 
Vejar    v.    Mound    City    Assn., '  97    Cal. 

659  271 

Vcrden  v.  Coleman,  4  Ind.  457  226 

\'erdin  v.   Slocum,   71    X.   Y.   34S  566 

Verges  v.  Giboney,  47   Mo.   171  443 

Verplanck,  In  re,  91  X.  Y.  439  653 

Very  v.   Russell,  65   X.  11.  646  442 

Verzier   v.    Convard,    75   Conn.    1  318 

Vestal  V.   Garrett.   197   111.  398  272 

Vickers  v.   Henry,  110  N.  Car.  371  65 

V.   Lcifeh,    104   X.   Car.   248  45 

Vidcan  v.  Grifini,  21   Cal.   389  335 

Viele  V.  Judson,  82  N.  Y.  32  438 

Vigilancia,   In  re,  68  Fed.   781  433 
Virginia    Fire    &    Marine    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Cottrell,   85  Va.  857  591 

Vizard  V.   Moody,   119  Ga.  918  446 

\'ogler   V.   Anderson,    46    Wash.   202  213 

Von  Arb  v.  Thomas,  lOo  Mo.  33  65 

Von   Arx   v.   Boone,    193    Fed.   612  598 

Von  Hesse  v.  MacKaye,  136  X.  Y.  114  340 

Von  Tobel   v.   Ostrander,    158   111.   499  538 

Vose  V.   Bradstreet,  27   Maine   156  270 

V.   Handy,  2   Greenl.    (Maine)    322  437 

Voss  V.   Filer,   109   Ind.   260  419 

V.   King,   38   W.  Va.   607  53 
Vought  V.  Williams.   120  X.  Y.  253       6,  77 

Vowles  V.  Craig,  8  Cranch  (U.  S.)  371  203 

W 

Wacek  v.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282  5,  10,   15,   16 

Wade  V.   Deray,   50  Cal.   376  291 

V.  Killough,    5    Stew.    &    P.     (Ala.) 

450  26 

V.  Miller,   32  N.   J.   L.   296  65 

Wadlcigh  v.  Glines,  6  X.  H.   17  322 

Wadsworth  v.  Wadsworth,  81  Cal.  187     676 

Waggener  v.   Waggener,  3   T.   B.   Mon. 

(Ky.)    542  74,  280,  335 

Wagner  v.  Varner,  50  Iowa  532  718 

Wailes  v.  Cooper,  24  Miss.  208  127 

W^ait  V.    Baldwin.  60  Mich.   622  129 

V.   Kern     River    Min.     &c.     Co.,     157 

Cal.    16  671 

V.  Wait.    4    N.    Y.    95  65 

Waits  V.   Moore,  89   Ark.    19  100 

Wakefield  v.   Chowen,  26   Minn.   379 

5,  8,  10,  20,  161 
Waldron  v.  Taylor,  52  W.  Va.  284  87,  717 
Walker  v.  Arnold,  71   Vt.   263  99 

V.  Atmore,    50   Fed.    644  451 

V.   Bowman,    27    Okla.     172         14,  23,  24 
V.   Bradbury,    15    Maine    207  91 

V.   Bruce,    44    Colo.     109  59 

V.   Converse,    148    111.    622  699 

V.  Deaver,  79  Mo.  664  736 

V.   Denison,   86   III.    142  337 

V.   Dunshee,    38    Pa.    St.   430        708,  728 
V.   Files,    94    Ark.    453  616 

V.  Hill,    73    X.    H.    254  467 

V.  Maddox,  105   Ga.  253  400 

V.  Schreiber.  47   Iowa  529  128 

W^alkerly's  Estate,   In  re,   108  Cal.   627 

43,  482,  484 

Walker's  Estate,  In  re,  5  Ariz.   70  719 

Walker's  Estate,   In  re,   110  Cal.   387  457 

Wall  V.   Fairlev,   77   X.  Car.    105  623 

V.   Pfanschmidt.     265     111.     ISO  733 

V.  W^all,    30    Miss.    91  96 

Wallace  v.   Furber,  62  Ind.   103  423 

v.  Hudson,    170   Cal.    596  722 

V.  Industrial    Trust    Co.,    29    R.    I. 

550  340 


TABLE   OF    CASES 


Ixxix 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Wallace 

V.  Smith,    113    Ky.    263 
V.  Swepston,   74  Ark.   520 
V.   Weld,    145    Iowa    478 
V.  Wilson,  30  Mo.  335 


478 
736 
642 
192 


Wallahan  v.  Ingersoll,  117  111.  123    111,  659 
Wall    Lumber    Co.    v.    Lott-Lewis    Co., 

5   Ga.  App.   604  612 

Wain's  Estate,  In  re,  189  Pa.  St.  631       483 
Walsh  V.  Anderson,   135   Mass.  65  445 

Waltemate's  Appeal,   In   re,   86   Pa.    St. 

219  719 

Walters  v.  Defenbaugh,  90  111.  241  420 

V.   Jordan,   35   N.  Car.   361  65 

V.  Walters,   73   Ind.   425  430 

Walters'  Will,   In  re,   64  Wis.  487  487 

Walthall  V.   Rives,   34  Ala.   91  442 

Walton  V.   Drumtra,   152   Mo.  489  58 

V.  Meeks,    120   N.   Y.    79  738 

Wambole  v.  Foote,  2   Dak.   1  324 

Warburton    v.    Mattox,    Morris    (Iowa) 

367  99 

Ward  V.  Dougherty,  75   Cal.  240  265 

V.  Mathews,    122    Ala.    188  719 

V.  Mulford,    32    Cal.    365  180,  214 

V.  Necedah    Lumber    Co.,    70    Wis. 

445  331 

V.  Gates,    43    Ala.    515  493 

V.  Rapp,  79  Mich.  469  62 

V.  Small,    90   Ky.    198  120 

V.  Stow,  17  N.  Car.  509  714 

V.  Ward,   120   111.    Ill  720 

Warden   v.   Watson,   93    Mo.    107  63 

Warden,    In    re,    57   Cal.    484  720 

Warden  v.   Adams.   15   Mass.   233     436,  437 

V.  Lyons,   118   Pa.    St.   396  42 

V.  Sabins,    36    Kans.    165  535 

Ware  v.  Hager,  31  Ky.  L.  728  193 

V.   Minot,     202     Mass.     512  459 

V.  Richardson,    3    Md.    505  58,  59 

V.  Bchintz,  190  111.   189  441 

V.   Wisner,    SO    Fed.    310  456 

Warehime  v.  Graf.  83   Md.   98  595 

Warfield  v.   Dorsev,  39  Md.   299  595 

Warn  v.   Brown,   i02  Pa.   St.   347  45 

Warner  v.    Bates,   98   Mass.   274  59 

V.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468  54,  276 

V.   Frend,    138   Cal.   651  674 

V.  Gunnison,   2    Colo.    App.    430  109 

V.   Norwegian    Cemetery    Assn.,    139 

Iowa  115  65 

V.  Rogers,  23   Minn.   34  61 

V.  Tanner,    38    Ohio    St.    118  49 

V.   Williard,    54    Conn.    470  46? 

V.  Winslow,    1    Sandf.    Ch.    (N.    Y.) 

430  121,  438 

Warner    Valley    Stock    Co.    v.    Calder- 

wood,   36   Ore.   228  207 

Warnock  v.  Harlow.  96  Cal.  298       118,  551 
Warren  v.    Homestead,   33    Maine   256     437 
V.   Lovis,    53    Maine    463  419 

V.  Lyons,    152    Mass.    310  52 

V.  Prescott,  84  Maine  483     712,  718,  734 
V.  St.    Paul    &.C.    R.    Co.,    18    Minn. 

384  677 

V.  Syme,    7    W.    Va.    474  120 

Washburn  v.  Van  Steenwyk,   32  Minn. 

336  456 

Washington     County    Abstract    Co.     v. 

Harris,  48  Okla.   577  16,  17,  18 

Wass  V.   Bucknam,   38  Maine   356  64 

Waterbury  v.   Piatt,   76  Conn.  435  110 

Waterhouse    v.    Martin,    Peck.    (Tenn.) 

392  89 

Security  State  Bank  v.  Waterloo  Lodge, 

85    Nebr.   255  429 

Waterman  v.  Carlton,   102  Tex.   510         724 

V.  Greene,   12  R.  I.  483  46 


Waters  v.   Bush,  42  Iowa  255  226 

V.   Spofford,   58  Tex.   115  120 
Watkins  v.   Blount,   43  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

460  734 

V.  Eaton,    30    Maine    529  640 

V.  Holman,   16   Pet.    (U.   S.)   25  652 

V.  Thornton,   11    Ohio   St.   367  64 

V.  Wassell,    15    Ark.    73  99 
V.  Watkins    (Ky.   App.),   120   S.   W. 

341  468 

V.  Wilhoit,    104    Cal.    395               121,  122 
Watkins   Land  Co.   v.    Creps,   72   Kans. 

333  206 

Watson  V.  Adams,   103  Ga.  733  570 

V.   Boyle,    55    Wash.     141  398 
V.  Grand   Rapids   &c.   Co.,   91   Mich. 

198  447 

V.  Hutto,    27    Ala.    513  583 

V.   Mercer,   8  Pet.    (U.   S.)    88  106 

V.  Muirhead,    57    Pa.    St.    161  16 

V.   O'Hern,   6   Watts    (Pa.)    362  50 

V.  Richardson,    110    Iowa   673  719 

V.   Sherman.    84    111.    263  358 

V.  Sutro,    86    Cal.    500                   616,  651 

V.  Turner,   89   Ala.   220  452 

V.  Violett,  63   Ky.   332  595 

V.  Watson,   225   111.   412  393 

Watters  v.   Rome  &c.   R.    Co.,    133   Ga. 

641  270 

Watts  V.  Dull.   184  111.  86  718 

V.  Watts,    38   Ohio    St.    480  473 

Way  V.   Arnold,   18   Ga.    181  99 

Weare  v.  Williams,  85   Iowa  253  127 

Weart  v.   Cruser,  49   N.   J.   L.   475  48 

Weatherford    v.    Weatherford,    20    Ala. 

548  719 

Weaver  v.   Carpenter,  42  Iowa  343  119 

V.  First    Nat.    Bank,    76   Kans.    540  66 

Webb  V.   Bidwell,   IS   Minn.    (Gil.  394) 

479  632 

V.  Haefr'er,  S3  Md.  187  442 

V.  Hayden,    166    Mo.    39  59 

V.  Hoselton,   4   Nebr.   308  358 

V.  Hufif,    61    Tex.    677  283 

V.  Jackson,    6    Colo.    App.    211  718 

V.  Janney,   9  App.   D.   C.  41  673 

V.  Robbins,  77  Ala.  176                  129,  313 

V.   Seekins,    62    Wis.    26  51 

V.  Stone,  24   N.    H.   282  424 

V.  Thompson,   23    Ind.   428  314 

Webber  v.   Kaslner,   5   Ariz.   324        119,  621 
V.   Pere     Marquette     Boom     Co.,     62 

Mich.   626  224 

Weber  v.   Christen,   121   111.   91  286 

V.  McCleverty,    149    Cal.    316  441 

Webster   v.    Chicago,   62   in.    302  646 

V.  Cooper,  14  How.   (U.  S.)  488  58 

V.  Daniel,    47    Ark.    131  350 
V.  Vandeventer,      6     Gray      (Mass.) 

428  326 

Webster    City    Steel    Radiator    Co.    v. 

Chamberlin,   137   Iowa   717  536 

Weed   V.    Woods,    71    N.    H.    581  43 

Weeden  v.  Hawes,  10  Conn.  SO  578 

V.  Richmond,   9   R.    I.    128  650 

Weeks  v.    Brooks,   205   Mass.  458  957 

V.  Grace,   194   Mass.   296  110 

V.  Waldron,   64   N.   H.    149  635 

Weider  v.   Maddox,  66  Tex.   372  376 

Weile    V.    United    States,    7    Ct.    of    CI. 

(U.  S.)   535  337 

WeUer  v.  Monroe  County,  76  Miss.  492  185 

Weir,   In  re,   9   Dana    (Ky.)   434  714 

Welborn   v.   Anderson,   37   Miss.    155  73 

V.   Kimmerling,    46    Ind.    App.    98  668 

Welch  v.   Ketcham,  48  Minn.   241  118 

V.  Spragins,   98   Ky.   279  66 


Ixxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


{References  arc  to  Sections.'] 


Weldon  v.   Rogers,   1S7   Cal.   410  350 

V.  Tollman,   67   Fed.   986  433 

Welland    Canal   v.   Hatliaway,   8   Wend. 

(N.   Y.)   840  108 

Wellborn  v.   Weaver,   17  Ga.  267  311 

Welles  V.   Bailey,   55  Conn.   292  103 

Wellnian  v.   Churchill,  92  Maine  193       275 

Wells  V.   Caywood,  3   Colo.   487  323 

V.   Francis,   7   Colo.   396  392 

V.  Coss,   110  La.   347  715 

V.  Houston.  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  629     468 

V.  Rice,  34  Ark.  346  595 

V.  Seeley,  47  Hun  (N.  Y.)  109 

708,  728 

V.  Smith,   2   Utah    39  125 

V.  Thompson,    13   Ala.   793  64 

V.  Wells.  47    Rarb.    (N.    Y.)    416  124 

Wells'  Estate,  In  re,  69  Vt.  388  583 

Wells,    In    re,    113    N.    Y.    296  734 

Welsh  V.   liriggs,   204   Mass.   540  634 

Wendt   V.    Martin,   89   111.    139  533 

Wentworth   v.   Read,    166   III.    139  483 

V.   Wentworth,   69   Maine  247  65 

Werner  v.   Werner,  59  Kans.  399  676 

Wertheimer    v.    Thomas,    168    Pa.    St. 

168  434 

West  V.   Duncan,  42   Fed.   430  640 

V.  Jordan,  62  Maine  484  570 

V.  Pine,  4  Wash.    (U.   S.)    691  99 

V.  Rassman,    135   Ind.   278  466 

V.  Roberts,    135    Fed.   350  207 

V.   Williams,    15   Ark.   682  708 

V.  Wright,    115    Ga.    277  96 

West,  In  re,  128  Fed.  205  385 

Wesner  v.    O'Brien,    56   Kans.    724  676 

Wessels  v.    Colebank,    174   111.    618  61 

Westbrook  v.   Gleason,   79   N.   Y.   23  126 

West    Chicago    St.    R.    Co.    v.    People, 

214    111.    9  62 

Western    Loan    &-c.    Co.   v.    Silver    Bow 

Abstract  Co.,  31   Mont.  448  16,   17 

Western    Min.    &   Mfg.    Co.    v.    Peytona 

Cannel  Coal  Co.,  8  W.  Va.  406  303 

V.'estern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Lansing,  49  N. 

Y.   499  50 

Westervelt   v.    Wyckoflf,    32    N.    J.    Eq. 

188  129,  316 

Westfaling  v.  Westfaling,  3  Atk.  460  467 
Westhafer  v.  Patterson,  120  Ind.  4S9  673 
West  Jersey  Title  &c.  Co.  v.  Barber,  49 

N.   J.    Eq.    474  9 

West    Lumber    Co.    v.    Lyon,    53    Tex. 

Civ.    App.    648  382,  545 

Weston  V.   Livezey,  45  Colo.  142  428 

V.  Weston,   38   Ohio    St.   473        714,  716 
West    Virginia    Pulp    &    Paper    Co.    v. 

Miller,    176   Fed.   2f!4  458 

Wetmore   v.    Wetmore,    149    N.   Y.    520     676 
V.   Wetmore,    40    Ore.    332  676 

Wetter  v.  Walker,  62  Ga.   142  89 

Wever   v.    Parker,    131    Ga.    510  611 

Weyer  v.   Beach,  79  N.   Y.   409  538 

Whaley    v.    Northern    Pacific    R.    Co., 

167   Fed.  664  200 

Whalley  v.   Small,   25   Iowa   184  132 

Wharton  v.  Hannon.  115  Ala.  518  667 

Wheaton  v.  Andress,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

452  464 

Wheeler  v.  Aycock,   109  Ala.   146  432 

V.  Chicago.   68    Fed.    526  210 

V.  Clutterbuck,   52    N.    Y.    67       707,  708 
V.   Duke,   1    Cr.  &  M.  210  48 

V.  Hotchkiss.   10  Conn.  225  64 

V.  Long,    128    Iowa    643  43 

V.  Smith,    50   Mich.   93  65 

V.  Walker,   2    Conn.    196  55 

V.  Wavne,    132    III.    599  304 

Whipple  v.  Latrobe,  20  R.  L  508  708 


Whitaker   v.    Erie    Shootitng   Club,    102 

Mich.  454  689 

Whitaker's  Estate,   175  Pa.   St.   139  711 

Whitcher  v.   Webb,   44   Cal.    127  426 

Whitcomb   v.    Rodman,    156    111.    116         460 

White  V.    Rrocaw,    14   Ohio   St.   339  312 

V.  Clarke,  7  T.  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   640       67 

V.  Denman,   1   Ohio  St.   110  120 

V.   Flvnn,   23    Ind.    46  644 

V.  Gibson,  61   Misc.    (N.  Y.)   436         574 

V.   Hermann,    51    111.    243  423 

V.  Howard,  46   N.   Y.   144  456 

V.  Keller,  68   Fed.   796  456 

V.  Luning,   93   U.   S.    514  272 

V.   McGarahan,  87  Ga.   217  123 

V.  Massachusetts      Inst,     of     Tech., 

171    Mass.    84  466 

V.  Morris,   107   N.   Car.  92  663 

V.   O'Bannon,    86    Ky.    93  553 

V.   Old,    113  Va.   709  466 

V.   Strahl,    17    Wis.    146  642 

V.  University     Land     Co.,     49     Mo. 

App.  450  417 

V.  Walsh,   62   Misc.    (N.   Y.)   423         419 

V.  White,   19  Ohio  St.  531  730 

V.  White,  64  W.  Va.  30  737 

V.  White,   72   W.   Va.    144  737 

White,   In  re,    135   Fed.   199  380 

Whitehead  v.   Park,  53  Ga.   575  473 

v.   Plummer,    76    Iowa    181  212 

Whitenack  v.   Agartt,  56  111.  App.  72       621 

Whitfield   V.    Garriss,    131    N.   Car.    148       46 

Whitham  v.   Ellsworth,  259   111.  243  91 

Whitley  v.  Barnett,  151   Iowa  487  416 

Whitlock  V.   Johnson,   87  Va.   323  129 

Whitman   v.    Huefner,   221    Mass.    265      724 

V.   Perkins,    56    Nebr.    181  399 

Whitmer  v.  Schenk,  11  Idaho  702  101 

Whitney     v.     Fitchburg     R.     Co.,     178 

Mass.    559  275,  506 

V.  Lowe,    59    Nebr.    87  433 

V.  Swett,   22   N.   H.    10  51 

V.  Taylor,    158  U.   S.   85  196 

V.  Union   R.    Co.,    11    Gray    (Mass.) 

359  273,  277 

v.  Whitney,  45  N.  H.  311  65 

Whittaker  v.  Pendola,  78  Cal.  296  195 

v.   Thayer,   58  Tex.   Civ.   App.   282        697 

Whittemore   v.   Gibbs,   24   N.   H.   484  51 

v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  174  Mass. 

363  62 

Whitten  V.  Whitten,  36  N.  H.  332  670 

Whittlesey   v.    Fuller,    11    Conn.    337 

321,  326 
Whitworth  V.  Pool,  29  Ky.  L.  1104  393 
Wickman  v.  Robinson,  14  Wis.  493  531 
Widdicombe    v.     Childers,     124    U.     S. 

400  224 

Widner  v.    State,   49   Ark.    172  ,        203,  209 
Wier   v.    Simmons,   55    Wis.   637  316 

Wiesner  v.   Zaun,  39   Wis.    188  728 

Wiggins  V.   Lusk,   12   111.   132  226 

Wiggins     Ferry     Co.     v.     Ohio     S;c.     R. 

Co.,  94   HI.   83  43 

Wilburn  v.   Land,   138  Wis.   36  668 

Wilcox  V.  First  Nat.  Bank.  93  Tex.  322    530 
V.     Jackson,    13   Pet.    (U.    S.)    498 

184,  193,  221 

V.  Jackson,    109    III.    261  203 

V,  Raben,   24   Nebr.   368  592 

v.  Wheeler,    47    N.    H.    488  45,  268 

Wilcoxon  V.  McGhee,  12  111.  381  227 

Wildberger  v.  Cheek,  94  Va.   517     471,  734 

Wilder  v.   Aurora  &c.    R.   &c.   Co.,   216 

HI.   493  105 

Wiley  v.    Gregory,   135   Ind.   647  472 

Wilhelmi  v.   Leonard,   13   Iowa  330  428 

Wilhite  V.   Hamrick,   92   Ind.   594  623 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


Ixxxi 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Wilkerson  v.  Bracken,  24  N.  Car.  315  708 

V.   Clark,    80    Ga.    367  465 

Wilkins  V.   Huse,   9   Ohio    154  351 

Wilkinson   v.    Scott,    17    Mass.   249  318 
Willamette  Real  Estate  Co.  v.  Hendrix, 

28    Ore.    485  614 

Willard  v.   Cramer,  36  Iowa  22  120 

V.   Darrah,    168    Mo.    660  466 

Willemin  v.   Dunn,  93   III.   511  429 

Willet  V.   Brown,  65   Mo.   138  65 

Willets  V.   Langhaar,  212   Mass.   573  61 

Williams  v.   Childress,  25   Miss.  78  583 

V.  Cowden,    13   Mo.   211  477 

V.  Crocker,    36    Fla.    61  373 

V.  Cunningham,   S2  Ark.   439  392 

V.  Daly,    33    III.    App.    454  31 

V.  Davis,     154    Ala.    422  415,  421 

V.   Derair,    31    Mo.    13  53 

V.  Cause,  83   S.   Car.   265  45 

V.  Gibson,  84  Ala.   228  63 

V.  Glenn,   87   Ky.   87  592 

V.  Glover,   66  Ala.   189  272 

V.  Hacker,    16    Colo.    113  98 

V.  Hanley,   16   Ind.  App.  464  17,  19 

V.  Hutchinson  &  S.  R.  Co.,  62  Kans. 

412  562 

V.  Jackson,  107  U.  S.  478  118 

V.  Jones,    166    N.    Y.    522  475 

V.  Jones,   2    Swan    (Tenn.)    620  47 

V.  Kemper,    4    Okla.    145  376 

V.  Keyes,   90   Mich.   290  438 

V.  Kimball,    35    Fla.    49                 719,  724 

V.  Knight,    18    R.    I.    333  718 

V.  Monroe,    125    Mo.    574            576,  658 

V.  Peters,   72  Md.   584  99 
V.  Peyton's    Lessee,    4    Wheat.    (U. 

S.)    77  599 
V.  Porter    (Ky.    App.).    21    S.    W. 

643  699 

V.  Rice,    60    Mich.    102  532 

V.  Teachey,    85    N.    Car.    402        436,  437 

V.  Thurlow,    31    Maine    392  99 

V.  Weinbaum,    178   Mass.   238  537 

V.  Williams,    189    111.    500  460 

V.  Williams,   108  Iowa  91  59 

Williams,  In  re,   62   Mo.   App.   339  737 

Williamson   v.    Berry,   49    U.    S.   495  590 

V.  Brown,    15    N.    Y.    354  127 

V.  Hall,    62    Mo.    405  257 

V.  Mayer,    117   Ala.   253  346 

V.  Roberts    (Mo.),    187    S.   W.    19  720 

Willingham  v.  King,  23   Fla.  478  706 

Willink  V.  Morris  &c.   Co.,  4  N.  J.  Eq. 

377  129 

Willis   V.    Adams,    66    Vt.    223  129 

V.  Jenkins,   30  Ga.    167  717 

V.  Vallette,   4   Mete.    (Ky.)    186  128 

Will  of  Bank,  In  re,  87  Md.  425  469 

Will  of  Barrett,   In  re.   111   Iowa  570  46 

Will  of  Kopmier,   In  re,   113    Wis.   233  453 

Will  of  Prasser,   In   re,   140  Wis.   92  459 

Will  of  Simons,  In   re,   55   Conn.  239  473 

Will  of  Stickney,  In  re,  85   Md.   79  482 

Will  of  Walter,  In  re,  64  Wis.  487  487 

Wills   V.    Wills,   85    Kv.   486  43 

Willwhite  v.  Berry,  232  111.  331  695 

Wilmarth  v.   Reed,  83   Mich.   44  480 

Wilson  V.   Braden,  48  W.  Va.   196  655 

V.  Byers,    77    III.    76  194 

V.  Campbell,    33    Ala.    249  347 

V.   Cochran,   48   Pa.    St.    107  61 

V.  Fisher,    148   N.   Car.   535  420 

V.   Fridenburg,    19    Fla.    461  66 

V.  Godfrey,    145    Iowa    696  433 

V.  Griess,    64    Nebr.    792  330 

V.  Hoffman     (N.    J.    Ch.),    50    Atl. 

592  594 

V.  Holt,  91  Ala.  204  97 


Wilson 

V.  Kirkland,   172  Ala.   72 
V.  Logue,   131    Ind.    191 
V.   Miller,    16   Iowa   111 
V.  Otis,   71   N.   H.  483 
V.   Piper,    77    Ind.    437 


723 
121 

127 
718 

525 


V.  Plutus   Min.   Co.,   174   Fed.   317       530 
V.   Rehm,    117    111.    App.    473  419 

V.  St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    108    Mo. 

588  658 

V.  Simon,  91  Md.   1  533 

V.   Storthz,     117    Ark.    418  86,  724 

V.  Trenton,  53   N.  J.  L.   178  660 

V.   Vanstone,   112   Mo.   315  -128 

V.  White,    109    N.    Y.    59  591 

V.  Wilson,    85    Nebr.    167  283 

Wilt  V.    Cutler,   38   Mich.    189  117 

Wimpfheimer    v.     Prudential    Ins.     Co., 

56  N.   T.  Eq.   585  672 

Winans  v.   Peebles,  32  N.  Y.  423  323 

Winch  V.   Bolton,   94  Iowa   573  65 

Winchester  v.   Hinsdale,   12   Conn.   88       677 
V.  United  States,  14  Ct.  CI.   13  112 

Windley  v.  Swain,  150  N.  Car.  356  612 

Wing  V.   Cooper,   37  Vt.   169  419 

Wingo   V.   Parker,    19   S.   Car.   9  99 

Winn   V.   Strickland,   34    Fla.   610       98,  655 
V.  Tabernacle   Inf.,    135   Ga.    380  474 

Winnipisiogee  Paper  Co.  v.  New  Hamp- 
shire Land  Co.,  59  Fed.  542  270 
Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Barney,  113 

U.    S.   618  212 

Winsor   v.    Mills,   157   Mass.   362  47 

Winsted  Sav.  Bank  &c.  Assn.  v.  Spen- 
cer, 26  Conn.  195  282 
Winston  v.  Browning,  61  Ala.  80  577 
V.  Hodges,  102  Ala.  304  280 
Winter  v.  Gorsuch,  51  Md.  180  312 
Wisby  V.  Bonte,  19  Ohio  St.  238  105 
Wisconsin    Cent.    R.    Co.    v.    Forsythe, 

159    U.    S.    46  193,  212,  220 

V.   Price   County,    133    U.    S.    496  212 

Witbeck  v.   Waine,   16  N.   Y.   532  33 

Witcher   v.    Conklin,   84   Cal.    499  195 

Withers  v.   Jenkins,   14   S.   Car.   597  64 

Wittenbrock  v.   Wheadon,   128  Cal.   150 

197,  225 

Witter,  In  re,   15   N.  Y.   S.   133  720 

Wixon    v.    Devine,    91    Cal.    477  98 

Wolbert   v.    Beard,    128   Wis.    391  59 

Wolf  v.   Batchelder,   56  Pa.   St.   87  534 

v.  Frost,  4   Sandf.   Ch.    (N.  Y.)    72       61 

Wolfe  v.   Dyer,   95   Mo.   545  120 

v.  Hatheway,   81    Conn.    181  483 

v.  Hines,  93   Ga.   329  359 

V.  Mueller,    46    Colo.    335  457 

Woman's     Union     Missionary     Soc.     of 

America    v.    Mead,    131    III.    33  481 

Wommack    v.    Whitmore,    58    Mo.    448     274 
Wood  V.   Augustine,  61   Mo.  46  355 

V.  Boyd,    145    Mass.    176  275 

V.  Bullard,   151   Mass.   324  464 

V.   Cochrane,    39    Vt.    544  120 

V.  Colvin,   5   Hill    (N.   Y.)   228  615 

V.   Fowler,    26    Kans.    682  104 

V.  Goodridge,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)   117       280 
V.   Hammond,    16   R.    I.   98  458 

V.  Holly  Mfg.   Co.,   100  Ala.   326         417 
V.   Kerkeslager,    227    Pa.    536  371 

V.  Little,   35   Maine   107  670 

V.   Lordier,     115     Ind.     519  123 

V.  Mann,    3    Sumn.    (U.    S.)    318         592 
V.   Matthews,   S3   Ala.    1  492 

V.  Mitchell,    61    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.) 

48  730 

V.  Pittman,    113    Ala.    207  223,  229 

V.   Price,    79    N.   J.    Eq.    620  434 

V.  Ruland,    10    Mo.    143  21 


Ixxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 


Wood 

V.  Rusher,   42    Minn.    389  301 

V.  Watson,   107   N.   Car.   52  570 

V.  Wood,    150   Ind.    600  602 

V.  Wood,    83    N.    Y.    575               320,  479 

Woodbury  v.   Fisher,  20  Ind.   387  120 

V.   Manlove,    14   111.    213  124 
Woodcock's   Appeal,    In   re,    103    Maine 

214  466 

Woodgate  v.   Fleet,  44  N.  Y.   1  98 
Woodhull    V.    Longstreet,    18    N.    J.    L. 

405  327 

\yoodman  v.  Madigan,  58  N.  H.  6  43 
Woodmere  Cemetery  v.  Roulo,  104  Mich. 

595  109 

Woodruff  V.   Adair,   131   Ala.   530     358,  417 

V.  Pleasants,    81    Va.    37  59 

V.  Rnysden,    105   Tenn.   491  694 

V.  Trenton     ^^'ater     Power     Co.,     10 

N.  J.   Eq.   489  113 

V.  Woodruff,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  349  296 
Woods     V.  Farmere,      7     Watts      (Pa.) 

382  99 

V.  Garnett,  72  Miss.  78  126 

V.  Wallace,    22    Pa.    St.    171  419 

V.  West,    40     Nebr.     307                 147,  241 

V.   Woods,    66    Maine    206  672 

Wood's  Appeal,  In  re,  18  Pa.  St.  478  724 
Wood's  Appeal,  In  re,  82   Pa.   St.    116 

117,  122 

Wood's  Estate,  In  re,  36  Cal.  75  452 
Woodward    v.    Boro,    16    Lea    (Tenn.) 

678  122 

V.  James,   115   N.   Y.   346  59 

V.  Tewcll,    140    U.    S.    247  419 

V.  Sloan,  27   Ohio  St.   592  644 

Woodward,  In  re,  81  Conn.   152  718 

Woodworth  v.  Fulton,  1  Cal.  295  214 

Woolerv  v.   Woolery,   29   Ind.   249  737 

Woolfolk   V.    Graniteville   Mfg.    Co.,   22 

S.   Car.  332  120 

Woollacott  V.  Chicago,   187  111.   504  239 

Woolverton   v.   Johnson,   69   Kans.   708  476 

Wooster    v.    Handy,    23    Fed.    49  560 

Wooten  V.  Steele.   109  Ala.   563  315 
Worcester    Nat.    Bank    v.    Cheeney,    87 

111.    602                                                  117,  122 
Work  V.  United  Globe  Mines,   12  Ariz. 

339  699 

Worsham   v.    Freeman,   34  Ark.   55  120 

Worth  V.  Simmons,  121  N.  Car.  357  668 

Worthen   v.    Garno,    182   Mass.    243  62 
Worthen    &    Aldrich    v.    White    Spring 

Paper   Co.,    74    N.   J.    Eq.    647  61 

Worthing  v.  Webster,  45  Maine  270  644 

Worthington  v.  Lee,  61   Md.   530  671 
W.    P.    Noble    Mercantile    Co.    v.    Mt. 

Pleasant  Co-Op.  Inst.,  12  Utah  213  372 
Wright    V.    Denn,    10    Wheat.    (U.    S.) 

204  46 

V.  Edwards,   10  Oree.   298  600 

V.  Hutchinson,    156    HI.    575  371 

V.  Lassiter,   71    Tex.   604  118 

V.  Lee,  2  S.  Dak.   596  330 

V.  Lore.   12  Ohio  St.  619  719 
V.  Mattison,   18  How.    (U.   S.)    50 

73,  688 

V.  Roscberry,   121  U.   S.  488  221 

V.  Shiniek,    8    Kans.    App.    353  438 

V.  Tichenor,    104    Ind.    185  73 

V.  Waheford,    17    Ves.    (Jr.)    4S4a  280 

V.   Wright,    77    Fed.    795  286 

V.   Wright,    100    Tenn.    313  87 

V.  Young,   75   Kans.   287  491 

V.   Young,   6   Ore.   87  351 

Wright     Dalton-Bell-Anchor    Store    Co. 

V.      St.    Louis    &c.    R.    Co.,    142    Mo. 

App.    50  3'Sl 


W.  T.   Bradley  Co.  v.  Gaghan,  208  Pa. 

511  536 

Wundcrle  v.   Wunderle,   144  111.  40  732 

Wycth   V.    Stone,    144   Mass.   441  718 

Wyllie  V.  Pollen,  32  L.  J.   (N.  S.)   Ch. 

782  128 

Wylly-Gabbett  Co.  v.  Williams,  53  Fla. 

872  419 

Wyman  v.  Taylor,  124  N.  Car.  426  185 

Wynne  v.  Wynne,  23   Miss.   251  456 

Wythe  V.  Smith,  4  Sawy.   (U.  S.)   17       202 


Yackle   v.   Wightman,    103    111.    169 

563,  566,  577 
\ancey   v.    Radford,   86   Va.    638  321 

Yanish    v.    Tarhox,    49    Minn.    268  272 

Yarboroug  v.   Moore,    151    N.   Car.    116     602 
Yard    v.    Murray,    86    Pa.    St.    113  720 

V.  Ocean     Beach    Assn.,     49     N.    J. 

Eq.  306  104 

Yeager   v.    Groves,   78  Ky.   278  659 

V.   Tuning,    79    Ohio    St.    121  61 

Yellow  Jacket  &c.   Co.   v.    Stevenson,   5 

Nev.    224  51 

Yerkes  v.   Hadley,   5  Dak.  324  427 

V.   Yerkes,    200   Pa.    419  484 

Yetter   v.    King   &c.    Co.,    66    N.    J.    L. 

491  53 

Yocum   V.   Siler,   160  Mo.   281  46 

York   V.    Goodwin,    67    Maine   260  646 

Youghrogheny  River  Coal  Co.  v.  Pierce, 

153    Pa.    St.    74  63 

Youm.ans    v.    Youmans,    26    N.    T.    En 

149  678 

Young  V.    Bradley,    101   U.    S.    782  338 

V.   Brand,     15     Nebr.     601  352 

V.   Lohr,    lis    Iowa   624  16,   19,  22 

V.  Mahoning    Co.,    53    Fed.    895  268 

V.   Morehead,   94   Ky.   608  65 

V.  Pickens,   45    Miss.    553  570 

V.   Rathbone,     1     C.     E.     Green     (N. 

^   J.)    224  595 

V.  Schofield,   132   Mo.   650  616 

V.   Sheldon,    139    Ala.    444  60,  335 

Youngblood   v.   Vasline,   46   Mo.   239  118 

Youngerman  v.  Polk  County,   110  Iowa 

731  275 

Young's  Estate.  In  re,  123  Cal.  337  487 

\oung     Women's     Christian     Assn.     v. 

Spencer,  9  Ohio  C.  C.   (N.  S.)   351      631 
\  ounkcr   v.    Martin,    18    Iowa    143  439 

Youtz  V.  Julliard,   10  Ohio   Dec.   298       435 


Zachana  v.  Cohen  Co.,   140  Iowa  682  283 

Zann  v.  Haller,  71  Ind.  136  262 
Zcigler    V.    Commonwealth,    12    Pa.    St. 

227  21 

Zeile,  In  re,  74  Cal.  125  452 
Zcischang  v.   Helmke   (Tex.   Civ.  App.), 

84   S.   W.   436  392 

Zeisweiss  v.  James,  63  Pa.  St.  46S  458 
Zeust    V.     Staffan,     16    App.     Cas.     (D. 

C.)    141                               ii'                 V  ^^ 

Ziegler    v.    Commonwealth,    12    Pa.  St 
^227                                               12,  13,  20,  21 

Zimmerer  v.    Stuart,   88   Nebr.   530  722 

Zingsem  v.  Kidd.  29  N.   L   Eq.  516  348 

Zmkeisen   v.    Lewis,    71    Kans.    837  447 

Zoeller  v.  Rilev,  100  N.  Y.   102  546 

Zweigardt  v.  Birdseye,  57  Mo.  App.  462     22 


TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS 


CHAPTER    I 


ABSTRACTS  IN  GENERAL 


SEC 
1. 

2. 

3. 
4. 

5. 
6. 


9. 

10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 
20. 


Abstracts  defined. 
Origin  and  history  of  abstracts. 
The  object  of  an  abstract. 
American    and    English    methods 
distinguished. 

General  requisites  of  an  abstract. 
Sufficiency    of    abstract    between 
vendor  and  vendee. 
Abstract  showing  good  title. 
Period   for  which  title  should  be 
shown. 

Qualifications  of  abstracters. 
Scope  of  abstracters'  undertaking. 
Relation  of  trust  and  confidence. 
Who  may  make  abstracts. 
Compensation  of  abstracters. 
Bond  of  abstracters. 
Nature  of  abstracter's  liability. 
Liability    for   negligence   or   mis- 
take. 

Liability     for     failure     to     show 
liens  or  incumbrances. 
Measure  of  damages  against  ab- 
stractee. 

Actual  damages  sustained. 
Limiting  liability  of  an  abstracter. 


21.  Liability  of  public  officers  exam- 
ining title. 

22.  To   whom   an   abstracter   may  be 
liable. 

23.  When  right  of  action  accrues. 

24.  Pleadings    in    action    against    ab- 
stracter. 

25.  Agreement  to  furnish  abstract. 

26.  Duty  to  furnish  abstract  irrespec- 
tive of  agreement. 

27.  Contract  by  broker  to  furnish  ab- 
stract. 

28.  Requiring  abstracts  of  parties  to 
real  actions. 

29.  Abstract  where  records  destroyed. 

30.  Property  in  the  abstract. 

31.  Delivery  of  abstract. 

32.  Tender  of   abstract  after  expira- 
tion of  agreed  time. 

33.  Merger  in  deed  of  contract  to  de- 
liver abstract. 

34.  Waiver  of  objections  to  title  by 
taking  possession. 

35.  Time    in    which    to    examine    ab- 
stract. 

36.  Taxation  of  abstract  books. 


§  1.  Abstracts  defined. — An  abstract  of  title  is  a  short 
methodically  written  or  printed  history  of  the  title  to  a  designated 
tract  of  land.  It  consists  of  a  summary  or  an  epitome  of  the 
material  parts  of  every  recorded  instrument  of  conveyance  which 
in  any  particular  affects  the  land,  or  the  title  thereto,  or  any 
estate  or  interest  therein,  together  with  a  brief  statement  of  all 
liens  and  incumbrances  to  which  the  same  may  be  subjected.^  In 
short,  it  is  a  summary  or  an  epitome  of  facts  relied  on  as  evidence 
of  the  title  to  real  estate;-  and  may  consist  of  a  note  of  a  single 

1  Smith  V.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533,  23  2  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  App. 
Pac.  217;  Heinsen  v.  Lamb,  117  111.  559,  31  Pac.  504;  Geithman  v.  Eichler. 
549,  7  N.  E.  75.  265  111.  579,  107  N.  E.  180;  McMillan 


§    2  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  2 

conveyance,  as  it  always  does  where  the  grantee  from  the  govern- 
ment furnishes  an  abstract  of  title. ^  Some  authorities  hold  that 
an  abstract  is  not  only  a  statement,  in  substance  of  what  appears 
on  the  public  records  affecting  title,  but  also  a  statement,  in  sub- 
stance, of  such  facts  as  do  not  appear  upon  the  public  records 
which  are  necessary  to  perfect  the  title.*  But,  as  the  term  is  gen- 
erally used  in  this  country,  it  may  be  defined  as  a  synopsis  of 
what  appears  on  the  public  records  affecting  the  title  to  a  tract  of 
realty.^  In  a  legal  sense,  an  abstract  is  a  summary  of  facts  relied 
on  as  evidence  of  title. "^  Such  facts  are  usually  arranged  in  chro- 
nological order,  and  are  intended  to  show  the  origin,  cause,  and 
incidents  of  the  title  without  the  necessity  of  referring  to  the 
original  instruments  or  the  records  wherein  they  are  recorded.^ 

§  2.  Origin  and  history  of  abstracts. — While  abstracts  of 
title  to  real  estate  are  now  in  general  use  throughout  the  civilized 
world,  little  can  be  said  concerning  their  origin  and  history.  Men- 
tion is  made  by  English  writers  of  their  having  been  in  use 
during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  but  no  attempt  is 
made  to  fix  a  definite  date  when  their  use  began.  While  titles 
were  yet  young  and  transfers  comparatively  few,  there  was  little 
need  for  an  abstract.  Also  when  the  value  of  landed  property 
was  comparatively  insignificant,  an  abstract  of  the  title  was  evi- 
dently regarded  of  little  moment.  But  in  the  course  of  time 
transfers  multiplied  and  values  increased  to  such  an  extent  that 
men  became  more  concerned  about  their  titles,  and  were  loth  to 
part  with  their  money  without  assurance  that  the  title  proffered 
was  free  from  defects.  Before  the  adoption  of  a  system  of  regis- 
tration the  examination  of  a  title  had  to  be  made  from  the  in- 
struments themselves  or  from  an  abstract  of  such  instruments. 
As  these  instruments  or  muniments  of  title  were  handed  down 
from  one  owner  to  another  there  was  great  danger  of  some  of 
them  being  lost  or  destroyed.   The  abstract  not  only  obviated  this 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank.  56  Tex.  Civ.  App.  ■"'  Smith  v.   Tavlor.  82  Cal.  533,  23 

45,     119    S.    W.    709;    Nicholson    v.  Pac.  217;  Union  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v. 

Lieber    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),   153  S.  W.  Chisholm,  33  III.  App.  647;  Constan- 

641.  tine  v.   East,  8  Ind.  App.  291.  35  N. 

3Heinsen  v.  Lamb,   117   111.  549,  7  E.  844;   Stevenson  v.   Polk,  71   Iowa 

N.  E.  75.  278,  32  N.  W.  340. 

^Hollifield    v.    Landrum.    31    Tex.  "  Geithman  v.  Eichler,  265  111.  579, 

Civ.  App.  187.  71  S.  W.  979;  Spark-  107  N.  E.  180. 

man  v.  Davenport  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  'Banker  v.  Caldwell,  3  Minn.  94. 
160  S.  W.  410. 


3  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  g    6 

danger,  but  greatly  lessened  the  labor  of  counsel  in  passing  upon 
the  title. 

Systems  of  registration  of  land  titles,  more  or  less  complete, 
have  for  a  long  time  prevailed  in  Germany  and  France,  and  per- 
haps in  other  European  countries;  but  prior  to  the  adoption  of 
the  Torrens  system  of  registration  of  titles  in  England  in  1875, 
no  general  system  of  registration  was  employed  in  that  country. 
This  probably  accounts  for  the  general  use  of  abstracts  in  Eng- 
land prior  to  the  above  mentioned  date,  and  such  use  probably 
originated  from  the  grantor's  unwillingness  to  allow  his  title 
papers  to  go  out  of  his  possession  before  he  parted  with  the  title. 

There  is  no  data  giving  the  exact  origin  of  abstracts  in  this 
country.  In  the  earlier  years  of  the  republic  little  attention  was 
given  to  titles  to  real  estate.  Purchasers  usually  relied  upon  an 
express  warranty  in  the  grantor's  deed,  and  present  possession 
was  taken  as  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  ownership;  but  as  land  val- 
ues increased,  and  the  evidence  of  title  began  to  multiply,  pur- 
chasers began  to  part  more  cautiously  with  their  money  in  ex- 
change for  titles.  It  became  no  longer  possible  to  examine  a 
title  by  an  inspection  of  the  original  instruments,  most  of  which 
were  lost;  nor  was  it  practical  to  laboriously  follow  a  chain  of 
title  through  the  records.  It  was  this  impossibility  of  preserving 
instruments  affecting  the  title,  as  well  as  the  impracticability  of 
examining  them  in  their  entirety,  that  gave  rise  to  the  practice  of 
assembling  the  essential  parts  of  the  recorded  instruments  in 
chronological  order. 

§  3.  The  object  of  an  abstract. — The  object  of  an  abstract 
is  to  afford  a  prospective  purchaser  or  mortgagee  of  real  estate  a 
speedy  and  convenient  means  for  ascertaining  the  condition  of 
the  title.  By  its  use  the  purchaser,  or  his  attorney,  may  readily 
pass  upon  the  validity  of  the  title  in  question^  without  having  to 
make  a  specific  inspection  of  all  the  original  instruments  affecting 
the  title,  or  without  resorting  to  a  laborious  search  of  the  rec- 
ords.°  "It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  few  persons  purchase  real 
estate  at  the  present  time  without  first  obtaining  from  the  vendor 

s  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  App.  Equitable  Reversionary  Interest  Soc, 

559.  31   Pac.  504;  Stevenson  v.  Polk,  28  Ch.  Div.  416. 

71  Iowa  278,  32  N.  W.  340 ;  Pagan  v.  »  Banker  v.   Caldwell,  3   Minn.  94 ; 

Hook,  134  Iowa  381,  105  N.  W.  155,  Stevenson  v.  Polk,  71  Iowa  278,  32  N. 

Ill   N.  W.  981;   Kane  v.  Rippey,  22  W.  340. 
Ore.   296,   23    Pac.    180;    Burnaby   v. 


§    4  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  4 

an  abstract  of  the  vendor's  title,  and  with  the  view  of  having  such 
title  passed  upon  by  some  one  learned  in  the  law."^" 

The  value  of  an  abstract  of  title  consists  not  only  in  the  infor- 
mation it  contains,  but  also  in  the  form  and  arrangement  of  such 
information  so  that  it  may  be  used  with  ease  and  safety.  It 
should  set  forth  the  contents  of  every  instrument  of  record 
affecting  the  title,  so  full  that  no  reasonable  inquiry  shall  remain 
unanswered,  so  brief  that  the  mind  of  the  examiner  shall  not  be 
distracted  by  irrelevant  details,  so  methodical  that  counsel  may 
form  an  opinion  on  each  conveyance  as  he  proceeds  in  his  perusal, 
and  so  clear  that  no  new  arrangement  or  dissection  of  the  evi- 
dence shall  be  required.  When  thus  prepared,  abstracts  will 
serve  as  a  safe  and  convenient  guide  to  purchasers  or  to  investors 
in  real  estate  securities. 

§  4.  American  and  English  methods  distinguished. — 
While  the  terms  "abstract"  and  "examination"  are  practically 
synonymous,  and  are  used  interchangeably  by  the  profession,  the 
latter  term  is  given  the  preference  by  our  abstracters  in  order  to 
define  the  scope  of  their  inquiry,  as  compared  with  the  narrow 
and  confined  method  employed  by  English  abstracters.  English 
abstracts  show  only  the  interest  of  some  one  individual  in  the 
property,  rather  than  the  general  condition  of  the  title.  The 
origin  and  course  of  title  to  real  property  in  England  can  not  be 
shown  for  any  considerable  period  of  time  owing  to  the  nature 
of  land  tenures  and  the  peculiar  conditions  attending  the  owner- 
ship of  real  estate  in  that  country.  The  period  covered  by  the 
abstract  must  be  at  least  sixty  years,  and  usually  commences  with 
a  deed  or  will,  and  sometimes  with  a  descent.  Such  an  abstract 
would  serve  no  useful  purpose  in  this  country,  where  title  is  fre- 
quently claimed  through  different  channels  from  the  same  source, 
and  where  adverse  titles  often  have  an  independent  origin.  While 
our  abstracts  are  confined,  as  a  rule,  to  matters  of  record,  they 
present  a  far  wider  range  by  inquiring  into  every  matter  in  any 
way  affecting  the  title,  in  whomsoever  it  may  rest,  and  regardless 
of  how  it  may  have  been  acquired.  Hence  the  American  abstract 
of  title  possesses  none  of  the  personal  features  that  are  character- 
istic of  the  English  abstract,  but  is  more  in  the  nature  of  an  ex- 
amination in  rem.     English  abstracts  of  title  are  prepared  from 

10  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  App.     559,  31  Pac.  504. 


5  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    D 

the  original  unrecorded  instruments  of  conveyance  and  transfer, 
and  from  family  histories  or  pedigrees.  It  is  customary  for  the 
attorney  for  the  vendor  to  prepare  the  abstract  and  deliver  it, 
together  with  the  original  documents,  to  the  vendee's  attorney, 
who  thereupon  proceeds  to  compare  the  abstract  with  such  orig- 
inal documents  to  ascertain  if  it  contains  a  correct  statement  of 
all  the  circumstances  disclosed  by  them  relative  to  the  title.  Until 
such  abstract  and  title-papers  are  furnished  the  vendee,  he  is  not 
bound  to  accept  a  deed  or  pay  the  purchase-money.  Upon  the 
vendee,  however,  devolves  the  labor  or  expense  of  verifying  the 
abstract  and  of  ascertaining  if  it  correctly  sets  forth  the  original 
instruments.  He  must  determine  if  the  title  proffered  is  one 
which  he  is  satisfied  to  accept.  If  he  finds  objections  to  the  title 
he  must  certify  his  objections  within  a  limited  time,  or  be  deemed 
to  have  waived  them.  But  when  these  objections  are  signed  by 
the  attorney  for  the  vendee  and  seasonably  sent  to  the  vendor  or 
his  attorney  they  become  a  part  of  the  obstract."  In  the  eastern 
states  of  this  country  the  English  method  of  making  abstracts  is 
followed  somewhat  closely,  but  in  the  middle  and  western  states 
abstracters  have  departed  from  the  conventional  system  used  in 
England  and  in  the  colonial  states  of  this  countr\\  The  laws  of 
the  various  states  require  that  deeds,  mortgages,  and  other  evi- 
dences of  title  be  filed  for  record  in  the  ofiice  of  an  official  elected 
for  the  purpose  of  copying  them  in  permanent  books  prepared 
and  kept  for  this  purpose.  These  books  are  public  records  and 
may  be  examined  by  any  one.  It  is  from  these  public  records, 
and  not  from  the  original  documents,  that  our  abstracts  are  pre- 
pared. The  abstracter  collects  and  condenses  the  information 
found  in  the  records  and  arranges  it  in  chronological  order  for 
the  convenience  of  the  attorney  who  is  to  pass  upon  the  title. 
Where  land  values  are  relatively  important,  or  where  titles  have 
become  complicated,  abstracts  are  used ;  but  it  would  seem  that 
their  use,  in  jurisdictions  where  instruments  are  required  to  be 
recorded,  is  regulated  rather  by  convenience  and  courtesy  of  the 
parties  than  by  and  distinct  recognition  of  the  English  custom 
as  a  part  of  our  law  of  conveyancing. 

§  5.     General  requisites  of  an  abstract. — Generally  speak- 
ing, an  abstract,  as  a  summary  or  epitome  of  title  to  real  estate, 

^^  Lee  on  Abstracts,  p.  *3. 


§    5  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  6 

should  contain  the  material  or  operative  parts  of  all  conveyances, 
transfers,  and  all  other  facts  relied  on  as  evidence  of  title,  to- 
gether with  all  such  facts  appearing  of  record  as  may  impair  the 
title.  It  should  contain  a  full  summary  of  all  grants,  convey- 
ances, wills,  and  all  records  and  judicial  proceedings  whereby 
the  title  is  in  any  way  affected,  and  all  encumbrances  and  liens  of 
record,  and  show  whether  they  have  been  released  or  not.^^  It 
should  include  a  concise  statement  of  what  appears  on  the  public 
records  affecting  the  title  to  the  property  in  question,  whether  it 
shows  an  equitable  title,  a  legal  title,  or  no  title  at  all."  It  should 
contain  whatever  concerns  the  source  of  title  and  its  condition. 
Not  only  should  the  descent  and  line  of  the  title  be  clearly  traced 
out,  and  all  encumbrances,  all  chances  of  eviction,  or  adverse 
claims,  be  shown,  but  material  parts  of  all  patents,  deeds,  wills, 
judicial  proceedings,  and  other  records  or  documents  which  in 
any  way  affect  the  title  to  the  property  in  question."  Just  how 
full  or  minute  a  description  of  any  of  the  instruments  noted 
should  be  given  is,  perhaps,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  matter  for  the 
abstracter  to  decide,^^  although  in  so  far  as  he  undertakes  to  de- 
scribe them  he  must  see  that  the  description  is  accurate."  It  has 
been  said  that  an  abstract  of  title  should  be  "so  full  that  no  rea- 
sonable inquiry  shall  remain  unanswered,  so  brief  that  the  mind 
of  the  reader  shall  not  be  distracted  by  irrelevant  details,  so 
methodical  that  counsel  may  form  an  opinion  on  each  conveyance 
as  he  proceeds  in  his  reading,  and  so  clear  that  no  new  arrange- 
ment or  dissection  of  the  evidence  may  be  required.""  But  unless 
there  is  a  contract  expressly  requiring  it,  the  abstract  need  not 
generally  show  matters  not  of  record,  or  all  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  conveyances  which  might  affect  the 
title,  such  as  possession,  or,  who  were  the  legal  heirs  of  the  de- 
ceased owner  where  administration  was  not  had  within  the  juris- 
diction. Nor  is  it  necessary  to  state  that  descriptions  of  the 
premises  in  the  various  instruments  are  inconsistent;"  nor  is  it 

i2Heinsen  v.  Lamb,  117  111.  549,  7  ig  Equitable     Bldg.     &c.     Assn.     v. 

N.  E.  75;  Attcberv  v.  Blair.  244  111.  Bank  of  Commerce  &c.  Co.,  118  Tenn. 

363,  91  N.  E.  475.  135  Am.  St.  342.  678,  102  S.  W.  901,  12  L.  R.  A.   (N. 

"Smith  V.  Tavlor.  82  Cal.  533,  23  S.)   449n.  12  Ann.  Cas.  407. 

Pac.  217;  Union  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  ^^  Qirwen  Ahstr.  Tit.,  §  36. 

Chisholm,  33  111.  App.  647.  i^  American    Trust    Invest.    Co.    v. 

i"*  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  App.  Nashville  Abstract  Co.    (Tenn.  Ch.), 

559.  31  Pac.  504.  39  S.  W.  877. 

isWacek  v.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282,  53 
N.  W.  633,  38  Am.  St.  502. 


7  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    O 

required  that  the  abstract  contain  an  opinion  as  to  the  legal  effect 
of  any  of  the  instruments  noted. ^°  While  it  is  not  generally  a  part 
of  the  duty  of  an  abstracter  to  go  outside  the  record  to  search 
for  facts  affecting  the  title  to  real  estate,  still  he  must  furnish  to 
an  intended  purchaser,  by  means  of  the  abstract,  everything  per- 
taining to  the  names  and  to  the  property  in  question,  so  far  as 
appears  from  the  record,  that  reasonably  might  affect  such  title, 
and  thus  put  the  purchaser  on  inquiry,  in  order  that  such  pur- 
chaser may  himself  make  the  proper  investigation  as  to  the  out- 
side facts. ^°  When  the  abstract  is  prepared  to  cover  a  limited 
period  only,  it  need  not  include  anything  of  record  outside  such 
period.^^  Likewise,  if  it  is  prepared  to  cover  certain  records,  it 
need  not  include  anything  outside  such  records.'" 

§  6.  Sufficiency  of  abstract  between  vendor  and  vendee. — 
When  a  contract  for  the  sale  and  purchase  of  land  provides  that 
the  vendor  shall  furnish  the  vendee  with  an  abstract  of  the  title, 
the  only  fair  interpretation  of  such  contract  is  that  a  full  abstract 
of  the  title  is  to  be  furnished,  which  must  show  on  its  face  a  good 
title  in  the  vendor.^^  Where  the  contract  provides  that  the  ab- 
stract shall  show  a  marketable  title,  the  vendor  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  show  by  evidence  outside  the  abstract  that  the  title  is 
good,^*  nor  will  the  purchaser  be  required  to  go  outside  the  ab- 
stract in  examining  the  title. "^  The  vendor  can  not  resort  to  parol 
evidence  to  remove  doubts  from  the  title,  if,  by  the  terms  of  the 
contract,  he  is  to  furnish  a  "good  title  of  record,"-'^  or  if  he  con- 
tract in  express  terms  that  the  title  shall  be  free  from  encum- 
brances. "'^ 

Under  a  contract  providing  that  an  abstract  showing  a  good 
title  shall  be  furnished,  a  vendee  is  entitled  to  demand  that  the 

i^Wacek  v.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282,  53  N.  W.  340;  Kane  v.  Rippey,  22  Ore. 

N.  W.  633,  38  Am.  St.  502.  296,  23  Pac.  180. 

20  Stephenson  v.  Cone,  24  S.  Dak.  24  porker  v.  Porter,  11  III.  App. 
460,  124  N.  W.  439,  26  L.  R.  A.   (N.  602. 

S.)  1207n.  23  Horn  v.  Butler,  39  Minn.  515,  40 

21  Wakefield  v.   Chowan,  26  Minn.     N.  W.  833. 

379,  4  N.  W.  618.  20  Benson  v.   Shotwell,  87  Cal.  49, 

22  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Nebr.  765,  25  Pac.  249 ;  Sheehy  v.  Miles,  93  Cal. 
65  N.  W.  899.  288,  28   Pac.   1046 :   Page  v.  Greeley, 

23  Smith  V.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533,  23  75  111.  400 :  Coray  v.  Matthewson,  7 
Pac.  217;  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  80,  44  How.  80. 

App.  559.  31  Pac.  504 ;  Constantine  v.         27  Evans  v.  Taylor,  177  Pa.  St.  286, 
East.  8  Ind.  App.  291,  35  N.  E.  844;     35  Atl.  635,  69  L.  R.  A.  790. 
Stevenson  v.   Polk,  71   Iowa  278,  32 


IITI.KS    AND    AHSTKACTS 


8 


abstract  disclose  a  marketable  title  free  from  encuir/hrances  and 
defects,  and  as  to  which  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt.''*  In  such 
a  case  an  abstract  which  fails  to  show  whether  there  were  judg- 
ments against  or  convenances  by  the  vendor,  is  insufficient, "'•*  but 
an  abstract  furnished  by  a  vendor  is  not  insufficient  because  it 
fails  to  show  that  an  acknowledgment  taken  in  another  state  bore 
a  notarial  seal,  when  the  law  of  such  state  provides  that  an  offi- 
cial seal  shall  not  be  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  certificate  of 
acknowledgment.  But  even  though  a  seal  is  required,  the  letters 
"L.  S."  in  an  abstract  of  title,  following  the  name  of  a  notary  in 
a  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  sufficiently  indicates  that  an  offi- 
cial seal  was  attached  to  such  certificate.^"  Where  the  agreement 
was  to  purchase  certain  real  estate  "on  delivery  of  a  warranty 
deed,  conveying  clear  title,  with  abstract,"  it  was  held  that  the 
purchaser  could  insist  upon  the  delivery  of  an  abstract  showing 
clear  title  as  a  condition  precedent,  and  that  upon  default  in  fur- 
nishing such  an  abstract  he  could  maintain  an  action  for  pur- 
chase-money paid."^^  The  fact  that  the  vendor  can  show  title  by 
adverse  possession  does  not  change  the  above  rule.^^ 

Where  the  contract  of  sale  required  the  vendor  to  furnish  a 
satisfactory  abstract  of  title  and  give  a  quitclaim  or  special  war- 
ranty deed,  it  was  held  that  no  undertaking  as  to  the  character 
of  the  title  to  be  conveyed  was  implied,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it 
shows  that  the  vendor  assumes  no  responsibility  as  to  the  title 
any  further  than  it  may  have  been  affected  by  his  own  acts.^^ 

§  7.  Abstract  showing  good  title. — Where  the  vendor 
agrees  to  convey  to  the  vendee  "by  warranty  deed  with  abstract 
showing  good  title,"  this  has  reference  to  the  record  title,  which 
may  be  epitomized  in  the  abstract,  and  is  a  condition  precedent  to 
the  vendor's  right  to  demand  the  deferred  payments.^*  Where 
the  contract  calls  for  an  abstract  showing  a  good  title,  nothing 
less  than  this  will  satisfy  the  condition,  no  matter  what  the  ven- 


=8Vought  V.  Williams,  120  N.  Y. 
253.  24  N.  E.  195.  8  L.  R.  A.  591,  17 
Am.  St.  634 ;  Moot  v.  Business  Men's 
Assn.,  157  N.  Y.  201,  52  N.  E.  1,  45 
L.  R.  A.  666;  Gates  v.  Parmley.  93 
Wis.  294.  66  N.  W.  253.  67  N.  W.  739. 

-^  Union  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Cliis- 
liolm,  33  111.  App.  647. 

"0  Bucklen  v.  Hasterlik,  155  111.  423, 
40  N.  E.  561. 


31  Smith  V.  Taylor.  82  Cal.  533,  23 
Pac.  217;  Tavlor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo. 
App.  559.  31  Pac.  504. 

2-  Constantine  v.  East,  8  Ind.  App. 
291.  35  N.  E.  844. 

33  Fitch  V.  Willard,  73  111.  92. 

3-*  Lessenich  v.  Sellers.  119  Iowa 
314,  93  N.  W.  .348;  Pagan  v.  Hook, 
134  Iowa  381,  105  N.  W.  155. 


I 


I 


9  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    8 

dor's  real  title  may  be,  and  in  an  action  for  specific  perform- 
ance brought  by  him  he  has  the  burden  of  proving  that  he,  in 
fact,  complied  with  the  condition.^'  Where  a  contract  of  sale 
provided:  "Ten  days  given  to  examine  title;  and  if,  upon  exam- 
ination of  the  records,  it  shall  appear  that  any  material  act  or 
thing  is  necessary  to  be  done  or  performed  in  order  to  perfect 
the  title  to  said  premises,  which  the  seller  is  unable  to  do  or  per- 
form within  a  reasonable  time,  not  exceeding  sixty  days  from 
date  hereof,  then  the  sale  to  be  void  at  the  option  of  either 
party,"  it  was  held  that  the  purchaser  was  not  required  to  accept 
the  title  where  it  depended  solely  on  adverse  possession."^  A 
purchaser  will  not  be  compelled  to  accept  a  title  that  is  not  clear, 
or  to  assume  the  risk  of  subsequent  litigation/'' 

An  agreement  to  convey  a  perfect  title  contemplates  that  such 
a  title  shall  be  fairly  deducible  of  record.  No  reasonable  doubt 
should  exist  respecting  the  validity  of  the  title,  and  it  should  be 
free  from  litigation,  palpable  defects  and  grave  doubts,  and  it 
should  consist  of  both  legal  and  equitable  titles.^® 

§  8.  Period  for  which  title  should  be  shown. — According 
to  the  Old  English  rule  an  abstract  was  required  to  show  title  for 
sixty  years  or  more  prior  to  the  date  of  making,  but  .the  period 
has  been  greatly  lessened  as  a  result  of  the  shortening  of  the 
time  necessary  to  bar  an  action  for  real  property.  By  the  Vendor 
and  Purchaser  Act  of  1874,  an  abstract  that  shows  title  for  forty 
years  in  sufficient.  ^^  But  by  the  same  act,  recitals  in  deeds  over 
twenty  years  old  are  prima  facie  evidence  of  facts  recited,  and 
when  the  title  begins  from  a  deed  over  twenty  years  old,  reciting 
seisin  in  fee,  the  vendee  can  not  demand  that  the  abstract  run 
back  further,  except  so  far  as  he  may  prove  the  recitals  inac- 
curate.*" 

There  is  no  rule  in  this  country  requiring  that  the  abstract  shall 
cover  a  certain  period,  but  the  universal  custom  is  to  carry  the 
title  back,  where  possible,  to  the  original  patent  from  the  govern- 
ment.  In  the  older  states  this  is  impossible  because  of  the  condi- 

35  Sheehy  v.  Miles,  93  Cal.  288,  28  ss  Turner  v.  McDonald,  76  Cal. 
Pac.  1046;  Brown  v.  Widen  (Iowa),  177,  18  Pac.  262,  9  am.  St.  189; 
103  N.  W.  158.  Sheehy  v.  Miles,  93  Cal.  288,  28  Pac. 

36  Noyes  v.  Johnson,  139  Mass.  436,  1046. 

31  N.  E.  767.  30  In  re  Johnson,  30  Ch.  Div.  42. 

37  Cunningham  v.  Blake,  121  Mass.  ^o  Bolton  v.  London  School  Board, 
333;  Butts  v.  Andrews,  136  Mass.  221.     7  Ch.  Div.  766. 


§    8  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  10 

tion  of  tlie  early  records.  In  such  cases  it  would  seem  that  the 
title  should  be  shown  for  a  period  of  forty  years.  In  any  event 
his  examination  should  be  carried  back  until  he  arrives  at  what  is 
commonly 'called  the  "root  of  title."  By  this  phrase  is  meant  a 
title  existing  in  some  one  through  whom  the  vendor  claims  for 
such  length  of  time  as  would  bar  any  adverse  claim  existing  at 
the  beginning  of  that  period,  including  all  savings  in  favor  of 
persons  under  legal  disabilities.'*^ 

\\'hen  an  abstracter  is  employed  to  make  an  abstract  of  title 
to  certain  lands  from  and  after  a  specified  date,  he  is  not  bound  to 
inquire  as  to  the  existence  of  judgments  entered  or  conveyances 
recorded  prior  to  that  date.  He  need  not  inquire  or  certify  as  to 
any  lien  arising  under  any  such  prior  judgment,  though  the  same 
attached  to  and  became  operative  upon  the  land  after  that  time; 
nor  is  he  required  to  inquire  or  state  whether  the  title  vested  in 
any  grantee  during  the  period  covered  by  the  contract  was  af- 
fected by  any  prior  conveyance  or  any  estoppel  growing  out  of 
any  covenants  therein.*^  It  has  been  held  that  deeds  recorded  be- 
fore the  grantor  has  any  record  title,  may  be  safely  disregarded 
in  an  examination  of  title  under  a  system  of  registration  and 
notice  which  provides  that  such  deeds  are  not  constructive  notice 
to  an  innocent  purchaser,  and  the  abstracter  is  not  bound  to  look 
for  deeds  of  any  person  through  whom  the  title  passes,  before 
the  date  of  his  record  title. ^^  However,  the  safer  plan  would  be 
to  extend  the  search  back  at  least  to  the  date  of  the  execution  of 
the  recorded  deed.  A  grantee  purchasing  subsequent  to  the  deed 
conveying  the  legal  title  to  his  grantor  is  not  charged  with  notice 
of  a  mortgage  by  his  grantor,  made  and  recorded  before  the  lat- 
ter obtained  title. ^*  A  search  for  mortgages  against  the  holder  of 
the  title  to  the  property  in  question  should  l>egin  from  the  time 
of  the  conveyance  to  him,  and  a  mortgage  on  the  property  given 
by  him  and  recorded  before  the  date  of  the  deed  to  him  will  not 
be  constructive  notice. ^^  When  the  abstracter  finds  a  deed  or 
other  instrument  filed  for  record  on  a  certain  day,  he  should  ex- 

41  Paine    V.    Meller.    6    Ves.    347 ;  Funk,  68  Mo.  18,  30  Am.  Rep.  771 ; 

Cooper  V.  Emery,  1  Phil.  388.  Farmers  Loan  &c.   Co.  v.   Maltby,  8 

"*'-  Wakefield   v.   Chowan,  26   Minn.  Paige  Ch.  361. 

379.  4  N.  W.  618.  "s  state  v.  Bradish,   14  Mass.  296; 

"  State  V.   Bradish,   14  Mass.  296;  Calder  v.  Chapman.  52  Pa.  St.  359,  91 

Dodd  V.  WilHams,  3  Mo.  App.  278.  Am.  Dec.  163 ;  McCusker  v.  McEvey, 

■*•»  Morse  v.   Curtis.   140  Mass.   112.  10  R.  I.  606. 
2  N.  E.  929,  54  Am.  St.  456 ;  Turk  v. 


I 


11  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    " 

amine  the  records  for  the  whole  of  that  day.  While  it  may  be 
said  that  the  law  takes  notice  of  fractions  of  days  as  to  the  time 
of  filing  instruments  for  record,  the  general  rule  that  the  law 
takes  no  notice  of  fractions  of  days  applies  to  the  execution  of 
deeds  and  mortgages,  where  the  hour  of  their  execution  does  not 
appear.  The  rule  requires  the  abstracter  to  go  back  in  his  search 
to  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  where  the  deed  does 
not  show  the  hour  of  its  execution,  he  should  commence  his 
search  at  the  beginning  of  the  day.**' 

§  9.  Qualifications  of  abstracters. — A  person  who  holds 
himself  out  as  an  abstracter  of  titles  to  real  estate,  impliedly  un- 
dertakes that  he  possesses  the  requisite  knowledge  and  skill  for 
such  employment,  and,  if  he  contracts  to  render  such  service  he 
is  bound  to  exercise  ordinary  skill  and  care  in  making  such  ab- 
stract.*^ An  abstract  company  engaged  in  the  business  of  making 
and  selling  abstracts  of  title,  thereby  represents  to  the  purchaser 
of  such  abstracts  that  its  employes  are  competent  and  qualified  to 
make  examinations  of  the  records  and  to  furnish  such  abstracts, 
and  that  the  purchaser  may  safely  rely  upon  the  statements  and 
representations  contained  in  the  abstract  and  certificate  thereto.** 
It  has  been  said  that  in  preparing  an  abstract,  no  professional 
opinion  as  to  the  legal  effect  of  the  instruments  abstracted  is  re- 
quired ;  that  the  abstracter  has  only  to  furnish  the  facts  from  the 
records,  and  the  purchaser,  mortgagee  or  his  counsel,  determines 
for  himself  their  sufficiency.*^  And  yet,  by  their  profession,  ab- 
stracters are  required  to  have  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  law 
to  know  what  constitutes,  and  what  does  not  constitute  a  lien  upon 
real  estate,  and  to  use  sufficient  diligence  to  find  any  such  encum- 
brances when  properly  made  a  matter  of  record,  so  as  to  affect  all 
parties  interested  with  notice. ^° 

The  preparation  of  a  perfect  abstract  of  title  to  a  tract  of  land, 
including  all  the  instruments  of  conveyance  and  transfer,  to- 
gether with  all  the  encumbrances  which  affect  it,  involves  the 
exercise  of  much  legal  knowledge  and  careful  research.   The  per- 

4*5  Higgins  V.  Dennis,  104  Iowa  605,  *9  West    Jersey    Title    &c.    Co.    v. 

74  N.  W.  9.  Barber,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  474.  24  Atl.  381 ; 

47  Brown  v.  Sims,  22  Ind.  317,  53  Dickie  v.  Abstract  Co..  89  Tenn.  431, 
N.  E.  779,  72  Am.  St.  308.  14  S.  W.  896,  24  Am.  St.  616. 

48  Hillock  V.  Idaho  Title  &c.  Co.,  so  Dodd  v.  Williams,  3  Mo.  App. 
22  Idaho  440,  126  Pac.  612,  42  L.  R.  278. 

A.  (N.  S.)   178. 


§     10  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  12 

son  who  undertakes  its  preparation  must  understand  fully  all  the 
laws  on  the  subject  of  conveyancing,  descent  and  inheritances, 
uses  and  trusts,  devises,  and,  in  fact,  every  branch  of  the  law 
that  can  affect  real  estate  in  its  various  mutations  from  owner 
to  owner,  sometimes  by  operation  of  law,  and  sometimes  by  act 
of  the  parties. ^^  Just  what  constitutes  a  lien  upon  real  estate  may 
be  a  difficult  question  in  some  cases  to  decide ;  but  the  abstracter 
is  bound  to  know  the  state  of  the  law  on  the  subject,  at  least  suffi- 
ciently to  put  him  on  his  guard ;  and  where  there  may  be  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  as  to  whether  such  or  such  a  recorded  instrument  is 
a  lien,  if  he  choose  to  resolve  the  doubt  he  does  so  at  his  own 
peril.  If,  for  instance,  it  be  possible  that  a  deed  given  and  re- 
corded before  the  grantor  has  any  record  title  can  be  good  against 
a  subsequent  purchaser  without  actual  notice,  of  the  same  prop- 
erty from  the  same  grantor,  the  abstracter  will  be  bound  to  look 
for  all  conveyances  of  every  grantor  in  the  chain  of  title,  up  to  the 
time  the  title  passes  out  of  such  grantor  or  alienor.  While  an  ab- 
stracter may  become  very  proficient  in  his  work  without  a  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  the  law  pertaining  to  the  subject  mentioned, 
yet  he  will  find  it  much  to  his  advantage  to  possess  at  least  a 
knowledge  of  the  fundamental  principles  pertaining  thereto.  But 
any  mistakes  he  may  make  concerning  matters  of  difficulty  where 
the  law  is  unsettled  does  not  render  him  liable.  The  abstracter 
must  also  be  perfectly  familiar  with  the  system  of  surveying  and 
describing  land  which  prevails  in  the  United  States,  and  must  be 
able  to  construct  a  diagram  or  plat  of  the  property  which  is  de- 
scribed according  to  courses  and  distances. 

In  case  the  abstracter  does  not  choose  to  assume  the  liability 
which  the  law  imposes  upon  him  he  may  avoid  it  by  noting  in  his 
certificate  every  question  which  arises  upon  the  title  as  to  which 
there  can  be  the  slightest  doubt  in  the  legal  mind,  or  by  giving  a 
list  of  deeds  and  encumbrances,  and  abstaining  from  expressing 
any  opinion  as  to  their  legal  effect. '''- 

§  10.  Scope  of  abstracter's  undertaking. — The  nature  and 
scope  of  an  abstracter's  duties  may  be  prescribed  and  limited  by 
contract  ;^^  but  in  the  absence  of  an  express  contract  defining  the 
scope  of  an  abstracter's  duties,  he  impliedly  agrees  to  exercise 

•"■'i  Banker  v.  Caldwell,  3  Minn.  94.         •'^^  Wakefield  v.   Chowen,  26  Minn. 
•"'aDodd   V.   Williams,   3   Mo.   App.-    379.  4  N.  W.  618;  Thomas  v.  Carson, 
278.  46  Nebr.  765,  65  N.  W.  899. 


13  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §     10 

due  and  ordinary  care  in  the  performance  of  his  task.^*  He  is 
bound  to  disclose  to  the  person  employing  him  all  pertinent  in- 
formation acquired  by  him  in  the  course  of  his  examination,  and 
to  set  forth  whatever  concerns  the  sources  of  title  and  its  condi- 
tions, whether  these  tend  to  confirm  the  title  or  to  impair  it.^^  He 
must  present  a  summary  of  the  records  of  all  grants,  patents, 
conveyances,  wills,  documents  and  all  judicial  proceedings  which 
may  affect  the  title  in  any  way;  also  all  mortgages,  judgments, 
taxes,  assessments,  mechanic's  liens,  lis  pendens  notices,  or  other 
liens  which  may  encumber  the  title  in  any  degree.  He  must  note 
all  unsatisfied  liens,  although  he  doubts  their  validity. ^"^  He  must 
set  out  every  part  of  an  instrument  which  may  have  any  bearing 
on  the  condition  of  the  title,  and  his  employer  is  entitled  to  as- 
sume that  any  part  not  so  set  out  has  no  bearing  on  the  title." 
But  it  is  not  implied  that  he  should  show  matters  not  of  record, 
or  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  connected  with  the  conveyances 
which  might  affect  the  title,  such  as  possession,  names  of  legal 
heirs,  and  matters  of  a  similar  character.  It  would  seem  that  he 
is  only  bound  to  exercise  reasonable  care,  diligence  and  skill  in 
preparing  the  abstract,  and  that  the  element  of  guaranty  does  not 
enter  into  the  employment. =^  His  examination  must  be  of  the 
actual  records,^^  and  he  is  not  justified  in  relying  upon  marginal 
notes  and  references.''''  "One  who  undertakes  the  examination 
of  titles,  for  compensation,  is  liable  for  want  of  ordinary  care 
and  skill  in  the  performance  of  that  task.  To  furnish  abstracts 
of  title  is  a  business — a  sort  of  profession.  The  party  under- 
taking it  assumes  the  responsibility  of  discharging  his  duty  in  a 
skilful  and  careful  manner.  That  is  just  what  he  is  paid  for  do- 
ing. Patience  in  the  investigation  of  records  is  the  main  capacity 
required.  There  are  no  professional  opinions  required  of  the 
abstracter.  It  is  his  duty  to  furnish  facts  from  the  records,  with- 
out concern  for  their  legal  effect.     Upon  the  facts  furnished  the 

■'^*Lattin  V.  Gillette,  95  Cal.  317,  30  "  Burnaby  v.  Equitable  Reversion- 

Pac.  545.  29  Am.   St.   115;   Chase  v.  arv  Interest  Soc,  54  L.  J.  Ch.  466,  52 

Heaney,  70  111.  268.  L.'T.   (N.  S.)  350. 

•'5  Smith  V.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533,  23  ss  Thomas  v.   Schee,  80  Iowa  237, 

Pac.  217 ;  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  Colo.  45  N.  W.  539. 

App.    559,    31    Pac.    504;    Heinsen    v.  s"  Wacek  v.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282,  53 

Lamb.  117  111.  549,  7  N.  E.  75 ;  Banker  N.  W.  633,  38  Am.  St.  502. 

V.    Caldwell,    3    Minn.    94;    Kane    v.  ^o  Wacek  v.  Prink.  51  Minn.  282,  53 

Rippey,  22  Ore.  296,  23  Pac.  180.  N.  W.  623,  38  Am.  St.  502. 

^^  Oilman  v.  Hovey,  26  Mo.  280. 


§11  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  14 

purchaser  must  make  his  own  examination,  and  determine  for 
himself  on  their  sufficiency.""^ 

The  scope  of  an  abstracter's  duties  may  be  defined  by  an  agree- 
ment between  the  parties.  Thus,  where  the  agreement  was  to  make 
and  furnish  a  correct  record  abstract  of  title  to  certain  lands 
from  and  after  a  specific  date,  there  is  no  obligation  to  note  upon 
the  abstract  an  unsatisfied  judgment  against  one  of  the  grantees 
of  the  title,  and  which  judgment  only  appears  of  record  prior  to 
that  date,  though  the  same  becomes  a  lien  upon  the  premises  after 
that  time/'"  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  an  abstracter  in 
searching  the  records  for  a  chain  of  title,  should  not  stop  at  the 
day  and  hour  at  which  the  evidence  of  a  title  in  a  certain  grantee 
is  filed  for  record,  but  should  go  back  to  the  date  of  that  title 
as  shown  by  the  record;  for  the  grantee  may  have  made  con- 
veyances affecting  the  title  between  the  dates  of  his  receiving  title 
and  recording  his  deed/'^ 

§  11.  Relation  of  trust  and  confidence. — Persons  engaged 
in  the  business  of  preparing  abstracts  of  title  occupy  a  relation 
of  trust  and  confidence  toward  those  employing  them,  which  is 
second  only  in  the  sacredness  of  its  nature  to  the  relation  which 
an  attorney  sustains  to  his  client.  Such  persons  consult  the  evi- 
dence of  ownership  and  become  familiar  with  the  chains  and  his- 
tories of  title.  They  handle  private  title  papers,  and  become 
aware  of  whatever  weaknesses  or  defects  may  exist  in  the  legal 
proceedings  through  which  the  ownership  of  real  property  is  se- 
cured. They  should  be  held  to  a  strict  responsibility  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  trust  and  confidence  which  are  necessarily  reposed  in 
them.*'* 

Where  the  abstracter,  in  addition  to  making  the  abstract,  un- 
dertakes to  advise  his  employer  as  to  whether  his  examination 
discloses  a  good  and  marketable  title,  he  assumes  the  same  re- 
sponsibilities and  owes  such  employer  the  same  duty  as  if  he  were 
an  attorney.  This  involves  upon  his  part  the  exercise  of  due 
care  and  skill  in  investigating  the  title,  and  the  utmost  frankness 
toward  his  employer  in  disclosing  the  result  of  his  investigation, 
and  in  advising  the  proper  course  to  pursue  in  view  of  the  facts 

"1  Stephenson  v.   Cone,  24   S.  Dak.  "^  Higgins  v.  Dennis,  104  Iowa  605, 

460,  124  N.  W.  439,  26  L.  R.  A.   (N.  74  N.  W.  9. 

S.)   1207n.  "Vallette  v.  Tedens,   122  111.  607, 

'>2  Wakefield   v.   Chowen,  26   Minn.  14  N.  E.  52,  3  Am.  St.  502. 
379.  4  N.  W.  618;  Dodd  v.  Williams, 
3  Mo.  App.  278. 


15  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §     12 

which  have  been  discovered  respecting  the  title. ''^  Abstracters 
and  attorneys  who  undertake  to  assemble  all  the  evidence  of  title, 
or  to  advise  their  clients  with  reference  thereto,  but  who  make 
mistakes  either  intentionally  or  unintentionally,  will  be  estopped 
from  taking  advantage  of  their  own  wrong  by  buying  up  out- 
standing titles  that  destroy  the  rights  of  those  who  trusted  in 
them.*"^  But  an  abstracter  is  not  precluded  from  purchasing  an 
interest  in  land  adverse  to  the  title  for  which  he  has  furnished 
a  correct  abstract  to  his  client.''^  An  attorney  at  law,  holding  him- 
self out  as  a  competent  person  to  make  and  certify  abstracts  of 
title,  and  who  induces  parties  to  buy  of  him  a  tract  of  land  by 
presenting  them  with  an  abstract  of  title  thereto  on  which  he  cer- 
tified in  writing  that  "he  had  carefully  examined  the  title  to  said 
lands,  and  that  the  same  was  a  full,  true  and  complete  abstract 
of  said  title,"  is  liable  for  damages  resulting  to  the  purchasers 
on  account  of  his  fraudulent  entries  as  to  the  character  of  his 
title.'' 

§  12.  Who  may  make  abstracts. — The  business  of  exam- 
ining titles  and  making  abstracts  was  formerly  confined  mainly 
to  public  officers  having  the  custody  and  care  of  the  records  of 
instruments  relating  to  the  title  to  real  estate,'^  but  in  recent  years 
the  bulk  of  the  business  has  been  done  by  private  individuals, 
partnerships  and  corporations.^"  By  statute  in  some  states  it  is 
made  the  duty  of  local  officers  having  charge  of  certain  records 
relating  to  or  affecting  land  titles  to  make  and  furnish  searches 
of  title  when  called  upon  for  that  purpose.'^  The  officer's  duties 
under  such  statutes  are  not  so  extensive  as  those  of  private  ab- 
stracters.'^^ 

^^  Glyn  V.  Title  Guarantee  &c.  Co.,  Arizona,  California,  Colorado,  Idaho, 

132  App.  Div.  859.  117  N.  Y.  S.  424.  Illinois,    Minnesota,     Montana,    New 

66  Marston    v.    Catterlin,    239    Mo.  York.    Oresjon,    Pennsylvania,    South 

390,  144  S.  W.  475.  Carolina,    Utah   and   Wyoming.     See 

<"■  Moore  v.  Empire  Land  Co.,  181  also   Lusk  v.    Carlin,   4   Scam.    (111.) 

Ala.  344,  61  So.  940.  395 ;    Kimball   v.    Connolly,   3    Keves 

68  Thomas  v.   Schee,   80  Iowa  237,  (N.  Y.)  57,  2  Abb.  Dec.  504,  33  How. 

45  N.  W.  539.  Prac.  247 ;  Van   Schaick  v.  Sigel,  58 

69Glawatz     V.     People's     Guaranty  How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)    211;    Ziegler   v. 

Search  Co.,  49  App.  Div.  465,  63  N.  Commonwealth,      12     Pa.      St.     227; 

Y.  S.  691.  Philadelphia  v.  Anderson,  142  Pa.  St. 

70  Allen  V.  Hopkins,  62  Kans.  175,  357,  21  Atl.  976.  12  L.  R.  A.  751; 
61  Pac.  750 ;  Glawatz  v.  People's  Dirks  v.  Collin,  37  Wash.  620,  79  Pac. 
Guaranty  &c.  Co.,  49  App.  Div.  465,  1112. 

63  N.  Y.  S,  691.  72  Dirks  v.  Collin,  37  Wash.  620,  79 

71  Such   statutes   will  be    found   in     Pac.  1112. 


§     13  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  16 

§  13.  Compensation  of  abstracters. — Statutes  requiring 
public  ofticers  to  make  searches  and  furnish  data  for  abstracts 
of  title  usually  provide  certain  fees  as  compensation  for  their 
services.'^  But  where  the  provisions  of  a  statute  secure  to  the' 
public  the  right  to  examine  the  records  free  of  charge,  the  clerk  is 
entitled  to  a  fee  only  when  he  is  required  to  make  the  search  him- 
self ;'^  and  where  the  search  is  made  by  a  private  individual,  with- 
out any  service  or  assistance  from  the  officer  or  his  deputies,  such 
officer  is  not  entitled  to  any  fees  or  compensation."  The  compen- 
sation of  a  private  individual  or  a  corporation  engaged  in  the  ab- 
stract business  is  regulated  by  the  nature  and  terms  of  the  em- 
ployment,^® and  where  such  abstracter  fails  to  comply  with  the 
terms  of  the  employment  the  right  to  compensation  will  be  de- 
nied." In  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  fixing  the  amount 
of  compensation,  the  abstracter  will  be  entitled  to  whatever  his 
services  are  reasonably  worth. ^^  Where  the  abstracter's  compen- 
sation was  based  on  an  agreed  price  for  each  transfer,  and  there 
was  a  custom  among  abstracters  to  treat  each  successive  step 
leading  to  a  conveyance  as  a  transfer,  and  not  all  the  transactions 
taken  together,  it  was  held  that  the  abstracter  was  authorized  to 
make  up  his  account  on  such  theory.''^ 

§  14.  Bond  of  abstracters. — The  statutes  of  some  states 
require  abstracters  to  give  bonds  with  sureties  as  security  against 
injury  to  the  public  records  or  against  damages  to  their  employ- 
ers from  a  lack  of  skill  or  care  in  the  performance  of  their  du- 
ties,^°  but  such  statutory  requirements  do  not  create  the  business 

"Morse   v.   Lambe,   23   Ont.   608;  Bowman,  27  Okla.  172,  111  Pac.  319, 

Ziegler  v.  Commonwealth,  12  Pa.  St.  30  L.  R.  A.   (N.   S.)   642.  Ann.  Cas. 

227.  1912B,  839n.    In  Idaho  a  bond  in  the 

74  In  re  Chambers.  44  Fed.  786.  penal  sum  of  $10,000  signed  by  three 

"•'■'  State  V.    McMillan,   49   Fla.   243,  sureties,     residents     of     the     county, 

38  So.  666;  Burton  v.  Tuite.  78  Mich,  must  be  given;  in  Kansas  a  bond  for 

363.  44  N.  W.  282,  7  L.  R.  A.  7Z.  $5,000,  with  three  or  more  sureties ; 

76  McVeigh  v.  Chicago  Mill  &c.  Co.,  in    Nebraska   the   bond   must  be    for 

96  Ark.  480.   132   S.   W.  638;   Griffin  $10,000  with  not  less  than  three  sure- 

V.  Arlt,  96  N.  Y.  S.  1033.  ties ;  in  North  Dakota  the  bond  must 

"  Griffin  v.  Arlt,  96  N.  Y.  S.  1033.  be  for  $10,000  with  not  less  than  three 

78  Kenyon  v.  Charlevoix   Imp.  Co.,  sureties ;    in    Oklahoma.   $5,000   bond 

135  Mich.  103,  97  N.  W.  407.  with  three  sureties;  in  South  Dakota, 

"McVeigh  v.  Chicago  Alill  &c.  Co.,  $10,000  with  three  sureties;  in  Utah, 

96  Ark.  480,  132  S.  W.  638.  bond   for  not  less  than  $10,000  with 

^°  Allen  V.  Hopkins,  62  Kans.  175,  sureties    to   be    approved    by   county 

61    Pac.   750 :   Thomas  v.   Carson,   46  commissioners. 
Nebr.  765,  65  N.  W.  899 ;  Walker  v. 


17  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §     15 

of  abstracting  into  a  public  office,  nor  constitute  the  abstracter  a 
public  officer.^^  Under  some  statutes  the  abstracter  and  his  sure- 
ties are  liable  not  only  to  the  person  employing  the  abstracter, 
but  to  all  persons  who  purchase  the  land  in  reliance  on  the  ab- 
stract.^^  Sureties  liable  on  the  bond  of  an  abstracter,  to  a  pur- 
chaser of  land  for  the  omission  from  the  abstract  of  an  outstand- 
ing mortgage  on  the  land,  are  not  discharged  by  an  extension  of 
time  granted  by  the  vendee  to  the  vendor  to  make  good  his  cove- 
nants of  waranty  against  encumbrances  contained  in  his  deed.^^ 
The  sureties  on  the  bond  of  an  abstracter  of  titles  can  not  be  held 
liable  for  an  error  or  omission  of  their  principal  occurring  prior 
to  the  execution  of  the  bond.^* 

§  15.  Nature  of  abstracter's  liability. — That  there  exists 
a  liability  on  the  part  of  persons  who  engage  in  the  business  of 
searching  records,  examining  titles  and  preparing  abstracts  for 
compensation,  is  well  settled,  but  as  to  the  nature  of  the  liability 
thus  assumed,  the  authorities  have  not  been  altogether  in  har- 
mony. It  appears  to  be  settled,  however,  that  the  contract  is  not 
one  of  indemnity,  but  merely  an  undertaking  that  the  abstracter 
will  faithfully  and  skilfully  perform  his  work.®^  ''The  examiner 
of  titles  does  not  warrant.  He  is  not  liable  except  for  negligence 
or  want  of  necessary  skill  and  knowledge.  The  contract  made  by 
him  when  he  receives  a  fee  and  examines  a  title  is  not  one  of 
indemnity,  but  a  contract  that  he  will  faithfully  and  skilfully  do 
his  work;  and  this  contract  is  broken,  and  an  action  lies  for  the 
breach  of  it,  so  soon  as  he,  through  negligence  or  ignorance  of  his 
business,  delivers  a  false  certificate  of  title.  Where  indemnity 
alone  is  expressed  it  has  always  been  held  that  damage  must  be 
sustained  before  a  recovery  can  be  had;  but,  where  there  is  a 
positive  agreement  to  do  the  act  which  is  to  prevent  damage  to 
plaintiff,  there  the  action  lies  if  defendant  neglects  or  refuses  to 
do  the  act."®®    An  action  against  an  abstracter  to  recover  dam- 

8^  Allen  V.  Hopkins,  62  Kans.  175,  ^s  Dundee  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hughes, 

61  Pac.  750.  20    Fed.    39;    Thomas    v.    Schee,    80 

82  E.  T.  Arnold  &  Co.  v.  Earner,  Iowa  237,  45  N.  W.  539;  Wacek  v. 
91  Kans.  768,  139  Pac.  404,  Ann.  Cas.  Frink,  51  Minn.  282,  53  N.  W.  633,  38 
1915D,  446n.  Am.  St.  502. 

83  Allen  V.  Hopkins,  62  Kans.  175,  so  Rankin  v.  Schaefifer,  4  Mo.  App. 
61  Pac.  750.  108.    See  also  In  re  Negus,  7  Wend. 

8*  Goldberg   v.    Sisseton    Loan    &c.     (N.   Y.)    499;   Rowsey  v.   Lynch,  61 
Co.,  24  S.  Dak.  49,  123  N.  W.  266,  140     Mo.  560. 
Am.  St.  775. 

2 — Thomp,  Abstr. 


§     16  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  18 

ages  for  negligence  in  making  or  certifying  an  abstract  of  title 
does  not  sound  in  tort,  but  must  be  founded  on  contract  ;^^  and 
the  foundation  of  the  action  for  damages  is  his  implied  promise 
to  perform  with  care,  diligence  and  sufticient  skill  the  duty  under- 
taken for  the  compensation  agreed  upon.**®  Thus  where  an  ab- 
stracter knew  that  the  abstract  was  being  made  for  the  exclusive 
benefit  and  use  of  a  certain  person,  and  he  knew  that  such  person 
would  rely  thereon,  and  the  abstract  was  delivered  to  such  per- 
son, the  abstracter  was  held  liable.®^  But  the  remedy  may  be  in 
tort  where  the  injury  or  loss  resulted  from  a  conspiracy  between 
the  abstracter  and  others  to  defraud  the  plaintiff  by  leaving  off 
instruments  not  covered  by  the  certificate. °° 

§  16.  Liability  for  negligence  or  mistake. — If  an  abstracter 
fails  to  make  necessary  searches,  or  searches  without  due  care, 
or  fails  to  note  in  the  abstract  any  material  fact  discovered  in 
his  search,  he  is  liable  to  his  employer  for  any  damage  the  latter 
may  sustain  by  reason  of  such  failure  or  neglect."^  But  before 
damages  can  be  recovered  it  must  appear  that  they  are  the  direct 
result  of  the  abstracter's  negligence.^"  He  impliedly  agrees  to  ex- 
ercise reasonable  care  and  skill  in  the  performance  of  his  under- 
taking, and  if  he  fails  to  exercise  this  reasonable  care  and  skill, 
he  is  liable  for  the  injury  that  is  the  direct  result  of  his  neglect  or 
w'ant  of  skill. ^^  "It  is  elementary  that  one  who  undertakes,  for 

87Lattin  v.  Gillette,  95  Cal.  317,  30  W.  539;   Smith  v.  Holmes,  54  Mich. 

Pac.  545,  29  Am.  St.  115;  Russell  v.  104,  19  N.  W.  767;  Wacek  v.  Frink, 

Polk  County  Abs.  Co.,  87  Iowa  233,  51  Minn.  282,  53  N.  W.  633,  38  Am. 

54    N.    W.    212,    43    Am.    St.    381;  St.  502;  Gilman  v.  Hovey,  26  Mo.  280. 

Thomas  v.  Title  &c.  Co.,  81  Ohio  St.  02  Kimball    v.    Connolly,    42    N.    Y. 

432,  91  N.  E.  183,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  57,  33  How.  Prac.  247,  2  Abb.  Dec. 

1210;  Bremerton  Development  Co.  v.  504. 

Title  Trust   Co.,  67  Wash.   268,   121  93  National  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ward,  100 

Pac.  69.  U.   S.   195,  25   L.  ed.  621 ;   Lattin  v. 

88  Chase    v.    Heaney,    70    111.    268;  Gillette,  95  Cal.  317,  30  Pac.  545,  29 

Smith  V.  Holmes,  54  Mich.  104,  19  N.  Am.  St.   115;  Hillock  v.   Idaho  Title 

W.    767;    Gilman   v.    Hovey.   26    Mo.  &  Trust  Co.,  24  Idaho  242,  133  Pac. 

280;  Stephenson  v.  Cone,  24  S.  Dak.  119;    Brown    v.    Sims.    22    Ind.    App. 

460,  124  N.  W.  439.  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  317,  53   N.   E.  779,  72  Am.   St.  308; 

S.)  1207n;  Dickie  v.  Abstract  Co.,  89  Young  v.  Lohr,  118  Iowa  624,  92  N. 

Tenn.  431,  14  S.  W.  896,  24  Am.  St.  W.   684;    Renkert   v.   Title   Guaranty 

616.  Trust  Co..   102  Mo.  App.  267,  76  S. 

80  Denton    v.    Nashville    Title    Co.,  W.   641 ;    Western    Loan    &c.    Co.    v. 

112  Tenn.  320,  79  S.  W.  799.  Silver    Bow   Abstract   Co..   31    Mont. 

00  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Ncbr.  765,  448,   78    Pac.   774,    107   Am.    St.   435; 

65  N.  W.  899.  Security   Abstract   &c.    Co.   v.    Long- 

ni  Chase    v.    Heaney,    70    111.    268;  acre,  56  Nebr.  469,  76  N.  W.   1073; 

Thomas  v.  Schee,  80  Iowa  237,  45  -N.  Crook  v.  Chilvers,  99  Nebr.  684,  157 


I 


19  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §     16 

a  consideration,  the  examination  of  titles  is  liable  for  a  fail- 
ure to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  so  doing.  It  is  the  general 
rule  that  the  liability  of  an  abstracter  is  based  upon  con- 
tract."^* The  abstracter  must  examine  the  records  themselves, 
and  if  he  relies  upon  the  indexes  thereto  or  marginal  refer- 
ences thereon,  and  damages  result  therefrom,  he  is  liable  for 
the  loss.^^  Where  a  person  informs  the  abstracter  that  he  shall 
rely  entirely  upon  the  abstract,  and  the  abstracter  assures  him 
that  he  may  place  such  reliance  on  the  abstract,  such  abstracter, 
if  he  fails,  through  negligence,  to  set  out  in  the  abstract  an  ex- 
isting lis  pendens,  will  be  liable  for  such  damages  as  may  result 
from  his  negligence.^''  But  where  an  abstracter,  without  any 
fraudulent  intent,  makes  a  mistake  in  the  abstract,  the  person  em- 
ploying him  can  not  hold  such  abstracter  liable  for  a  loss  occa- 
sioned thereby  unless  he  uses  ordinary  diligence  in  informing  the 
abstracter  of  such  mistake,  where  the  loss  could  be  averted,  if 
the  abstracter  were  so  informed. °^  Nor  can  a  party  recover 
against  an  abstracter  for  a  false  certificate  of  title,  where  he  does 
not  examine  the  abstract  or  have  some  one  to  examine  it 
for  him.^^  Damages  for  negligence  are  recoverable  against 
a  person  engaged  in  searching  the  records  and  certifying 
to  titles  who  undertakes  to  furnish  a  party  a  full  abstract 
of  title  to  land  which  the  latter  desires  to  purchase,  if,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  careless  omission  therefrom  of  an  incumbrance,  the 
purchaser  is  put  to  additional  expense  to  perfect  the  title.^^ 
Where  an  abstracter  furnished  an  erroneous  abstract  to  a  hus- 
band who  delivered  it  to  a  loan  company  to  obtain  a  loan,  and  the 
loan  company's  attorney  reported  the  title  good,  relying  on  the 
abstract  for  his  opinion,  and  the  company  granted  the  loan,  the 
abstracter  having  had  no  knowledge  of  the  purpose  for  which  the 

N.   W.   617;   Hershiser  v.   Ward,   29  v.   Waco   Abstract  &c.    Co..    16  Tex. 

Nev.    228,    87    Pac.    171 ;    Economy  Civ.  App.  329,  40  S.  W.  812. 

Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v.  West  Jersey  Title  '^■i  Young  v.  Lohr,  118  Iowa  624,  92 

Co.,   64   N.   J.   L.   27,   44   Atl.   854 ;  N.  W.  684. 

Byrnes  v.  Palmer,  18  App.  Div.  1,  45  ^■'  Wacek  v.  Frink.  51  Minn.  282,  53 


N.  Y.  S.  479,  26  Civ.  Proc.  382 
Washington  Countv  Abstract  Co.  v 
Harris,  48  Okla.  577,  149  Pac.  1075 
Watson  v.  Muirhead,  57  Pa.  St.  161 
98    Am.     Dec.    213 ;     Stephenson    v 


N.  W.  633,  38  Am.  St.  502. 

°6  Brown  v.  Sims,  22  Ind.  App.  317, 
53  N.  E.  779.  72  Am.  St.  308. 

°^  Roberts  v.  Leon  Loan  &c.  Co.,  63 
Iowa  76,  18  N.  W.  702. 


Cone,  24  S.  Dak.  460.  124  N.  W.  439,  ss  Trimble  v.  Stewart,  35  Mo.  App. 

26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1207n;  American  537. 

Trust  Inv.  Co.  v.  Nashville  Abstract  on  Smith  v.   Holmes,  54  Mich.   104, 

Co.   (Tenn.),  39  S.  W.  877;  Puckett  19  N.  W.  767. 


^  li 


TITl.KS    AND    AUSTRACTS 


20 


liusbaiKl  wanted  the  aljstraet,  it  was  held  that  the  abstracter  was 
not  hable  to  the  loan  company  for  damages  due  to  his  mistake/ 

§  17.  Liability  for  failure  to  show  liens  or  incumbrances. 
— An  abstracter  has  been  held  liable  for  damages  sustained 
through  his  failure  to  disclose  in  the  abstract  the  following  liens 
or  encumbrances  against  the  estate :  Prior  deeds  of  conveyances 
duly  recorded;'  mortgages;^  sale  of  land  for  taxes ;^  judgments ;'"' 
attachment  suits;*'  and  special  assesments/  If  an  abstract  refers 
to  a  will  and  purports  to  set  out  its  contents  as  devising  the  land 
in  fee,  while  in  fact  only  a  life  estate  was  devised,  the  abstracter 
has  not  exercised  a  proper  degree  of  care  and  skill,  and  if  his 
employer  is  injured  through  his  reliance  on  the  abstract,  he  may 
recover  damages  to  compensate  him  for  his  loss.^  But  no  recov- 
ery can  be  had  against  an  abstracter  for  failure  to  report  a  judg- 
ment lien  against  the  property  where  his  employer  had  purchased 
the  property  before  he  made  the  examination,  and  advanced  no 
money  on  the  faith  of  the  statement  in  the  abstract."  Nor  is  an 
abstracter  liable  to  his  employer  beyond  nominal  damages  for 
failure  to  note  on  an  abstract  a  lien  junior  to  his  employer's  claim 
of  title,  unless  it  appears  that  he  has  necessarily  suffered  special 
damages  on  account  of  such  omission.^" 

§  18.  Measure  of  damages  against  abstracter. — The  meas- 
ure of  damages  for  an  abstracter's  failure  to  set  out  in  the  al> 
stract  the  true  condition  of  the  title  is  his  employer's  actual  loss, 
which  is  usually  the  amount  which  he  had  to  pay  to  get  the  title, 
or  to  get  the  encumbrance  removed/^  Where  an  abstracter  failed 


1  Equitable  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v. 
Bank  of  Commerce,  118  Tenn.  678, 
102  S.  W.  901,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
449n,  12  Ann.  Cas.  407. 

2  National  Sav.  Bank  v.  Ward,  100 
U.  S.  195,  25  L.  cd.  621 ;  Washington 
County  Abstract  Co.  v.  Harris,  48 
Okla.  577,  149  Pac.  1075;  Dickie  v. 
Nashville  Abstract  Co.,  89  Tenn.  431, 
14  S.  W.  896,  24  Am.  St.  616. 

3  Smith  V.  Holmes,  54  Mich.  104,  19 
N.  W.  767;  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46 
Nebr.  765,  65  N.  W.  899. 

4  Hillock  V.  Idaho  Title  &c.  Co.,  24 
Idaho  242,  133  Pac.  119;  Chase  v. 
Heancy,  70  111.  268. 

''Western  Loan  &c  Co.  v.  Silver 
Bow  Abstract  Co.,  31  Mont.  448;  78 


Pac.  774,  107  Am.  St.  435;  Renkert 
V.  Title  Guaranty  Trust  Co.,  102  Mo. 
App,  267,  76  S.  W.  641. 

"  Security  Abstract  &c.  Co.  v. 
Longacre,  56  Nebr.  469,  76  N.  W. 
1073. 

7  Morange  v.  Mix,  44  N.  Y.  315. 

8  Equitable  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v. 
Bank  of  Commerce,  118  Tenn.  678, 
102  S.  W.  901,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
449n.  12  Ann.  Cas.  407. 

^  United  States  Wind  Engine  &c. 
Co.  V.  Linville,  43  Kans.  455.  23  Pac. 
597;  Roberts  v.  Sterling,  4  Mo.  App 
593. 

I'' Williams  v.  Hanley,  16  Ind.  App. 
464,  45  N.  E.  622. 

11  Chase    v.    Heaney,    70    111.    268; 


21  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §     18 

to  show  a  deed  in  the  abstract,  it  was  held  that  a  purchaser  rely- 
ing on  such  abstract  could  recover  damages  from  such  abstracter 
to  the  extent  of  the  price  paid  for  the  land,  reasonable  attorney's 
fees,  costs,  and  other  necessary  expenses  incurred  in  an  attempt 
to  defeat  the  outstanding  title,  provided  there  was*  a  reasonable 
probability  of  defeating  same.^"  But  an  abstracter  is  liable  only 
for  the  damage  which  is  the  direct  consequence  of  his  error  or 
mistake.  He  is  not  liable  for  any  loss  resulting  to  his  employer 
on  account  of  defects  in  the  abstract  to  the  extent  such  loss  could 
have  been  averted  or  lessened,  by  prompt  action  on  the  part  of 
such  employer."  Thus  where'  he  has  omitted  a-  mortgage  from 
an  abstract  prepared  for  an  intending  purchaser  of  lands,  he  can 
not  be  held  liable  for  any  payments  made  after  the  purchaser 
has  notice  of  the  mortgage.^*  But  one  who  has  suffered  an  injury 
by  reason  of  an  error  in  an  abstract  is  not  called  upon  to  do  an 
act  which  will  not  affect  his  own  damages,  though  it  would  be  of 
service  to  the  abstracter.^^  Where  a  purchaser  of  land  relied  on 
an  abstract  furnished  him  by  an  abstracter,  which  failed  to  set 
out  an  attachment  on  the  land,  and  the  land  was  afterward  sold 
and  a  deed  executed  under  the  attachment  before  the  purchaser 
had  notice  of  the  omission,  the  measure  of  such  purchaser's  dam- 
ages was  held  to  be  the  value  of  the  land  and  not  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  in  attachment. ^°  Where,  by  reason  of  an  abstract- 
er's negligence,  the  abstract  does  not  show  a  prior  lien  on  the 
property,  and  his  employer,  in  reliance  on  the  abstract,  makes  a 
loan  on  the  property,  the  employer  is  entitled  to  bring  suit  against 
such  abstracter  without  waiting  for  any  default  in  the  mortgage 
and  may  recover  the  difference  in  value  between  the  security  he 
contracted  for  and  that  which  he  actually  received. ^^  An  abstracter 
is  liable  to  a  mortgagee  for  the  entire  amount  loaned  on  a  mort- 
gage, on  the  faith  of  the  abstract  showing  no  prior  lien,  when  in 
fact  the  property  was  mortgaged  for  more  than  its  value,  and 
was  exhausted  to  satisfy  the  first  mortgage." 

Dodd  V.  Williams,  3  Mo.  App.  278;  is  Van   Schaick  v.   Sigel,  60  How. 

Morange  v.  Mix,  44  N.  Y.  315;  Allen  Pr.  (N.  Y.)   122,  9  Daly  383. 

V.  Clark,  7  L.  T.  N.  S.  781.  ^^  Security     Abstract     &c     Co.     v. 

12  Washington  County  Abstract  Co.  Longacre,  56  Nebr.  469,  76  N.  W. 
V.  Harris,  48  Okla.  577,  149  Pac.  1075.  1073. 

13  Roberts  v.  Leon  Loan  &c.  Co..  63  i^  Lilly  v.  Boyd,  72  Ga.  83 ;  La 
Iowa  76,  18  N.  W.  702;  Kimball  v.  Wall  v.  Groman.  180  Pa.  St.  532,  37 
Connolly.  42  N.  Y.  57,  33  How.  Pr.  Atl.  98.  57  Am.  St.  662. 

247,  2  Abb.  Dec.  504.  is  Fox  v.  Thibault,  33  La.  Ann.  32. 

1*  Brega  v.  Dickey,  16  Grant's  On. 
(U.  C.)  494. 


19 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


22 


§  19.  Actual  damages  sustained. — In  an  action  against  an 
abstracter  to  recover  damages  for  loss  sustained  by  a  defective 
abstract,  the  plaintiff  must  show  that  he  relied  upon  the  abstract. ^^ 
If  he  relied  upon  the  abstract  and  has  sustained  a  loss  thereby,  he 
can  recover  damages  against  the  abstracter,  if  the  error  was  one 
that  a  person  of  ordinary  care  and  skill  in  the  business  of  making 
abstracts  would  not  have  made."°  The  plaintiff  must  show  that 
he  had  a  right  to  rely  on  the  abstract,  and  that  actual  injury  has 
resulted  to  him.  It  is  not  enough  to  show  that  the  abstract  was 
defective,  but  it  must  be  shown  in  addition  thereto  that  actual 
loss  resulted  from  it.^^  Unless  something  is  bought  and  some- 
thing is  parted  with,  there  can,  of  course,  be  no  damages.""  "The 
damages  in  this  class  of  cases  should  be  confined  to  injuries  which 
the  court  can  see  resulted  in  loss  of  title  or  impairment  of  some 
kind  to  the  ownership  or  enjoyment  of  the  property  which  was 
purchased  on  the  faith  of  the  abstract,  and  that  such  injury  was 
the  direct  result  of  the  defect  complained  of  therein."-^ 

§  20.  Limiting  liability  of  an  abstracter. — An  abstracter 
may  limit  his  liability  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  abstract  and 
fullness  of  search  to  certain  records,  either  by  a  specific  contract 
to  that  effect  or  by  specifying  in  his  certificate  the  records  exam- 
ined."* But  he  can  not  limit  his  liability  by  an  obscure  statement 
in  his  certificate  without  specifically  calling  his  employer's  atten- 
tion thereto.  If  he  finds  it  impossible  to  furnish  a  complete  and 
reliable  abstract,  it  is  his  duty  to  give  his  employer  notice  of  the 
fact,  that  he  may  employ  some  one  else ;  otherwise  such  employer 
will  have  a  right  to  rely  on  his  competency  and  fidelity  in  this 
respect."'   A  statement  in  the  certificate  to  the  effect  that  the  ab- 


19  Young  V.  Lohr,  118  Iowa  624,  92 
N.  W.  684;  United  States  Wind  En- 
gine &c.  Co.  V.  Linville,  43  Kans.  455, 
23  Pac.  597;  Hershiser  v.  Ward.  29 
Nev.  228,  87  Pac.  171;  Equitable 
Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v.  Bank  of  Com- 
merce, 118  Tenn.  678,  102  S.  W.  901, 
12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  449n,  12  Ann. 
Cas.  407. 

20  Equitable  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v. 
Bank  of  Commerce,  118  Tenn.  678, 
102  S.  W.  901,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
449n,  12  Ann.  Cas.  407. 

21  Batty  V.  Pout,  54  Ind.  482 ;  Will- 
iams V.  Hanley,  16  Ind.  App.  464.  45 
N.  E.  622;  United  States  Wind  En- 


gine &c.  Co.  V.  Linville,  43  Kans.  455, 
23  Pac.  597;  Kimball  v.  Connolly,  3 
Keyes  (N.  Y.)  57,  2  Abb.  Dec.  504, 
3^  How.  Pr.  247 ;  Byrnes  v.  Palmer, 
18  App.  Div.  1,  45  N.  Y.  S.  479,  26 
Civ.  Proc.  382 ;  Puckett  v.  Waco  Ab- 
stract &c.  Co.,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  329, 
40  S.  W.  812. 

22  Kimball  v.  Connolly,  3  Keyes 
(N.  Y.)  57,  2  Abb.  Dec.  504,  33  How. 
Pr.  247. 

23  Denton  v.  Nashville  Title  Co., 
112  Tenn.  320,  79  S.  W.  799. 

2*  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Neb*-,  765, 
65  N..W.  899. 
25Chas  v.  Heaney,  70  III  268. 


23  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    21 

stracter  finds  no  conveyance  or  encumbrance  affecting  the  title,  is 
equivalent  to  a  statement  that  there  are  none.'"  The  liability  of 
an  abstracter  is  measured  by  his  employment,  and  when  he  is 
engaged  to  search  the  records  for  liens  only,  or  for  deeds  only, 
his  liability  will  not,  by  implication,  be  so  extended  as  to  embrace 
liens  or  conveyances  not  disclosed  by  a  search  of  the  designated 
office  or  offices.  In  other  words,  in  order  to  maintain  an  action 
upon  the  statutory  undertaking  of  an  abstracter,  it  is  necessary  to 
show  that  the  act  of  omission  or  commission  alleged  as  the  cause 
thereof  is  a  breach  of  the  conditions,  express  or  implied,  of  the 
particular  engagement  to  which  it  relates. "'^  So  if  the  engagement 
is  to  make  a  correct  abstract  of  title  from  a  specified  sale,  the  ab- 
stracter is  not  liable  for  a  failure  to  note  upon  the  abstract  an 
unsatisfied  judgment  against  a  grantee  in  the  chain  of  title,  which 
only  appears  of  record  prior  to  that  date,  notwithstanding  that 
the  judgment  becomes  a  lien  upon  the  property  after  that  time."^ 

§  21.  Liability  of  public  officers  examining  titles. — By 
statute  in  some  states  abstracters  are  not  permitted  to  search  the 
public  records;  and  in  others  they  are  required  to  pay  a  fee  for 
the  privilege  of  making  a  search.  In  such  states,  it  is  the  prac- 
tice of  the  abstracter,  after  having  ascertained  the  chain  of  title, 
to  direct  written  requisitions  to  the  proper  official  having  custody 
of  the  records  for  searches  for  encumbrances  or  liens  of  record 
that  may  affect  the  property.  Whenever,  by  law  or  "custom,  it  is 
made  a  part  of  the  duty  of  such  official  to  make  such  searches,  he 
is  held  liable  for  mistakes  and  omissions  and  false  certificates  of 
search,  to  the  same  extent  as  an  abstracter.^^  A  duty  sufficient  to 
create  such  liability  on  the  part  of  a  public  official  need  not  be 
expressly  created  by  statute,  but  may  be  created  by  custom,  or 
may  be  implied  from  the  fact  that  he  may  charge  a  fee  for  his 
services.^"   When  such  liability  exists  the  officer  is  liable  for  the 

26  Ziegler  v.  Commonwealth,  12  Pa.  W.  767 ;   Kimball  v.  Connolly,  42  N. 

St.    227;    Philadelphia    v.    Anderson,  Y.  57,  33  How.  Pr.  247,  2  Abb.  Dec. 

142  Pa.  St.  357,  21  Atl.  976,  12  L.  R.  504 ;    McCaraher    v.    Commonwealth, 

A.  751 ;  Tripp  v.  Hopkins,  13  R.  I.  99.  5  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)  21.  39  Am.  Dec. 

2^^  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Nebr.  765,  506;    Ziegler    v.    Commonwealth,    12 

65  N.  W.  899.  Pa.    St.    227;    Houseman    v.    Girard 

28  Wakefield  v.    Chowan,  26  Minn.  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.,  81  Pa.  St.  256;  Siew- 

379.  4  N.  W.  618.  ers  v.  Commonwealth,  87  Pa.  St.  15 ; 

20Lusk   V.    Carlin,    4    Scam.    (111.)  Tripp  v.  Hopkins,  13  R.  I.  99. 

395  ;  Fox  v.  Thibault,  33  La.  Ann.  32  ;  so  Lusk   v.    Carlin,    4    Scam.    (111.) 

Smith  V.  Holmes,  54  Mich.  104,  19  N.  395 ;    Ziegler    v.    Commonwealth,    12 


§  22 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


24 


mistakes  and  omissions  of  his  deputies,  clerks,  and  persons  in 
his  employ. ^^  His  liability,  like  that  of  an  abstracter's,  is  only 
to  those  who  employ  him,  or  others  in  privity  of  contract  with 
him.^"  The  officer  may  limit  his  liability  by  his  certificate,  or  it 
may  be  limited  by  the  requisition  for  the  search. ^^  But  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  requiring  a  public  officer  to  make  searches, 
and  especially  where  the  statute  specifies  no  compensation  there- 
for, he  is  not  liable  unless  he  has  a  contract  with  the  person  for 
whom  the  search  is  made,  or  unless  the  certificate  is  falsely  made 
with  an  intent  to  defraud.^* 

§  22.  To  whom  an  abstracter  may  be  liable. — As  a  general 
rule,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  collusion,  or  malicious  or  tortious 
act,  the  maker  of  an  abstract  is  liable  for  his  errors  only  to  the 
party  that  employed  him,  or  is  in  some  way  in  privity  of  contract 
with  him.^^  And  where  this  rule  obtains,  the  fact  that  the  ab- 
stracter has  knowledge  that  the  abstract  is  to  be  used  in  a  sale  or 
loan  to  advise  a  prospective  purchaser  or  mortgagee  of  the  land 
does  not  afifect  the  rule  as  to  his  liability."''  But,  inasmuch  as  the 
vendee  or  mortgagee,  the  only  parties  likely  to  be  damaged  by 
any  mistake  or  inaccuracy  in  an  abstract,  seldom  procures  the 


Pa.  St.  227;  McCaraher  v.  Common- 
wealth, 5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  21,  39 
Am.  Dec.  506. 

31  Kimball  V.  Connolly.  42  N.  Y. 
57,  Zl  How.  Pr.  247,  2  Abb.  Dec.  504 ; 
Peabody  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v.  House- 
man, 89  Pa.  St.  261,  Zl  Am.  Rep.  757. 

32  Mallory  v.  Ferguson,  50  Kans. 
685.  32  Pac.  410,  22  L.  R.  A.  99; 
Commonwealth  v.  Harmer,  6  Phila. 
(Pa.)  90;  Houseman  v.  Girard  Bldg. 
&c.  Assn.,  81  Pa.  St.  256. 

33  Tripp  V.  Hopkins,  13  R.  I.  99. 

3-*  Mechanics  Bldg.  Assn.  v.  Whit- 
acre,  92  Ind.  547 ;  Mallory  v.  Fergu- 
son, 50  Kans.  685,  32  Pac.  410,  22  L. 
R.  A.  99;  Wood  v.  Ruland,  10  Mo. 
143. 

35  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S. 
195,  25  L.  ed.  621 ;  Dundee  Mtg.  Co. 
V.  Hughes,  20  Fed.  39;  Talpey  v. 
Wright,  61  Ark.  275,  32  S.  W.  1072, 
54  Am.  St.  206;  Buckley  v.  Gray,  110 
Cal.  339,  42  Pac.  900,  31  L.  R.  A.  862, 
.52  Am.  St.  88;  Mechanic's  Bldg. 
Assn.  V.  Whitacre.  92  Ind.  547 ; 
Brown  v.  Sims,  22  Ind.  App.  317,  53 
N.  E.  779,  72  Am.  St.  308;   Mallory 


V.  Ferguson,  50  Kans.  685,  32  Pac. 
410,  22  L.  R.  A.  99;  Morano  v.  Shaw, 
23  La.  Ann.  379 ;  Schade  v.  Gehner, 
133  Mo.  252.  34  S.  W.  576;  Zwei- 
gardt  V.  Birdseye.  57  Mo.  App.  462 ; 
Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Nebr.  765,  65 
N.  W.  899;  Gate  City  Abstract  Co. 
V.  Post,.  55  Nebr.  742,  76  N.  W.  471; 
Day  V.  Reynolds,  23  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
131 ;  Lockwood  v.  Title  Ins.  Co.,  Th 
Misc.  296,  130  N.  Y.  S.  824 ;  Thomas 
V.  Title  &c.  Co.,  81  Ohio  St.  432.  91 
N.  E.  183,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1210; 
Sackett  v.  Rose  (Okla.).  154  Pac. 
1177;  Houseman  v.  Girard  Bldg.  &c. 
Assn.,  81  Pa.  St.  256;  Siewers  v. 
Commonwealth,  87  Pa.  St.  15 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Harmer,  6  Phila.  90; 
Equitable  Bldg.  &c.  Assn.  v.  Bank  of 
Commerce,  118  Tenn.  678,  102  S.  W. 
901,  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  449n,  12 
.^nn.  Cas.  407:  Bremerton  Develop- 
ment Co.  V.  Title  Trust  Co..  67  Wash. 
268.  121  Pac.  69. 

3'^  Zwcigardt  v.  Birdseye.  57  Mo. 
App.  462 ;  Anderson  v.  Spriesters- 
bach.  69  Wash.  393.  125  Pac.  166,  42 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  176n. 


25  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    22 

abstract  to  be  made,  there  is  a  tendency  to  extend  the  habihty  to 
parties  other  than  the  employer  of  the  abstracter.  Thus  where 
one  employed  by  a  landowner  to  make  an  abstract  knew  that  it 
was  to  be  used  to  induce  a  third  party  to  make  a  loan  on  the  land 
and  that  he  would  rely  on  it,  subsequently  delivered  the  abstract 
to  such  proposed  mortgagee  with  the  assurance  that  his  work 
could  be  relied  upon  and  that  the  title  was  correctly  shown  in  the 
abstract,  he  was  held  liable  to  such  mortgagee  for  loss  sustained 
by  him  on  account  of  defects  in  the  title  not  shown  by  the  ab- 
stract." In  another  case  it  was  held  that  the  maker  of  an  ab- 
stract, who  guaranteed  its  correctness,  was  answerable  in  dam- 
ages to  the  purchaser  who  relied  upon  the  abstract,  and  refused 
to  purchase  without  it,  where  recorded  conveyances  were  omitted 
from  such  abstract  to  the  injury  of  such  purchaser,  though  the 
abstract  was  made  at  the  request  and  expense  of  and  delivered  to 
the  owner  of  the  property,  who  thereupon  delivered  it  to  the  in- 
tending purchaser  for  examination.^^  Where,  upon  inquiry,  an 
abstracter  affirms  the  correctness  of  his  abstract  to  the  grantee  or 
mortgagee  of  his  employer,  he  will  be  held  liable  for  loss  result- 
ing to  such  grantee  or  mortgagee  relying  upon  his  abstract,  on 
account  of  defects  therein.^''  The  abstracter's  liability  is  not  af- 
fected by  the  fact  that  a  person  other  than  his  employer  paid  him 
for  making  it.*°  Nor  will  the  fact  that  the  borrower  knew  of  the 
existence  of  omitted  liens,  and  acted  as  the  agent  of  the  lender  in 
ordering  the  abstract,  relieve  the  abstracter  from  liability  to  a 
party  loaning  money  and  relying  on  his  certificate."  Where  a 
landowner,  being  an  abstracter,  prepares  an  abstract  of  title  to  his 
land,  which  abstract  is  to  be  used  to  induce  others  to  purchase 
the  land,  he  is  liable  to  a  purchaser  thereof  for  mistakes  in  the 
abstract  just  as  much  as  if  the  abstract  was  prepared  upon  the 
purchaser's  order.*'  There  is  a  contract  between  the  owner  of 
land  and  an  abstracter,  for  making  an  abstract,  rendering  the  ab- 
stracter liable  for  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  the  exam- 
ination, though  the  contract  was  by  the  owner's  agent,  who  did 

"Brown  v.  Sims,  22  Ind.  App.  317,     Assn.,   81    Pa.    St.    256;    La   Wall   v. 
53  N.  E.  779,  72  Am.  St.  308.  Groman,  180  Pa.  St.  532,  Zl  Atl.  98, 

38  Dickie  V.  Abstract  Co.,  89  Tenn.     57  Am.  St.  662. 

431,  14  S.  W.  896,  24  Am.  St.  616.  ^i  Houseman    v.    Girarcl    Bldg.    &c. 

39  Siewers    v.     Commonwealth,     87     Assn.,  81  Pa.  St.  256. 

Pa.  St.  15.  43  Thomas   v.    Schee,  80   Iowa  237. 

40  Page   V.    Trutch,    Fed.    Cas.    No.     45  N.  W.  539. 
10668 ;  Houseman  v.  Girard  Bldg.  &c. 


§  2Z 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


26 


not  disclose  his  agency."'''  Under  statutes  requiring  abstracters  to 
give  bond  for  the  payment  of  any  damages  to  a  party  through 
any  error,  they  are  liable  to  a  purchaser  who  relies  on  the  ab- 
stract, without  regard  to  who  paid  for  the  abstract  or  ordered  it 
made.'** 

§  23.  When  right  of  action  accrues. — The  right  of  action 
against  an  abstracter  for  damages  resulting  from  a  defective  ab- 
stract accrues  at  the  time  the  examination  is  made  and  reported, 
and  not  when  the  error  is  discovered,  and  the  damages  resulting 
therefrom  have  been  paid;*^  and  the  statute  of  limitations  runs 
from  that  time,  and  not  from  the  time  the  damages  accrued.**' 
Whether  the  negligence  out  of  which  the  cause  of  action  arises 
is  the  breach  of  an  implied  contract,  or  the  affirmative  disregard 
of  some  positive  duty,  is  immaterial.  In  either  case  the  liability 
arises  immediately  upon  such  breach  of  contract  or  disregard  of 
duty,  and  an  action  to  recover  the  damages  which  are  the  measure 
of  such  liability  may  be  immediately  maintained.  The  right  to 
maintain  the  action  is  distinguished  from  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages, and,  although  the  entire  damage  resulting  from  such  a  neg- 
ligence may  not  have  been  sustained,  or  the  fact  that  the  negli- 
gence occurred  may  not  have  been  known  until  the  right  to  a 
recovery  is  barred,  yet  the  time  within  which  an  action  may  be 
brought  is  not  thereby  prolonged.*^  But  where  the  complaint  in 
an  action  against  an  abstracter  not  only  alleged  the  contract  and 
purchase  of  the  abstract  and  certificate,  but  also  alleged  that 
through  and  by  the  mistake  of  the  defendant  the  certificate  to  the 
abstract  was  false  and  untrue,  and  that,  relying  on  the  truth  and 
correctness  of  the  certificate,  plaintiff  made  the  purchase  of  the 
land,  and  subsequently  sustained  the  injury  and  damages  com- 


43  Young  V.  Lohr,  118  Iowa  624,  92 
N.  W.  684. 

4*  Scott  V.  Jordan  (Okla.),  155 
Pac.  498;  Goldberg  v.  Sisseton  Loan 
&c.  Co.,  24  S.  Dak.  49,  123  N.  W.  266, 
140  Am.  St.  775. 

«  Lattin  v.  Gillette,  95  Gal.  317.  30 
Pac.  545,  29  Am.  St.  115;  Russell  v. 
Polk  County  Abstract  Co.,  87  Iowa 
233.  54  N.  W.  212.  43  Am.  St.  381; 
Provident  Loan  Trust  Co.  v.  Wol- 
cott,  5  Kans.  App.  473,  47  Pac.  8; 
Schade  v.  Gehner,  133  Mo.  252,  34 
S.  W.  576:  Rankin  v.  Schaeffer,  4 
Mo.  App.   108;   Walker  v.   Bowman, 


27  Okla.  172,  111  Pac.  319,  30  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  642,  Ann.  Gas.  1912B. 
839n ;  Owen  v.  Western  Sav.  Fund, 
97  Pa.  47.  39  Am.  Rep.  794;  Bodine 
V.  Wayne  Title  &c.  Co.,  Zi  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  68. 

«  Lattin  V.  Gillette,  95  Cal.  317,  30 
Pac.  545.  29  Am.  St.  115;  Russell  v. 
Polk  County  Abstract  Co.,  87  Iowa 
233,  54  N.  W.  212.  43  Am.  St.  381; 
Schade  v.  Gehner,  133  Mo.  252,  34  S. 
W.  576. 

47  Lattin  V.  Gillette,  95  Cal.  317,  30 
Pac.  545,  29  Am.  St.  115. 


27  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    24 

plained  of,  it  was  held  that  the  cause  of  action  did  not  accrue 
until  the  discovery,  by  the  plaintiff,  of  the  facts  constituting  the 
fraud  or  mistake.*^ 

§  24.  Pleadings  in  action  against  abstracter. — In  an  ac- 
tion against  an  abstracter  for  damages  resulting  from  an  incor- 
rect or  defective  abstract,  the  complaint  should  allege  or  show  the 
nature  of  the  agreement  or  character  of  the  abstract  to  be  fur- 
nished/^ that  the  abstract  was  defective,^"  that  the  plaintiff  re- 
lied and  acted  upon  the  abstract,^^  and  that  he  has  been  damaged 
thereby.^^  Where  the  damage  resulted  from  a  false  certificate 
the  complaint  must  show  that  the  plaintiff  has  been  damaged  on 
account  of  it/^  The  complaint  must  allege  facts  and  not  conclu- 
sions.^* But  it  is  not  defective  because  it  alleges  that  the  plaintiff 
was  ousted  from  the  premises  "by  due  course  of  law."^^  Where 
the  action  is  brought  by  a  vendee,  to  recover  damages  on  account 
of  an  error  in  an  abstract,  he  must  allege  in  his  complaint  that  he 
purchased  the  realty.^*^  But  allegations  as  to  defendant's  lack 
of  care  and  skill  may  be  general,"  and,  as  the  cause  of  action  ac- 
crues when  the  abstract  is  furnished,  the  complaint,  if  it  shows  a 
breach  of  duty  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  and  a  liability  in- 
curred by  plaintiff  as  a  result  thereof,  need  not  allege  that  the 
plaintiff  at  the  time  the  action  was  begun  had  been  actually  sub- 
jected to  pecuniary  loss.^^ 

§  25.  Agreement  to  furnish  abstract. — Ordinarily  parties 
entering  into  an  executory  agreement  for  the  purchase  and  sale 
of  real  estate  make  provisions  therein  specifying  the  time  allowed 
for  examination  of  the  title,  for  furnishing  abstract,  making  re- 
port of  defects  and  objections,  specifying  the  time  within  which 
the  vendor  may  thereafter  make  his  title  good,  and  the  character 
of  the  conveyance  to  be  executed  by  him.^^    Where  the  vendor 

48  Hillock  V.  Idaho  Title  &c.  Co.,  22  ^4  Puckett  v.  Waco  Abstract  &c. 
Idaho  440.  126  Pac.  612,  42  L.  R.  A.  Co.,  16  Tex.  Civ.  Ann.  329,  40  S.  W. 
(N.  S.)  178.  812. 

49  Hershiser  v.  Ward,  29  Nev.  228,  ^^s  Hershiser  v.  Ward,  29  Nev.  228, 
87  Pac.  171.  87  Pac.  171. 

50  Hershiser  v.  Ward,  29  Nev.  228,  so  Batty  v.  Fout,  54  Ind.  482. 

87  Pac.  171.  "  Oilman  v.  Hovey.  26  Mo.  280. 

51  Batty  V.  Fout,  54  Ind.  482.  ^s  Walker  v.  Bowman,  27  Okla.  172, 

52  United  States  Wind  Engine  &c.  Ill  Pac.  319,  30  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  642, 
Co.  V.  Linville,  43  Kans.  455,  23  Pac.  Ann.  Cas.  1912  B,  839n. 

597.  59  Easton    v.    Montgomery,    90    Cal. 

53  United   States  Wind   Engine  &c.     307,  27  Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123. 
Co.  V.  Linville,  43  Kans.  455,  23  Pac. 

597. 


§  25 


TITI,ES    AXD    ABSTRACTS 


28 


agrees  to  furnish  an  abstract  of  title  within  a  specified  time,  but 
fails  to  do  so,  the  vendee  can  not  be  required  to  extend  the  time, 
but  may  rescind  the  contract  and  recover  the  purchase-money 
which  he  has  paid  to  the  vendor.*"*  Likewise,  if  the  vendor  agrees 
to  furnish  an  abstract,  and  furnishes  one  showing  a  defective 
title,  he  may  recover  the  purchase-money  paid,  even  though  the 
vendor  had  a  good  title  as  a  matter  of  fact."^  Where  the  vendor 
agrees  in  the  contract  of  sale  to  furnish  the  vendee  an  abstract  of 
title  and  the  condition  of  the  sale  is  that  the  title  shall  be  good  or 
there  shall  be  no  sale,  the  fair  interpretation  of  the  contract  is 
that  a  full  and  complete  abstract  of  title  is  to  be  furnished.  If 
the  abstract  does  not  disclose  a  good  record  title,  the  purchaser 
is  not  required  to  make  an  investigation  dehors  the  record,  nor 
is  he  required  to  assume  the  risk  of  any  litigation  shown  by  the 
abstract  to  be  either  pending  or  probable.  In  an  action  by  the 
vendee  to  recover  purchase-money  paid  by  him,  evidence  of  the 
invalidity  of  the  claims  of  persons  whom  the  abstract  shows  to 
be  asserting  title  adverse  to  the  vendor  is  inadmissible.''"  It  is  a 
sufficient  compliance  w^ith  an  agreement  to  furnish  an  abstract  if 
the  vendee  is  notified  where  it  may  be  found,  if  it  is  accessible  to 
him,  and  if  he  raises  no  objection  at  the  time.*^^  The  agreement  to 
furnish  an  abstract  means  an  abstract  of  the  records  in  the  re- 
corder's office  and  all  the  records  showing  the  title  of  the  vendor 
to  the  real  estate."*  It  is  a  statement  of  the  substance  of  the  mat- 
ters appearing  in  the  public  records  affecting  the  title  to  the  real 
estate  involved.*''^  By  some  authorities  it  means  not  only  a  state- 
ment in  substance  of  what  appears  on  the  public  records  affecting 
the  title,  but  also  a  statement  in  substance  of  those  facts  which 
do  not  appear  on  the  public  records  necessary  to  perfect  the 
title. ®°  Where  an  abstract  of  title  furnished  by  a  vendor  to  a  ven- 
dee under  a  contract  of  sale  does  not  connect  the  vendor  wath  the 
title,  but  shows  it  to  be  in  a  third  person,  the  vendee  may  properly 


60  Howe  V.  Hutchinson.  105  111.  501  ; 
Des  Moines  &c.  Real  Estate  Co.  v. 
Beale,  78  111.  App.  40. 

61  Boas  V.  Farrington,  85  Cal.  535, 
24  Pac.  787. 

62  Smith  V.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533,  23 
Pac.  217. 

«3  Papin  V.  Goodrich,  103  111.  86. 
64  Stevenson  V.  Polk,  71  Iowa  278,  32 
N.  W.  340. 


65  Union  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Chis- 
holm.  33  111.  App.  647. 

66  Tasker  v.  Garrett  County,  82  Md. 
150.  33  Atl.  407;  Loring  v.  Oxford, 
18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  415,  45  S.  W.  395; 
Ilollifield  V.  Landrum,  31  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  187,  71  S.  W.  979;  Dickinson  v. 
Chesapeake  R.  Co.,  7  W.  Va.  390. 


i 


29  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    26 

refuse  to  comply  with  the  contract  of  sale,  though  a  sufficient 
deed  to  the  vendor  is  afterward  exhibited  to  the  vendee,  since  the 
absence  of  the  vendor's  name  from  the  abstract  does  not  show 
whether  any  conveyances  have  been  made  by  the  vendor,  or  any 
judgments  recovered  against  him,  or  any  other  facts  which  would 
affect  the  title  as  to  him.*''  There  is  no  agreement  to  furnish  an 
abstract  where  the  contract  of  sale  and  purchase  simply  provides 
that  "title  to  be  satisfactory  and  a  warranty  deed  given,""^  or  to 
"make  good  title  and  give  a  warranty  deed."^^ 

§  26.     Duty  to  furnish  abstract  irrespective  of  agreement. 

— In  England  it  would  seem  that  the  vendor  must  furnish  the 
vendee  with  an  abstract  of  title  irrespective  of  any  agreement 
upon  the  subject.""  The  reason  assigned  for  this  is,  that  the  ven- 
dee, in  the  absence  of  any  record  of  the  vendor's  muniments  of 
title,  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  inspect  them  or  their  equiv- 
alents, unless  he  has  agreed  to  take  the  title  without  such  inspec- 
tion. But  it  is  the  usual  practice  in  that  country  to  insert  in  the 
contract  of  sale  a  provision  that  the  vendor  shall,  within  a  stated 
time,  prepare  at  his  own  expense  and  deliver  to  the  purchaser 
an  abstract  of  the  title.'^  Although  the  vendor  should  think  fit  to 
deliver  his  title  deeds  to  a  purchaser  in  lieu  of  an  abstract,  the 
purchaser  would  yet  have  a  right  to  require  an  abstract  of  title 
at  the  vendor's  expense."  In  this  country  the  universal  custom 
now  prevailing  in  the  transfer  of  real  estate  is  for  the  vendor  to 
furnish  to  the  vendee  satisfactory  evidence  of  his  title,  and  this  is 
usually  done  by  furnishing  him  an  abstract.  "An  abstract  has 
become  the  usual  concomitant  of  every  instrument  evidencing  an 
interest  or  ownership  in  land."'^  But,  in  the  absence  of  an  ex- 
press agreement  to  furnish  an  abstract,  the  vendor  is  not  bound 
to  furnish  one,  and  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  purchaser  to  provide 
an  abstract  and  to  satisfy  himself  as  to  the  condition  of  the  title."* 

6- Union  Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Chis-  ^i  Dart  Vend.  &   Purch.    (Sth  ed.) 

holm,  33  111.  App.  647 ;  Drury  v.  Mick-  125. 

elberry,  144  Mo.  App.  212,  129  S.  W.  "  Preston  on  Abstracts,  p.  34. 

237.  "Gate  City  Abstract  Co.  v.  Post, 

68  Taylor  v.  Williams.  45  Mo.  80.  55  Nebr.  742,  76  N.  W.  471. 

GSTapp  V.  Nock.  89  Ky.  414,  12  S.  "*  Bolton   v.   Branch.   22  Ark.  435; 

W.  713.  11  Ky.  L.  611.  Easton  v.   Montgomery  90  Cal.  307; 

^0  Williams   Real    Prof.    (6th    ed.),  27  Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123;  Symns, 

450;  2  Sudg  Vend  (Sth  ed)  29  (428)  ;  v.  Cutter,  9  Kans.  App.  210,  59  Pac. 

Dart  Vend.  (Sth  ed.)  125.  671;  Carr  v.  Roach.  2  Duer  (N.  Y.) 

20;  Espy  V.  Anderson,  14  Pa.  St.  308. 


§  26 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


30 


"In  the  absence  of  any  special  agreement,  the  purchaser  must 
look  for  himself  to  the  records  for  the  validity  of  the  title  to 
lands  he  would  purchase. "^^  Since  the  title  is  of  record,  the  ap- 
plication of  the  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor,  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cial agreement,  requires  the  purchaser  to  satisfy  himself  as  to  the 
sufficiency  of  the  title,  and  for  that  purpose  to  procure  an  ab- 
stract of  the  title,  if  he  desires  it,  and  to  make  the  necessary  in- 
vestigation/" The  Supreme  Court  of  Alabamia,  following  the 
English  rule,  has  held  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  vendor,  when  re- 
quired, to  furnish  to  the  purchaser  an  abstract  of  the  title/'^  It 
would  seem  that  as  between  mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  the  for- 
mer must  furnish  the  latter  an  abstract  of  title  and  pay  for  same. 
The  reason  assigned  for  this  rule  is,  that  the  mortgagee  is  en- 
titled to  the  full  amount  of  his  loan  and  interest,  and  without 
discount  for  expenses  incurred  in  preparing  the  security  and 
ascertaining  its  value. '^^  Where  there  is  no  agreement  obligating 
the  vendor  to  furnish  the  vendee  with  an  abstract  of  the  title,  the 
latter  is  not  at  liberty  to  pronounce  the  title  defective  without  any 
examination,  or  upon  a  partial  examination.  Having  assumed  to 
examine  the  title  for  the  purpose  of  determining  w'hether  it  was 
good,  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to  make  a  complete  examination 
thereof.  He  could  call  upon  the  vendor  for  any  information  with 
reference  thereto,  and  it  then  would  be  the  duty  of  the  vendor  to 
furnish  such  information  as  he  possesses.'^  If,  upon  such  exam- 
ination, it  appears  to  him  that  the  title  is  defective,  it  then  becomes 
his  duty  to  report  to  the  vendor  the  particulars  wherein  such  de- 
fects are  claimed  to  exist,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  time  fixed  by 
the  contract  of  sale  within  which  the  vendor  must  remove  the  de- 
fects, or  satisfy  the  vendee's  objections,  a  reasonable  time  will  be 
allowed  therefor.*^"  If  the  vendor  fails  within  such  time  to  rem- 
edy the  defects  thus  pointed  out,  the  vendee  in  an  action  to  re- 
cover the  purchase-money  or  deposit  paid  by  him  on  the  ground 
that  the  title  is  defective,  is  limited  to  such  defects  as  were  then 
pointed  out.*"^ 


''^'  Symns  v.  Cutter,  9  Kans.  App. 
210.  59  Pac.  671. 

^*5  Easton  v.  Montgomery.  90  Cal. 
307,  27  Pac.  280;  25  Am.  St.  123; 
Espy  V.  Anderson,  14  Pa.  St.  308. 

"^Chapman  v.  Lee,  55  Ala.  616; 
Wade  V.  Killough,  5  Stew.  &  P, 
(Ala.)  450. 


'  s  Mart,   on   Abst.   9. 

-f  Benson  v.  Shotwell,  87  Cal.  49. 
25  Pac.  249. 

*o  More  V.  Smedburgh,  8  Paige  (N. 
Y.)  600. 

^^  Easton  v.  Montgomery,  90  Cal. 
307,  27  Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123. 


31  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    27 

§  27.  Contract  by  broker  to  furnish  abstract. — It  has  been 
held  that  authority  conferred  on  a  real  estate  broker  to  make  a 
binding  contract  for  the  sale  of  land  includes  power  to  bind  the 
grantor  to  furnish  an  abstract  of  title. ^^  But  it  would  seem  that 
if  the  grantor  is  not  required  to  furnish  an  abstract,  a  real  estate 
broker  employed  to  find  a  purchaser  for  his  property  at  a  price 
stipulated  in  the  contract  of  employment,  has  no  power,  in  mak- 
ing a  contract  of  sale,  to  bind  the  grantor  to  furnish  an  abstract.®^ 
A  real  estate  broker  who  has  no  express  authority  from  his  prin- 
cipal to  agree  to  furnish  a  satisfactory  abstract  of  title  has  no 
implied  authority  to  so  agree,  and  a  contract  made  by  him,  con- 
taining such  agreement,  is  in  excess  of  his  authority.®*  It  is  well 
settled  that,  if  the  broker  relies  for  his  commission  on  having 
made  a  sale  under  the  authority  conferred  on  him  by  the  owner, 
he  must  prove  a  sale  made  on  the  terms  and  conditions  specified 
by  the  owner.®^  A  real  estate  broker's  authority  is  limited  to  the 
precise  terms  given  him  by  his  principal,  and  the  principal  is  not 
bound  by  a  departure  there  from. ^^ 

§  28.     Requiring  abstracts  of  parties  to  real  actions. — The 

statutes  of  many  states  provide  .that  either  party  to  a  real  action 
may  require  the  other  to  furnish  an  abstract  of  the  title  or  titles 
to  the  real  estate  involved.  The  time  for  furnishing  the  abstract 
is  usually  regulated  by  the  statute  requiring  it  to  be  furnished. 
Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  court  may,  in  all  proper  cases, 
upon  motion,  order  abstracts  of  title  to  be  furnished,  it  was  held 
that  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  upon  a  fire  insurance  policy  could 
not  be  required  to  furnish  an  abstract  of  title  to  the  property 
which  was  destroyed  by  fire.®'  Where  the  action  was  for  the  pos- 
session of  the  land  described  in  the  complaint  and  to  quiet  title 
thereto,  and  the  plaintiff  had  filed  an  abstract  of  title  showing 
upon  what  deeds  of  conveyance  she  relied  to  prove  such  title,  it 

82  Jasper    v.    Wilson,    14    N.    Mex..  ss  Blodgett  v.  Sioux  Citv  &  St.  P. 

482,  94  Pac.  951,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  R.  Co.,  63  Iowa  606,   19  N.  W.  799; 

982n.  Smith  v.  Allen,  101   Iowa  608.  70  N. 

ssRaston   v.    Montgomery,   90    Cal.  W.  694;  Balkema  v.  Searle,  116  Iowa 

307,  27  Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123 ;  Gil-  374,  89  N.  W.  1087. 

bert  V.  Baxter,  71  Iowa  327,  32  N.  W.  so  Balkema  v.  Searle,  116  Iowa  374, 

364:  Balkema  v.  Searle,  116  Iowa  374,  89  N.  W.  1087;  Ballou  v.  Berevend- 

89  N.  W.   1087 ;  Hunt  v.  Tuttle.   133  sen.  9  N.  Dak.  285.  83  N.  W.  10. 

Iowa  647,   110  N.  W.   1026;  Espy  v.  s^  phoenix    Ins.    Co.    v.    Rowe,    117 

Anderson,  14  Pa.  St.  308.  Ind.  202,  20  N.  E.  122. 

S4  Mitchell   V.   Hagge    (Iowa),    160 
N.  W.  287. 


§    29  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  32 

was  held  that  she  was  not  required  to  furnish  a  more  complete 
abstract. ^^  When  an  abstract  is  furnished  pursuant  to  the  statute, 
either  voluntarily  or  by  order  of  court,  it  constitutes  no  part  of 
the  complaint.^''  Where  a  statute  provides  that  an  abstract  may 
be  demanded  in  an  action  in  ejectment,  it  is  not  to  be  construed 
as  requiring  the  production  of  an  abstract  in  the  technical  sense. 
It  is  sufificient  if  it  be  specific  enough  to  advise  the  opposite  party 
of  the  title  upon  which  reliance  will  be  placed. °°  Where  a  statute 
provided  in  substance  that  either  party  may  demand  of  the  other 
an  abstract  in  writing  of  the  claim  of  title  upon  which  he  relies, 
which  must  be  filed  within  a  specified  time,  and  in  default  thereof 
no  evidence  of  the  title  of  such  opposite  party  shall  be  given  on 
the  trial,  it  was  held  that  where  the  abstract  filed  stated  that  a 
deed  in  the  chain  of  title  was  recorded  in  volume  5  of  the  records 
of  deeds,  while  in  fact  it  w^as  recorded  in  book  lettered  V,  it  was 
not  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  statute."^ 

§  29.  Abstract  where  records  destroyed. — Where  the 
public  records  and  title  papers  have  been  lost  or  destroyed,  an 
abstract  of  title,  or  letter  press  copy  thereof,  made  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business  prior  to  such  loss  or  destruction,  and  delivered 
to  the  parties  interested  in  the  land,  is  generally  regarded  as  com- 
petent evidence  of  the  facts  therein  recited."^  Such  abstract  or 
copy  thereof  is  rendered  competent  evidence  either  by  comity,  or, 
in  some  states,  by  statutory  enactment.  But  before  it  can  be  relied 
on  as  evidence  under  a  statute,  the  requirements  of  the  statute 
must  be  complied  with.  Thus  an  affidavit  which  states  that  the 
original  documents  referred  to 'in  a  certified  abstract  are  not  in 
the  possession  of  the  complainant  and  "that  they  have  been  either 
lost  or  destrayed,  and  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  complainant  to 
produce  them,"  was  held  insufficient  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the 
introduction  of  the  abstract  in  evidence,  under  the  statute,  be- 
cause the  affidavit  failed  to  show  that  the  original  instrument  was 
not  intentionally  destroyed  or  disposed  of  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
troducing a  copy.^^ 

88  Roberts  v.  Vornholt,  126  Ind.  511,  f-"  Jackson  v.  Tribble,  156  Ala.  480, 
26  N.  E.  207.  47  So.  310. 

89  Roberts  v.  Vornholt,  126  Ind.  511,  ''i  Coler  v.  Alexander  60  Tc.x.  Civ. 
26  N.  E.  207 :  Hoover  v.  Weesner,  147  App.  573,  128  S.  W.  664. 

Ind.  510,  45  N.  E.  650,  46  N.  K.  905 ;        "2  Russell  v.  Mandell,  73  111.  136. 
O'Mara   v.    McCarthy,   45    Ind.   App.        03  Bauer  v.  Glos,  244  111.  627,  91  N. 
147;  90  N.  E.  330.  E.  701. 


33  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    30 

§  30.  Property  in  the  abstract. — In  England  the  pur- 
chaser has  a  temporary  right  of  property  in  the  abstract  during 
the  negotiations  for  sale  of  the  land,  and  an  absolute  ownership 
therein  if  the  sale  be  consummated.^*  There  seems  to  be  no  rea- 
son why  this  rule  should  not  apply  in  this  country.^^  Our  courts 
have  held  that  the  absolute  right  of  property  in  the  abstract  re- 
mains in  the  vendor  until  the  sale  is  consummated.  Pending  the 
sale  the  vendee  is  entitled  to  the  custody  of  the  abstract  and  has  a 
special  property  therein,  which  he  can  enforce  against  the  vendor 
or  other  persons.  But  immediately  upon  the  rescission  of  the 
contract  of  sale  all  his  rights  in  and  to  the  abstract  cease.°"  If 
the  contract  of  sale  is,  for  any  reason,  rescinded,  the  purchaser 
can  not  hold  the  abstract  as  a  security  for  the  return  of  any  pur- 
chase-money he  may  have  paid.**^  As  between  mortgagor  and 
mortgagee,  the  rule  is  that  an  abstract  furnished  by  the  mort- 
gagor to  assist  the  mortgagee  in  examining  the  title  becomes  a 
part  of  the  security  for  the  loan,  and  may  be  retained  by  the 
mortgagee  until  the  mortgage  is  discharged.'*^ 

§  31.  Delivery  of  abstract. — An  executory  contract  for 
the  sale  and  purchase  of  real  estate  requiring  the  furnishing  of 
an  abstract  implies  that  it  shall  be  furnished  sufficiently  long  be- 
fore the  date  of  the  consummation  of  the  sale  and  payment  of 
the  purchase-money  for  the  purchaser  to  have  opportunity  to  ex- 
amine it.°°  If  such  contract  provides  for  the  exhibition  of  an  ab- 
stract showing  title  in  the  vendor  by  a  day  named,  this  is  a  con- 
dition precedent  to  be  performed  before  either  party  can  call 
upon  the  other  to  perform  the  agreement,  and  if  the  abstract  is 
not  satisfactory,  or  fails  to  show  the  title  agreed  to  be  made,  the 
other  may  elect  to  consider  the  contract  at  an  end.^  If  the  vendor 
does  not  produce  the  abstract  at  the  appointed  time,  the  purchaser 
may  rescind  the  contract  and  recover  his  deposit.^  When  the  con- 
tract calls  for  an  abstract  show^ing  good  title  by  a  day  certain,  the 
vendor  can  not  demand  time  to  furnish  an  additional  abstract  if 
the  first  is  defective.^   But  a  purchaser  w^ho  has  granted  the  ven- 

94  Roberts  v.  Wyatt,  2  Taunt,  268;  9s  Holm  v.  Wust,  11  Abb.  Pr.    (N. 

Langslow  v.  Cox,  1  Chit.  98.  S.)    (N.  Y.)   113. 

»5  Chapman  v.  Lee.  55  Ala.  616.  ^9  Compton  v.  Bagley,  1  Ch.  313. 

i'e  Jackson   v.    Conlin,    50   111.   App.  i  Howe  v.  Hutchinson,  105  111.  501. 

538;  Espy  v.  Anderson,  14  Pa.  St.  308.  2  Williams  v.  Daly,  33  111.  App.  454. 

«7  Jackson    v.    Conlin,    50    111.    App.  s  Howe  v.  Hutchinson,  105  111.  501 ; 

538.  Williams  v.  Daly,  33  111.  App.  454. 
3 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    32  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  34 

dor  time  to  remedy  defects  in  an  abstract  will  not  be  allowed  to 
rescind  for  failure  to  furnish  an  additional  abstract  within  a  rea- 
sonable time  without  notifying  the  vendor  that  he  will  wait  no 
longer,  where  he  receives  the  abstract  furnished  as  if  he  meant  to 
have  it  examined.*  Where  the  vendor  agrees  to  furnish  an  ab- 
stract of  title  within  a  certain  specified  number  of  days  from  the 
date  of  the  contract,  which  he  fails  to  do,  and  the  vendee  raises 
no  objection  on  that  ground,  and  continues  to  make  payments 
under  the  contract  and  otherwise  treats  it  as  still  in  force,  he  will 
be  deemed  to  have  waived  the  performance  of  that  condition,  and 
can  not  maintain  rescission  or  recover  the  money  advanced  on 
account  of  such  default/  If  no  time  is  fixed  in  the  contract  for 
the  delivery  of  the  abstract  to  the  purchaser,  it  may  be  delivered 
within  a  reasonable  time."  Where  the  contract  required  the  ven- 
dor to  furnish  an  abstract  within  a  reasonable  time,  it  was  held 
that  what  was  a  reasonable  time  depended  on  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  and  the  fact  that  a  payment  was  to  be  made  within 
thirty-five  days  from  the  date  of  the  contract  did  not  necessarily 
mean  that  the  abstract  should  be  delivered  within  that  time.^  If 
the  contract  provides  that  an  abstract  shall  be  furnished  "without 
delay,"  the  vendee  must  allege  and  prove  a  demand,  and  a  refusal 
to  deliver  the  abstract  within  a  reasonable  time  thereafter,  to  en- 
title him  to  a  rescission  of  the  contract.^ 

§  32.  Tender  of  abstract  after  expiration  of  agreed  time. 
— Should  the  vendee  wish  to  insist  on  a  breach  of  the  contract  of 
sale  due  to  the  vendor's  failure  to  furnish  an  abstract  within  the 
time  specified,  he  must  decline  to  accept  it,  if  tendered  to  him 
after  the  period  limited  by  the  terms  of  the  contract.  If  he  ac- 
cepts the  abstract  after  a  breach  of  the  condition  respecting  the 
time  of  delivery,  he  waives  his  right  to  claim  rescission  on  ac- 
count of  such  breach.  In  a  case  where  the  contract  provided  that 
the  vendor  should  deliver  an  abstract  within  ten  days  from  the 
signing  of  the  contract,  but  he  did  not  do  so  until  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  prescribed  ten  days,  and  the  abstract  was  accepted, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  said :  "The  effect  of  the 

4  Jackson  v.  Conlin,  50  111.  App.  538.        7  Jackson  v.  Conlin.  50  111.  App.  538. 

5  McAlpine  v.  Reicheneker,  56  ^  Cummings  v.  Wilson,  99  Minn. 
Kans.  100,  42  Pac.  339.  502,  110  N.  W.  4. 

6  Martin  v.  Roberts,  127  Iowa  218, 
102  N.  W.  1126. 


35  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    33 

fact  that  the  abstract  was  not  deHvered  within  ten  days  after  sale 
has  been  waived  by  the  acceptance  of  it,  when  deHvered,  without 
objection,  and  its  retention  for  months  without  specifically  re- 
ferring to  any  other  defects  in  the  title  than  those  amendable  by 
the  steps  taken  in  the  county  court  suggested  by  the  buyer's  coun- 
sel as  necessary  to  perfect  the  title. "^  The  vendee  can  not  waive 
the  condition  to  furnish  an  abstract  within  a  specified  time,  and 
subsequently  obtain  rescission,  or  recover  the  money  advanced, 
by  reason  of  such  default.^"  Thus  where  the  vendor  agreed  to 
furnish  the  vendee  an  abstract  within  thirty  days  from  the  date 
of  sale,  which  was  not  done,  and  the  vendee  thereafter  treated 
the  default  as  immaterial,  and  continued  to  make  payments  under 
the  contract,  and  otherwise  treated  the  contract  as  still  in  force, 
he  was  denied  rescission,  or  a  recovery  of  the  money  advanced, 
on  account  of  such  default/^ 

§  33.  Merger  in  deed  of  contract  to  deliver  abstract, — 
Whether  a  contract  for  the  future  delivery  of  an  abstract  show- 
ing a  good  title  is  merged  in  a  warranty  deed,  and  a  mortgage 
executed  by  the  purchaser  to  secure  payment  of  purchase-money, 
all  of  which  instruments  were  executed  simultaneously,  must  be 
determined  from  an  examination  of  such  instruments,  taking 
into  consideration  the  situation,  conduct  and  intention  of  the  par- 
ties. The  provision  in  the  contract  will  be  merged  in  the  deed  if 
the  latter  instrument  is  accepted  as  a  performance  of  the  condi- 
tion, but  the  deed  will  not  supersede  the  provision  if  it  is  agreed 
and  intended  by  the  parties  that  the  provision  relative  to  furnish- 
ing the  abstract  is  to  continue  in  full  force  and  effect."  It  can 
not  be  said  as  a  matter  of  law  that  a  contract  of  sale  is  merged 
in  a  subsequent  deed,  especially  where  there  is  no  inconsistency 
between  the  provisions  of  the  contract  and  the  deed.^^  But  a  writ- 
ten contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  is  superseded  and  extin- 
guished by  a  subsequent  deed  of  conveyance  between  the  same 
parties,  which  covers  in  its  provisions  all  of  the  stipulations  con- 
tained in  the  contract.^* 

s  Kentucky    Distilleries    &c.    Co.    v.  "  Nothe  v.   Nomer,   54   Conn.   326, 

Blanton,  149  Fed.  31,  80  C.  C.  A.  343.  8  Atl.  134;  Witbeck  v.  Waine,  16  N. 

_  loMcAlpine     v.     Reicheneker,     56  Y.  532;  Close  v.  Zell.  141  Pa.  390,  21 

Kans.  100,  42  Pac.  339.  Alt.  770,  23  Am.  St.  296. 

"McAlpine     v.     Reicheneker,     56  ^^  Hampe  v.  Higgins,  74  Kans.  296, 

Kans.  100,  42  Pac.  339.  85  Pac.  1019. 

12  Read  v.  Loftus,  82  Kans.  485.  108 
Pac.  850,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  457n. 


§    34  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  36 

§  34.  Waiver  of  objections  to  title  by  taking  possession. — 
Whether  or  not  a  purchaser  waives  objections  to  the  title  by  tak- 
ing possession  of  the  premises  is  clearly  one  of  fact.  If  he  takes 
possession  with  knowledge  of  defects,  the  general  rule  is  that  he 
thereby  waives  his  right  to  rescind  the  contract  or  to  recover 
damages  against  the  vendor/^  But  the  rule  is  otherwise  where 
the  purchaser  was  not  aware  of  the  objections  to  the  title  w^hen 
he  took  possession  ;^°  or  where  the  contract  of  sale  authorizes  him 
to  take  possesion  before  title  is  made ;"  or  w^here  under  the  con- 
tract he  is  entitled  to  call  for  a  good  title  and  takes  possession  with 
the  concurrence  of  the  vendor;^*  or  where  the  vendor  has  agreed 
to  remove  the  objection  to  the  title."  Where  the  contract  of  sale 
provides  that  the  vendor  shall  furnish  an  abstract  showing  a 
good  title,  the  fact  that  the  vendee  has  taken  possession  of  the 
land  and  made  improvements  thereon,  is  not  conclusive  evidence 
that  he  has  waived  the  stipulation  as  to  title.""  If  the  vendor  de- 
livers an  abstract  to  the  purchaser's  attorney  in  compliance  with 
the  contract  of  sale,  and  the  attorney  in  good  faith  makes  objec- 
tions to  the  title,  and  the  vendor,  for  the  purpose  of  removing 
one  of  these  objections,  promises  to  prosecute  an  action  to  quiet 
title,  the  fact  that  the  vendee  continues  in  possession  for  a  rea- 
sonable time  in  reliance  upon  such  promise,  will  not  be  denied 
rescission,  where  the  vendor  refuses  to  take  any  steps  to  remove 
the  objections.  But  an  unreasonable  delay  on  the  part  of  the 
purchaser  in  instituting  a  suit  for  rescission,  w^hile  it  does  not 
constitute,  as  a  legal  proposition,  a  waiver  of  the  stipulation  in 
the  contract  to  give  good  title,  is,  nevertheless,  a  proper  circum- 
stance for  consideration  in  determining  whether  or  not  rescission 
should  be  decreed."^  Where  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  mineral 
lands  provided  that  the  vendor  furnish  the  vendee  a  sufficient  ab- 
stract of  title  showing  clear  title  in  the  vendor,  and  where  ab- 
stracts were  delivered  to  the  vendee  who  took  possession  of  the 

J'^  Barnett   v.    Gaines.    8    Ala.    Z7Z;  (S.  Car.)  370;  Hendricks  v.  Gillespie, 

Tompkins    v.    Hyatt.    28    N.    Y.   347;  25  Grat.  (Va.)  181. 

Caswell  V.  Black  River  Mf^  Co.,  14  i^  Magaw  v.  Lathrop,  4  Watts  &  S. 

Johns.     <N.    Y.)     453;     Mitchell    v.  (Pa.)  316. 

Pinckney,   13    S.   Car.  203;    Christian  i>' Barnett  v.  Wheeler,  7  M.  &  W. 

V.  Cabell,  22  Gratt.  (Va.)  99.  363. 

1"  Cans  V.   Renshaw,  2   Pa.   St.  34,  20  Read  v.  Loftus.  82  Kans.  485,  108 

44  Am.  Dec.  152.  Pac.  850,  31   L.  R.  A.   (N.   S.)   457n. 

17  Thompson  v.  Dulles,  5  Rich.  Eq.  21  Read  v.  Loftus,  82  Kans.  485.  108 

Pac.  850,  31  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  457n. 


Z7  ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL  §    35 

property,  and  nearly  three  years  after  executing  the  contract  of 
sale  exchanged  the  property  acquired  for  other  property,  it  was 
held  that  there  was  an  acceptance  on  the  part  of  the  original  ven- 
dee of  the  title  to  the  property  as  a  sufificient  compliance  with  the 
terms  of  the  contract.-^ 

§  35.  Time  in  which  to  examine  abstract. — Sufficient  time 
in  which  to  examine  and  verify  the  abstract  should  be  given  the 
purchaser  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  sale,  and  where  no  time 
is  specified  therein,  he  will  be  allowed  a  reasonable  time  for  that 
purpose. ^^  Unless  he  has  expressly  agreed  to  do  so,  he  can  not 
be  required  to  pay  the  purchase-money  before  he  has  examined 
the  abstract.^*  Where  a  vendor  contracts  to  sell  land,  agreeing 
to  furnish  an  abstract  of  title,  and  the  vendee  is  to  have  a  speci- 
fied number  of  days  from  the  date  of  the  contract  in  which  to  ex- 
amine the  title  and  pay  the  purchase-money,  a  tender  of  the  pur- 
chase-money after  the  expiration  of  the  time  given  for  such  ex- 
amination and  payment  is  too  late,  and  specific  performance  will 
be  denied,  though  the  vendor  did  not  furnish  the  abstract  within 
the  time  limited  for  such  examination  and  payment.^^  When  the 
record  shows  an  apparent  encumbrance,  the  most  that  the  vendor 
can  insist  upon  is  that  the  vendee  shall  satisfy  himself  within  a 
reasonable  time  whether  such  apparent  encumbrance  is  valid  or 
not.^**  After  the  purchaser  has  examined  the  abstract  in  the  time 
allowed  for  that  purpose,  it  is  his  duty  to  point  out  his  objections 
to  the  title,  if  any,  so  as  to  give  the  vendor  an  opportunity  to  re- 
move them."^  If  he  retains  the  abstract  an  unreasonable  length 
of  time,  without  making  any  objections  thereto,  he  will  be 
deemed  to  have  waived  any  defects  there  may  be  in  the  title.'* 
But  in  the  absence  of  any  waiver  of  defects,  it  would  seem  that 
the  vendee  is  not  bound  at  his  peril  to  point  out  his  objections 
•specifically  in  order  to  insist  on  a  breach  of  the  contract."^  Where 
the  vendee  is  given  a  specified  time  in  which  to  examine  the  ab- 

22  Thornburg  v.  Doolittle,  148  Iowa  Goodell  v.  Sanford,  31  Mont.  163,  11 

530,  125  N.  W.  1003.  Pac.  522. 

23Hoyt  V.  Tuxbury,  70  111.  331.  28  Stevenson  v.  Polk,  71  Iowa  278, 

2*  Pennsylvania  Min.  Co.  v.  Thorn-  32  N.  W.  340. 

as,  204  Pa.  325,  54  Alt.  101.  29  Smith  v.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533.  23 

25Kelsey  v.  Crowther,  7  Utah  519,  Pac.  217;    Howe  v.   Hutchinson,    105 

27  Pac.  695.  111.    501;    Lessenich    v.    Sellers.    119 

26  Allen  v.  Atkinson,  21   Mich.  351.  Iowa  314,  93  N.  W.  348:  Kane  v.  Rip- 

27  Easton    v.    Montgomery,   90   Cal.  pey,  22  Ore.  296,  23  Pac.  180. 
307,   27    Pac.   280,   25    Am.    St.    123; 


§    36  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  38 

stract,  he  may  abandon  the  contract  at  the  expiration  of  the  time, 
if  he  finds  that  the  vendor  has  not  such  a  title  as  the  contract  calls 
for.^"  Even  if  he  makes  no  objection  to  the  title  at  the  expiration 
of  the  time  allotted  for  the  examination,  the  vendor  can  not  com- 
pel specific  performance  of  the  contract  if  his  title  is  defective.^^ 
But  the  purchaser  can  not  recover  back  his  deposit  where  he  has 
not,  at  the  expiration  of  the  specified  time,  notified  the  vendor 
that  the  title  is  unsatisfactory,  and  that  he  intends  to  rescind  the 
contract.^^  Where  the  vendor,  in  pursuance  of  his  agreement 
with  the  purchaser,  furnishes  an  abstract  showing  the  title  to  the 
land,  and  the  purchaser  accepts  same  without  objection,  and 
keeps  it  until  the  time  allowed  the  vendor  to  furnish  the  abstract 
has  passed,  the  purchaser  can  not  then  insist  upon  its  insufficiency 
as  a  breach  of  the  contract.^^ 

§  36.  Taxation  of  abstract  books. — There  is  a  lack  of  uni- 
formity of  opinion  relative  to  the  question  of  the  liability  of  ab- 
stract books  to  taxation.  Some  courts  class  them  with  private 
manuscripts  as  being  of  no  intrinsic  value,  and  for  this  reason 
say  they  are  not  liable  to  taxation.  These  authorities  contend 
that  such  books  are  only  valuable  for  the  information  they  con- 
tain, and  that  information  is  conveyed  by  consultation  or  ex- 
tracts; that  their  value  is  only  kept  up  by  their  completeness  and 
continued  correction;  that  the  sale  of  a  complete  copy  would 
practically  destroy  their  value  in  the  hands  of  their  owner;  and 
that  a  similar  compilation  by  any  one  else  would  have  a  like  re- 
sult. They  hold  that  the  value  of  such  books,  except  as  they  are 
used,  is  nothing;  that  they  resemble  in  nature,  if  not  precisely, 
the  books  which  are  consulted  by  any  person  who  makes  an  in- 
come from  his  acquired  knowledge,  whether  scientific  or  other- 
wise.^* Although  such  books  may  be  made  subject  to  levy  and 
sale  on  execution  by  statute,  it  is  held  that  such  a  statute  will  not 
operate  as  modifying  the  rule  by  which  they  are  considered  not 
to  be  subject  to  taxation. ^^   In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  such 

30  Mead  v.  Fox,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  -*  Stevens  v.  Gladding,  17  How. 
199.  (U.  S.)   447,  15  L.  ed.   155;  Dart  v. 

31  Packard  v.  Usher,  7  Gray  Woodhouse,  40  Mich.  399,  29  Am. 
(Mass.)  529.  Rep.  544;    Perry  v.   Big    Rapids,    67 

3^  Anderson  v.  Strassburger,  92  Gal.  Alich.  146,  34  N.  W.  530,  11  Am.  St. 

38,  27  Pac.  1095.  570;  Banker  v.  Caldwell,  3  Minn.  94. 

33  Moot   V.    Business    Men's    Assn.,  35  Loomis  v.  Jackson,  130  Mich.  594, 

157  N.  Y.  201,  52  N.  E.  1,  45  L.  R.  A.  90  N.  W.  328. 
666. 


39 


ABSTRACTS    IN    GENERAL 


36 


books,  being  used  as  a  means  of  profit,  are  considered  property 
having  a  market  value,  and  may  be  properly  assessed  for  taxa- 
tion.^*^  It  is  argued  that  the  chief  value  of  such  books  consists  in 
their  contents  being  kept  from  the  public.  "They  are  the  means, 
in  a  sense  the  instruments,  for  carrying  on  a  business;  as  much 
so  as  are  the  tools  or  machinery  by  which  the  artisan  plies  his 
calling.""  It  is  held  that  the  fact  that  the  books  are  largely  in 
abbreviations  and  in  cipher  code  which  only  a  limited  number 
of  persons  understand  does  not  render  them  exempt  from  taxa- 
tion.^^ 


3^  Leon  Loan  &c.  Co.  v.  Equaliza- 
tion Board,  86  Iowa  127.  53  N.  W.  94, 
17  L.  R.  A.  199,  41  Am.  St.  486; 
Booth  V.  Phelps,  8  Wash.  549,  23  L. 
R.  A.  864,  36  Pac.  489,  40  Am.  St. 
921. 


37  Leon  Loan  &c.  Co.  v.  Equaliza- 
tion Board,  86  Iowa  127,  53  N.  W.  94, 
17  L.  R.  A.  199.  41  Am.  St.  486. 

38  Booth  V.  Phelps,  8  Wash.  549,  36 
Pac.  489,  23  L.  R.  A.  864,  40  Am.  St. 
921. 


CHAPTER    11 


ESTATES,  INTERESTS  AND  RIGHTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY 


SEC 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 


Estates  defined  and  distinguished. 

General  classification  of  estates. 

Estates  in  fee  simple. 

Modified  fees. 

Conditional  fees  at  common  law. 

Creation  of   fee  simple  estate  by 

deed. 

46.  Creation  of   fee  simple  estate  by 
will. 

47.  Limitations     and     restrictions     in 
transfers  of  fee  simple  estates. 

48.  Estates  in  fee  tail. 

49.  Life  estates. 

50.  Estates  for  years. 

51.  Estates  at  will. 

52.  Estates  at  sufferance. 


53.  Estates  from  year  to  year. 

54.  Estates  upon  condition. 

55.  Estates  upon  limitation. 

56.  Estates    upon    conditional    limita- 
tion. 

57.  Legal  and  equitable  estates. 

58.  Uses. 

59.  Trusts. 

60.  Powers. 

61.  Easements. 

62.  Licenses. 

63.  Profits  a  prendre. 

64.  Curtesy. 

65.  Dower. 

66.  Homestead. 

67.  Widow's  quarantine. 


§  40.  Estates  defined  and  distinguished. — The  term  "es- 
tate" is  used  in  various  senses.  It  is  often  used  to  designate  the 
property  composing  the  assets  of  a  descendant,  or  the  property, 
real  and  personal,  belonging  to  an  existing  individual,^  and  in  its 
broadest  sense  is  held  to  include  choses  in  action."  "The  word  'es- 
tate,' unqualified  or  restricted,  is  always  construed  to  embrace 
every  description  of  property,  real,  personal,  and  mixed."^  But 
when  api^Jied  to  real  property,  it  signifies  not  only  the  title  or  in- 
terest which  the  owner  has  therein,  bufthe  state,  condition  or  cir- 
cumstances in  which  he  stands  in  regard  to  it,  and  has  relation  to 
the  quantity  or  interest  he  has  therein,  and  the  time  at  which  that 
quantity  or  interest  is  to  be  enjoyed.*  Subjectively  speaking,  an 
estate  in  lands  is  the  quantity  of  interest  w'hich  the  owner  thereof 
has,  from  a  fee  simple  down  to  naked  possession.^  It  expresses 
the  owner's  position  with  regard  to  the  degree,  quantity,  nature 
or  extent  of  interest  he  has  in  land,''  and,  particularly,  with  ref- 

1  Sellers  v.  Sellers,  35  Ala.  235.  ''•  Robertson  v.  Vancleave,  129  Ind. 

2  State  V.  Fidelity  &c.  Co.,  35  Tex.    217,  26  N.  E.  899,  29  N.  E.  781,  15  L. 


Civ.  App.  214,  80  S.  W.  544. 

3  Pulliam  V.  Pulliam,  10  Fed.  25. 

*  In  re  Rash's  Estate  (Pa.),  2  Pars. 
Eq.   Cas.   160. 

5  Moody  V.  Farr,  33*  Miss.  195  ;  Jack- 
son V.  Parker,  9  Cow.   (N.  Y.)   72. 


R.  A.  68;  Bates  v.  Sparrell,  10  Mass. 
323;  Clift  v.  White,  12  N.  Y.  519; 
Messmore  v.  Williamson,  189  Pa.  St. 
73,  41  Atl.  1110,  69  Am.  St.  791. 


40 


41        ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY      §  41 

erence  to  quantity,  whether  a  fee  shnple,  a  fee  tail,  for  Hfe,  for  a 
term  of  years  or  any  other  interest.'  It  does  not  import  a  fee  or 
even  a  freehold,  but  any  legal  interest  in  land.^  The  words  "es- 
tate" and  "interest"  are  synonymous  terms,  and  are  not  infre- 
quently used  as  convertible  terms.^  But  it  has  been  held  that  "es- 
tate" and  "equity"  are  not  synonymous  words  either  in  meaning 
or  substance.'"  Objectively  speaking,  an  estate  is  the  thing  itself 
of  which  one  is  owner,"  but  the  technical  use  of  the  term  "es- 
tate" is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  corporeal  property 
itself.'- 

§41.  General  classification  of  estates.  —  The  primary 
classification  of  estates  is:  (1)  With  reference  to  their  quantity 
or  duration;  (2)  with  reference  to  their  conditional  or  qualified 
nature;  (3)  with  reference  to  their  legal  or  equitable  character; 
(4)  with  reference  to  the  time  of  their  enjoyment;  and  (5)  with 
reference  to  the  number  of  their  owners. 

In  respect  to  the  quantity  or  duration  of  estates,  they  are  either 
(1)  freehold  estates  or  (2)  estates  less  than  freehold. 

Freehold  estates  are  divided  into  (1)  Estates  of  inheritance, 
and  (2)  estates  not  of  inheritance.  Estates  of  inheritance  are 
such  as  pass  to  the  owner's  heirs,  and  include :  ( 1 )  Fee  simple 
estates,  (2)  modified  fees,  or  base,  qualified  and  determinable 
fees,  (3)  estates  in  fee  conditional,  and  (4)  estates  in  fee  tail. 
Estates  not  of  inheritance  are  either  estates  for  the  life  of  the 
owner,  termed  "life  estates,"  or  for  the  life  of  another,  termed 
"estates  pur  autre  vie."  Life  estates  created  by  voluntary  act  are 
known  as  "conventional"  life  estates,  and  those  created  by  act  q^ 
law  are  termed  "legal"  life  estates.  Legal  life  estates  are  either 
a  "tenancy  in  tail  after  possibility  of  issue  extinct,"  curtesy, 
dower  and  homestead. 

Estates  less  than  freehold  are:  (1)  Estates  for  years,  (2) 
estates  at  will,  (3)  estates  from  year  to  year,  and  (4)  estates  by 
sufferance. 

Estates  with  reference  to  their  conditional  or  qualified  nature 

7  Co    Lit   345a.  ^^  Tewksbury     Tp.     v.     Readington 

s  Sudbury  v.  Stow,  13  Mass.  462.  Tp.,  8  N.  J.  L.  319. 

"J  New  York  v.  Stone,  20  Wend.  (N.  "  Sellers  v.  Sellers,  35  Ala.  235. 

Y.)    139;  Hurst  v.  Hurst,  7  W.  Va.  12  Deering  v.  Tucker.  55  Maine  284. 

289. 


§    42  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  42 

may  be  divided  into:  (1)  Estates  upon  condition,  (2)  estates 
upon  limitation,  and  (3)  estates  upon  conditional  limitation. 

Estates  as  regards  their  quality  are  either:  (1)  Legal  or  (2) 
equitable.  The  former  applies  to  such  estates  as  are  cognizable 
by  courts  of  law;  the  latter  are  such  as  are  recognized  and  pro- 
tected in  courts  of  equity,  and  embrace  uses,  trusts  and  equity 
of  redemption. 

Estates  with  reference  to  their  time  of  enjoyment  are  divided 
into:  (1)  Estate  in  possession,  and  (2)  estates  in  expectancy. 
The  first  of  these  are  the  kinds  most  frequently  owned  and  most 
commonly  desired.  The  second  class  includes  all  future  estates,  or 
all  interests  where  the  right  of  possession  and  enjoyment  is  post- 
poned to  some  future  time. 

Estates  with  reference  to  the  number  of  their  owners  are 
divided  into:  (1)  Estates  in  severalty,  and  (2)  joint  estates.  To 
the  former  class  belong  those  estates  in  which  the  right  of  posses- 
sion is  in  one  person  at  a  time.  To  the  latter  class  belong  those 
estates  in  which  the  right  of  possession  and  enjoyment  may  be 
held  by  two  or  more  persons  in  an  undivided  ownership,  and  in- 
clude joint  tenancies,  tenancies  in  common,  estates  in  coparce- 
nary, estates  in  the  entirety,  and  estates  in  partnership.  Legal 
estates  are  those  cognizable  by  courts  of  law. 

§  42.  Estates  in  fee  simple. — A  fee  simple  is  the  greatest 
interest  and  the  most  absolute  in  the  rights  conferred  that  a  per- 
son can  have  in  real  property,^^  and  carries  with  it  an  unlimited 
power  of  alienation."  It  is  the  highest  estate  which  the  law  rec- 
ognizes,^^ and  when  this  term  is  used,  and  no  words  of  qualifica- 
tion or  limitation  are  added,  it  necessarily  implies  an  estate  owned 
in  severalty,  and  an  estate  in  possession.^''  It  includes  all  qualifi- 
cations or  restrictions  as  to  the  persons  who  may  inherit  as  heirs ; 
thus  distinguishing  it  from  a  fee  tail,  as  well  as  from  an  estate 
which,  though  inheritable,  is  subject  to  conditions  or  collateral 
determination.^^  The  word  "fee"  means  inheritance,  and,  as 
Lord  Coke  says,  "  'simple'  is  added,  for  that  it  is  descendible  to 
the  heirs  of  the  body,  or  the  like."^^   In  other  words,  the  owner 

13  Bush   V.    Bush,    5    Del.    Ch.    144;  i«  Bracket!  v.  Ridlon,  54  Maine  426. 

Brackett  v.   Ridlon,   54    Maine    426;  i^  Warden  v.  Lyons,  118  Pa.  St.  396, 

Jecko  V.  Taussig.  45  Mo.  167.  12  Alt.  408. 

"  Havnes  v.  Bourn,  42  Vt.  686.  is  Haynes  v.  Bourn,  42  Vt.  686;  Co. 

i-'McMillen  v.  Anderson,  95  U.  S.  Lit.  lb;  2  Bl.  Comm.  105. 
Zl,  24  L.  ed.  335. 


43        ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY      §  43 

of  the  fee  holds  the  land  for  himself  and  for  his  heirs,  absolutely 
and  simply/^  The  word  "absolute"  added  does  not  impart  any- 
thing to  the  legal  effect  of  the  term  "fee"  or  "fee  simple."""  The 
terms  "fee,"  "fee  simple"  and  "fee  simple  absolute,"  when  used 
in  modern  conveyancing,  are  practically  synonymous."^  An  estate 
in  fee  simple  is  a  freehold  estate  in  perpetuity."  Ownership  in 
fee  simple  implies  something  more  than  being  the  holder  of  the 
naked  legal  title  to  land.  It  implies  an  indefeasible  legal  title — 
the  entire  title  and  estate  in  land."^ 

§  43.  Modified  fees. — Under  the  head  of  "modified  fees" 
may  be  included  what  are  termed  base,  qualified  or  determinable 
fees.  This  classification  results  from  the  fact  that  they  are  modi- 
fications of  estates  in  fee.  The  terms  "base  fees,"  "qualified 
fees"  and  determinable  fees,"  have  been  used  promiscuously  as 
descriptive  of  an  estate  which  has  a  qualification  subjoined  thereto, 
and  which  may  be  determined  whenever  the  qualification  annexed 
to  it  is  at  an  end.-*  Some  question  of  doubt  has  arisen  as  to 
whether  there  is  now  any  such  estates  as  base,  qualified  or  deter- 
minable fees,  but  such  estates  are  recognized  in  this  country  by 
courts  and  text-writers  generally. ^^ 

A  qualified  fee  is  one  where,  instead  of  limiting  the  estate  to 
a  man  and  his  heirs,  it  is  limited  to  him  and  the  heirs  of  an  an- 
cestor whose  heir  he  is. 

A  determinable  fee  is  an  estate  limited  to  a  man  and  his  heirs, 
with  a  qualification  annexed  to  it  by  which  it  is  provided  that  it 
must  determine  whenever  that  qualification  is  at  an  end."'' 

An  estate  which  is  to  continue  till  the  happening  of  a  certain 
event  is  not  upon  a  condition  subsequent,  because  upon  the  hap- 
pening of  that  event  the  estate  ceases  by  its  own  limitation  with- 
in Stephen's  Comm.  (15th  cd.),  Vol.     First  Universalist  Soc.  v.  Boland.  155 
1   145  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  524,  15  L.  R.  A. 

'20  Clark  V.   Baker,    14   Cal.  612,   76    231;  Hall  v.  Turner,  110  N.  Car.  292. 
Am    Dec   449.  14  S.  E.  791  ;  Lyford  v.  Laconia,  75 

21  Bowen  v.  John,  201  111.  292,  66  N.  N.  H.  220.  72  Atl.  1085,  22  L.  R.  A. 
E,  357;  Jecko  v.  Taussig,  45  Mo.  167;  (N.  S.)  1062n,  139  Am.  St.  680;  2  Bl. 
Lett  V.  Wykoff,  2  N.  Y.  355.  Comm.  109. 

22  Friedman  v.  Steiner,  107  111.  125 ;  23  Y\r%X.  Universalist  Society  v.  Bo- 
Jecko  V.  Taussig,  45  Mo.  167.  land,  155  Alass.  171,  29  N.  E.  524,  15 

23  United  States  v.  Hyde,  132  Fed.     L.  R.  A.  231. 

545.  2GYVeed  V.  Woods,  71   N.  H.   581, 

24  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  Ohio  &c.  53  Atl.  1024;  Lvford  v.  Laconia,  75 
R.  Co..  94  111.  83;  Wills  v.  Wills,  85  N.  H.  220,  72  Atl.  1085,  22  L.  R.  A. 
Ky.  486,  9  Kv.  L.  76,  3  S.  W.  900;  (N.  S.)  1062n,  139  Am.  St.  680. 


§    43  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  44 

out  a  re-entry  by  the  grantor.  Sucli  an  estate  is  a  fee,  because  it 
lasts  forever ;  it  is  determinable,  because  it  may  end  by  the  happen- 
ing of  the  event  named.  Illustrations  of  determinable  fees  are, 
"as  long  as  the  church  of  St.  Paul  shall  stand,"  or  "a  tree  shall 
stand,"  or  "so  long  as  A  shall  have  heirs  of  his  body,"  or  "till 
the  marriage  of  a  certain  person. "^^  A  grant  to  a  religious  so- 
ciety to  hold  so  long  as  the  society  shall  support  certain  specified 
doctrines,  the  deed  reciting  that  when  the  land  is  devoted  to  other 
purposes  "then  the  title  of  said  society  or  its  assigns  shall  forever 
cease,"  creates  a  determinable  fee.  The  grant  in  such  case  is  not 
upon  a  condition  subsequent,  and  no  re-entry  is  necessary;  but 
by  the  terms  of  the  grant  the  estate  is  to  continue  so  long  as  the 
real  estate  shall  be  devoted  to  the  specified  uses,  and  when  it  shall 
no  longer  be  so  devoted,  then  the  estate  will  cease  and  determine 
by  its  own  limitation. ^^ 

A  base,  qualified  or  determinable  fee  is  created  by  a  devise  in 
fee  coupled  with  a  provision  that  upon  the  happening  of  a  certain 
condition  or  contingency  the  estate  so  devised  may  be  deter- 
mined."^ If  the  condition  or  contingency  be  void,^°  or  becomes 
impossible  of  performance  without  fault  of  the  devisee,  the  estate 
becomes  a  fee  simple  absolute. ^^  The  event  or  contingency  which 
may  be  provided  for  to  defeat  the  qualified  or  defeasible  fee  may 
be  the  marriage  of  the  first  devisee,^"  or  his  death  before  mar- 
riage,^^  or  death  before  distribution,^*  or  death  before  attaining  a 
certain  age.^^ 

27  2  Bl.  Comm.  109 ;  4  Kent  Comm.  •''■2  Frey  v.  Thompson,  66  Ala.  287 ; 

9,  129.  Cummings  v.  Lohr,  246  111.  577.  92  N. 

2«  Owen   V.    Field,    102     Mass.    90 ;  E.  970 ;  Chenault  v.  Scott.  23  Ky.  L. 

First  Universalist  Society  v.  Boland,  1974,  66  S.  W.  759;  Rohrbach  v.  San- 

155  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  524,  15  L.  R.  ders,  212  Pa.  636,  62  Atl.  27;  Haring 

A.  231.  V.  Shelton.  103  Tex.  10.  122  S.  W.  13. 

2oMcFarland  v.  McFarland,  177  111.  33  wheeler  v.  Long,  128  Iowa  643, 

208,  52  N.  E.  281  ;  Greer  v.  Wilson,  105  N.  W.  161. 

108  Ind.  322.  9  N.  E.  284;  Common-  3*  Giles  v.  Anslow.   128  111.  187,  21 

wealth  V.  Pollitt,  25  Ky.  L.  790,  76  S.  N.  E.  225 ;  Corey  v.  Springer,  138  Ind. 

W.  412.  506.  7>1  N.  F.  322 ;  Schneider  v.  Holtz- 

30  Carter  v.  Carter,  39  Ala.  579;  In  hauer,  134  Ky.  Z\  119  S.  W.  177;  Rob- 
re  Walkerlv's  Estate,  108  Cal.  627,  41  ert  v.  Corning,  89  N.  Y.  225,  23  Hun 
Pac.  772.  49  Am.  St.  97.  299. 

31  Huckabee  v.  Swoope,  20  Ala.  35  Matlock  v.  Lock.  38  Ind.  App. 
491  ;  New  Haven  Co.  v.  Trinity  281,  IZ  N.  E.  171 ;  Wheeler  v.  Long, 
Church  Parish.  82  Conn.  378.  IZ  Atl.  128  Iowa  643.  105  N.  W.  161  :  Hersey 
789,  17  Ann.  Cas.  432;  Shocklcy  v.  v.  Purington,  96  Maine  166,  51  Atl. 
Parvis,  4  Houst,  (Del.)  568;  Green  v.  865;  Woodman  v.  Madigan.  58  N.  H. 
Gordon,  38  App.  D.  C.  443 ;  Harrison  6;  Foster  v.  Wick.  17  Ohio  250; 
V.  Harrison.  105  Ga.  517,  31  S.  E.  455;  Glasscock  v.  Tate,  107  Tenn.  486,  64 
70  Am.  St.  60.  S.  W.  715. 


I 


45  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS    IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    44 

A  devise  of  lands  by  a  testator  to  his  wife,  "her  heirs  and  as- 
signs forever,"  with  a  stipulation  that  "it  is  my  will  that  my  said 
wife  and  her  heirs  shall  hold  said  land  in  fee  simple  forever,  or 
so  long  as  she  shall  remain  a  widow,"  gives  the  wife  a  fee  simple 
title,  determinable  on  her  remarriage;  and  a  purchaser  from  her 
takes  with  notice  of  the  nature  of  her  estate. ^'^  The  event  or  con- 
tingency expressed  must  be  of  such  a  character  that  it  may,  by 
possibility,  never  happen. ^'^  Where  an  estate  is  conveyed  in  fee 
for  a  specified  purpose  and  no  other,  the  fee  is  a  base  fee, 
determinable  upon  the  cessation  of  the  use  of  the  property 
for  that  purpose."®  The  right  or  possibility  of  reverter  after 
the  termination  of  such  an  estate  is  similar  to,  though  not  cjuite 
identical  with,  the  possibility  of  reverter  which  remains  in  the 
grantor  of  lands  upon  a  condition  subsequent.  This  right  repre- 
sents whatever  is  not  conveyed  by  the  deed,  and  it  is  the  possibil- 
ity that  the  land  may  revert  to  the  grantor  or  his  heirs  when  the 
granted  estate  terminates. ^^ 

§  44.  Conditional  fees  at  common  law. — Conditional  fees, 
at  common  law,  were  fees  limited  to  some  particular  heir  ex- 
clusive of  others,  as  to  the  heirs  of  A's  body,  by  which  only  his 
Hneal  descendants  are  admitted,  in  exclusion  of  the  collateral 
heirs.*"  This  was  construed  to  be  a  fee  simple  upon  condition  that 
the  grantee  had  the  heirs  prescribed.  If  the  grantee  die  leaving 
no  such  heirs,  the  land  reverted  to  the  grantor.  A  fee  conditional 
at  common  law  became  a  fee  tail  by  the  statute  de  donis  condition 
alibus.  This  statute  ordained  that  "the  will  of  a  donor  according 
to  the  form  of  the  deed  or  gift  manifestly  expressed,  be  hence- 
forth observed;  so  that  they  to  whom  a  tenement  was  given 
under  such  condition  shall  have  no  power  to  alien  the  tenement  so 
given,  but  that  it  shall  remain  unto  the  issue  of  them  to  whom 
it  was  given  after  their  death,  or  shall  revert  to  the  donor  or  his 
heirs,  if  issue  fail,  or  there  is  no  issue  at  all.""  The  effect  of  the 
statute  was  not  to  create  a  new  estate,  but  to  prevent  the  dis- 

•■'•'=  Haring  v.   Shelton,   103  Tex.   10,  land,  155  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  524,  15 

122  S.  W.  13.  L.  R.  A.  231. 

'-'^  Van  Horn  v.  Campbell.  100  N.  Y.  4o  Simmons    v.    Augustin,     3     Port. 

287,  3  N.  E.  316.  53  Am.  Rep.  166.  (Ala.)  69;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

3«Slegel  V.  Lauer.  148  Pa.  St.  236,  Patterson,  68   Md.  606.    13   Atl.   369; 

23  Atl.  996.  15  L.  R.  A.  547.  Paterson  v.  Ellis,  11  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

39  First  Universalist  Society  v.  Bo-  259,  277 

41 13  Edw.  I.  1285. 


§    45  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  46 

charge  of  the  condition  by  the  donee's  having  issue  of  the  pre- 
scribed class.  The  fee  was  preserved  to  such  issue  while  there 
existed  any  to  take  it,  and  wdien  there  was  a  failure  of  such  issue 
the  reversion  was  secured  to  the  donor. 

§  45.  Creation  of  fee  simple  estate  by  deed. — A  fee  simple 
estate  in  land  may  be  created  by  deed  or  by  will.  In  the  creation 
of  an  estate  in  fee  simple  by  deed  at  common  law  the  limitation 
must  be  to  one  "and  his  heirs" ;  otherwise,  the  grantee  will  take 
only  a  life  estate. ^^  And  it  w^ould  seem  that  other  words  of  the 
same  meaning  will  not  suffice,  even  though  the  intention  to  pass 
a  fee  is  clear.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a  fee  simple  will  not 
pass  by  such  words  as  "his  lawful  issue  and  their  lawful  issue 
forever,""*^  "successors  and  assigns  forever,''"  "executors,  ad- 
ministrators and  assigns,"*^  or  "in  fee  simple."'*® 

It  would  seem  that  no  words  of  limitation  are  required  to  pass 
a  fee  simple  to  a  corporation  aggregate,*^  but  the  use  of  some 
such  words  is  necessary  to  pass  such  an  estate  to  a  corporation 
sole.*^ 

Since  a  quitclaim  deed  passes  whatever  interest  the  grantor  has, 
no  words  of  inheritance  are  necessary  to  pass  a  fee  simple  estate 
to  the  grantee,  if  the  grantor  was  seized  in  fee  simple.*^  But  con- 
veyances between  tenants  in  common  must  contain  words  of  in- 
heritance in  order  to  pass  a  fee,  as  one  tenant  in  common  can  not 
convey  to  another  in  any  other  way,  or  by  a  conveyance  whose 
operation  is  different  from  those  used  by  grantors'  between  whom 
such  relationship  exists.^"  When  technical  words  of  inheritance 
are  not  used  in  the  conveyance,  but  are  supplied  by  reference 
to  another  instrument  which  contains  them,  a  fee  simple  estate 
will  vest  in  the  grantee. ^^    Whenever,  however,  it  can  be  shown 

•*2  Edwardsville   R.   Co.  v.   Sawyer,  Congregational  Soc.  v.  Stark,  34  Vt. 

92  111.  Zn;  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L.  243. 

505.  82  Am.  Dec.  237  ;  Stell  v.  Barkam,  ^8  Overseers   of   Poor  v.    Sears,  22 

87  N.  Car.  62;  Jordan  v.  McClure,  85  Pick.   (Mass.)    126;  Olcott  v.  Gabert, 

Pa.  St.  495  :  Arms  v.  Burt,  1  Vt.  303,  86  Tex.  121,  22,  S.  W.  985. 

18   Am.    Dec.   680 ;    contra :    Cole   v.  ^o  Rector  v.  Waugh,  17  Mo.  13,  57 

Lake  Co.,  54  N.  H.  242.  Am.  Dec.  251. 

«  Williams    V.    Cause,   83    S.    Car.  so  Rector  v.  Waugh,  17  Mo.  13,  57 

265.  65  S.  E.  241.  Am.  Dec.  251. 

*■*  Sedgwick    v.     Laflin,     10    Allen  ^^  Reaume  v.  Chambers,  22  Mo.  36; 

(Mass.)  430.  Mercier  v.    Missouri    iSrc.    R.    Co.,    54 

^^  Clearwater    v.    Rose,     1     Blackf.  Mo.  506;  Lemon  v.  Graham,  131  Pa. 

(Ind.)  137.  St  447,  19  Atl.  48,  6  L.  R.  A.  663. 

4G  Taylor  v.  Cleary,  29  Grat.  (Va.)  But  see   Lytle  v.   Lytle,   10   Watts 

448.  (Pa.)   259. 

47  Wilcox  V.  Wheeler,  47  N.  H.  488 ; 


47  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    45 

to  a  court  of  equity  that  it  was  the  manifest  intention  of  the 
grantor  to  convey  a  fee  simple,  the  deed  will  be  reformed  so  as 
to  include  words  of  inheritance  in  conformity  to  such  intention. ^^ 
The  use  of  the  word  "heirs"  is  regarded  as  merely  indicating 
that  the  grantee  takes  an  estate  which  will  pass  to  his  heirs,  or  to 
the  heirs  of  any  one  to  whom  he  may  alien  it ;  that  is,  it  is  a 
word  of  limitation,  and  not  a  word  of  purchase. ^^ 

The  ofBce  of  the  habendum  is  to  define  the  grantee's  estate. 
However,  the  nature  and  duration  of  the  estate  are  sometimes 
defined  in  the  "premises,"  by  which  term  are  designated  all  those 
parts  of  a  deed  which  go  before  the  habendum.  In  naming  the 
grantee  in  the  granting  clause,  if  the  words  "and  his  heirs"  are 
added,  the  grantee  takes  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  though  the  haben- 
dum clause  be  wholly  omitted.^*  Although  the  words  of  limita- 
tion usually  appear  in  the  habendum  as  an  independent  clause  of 
the  deed,  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should,  if  they  appear  in 
some  other  part,  as  in  the  premises. ^^  The  habendum  may  ex- 
plain, enlarge  or  qualify,  but  can  not  contradict  or  defeat  the 
estate  granted  by  the  premises.^®  If  no  words  of  inheritance  are 
used  in  the  premises,  the  grantee  by  the  premises  takes  by  impli- 
cation only  a  life  estate  at  most.  The  habendum  may  then,  by 
express  limitation,  define  the  estate  granted  as  an  estate  in  fee, 
and  the  estate  so  expressly  defined  necessarily  excludes  the  un- 
certain implication  from  the  premises. ^^ 

While  the  word  "heirs"  is  indispensable  at  common  law  in  the 
limitation  of  an  estate  of  inheritance,  yet  the  statutes  of  most 
of  the  states  have  dispensed  with  the  necessity  of  its  use  to 
create  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  and  in  some  states  a  fee  simple 
estate  is  presumed  to  have  been  intended,  unless  a  contrary  in- 
tention clearly  appears.^®    Notwithstanding  a  statutory  provision 

52  Ewing  V.  Shannahan,  113  Mo.  •'''' Montgomery  v.  Sturdivant,  41 
188,  20  S.  W.  1065;  Vickers  v.  Leigh,  Cal.  290;  Riggin  v.  Love,  72  111.  553; 
104  N.  Car.  248,  10  S.  E.  308.  Bodine  v.  Arthur.  91  Ky.  53,   12  Ky. 

53  Cole  V.  Lake  Co.,  54  N.  H.  242.  L.  650,  14  S.  W.  904 ;  34  Am.  St.  162 ; 

54  Goodtitle  V.  Gibbs,  5  B.  &  C.  709,  Berry  v.  Billings,  44  Maine  416,  69 
8  D.  &  Ry.  502.  Am.  Dec.  107 ;   Bean  v.  Kenmuir,  86 

55  Montgomery    v.     Sturdivant,    41  Mo.  666. 

Cal.   290;    Major   v.   Bukley,   51    Mo.  5,s  Stim.  Am.  St.  Law,  §  1474. 

227;    Karchner   v.    Hoy,    151    Pa.    St.  The  common  law  rule  requiring  the 

383,  25  Atl.  20.  use  of  words  of  inheritance  to  pass  a 

56  Breed  v.  Osborne.  113  Mass,  318;  fee  simple  estate  prevails  in  Delaware, 
Rines  V.  Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394.  9  S.  Florida,  New  Jersey,  Ohio,  Pennsyl- 
W.  798;  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42  Pa.  St.  vania,  South  Carolina  and  Wyoming. 
374 ;  Warn  v.  Brown,  102  Pa.  St.  347 ; 

Thompson  v.  Carl,  51  Vt.  408. 


§    46  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  48 

that  the  words  "convey  and  warrant"  shall  convey  a  fee  simple 
to  the  grantee,  the  grantor  may  use  these  words  and  yet  actually 
convey  in  the  deed,  after  description  of  the  land,  his  intention  to 
pass  a  less  estate  than  one  of  inheritance  to  the  first  taker,  which 
will  be  given  effect. ^^ 

§  46.  Creation  of  fee  simple  estate  by  will. — A  devise 
of  real  estate  to  one  and  his  "heirs  and  assigns"  is  the  surest 
method  of  creating  a  fee  in  the  devisee,""  but  even  in  the  absence 
of  the  word  "heirs,"  other  words  in  the  will  showing  an  intention 
to  devise  a  fee  simple  are  sufficient  to  pass  such  an  estate.*'^  But 
the  intention  must,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  changing  the  rule, 
appear  in  some  way  on  the  face  of  the  will,''"  and  it  is  sometimes 
said  that  there  must  be  words  from  which  an  intention  to  pass 
a  fee  may  necessarily  be  implied.'^^ 

But  by  statute  in  most  states  it  is  provided  that  a  devise  of 
land  shall  pass  or  be  construed  to  pass  a  fee  simple,  or  all  the 
testator's  interest  in  the  land,  unless  a  contrary  intention  appear 
from  the  words  of  the  will;*^*  the  presumption  which  formerly 
obtained  that  only  a  life  estate  was  intended  to  pass,  unless  the 
contrary  appeared,  being  thus  reversed.  ''^  Where  the  statute 
has  dispensed  with  the  use  of  the  word  "heirs"  in  devising  real 

•■^^  Adams  v.   Merrill,  45   Ind.  App.  In   re   Barrett's   Will,    111    Iowa   570. 

315.  85  N.  E.  114,  87  N.  E.  36.  82  N.  W.  998,  5  Prob.  Reb.  Ann.  639; 

*'°  Galloway  v.  Darby,  105  Ark.  558,  Boston  Safe  Deposit  &c.  Co.  v.  Stich, 

151  S.  W.  1014,  44  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  61   Kans.  474,  56  Pac.   1082;  Clay  v. 

782n,  Ann.  Cas.   1914  D,  712n ;  Red-  Chenault.  108  Ky.  11,  21  Ky.  L.  1485 ; 

dick  V.  Lord,  131  Ind.  336,  30  N.  E.  55   S.   W.   729;    Fuller   v.   Fuller,  84 

1085;  Kendall  v.  Clapp,  163  Mass.  69,  Maine  475,  24  Atl.  946;   Simonds  v. 

39  N.  E.  ny,   Jackson  v.  Littell,  213  Simonds,    168    Mass.    144,    46    N.    E. 

Mo.  589,   112  S.  W.  53,   127  Am.  St.  421;  Johnson  v.  Delomc  L.  &c.  Co., 

620.  And  see  post  chap.  30.  §  793.  11   Miss.    15,   26   So.   360;   Yocum   v. 

Gi  Wright  V.  Denn,  10  Wheat.    (U.  Siler,  160  Mo.  281,  61  S.  W.  208;  Feit 

S.)    204,  6  L.    ed.    303;    Schneer  v.  v.  Richard,  64  N.  J.  Eq.  16,  53  Atl. 

Greenbaum,  27  Del.  97,  86  Atl.   107;  824;  Grain  v.  Wright,  114  N.  Y.  307, 

Robinson  v.  Randolph,  21  Fla.  629,  58  21  N.  E.  401  ;  Whitfield  v.  Garriss,  131 

Am.  Rep.  692 ;  Ashby  v.  McKinlock,  N.  Car.  148,  42  S.  E.  568 ;  In  re  Jere- 

271   111.  254,   111   N.   E.    101;    2    Bl.  my's  Estate,  178  Pa.  St.  477,  35  Atl. 

Comm.  108;  Co.  Lit.  9b.  847;   Waterman   v.   Greene,    12   R.    I. 

«2  Jackson   v.  Wells,  9  Johns.    (N.  483;  McAllister  v.  Tate,  11   Rich.  L. 

Y.)  222.  (S.  Car.)  509,  12>  Km.  Dec.  119 ;  Dulin 

03  wheaton   v.   Andress,   23   Wend.  v.  Moore  (Tex.  Civ.  Appl),  69  S.  W. 

(N.  Y.)  452.    _  _  94;    Reeves   v.    School    Dist.     59,    24 

'^*  For  cases  illustrating  the  applica-  Wash.  282,  64  Pac.  752;   Morrison  v. 

tion    of    these   statutes    see    Smith    v.  Clarksburg  C.  &c.  Co.,  52  W.  Va.  331, 

Philhps,    131    Ala.    629,    30    So.   872;  43  S.  E.  102. 

Ford  V.  Gill.  109  Ga.  691,  35  S.  E.  156;         '■■■  McConncl  v.   Smith,  23  111.  611  ; 

McFarland  v.  McFarland,  177  111.  208,  Baldwin     v.     Bean,     59     Maine    481  ; 

52  X.  E.  281,  4  Prob.  Rep.  Ann.  279;  Shirey  v.  Postlcthwaite,  72  Pa.  St.  39. 


I 

i 


49  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    47 

estate,  the  fact  that  a  testator  used  the  word  has  been  held  not  to 
cast  any  doubt  upon  the  intention  of  the  testator  to  devise  a  fee 
simple."*^ 

It  has  been  held  that,  unless  a  contrary  intention  appear,  a 
devise  of  one's  "estate"  located  at  a  certain  place, ^'^  or  of  "all" 
his  "estate,"''^  or  "all"  his  "real  estate,"''''  or  his  "property,"  with 
reference  to  particular  land  or  to  the  testator's  possessions  gen- 
erally,^'' though  without  the  use  of  the  word  "heirs"  or  other 
words  of  limitation,  will  vest  a  fee  simple  in  the  devisee;  such 
expressions  being  regarded  as  descriptive  of  the  quantity  of  in- 
terest intended  to  be  conveyed.  The  same  effect  is  given  to  a 
devise  to  a  person  "in  fee  simple,"  or  "forever,"''^  and  to  such 
a  devise  with  merely  a  charge  or  duty  imposed  on  the  devisee 
personally  in  regard  to  the  payment  of  money,  to  enable  him  to 
discharge  which  an  estate  for  life  might  not  be  sufficient,  though 
not  if  the  charge  is  imposed  on  the  land  alone."" 

§  47.  Limitations  and  restrictions  in  transfers  of  fee  simple 
estates. — The  owner  of  a  fee  simple  estate  can  not,  in  its 
transfer,  create  an  estate  unknown  to  the  law,  or  one  which  is 
prohibited  by  law,"  nor  is  he  permitted  to  convey  to  another,  and 
at  the  same  time  forbid  such  other  the  right  of  alienation,  for 
only  very  limited  restraints  on  alienation  are  allowed. ^^  Thus 
he  will  not  be  permitted  to  transfer  the  estate,  and  by  the  terms 

6«  Gannon  v.  Allbright,  183  Mo.  238,  Foster    v.    Stewart,    18    Pa.     St.    23 ; 

81  S.  W.  1162,  67  L.  R.  A.  97,  105  Am.  Arnold  v.  Lincoln,  8  R.  I.  384. 

St.  471.  712  Bl.  Comm.  108;  Co.  Lit.  9b. 

"•^Lambert  v.  Paine,  3  Cranch   (U.  "Wright  v.    Den,    10   Wheat.    (U. 

S.)  97,  2  L.  ed.  Zll  \  Robinson  v.  Ran-  S.)  204,  6  L.  ed.  303;  Funk  v.  Eggle- 

dolph.  21  Fla.  629,  58  Am.  Rep.  692;  ston.   92   111.   515.   34   Am.   Rep.    136; 

Leland    v.    Adams,    9    Gray    (Mass.)  Snyder  v.  Nesbitt,  11  Md.  576,  26  Atl. 

171.  1006;    Parker    v.     Parker,     5     Mete. 

esSaeger  v.   Bode,   181   111.  514,  55  (Mass.)    134;    Jackson    v.     Bull,     10 

N.  E.  129;  Godrey  v.  Humphrey,   18  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   148,  6  Am.  Dec.  321; 

Pick.   (Mass.)  537,  29  Am.  Dec.  621;  King  v.  Cole,  6  R.  I.  584;  2  Jarman 

Forsaith   v.    Clark,    21     N.     H.    409;  Wills.  1131. 

Steward  v.  Knight,  62  N.  J.  Eq.  232,  ^3  Loosing  v.  Loosing,  85  Nebr.  66, 

49    Atl.    535;    Jackson    v.    Merrill.    6  122  N.  W.  707,  25  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

Johns.   (N.  Y.)    185.  5  Am.  Dec.  213.  920;   In  re  Doebler's  Appeal,  64  Pa. 

69  Boston   Safe   Deposit  &c.   Co.  v.  St.  9. 

Stich,    61    Kans.    474,    59    Pac.    1082 ;  74  Hill  v.  Gray,  160  Ala.  273,  49  So. 

Bacon      v.      Woodward,      12      Gray  676 ;  Langdon  v.  Ingram.  28  Ind.  360  ; 

(Mass.)  Zld;  Forsaith  v.  Clark  21  N.  Conger  v.  Lowe,  124  Ind.  368.  24  N. 

H.  409;   Sharp  v.  Humphreys,  16  N.  E.  889.   9   L.   R.   A.    165;    Blackstone 

J-  L.  25.  Bank  v.  Davis.  21   Pick.    (Mass.)   42, 

70  Lincoln    v.    Lincoln     107     Mass.  32  Am.  Dec.  241. 
590;    Fogg   V.    Clark,    1    N.    H.    163; 

4 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    48  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  50 

of  the  transfer  provide  that  the  estate  shall  terminate  if  the 
grantee  attempts  to  transfer  it  to  another." 

While  the  general  policy  of  the  law  is  against  unlimited  re- 
strictions upon  the  right  of  alienation,  an  owner  of  land  may 
agree,  for  a  valuable  consideration,  that  he  will  not  sell  his 
property  during  his  lifetime,  or  that  during  his  lifetime  a  certain 
person  shall  have  the  right  to  say  whether  or  not  he  will  take 
the  property  at  his  death  at  a  stipulated  or  an  agreed  price." 
Some  authorities  hold  that  a  condition  in  an  instrument  of  con- 
veyance that  the  tenant  of  the  fee  shall  not  transfer  it  to  a 
particular  person  or  persons  is  invalid;"  while  others  seem  to 
think  that  such  a  condition  is  valid. '^^  But,  by  the  weight  of 
authority,  a  condition  that  he  can  transfer  it  only  to  a  certain 
class  of  persons,  is  invalid. ^°  The  restriction  against  selling  to 
particular  persons,  or  to  any  but  certain  specified  parties,  does 
not,  if  valid,  suspend  for  a  moment  the  power  of  sale,  but  a  sale 
may  be  made  at  any  time  to  parties  not  coming  within  the  re- 
striction.®" 

The  fact  that  a  restriction  suspending  the  power  of  alienation 
for  a  limited  time  only,  does  not,  by  the  weight  of  authority, 
render  the  restriction  valid,  if  the  estate  in  fee  simple  is  vested. ^'^ 
But  it  has  been  held  that  such  a  restriction  is  valid  if  the  estate 
is  to  be  terminated  upon  the  making  of  the  alienation.®^ 

§  48.  Estates  in  fee  tail. — An  estate  in  fee  tail  is  a  free- 
hold estate  of  inheritance  limited,  not  to  the  grantee's  heirs  in 

"Potter  V.   Couch,   141   U.   S.  296,  602;  Attwater  v.  Attwater,   18  Beav. 

11  Sup.  Ct.  1005,  35  L.  ed.  721;  Win-  330;   In  re  Rosher,  26  Ch.  Div.  801. 

sor  V.  Mills,  157  Mass.  362,  32  N.  E.  See  also   Morse  v.   Blood,  68   Minn. 

352;  Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  442,  71  N.  W.  682. 

Grace  Church,   53   N.  J.   Eq.  413,  32  «» Maudlebaum     v.     McDonell,     29 

Atl.  691;  Hardy  v.  Galloway,  111  N.  Mich.  78,  18  Am.  Rep.  61. 

Car.  519,  32  Am.  St.  828 ;   Turley  v.  ^i  Potter  v.  Couch,   141   U.   S.  296, 

Massengil,  7  Lea   (Tenn.)   353.  11  Sup.  Ct.  1005,  35  L.  ed.  721;  Con- 

■<••  Elliott  V.   Delaney,   217   Mo.    14,  ger  v.  Lowe.   124  Ind.  368,  24  N.  E. 

116  S.  W.  494.  889,  9  L.  R.  A.  165;  Todd  v.  Sawyer, 

"Barnard  v.  Bailey,  2  Har.  (Del.)  147  Mass.  570.  17  N.  E.  527;  Maudle- 

56;     Williams     v.     Jones,     2     Swan  baum   v.   McDonell,   29   Mich.   78,    18 

(Tenn.)  620;  4  Kent.  Comm.  131.  Am.  Rep.  61 ;  Van  Home  v.  Campbell, 

78Cowell  V.  Colorado  Springs.  Co.,  100  N.  Y.  287,  3  N.  E.  316;  Anderson 

100  U.  S.  55,  25  L.  ed.  547 ;  Winsor  v.  v.  Gary,  j6  Ohio  St.  506,  38  Am.  Rep. 

Mills,   157  Mass.  362,  32  N.   E.  352;  602;   In  re  Rosher,  26  Ch.  Div.  801. 

Co.  Lit.  223.  But   see   Harkness  v.   Lisle,    132   Ky. 

ToChappell  V.   Chappel    (Ky.),   119  767,  117  S.  W.  264. 

S.  W.  218 ;  Schermerhorn  v.  Negus,  1  ^-  Fowlkes     v.     Wagoner      (Tenn« 

Denio    (N.    Y.)     448;     Anderson    v.  Ch.)  46  S.  W.  586. 
Gary,  36  Ohio  St.  506,  38  Am.  Rep. 


^ 


51  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    48 

general,  but  to  the  heirs  of  his  body.*^  When  the  grantee  in  tail 
is  alone  mentioned  as  a  person  from  whose  body  the  heirs  are  to 
be  derived  the  estate  is  in  tail  general,  and  any  of  the  issue  of 
the  donees'  body  can  inherit.®*  When  both  the  parents  from 
whose  bodies  the  heirs  must  be  derived  are  specified,  as  where 
the  grant  is  to  one  and  the  heirs  of  his  body  by  a  woman  named, 
the  estate  is  in  tail  special.^^  The  estate  may  be  confined  to  heirs 
male  or  female,  and  then  the  descent  must  be  traced  through 
heirs  male  in  the  one  case,  or  heirs  female  in  the  other,  and  the 
estate  is  in  tail  male  or  female. ^"^ 

To  create  an  estate  in  fee  tail  it  is  essential  to  use  not  merely 
the  word  "heirs,"  but  some  words  indicating  the  body  from  which 
the  heirs  are  to  come,  or  some  word  of  procreation  from  a  par- 
ticular person.®''  While  the  words  of  limitation  generally  used 
are  "heirs  of  his  body,"  other  equivalent  words,  which  clearly 
make  the  limitation  to  the  heirs  of  the  body  of  the  grantee,  are 
sufficient.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  words  "heirs  of  his 
flesh"  will  create  an  estate  in  fee  tail.®®  Any  words  which  show 
that  the  word  "heirs"  is  to  be  restricted  to  the  heirs  of  the  body, 
will  be  sufficient  to  create  such  an  estate.®^  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  the  word  "issue"  or  "seed"  can  not  be  substituted 
for  the  word  "heirs"  in  creating  an  estate  in  fee  tail.°° 

In  this  country  the  statute  de  donis  was  generally  recognized 
in  the  colonies  and  original  estates  as  being  in  force. ^^  Recoveries 
for  barring  entails  were  adopted  in  several  of  the  colonies,  and 
generally  continued  in  use  until  more  effectual  remedies  were 
secured  by  statute.^"  But  now,  however,  great  changes  have  been 
made.    By  the  statutes  of  some  states,  estates  tail  have  been  abol- 

83  McArthur  v.  Allen.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  pital,    155   Mass.  323,  29  N.   E.  625 ; 

8659;   Riggs  v.  Sallv,   15  Maine  408;  Corbin    v.    Healy,    20    Pick.    (Mass.) 

Corbin    v.    Healy,    20    Pick.    (Mass.)  514;   Holcomb  v.   Lake,   24  N.  J.   L. 

514;   Fanning  v.   Doan,   128  Mo.  323,  686;   Pollock  v.  Speidel,   17  Ohio  St. 

30  S.  W.  1032;  Prindle  v.  Beveridge,  439;  Hall  v.  Vandegrift,  3  Bin.  (Pa.) 

7   Lans.    (N.   Y.)    225;    Goodright  v.  374. 

Morningstar,  1  Yeates    (Pa.)    313.  ^o  Wheeler  v.  Duke,  1  Cr.  &  M.  210. 

s-i  Duffy   V.   Jarvis,    84    Fed.    731;  oi  Corbin      v.      Healy,      20       Pick. 

Lehndorf  v.  Cope,  122  111.  317,  13  N.  (Mass.)    514;    Pollock  v.   Speidel,   17 

E.  505.  Ohio  St.  439;  Giddings  v.  Smith,  15 

«5  Allen  V.  Craft.  109  Ind.  476,  9  N.  Vt.  344. 

E.  919,  58  Am.  Rep.  425.  ='2  Hawley  v.  Northampton,  8  Mass. 

*^«Co.  Lit.  377a;   2  Bl.  Comm.  114.  3,  5  Am.  Dec.  66;  Baker  v.  Mattocks, 

87  Adams  v.  Ross,  30  N.  J.  L.  505,  Quincy  (Mass.)  69;  Den  v.  Smith, 
82  Am.  Dec.  237.  10  N.  J.  L.  46 ;  Jackson  v.  Van  Zandt, 

88  Co.  Lit.  20b.  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)   169. 

89  Brown  v.   Addison   Gilbert  Hos- 


§    49  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  52 

ished,  and  an  attempt  to  create  such  an  estate  will  result  simply 
in  vesting  a  fee  simple  in  the  donee.®**  In  such  states,  the  words 
of  procreation  used  in  deeds,  which,  without  the  statute,  would 
have  created  estates  tail,  are  to  be  wholly  disregarded,  leaving 
the  limitation  simply  to  the  heirs  of  the  grantee  and  creating  in 
him  a  fee  simple."*  In  several  states  the  first  donee  in  tail  takes 
the  life  estate  and  the  heirs  of  the  l)ody  of  such  donee  take  as 
purchasers,  the  remainder  in  fee  simple. °^  The  statutes  of  several 
states  enable  the  tenant  in  tail  to  bar  the  entail  by  a  convenance 
in  fee  simple.®*'  In  some  states,  however,  no  statutory  provisions 
as  to  estates  tail  exist,  and  in  such  states,  fees  tail  are  as  at  com- 
mon law,®^  unless,  the  court  deems  such  estates  inapplicable  to 
our  institutions.®^ 

While  estates  in  fee  tail  in  their  original  form  have  now  prac- 
tically fallen  into  disuse,  their  consideration  is  deemed  important 
from  the  fact  that  they  are  still  recognized  in  a  form  modified  by 
statutory  enactments.  We  find,  for  example,  that  it  is  provided  in 
some  states  that  language  which  formerly  created  an  estate  tail 
shall  be  held  to  create  a  fee  simple,  while  in  others  that  by  such 
language  a  life  estate  only  will  be  created.  Whatever  form  such 
statutes  abolishing  or  modifying  estates  tail  as  they  formerly 
existed  may  take,  in  order  that  they  may  be  properly  applied,  a 
knowledge  of  the  character  of  the  estate  and  the  mode  of  its 
creation  is  absolutely  necessary. 

§  49.  Life  estates. — A  life  estate  is  a  freehold  estate  in 
land,  but  not  of  inheritance.®®    This  estate  can  not  extend  beyond 

03  Duffy  V.  Jarvis.  84  Fed  731;  Bar-  ^^  Preston   v.    Smith,   26  Fed.  884; 

nett  V.  Barnett,  104  Cal.  298,  Zl  Pac.  Peterson  v.  Jackson.  196  111.  40,  63  N. 

1049;   Durant  v.   Muller,  88  Ga.  251,  E.  643;  Clarkson  v.  Clarkson,  125  Mo. 

14  S.  E.  612;  Mcllhinny  v.  Mcllhinny,  381,  28  S.  W.  446;  Brown  v.  Rodgers, 

137  Ind.  411,  7,1  N.  E.  147,  24  L.  R.  A.  125  AIo.  392,  28  S.  W.  630;  Fanning 

489,  45  Am.  St.  186;  Lanham  v.  Wil-  v.  Doan,  128  Mo.  323,  30  S.  W.  1032; 

son,    15   Ky.   L.    109,  22   S.   W.   438;  Weart  v.  Cruser,  49  N.  J.  L.  475,  13 

Pruitt  V.  Holland,  92  Ky.  641,  13  Ky.  Atl.  36;  Doty  v.  Teller,  54  N.  J.  L. 

L.  867,   18   S.   W.  852 ;    Prichard    v.  163,  23  Atl.  944,  Z7>  Am.  St.  670. 

James,  ^2>  Ky.  306,  14  Ky.  L.  243,  20  as  Collamore     v.      Collamore,      158 

S.  W.  216;  Rhodes  v.  Bouldrey,   138  Mass.  74,  32  N.  E.  1034. 

Mich.  144,  101  N.  W.  206 :  Nellis  v.  '^'^  Ewing  v.  Nesbitt,  88  Kans.  708, 

Nellis,   99   N.    Y.   505,   3    N.    E.   59;  129  Pac.  1131. 

Nicholson  v.  Bettle,   59  Pa.   St.  384 ;  '-'s  Jordon  v.  Roach,  32  Miss.  481. 

Ray  V.  Alexander,  146  Pa.  St.  242,  23  ^^  Cmnmings   v.    Cummings,   76   N. 

Atl.  383 ;  In  re  Robinson's  Estate,  149  J.  Eq.  568,  75  Atl.  210 ;  2  Bl.  Comm. 

Pa.  St.  418,  24  Atl.  297.  120. 

"*  Andrews  v.  Spurlin,  35  Ind.  262; 
Singletary  v.  Hill,  43  Tex.  588. 


53  j:STATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    49 

the  life  or  lives  of  some  particular  person  or  persons,  but  it  may 
possibly  continue  for  the  period  of  such  life  or  lives/ 

To  constitute  a  life  estate,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  continue 
during  the  life  or  lives  named,  but  it  is  sufficient  that  it  may  so 
continue,  though  liable  to  terminate  sooner  by  the  happening  of 
a  contingency.  Thus,  an  estate  granted  to  a  v.oman  for  her  life 
or  during  her  widowhood,  or  to  a  man  so  long  as  he  shall  occupy 
certain  premises,  is  a  life  estate."  Where  the  estate  is  limited 
for  the  life  of  the  tenant  himself  it  is  sometimes  termed  a  "con- 
ventional" life  estate,  and  where  it  is  limited  to  the  life  of 
another  person  or  persons  it  is  termed  an  estate  "pur  autre  vie."^ 

With  reference  to  their  creation  life  estates  are  either  "con- 
ventional" or  "legal."  The  former  has  reference  to  such  as  are 
created  by  the  act  of  the  parties,  and  the  latter  to  such  as  are 
created  by  construction  and  operation  of  law.*  Either  of  these 
forms  of  a  life  estate  may  be  created  by  deed  or  will.  Where  the 
owner  of  the  fee  grants  the  land  to  another  for  so  long  as  he 
lives,  the  grantee  takes  a  conventional  life  estate.^  This  form  of 
life  estate  may  be  created  either  by  express  words  or  by  impli- 
cation,*^ but  never  by  parol. '^  On  the  other  hand,  legal  life  estates 
result  from  the  construction  and  operation  of  law.  Thus  mar- 
riage will  often  give  both  spouses  life  interests  in  the  lands  of 
each  other,  though  no  express  contract  in  relation  to  such  prop- 
erty be  made.^  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  providing  that  a  fee 
simple  is  presumed  to  be  conveyed  unless  otherwise  restricted,  no 
special  words  are  necessary  to  create  a  life  estate."  Consequently, 
conveyances,  for  example,  to  one  "and  his  generation,  to  endure 
as  long  as  the  waters  of  the  Delaware  should  run;"^°  to  one  "his 

1  Gilmore  v.  Hamilton,  83  Ind.  196;  ^  Smith  v.  May,  3  Pennew.    (Del.) 

Hurd   V.   Gushing,   7    Pick.     (Mass.)  233,  50  Atl.  59;    Stewart  v.  Clark  13 

169;  Warner  v.  Tanner,  38  Ohio  St.  Mete.  (Mass.)  79;  Garrett  v.  Glark  5 

118;  2  Bl.  Comm.  121 ;  4  Kent  Comm.  Ore.  464. 

26.  8  Rose  V.  Rose,  104  Ky.  48,  20  Ky. 

2McArthur  v.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340,  L.  417,  46  S.  W.  524,  41  L.  R.  A.  353, 

5  Sup.  Gt.  652,  28  L.  ed.  1015;  Hay-  84  Am.   St.  430;  Foster  v.  Marshall, 

ward  V.  Kinney,  84  Mich.  591,  48  N.  22  N.  H.  491. 

W.  170 ;   Roseboom  v.  Van  Vechten,  ^  Bozeman   v.    Bishop,   94    Ga.   459, 

5    Denio    (N.    Y.)    414;    Mattocks   v.  20  S.  E.  11;  Kearney  v.  Kearney,  17 

Stearns,  9  Vt.  326.  N.  J.  Eq.  59 ;  Trusdell  v.  Lehman,  47 

3  Go.  Lit.  §  56;  2  Bl.  Gomm.  120;  N.  J.  Eq.  218,  20  Atl.  391;  Jackson  v. 
4  Kent  Gomm.  25.  Embler,  14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)   198. 

4  2  Bl.  Gomm.  120.  lo  Foster    v.    Joice,    Fed.    Gas.    No. 
•'■'2  Bl.  Gomm.  120.                                 4974,  3  Wash.  (U.  S.)  498. 

"2  Bl.  Gomm.  121;   4  Kent  Comm. 
25 


§    50  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  54 

executors,  administrators  and  assigns  ;"^^  to  several  "and  their 
representatives;"^'  to  them  and  "assigns  forever ;"^^  have  been 
held  to  convey  life  estates  only  to  their  respective  grantees/* 

§  50.  Estates  for  years. — An  estate  for  years  is  an  estate 
or  interest  in  land  less  than  a  freehold,  and  having  for  its  dura- 
tion a  definite  and  ascertained  period,  as  a  term  for  a  fixed  num- 
ber of  weeks,  months  or  years. ^"  According  to  the  common  law, 
this  estate  was  of  less  dignity  than  a  life  estate,  and  was  not  an 
interest  in  real  estate,  but  was  a  mere  chattel  interest,  known  as 
a  chattel  real  to  distinguish  it  from  chattels  personal.  The  prime 
requisite  of  this  kind  of  an  estate  is  definiteness  of  duration, 
while  there  is  no  requirement  that  it  must  last  for  at  least  a  year.^^ 
Its  duration  may  be  limited  to  nine  months,  or  any  time  certain 
less  than  a  year.^^ 

Where  the  term  and  duration  of  a  tenancy  is  fixed  and  certain, 
it  is  an  estate  for  years  and  not  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year. 
The  term  may  be  fixed  to  continue  "during  the  minority  of"  a 
person  named,  or  to  endure  for  a  certain  time  from  the  happening 
of  a  certain  contingency,  as  in  the  case  of  a  lease  for  twenty  years 
after  payment  of  a  certain  sum  by  the  lessee  to  the  lessor.^* 
Estates  for  years  are  almost  invariably  created  by  contract,  and 
never  by  operation  of  law."  The  contract  is  called  a  "lease"  or 
"demise;"  the  words  "grant,"  "demise"  and  "let"  being  com- 
monly used,  though  any  words  expressing  an  intention  to  transfer 
the  possession  for  a  fixed  time  is  sufficient. "°    Such  contracts  are 

iiHofsass  V.  Mann,  74  Md.  400,  22  "  Shaflfer  v.  Sutton,  5  Binn.   (Pa.) 

Atl.  65.  228. 

12  Mattocks  V.  Brown,  103  Pa.  St.  is  Reed  v.  Lewis,  74  Ind.  433,  39 
16.  Am.  Rep.  88 ;  Murray  v.  Cherrington, 

13  McMichael  v.  McMichael,  51  S.  99  Mass.  229 ;  Batchelder  v.  Dean,  16 
Car.  555,  29  S.  E.  403.  N.  H.  265 ;   Western  Transp.  Co.  v. 

11  For  other  words  held  to  pass  a  Lansing,  49  N.  Y.  499. 

life   estate,   see  Jossey  v.   White,  28  i»  Poppers  v.  Meagher,  148  111.  192, 

Ga.   265;    Schaefer   v.    Schaefer,    141  35  N.  E.  805;  Sawyer  v.  Hanson,  24 

111.  3Z7,  31  N.  E.  136;  Lowric  v.  Ry-  Maine  542;   Cass  County  v.  Cowgill, 

land,  65  Iowa  584,  22  N.  W.  686 ;  Cor-  97  Midi.  448,  56  N.  W.  849 ;  Loring 

by  V.  Corby,  85  Mo.  371 ;   Sheafe  v.  v.  Taylor,  50  Mo.  App.  80.     But  see 

Cushing,    17    N.    H.    508;    Jones    v.  Skinner  v.  Skinner,  38  Nebr.  756,  57 

Stites,    19  N.   J.   Eq.   324 ;   Leeper  v.  N.  W.  534. 

Neagle,  94  N.  Car.  338 ;  Robinson  v.  20  Branch  v.  Doane,  17  Conn.  402 ; 

Robinson,  89  Va.  916,   14  S.  E.  916;  Duncklee  v.  Webber,   151   Mass.  408. 

Dew  V.  Kuehn,  64  Wis.  293,  25  N.  W.  24  N.  E.   1082 ;  Horner  v.  Leeds,  25 

212.  N.  J.  L.   112;   Watson  v.  O'Hern,  6 

15  Brown  v.  Bragg.  22  Ind.  122.  Watts   (Pa.)   362. 

1-^  Casey  v.  King,  98  Mass.  503.   . 


I 


55  ESTATES    AND   INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    51 

a  charge  upon  the  fee  and  must  be  set  out  in  the  abstract  wherever 
they  are  found  on  the  public  records,  as  will  be  seen  in  a  subse- 
quent part  of  this  work. 

§  51.  Estates  at  will. — An  estate  at  wnW,  in  the  primary 
and  technical  sense  of  that  expression,  is  created  by  grant  and 
contract,  whereby  one  man  lets  land  to  another  to  hold  at  the 
will  of  the  lessor.''  In  a  tenancy  of  this  kind  both  the  entry  and 
occupation  are  lawful,  but  for  no  definite  term  or  purpose,  subject 
to  be  determined  at  common  law  by  either  party  instanter  and 
without  notice,  or  at  most  by  mere  demand  of  possession  by  the 
landlord.^'  This  kind  of  holding  is  distinguished  on  the  one 
hand  from  a  tenancy  at  sufferance  by  adverse  possession  by  the 
fact  that  it  is  under  an  agreement  from  the  landowner.  In  every 
case  a  tenancy  at  will  rests  on  the  actual  or  presumed  consent  of 
the  owner  of  the  premises.^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  an  estate  of  this  kind  differs  from  a  term 
for  years  or  for  life  in  that  it  may  be  brought  to  an  end  at  any 
time  at  the  whim  of  the  parties,  instead  of  continuing  until  the 
happening  of  a  certain  event  or  the  lapse  of  a  certain  period  of 
time.  Moreover,  it  was  determined  at  an  early  date  that  if  an 
estate  was  at  the  will  of  one  of  the  parties  it  was  equally  at  the 
will  of  the  other.-*  Where  a  tenant  occupies  the  premises  with- 
out rent  and  without  any  time  agreed  upon  to  limit  the  occupation 
and  without  in  any  way  binding  himself  to  become  a  tenant  for 
any  definite  time  or  at  any  agreed  price,  his  occupation  is  that 
of  a  tenant  at  will."^  It  has  been  held  that  a  mere  tenancy  at 
will  was  created  where  a  life  tenant  verbally  leased  the  premises 
for  the  full  term  of  his  life  in  consideration  of  an  agreement  for 
his  support.'®  Also  where  the  owner  of  land  allowed  some  of 
his  relatives  to  use  and  improve  it  without  payment  of  rent,  it 
was  held  that  they  became  mere  tenants  at  will."  In  a  case  where 
no  claim  was  made  for  a  more  permanent  tenure,  the  occupant 
was  held  to  be  by  implication  a  tenant  at  will,  even  without  the 

21  Den  V.  Drake,  14  N.  J.  L.  523;  47  Ind.  105,  17  Am.  Rep.  692;  Cowan 
4  Kent  Comm.   (1st  ed.)   100.  v.  Radford  Iron  Co.,  83  Va.  547,  3  S. 

22  Brown  v.  Kayser.  60  Wis.  1,  18     E.  120. 

N.  W.  523 ;  Webb  v.  Seekins,  62  Wis.  25  Maher  v.  James  Hanley  &c.  Co., 

26,  21   N.  Y.  814.  23  R.  I.  323.  50  Atl.  330. 

23  Gault  V.  Stormont,  51  Mich.  636.  20  Barrett  v.  Cox,  112  Mich.  220, 
17  N.  W.  214;  Ridgely  v.  Stillwell,  25  70  N.  W.  446. 

Mo.  570.  27  Ellsworth  v.  Hale,  33  Ark.  633. 

2*  Knight  V.  Indiana  Coal  &c.  Co., 


§    52  TITJ.ES    AND    AT?STRACTS  56 

reservation  of  any  renl.-^  A  parol  gift  of  land  creates  merely 
an  estate  at  will  in  the  donee,  which  he  has  tu)  power  to  alienate 
by  deed  or  lease,  and  any  attempt  to  do  so  on  his  part  termniates 
the  will.^"  A  tenant  who  enters  and  continues  in  possession  of 
the  demised  premises  under  a  written  lease  until  the  expiration 
of  the  term,  does  not  thereafter  become  a  tenant  at  will  by  refus- 
ing to  surrender  that  possession  and  by  holding  over  without  the 
consent  of  the  lessor.^" 

Entry  and  occupation  under  a  void  parol  lease  creates  a 
tenancy,  which  is  either  strictly  at  will  or  from  year  to  year  or 
from  month  to  month,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
case.^^  The  rule  that  occupation  under  a  void  lease  creates  a 
tenancy  at  will  applies  only  in  the  case  of  leases  granted  by  the 
owner  of  the  premises  which  can  not  be  enforced  because  of  a 
failure  to  comply  with  some  statutory  requirement  as  to  execu- 
tion.^" 

An  estate  at  wnll  is  uncertain  and  defeasible,  and  is  destroyed 
by  the  alienation  of  the  premises  by  either  party. ^^  The  estate 
of  a  tenant  at  will  is  not  an  interest  capable  of  bargain  and  sale. 
It  can  not  be  assigned  without  the  landlord's  consent.  An  un- 
authori.ied  transfer  gives  the  transferee  no  right  that  he  can  hold 
against  the  will  of  the  landlord.^'* 

§  52.  Estates  at  sufferance. — An  estate  at  sufferance  is 
where  one  who  comes  lawfully  into  possession  of  land  holds  over 
after  his  interest  has  determined,^'"'  and  while  he  is  not  liable 

28Larned  v.  Hudson,  60  N.  Y.  102.  Minn.  172;  Yellow  Jacket  &c.  Co.  v. 

-^  Jackson  v.  Rogers,  1  Johns.  Cas.  Stevenson,  S   Nev.  224. 

(N.   Y.)    33;   Contra,     Kaufman     v.  s^joy   v.    McKay,    70   Cal.   445,    11 

Cook,  114  111.  11,  28  N.  E.  378.  Pac.  763;    Jackson     v.     Aldrich,     13 

ao  Ferine  v.  Teaguc,  66  Cal.  446,  6  Johns,  (N.  Y.)  106;  Co.  Lit.  55b,  57a. 

Pac.  84;   Canning  v.  Fibush,  77  Cal.  3*  Cook  v.  Cook,  28  Ala.  660;   Mc 

196,  19  Pac.  376;  Kuhn  v.  Smith,  125  Leran  v.  Benton,  73  Cal.  329,  14  Pac. 

Cal.  615,  58  Pac.  204,  73  Am.  St.  79.  879;   Atlanta  &c.   R.   Co.  v.   McHan, 

3iPhelan  v.  Anderson,  118  Cal.  504,  110  Ga.  543,  35  S.  E.  634;  Cunning- 
50  Pac.  685  ;  Lockwood  v.  Lockvvood,  ham  v.  Holton,  55  Maine  33 ;  Cooper 
22  Conn.  425;  Huvser  v.  Chase,  13  v.  Adams,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  87;  Whit- 
Mich.  98;  Whitney  v.  Swett,  22  N.  temore  v.  Gibbs,  24  N.  H.  484;  Mc- 
H.  10;  Dumn  v.  Rothermel,  112  Pa.  Cann  v.  Rathbone,  8  R.  I.  403. 
St.  272,  3  Atl.  800;  Duke  v.  Harper,  35  Hauxhurst  v.  Lobree,  38  Cal.  563 ; 
6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  280,  27  Am.  Dec.  Coomler  v.  Hef ner,  86  Ind.  108 :  Han- 
462;  Sartwell  v.  Sowles,  72  Vt.  270,  son  v.  Jolin.son,  62  Md.  25,  50  Am. 
48  Atl.  11 ;  Dolan  v.  Scott,  25  Wash.  Rep.  199;  Warren  v.  Lyons,  152  Mass. 
214,  65  Pac.  190.  310,  25  N.  E.  721 ;  Abeel  v.  Hubbcll, 

32Toan  V.  Pline,  60  Mich.  385,  27  52  Mich.  37,  17  N.  W.  231;  Poole  v. 

N.  W.  557;   San  ford  v.  Johnson,  24  Engelke,  61  N.  J.  L.  124.  38  Atl.  823; 

Smith  V.  Littlefield,  51  N.  Y.  539. 


57  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    53 

strictly  for  rent  as  such,  he  is  Hable  for  such  sum  as  may  be 
reasonable  in  an  action  for  use  and  occupation.  It  has  never  been 
required  that  there  should  be  privity  either  of  contract  or  estate 
between  the  parties  to  a  tenancy  at  sufferance. ^^ 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  a  holding  by  sufferance  is  the 
absence  of  consent.  It  is  to  a  certain  extent  a  wrongful  holding. 
If  there  is  any  agreement  it  can  not  be  a  tenancy  at  sufferance. ^^ 
A  tenancy  by  sufferance  is  not  by  the  consent  but  by  the  laches 
of  the  owner,  and  it  follows  that  where  the  owner  has  been 
guilty  of  no  laches  there  can  be  no  tenancy  at  sufferance.^^  A 
tenancy  at  sufferance  arises  under  the  statutes  of  some  states 
from  a  bare  holding  over,^^  especially  where  the  lease  stipulates 
for  payment  of  rent  beyond  the  term.^°  An  employe  occupying 
premises  owned  by  his  master  becomes,  on  holding  over  after  the 
termination  of  his  employment,  a  tenant  at  sufferance.*'-  Also  a 
purchaser  of  land  who  is  put  in  possession  before  a  transfer  of 
title,  and  who  makes  default  in  the  payment  of  an  instalment  of 
the  purchase-money,  becomes  a  tenant  by  sufferance.*"  The  rule 
that  one  who  comes  into  possession  of  land  lawfully,  and  holds 
over  after  the  expiration  of  his  right,  becomes  a  tenant  at  suffer- 
ance, does  not  apply  to  one  whose  original  right  of  occupancy 
became  vested  in  him  by  operation  of  law.*^ 

§  53.  Estates  from  year  to  year. — An  estate  from  year  to 
year  is  a  qualified  tenancy  at  will  introduced  to  obviate  the  incon- 
veniences of  the  latter  kind  of  estate;  and  the  qualification  re- 
quires the  determination  of  the  will  to  be  prospective,  to  take 
effect  at  the  end  of  a  current  year  of  the  tenancy.**  Estates  at 
will,  and  estates  from  year  to  year  differ  chiefly  in  that  the 
former  may  be  terminated  by  either  of  the  parties  at  his  pleasure, 
while  the  latter  can  be  terminated  against  the  tenant  only  at  the 

36  Bennett  v.  Robinson,  21  Mich.  26;  19;  School  District  No.  11  v.  Batsche, 

Smith  V.  Littlefield,  51  N.  Y.  539.  106  Mich.  330,  64  N.  W.  196,  29  L.  R. 

2^  Cokimbian   Ins.  Co.   v.   Ashby,  4  A.  576. 

Pet.  (U.  S.)  139,  7  L.  ed.  809;  John-  ^2  Sanders  v.  Richardson,  14  Pick, 

son  V.  Carter,   16  Mass.  443.  (Mass.)  522. 

38  Moore  v.  Morrow,  28  Cal.  551 ;  43  Brown  v.  Smith,  83  III.  291 ;  Han- 
Spalding  V.  Hall,  6  D.  C.  123.  son  v.  Johnson,  62   Md.  25,   50  Am. 

39  Brown  v.  Markham,  56  Fla.  202,  Rep.  199 ;  Pattison  v.  Dryer,  98  Mich. 
48  So.  39;  Swift  v.  Boyd,  202  Mass.  564,  57  N.  W.  814;  Livingston  v.  Tan- 
26,  88  N.  E.  439.  ner,  14  N.  Y.  64. 

40  Benton  v.  Williams,  202  Mass.  **  Crawford  v.  Morris,  5  Grat. 
189,  88  N.  E.  843.  (Va.)  90. 

41  Eichengreen  v.  Appel,  44  111.  App. 


§    53  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  58 

expiration  of  the  year,  month,  etc.,  as  the  case  may  be,  by  a 
notice  to  quit/'  Some  courts  have,  in  the  absence  of  any  ex- 
cepting clause  in  the  statute  favoring  short  term  parol  leases, 
refused  to  recognize  tenancies  from  year  to  year,'*''  but  it  would 
seem  without  sound  reason;  because  the  doctrine  of  notice  to 
quit  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  stability  of  the  tenant's 
tenure  is  a  very  ancient  one.  It  existed  before  the  passage  of  the 
English  statute  of  frauds. 

In  certain  respects  an  estate  from  year  to  year  resembles  a 
holding  under  a  lease  for  a  definite  term  of  one  year.  The  tenant 
from  year  to  year  is  bound  for  the  full  year's  rent  even  though 
he  abandons  the  premises.  If  the  landlord  choose  to  hold  him,  a 
tenant  from  year  to  year  is  in  no  better  position  in  regard  to 
escaping  liability  for  rent  than  is  a  lessee  who  is  bound  by  express 
covenants. ^^ 

An  estate  at  will  is  converted  into  an  estate  from  year  to  year 
by  the  payment  of  rent;  the  conversion  being  wrought,  not  by 
the  length  of  time  of  the  holding,  but  by  the  fact  that  the  tenant 
entered  under  an  agreement  to  pay  an  annual  rent  and  pays  it 
accordingly.**^  A  general  occupancy  by  one  other  than  the 
owner  of  land  will  be  treated  as  a  tenancy  from  year  to  year 
whenever  the  reservation  of  rent  or  other  circumstances  plainly 
indicate  an  agreement  for  an  annual  holding.*'' 

The  leading  circumstance  which  turns  parol  leases  for  uncer- 
tain terms  into  tenancies  from  year  to  year  is  the  reservation  of 
an  annual  rent.^°  Where  a  tenant  enters  and  occupies  under  an 
invalid  parol  lease,  the  agreement  governs  the  terms  of  the  holding 
as  to  the  amount  and  time  for  payment  of  rent  and  as  to  other 
matters,  but  not  as  to  the  duration  of  the  term.^^ 

One  of  the  most  common  ways  in  which  a  tenancy  from  year 
to  year  originates  is  for  a  landlord  to  allow  his  tenant  for  years 

45  Currier  v.  Perley.  24  N.  H.  219.  31  Mo.  13;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  13  R. 

^'^  Hammon  v.  Douglas,  50  Mo.  434.  I.  467. 

^'^  Lockwood  V.  Lockwood,  22  Conn.        ^^  Larkin  v.  Avery,  23   Conn.  304 ; 

425;    Tanton   v.   Van   Alstine,  24   111.  Railsback    v.    Walke,     81     Ind.     409; 

App.  405 ;  Currier  v.  Perley,  24  N.  H.  Laughran    v.    Smith,    75    N.    Y.    205 ; 

219.  Peoples  v.  Evens,  8  N.  Dak.  121,  77 

48  Silsby  V.  Allen.  43  Vt.  172.  N.  W.  93 ;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v. 

«  Judd  V.  Fairs,  53  Mich.  518,  19  N.  West.  57  Ohio  St.  161,  49  N.  E.  344; 

W.  266 ;   Farlev     v.     McKeegan,     48  Thurber  v.  Dwyer,  10  R.  I.  355 ;  Bar- 

Nebr.  237,  67  N.  W.  161.  low  v.  Wainwright,  22  Vt.  88,  52  Am. 

50  Packard  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  Dec.  79. 
46  111.  App.  244;  WilHams  v.  Defair, 


59 


ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY 


§  54 


to  hold  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,^^  The  terms  of  a 
year  to  year  holding  are  the  same  as  those  of  a  lease  which  pre- 
ceded it  in  the  absence  of  any  agreement  changing  them.°^ 

§  54.  Estates  upon  condition. — Estates  upon  condition 
are  such  as  have  a  qualification  annexed  to  them  by  which  they 
may  upon  the  happening  of  a  particular  event  be  created,  enlarged 
or  destroyed.^*  They  are  divided  into :  ( 1 ) ,  Estates  upon  con- 
ditions implied  in  law;  and  (2),  estates  upon  conditions  express 
or  in  deed.  An  example  of  an  implied  condition  at  common  law 
was  that  a  tenant  for  life  should  not  convey,  by  feoffment  or  by 
fine  or  recovery,  a  greater  estate  than  that  which  he  had ;  for  such 
conveyances,  by  which  seisin  was  divested,  worked  a  forfeiture. ^^ 
Where  an  estate  is  granted  in  fee  simple  or  otherwise,  with  an 
express  qualification  annexed  whereby  the  estate  shall  commence, 
be  enlarged  or  defeated  upon  performance  or  breach  of  such 
qualification  or  condition,  it  is  an  estate  upon  condition  ex- 
pressed.^® 

Conditions  are  either  precedent  or  subsequent.  Precedent  con- 
ditions must  happen  or  be  performed  before  the  estate  vests. ^'^ 


52  Crommelin  v.  Thiess,  31  Ala.  412, 
70  Am.  Dec.  499;  Belding  v.  Texas 
Produce  Co.,  61  Ark.  ill,  ZZ  S.  W. 
421;  Burkhard  v.  Mitchell,  16  Colo. 
376,  26  Pac.  657 ;  Roberson  v.  Simons, 
109  Ga.  360.  34  S.  E.  604 ;  Hately  v. 
Myers,  96  111.  App.  217 ;  Kleespies  v. 
McKenzie,  12  Ind.  App.  404,  40  N. 
E.  648 ;  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 21  Kans.  680;  Hobbs  v. 
Batory,  86  Md.  68,  Zl  Atl.  713 ;  Gard- 
ner V.  Dakota,  21  Minn.  ZZ ;  Finney 
V.  St.  Louis,  39  Mo.  177;  Bradley  v. 
Slater,  SO  Nebr.  682,  70  N.  W.  258; 
Yetter  v.  King  &c.  Co.,  66  N.  J.  L. 
491,  49  Atl.  678 ;  Harty  v.  Harris,  120 
N.  Car.  408,  27  S.  E.  90;  Parker  v. 
Page,  41  Ore.  579,  69  Pac.  822 ;  Har- 
vey V.  Gunzberg,  148  Pa.  St.  294,  23 
Atl.  1005;  State  v.  Fort.  24  S.  Car. 
510 ;  Banbury  v.  Sherin,  4  S.  Dak.  88, 
55  N.  W.  723;  Shipman  v.  Mitchell, 
64  Tex.  174;  Peirce  v.  Grice,  92  Va. 
763,  24  S.  E.  392 :  Amsden  v.  Atwood, 
67  Vt.  289,  31  Atl.  448;  Allen  v.  Bart- 
lett,  20  W.  Va.  46;  Ganter  v.  Atkin- 
son, 35  Wis.  48. 

53Keegan  v.  Kinnare,  123  111.  280, 
14  N.  E.  14;  ToUe  v.  Orth,  75  Ind. 


298,  39  Am.  Rep,  147;  Bradley  v. 
Slater,  50  Nebr.  682,  70  N.  W.  258; 
Hemphill  v.  Flynn,  2  Pa.  St.  144; 
Providence  County  Sav.  &c.  Bank  v. 
Hall,  16  R.  I.  154,  13  Atl.  122;  Voss 
V.  King,  38  W.  Va.  607,  18  S.  E.  762. 
5*  Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468; 
Co.  Lit.  201a;  2  Bl.  Comm.  152. 

55  Co.  Lit.  §§  415,  416;  2  Bl.  Comm. 
274.  This  doctrine  did  not  apply  to 
conveyances  under  the  Statute  of 
Uses,  since  these  conveyed  only  what 
the  grantor  had ;  nor  does  it  apply  at 
this  time  in  this  country.  Quimby  v. 
Dill,  40  Maine  528 ;  McCorry  v.  King, 
3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  267,  39  Am.  Dec. 
165. 

56  Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468; 
Co.  Lit.  201 ;  2  Bl.  Comm.  154;  4  Kent 
Comm.  125. 

57  Stockton  V.  Weber,  98  Cal.  433, 
ZZ  Pac.  332;  Hurd  v.  Shelton.  64 
Conn.  496,  30  Atl.  766;  Richards  v. 
Richards.  90  Iowa  606,  58  N.  W.  926 ; 
Upington  v.  Corrigan,  69  Hun  320,  23 
N.  Y.  S.  451.  53  N.  Y.  St.  310;  Tilley 
V.  King,  109  N.  Car.  461,  13  S.  E. 
936;  Moore  v.  Perry,  42  S.  Car.  369, 
20  S.  E.  200. 


^  54 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


60 


If  the  condition  never  happens  or  is  not  performed,  the  grant  or 
devise  containing  the  condition  never  becomes  operative.'^®  In 
other  v^ords,  the  happening  or  performance  of  the  condition 
precedent  is  necessary  to  the  vesting  of  the  estate. °'  Thus  where 
a  deed,  made  in  consideration  of  the  performance  of  certain  con- 
ditions by  the  grantee,  provides  that  "when  these  conditions  are 
fully  complied  with,  then  this  deed  is  to  be  in  full  force  and 
virtue  in  law,  and  otherwise  null  and  void,"  the  grantee  does  not 
take  any  title  until  the  conditions  are  performed."" 

Subsequent  conditions  are  such  which,  by  reason  of  nonper- 
formance, defeat  the  estate  already  created.  The  condition  di- 
minishes or  destroys  the  estate  to  which  it  is  attached.'''-  The 
characteristic  of  a  condition  subsequent  is  that  it  prescribes  terms 
upon  which  the  land  granted  shall  revert  to  the  grantor.  If  such 
a  condition  be  impossible  or  unlawful,  the  estate  already  vested 
can  not  be  defeated.*'^  Conditions  subsequent  can  not  affect  the 
estate  conveyed  until  they  have  been  broken.'''^  Conditions  sub- 
sequent are  not  favored  f'^  but  they  are  favored  rather  than  con- 
ditions precedent. '^^ 

It  is  not  always  easy  to  determine  whether  a  particular  clause 
constitutes  a  condition  precedent  or  a  condition  subsequent,  as 
there  are  no  technical  words  by  which  to  distinguish  between 
them.*"'  It  is  a  matter  of  intention  of  the  party  imposing  the 
condition  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument  and  not 
merely  from  the  terms  of  a  part  of  it."  If  it  appears  that  the 
condition  on  which  the  estate  depends  must  be  performed  before 


58  Mizell  V.  Burnett,  49  N.  Car.  249, 
69  Am.  Dec.  744 ;  Donohue  v.  Mc- 
Nichol,  61  Pa.  St.  73. 

5»  Borst  V.  Simpson,  90  Ala.  373,  7 
So.  814. 

«0Oakman  v.  Walker,  69  Vt.  344, 
38  Atl.  63. 

''•^  Bank  of  Suisun  v.  Stark,  106  Cal. 
202,  39  Pac.  531;  Ritchie  v.  Kansas 
&c.  R.  Co.,  55  Kans.  36,  39  Pac.  718; 
Rice  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Corp.  12  Allen 
(Mass.)  141;  Harrison  v.  Foote,  9 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  576.  30  S.  W.  838; 
Mills  V.  Seattle  &c.  R.  Co..  10  Wash. 
520,  39  Pac.  246.  But  see  Baker  v. 
Mott,  78  Hun  141,  28  N.  Y.  S.  968,  60 
N.  Y.  St.  174;  Kilpatrick  v.  Balti- 
more, 81  Md.  179,  31  Atl.  805,  27  L. 
R.  A.  643,  48  Am.  St.  509;  Studdard 
V.  Wells,  120  Mo.  25,  25  S.  W.  201. 


62  Lynch  v.  Melton.  150  N.  Car. 
595,  64  S.  E.  497,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
684n. 

03  Aumiller  v.  Dash,  51  Wash.  520, 
99  Pac.  583. 

0*  Patterson  v.  Patterson,  135  Ky. 
339,  122  S.  W.  169:  Potomac  Power 
Co.  V.  Burchell,  109  Va.  676,  64  S.  E. 
982. 

'^^  Congregational  Church  Bldg.  Soc. 
V.  Everett,  85  Md.  79.  36  Atl.  654,  35 
L.  R.  A.  693.  60  Am.  St.  308. 

"oNicoll  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co., 
12  N.  Y.  121. 

"Lynch  v.  Melton,  150  N.  Car. 
595,  64  S.  E.  497,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
684n  ;  Finlay  v.  K^n^.  3  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
346,  7  L.  ed.  701  :  Frank  v.  Straford- 
Handcock,  13  Wvo.  37,  77  Pac.  134, 
67  L.  R.  A.  571,  110  Am.  St.  963. 


61        ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY      §  55 

the  estate  can  vest,  it  is  a  condition  precedent;  if,  however,  the 
performance  of  the  act  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vesting 
of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  it,  there  is  a  condition 
subsequent. °^ 

§  55.  Estates  upon  limitation. — The  word  "limitation"  in 
legal  sense  has  two  distinct  meanings.  Primarily,  it  signifies  the 
marking  out  of  the  bounds  or  limits  of  the  estate  created;  in  the 
other  sense  it  signifies  simply  the  creating  of  an  estate."^  When 
used  in  the  habendum  clause  of  a  deed,  it  is  an  appropriate  word 
to  declare  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  estate  granted,  and  the 
uses  for  which  the  grant  is  made.'° 

An  estate  upon  limitation,  therefore,  is  an  estate  created  by 
the  use  of  words  denoting  duration  of  time;  such  as  "while," 
"until,"  "during,"  "as  long  as,"  etc."  Such  are  estates,  to  A  so 
long  as  he  shall  live  on  the  premises;  to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his 
body,  while  they  do  not  sell  intoxicating  licjuor  on  the  land. 
Thus  we  see  the  estate  is  one  which  is  determined,  rather  than 
defeated,  by  the  happening  of  a  contingency."  In  a  case  where 
land  is  granted  to  a  woman  "during  widowhood,"  the  words 
"during  widowhood"  define  the  time  during  which  it  is  the  inten- 
tion of  the  grantor  that  the  estate  shall  endure,  and  at  the  end 
of  which  time  the  estate  shall  end.  However,  neither  the  use 
of  such  words  of  limitation,  nor  their  absence,  is  conclusive." 

A  limitation  determines  an  estate  upon  the  happening  of  the 
event  itself,  without  the  necessity  of  doing  any  act  to  regain  the 
estate.^*  "A  condition  is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  a 
limitation.  It  is  the  character  and  quality  of  the  estate  granted, 
and  not  the  terms  used  in  their  creation,  that  distinguishes  them. 
The  latter  requires  no  entry  to  determine  the  estate,  but  termi- 
nates it  ipso  facto  by  the  happening  of  the  event  referred  to, 

espinlay  v.   King,   3   Pet.    (U.   S.)  268;    Henderson    v.    Hunter.    59    Pa. 

346,  7  L.  ed.  701;   Burdis  v.  Burdis,  St.   335;    In   re   Machu,   21    Ch.   Div. 

96  Va.  81,  30  S.  E.  462,  70  Am.  St.  838;  Co.  Lit.  234b. 

825 ;  Donnelly  v.  Eastes,  94  Wis.  390,  ^2  Partington's   Cas.   5   Coke  41 ;   2 

69  N.  W.  157.  Bl.  Comm.  155. 

G^Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  Car.  1,  16  73  wheeler  v.  Walker,  2  Conn.  196, 

S.  E.  1011,  22  L.  R.  A.  598.  7  Am.  Dec.  264;  Stearns  v.  Godfrey, 

70  Mills  V.  Davison,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  659,  16  Maine  158;  Owen  v.  Field,  102 
35  Atl.  1072,  35  L.  R.  A.  113,  55  Am.  Mass.  90;  Camp  v.  Cleary,  76  Va.  140. 
St.  594.  74  Hoselton    v.    Hoselton,    166    Mo. 

71  Vanatta  v.  Brewer,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  182,  65  S.  W.  1005. 


§    56  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  62 

while  the  former  is  determined  only  by  the  re-entry  of  the  grantor 
or  his  heirs  for  the  condition  broken."" 

§  56,  Estates  upon  conditional  limitation. — An  estate 
upon  conditional  limitation  is  one  which  arises  from  a  conveyance 
to  one  person,  with  words  of  either  condition  or  limitation,  and 
with  the  further  provision  that,  upon  the  happening  of  a  speci- 
fied contingent  event,  it  shall  depart  from  him  and  go  over  to 
another  person. ^°  Such  are  estates,  to  A  and  his  heirs  until 
he  marries  and  then  to  B  and  his  heirs;  to  A  for  twenty  years, 
but  if  he  sell  intoxicating  liquor  on  the  premises,  then  to  B  for 
the  residue  of  the  term.  Thus  we  see,  the  estate  partake  both  of  a 
condition  and  a  limitation;'^  of  a  condition  because  it  defeats  the 
estate  previously  limited;  of  a  limitation,  because  upon  the  hap- 
pening of  the  contingency,  the  estate  passes  to  the  person  in  whose 
favor  the  limitation  is  made.^^ 

"One  material  difference,  therefore,  between  an  estate  in  fee 
on  condition  and  on  a  conditional  limitation  is  briefly  this  :  that  the 
former  leaves  in  the  grantor  a  vested  right,  which,  by  its  very 
nature,  is  reserved  to  him  as  a  present  existing  interest,  transmis- 
sible to  his  heirs;  while  the  latter  passes  the  whole  interest  of  the 
grantor  at  once,  and  creates  an  estate  to  arise  and  vest  in  a  third 
person  upon  a  contingency,  at  a  future  and  uncertain  period  of 
time.  A  grant  of  a  fee  on  condition  only  creates  an  estate  of  a 
base  or  determinable  nature  in  the  grantee,  leaving  the  right  or 
possibility  of  reverter  vested  in  the  grantor.  Such  an  interest 
or  right  in  the  grantor,  as  it  does  not  arise  and  take  effect  upon  a 
future  uncertain  or  remote  contingency,  is  not  liable  to  the  ob- 
jection of  violating  the  rule  against  perpetuities  in  the  same  degree 
with  other  conditional  and  contingent  interests  in  real  estate  of 
an  executory  character.  The  possibility  of  reverter,  being  a 
vested  interest  in  real  property,  is  capable  at  all  times  of  being 
released  to  the  person  holding  the  estate  on  condition,  or  his 
grantee,  and  if  so  released  vests  an  absolute  and  indefeasible  title 

'5  Bryan  v.  Spires,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  '''■  Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant, 

580.  3  Gray  (Mass.)  142,  63  Am.  Dec.  725. 

76  Horton   v.   Sledge,   29   Ala.  478 ;  "«  Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant, 

Outland  v.  Bowen,  115  Ind.  150.  17  N.  3  Gray  (Mass.)  142.  63  Am.  Dec.  725; 

E.  281,  7  Am.  St.  420;  Brattle  Square  Fowlkes  v.  Wagoner    (Tenn.)    46  S. 

Church  V.  Grant,  3  Gray  (Mass.)  142,  W.  586. 
63  Am.  Dec.  725;    Miller  v.  Levi,  44 
N.  Y.  489. 


63  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    57 

thereto.  The  grant  or  devise  of  a  fee  on  condition  does  not 
therefore  fetter  and  tie  up  estates,  so  as  to  prevent  their  ahena- 
tion,  and  thus  contravene  the  poHcy  of  the  law  which  aims  to 
secure  the  free  and  unembarrassed  disposition  of  real  property. 
It  is  otherwise  with  gifts  or  grants  of  estates  in  fee  with  limita- 
tions over  upon  a  condition  or  event  of  an  uncertain  or  indeter- 
minate nature.  The  limitation  over  being  executory,  and  de- 
pending on  a  condition,  or  an  event  which  may  never  happen, 
passes  no  vested  interest  or  estate.  It  is  impossible  to  ascertain 
in  whom  the  ultimate  right  to  the  estate  may  vest,  or  whether  it 
will  ever  vest  at  all,  and  therefore  no  conveyance  or  mode  of 
alienation  can  pass  an  absolute  title,  because  it  is  wholly  uncer- 
tain in  whom  the  estate  will  vest  on  the  happening  of  the  event  or 
breach  of  the  condition  upon  which  the  ulterior  gift  is  to  take 
effect."" 

§  57.  Legal  and  equitable  estates. — Estates  as  regards 
their  quality  are  either  legal  or  equitable.  A  legal  estate  is  one 
which  arises  under,  and  is  recognized  by  the  common  or  statutory 
law.  The  legal  estate  in  land  is  the  whole  estate  therein,  and  the 
holder  of  the  legal  title  is  the  sole  owner.*°  Prior  to  the  time 
when  courts  of  equity  began  to  take  cognizance  of  estates  in  land 
every  estate  was  "legal"  in  the  proper  acceptation  of  that  term, 
and  in  contemplation  of  law  there  was  and  could  be  but  one 
estate,  which  might  properly  be  denominated  the  "legal  estate. "^^ 
Such  legal  estates  known  to  the  courts  of  law,  and  which  they 
protected,  are,  in  the  main,  the  strictly  legal  estates  which  are 
recognized  by  the  courts  of  law  today.  They  were  and  are  such 
interests  in  lands,  for  which  the  owners  have,  by  and  for  them- 
selves, their  remedies  at  law  for  any  wrongful  taking  thereof  or 
injury  thereto. 

Equitable  estates  are  interests  which  a  person  has  in  lands, 
tenements  and  hereditaments  which  can  be  enforced  only  in  a 
court  of  equity.^^  Such  an  estate  is  not,  however,  strictly  speak- 
ing, an  interest  in  the  land  itself,  but  a  right  which  can  be  en- 
forced in  equity.®^     Upon  the  establishment  of  the  system  of 

"  Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant,  §2  Mcllvaine  v.  Smith,  42  AIo.  45.  97 

3  Gray  (Mass.)  142,  63  Am.  Dec.  725.  Am.   Dec.  295;   Avery  v.  Dufrees,  9 

^°  In    re    Qualification    of    Electors,  Ohio,  145. 

19  R.  I.  3S7,  35  Atl.  213.  S3  !„    re    Qualification    of    Electors, 

"  Sayre  v.  Mohney,  30  Ore.  238,  47  19  R.  I.  387,  35  Atl.  213. 
Pac.  197. 


§    5S  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  64 

equity  jurisprudence,  rights  and  interests  in  real  property  which 
courts  of  law  did  not  recognize  were  protected  and  enforced  by 
courts  of  equity.  These  rights  or  interests  thus  recognized  by 
courts  of  equity  are  termed  "equitable  estates,"  and  they  may 
exist  in  fee  simple,  fee  tail,  for  life,  or  for  years.  Ordinarily, 
equitable  estates  in  fee  are  subject  to  the  same  incidents  which 
attach  to  legal  estates  in  fee,  and,  generally  speaking,  these  in- 
clude the  right  to  dispose  of  the  estate  by  alienation  as  well  as  by 
devise/^^  Equitable  estates  descend  in  case  of  intestacy,  and  are 
subject  to  the  rights  of  dower  and  curtesy.  The  most  important 
forms  of  equitable  estates  are  uses  and  trusts,  which  will  be 
discussed  in  succeeding  sections. 

§  58.  Uses. — A  use,  as  it  originally  existed,  was  an  equi- 
table right  to  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  an  estate,  the  seisin  or 
possession  of  which  was  in  another.  Such  rights  were  not  rec- 
ognized in  the  courts  of  law,  but  were  protected  and  enforced  by 
courts  of  equity.  By  the  statute  of  27  Henry  VIII,  c.  10,  com- 
monly called  the  Statute  of  Uses,  it  was  provided  that,  in  the 
case  of  a  use,  the  seisin  should  be  transferred  to  the  person  en- 
titled to  the  use,  and  thereafter  uses  ceased  to  exist  as  equitable 
obligations  separate  from  the  legal  title,  except  in  certain  cases 
which  were  decided  not  to  be  within  the  operation  of  the  statute, 
and  three  of  which  have  survived  under  the  name  of  trusts.  A 
modern  use,  therefore  is  an  estate  of  right  which  is  acquired 
through  the  operation  of  the  Statute  of  Uses;  and  which,  when 
it  may  take  effect  according  to  the  rules  of  the  comimon  law,  is 
called  the  "legal  estate,"  and,  when  it  may  not,  is  denominated  a 
"use."  The  statute  of  Uses  is  in  force  in  many  of  the  states  of 
this  country,  either  by  re-enactment  or  judicial  recognition.^^  In 
some  states,  however,  the  statute  is  not  recognized, ®°  and  in  others 
all  uses  and  trusts  have  been  abolished  by  statute,  except  in  cer- 
tain cases. ^^ 

84Gunn   V.   Brown    (Md.),   23   Atl.  799,  31  Atl.  167;    Reeves  v.  Brayton, 

462;  Ropes  v.  Upton,  125  Mass.  258;  36  S.  Car.  384,  15  S.  E.  658. 

Lewin,   Trusts,   692;    Story    Eq.   Jur.  sg  McCurdy   v.    Otto,    140    Cal.    48, 

§  974.  73   Pac.   748;   Farmers  &   Merchants' 

85  Webster  v.  Cooper,  14  How.  (U.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Jensen,  58  Nebr.  522,  78  N. 
S.)  488,  14  L.  ed.  510;  Morgan  v.  W.  1054,  44  L.  R.  A.  861 ;  Helfenstein 
Rogers,  79  Fed.  577,  25  C.  C.  A.  97;  v.  Garrard,  7  Ohio  275;  Gorham  v. 
Tindal  v.  Drake.  51  Ala.  574;  Bryan  Daniels,  23  Vt.  600. 
V.  Bradley,  16  Conn.  474 ;  Myers  v.  *'  See  statutes  of  New  York,  Mich- 
Myers,  167  111.  52,  47  N.  E.  309 ;  .Kay  igan,  Minnesota,  South  Dakota  and 
V.  Scates,  37  Pa.  St.  31,  78  Am.  Dec.  Wisconsin. 
399;   Sullivan   v.   Chambers,  18  R.   I. 


65  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    59 

It  must  be  understood  that,  where  the  Statute  of  Uses  is  in 
force,  every  estate  arising  thereunder  is  a  legal  and  not  an  equita- 
ble estate,  and  that  it  is  solely  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  statute 
fails  to  operate  in  certain  cases,  that  a  class  of  equitable  estates 
exists.  The  uses  which  have  been  decided  not  to  be  within  the 
operation  of  the  statute  are,  active  uses,  uses  in  chattel  interests, 
uses  to  the  legal  grantee,  uses  upon  a  use  and  estates  for  the 
separate  use  of  married  women.  If  the  use  imposed  on  the  first 
taker  is  of  an  active  nature,  involving  the  exercise  of  some  power, 
agency  or  control  by  him,  it  has  been  held  that  the  statute  will 
not  operate. ^^  This  holding*  is  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  such  person  to  perform  his  duties  in  regard  to  the 
estate  unless  he  is  permitted  to  retain  the  legal  title.^''  Also  uses 
in  chattel  interests,  that  is,  interests  or  estates  for  a  term  of  years, 
have  been  held  not  within  the  statute,  because  the  language  of  the 
statute  is  "where  any  person  or  persons  stand  or  be  seised,"  and 
a  tenant  for  years  is  not  "seised."^"  Also  a  use  limited  to  the 
grantee  of  a  legal  estate  is  held  not  within  the  statute,  because 
the  provisions  of  the  statute  apply  to  cases  where  one  person  is 
seised  to  the  use  of  another  person. '^^  A  use  limited  upon  a  use  is 
another  case  which  has  been  held  not  to  be  within  the  terms  of 
the  statute,  because  the  effect  of  the  statute  is  exhausted  in  the 
first  use.°"  Also  lands  conveyed  or  devised  for  the  separate  use 
of  a  married  woman  are  held  not  within  the  statute,  because,  if 
the  legal  title  were  to  vest  in  her,  the  purpose  of  the  use  would 
be  defeated  by  entitling  the  husband  to  control  the  estate.^^ 

§  59.  Trusts. — While  it  was  the  object  of  the  statute  of 
Uses  to  destroy  that  double  property  in  land  which  resulted  from 
the  invention  of  conveyances  to  uses,  it  is  evident  that  this  object 

»8  Kirkland  v.  Cox,  94  111.  400.  02  Durant  v.  Ritchie,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 

89  In  re  Clark's  Appeal.  70  Conn.  195  ;  4190;  Reid  v.  Gordon,  35  Md.  183; 
39  Atl.  155;  Hart  v.  Seymour,  147  Hutchins  v.  Heywood.  50  N.  H.  491. 
111.  598,  35  N.  E.  246 ;  Morton  v.  Bar-  o3  Bowen  v.  Chase,  94  U.  S.  812,  24 
rett,  22  Maine  261,  39  Am.  Dec.  575;  L.  ed.  184;  Dean  v.  Long.  122  111. 
Hutchins  V.  Heywood,  SO  N.  H.  500 ;  447,  14  N.  E.  34 ;  Ware  v.  Richardson, 
In  re  Barnett's  Appeal,  46  Pa.  St.  392,  3  Md.  505,  56  Am.  Dec.  762 ;  Richard- 
86  Am.  Dec.  502 ;  Sprague  v.  Sprague,  son  v.  Stodder,  100  Mass.  528 ;  Wal- 
13  R.  I.  701  ;  Blount  v.  Walker,  31  S.  ton  v.  Drumtra,  152  Mo.  489,  54  S.  W. 
Car.  13,  9  S.  E.  804.  233 ;    Pittsfield    Sav.    Bank    v.    Berry, 

90  Kirkland  v.  Cox,  94  111.  400.  63  N.  H.  109 ;  Steacy  v.  Rice,  21  Pa. 

91  Meredith   v.    loans.   3    Cro.    Cas.  St.  75,  67  Am.  Dec.  447. 
244;    Peacock   v.    Eastland,    L.    R.    10 

Eq.  17. 

5 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    59  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  66 

was  not  entirely  accomplished.  The  strict  construction  put  upon 
the  statute  by  the  courts  defeated,  in  a  large  measure,  the  objects 
for  which  it  was  enacted.  As  was  pointed  out  in  the  preceding 
section,  there  were  certain  uses  upon  which  the  statute  had  no 
effect.  These  uses  continue  separate  and  distinct  from  legal 
estates,  and  are  recognized  and  supported  by  courts  of  equity  as 
such,  under  the  general  name  of  trusts."*  A  trust,  therefore,  is 
a  use  not  executed  by  the  Statute  of  Uses.'''^  The  words  "use" 
antl  "trust"  were  both  mentioned  in  the  statute,  and  were  per- 
fectly synonymous;  but  as  the  provisions  of  the  statute  were  not 
deemed  co-extensive  with  the  various  modes  of  creating  uses,  such 
uses  as  were  not  provided  for  by  the  statute  were  left  to  their 
former  jurisdiction.  A  trust  is  the  general  name  applied  to  the 
relation  between  two  persons,  by  virtue  of  which  one  of  them, 
as  trustee,  holds  the  legal  title  to  property  for  the  benefit  of  the 
other  who  holds  the  equitable  title  and  who  is  called  the  cestui  que 
trust.  There  are  certain  distinct  modes  of  creating  trusts;  that 
is  to  say,  there  are  certain  principal  cases  in  which  legal  estates, 
created  upon  trusts  for  certain  purposes,  will  not  be  executed  or 
transferred  from  the  common  law  grantee  to  the  beneficiary  by 
force  of  the  statute.  These  cases,  as  explained  in  the  preceding 
section  were  chattel  interests,  active  uses,  estates  for  the  separ- 
ate use  of  married  women,  a  use  upon  a  use,  and  uses  to  grantees 
of  legal  estates. 

Respecting  their  manner  of  creation,  trusts  are  divided  into 
express  trusts,  and  implied  trusts.  Express  trusts,  are  those 
which  are  created  in  express  terms  in  the  deed  or  will,""^  or  by 
words  showing  an  intention  to  create  a  trust. °^  When  the  in- 
strument creating  a  trust  contains  all  the  terms  of  the  trust,  and 
nothing  remains  to  be  done  to  carry  out  its  terms,  it  is  termed  an 
executed  trust.***  But  when  the  full  intention  of  the  donor  is 
not  declared,  so  that  something  remains  to  be  done  in  order  to 
complete  the  trust,  it  is  said  to  be  executory."" 

»*\Vare  v.  Richardson,  3  Md.  505,  ^^  Tennant  v.  Tennant,  43  W.  Va. 

56  Am.   Dec.  762;   Farmers'  Loan  &  547,  27  S.  E.  334. 

Trust  Co.  V.  Carroll,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  »«  In  re  Fair's  Estate,  132  Cal.  523, 

613.  60  Pac.  442,  64  Pac.  1000,  84  Am.  St. 

«5  Fisher   v.   Fields,    10  Johns.    (N.  70;  Corn  well  v.  Orton,  126  Mo.  355, 

Y.)    495;   Fuller  v.   Missroon,   35   S.  27  S.  W.  536. 

Car.  314,  14  S.  E.  714.  o'-*  Gaylord   v.   Lafayette,     115    Ind. 

•"■'Jones  V.    Byrne,    149    Fed.    457;  423,  17  N.  E.  899;    Morris  v.  Linton, 

Caldwell  V.  Matthewson,  57  Kans.  258,  74  Nebr.  411.   104  N.  W.  927;   In  re 

45  Pac.  614;  Kaphan  V.  Toney  (Tenn.  Smith's    Estate,    144    Pa.    St.   428,   22 

Ch.  App.)  58  S.  W.  909.  Atl.  916,  21  Am.  St.  641. 


I 


67  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    59 

While  no  particular  or  technical  words  are  required  to  create 
an  express  trust,  the  words  used  for  that  purpose  must  clearly 
show  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  donor  to  give  to  one  the 
legal  title  to  the  property,  and  to  another  the  equitable  title 
thereto/  There  must  concur  sufficient  words  or  acts  to  show  an 
unequivocal  intention  to  devote  the  subject-matter  to  the  object 
of  the  trust;  the  subject-matter  must  be  definite  in  character  and 
so  at  the  disposal  of  the  settler  as  to  enable  him  to  devote  it  to 
the  object  of  the  trust;  and  this  object  must  be  one  that  is  lawful, 
certain  and  ascertained.^ 

The  donor  frequently  expresses  his  desire  by  words  of  entreaty, 
expectation,  request,  recommendation,  hope,  wish,  desire,  and  the 
like,  rather  than  by  words  of  command.  Such  expressions  are 
termed  "precatory  words,"  and  they  have  often  been  held  suffi- 
cient to  create  a  trust  in  favor  of  the  person  or  object  sought  to 
be  benefited.^ 

While  no  consideration  is  required  to  support  an  executed 
trust,*  equity  will  not  enforce  an  executory  agreement  to  create 
a  trust  in  the  absence  of  any  consideration.^ 

A  trust  may  often  be  implied  from  the  nature  of  the  powers 
granted  or  duties  imposed  by  the  instrument  creating  it.®  But 
in  order  that  a  trust  may  be  implied  from  the  context  of  an  in- 

iln  re  Heywood's  Estate,  148  Cal.  7  N.  E.  269;  Brunson  v.  Henry,  140 

184,  82  Pac.  755;  Hughes  v.  Fitzger-  Ind.  455,  39  N.  E.  256;  Hall  v.  Hall, 

aid,  78  Conn.  4,  60  Atl.  694 ;  Quinn  v.  76  Kans.  806,  93  Pac.  177 ;  Bennett  v. 

Shields,  62  Iowa  129,   17  N.  W.  437,  Littlefield,    177   Mass.  294,   58   N.   E. 

49  Am.  Rep.  141;  Patrick  v.  Patrick,  1011;  Ownes  v.  Ownes,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 

135  Ky.  307,  122  S.  W.  159 ;  Robinson  60.    But  see  Hamilton  v.  Downer,  152 

V.  Cogswell,   192  Mass.  79,  78  N.  E.  III.  651,  38  N.  E.  7Z2> ;  Beeman  v.  Bee- 

389;    Pembroke    Academy   v.    Epsom  man,  88  Hun  14,  34  N.  Y.  S.  484,  68 

School  Dist,  75  N.  H.  408,  75  Atl.  100,  N.  Y.  St.  491. 

Z7  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)   646n;  Close  v.  s  Moore  v.   Ransdel,   156  Ind.  658, 

Farmers*  Loan  &c.  Co.,  195  N.  Y.  92,  59   N.    E.   936;    Fisher    v.    Hampton 

87  N.  E.  1005;  Haywood  v.  Wright,  Trans.  Co.,  136  Mich.  218,  98  N.  W. 

152  N.  Car.  421,  67  S.  E.  982;  In  re  1012,   112  Am.  St.  358;   Brannock  v. 

Nevins'   Estate,    192    Pa.    St.   258,   43  Magoon,  141  Mo.  App.  316,  125S.  W. 

Atl.  996;  Holmes  v.  Walter,  118  Wis.  535. 

409.  95  N.  W.  380,  62  L.  R.  A.  986.  e  Prince  v.  Barrow,  120  Ga.  810,  48 

2  Lines  v.  Darden,  5  Fla.  51  ;  In  re  S.  E.  412;  Ingraham  v.  Ingraham,  169 

Soulard's  Estate,  141  Mo.  642,  43  S.  111.  432.  48  N.  E.  561,  49  N.  E.  320; 

W.  617;  In  re  Smith's  Estate,  144  Pa.  Robinson  v.  Cogswell.   192  Mass.  79, 

St.  428,  22  Atl.  916,  27  Am.  St.  641.  78   N.   E.  389;    Barksdale  v.   Capital 

3McRee    v.    Means,    34    Ala.    349;  City  Realty  Co.,  88  Miss.  623.  42  So. 

Warner  v.  Bates,  98  Mass.  274;  Knox  668;  Woodward  v.  James,  115  N.  Y. 

V.  Knox.  59  Wis.  172,  18  N.  W.  155,  346,  22  N.  E.  150;  In  re  Warner's  Ap- 

48  Am.  Rep.  487;   Contra.   Colton  v.  peal,   80   Pa.    St.    140;     Woodruff    v. 

Colton,    21     Fed.     594;     Hopkins    v.  Pleasants.    81    Va.    Z7 ;    Wolbert    v. 

Glunt,  111  Pa.  St.  287,  2  Atl.  183.  Beard,  128  Wis.  391,  107  N.  W.  663. 

^Massey  v.  Huntington,  118  111.  80, 


§    59  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  68 

strument  it  must  be  reasonably  certain  in  its  terms  as  to  the 
property  embraced  in  the  trust,  the  beneficiaries,  the  nature  of  the 
estate  they  are  to  have,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  trust  is  to 
be  executed,  and,  when  either  of  these  elements  are  indefinite  or 
uncertain,  the  trust  must  fail/  When  a  trust  arises  by  impHca- 
tion  or  construction  of  law  in  order  to  carry  out  the  presumed 
intention  of  the  parties,  it  is  termed  a  resulting  trust.  Thus 
where  one  standing  in  a  fiduciary  relation  uses  fiduciary  funds  to 
purchase  property  in  his  own  or  in  another's  name,  a  resulting 
trust  will  be  created/  Also  a  resulting  trust  will  arise  in  con- 
nection with  certain  fraudulent  dealings  with  property/ 

There  is  a  class  of  implied  trusts  which  arise  entirely  by  con- 
struction of  equity,  independently  of  any  intention  of  the  parties, 
and  often  contrary  to  their  intention,  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing fraud,  or  promoting  justice.  These  are  called  constructive 
trusts.''' 

Trusts  are  also  classified  as  passive  and  active  trusts.  A  pas- 
sive trust,  or  dry  trust  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  is  one  in  which 
the  trustee  has  a  mere  legal  title,  and  which,  in  jurisdictions 
where  the  Statute  of  Uses  is  in  force,  will  be  executed  so  as  to 
vest  the  entire  legal  title  in  the  beneficiary."  Where- the  trustee 
is  given  a  mere  legal  title,  with  no  control  over  the  subject 
matter,  and  no  duties  to  perform,  the  trust  is  passive  and  is 
executed  in  the  cestui  cjue  trust  by  the  Statute  of  Uses.'"  An  active 
trust  is  one  in  which  powers  or  duties  are  imposed  upon  the  trus- 
tee with  reference  to  the  property  granted  ar  devised,  in  which 
case  it  becomes  necessary  that  he  should  continue  to  hold  the 
legal  title  in  order  to  perform  his  duty  or  execute  the  trust. 


13 


-  Smullin  V.  Wharton.  72,  Ncbr.  667,  424,  123  S.  W.  29,  25  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

103   N.  W.  288.   106  N.  W.  577,   112  424n ;  Hayes  v.  Tabor,  41  N.  H.  521; 

N.  W.  622,  113  N.  W.  267.  Denison  v.  Denison,  185  N.  Y.  438,  78 

s  Williams    v.    Williams,    108    Iowa  N.  E.    162;   Mims   v.   Machlin,  S3   S. 

91,  78  N.  W.  792 ;  Avery  v.  Stewart,  Car.  6,  30  S.  E.  585 :  Holmes  v.  Wal- 

136  N.  Car.  426,  48  S.  E.  775,  68  L.  ter,  118  Wis.  409,  95  N.  W.  380,  62  L. 

R.  A.  776.  R.  A.  986. 

'■'  Trapnall   v.    Brown,    19   Ark.   39 ;  ^^  Ringrosc  v.  Gleadall,  17  Cal.  App. 

Walker  v.  Bruce,  44  Colo.  109,  97  Pac.  664,  121  Pac.  407 ;  Jones  v.  Janes,  223 

250.  Mo.  424,  123  S.  W.  29,  25  li.  R.  A. 

loScadden  Flat    Gold-Min.    Co.    v.  (N.  S.)  424n. 

Scadden,    121    Cal.   32,,   53    Pac.   440;  i^  Chicago   Terminal   T.    R.    Co.   v. 

Williams   V.  Williams,    108   Iowa  91,  Winslow,  216  111    166,  74  N.  E.  815; 

78  N.  W.  792 :  Avery  v.  Stewart,  136  Gerard    v.    Buckley.    137    Mass.    475  ; 

N.  Car.  426,  48  S.  E.  775,  68  L.  R.  A.  Webb  v.  Hayden,  166  Mo.  39,  65  S. 

776.                                                     -  W.   760;    Story  v.    Palmer,   46   N.   J, 

11  Russell   v.    Bates,    181    Mass.    12,  Eq.    1,    18    Atl.    363;    In    re    Spring's 

62  N.  E.  950;  Jones  v.  Jones,  223  Mo.  Estate,  216  Pa.  529,  66  Atl.  110. 


69  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    60 

Thus  where  the  trustee  is  given  the  duty  to  care  for  the  land, 
pay  taxes,  collect  rents  or  make  sale  of  or  mortgage  the  land,  the 
trust  is  active/* 

§  60.  Powers. — A  power  is  an  authority  reserved  by  or 
limited  to  one  to  do  certain  acts  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter 
of  the  gift  for  his  own  benefit  or  for  the  benefit  of  another,  and 
operating  upon  an  estate  vested  either  in  himself  or  in  another. 
It  must  be  understood,  however,  that  the  power  is  distinct  from 
the  estate, ^^  although  it  may  be,  and  frequently  is,  coupled  with 
an  interest  in  the  land,  as  in  case  of  a  gift  to  a  tenant  for  life, 
with  a  general  power  of  disposition;  in  which  case  the  power 
does  not  enlarge  the  life  estate  into  a  fee,  although  a  sale  there- 
under will  pass  a  fee  to  the  purchaser/" 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  procedure  under  powers  presents 
a  new  mode  of  conveyance,  operating  through  the  medium  of 
springing  and  shifting  uses;  and  inasmuch  as  such  uses  may  be 
created  either  by  deed  or  by  will,  lands  may  be  transferred  in 
this  manner  either  by  will  or  deed.  In  form  and  general  attrib- 
utes powers  are  executory  interests,  but  are  called  powers  from 
the  fact  that  their  distinguishing  feature  is  that  some  designated 
person  has  the  power  to  raise  the  use  "in  another.  Before  the 
enactment  of  the  Statute  of  Uses,  powers  were  merely  directions 
to  the  trustee  of  the  legal  estate  as  to  the  manner  of  transferring 
the  estate.  They  were  future  uses  to  be  designated  by  the  person 
on  whom  the  power  was  conferred.  When  such  future  uses 
arose,  equity  compelled  the  trustee  to  observe  them;  and  when 
conveyances  under  the  Statute  of  Uses  became  established,  it 
was  still  usual  to  reserve  or  limit  such  powers  as  the  exigencies  of 
the  case  required. 

A  power  differs  from  an  estate,  in  that  no  title  or  interest  in 
the  land  is  vested  in  the  donee  by  reason  of  the  creation  of  the 
power.  There  is  also  a  clear  distinction  between  a  power  and  a 
trust.  Thus  a  power  conferred  upon  one  by  will  is  not  imperative, 
but  may  be  exercised  by  him  at  his  discretion;  while  a  trust  is 
imperative,  and  is  made  with  strict  reference  to  its  faithful  ex- 
ecution.  The  trustee  is  not  empowered,  but  is  required  to  act  in 

^*  Chicago   Terminal   T.    R.    Co.   v.  ^^  Sewall  v.  Wilmer,  132  Mass.  131  ; 

Winslow,  216  111.   166,  74  N.  E.  815;  Eaton  v.  Straw.  18  N.  H.  320. 

Gerard    v.    Buckley,    137    Mass.   475;  i«  Durr  v.  Wilson,  116  Ala.  125,  22 

Webb  V.  Hayden,  166  Mo.  39,  65  S.  So.   536;    Vamplew   v.    Chambers,   29 

W.  760.  Nebr.  83,  45  N.  W.  268. 


§    60  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  70 

accordance  with  the  will  of  the  testator."  However,  if  the 
power  is  made  a  duty,  or  if  it  is  coupled  with  the  duties  of  a 
trustee  for  the  benefit  of  the  trust,  or  ministerial  or  coupled  with 
an  interest,  it  may  be  enforced  by  a  court  of  equity/^ 

Powers  are  either  general  or  special.  They  are  general  when 
they  are  capable  of  being  exercised  by  the  donee  in  favor  of  any 
person,  including  himself,  and  are  not  restricted  as  to  the  estate 
or  interest  over  which  he  may  exercise  the  power,  while  the 
power  is  special  if  its  exercise  is  restricted  to  particular  persons, 
or  a  particular  class  of  persons,  or  if  it  can  be  exercised  only  for 
certain  named  purposes  or  under  certain  conditions.^'' 

Powers  are  also  further  classified  as  appendant  or  appurtenant, 
in  gross,  or  collateral.  Powers  are  said  to  be  appendant  or  ap- 
purtenant when  they  depend  on  the  estate  limited  to  the  person 
to  whom  they  are  given. '°  Thus,  where  an  estate  for  life  is 
limited  to  a  person,  with  a  power  to  convey  or  incumber  his  life 
estate,  the  power  is  appendant. ^^  Powers  collateral  or  in  gross 
are  powers  given  to  one  who  has  an  interest  in  the  estate,  to 
create  such  estates  only  as  will  not  attach  on  the  interest  limited 
to  him,  or  take  effect  out  of  his  own  interest.  Thus  where  a 
tenant  for  life  has  a  power  to  create  an  estate  which  is  not  to 
begin  until  his  own  ends.  It  is  a  power  in  gross,  because  the 
estate  for  life  has  no  concern  in  it.^^  A  power  simply  collateral 
is  a  power  given  to  a  person  not  having  any  interest  or  estate  in 
land,  and  to  whom  no  estate  is  given,  to  dispose  of  or  charge 
the  estate  in  favor  of  another.^^ 

Again,  powers  are  (1)  exclusive,  such  as  to  appoint  to  certain 
memljers  of  a  class,"*  or  (2)  nonexclusive,  as  a  power  to  appoint 
among  all  the  members  of  a  class. "^ 

17  Law   Guarantee   &  Trust   Co.   v.  2.3  McGriff    v.    Porter,    5    Fla.    373; 

Jones,  103  Tenn.  245,  58  S.  W.  219.  Hammond  v.   Croxton,   162  Ind.  353, 

1**  Freeman  v.   Prendergast,  94  Ga.  69  N.  E.  250,  70  N.  E.  368;  Bradt  v. 

369,  21   S.  E.  837;   Nugent  v.  Cloon,  Hodgdon,  94  Maine  559,  48  Atl.  179; 

117    Mass.   219;    Osborne  v.   Gordon,  Reid  v.  Gordon,  35  Md.  174. 

86  Wis.  92,  56  N.  W.  334.  21  Portsmouth  v.  Shackford,  46  N. 

19  Thompson  v.  Garwood,  3  Whart.  H.  423 ;  Graefif  v.  De  Turk.  44  Pa.  St. 
(Pa.)  287.  31  Am.  Dec.  502;  Sugden  527;  Huling  v.  Fenncr,  9  R.  I.  410. 
Powers  (8th  ed.),  394.  25  Hatchett    v.    Hatchett,    103    Ala. 

20  Brown  v.  Renshaw,  57  Md.  67;  556,  16  So.  550:  Faloon  v.  Flannery, 
Clark  V.  Wilson,  53  Miss.  119.  74  Minn.  3S,  76  N.  W.  954;  Lippincott 

21  Garland  v.  Smith,  164  Mo.  1,  64  v.  Ridgway,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  164; 
S.  W.  188.  Thrasher  v.  Ballard,  35  W.  Va.  524, 

22  Young  V.  Sheldon,  139  Ala".  444,  14  S.  E.  232. 
36  So.  27,  101  Am.  St.  44;  Garland  v. 

Smith,  164  Mo.  1,  64  S.  W.  188. 


I 
1 


71  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    61 

§  61.  Easements. — An  easement  is  a  right  in  the  owner  of 
one  parcel  of  land,  by  virtue  of  such  ownership,  to  use  the  land 
of  another  for  a  special  purpose  not  inconsistent  with  a  general 
property  in  the  latter.-''  In  strictness  it  is  a  mere  use  of  the  land 
of  another  without  taking  anything  from  it.^^  It  is  a  privilege, 
service  or  convenience  in  the  estate  of  another,  but  comprises  no 
interest  in  the  land  itself.-^  One  person  may  own  land  in  fee 
simple,  and  be  in  actual  possession  thereof,  while  another  may 
have  an  easement  therein.^^  But  one  can  not  have  an  easement  in 
his  own  lands. ^° 

Strictly  speaking,  an  easement  does  not  confer  title,  but  it  may 
affect  the  title  and  possession  of  the  owner  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  be  more  than  an  incumbrance.^^  Its  existence  is  a  breach  of 
a  covenant  against  incumbrances.^- 

The  essential  qualities  of  easements  are:  (1)  They  are  incor- 
poreal; (2)  they  are  imposed  upon  corporeal  property;  (3)  they 
confer  no  right  to  a  participation  in  the  profits  arising  from  such 
property,  and  (4)  there  must  be  two  distinct  tenements,  the  domi- 
nant to  which  the  right  belongs,  and  the  servient  upon  which  the 
obligation  rests. ^^ 

There  is  a  well-settled  distinction  between  an  easement  and 
license,  although  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  discover  a  substantial 
difference  between  them.^*  An  easement  is  an  interest  in  an- 
other's land  with  a  right  to  enjoy  it,  while  a  license  carries  no 
such  interest,^^  is  personal,  and  does  not  run  with  the  land.^*^  A 
license  may  be  created  by  parol, ^'  while  some  instrument  in  writ- 

2cWessels  v.  Colebank,  174  111.  618,  22  Mitchell  v.  Warner.  5  Conn.  497; 

51  N.  E.  639;    Warner  v.  Rogers,  23  Leonard  v.  Adams,   119    Mass.    366; 

Minn.  34;  Stevens  v.  Dennett,  51   N.  Wilson  v.  Cochran,  48  Pa.  St.  107,  86 

H.  324;  Clark  v.  Glidden,  60  Vt.  702,  Am.  Dec.  574;  Russ  v.  Steel,  40  Vt. 

15  Atl.  358.  310. 

27  Kennedy  Stave  &  Cooperage  Co.  33  pjerce  v.  Keator,  70  N.  Y.  419,  26 
V.  Sloss-Sheffield  Steel  &c.  Co.,  137  Am.  Rep.  612 ;  Le  Blond  v.  Peshtigo, 
Ala.  401,  34  So.  111.  140  Wis.  604.   123  N.  W.  157,  25  L. 

28  Peck   v.    Smith.    1    Conn.    103,    6  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   511n. 

Am.  Dec.  216;  Rhode  Island  Hospital  -nVolf  v.  Frost,  4  Sandf.  Ch.   (N. 

Trust  Co.  v.  Hayden,  20  R.  I.  544,  40  Y.)   12;  Hazelton  v.  Putnam,  3  Pin- 

Atl.  421,  42  L.  R.  A.  107.  ney  (Wis.)  107,  54  Am.  Dec.  158. 

20  Rhode  Island  Hospital  Trust  Co.  ss  Pomerov  v.  Mills,  3  Vt.  279,  23 

v.  Hayden,  20  R.  I.  544,  40  Atl.  421,  Am.  Dec.  207. 

42  L.  R.  A.  107.  36  Taylor  v.  Waters,  7  Taunt.  374. 

soworthen    &    Aldrich     v.     White  s"  Fitch     v.     Sevmour,      9      Mete. 

Sprmg  Paper  Co.,  74  N.  J.  Eq.  647,  (Mass.)    462;    Morrill    v.    Mackman, 

70  Atl.  468.  24  Mich.  279,  9  Am.  Rep.  124. 

31  Coleman     v.     Thomson,     6     Pa. 
County  Ct.   126. 


§    61  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  72 

ing  is  usually  required  to  create  an  easement.^*  The  person  giving 
a  license  may  usually  revoke  same  at  will,^^  while  an  easement 
can  not  be  so  revoked/" 

The  strict  and  technical  definition  of  an  easement  excludes  a 
right  to  the  proceeds  of  land,  or,  as  they  are  generally  termed, 
"profits  a  prendre."  Strictly  speaking,  these  latter  are  rights 
exercised  by  one  man  in  the  soil  of  another,  accompanied  v^ith 
participation  in  the  profits  thereof,  such  as  rights  of  pasture,  tak- 
ing wood,  digging  sand,  and  the  like.  But  this  right  of  profit  a 
prendre,  if  enjoyed  by  reason  of  holding  a  certain  other  estate, 
is  regarded  in  the  light  of  an  easement  appurtenant  to  such 
estate. ^^  Easements  that  inhere  in  the  land,  concern  the  premises, 
and  are  necessary  to  its  enjoyment,  are  called  easements  appur- 
tenant. They  attach  to  the  land  to  which  they  are  appurtenant, 
and  pass  by  deed  of  the  land  without  express  mention.*'  Thus, 
if  a  lot  to  which  a  right  of  way  appurtenant  is  attached  be  sub- 
divided, each  subdivision  is  entitled  to  all  legitimate  rights,  by 
way  of  easement,  which  appertain  to  the  entirety  of  the  original 
lot."^ 

A  mere  personal  interest  or  privilege  in  the  real  estate  of  an- 
other, and  which  is  not  assignable  or  inheritable  is  called  an  ease- 
ment in  gross.  It  dies  with  the  person  who  may  have  acquired  it, 
and  it  is  so  exclusively  personal  that  the  owner  by  right  can  not 
take  another  person  in  company  with  him.'**  An  easement  in 
gross  will  never  be  presumed  when  it  can  be  fairly  construed  to 
be  appurtenant  to  some  other  estate.*^ 

Where  the  easement  is  of  a  continuous  nature,  or  where  its  en- 
joyment may  1)e  continued  without  the  necessity  of  any  human 
interference,  it  is  said  to  be  a  continuous  easement.**'     To  this 

3H  Johnson  v.  Lewis,  47  Ark.  66,  2  ^2  Kuecken   v.   Voltz,    110   111.   264; 

S.  W.  329.   14  S.  W.  466;  Howes  v.  Moore  v.  Crose.  43  Ind.  30;  Willets 

Barmon,  11   Idaho  64,  81   Pac.  48,  69  v.  Langhaar,  212  Mass.  573.  99  N.  E. 

L.  R.  A.  568,  114  Am.  St.  255;  Yea-  466;  Boatman  v.  Lasley,  23  Ohio  St. 

ger  V.  Tuning.  79  Ohio  St.  121,  86  N.  614. 

E.  657,  19  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   700,  128  43  Trenton  v.  Toman,  74  N.  J.  Eq. 

Am.  St.  679.  702,  70  Atl.  606. 

3"  Cook  V.   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  40  •*4  Cadwalader    v.    Bailey,    17   R.    I. 

Iowa  451.  495,  23  Atl.  20,  14  L.  R.  A.  300. 

40  Hills  V.  Miller,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.)  ^5  Lj^iggrding  v.  Zignego.  77  Minn. 
254,   24    Am.    Dec.    218 ;     Foster    v.  421,  80  N.  W.  360.  77  Am.  St.  677. 
Browning,   4  R.   I.  47,  67  Am.   Dec.  ^g  Lampman  v.  Milks,  21  N.  Y.  SOS ; 
SOS.  Dee  v.  King,  77  Vt.  230,  59  Atl.  839, 

41  Huntington  v.   Asher,  96  N.   Y.  68  L.  R.  A.  860. 
604,  48  Am.  Rep.  652. 


1 


72>  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS    IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    62 

class  of  easements  belong  right  to  lateral  or  subjacent  support, 
right  to  light  and  air,  right  to  an  open  drain,  right  to  a  water 
course,  and  the  like.  Noncontinuous  easements,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  those  the  enjoyment  of  which  can  be  had  only  by  the 
interference  of  man,*^  such  as  rights  of  way,**  or  a  right  to  draw 
water  from  a  well.*^ 

If  an  easement  is  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  tenement,  and 
without  which  the  land  can  not  be  used  at  all,  it  is  called  an  ease- 
ment of  necessity  or  natural  easements,  in  distinction  from  con- 
ventional easements,  or  those  arising  out  of  agreement.^" 

At  common  law,  easements  were  said  to  "lie  in  grant"  and  "not 
in  livery."  So  an  easement  must  be  created  by  deed  unless  some 
statute  provides  otherwise. °^  This  includes  prescription,  which  is 
based  upon  the  common-law  doctrine  of  the  presumption  of  a 
grant.  While  ordinarily  an  easement  can  be  created  only  by 
writing  under  seal,  it  may  be  created  b.y  adverse  user,  by  estoppel, 
or  part  performance  of  a  parol  agreement. ^^  While  it  is  custom- 
ary to-  create  an  easement  by  an  express  reservation  in  the  deed 
of  conveyance,  it  may  be  done  quite  as  effectually  by  a  separate 
instrument  which  operates  to  create  .or  convey  the  easement 
only.^^  Unlike  other  estates  or  interests,  easements  may  be  cre- 
ated by  implication  as  well  as  by  express  grant. ^*  In  order  that  an 
easement  may  be  created  by  implication  it  must  be  necessary  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  land  granted. ^^  But  the  necessity  need  not 
be  absolute.  It  is  sufficient  if  it  appears  that  without  the  ease- 
ment the  grantee  could  not  enjoy  his  estate  in  full,  except  at  un- 
usual cost  or  inconvenience.^'' 

§  62,     Licenses. — A  license  is  a  mere  permission  given  by 

4"  Lampman  v.  Milks,  21  N.  Y.  505.  -"'S  Ashcroft  v.   Eastern  R.   Co..   126 

48  Oliver  v.    Pitman,   98   Mass.   46;  Mass.  196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672;  Gilbert 

Morgan   v.   Meuth,  60  Mich.  238,  27  v.    Peteler,    38    Bark.    (N.    Y.)    489; 

N.  W.  509;  Stuyvesant  v.  Woodruff,  Richardson    v.    Clements,   89   Pa.    St. 

21  N.  J.  L.  133,  57  Am.  Dec.  156.  503,  iZ  Am.  Rep.  784. 

*9  Lampman  v.  Milks.  21  N.  Y.  505.  -'^  Bean  v.  Bean.  163  Mich.  379,  128 

soHildreth   v.   Googins,    91    Maine  N.  W.  413;  Morgan     v.     Mason.     20 

227,  39  Atl.  550;  Laumier  v.  Francis,  Ohio  402,  55  Am.  Dec.  464. 

23  Mo.  181.  55Cihak   v.    Klehr,    117   111.   643,   7 

51  Fuhr  V.  Dean,  26  Mo.  116,  69  Am.  N.  E.  Ill;  Philbrick  v.  Ewing.  97 
Dec.  484;  Cagle  v.  Parker,  97  N.  Car.  Mass.  133;  In  re  Francies'  Appeal.  96 
271.  2  S.   E.  76;   Huff  v.   McCauley,  Pa.  St.  200. 

53  Pa.  St.  206,  91  Am.  Dec.  203.  ■'•'«  Thompson  v.  Miner,  30  Iowa  386, 

52  Shaw  V.  Proffitt,  57  Ore.  192,  109  517;  Oliver  v.  Hook,  47  Md.  301; 
Pac.  584,  110  Pac.  1092,  Ann.  Cas.  Lanier  v.  Booth,  50  Miss.  410 :  Valley 
1913  A,  63.  Falls  Co.  v.  Dolan,  9  R.  I.  489. 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


74 


one  landowner  to  another  to  use  his  land  for  a  given  purpose. ^^ 
It  may  be  created  either  by  express  agreement,  or  by  implica- 
tion.'^ .\  mere  license  exists  wherever  the  owner  grants  to  an- 
other a  right  to  enter,  without  giving  him  an  interest  in  the 
land.'' 

Every  landowner  impliedly  licenses  his  neighbors  and  stran- 
gers to  enter  for  any  proper  occasion,  as  business,  social  visits, 
and  to  make  inquiries  and  the  like.  The  nature  and  extent  of  this 
implied  license  is  controlled  and  measured  by  the  kind  of  prem- 
ises, the  purpose  of  the  entry  and  the  general  custom  of  the 
community. ''^  Being  a  purely  personal  right, "^  the  licensee  has  no 
power  to  assign  it.''"  Such  a  license  is  personal  to  the  licensee  and 
it  is  subject  to  revocation  by  the  licensor  at  w^ill.'"'^  But  if  the 
license  is  coupled  with  an  interest  it  can  not  be  so  revoked.''*  For 
instance,  if  a  londowner  sell  personal  property  on  his  land,  giving 
the  buyer  a  license  to  go  upon  the  land  and  remove  such  property, 
the  license  can  not  be  revoked.''"  Also  a  license  to  do  some  act 
which  obstructs  or  destroys  an  easement  of  the  licensor  can  not 
be  revoked  after  it  is  executed,  so  long  as  the  easement 
is  in  force. ^^  In  some  states  it  is  held  that  an  executed  license, 
the  execution  of  which  involved  the  expenditure  of  money  or 
labor,  is  regarded  in  equity  as  an  executed  agreement  for  a  valua- 
ble consideration,  and  that  it  is  therefore  irrevocable,  although 
given  merely  by  parol,  and  relating  to  the  use  and  occupation  of 


^"  Emerson  v.  Bergin,  16  Cal.  197, 
18  Pac.  264;  Howes  v.  Barmon.  11 
Idaho  64,  81  Pac.  48,  69  L.  R.  A.  568, 
114  Am.  St.  255;  Baldwin  v.  Taylor, 
166  Pa.  St.  507,  31  Atl.  250. 

=s  Cutler  V.  Smith,  57  111.  252;  Har- 
mon V.  Harmon,  61  Maine  222 ;  Lakin 
V.  Ames,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  198; 
Adams  v.  Burton,  43  Vt.  36. 

^0  Prince  v.  Case,  10  Conn.  375,  27 
Am.  Dec.  675  ;  Baltimore  &  H.  R.  Co. 
V.  Algire,  63  Md.  319;  Cook  v. 
Stearns,  11  Mass.  533. 

«o  Cutler  V.  Smith,  57  111.  252 ;  Gib- 
son V.  Leonard,  143  111.  182,  32  N.  E. 
182,  17  L.  R.  A.  588,  36  Am.  St.  376; 
Sterling  v.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  217.  12 
Am.  Rep.  80;  Kay  v.  Pennsylvania 
Co.,  65  Pa.  St.  273,  3  Am.  Rep.  628. 

"1  Blaisdell  v.  Portsmouth  &c.  R. 
Co.,  51  N.  H.  483 ;  East  Jersey  Iron 
Co.  V.  Wright,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  248.  ; 

"2  Ruggles     V.     Lesure,     24     Pick. 


(Mass.)  187;  Ward  v.  Rapp,  79  Mich. 
469,  44  N.  W.  934 ;  Fuhr  v.  Dean,  26 
Mo.  116,  69  Am.  Dec.  484;  Pearson 
V.  Hartman,  100  Pa.  St.  84. 

('3  Hibbard,  Spencer,  Bartlett  &  Co., 
V.  Chicago.  173  111.  91,  50  N.  E.  256, 
40  L.  R.  A.  621 ;  Classen  v.  Chesa- 
peake Guano  Co.,  81  Md.  258.  31  Atl. 
808;  Pitzman  v.  Boyce,  111  Mo.  387, 
19  S.  W.  1104,  ZZ  Am.  St.  536. 

«*  Barney  v.  Lincoln  Park,  203  111. 
.397,  67  N.  E.  801  ;  Long  v.  Buchanan, 
27  Md.  502,  92  Am.  Dec.  653 ;  Sterling 
V.  Warden,  51  N.  H.  217,  12  Am.  Rep. 
80. 

65  Carter  v.  Wingard,  47  111.  App. 
296;  Rogers  v.  Cox,  96  Ind.  157,  49 
Am.  Rep.  152.  But  see  Fish  v.  Cap- 
well,  18  R.  I.  667,  29  Atl.  840,  25  L. 
R.  A.  159,  49  Am.  St.  807. 

'"■c  Powers  v.  Harlow.  53  Mich.  507, 
19  N.  W.  257,  51  Am.  Rep.  154. 


7S  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    63 

real  estate. ^'^  Where,  however,  the  authority  consists  of  a  mere 
oral  license,  the  courts  generally  hold  that  the  license  can  be  re- 
voked, regardless  of  the  expenditures  or  improvements  made, 
since  a  contrary  holding  would,  in  effect,  transfer  an  interest  in 
land  by  parol. ^^ 

A  license  is  also  revoked  by  the  death,®"  or  insanity'"  of  either 
the  licensor  or  licensee,  by  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  which  it 
was  given,"  by  abandonment  or  nonuser,^^  by  a  sale  of  the  land,^^ 
or  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain/* 

§  63.  Profits  a  prendre. — A  profit  a  prendre  is  a  right  in 
one  person  to  take  the  soil,  gravel,  minerals,  and  the  like  from  the 
land  of  another."  The  thing  so  taken  is  supposed  to  have  some 
value."  It  is,  in  its  nature,  corporeal,  and  is  capable  of  livery, 
while  easements  are  not,  and  may  exist  independently  without 
connection  with  or  being  appendant  to  other  property,'^  that  is, 
it  may  be  held  by  one  independently  of  his  ownership  of  other 
land,  the  rule  in  this  respect  differing  from  that  usually  regarded 
as  applying  to  easements,  unattended  with  a  right  of  profit. ^^  It 
may  be  further  distinguished  from  an  easement,  in  that  the  latter 
consists  in  a  right  to  use  or  enjoy,  but  involves  no  right  to  take 
any  profit  from  the  land.^° 

Profits  a  prendre  may,  however,  be  appurtenant  to  other  land, 
the  land  to  which  the  right  appertains  being  then  the  "dominant 

67  Ferguson  V.  Spencer,  127  Ind.  66,  ener,  117  Ind.  465,  20  N.  E.  254; 
25  N.  E.  1035;  Rerick  v.  Kern,  14  Fischer  v.  Johnson,  106  Iowa  181,  Id 
Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.)    267,   16  Am.  Dec.     N.  W.  658. 

497.  73  Entwhistle  v.  Henke.  211  111.  273, 

68  West  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Peo-  71  N.  E.  990,  103  Am.  St.  196 ; 
pie,  214  III.  9,  12>  X.  E.  393 ;  Whitte-  Worthen  v.  Garno,  182  Mass.  243,  65 
more  v.  New  York  &c.   R.  Co.,   174  N.  E.  67. 

Mass.  363,  54  N.  E.  867  ;  Nowlin  Lum-  74  chpp  v.  Boston,   133   Mass.  367. 

ber  Co.  v.  Wilson.  119  Mich.  406,  78  75  Black  v.  Elkhorn  Mining  Co.,  49 

N.  W.  338;   Rodefer  v.  Pittsburg  &c.  Fed.  549;  Bingham  v.  Salene,  15  Ore. 

R.  Co.,  12  Ohio  St.  272,  74  N.  E.  183,  208,  14  Pac.  523,  3  Am.  St.  152. 

70  L.  R.  A.  844.  7g  Pierce  v.   Keator,  70  N.  Y.  419. 

6»  Ruggles     V.     Lesure,     24     Pick.  26  Am.  Rep.  612  ;  Payne  v.  Sheets,  75 

(Mass.)    187:   Estelle  v.   Peacock,  48  Vt.  335,  55  Atl.  656. 

Mich.   469,    12   N.   W.   659;    Blaisdell  77  pjerce  v.   Keator,  70  N.  Y.  419, 

V.  Portsmouth  &c.  R.  Co.,  51  N.  H.  26  Am.  Rep.  612. 

483.  78  Tinicum    Fishing    Co.    v.    Carter, 

70  Berry  v.  Potter,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  664,  61  Pa.  St.  21,  100  Am.  Dec.  597; 
29  Atl.  il2>  Youghrogheny     River     Coal     Co.     v. 

71  Detroit  &  B.  Plank  Rd.  Co.  v.  Pierce,  153  Pa.  St.  74,  25  Atl.  1026; 
Detroit  Suburban  R.  Co.,  103  Mich.  Cadwalader  v.  Bailey,  17  R.  I.  495, 
585.  61  N.  W.  880 ;  Glynn  v.  George,  23  Atl.  20.  14  L.  R.  A.  300. 

20  N.  H.  114.  70  Huntington   v.   Asher,   96  N.   Y. 

72  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mich-    604,  48  Am.  Rep.  652. 


§    64  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  76 

tenement,"  and  the  land  from  which  the  profits  are  taken  being 
the  "servient  tenement. "^°  Some  of  the  most  common  profits  a 
prendre  are  the  right  of  pasture,  the  right  to  take  minerals,  the 
right  to  take  firewood,  and  the  right  to  fish. 

Profits  a  prendre,  like  easements,  may  be  acquired  either  by 
grant  or  by  prescription ;  and,  like  easements,  they  may  be  cre- 
ated by  words  of  exception  or  reservation."  If  created  by  grant 
it  carries  with  it  by  necessary  implication  all  rights  necessary  to 
its  full  enjoyment. ^^  A  right  of  profit  in  gross  can  not  be  appor- 
tioned so  that  different  persons  may  work  it  separately,  but  all 
the  assignees  must  w^ork  it  in  common,  otherwise  there  might  re- 
sult an  overcharging  of  the  servient  estate.*^  A  right  of  profit  a 
prendre  may  be  distinguished  by  a  release  of  the  right  to  the 
owner  of  the  servient  estate,*^*  by  a  union  of  the  titles  to  the  dom- 
inant and  servient  estates  in  one  person, ^^  and.  if  common  appur- 
tenant, by  an  alienation  of  a  part  of  the  land  to  which  the  right  is 
attached.^" 

§  64.  Curtesy. — Upon  the  marriage  of  a  man  to  a  woman 
who  is  seised  during  coverture  of  an  estate  of  inheritance,  and 
has  by  her  issue  born  alive,  capable  of  inheriting  the  estate,  he 
takes  an  estate  for  life.  This  is  sometimes  called  tenancy  by  the 
curtesy  of  England,  though  the  same  estate  existed  in  ancient 
times  in  other  countries.  In  this  country  such  an  estate  obtains 
in  all  the  states  where  not  abolished  by  statute.  The  requisites  of 
curtesy  are  (1)  lawful  marriage,"  (2)  legitimate  issue  born  alive 
and  capable  of  inheriting,**^   (3)    sufficient  seising  of  the  wife 

soGrubb  v.  Grubb,  74  Pa.  St.  25;  582;  Bell  v.  Obio  R.  Co..  25  Pa.  St. 

Hall  V.  Lawrence,  2  R.  I.  218,  57  Am.  161,  64  Am.  Dec.  687. 
Dec.  715.  **^  Wells  v.  Tbompson,  13  Ala.  793, 

»i  Stockbridgc  Iron  Co.  v.  Hudson  48  Am.   Dec.   76;   2   Bl.   Comm.    127. 

Iron  Co.,  107  Mass.  290;  Wardell  v.  A   statute  giving  the   surviving  hus- 

Watson,  93    Mo.    107,   5    S.   W.   603;  band  a  right  of  curtesy  in  the  estate 

In  re  Alden's  Appeal,  93  Pa.  St.  182.  of  his  deceased  wife  has  no  applica- 

82  Williams  v.  Gibson,  84  Ala.  228,  tion  to  marriages  contracted  before 
4  So.  350,  5  Am.  St.  368;  Marvin  v.  its  enactment:  Hall  v.  Moore,  32  Ky. 
Brewster  Iron  Min.  Co.  55  N.  Y.  538,  L.  56,  105  S.  W.  414. 

14  Am.  Rep.  322.  »s  Nicrosi  v.  Phillip!,  91  Ala.  291,  8 

83  Harlow  v.  Lake  Superior  Iron  So.  561 ;  Goff  v.  Anderson,  91  Ky. 
Co.,  36  Mich.  105;  Funk  v.  Haider-  303,  12  Ky.  L.  888.  15  S.  W.  866,  11 
man,  53  Pa.  St.  229.  L.  R.  A.  825 ;   Ryan  v.   Freeman,  36 

8*  Co.  Lit.  280a.  Miss.    175;    Donogan   v.    Griffith,   215 

85  Hall  v.  Lawrence,  2  R.  I.  218,  57  Mo.  149,  114  S.  W.  621,  20  L.  R.  A. 

Am.  Dec.  715.  (N.   S.)   825n,   128  Am.  St.  458n,   15 

8cVan    Rensselaer   v.    RadclifT,    .10  Ann.  Cas.  724. 

Wend.    (N.    Y.)    639;    25    Am.    Dec. 


I 


77  ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS    IN    REAL    PROPERTY  §    64 

during  coverture,®^  and  (4)  death  of  the  wife  in  the  hfetime  of 
the  husband. °°  At  common  law  both  the  seising  of  the  wife  dur- 
ing coverture  and  birth  of  issue  capable  of  inheriting  are  nec- 
essary to  constitute  an  estate  by  the  curtesy,  but  where  this  rule 
prevails  it  is  held  that  a  concurrence  of  seisin  and  birth  of  issue 
is  not  necessary  to  constitute  an  estate  of  this  kind.^^  Thus  if 
the  wnfe  becomes  seised  of  lands  during  coverture  and  then  be 
disseised,  and  then  have  issue,  the  husband  will  be  tenant  by  the 
curtesy  initiate,  and  on  his  wife's  death  may  enter  as  such."' 

It  has  been  said  that  the  estate  by  the  curtesy  had  its  origin  in 
the  obligation  to  support  the  children  of  the  marriage  ;°^  but  if 
this  is  so,  the  reason  operates  in  originating  only  and  not  in 
bounding  or  limiting  the  estate.^* 

The  husband  is  entitled  to  curtesy:  (1)  In  his  w^ife's  estate  of 
inheritance;^^  (2)  in  her  equitable  estate  of  inheritance;'^*^  (3)  in 
her  estates  in  expectancy  when  they  vest  in  possession  during  her 
life;"''  (4)  in  her  estates  held  in  joint  tenancy  or  in  coparce- 
nary ;"®  and  (5  )  in  her  determinable  estates,  when  they  are  deter- 
mined by  a  shifting  use  or  executory  devise."^  But  the  husband 
is  not  entitled  to  curtesy  (1)  in  his  wife's  life  estate;^  (2)  in  a 
reversion  or  remainder  where  the  prior  particular  freehold  estate 
does  not  determine  before  her  death;-  (3)  in  her  estates  in  joint 

8»Stinebaugh    v.    Wisdom.     13     B.  (Md.)   179,  48  Am.  Dec.  557;  Thorn- 

Mon.   (Kv.)   467;  Wass  v.  Biicknam,  ton  v.  Krepps,  37  Pa.  St.  391. 

38  Maine  356;  Rabb     v.     Griffin,     26  9"  Meacham  v.  Bunting.  156  111.  586, 

Miss.   579;    Hopper   v.    Demarest,   21  41  N.  E.  175,  28  L.  R.  A.  618,  47  Am. 

N.  J.  L.  525.  St.  239. 

°°  Wheeler  v.   Hotchkiss,   10  Conn.  9"  Withers   v.    Jenkins,    14    S.    Car. 

225 ;  Porch  v.  Fries,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  204.  597. 

91  Heath  v.  White,  5  Conn.  228;  "s  Wass  v.  Bucknam,  38  Maine  360 ; 
Zeust  V.  Stafifan,  16  App.  Cas.  (D.  C.)  Buckley  v.  Buckley,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
141;    Stewart  v.   Ross,  50  Miss.  776;  43. 

Donovan  v.  Griffith,  215  Mo.  149,  114  ^n  Carter  v.  Couch,  157  Ala.  470.  47 

S.  W.  621,  20  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  825n,  So.  1006.  20  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   858n ; 

128  Am.  St.  458n.  15  Ann.  Cas.  724;  Martin  v.  Renaker,  10  Kv.  L.  469,  9  S. 

In  re  Starhuck.  63  Misc.,  156,  116  N.  W.  419;  Hatfiel  v.  Sneden,  54  N.  Y. 

Y.  S.  1030;  Templeton  v.  Twitty,  88  280;    McMasters   v.   Neglev,    152   Pa. 

Tenn.  595,  14  S.  W.  435.  St.  303,  25  Atl.  641. 

92  Jackson  v.  Johnson,  5  Cow.  (N.  ^  Jannev  v.  Sprigg,  7  Gill  (Md.) 
Y.)  75,  15  Am.  Dec.  433.  197,    48    Am.    Dec.    557;    Spencer    v. 

">•  Hunter  v.  Whitworth,  9  Ala.  965  ;  O'Niell,   100  Mo.  49,  12  S.  W.   1054 ; 

Templeton  v.  Twitty,  88  Tenn.  595,  14  Adams   v.   Ross,   30   N.  J.   L.  505,  82 

S.  W.  435.  Am..  Dec.  237. 

■'4  Heath  v.  White,  5  Conn.  228.  "  Orford  v.  Benton.  36  N.  H.  395 ; 

o-'^Northcut  V.  Whipp,   12   B.   Mon.  Adair  v.   Lott,   3   Hill    (N.   Y.)    182; 

(Ky.)    65;   Janney  v.    Sprigg,   7   Gill  Watkins    v.    Thornton,    11    Ohio    St. 

367;  Hitner  v.   Ege,  23   Pa.  St.  305. 


§    64  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  78 

tenancy;^  (4)  in  a  bare  legal  estate,  the  beneficial  interest  in 
which  is  in  another;'*  (5)  in  a  future  estate  expectant  upon  the 
termination  of  a  present  freehold  estate;'^  or  (6)  in  the  home- 
stead right  of  an  infant  wife.^ 

The  husband's  curtesy  may  be  excluded :  ( 1 )  By  perpetual 
separation  amounting  to  an  absolute  divorce;^  (2)  by  special  pro- 
vision in  a  conveyance  to  the  wife;®  (3)  w^here  the  husband  joins 
his  wife  in  a  mortgage  upon  her  lands ;°  (4)  by  a  devise  by  the 
w^ife  of  her  separate  estate;^"  (5)  by  contract  between  the  parties 
made  before  or  after  marriage, ^^  and  (6)  by  the  husband's  fail- 
ure to  claim  such  right  as  against  an  adverse  holder  for  the  period 
of  limitations.^^  Where  a  husband  has  voluntarily  settled  lands 
upon  his  wife  by  deed  executed  to  her,  and  there  is  no  express  or 
implied  relinquishment  in  the  deed  of  his  right  to  claim  curtesy 
upon  her  death,  he  will  not  be  denied  such  right.^^ 

The  right  of  curtesy  exists  in  Alabama,  Alaska,  Arkansas, 
Connecticut,  Delaware,  District  of  Columbia,  Hawaii,  Kentucky, 
Missouri,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  North  Caro- 
lina, Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  Rhode  Island,  Tennessee,  Vermont, 
Virginia,  West  Virginia  and  Wisconsin.  In  Ohio  and  Illinois  the 
husband  is  given  the  right  of  dower  in  the  place  of  curtesy.  In 
Virginia,  curtesy  initiate  has  been  abolished  but  curtesy  consum- 
mate remains  as  at  common  law.   In  Connecticut  every  man  mar- 

3  Carr  v.  Givens,  9  Bush  (Ky.)  679,  the  wife  may  thus  defeat  curtesy;  the 

15  Am.  Rep.  747.  general  rule  being  that  her  power  to 

*  Norton  v.  McDevitt,  122  N.  Car.  make  a  will  does  not  enable  her  to 
755,  30  S.  E.  24 ;  McKce  v.  Jones,  6  defeat  the  husband's  curtesy.  Casler 
Pa.  St.  425.  V.  Gray,  159  Mo.  588.  60  S.  W.  1032 ; 

5  Planters'    Bank    of    Tennessee    v.  In  re  Clarke's  Appeal,  79  Pa.  St.  376; 

Davis,     31     .A.la.    626;     Ferguson    v.  Alderson  v.  Alderson,  46  W.  Va.  242, 

Tweedy,  43  N.  Y.  543.  33  S.  E.  228. 

"Owens  V.  Jabine,  88  Ark.  468,  115  ^  McBreen    v.    McBreen,    154    Mo. 

S.  W.  383.  323,  55   S.  \V.  463.  77  Am.   St.  758; 

7  Hartigan  v.  Hartigan,  65  W.  Va.  Charles  v.  Charles,  8  Grat.  (Va.)  486, 

471,  64  S.  E.  726,  131  Am.  St.  973,  19  56  Am.  Dec.  155. 

Ann.  Cas.  728.  12  Shortall  v.  Hinckley,  31  III.  219; 

*  McBreen  v.  McBreen,  154  Mo.  Childcrs  v.  Bumgarner,  53  N.  Car. 
323.  55  S.  W.  463,  77  Am.  St.  758;  297;  Crow  v.  Kightlinger,  25  Pa.  St. 
Haight  V.  Hall,  74  Wis.  152.  42  N.  W.  343. 

109.  3  L.  R.  A.  857,  17  Am.  St.  122.  "  Qgden  v.  Ogden.  60  Ark.  70,  28 

»  Havden  v.  Peirce,  165  Mass.  359,  S.  W.  796,  46  Am.  St.  151 ;  Meacham 

43  N.  E.  119.  V.  Bunting,  156  111.  586,  41  N.  E.  175, 

10  Garner  v.  Wills,  92  Kv.  386,   13  28   L.    R.   A.   618.   47   Am.    St.   239; 

Ky.  L.  726.  17  S.  W.  1023;  Stewart  v.  Tremmel  v.  Kleibolt.  6  Mo.  App.  549; 

Ross.  50  Miss.  776;  Tiddy  v.  Graves,  Deming   v.    Miles,    35    Nebr.    739,    53 

126  N.  Car.  620.  36  S.  E.  127;  Chap-  N.  W.  665,  37  Am.  St.  464;  Depue  v. 

man   v.    Price,   83   Va.   392,    11    S..  E.  Miller,  65  W.  Va.  120.  64  S.  E.  740, 

879.    It  is  only  under  some  statutes  that  23  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)   775n. 


I 


79        ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY      §  65 

ried  prior  to  April  20,  1877,  is  given  the  right  of  curtesy  in  his 
wife's  estate,  but  those  married  subsequent  to  that  date  take  as 
survivor  of  the  wife.  In  all  other  states  not  mentioned  above 
curtesy  has  been  abolished  by  statute. 

§  65.  Dower. — By  the  common  law^  a  wife  was  entitled,  on 
the  death  of  her  husband,  to  be  endowed  of  a  third  part  of  all  the 
lands  and  tenements  whereof  the  husband  was  seised,  in  fee  sim- 
ple or  in  fee  tail,  at  any  time  during  coverture.'^  At  first  it  was 
limited  to  lands  held  by  the  husband  at  the  time  of  the  marriage, 
but  by  the  Magna  Charta  it  was  extended  to  all  lands  of  which 
the  husband  was  seised  during  coverture.  This  right  or  estate 
of  dower  exists  in  all  the  states  where  it  has  not  been  modified  or 
abolished  by  statute.  It  is  a  right,  though  inchoate  pending  the 
life  of  the  husband,  is  in  the  nature  of  a  property  right,  and  the 
wife  can  not  be  divested  of  it  by  any  act  of  the  husband,  whether 
done  in  good  faith,  or  in  fraud,  either  of  his  immediate  grantee 
or  of  those  who  may  come  after  him.^^ 

The  requisites  of  this  common-law  right  of  estate  of  dower 
are:  (1)  A  valid  marriage;"  (2)  seisin  of  the  husband  during 
coverture;"  and  (3)  death  of  the  husband  during  the  lifetime 
of  the  wife.^^ 

At  common  law  the  right  of  dower  attached  only  to  the  hus- 
band's estates  of  inheritance;  that  is,  to  fee  simple  estates  or  es- 
tates in  fee  tail.'^  Generally  speaking,  a  wife  has  no  dower  in 
lands  to  which  her  husband  has  merely  an  equitable  title.  But  by 
statute  in  many  states  this  rule  has  been  changed,  so  that  the  right 
exists  in  the  husband's  equitable  estates.^°    It  is  generally  held 

"Sisk  V.  Smith,  1  Gil.   (111.)   503;  Phelps  v.  Phelps,   143  N.  Y.  197    38 

2    Bl.    Comm.    129;    Co.    Lit.    §    30a;  N.  E.  280,  25  L.  R.  A.  625;   Dudley 

Co.  Lit.  §  36.  V.  Dudley,  76  Wis.  567,  45  N.  W.  602, 

1^  Warner  v.  Norwegian  Cemetery  8  L.  R.  A.  814 

Assn..  139  Iowa  115,  117  N.  W.  39.  is  Sisk  v.  Smith,  1   Gil.    (111.)   503; 

i"  De   France   v.   Johnson,   26   Fed.  McCraney  v.  McCraney,  5  Iowa  232 

891 ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  28  Ark.  19 ;  Hig-  68  Am.  Dec.  702 ;  Wait  v.  Wait,  4  N. 

gms  V.  Breen,  9  Mo.  497;   Pearson  v.  Y.  95. 

Howey,   11    N.  J.  L.   12;   Cropsey  v.  i^  Johnson  v.  Jacob,  11  Bush  (Kv.) 

Ogden,  11  N.  Y.  228.  646;   Pinkham  v.   Pinkham.  55  Nebr. 

17  Kirkpatrick  v.  Kirkpatrick,  197  729,  76  N.  W.  411;  Kennedy  v.  Ken- 
Ill.  144,  64  N.  E.  267:  Smallridge  v.  nedy,  29  N.  J.  L.  185;  2  Bl.  Comm. 
Hazlett,  112  Ky.  841,  23  Ky.  L.  2228,  131  ;  Co.  Lit.  §  36. 
66  S.  W.  1043  ;  Hill  V.  Pike,  174  Mass.  -'o  Atkin  v.  Merrell,  39  111  62- 
582,  55  N.  E.  324;  Wheeler  v.  Smith,  Stroup  v.  Stroup,  140'lnd.  179,  39  N. 
50  Mich.  93,  15  N.  W.  108 ;  Ellis  v.  E.  864,  27  L.  R.  A.  523 ;  McMahan  v. 
Kyger,   90   Mo.   600,    3    S.    W.   23;  Kimball,   3   Blackf.    (Ind.)l;   Everitt 


§  65 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


80 


that,  though  the  husband's  land  is  subject  to.  a  mortgage,  which 
takes  precedence  of  dower,  the  wife  is  entided  to  dower  in  the 
land  as  against  all  persons  except  the  owner  of  the  mortgage."'- 
Where  the  interest  of  the  husband  is  that  of  a  tenant  in  common 
or  as  a  coparcener  with  others,  it  is  subject  to  the  wife's  dower.-^ 
Where  lands  are  held  by  the  husband  in  partnership  with  another, 
the  wife  is  entitled  to  dower  in  any  surplus  interest  of  her  hus- 
band after  payment  of  the  firm's  debts.^^  But  land  held  by  the 
husband  with  others  in  joint  tenancy  is  not  subject  to  dower, 
though  a  severance  will  entitle  the  widow  to  dower  if  the  husband 
thereafter  remains  solely  seised."*  In  the  absence  of  any  statutory 
provision  to  the  contrary,  a  wife  is  not  entitled  to  dower  in  land 
held  in  reversion  or  remainder  by  the  husband,  where  the  preced- 
ing estate  does  not  determine  during  coverture. ^^  And  if  his 
estate  is  determinable  on  the  happening  of  a  condition  subsequent 
or  by  limitation,  the  determination  of  the  estate  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  husband  will  defeat  the  wife's  right  of  dower."*^  But  if  the 
husband's  estate  is  an  executory  devise,  defeasible  by  the  death  of 
the  husband  without  issue,  it  has  been  held  that  the  widow  is  en- 
titled to  dower,  even  if  there  be  no  issue. ^^  Dower  can  not  be 
claimed  in  an  estate  by  the  entirety  ;"^  nor  can  a  divorced  woman 


V.  Everitt,  71  Iowa  221,  32  N.  W. 
273;  Davis  v.  Green;  102  Mo.  170,  14 
S.  W.  876,  11  L.  R.  A.  90;  McClure 
V.  Fairfield,  153  Pa.  St.  411,  26  Alt. 
446.  A  married  woman  has  no  in- 
choate right  of  dower  in  real  estate 
which  her  husband  holds  under  a  con- 
tract of  purchase,  having  paid  only  a 
part  of  the  purchase  price.  Nortnass 
V.  Pioneer  Townsite  Co.,  82  Nebr. 
382,  117  N.  W.  951. 

21  Cox  V.  Garst,  105  111.  342 ;  Snow 
V.  Stevens,  15  Mass.  278;  Jones  v. 
Bragg,  33  Mo.  337,  84  Am.  Dec.  49; 
Wade  V.  Miller,  32  N.  J.  L.  296;  Mills 
V.  Van  Voorhies,  20  N.  Y.  412,  10 
Abb.   Prac.   152. 

22Harvill  v.  Holloway.  24  Ark.  19 
Ross  v.  Wilson.  58  Ga.  249;  Cook  v 
Walker.  70  Maine  232;  Rockwell  v 
Rockwell,  81  Mich.  493,  46  N.  W.  8 
Lee  v.  Lindell,  22  Mo.  202.  64  Am 
Dec.  262 ;  Whitney  v.  Whitney,  45  N 
H.  311. 

23  Bopp  v.  Fox,  63  111.  540;  Grissom 
V.  Moore,  106  Ind.  296.  6  N.  F.  629, 
55  Am.  Rep.  742;  Dver  v.  Clafk.  5 
Mete.  (Mass.)  562,  39  Am.  Dec.  697; 


Willet  V.  Brown,  65  Mo.  138,  27  Am. 
Rep.  265;  Greenwood  v.  Marvin,  111 
N.  Y.  423,  19  N.  E.  228. 

2*Mayburry  v.  Brien,  15  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  21,  10  L.  cd.  646;  Cockrill  v. 
Armstrong,  31  Ark.  580;  Babbitt  v. 
Day,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  392,  5  Atl.  275. 

25  Kirkpatrick  v.  Kirkpatrick.  197 
111.  144,  64  N.  E.  267;  Young  v.  More- 
head,  94  Ky.  608,  15  Ky.  L.  383,  23  S. 
W.  511;  Hill  V.  Pike,  174  Mass.  582, 
55  N.  E.  324;  Von  Arb  v.  Thomas, 
163  Mo.  33,  63  S.  W.  94;  Dudley  v. 
Dudley.  76  Wis.  567,  45  N.  W.  602, 
8  L.  R.  A.  814. 

2«  Beardslee  v.  Beardslee,  5  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  324;  Rhode  Island  Hospital 
Trust  Co.  v.  Harris,  20  R.  I.  408,  39 
Atl.  750. 

27  Northcut  V.  Whipp,  12  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  65;  Clark  v.  Clark,  84  Hun  362, 
32  N.  Y.  S.  325.  65  N.  Y.  S.  483; 
Pollard  V.  Slaughter,  92  N.  Car.  72, 
53  Am.  Rep.  402 ;  Contra :  Edwards  v. 
Bibb,  54  Ala.  475. 

28  Roulston  V.  Hall,  66  Ark.  305,  50 
S.  W.  690,  74  Am.  St.  97. 


81 


ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY 


65 


have  dower  in  lands  owned  oy  her  former  husband  during  the 
marriage."^  A  wife  is  not  entitled  to  dower  in  lands  paid  for  by 
the  husband  but  conveyed  to  another  f°  in  lands  sold  before  mar- 
riage by  oral  contract  under  which  the  vendee  had  gone  into  pos- 
session;^^ in  lands  to  which  the  husband  gives  a  bond  to  convey 
to  another  at  the  time  he  acquires  title  f~  or  in  lands  held  in  trust 
by  the  husband  for  a  third  person. ^^ 

The  right  of  dower  at  common  law  exists  only  in  the  husband's 
lands  and  tenements.^*  This  includes  mines  and  quarries  belong- 
ing to  the  husband  which  were  opened  and  worked  during  his 
life,^^  wild  and  unimproved  lands, ^'^  rent  charged  on  another's 
land  in  favor  of  the  husband  and  his  heirs,^^  and  in  a  fishing  priv- 
ilege, or  other  right  of  profit. ^^  But  the  wife  is  not  entitled  to 
dower  in  unopened  mines, ^'•^  in  crops  or  timber  which  has  been 
severed  from  the  realty,'*"  or  in  mere  personal  hereditaments.'*^ 

The  right  to  dower  may  be  barred  or  forfeited  in  various 
ways,  though  the  husband  by  his  act  alone,  without  the  wife's 
assent,  can  not  bar  it.^"  It  may  be  barred  :  ( 1 )  By  the  husband's 
bona  fide  conveyance  before  marriage,*^  and  sometimes  after 
marriage;**  (2)  by  the  elopement  and  adultery  of  the  wife;*^  (3) 


29  Allen  V.  Austin,  21  R.  I.  254,  43 
Atl.  69. 

30  Phelps  V.  Phelps,  143  N.  Y.  197, 

38  N.  E.  280,  25  L.  R.  A.  625. 

31  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  92  Va. 
537,  24  S.  E.  225,  53  Am.  St.  823. 

32  Hallett  V.  Parker,  68  N.  H.  598, 

39  Atl.  583. 

33  Gritten  v.  Dickcrson,  202  111.  372, 
66  N.  E.  1090. 

3*2  Bl.  Comm.  131 ;  Co.  Lit.  §  36. 

35  Hendrix  v.  McBeth,  61  Ind.  473, 
28  Am.  Rep.  680 ;  Gaines  v.  Green 
Pond  Iron  Co.,  Z2  N.  J.  Eq.  603; 
Sayers  v.  Hoskinson,  110  Pa.  St.  473; 
Clift  V.  Clift,  87  Tenn.  17,  9  S.  W.  198. 
360. 

36  Chapman  v.  Schroeder,  10  Ga. 
321;  Schnebly  v.  Schnebly,  26  111.  116; 
Brown  v.  Richards,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  32. 
But  a  different  rule  seems  to  prevail 
in  the  New  England  states :  Stevens 
V.  Owen,  25  Maine  94 ;  Conner  v. 
Shepherd,  15  Mass.  164;  Johnson  v. 
Perlev,  2  N.  H.  56.  9  Am.  Dec.  35. 

37  Chase's  Cas.  1  Bland  (Md.)  227, 
17  Am.  Dec.  277 ;  Co.  Lit.  32a. 


3s  Co.  Lit.  32a. 

39  Stoughton  V.  Leigh,  1  Taunt.  402. 
Contra :  In  re  Seager,  92  Mich.  186, 
52  N.  W.  299;  Coates  v.  Cheever,  1 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  460. 

40  Hallett  V.  Hallett,  8  Ind.  App. 
305,  34  N.  E.  740. 

41  Co.  Lit.  §  32. 

42  Gove  V.  Gather.  23  111.  634,  76 
Am.  Dec.  711;  McKelvey  v.  McKel- 
vey,  75  Kans.  325.  89  Pac.  663,  121 
Am.  St.  435 ;  Rodman  v.  Robinson 
134  N.  Car.  503,  47  S.  E.  19,  65  L.  R. 
A.  682. 

43  Daniher  v.  Daniher,  201  111.  489, 
66  N.  E.  239;  Pratt  v.  Skolfield,  45 
Maine  386;  Beckwith  v.  Beckwith,  61 
Mich.  315,  28  N.  W.  116. 

44  Stewart  v.  Stewart.  5  Conn.  317 ; 
Hopkins  v.  Bryant,  85  Tenn.  520,  3  S. 
W.  827. 

45  McQuinn  v.  McQuinn,  110  Ky. 
321,  22  Ky.  L.  1770,  61  S.  W.  358; 
Walters  v.  Jordan,  35  N.  Car.  361,  57 
Am.  Dec.  558.  But  adultery  without 
elopement  does  not  bar  dower.  Cogs- 
well V.  Tibbetts,  3  N.  H.  41 ;  Reel  v. 


6 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    66  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  82 

by  divorce  ;*"  (4)  by  annulment  of  the  marriage  ;*^  (5)  by  the  loss 
of  the  husband's  estate;'**  (6)  by  voluntary  release  on  the  part  of 
the  wife ;  ''"■'  and  (7)  by  jointure.^" 

The  common-law  right  of  dower  exists  in  Florida,  Illinois, 
Kentucky,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Missouri,  Nebraska, 
New  Jersey,  New  York,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Oregon,  Rhode 
Island,  Virginia,  West  Virginia  and  Wisconsin.  The  widow  is 
entitled  to  dower  in  one-half  of  the  lands  owned  by  the  husband 
at  the  time  of  his  death,  if  he  left  no  lineal  descendants,  and  to 
one-third  if  there  be  such,  in  Alabama,  Arkansas  and  Pennsyl- 
vania. She  takes  one-third  of  all  the  real  estate  of  which  the 
husband  died  seised,  or  which  came  to  him  in  right  of  marriage, 
in  Georgia  and  New  Hampshire ;  and  the  husband  must  have  had 
title  in  fee  simple  in  Delaware. ^^  In  Connecticut,  Tennessee  and 
Vermont,  the  widow  has  a  right  of  dower  during  her  life  in  one- 
third  part  of  the  real  estate  of  which  her  husband  died  seised. 
In  all  other  states  not  mentioned  above,  the  right  of  dower  has 
either  been  abolished  by  statute,  or  has  never  been  adopted ;  but 
in  lieu  thereof  the  wife  takes  a  certain  share  of  the  husband's 
estate  under  the  statutes  of  descent  and  distribution. 

§  66.  Homestead. — Generally  speaking,  a  homestead  is 
an  artificial  estate  in  land,  usually  for  the  life  or  lives  of  those  en- 
titled to  it,  exempt  from  the  demands  of  creditors."  Strictly 
speaking,  it  is  not  an  estate  in  land,'"'^  but  a  right  additional  to  and 
independent  of  the  ordinary  right  of  ownership. °*  It  is  desig- 
nated as  a  shelter  of  the  homestead  roof,  and  not  as  a  mere  in- 
Elder,  62  Pa.  St.  308,  1  Am.  Rep.  414.  49  Dooley  v.  Greening.  201  Mo.  343, 
Nor  does  adultery  committed  by  the  100  S.  W.  43 ;  Hinchli_ffe  v.  Shea,  103 
wife  after  her  husband  has  driven  her  N.  Y.  153,  8  N.  E.  477. 
away  bar  her  right  to  dower.  Heslop  ^*^  Bryan  v.  Bryan,  62  Ark.  79,  34  S. 
V.  Heslop,  82  Pa.  St.  537.  W.  260 ;   Andrews     v.     Andrews,     8 

*''  Kent  V.  McCann,  52  111.  App.  305;      Conn.  79;  Culberson  v.  Culberson,  37 
Fletcher  v.   Monroe,   145   Ind.  56,  43     Ga.   296;   Wentworth   v.   Wcntworth, 
N.  E.  1053 ;  Winch  v.  Bolton,  94  Iowa     69   Maine  247 ;    Grogan   v.   Garrison, 
573,  63  N.  W.  330;  Calame  v.  Calame,     27  Ohio  St.  50. 
24  N.  J.  Eq.  440.  ^i  Bush  v.  Bush,  5  Del.  Ch.  144. 

47  Price  V.  Price,  124  N.  Y.  589,  27  ^-  Buckingham  v.  Buckingham,  81 
N.  E.  383,  12  L.  R.  A.  359.  Mich.  89,  45  N.  W.  504. 

48  Stribling  V.  Ross,  16  111.  122  ;  ^3  Ellinger  v.  Thomas,  64  Kans.  180, 
Toomey  v.  McLean,  105  Mass.  122;  67  Pac.  529;  Thomas  v.  Fulford,  117 
Vickers  v.  Henry  110  N.  Car.  371,  15     N.  Car.  667,  23  S.  E.  635. 

S.  E.  115;  McClure  v.  Fairfield,  153  ^4  Speyrer  v.  Miller,  108  La.  204,  32 
Pa.  St.  411,  26  Atl.  446.  So.  524,  61  L.  R.  A.  781. 


1 


83 


ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY 


66 


vestment  in  real  estate,  or  the  rents  and  profits  derived  there- 
from.^'^ 


55  Lyon  V.  Harden.  129  Ala.  643,  29 
So.  m\  Norris  v.  Kidd,  28  Ark.  485; 
Dickman  v.  Birkhauser,  16  Nebr.  686, 
21  N.  W.  396. 

There  is  no  homestead  exemption 
in  Delaware,  District  of  Columbia, 
Hawaii,  Indiana,  Maryland,  New  Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania  and  Rhode  Island ; 
but  in  all  the  other  states  there  are 
constitutional  or  statutory  provisions 
exempting  from  execution  or  other 
forced  sale  for  debts,  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent, the  homestead  or  residence  of 
the  debtor.  The  amount,  extent  and 
value  of  this  homestead  exemption 
vary  greatly  in  the  different  states. 
In  Alabama,  the  claimant  is  entitled 
to  not  more  than  one  hundred  and 
sixty  acres,  with  improvements,  and 
of  value  not  to  exceed  two  thousand 
dollars ;  in  Alaska,  not  more  than  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres,  and  if  lo- 
cated in  a  city  or  town,  not  to  exceed 
a  quarter  of  an  acre,  and  the  value 
thereof  not  to  exceed  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars ;  in  Arizona,  one 
compact  body,  not  limited  in  extent, 
but  not  to  exceed  four  thousand  dol- 
lars in  value ;  in  Arkansas,  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  acres  in  extent  and  if 
located  within  a  city  or  town,  one 
acre,  and  not  to  exceed  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars  in  value ;  in  Cal- 
ifornia, the  dwelling-house  in  which 
the  claimant  resides  and  the  land  on 
which  the  same  is  situated,  not  ex- 
ceeding in  value  five  thousand  dollars 
for  the  head  of  the  family  and  one 
thousand  for  any  other  person ;  in 
Colorado,  real  estate  not  exceeding 
two  thousand  dollars  in  value ;  in 
Connecticut,  a  dwelling-house  or 
other  real  estate  in  connection  there- 
with of  a  value  not  to  exceed  one 
thousand  dollars ;  in  Florida,  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres  of  land,  or 
half  of  one  acre  within  a  city  or  town, 
together  with  improvements  thereon, 
regardless  of  value ;  in  Georgia,  real 
estate,  or  personal  property,  or  both, 
to  the  value  in  the  aggregate  of  one 
thousand  six  hundred  dollars ;  in 
Idaho,  real  estate  in  value  not  exceed- 
ing five  thousand  dollars ;  in  Illinois, 
the  whole  of  the  lot  of  land  and 
buildings  thereon  occupied  as  a  resi- 


dence by  the  claimant,  to  the  extent 
and  value  of  one  thousand  dollars; 
in  Iowa,  half  an  acre  if  within  a  city 
or  town,  or  forty  acres  if  outside, 
and  without  limit  as  to  value ;  in  Kan- 
sas, one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  of 
farming  land,  or  one  acre  within  the 
limits  of  a  city  or  town,  and  regard- 
less of  value ;  in  Kentucky,  so  much 
land,  including,  the  dwelling-house 
and  appurtenances  owned  by  claim- 
ant, as  shall  not  exceed  in  value  one 
thousand  dollars ;  in  Louisiana,  real 
estate  of  the  value  not  to  exceed  two 
thousand  dollars ;  in  Maine,  a  home- 
stead not  exceeding  five  hundred  dol- 
lars in  value ;  in  Massachusetts,  real 
estate  of  the  value  of  not  more  than 
eight  hundred  dollars ;  in  Michigan, 
one  lot  or  its  equivalent  in  town  or 
city,  or  not  more  than  forty  acres  in 
the  country,  and  not  exceeding  in 
value  in  either  case  one  thousand  five 
hundred  dollars ;  in  Alinnesota,  eighty 
acres  if  situated  outside  the  limits  of 
a  city  or  town,  and  one-half  acre  in 
city  or  town  containing  less  than  five 
thousand  inhabitants,  and  one-third 
acre  if  there  be  more  than  five  thou- 
sand inhabitants ;  in  Mississippi,  not 
more  than  one  hundred  and  sixty 
acres,  and  of  the  value  of  not  more 
than  three  thousand  dollars  exclusive 
of  improvements,  or  a  residence  in  a 
city  or  town  not  to  exceed  in  value 
three  thousand  dollars ;  in  Alissouri, 
not  more  than  one  hundred  and  sixty 
acres  of  land  in  the  country  not  to 
exceed  one  thousand  five  hundred 
dollars  in  value,  and  in  cities  or 
towns  having  a  population  of  forty 
thousand  or  more,  not  to  exceed 
eighteen  square  rods  of  ground  of  the 
value  of  three  thousand  dollars,  and 
in  cities  having  a  population  of  ten 
thousand  and  less  than  forty  thou- 
sand, not  to  exceed  thirty  square  rods 
of  ground  of  the  total  value  of  one 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  and  in 
towns  of  less  than  ten  thousand,  not 
to  exceed  five  acres  of  ground,  of  the 
total  value  of  one  thousand  five  hun- 
dred dollars ;  in  Montana,  a  home- 
stead of  value  not  exceeding  two 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars ;  in  Ne- 
braska, a  house  and  one  hundred  and 


§  66 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


84 


The  statutes  creating  homesteads  have  no  extraterritorial 
forcej^"  but  are  to  be  Hberally  construed  for  the  benefit  of  those 
entitled  to  the  benefits  thereof.^'  This  homestead  legislation  con- 
sists of  two  materially  different  forms;  one  of  the  federal  law, 
and  the  other  of  the  statutes  of  the  several  states.  The  former 
provides  for  the  acquisition  of  land  for  a  homestead,  and  inci- 
dentally exempts  it  from  the  debts  of  the  homesteader  before  he 
acquires  his  patent;  the  latter  authorizes  the  head  of  the  family  to 
designate  property  as  a  homestead,  and  thus  exempt  it  from  his 
future  debts.  The  state  homestead  law  does  not  affect  the  prop- 
erty until  the  owner  obtains  a  patent.^'*  The  law  does  not  gen- 
erally require  that  the  claimant  of  the  homestead  rights  be  the 


sixty  acres  of  land  in  the  country  or 
if  in  a  town  or  city,  not  exceeding 
two  lots,  and  in  either  case  not  ex- 
ceeding two  thousand  dollars  in  val- 
ue", in  Nevada,  a  homestead  not  ex- 
ceeding five  thousand  dollars  in 
value ;  in  New  Hampshire,  a  home- 
stead in  real  estate  of  the  value  of 
five  hundred  dollars ;  in  New  York, 
a  lot  of  land  and  buildings  thereon 
not  exceeding  in  value  one  thousand 
dollars ;  in  North  Carolina,  a  home- 
stead and  dwellings  and  buildings 
used  therewith,  not  exceeding  in  value 
one  thousand  dollars ;  in  North  Da- 
kota, homestead  not  exceeding  in 
value  five  thousand  dollars,  and  if 
within  a  town  not  exceeding  two  acres 
in  extent,  and  if  not  within  a  town 
not  exceeding  one  hundred  and  sixty 
acres ;  in  Ohio,  a  family  homestead 
not  exceeding  one  thousand  dollars  in 
value ;  in  Oklahoma,  real  estate  con- 
sisting of  not  more  than  one  hundred 
and  sixty  acres  regardless  of  value ; 
in  Oregon,  not  to  exceed  one  hundred 
and  sixty  acres  in  extent  if  not  lo- 
cated in  a  city,  or  one  block  if  located 
in  a  city,  in  neither  case  to  exceed 
one  thousand  five  hundred  dollars  in 
value ;  in  South  Carolina,  real  estate 
of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars; 
in  South  Dakota,  a  tract  not  exceed- 
ing one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  if  in 
the  country,  or  one  acre  if  in  a  town, 
to  the  extent  and  value  of  five  thou- 
sand dollars ;  in  Tennessee,  land  and 
improvements  thereon  not  exceeding 
in  value  one  thousand  dollars ;  in 
Texas,  land  not  in  city  or  towii  con- 
sisting  of    two    hundred   acres    with 


improvements  thereon,  and  if  in  city 
or  town  consisting  of  a  lot  or  lots 
not  to  exceed  in  value  five  thousand 
dollars;  in  Utah,  land  not  exceeding 
in  value,  with  improvements  thereon, 
of  the  sum  of  one  thousand  five  hun- 
dred dollars  for  the  head  of  the  fam- 
ily, and  the  further  sum  of  five  hun- 
dred dollars  for  his  wife,  and  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars  for  each 
other  member  of  the  family;  in  Ver- 
mont, a  homestead  of  the  value  of 
five  hundred  dollars ;  in  Virginia,  a 
homestead  of  the  value  of  two  thou- 
sand dollars ;  in  Washington,  home- 
stead with  improvements  thereon  not 
exceeding  in  value  the  sum  of  two 
thousand  dollars ;  in  West  Virginia, 
a  homestead  of  the  value  of  one  thou- 
sand dollars ;  in  Wisconsin,  not  ex- 
ceeding forty  acres  when  not  includ- 
ed in  city  or  town,  and  not  exceeding 
one-fourth  of  an  acre  and  a  dwelling- 
house  thereon  in  city  or  town,  in 
either  case  not  exceeding  in  value  the 
sum  of  five  thousand  dollars ;  in 
Wyoming,  the  homestead  consists  of 
a  house  and  lot  or  lots  in  a  town  or 
city,  or  a  farm  not  exceeding  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres,  to  the  value 
of  two  thousand  five  hundred  dollars. 

^"  Cherokee  Const.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
92  Ark.  260,  122  S.  W.  485,  135  Am. 
St.  177. 

^'^  Deere  v.  Chapman,  25  111.  610, 
79  Am.  Dec.  .350;  Barber  v.  Rora- 
beck,  36  Mich.  399;  Jarvis  v.  Moe,  38 
Wis.  440. 

ssHesnard  v.  Plunkett,  6  S.  Dak. 
73,  60  N.  W.  159. 


85 


ESTATES    AND    INTERESTS   IN    REAL    PROPERTY 


§    66 


owner  of  a  freehold,  but  allows  such  rights  to  be  established 
whether  the  estate  be  in  fee,  for  life,  or  for  years.^* 

One  is  entitled  to  the  homestead  exemption  in  a  leasehold 
estate ;^°  in  an  equitable  estate;"  in  lands  held  in  cotenancy;'^-  in 
lands  held  in  joint  tenancy;®^  and  in  lands  held  by  the  entireties.®* 
But,  as  a  rule,  homestead  rights  can  not  be  claimed  in  partnership 
property;®^  nor  in  remainders  and  reversions  after  freehold  in- 
terests.*® 

The  general  intent  of  the  statutes  is  to  confer  the  right  of 
homestead  upon  the  actual  head  of  the  family,®^  and  so  it  is  pri- 
marily to  the  husband,  and  on  his  death  it  inures  to  his  widow. ®^ 
In  order  that  a  person  may  successfully  claim  the  right  of  home- 
stead he  must  have  some  one  dependent  upon  him;  some  one 
whom  he  is  under  a  legal  or  moral  obligation  to  support.®^ 

Actual  or  constructive  occupation  of  the  premises  as  a  home,  is 
essential  to  give  the  character  of  homestead  to  real  property.^"  In 
some  states  it  is  required,  in  addition  to  occupancy,  that  the 
claimant  execute  a  written  declaration   or  certificate   that  the 


S9  Bartholomew  v.  West,  2  Dill  (U. 
S.)  290,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1071 ;  Tyler  v. 
Jewett,  82  Ala.  93,  2  So.  905;  Alexan- 
der V.  Jackson,  92  Cal.  514,  28  Pac. 
593,  27  Am.  St.  158;  Allen  v.  Haw- 
ley,  66   111.    164;    Maatta  v.    Kippola, 

102  Mich.  116,  60  N.  W.  300;  Doane 
V.  Doane,  46  Vt.  485. 

eoConklin  v.  Foster,  57  111.  104;  In 
re  Emerson's  Homestead,  58  Minn. 
450,  60  N.  W.  23 ;  Phillips  v.  Warner, 
4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  147.  16  S.  W.  423; 
Beranek  v.  Beranek,  113  Wis.  272,  89 
N.  W.  146. 

"Myrick  v.  Bill,  5  Dak.  167,  2,7 
N.  W.  369 ;  Rice  v.  Rice,  108  111.  199 ; 
Stafford  V.  Woods,  144  111.  203,  23 
N.  E.  539:  Lessell  v.  Goodman.  97 
Iowa  681,  66  N.  W.  917.  59  Am.  St. 
432;  McKee  v.  Wilcox,  11  Mich.  358, 
83  Am.  Dec.  743 ;  Doane  v.  Doane,  46 
Vt.  485;  Canfield  v.  Hard,  58  Vt.  217, 
2  Atl.  136. 

^2  Chapman  v.  White  Sewing  Ma- 
chine Co.,  78  Miss.  438,  28  So.  735; 
Clark  V.  Thias,  173  Mo.  628,  72,  S.  W. 
616, 

«3Swan   V.   Walden,    156   Cal.    195, 

103  Pac.  931.  134  Am.  St.  118.  20  Ann. 
Cas.  194;  Giles  v.  Miller,  36  Nebr. 
346,  54  N.  W.  551,  38  Am.  St.  730. 


"Cole  V.  Cole,  126  Mich.  569,  85 
N.  W.  1098. 

^^  Ex  parte  Karish,  32  S.  Car.  437, 
11  S.  E.  298,  17  Am.  St.  865;  Brady 
V.  Kreuger,  8  S.  Dak.  464,  66  N.  W. 
1083,  59  Am.  St.  771. 

^^  Kingsley  v.  Kingsley,  39  Cal.  665 ; 
Drake  v.  Moore,  66  Iowa  58,  23  N. 
W.  263 ;  Howell  v.  Jones,  91  Tenn. 
402,  19  S.  W.  757. 

G'Dawley  v.  Ayers,  23  Cal.  108; 
Adams  v.  Clark,  48  Fla.  205,  27  So. 
734;  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  223  111.  423. 
79  N.  E.  139;  People  v.  McClay.  2 
Nebr.  7;  Sproul  v.  McCoy,  26  Ohio 
St.  577 ;  Cobbs  v.  Coleman,  14  Tex. 
594. 

«8Raggio  V.  Palmtag.  155  Cal.  797, 

103  Pac.  312 ;  Garwood  v.  Garwood, 
244  111.  580.  91  N.  E.  672 ;  Weaver  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank.  76  Kans.  540.  94 
Pac.  273,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  110, 
123  Am.  St.  155. 

'^oSheehy  v.    Scott,    128    Iowa   551. 

104  N.  W.  1139,  4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
365. 

■oAucker  v.  McCoy.  56  Cal.  524; 
Floyd  County  v.  Wolfe.  138  Iowa 
749.  117  N.  W.  32;  Ingels  v.  Ingels, 
50  Kans.  755.  22  Pac.  387:  Kennedy 
v.  Duncan,  157  Mo.  App.  212,  137  S. 
W.  299. 


§  67 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


86 


premises  are  claimed  as  a  homestead.^^  The  statutes  fix  the 
amount,  extent  and  value  of  homestead,  and  it  can  not  exceed 
the.  statutory  limitation. '- 

The  rule  is  universal  that  one  can  not  claim  homestead  exemp- 
tions in  more  than  one  piece  of  property,"  and  hence  that  an 
actual  abandonment,  or  the  acquiring  of  a  new  homestead,  will 
extinguish  the  right  in  the  old/*  While  homestead  rights  are  re- 
quired by  some  statutes  to  be  described  in  writing  by  the  claim- 
ant, and  the  description  entered  upon  the  public  records,  but  in 
the  absence  of  such  a  statute  an  inquiry  dehors  the  record  should 
be  made. 

The  statutes  of  many  states  provide  for  restrictions  upon  hus- 
band's right  to  convey  or  mortgage  the  homestead  property  with- 
out the  wife  joining  in  the  conveyance."  Neither  can  the  owner 
dispose  of  the  homestead  by  will  so  as  to  cut  off  the  rights  of  the 
wife  and  children  to  the  benefits  thereof  after  his  death.^" 

In  order  to  provide  a  home  and  shelter  for  a  surviving  husband 
or  wife  and  for  the  minor  children,  the  homestead  acts  generally 
provide  for  the  descent  or  continuance  of  the  homestead  of  a  par- 
ent to  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  surviving  spouse  and  children." 

§  67.  Widow's  quarantine. — At  common  law  the  widow 
was  entitled  to  have  her  dower  assigned  to  her  within  forty  days 


71  Boreham  v.  Byrne,  83  Cal.  23,  23 
Pac.  212;  Welch  v.  Spragins,  98  Ky. 
279,  17  Ky.  L.  884,  32  S.  W.  943; 
Donaldson  v.  Winningham,  48  Wash. 
374,  93  Pac.  534,   125  Am.  St.  937. 

72Powe  V.  McLeod,  76  Ala.  418; 
Holley  V.  Horton.  164  Mich.  31,  129 
N.  W.  6,  Acreback  v.  Myer,  165  Mo. 
685,  65  S.  W.  1015;  Pickett  v.  Gleed, 
39  Tex.  Civ.  App.  71,  86  S.  W.  946. 

■^3  Atchison  Sav.  Bank  v.  Wheeler, 
20  Kans.  625 ;  Donaldson  v.  Lamprey, 
29  Minn.  18,  11  N.  W.  119. 

7*  Taylor  v.  Hargous,  4  Cal.  268, 
60  Am.  Dec.  606. 

"Miller  V.  Marx,  55  Ala.  322; 
Club  V.  Wise,  64  III.  157;  Davis  v. 
McCullouch.  192  111.  277,  61  N.  E. 
2)11;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jacobs,  50 
Mich.  340.  15  N.  W.  500;  Morrill  v. 
Hopkins,  36  Tex.  686;  Day  v.  Adams, 
42  Vt.  510;  Riehl  v.  Bingenheimer, 
28  Wis.  88. 

76  Bell  V.  Bell.  84  Ala.  64.  4  So. 
189;  Sulzberger  v.  Sulzberger,  50  Cal. 
385 ;   Wilson   v.   Fridenburg,    19   Fla. 


461;  Kleimann  v.  Gieselman,  114  Mo. 
437.  21  S.  W.  796;  Norris  v.  Moulton, 
54  N.  H.  392 ;  McCrae  v.  McCrae,  103 
Tenn.  719,  54  S.  W.  979;  Hall  v. 
Fields,  81  Tex.  553,  17  S.  W.  82; 
In  re  Hatch's  Estate,  62  Vt.  300,  18 
Atl.  814,  22  Am.  St.  109. 

"Tartt  V.  Negus,  127  Ala.  301,  28 
So.  713 ;  Kirksey  v.  Cole,  47  Ark.  504, 

1  S.  W.  778 ;  Gresham  v.  Johnson,  70 
Ga.  631;  Capek  v.  Kropik,  129  111. 
509,  21  N.  E.  836;  Burns  v.  Keas,  21 
Iowa  257;  Barbe  v.  Hyatt,  50  Kans. 
86,  31  Pac.  694;  Gavin  v.  Sanders,  5 
Ky.  L.  321;  Eaton  v.  Robbins,  29 
Minn.  329,  13  N.  W.  143;  Acker  v. 
Trueland,  56  Miss.  30;  Fore  v.  Fore, 

2  N.  Dak.  260.  50  N.  W.  712 ;  Stewart 
v.  Blalock,  45  S.  Car.  61,  22  S.  E. 
774;  Threat  v.  Moody,  87  Tenn.  143, 
9  S.  W.  424 :  Ashe  v.  Yungst,  65  Tex. 
631 ;  Knudsen  v.  Hannberg,  8  Utah 
203,  30  Pac.  749;  Austin  v.  Clifford, 
24  Wash.  172,  64  Pac.  155 ;  Spcidel  v. 
Schlosser.  13  W.  Va.  686;  Johnson 
v.  Harrison,  41  Wis.  381. 


87       ESTATES  AND  INTERESTS  IN  REAL  PROPERTY      §  67 

after  her  husband's  death.  During  this  period  she  has  the  right 
to  reside  in  the  dwelling-house,  occupied  by  the  family,  and  to 
be  supported  out  of  his  estate.  This  right  is  entitled  the  "wid- 
ow's quarantine,"  and  in  some  jurisdictions  she  is  permitted  to 
remain  until  her  dower  is  assigned. '^^  It  has  been  held  that  the 
right  can  be  claimed  only  as  to  the  property  of  which  the  widow 
is  dowable,^^  and  does  not  extend  to  leasehold  estates  unless  the 
same  is  made  subject  to  dower.**' 

The  widow's  quarantine  is  not  subject  to  sale  on  execution  for 
her  debts, *^  nor  need  she  pay  a  tax  on  the  premises.®^  Her  right, 
however,  may  be  forfeited  by  her  remarriage,  but  the  right  is  not 
forfeited  by  her  abandonment  of  the  premises  during  the  term  of 
residence.*^  Modern  statutes,  however,  in  respect  to  the  widow's 
quarantine,  are,  as  a  general  thing,  more  liberal  in  her  favor  than 
the  common  law.  No  change  from  the  common  law  is  made  in 
Delaware,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  New 
York,  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee.  The  period  during  which 
the  widow  may  remain  in  the  mansion  of  the  deceased  husband  is 
extended  to  ninety  days  in  Maine;  two  months,  and  until  dower 
is  assigned,  in  Arkansas ;  one  year  in  Ohio,  Oregon  and  Rhode 
Island;  and  until  dower  be  assigned  with  no  limit  of  time  in 
Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Michigan,  Mis- 
souri, Nebraska,  New  Jersey,  Vermont,  Virginia,  West  Virginia 
and  Wisconsin. 

In  those  states  in  which  dower  has  been  abolished  by  statute, 
the  homestead  laws,  the  year's  support  allowed  to  the  widow  and 
family,  and  the  laws  regulating  the  descent  of  real  estate,  com- 
pensate for  the  right  of  quarantine  at  common  law.  Until  the 
dower  has  been  assigned  the  widow  may  not  only  occupy,  free  of 
rent,  the  dwelling-house,  together  with  all  the  appurtenant  be- 
longings, and  the  messuage  or  plantations  connected  therewith,^* 
but  her  right  constitutes  a  freehold  for  life,  unless  sooner  de- 
feated by  assignment  of  dower.*^   And  it  has  been  held  that  she 

■^8  Pharis  V.  Leachman,  20  Ala.  662 ;  others.    Grubbs  v.   Leyendecker,    153 

Rambo  V.  Bell,  3  Ga.  207.  Ind.  348,  53  N.  E.  940. 

79  Harrison   v.    Boyd,    36   Ala.   203.  ^2  Branson  v.  Yancy,  16  N.  Car.  11. 

80  Pizzala  v.  Campbell,  46  Ala.  35.  ^^  Doe  v.  Carrol,  16  Ala.  148. 

81  Cook  V.  Webb.  18  Ala.  810.  Right  «*  Inge  v.  Murphy,  14  Ala.  289; 
of  widow  to  occupy  lands  of  her  bus-  White  v.  Clarke,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
band  with  his  children  or  heirs  until  640. 

her  death  is  assigned  as  a  personal  ^s  Miller  v.  Talley,  48  Mo.  503 ; 
right  which   she   can   not  convey  to    Bleecker   v.    Hennion,   23    N.   J.   Eq. 

123. 


§    67  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  88 

may  lease  such  freehold  to  another,  and  will  be  entitled  to  the 
rent  paid  therefor.'*"  But  whether  she  can  assign  her  right  to  re- 
main in  the  mansion  house  to  another  has  been  differently  held, 
the  right  being  affirmed  in  some  states,"  and  denied  in  others.** 

86  Reeves    v.    Brooks,   80   Ala.   26;        s^  jones  v.  Manly,  58  Mo.  559. 
Chaplin   v.    Simmons,   7   T.   B.    Mon.         88  Barber  v.  Williams,  74  Ala.  331. 
(Ky.)  Zyj;  McLaughlin  v.  McLaugh- 
lin, 22  N.  J.  Eq.  505. 


CHAPTER    III 

TITLE  TO   REAL  ESTATE  IN   GENERAL 

SEC.  SEC. 

70.  Title  defined  and  distinguished.         75.  Complete,  perfect,  good,  and  clear 

71.  Various  estates  to  which  title  re-  titles. 

lates.  76.  Bad,     defective,     imperfect,     and 

72.  Allodial  titles.  doubtful  titles. 

73.  Color  of  title.  77.  Marketable  titles. 

74.  Legal  and  equitable  titles.  78.  Evidences  of  title. 

79.  Title  insurance. 

§  70.  Title  defined  and  distinguished.— The  term  "title," 
as  applied  to  real  estate,  may  be  defined  as  the  means  whereby 
the  ownership  of  land  is  acquired  or  established.  It  is  the  means 
whereby  the  owner  of  land  has  the  just  possession  of  his  prop- 
erty.^ The  term  indicates  the  evidence  of  ownership,  or  the  chan- 
nel through  which  an  estate  in  land  is  acquired,  and  when  used  in 
a  legal  sense  it  is  sometimes  said  to  mean  ownership,-  and  estate 
in  fee,^  a  right  of  possession,*  or  the  evidence  of  one's  right  of 
possession.^  The  term  "title,"  in  the  popular  sense,  refers  rather 
to  the  instruments  which  are  usually  relied  upon  to  evidence  the 
title,  and  to  the  outward  assertive  acts  that  import  dominion,  than 
to  the  strict  legal  means  whereby  the  owner  of  land  has  the  just 
possession  thereof.  Title  is  clearly  distinguishable  from  the 
property  or  interest  which  one  has  in  lands,  tenements  and  here- 
ditaments. This  property  or  interest  is  called  an  "estate,"  and  is 
entirely  distinct,  not  only  from  the  land  itself,  but  also  from  the 
methods  of  holding  it,  and  from  the  title  by  which  it  may  be  ac- 
quired or  held.  An  estate  in  land  is  the  degree,  quantity,  nature 
or  extent  of  interest  which  a  person  has  in  it;  while  his  title  to  it 
is  the  evidence  of  his  right  or  of  the  extent  of  his  interest;  the 

1  Adams  v.  Hopkins,  144  Cal.  19,  77  *  Rodgers  v.  Palmer,  33  Conn.  155 ; 
Pac.  712;  Jacob  Tome  Institute  v.  Dunster  v.  Kelly,  110  N.  Y.  558,  18 
Davis,  87  Md.  591,  41  Atl.  166;  2  Bl.     N.  E.  361. 

Comm.  195.  s  Chapman    v.    Dougherty,    87    Mo. 

2  Livingston  v.  Ruff,  65  S.  Car.  284,  617,  56  Am.  Rep.  469;  Patty  v.  Mid- 
43  S.  E.  678.  dieton,  82  Tex.  586,  17  S.  W.  909. 

3  Gillespie  v.   Broas,  23   Barb.    (N. 
Y.)  370. 

89 


§    71  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  90 

means  whereby  the  owner  is  enabled  to  assert  or  maintain  his 
possession,  the  right  of  the  owner  considered  with  reference 
either  to  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  acquired,  or  its  capacity 
of  being  effectually  transferred.*^ 

§  71.  Various  estates  to  which  title  relates. — It  would  be 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  work  to  discuss  at  length  the  various 
kinds  of  estates  or  interests  in  real  property,  but  inasmuch  as 
they  will  be  frequently  referred  to  in  connection  with  our  treat- 
ment of  title  it  is  deemed  important  that  we  include  a  classifica- 
tion of  them,  together  with  a  brief  definition  of  each. 

With  reference  to  their  quantum  or  duration  estates  are  either: 
(1)  Freehold  estates  or  (2)  estates  less  than  freehold. 

A  freehold  estate  is  one  which  is  to  endure  for  an  uncertain 
period,  which  must,  or  at  least  may,  last  during  the  life  of  some 
person.  Freehold  estates  are  either  estates  of  inheritance  or 
estates  not  of  inheritance.  The  former  has  reference  to  estates 
which  may  descend  to  heirs,  and  includes :  (a)  Fee  simple  estates 
and  (b)  estates  in  fee  tail;  while  the  latter  has  reference  to 
estates  which  do  not  descend  to  heirs,  and  includes:  (a)  Life 
estates,  (b)  estates  pur  autre  vie,  (c)  tenancy  in  tail  after  possi- 
bility of  issue  extinct,  (d)  dower,  (e)  curtesy  and  (f)  estates 
during  coverture.  An  estate  in  fee  simple  is  that  estate  which  a 
person  has  where  lands  are  given  to  him  and  to  his  heirs  abso- 
lutely, without  any  end  or  limit  put  to  his  estate.  An  estate  in  fee 
tail  is  an  estate  of  inheritance  which,  if  left  to  itself,  will,  after  the 
death  of  the  first  taker,  descend  to  his  lawful  issue  as  long  as  his 
posterity  endures  in  a  regular  order  of  descent  from  one  to  an- 
other, and  will  terminate  on  the  failure  of  such  posterity.  A  life 
estate  is  an  estate  which  can  not  extend  beyond  the  life  or  lives  of 
some  particular  person  or  persons,  but  may  possibly  continue  for 
the  period  of  such  life  or  lives.  If  the  estate  is  for  the  life  of 
another  person  or  persons  other  than  the  life  of  the  tenant  him- 
self it  is  an  estate  pur  autre  vie.  A  tenancy  in  tail  after  possibil- 
ity of  issue  extinct  is  where,  upon  the  death  of  the  appointed  wife 
of  the  donee  in  special  tail,  or  of  one  of  two  donees  in  special 
tail  w'ithout  issue  living,  the  donee  or  survivor  of  the  two  donees 
takes  for  his  life,  possibility  of  issue  being  extinct.    Dower  is  an 

6  Robertson  v.  Vancleave,  129  Ind.     217,  26  N.  E.  899,  29  N.  E.  781,  15 

L.  R.  A.  68. 


91  TITLE    TO    REAL    ESTATE  §    71 

estate  for  life  which  a  widow  has  in  some  portion  of  the  lands 
and  tenements  of  which  her  husband  was  seised  at  any  time 
during  coverture,  and  which  her  issue  might  have  inherited  if  she 
had  had  any.  An  estate  by  the  curtesy  is  a  life  estate  to  which  a 
husband  is  entitled  upon  the  death  of  his  wife  in  lands  or  tene- 
ments of  which  she  was  seised  in  fee  in  possession  during  their 
coverture,  provided  they  have  any  lawful  issue  born  alive,  and 
possibly  capable  of  inheriting  the  estate.  An  estate  during  cover- 
ture is  that  right  or  interest  which  a  husband  or  wife  has  during 
coverture  in  the  lands  and  tenements  of  his  or  her  spouse. 

Estates  less  than  freehold  are:  (a)  Estates  for  years,  (b) 
estates  at  will,  (c)  estates  from  year  to  year,  and  (d)  estates  at 
sufferance.  An  estate  for  years  is  an  estate  or  interest  in  land, 
having  for  its  duration  a  definite  and  ascertained  period,  as  a 
term  for  a  fixed  number  of  weeks,  months  or  years.  An  estate  at 
will,  in  the  primary  and  technical  sense  of  that  expression,  is  cre- 
ated by  grant  and  contract,  whereby  one  person  lets  land  to  an- 
other to  hold  at  the  will  of  the  lessor.  An  estate  from  year  to 
year  is  a  qualified  tenancy  at  will  introduced  to  obviate  the  incon- 
veniences of  the  latter  kind  of  estate;  and  the  qualification  re- 
quires the  determination  of  the  will  to  be  prospective,  to  take 
effect  at  the  end  of  a  current  year  of  the  tenancy.  An  estate  at 
sufferance  is  where  one  who  comes  lawfully  into  possession  of 
land  holds  over  after  his  interest  has  determined. 

Estates  wnth  regard  to  their  time  of  enjoyment  are  either  :  (1) 
Present  estates  or  (2)  future  estates.  The  former  has  reference 
to  an  estate  where  the  tenant  is  in  actual  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises, or  in  receipt  of  the  rents  and  other  income  arising  there- 
from. The  latter  is  an  estate  in  which  the  tenant  has  a  present  or 
vested  contingent  right  of  future  possession  and  enjoyment.  Fu- 
ture estates  include :  (a)  Reversions,  (b)  remainders,  (c)  contin- 
gent uses,  (d)  springing  uses,  (e)  shifting  uses,  and  (f)  execu- 
tory devises.  An  estate  in  reversion  is  the  residue  of  an  estate 
left  in  the  grantor  to  commence  in  possession  after  the  deter- 
mination of  some  particular  estate  granted  out  by  him.  An  es- 
tate in  remainder  is  an  estate  limited  to  take  effect  and  be  enjoyed 
after  another  estate  is  determined.  A  contingent  use  is  a  use  lim- 
ited in  a  deed  or  conveyance  of  land  which  may  or  may  not  hap- 
pen to  vest,  according  to  the  contingency  expressed  in  the  limita- 
tion of  such  use.     A  springing  use  is  one  limited  to  arise  on  a 


§    72  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  92 

future  event,  where  no  preceding  estate  is  limited,  and  which 
does  not  take  effect  in  derogation  of  any  other  interest  than  that 
of  the  grantor.  A  shifting  use  is  one  which  takes  eft'ect  in  dero- 
gation of  some  other  estate,  and  is  either  limited  by  the  deed  by 
which  it  is  created,  or  authorized  to  be  created  by  some  one 
named  in  the  deed.  An  executory  devise  of  lands  is  such  disposi- 
tion of  them  by  will  that  thereby  no  estate  vests  at  the  death  of 
the  testator,  but  only  on  some  future  contingency. 

Estates  classified  according  as  they  are  owned  by  one  or  more 
persons,  and  according  to  the  nature  of  the  rights  of  several 
owners,  are:  (1)  Estates  in  severalty  and  (2)  joint  estates.  The 
former  has  reference  to  those  estates  which  are  held  by  a  per- 
son in  his  own  right,  without  any  other  person  being  joined  or 
connected  with  him  in  point  of  interest  during  his  estate.  The 
latter  has  reference  to  estates  in  which  two  or  more  persons  are 
joined  in  interest,  and  include:  (a)  Joint  tenancy,  (b)  tenancy 
in  common,  (c)  tenancy  in  coparcenary,  and  (d)  tenancy  in  en- 
tirety. A  joint  tenancy  is  where  lands  or  tenements  are  granted 
to  two  or  more  persons,  to  hold  in  fee  simple,  fee  tail,  for  life, 
for  years  or  at  will.  In  such  tenancies,  there  must  be  unity  of  in- 
terest, of  title,  of  time  and  of  possession.  A  tenancy  in  com- 
mon is  where  there  are  several  owners  who  may  hold  by  differ- 
ent title,  in  different  interests,  which  may  be  acquired  at  differ- 
ent times,  the  only  unity  being  unity  of  possession.  A  tenancy 
in  coparcenary  is  where  several  persons  hold  as  one  heir,  whether 
male  or  female.  This  form  of  tenancy  has  unity  of  time,  title, 
and  possession,  but  the  interests  of  the  coparceners  may  be  un- 
equal. A  tenancy  in  entirety  is  one  arising  on  a  conveyance  to  a 
man  and  his  wife  jointly.  They  are  seised,  not  of  moieties,  but 
of  entireties,  and  the  survivor  takes  the  whole  estate. 

§  72.  Allodial  titles. — Under  the  feudal  system  in  Eng- 
land there  was  no  such  thing  as  absolute  ownership  in  land ;  the 
primary  title  to  all  lands  being  vested  in  the  crown,  and  no 
method  was  provided  by  which  it  could  divest  itself  thereof.  Many 
of  the  old  feudal  tenures  have  been  abolished,  so  that  at  the  present 
time,  in  England,  all  lands  of  inheritance  are  held  either  by 
socage  or  copyhold  tenure.^ 

The  early  English  settlers  in  this  country  brought  with  them 
from  the  mother  country  such  parts  of  the  common  and  statutory 

7  Laws  of  Eng.,  vol.  24,  pp.  147,  148. 


93  TITLE    TO    REAL    ESTATE  §    7ci 

laws  as  were  of  a  general  nature  and  applicable  to  their  situa- 
tion.^ Lands  in  this  country  were  then  held  in  free  and  common 
socage  under  grants  from  the  crown.^  But  by  statute,  or  by  force 
of  judicial  decisions,  land  tenures  have  been  generally  abolished 
in  this  country,^"  and  the  lands  are  said  to  be  allodial,  as  opposed 
to  feudal ;  by  which  is  meant  that  w^hile  title  is  primarily  vested 
in  the  sovereign  power,  that  power  may,  by  proper  gifts  or  con- 
veyances, divest  itself  of  such  title  and  transfer  the  same  to  indi- 
viduals. Allodial  lands  are  said  to  be  held  in  absolute  ownership, 
the  same  as  personalty.^^ 

Thus  the  character  of  the  title  to  lands  in  this  country  since 
the  revolution  has  become  allodial,  that  is,  wholly  independent, 
and  held  of  no  superior  at  all.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  some  rights  and  interests  in  the  land  are  reserved  to  the 
state;  such,  for  instance,  as  the  right  of  taxation,  the  right  of 
eminent  domain,  and  the  right  of  escheat.  Land  held  allodially 
is  owned  subject  to  such  rights  of  the  state,  but  free  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  other  domination  or  control. 

§  73.  Color  of  title. — Color  of  title  is  that  which  in  ap- 
pearance is  title,  but  which  in  reality  is  not  title. ^"  Color  of 
title  is  an  apparent  title  founded  upon  descent  cast,^^  deed  of  con- 
veyance," an  execution  sale,^^  a  decree  of  court,"  a  will,^^  a  tax 
deed,^^  a  quitclaim  deed,"  or  any  instrument  in  writing  defining 

8  Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church,  4  i3  Peadro  v.  Carriker,  168  111.  570. 
Paige  (N.  Y.)  178.  48   N.   E.    102;    Miller   v.    Davis,    106 

9  Chisholm  V.  Georgia,  2  Ball.   (U.     Mich.  300,  64  N.  W.  338. 

S.)  419,  1  L.  ed.  440;  Van  Rensselaer  i-i  Chickering  v.  Failes.  26  111.  508; 

V.  Hays,   19  N.  Y.  68,  75  Am.  Dec.  Welborn  v.  Anderson,  2>7  Miss.   155. 

278.  But  see  Wright  v.  Tichenor,  104  Ind. 

10  Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  Gill  &  J.  185,  3  N.  E.  853. 

(Md.)  443.  i^Kendrick  v.  Latham,  25  Fla.  819, 

11  New  Orleans  v.  United  States,  6  So.  871 ;  Falls  of  Neuse  Mfg.  Co. 
10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  662,  9  L.  ed.  573;  v.  Brooks,  106  N.  Car.  107,  11  S.  E. 
Cook  V.  Hammond,  4  Mason  467,  478,  456. 

Fed.    Cas.    No.    3,    159;    Bancroft   v.  le  Qwsley  v.  Matson,  156  Cal.  401, 

Cambridge.    126    Mass.    438 ;    Minne-  104  Pac.  983 ;  Huls  v.  Buntin,  47  111. 

apoHs  Mill  Co.  v.  Tiffany,  22  Minn.  396. 

463.  "Baldwin  v.  Ratcliff,  125  111.  376, 

12  Wright  V.  Mattison,  18  How.  (U.  17  N.  E.  794;  Holloway  v.  Jones,  143 
S.)  50,  15  L.  ed.  280;  Black  v.  Ten-  Pa.  St.  564,  22  Atl.  710. 

nessee  Coal  &c.  Co..  93  Ala.  109,  9  So.  i^  Mclntyre  v.  Thompson,  4  Hughes 

537;  Finley  v.  Hogan,  60  Ark.  499,  30  (U.  S.)   562,  10  Fed.  531,  4  Hughes 

S.  W.  1045 ;  Millett  v.  Lagomarsino,  562 ;  Chicago  v.  Middlebrooke,  143  111. 

107  Cal.  102,  40  Pac.  25 ;  Studstill  v.  265,  32  N.  E.  457. 

Willco.x.   94   Ga.  690,   20   S.    E.    120;  "  Safford   v.    Stubbs,    117    111.    389, 

Kopp  V.  Herrman,  82  Md.  339,  33  Atl.  7  N.  E.  653 ;  contra.  Swift  v.  Mulkey, 

646.  14  Ore.  59,  12  Pac.  76. 


§    74  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  94 

the  extent  of  the  disseisor's  claim.-*'  Any  instrument  may  consti- 
tute color  of  title,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions, which  purports  to  convey  the  land  and  shows  the  extent 
and  boundaries  of  the  premises  conveyed,  although  it  is  void  as 
a  muniment  of  title."^  "When  we  say  a  person  has  color  of  title, 
whatever  may  be  the  meaning  of  the  phrase,  we  express  the  idea, 
at  least,  that  some  act  has  been  previously  done,  or  some  event 
transpired,  by  which  some  title,  good  or  bad,  to  a  parcel  of  land  of 
definite  extent  has  been  conveyed  to  him."" 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  title  under  which  the  disseisor 
claims  should  be  a  valid  one.^^ 

§  74.  Legal  and  equitable  titles. — The  classification  of 
titles  into  legal  and  equitable  has  reference  more  particularly  to 
the  courts  by  which  they  are  recognized.  For  instance,  a  person 
has  a  legal  title  to  land  when  he  has  a  right  thereto  in  the  nature 
of  ownership  cognizable  by,  and  enforcible  in,  a  court  of  law. 
Actual  or  constructive  possession,  coupled  with  the  legal  right  of 
possession,  will  constitute  a  good  and  sufficient  legal  title.  This 
legal  right  of  possession  must  be  such  as  would  authorize  a  court 
of  law  to  award  a  possessory  writ.  So,  when  we  speak  of  a  per- 
son having  title  to  a  piece  of  land  we  mean  that  he  has  a  legal 
title,  or  one  without  qualification.-*  When  the  title  to  real  estate 
is  spoken  of  without  qualifying  terms,  a  legal  title  is  understood 
as  meant.-" 

An  equitable  title  is  the  right  in  a  party  to  whom  it  belongs  to 
have  the  legal  title  to  land  transferred  to  him.-°  It  is  such  an  in- 
terest as  is  cognizable  solely  in  a  court  of  equity.  Such  a  title  ex- 
ists where  the  legal  title  is  vested  in  one  person  and  the  beneficial 
interest  inures  to  another  person,  who  may  be  named  in  the  deed 
or  who  may  not  be  named  at  all,  but  whose  right  may  exist  by 
parol.  Thus  where  title  to  land  for  which  a  wife  paid  the 
purchase-money  is  taken  in  the  name  of  her  husband,  an  equitable 

20  Cook  V.  Norton,  43  111.  391;  Mich.  359,  45  N.  W.  343;  Jackson  v. 
Thompson  v.  Burhans,  79  N.  Y.  93.  Newton.   18  Johns.    (N.  Y.)   355. 

21  Joplin  Brewing  Co.  v.  Pavne,  197  ~*  Hoult  v.  Donahue,  21  W.  Va. 
Mo.  422,  94  S.  W.  896,  114  Am.  St.  294. 

770.  25  Spencer    v.    Winselman,    42    Cal. 

22  St.  Louis  V.  Gorman,  29  Mo.  593,     479. 

77  Am    Dec   586  2n  7]-,ygerson   v.  Whitbeck,   5  Tjtah 

23  Hall  V.   Law.   102  U.   S.  461,  26     406,  16  Pac.  403. 
L.  ed.  217;  Hecock  v.  Van  Dusen,  80 


95  TITLE    TO    REAL    ESTATE  §    75 

title  exists  in  favor  of  the  wife,  and  a  court  of  equity  will  decree 
a  transfer  of  the  legal  title  to  her.-^  Likewise,  where  the  legal 
title  to  lands  sold  remains  in  the  vendor  until  the  purchase-money 
has  been  paid,  the  vendee  acquires  an  equitable  title  only,  and 
tipon  payment  of  the  full  amount  of  the  purchase-money,  he  can 
compel  the  vendor  to  transfer  the  legal  title  to  him,^**  Although 
an  equitable  title  is  one  that  a  court  of  equity  will  enforce,  it  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  a  purchaser  can  not  be  compelled  to 
take  such  a  title,^^  especially  where  the  equity  is  controverted/" 
It  will  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  vendor  will,  if  time  is 
not  material,  be  allowed  time  in  which  to  get  the  legal  title. 

§  75.  Complete,  perfect,  good,  and  clear  titles. — To  con- 
stitute in  one  a  complete  title  to  real  estate,  he  must  have  ac- 
quired, from  one  or  more  sources,  the  possession,  the  right  of 
possession,  and  the  right  of  property. ^^  Where  any  one  or  more 
of  these  elements  is  wanting,  the  title  is  defective  or  does  not  ex- 
ist. While  the  element  of  the  right  of  property  is  sometimes  said 
to  have  disappeared  from  our  modern  law,  yet  it  is  still  to  be 
found  as  a  distinct  entity  in  some  jurisdictions;  and  clearness  of 
conception  of  how  ownership  becomes  complete,  through  various 
sources  of  acquisition,  often  depends  on  a  careful  inquiry  regard- 
ing all  three  of  these  elements. 

It  is  apparent  that  one  may  have  possession  or  actual  occupa- 
tion without  any  pretense  of  right;  or  one  may  have  the  right  of 
possession,  while  another  has  the  possession  in  fact ;  or  one  may 
have  the  mere  right  of  property,  while  possession  and  right  of 
possession  may  be  in  another.  These  elements  must  be  united  in 
one  person  to  constitute  a  complete  title. ^-  By  statute  in  most 
jurisdictions,  the  right  of  property  as  distinct  from  the  right  of 
possession  is  now  recognized.  The  two  go  hand  in  hand,  so  that, 
generally  speaking,  adverse  possession  may  now  complete  a  title, 
by  transferring  all  the  elements  of  ownership,  in  the  period  fixed 
by  the  statute. 

^"  Beringer  v.  Lutz,  188  Pa.  St.  364,  Am.    Dec.   48 ;    Littlefield   v.    Tinsley. 

41  Atl.  643.  26  Tex.  353 ;  Newberry  v.  French,  98 

28  Jennisons   v.    Leonard.   21    Wall.  Va.  479.  36  S.  E.  519. 

(U.  S.)  302,  22  L.  ed.  539.  so  Ankeny  v.  Clark,  148  U.  S.  345, 

-nVaggoner    v.    Waggoner.    3    B.  13  S.  Ct.  617,  37  L.  ed.  475. 

Mon.    (Ky.)    556;   Alorris  v.  Mowatt,  si  Di,-,gey  y.  Paxton,  60  Miss.  1038. 

2   Paige    (N.   Y.)    586   22   Am.    Dec.  32  Khle  v.  Quackenboss,  6  Hill  (N. 

661 ;  Jones  v.  Taylor,  7  Tex.  240,  56  Y.)  537. 


§    75  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  96 

To  constitute  a  perfect  title  there  must  be  a  union  of  the  same 
elements,  namely,  actual  possession,  the  right  of  possession,  and 
the  right  of  property."'^  Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  such  title  as 
a  "perfect  title."  Where  the  phrase  was  embodied  in  a  contract 
of  sale,  it  was  said  to  mean  such  a  title  as  is  perfect  and  safe  to  a 
moral  certainty;  a  title  which  does  not  disclose  a  patent  defect 
which  suggests  the  possibility  of.  a  lawsuit  to  defend  it;  a  title 
such  as  a  well-informed  and  prudent  person  paying  full  value  for 
the  property  would  be  willing  to  take.^*  "A  perfect  title  always 
carries  with  it,  in  legal  contemplation,  lawful  seisin  and  posses- 
sion. Such  seisin  and  possession  is  co-extensive  with  the  right, 
and  deemed  to  continue  until  ouster  by  actual  possession  of  an- 
other under  claim  of  right. "^'^ 

The  term  "good  title"  does  not  necessarily  mean  one  perfect  of 
record. ^"^  It  consists  in  the  rightful  ownership  of  property  and 
in  the  rightful  possession  thereof,  together  with  the  appropriate 
legal  evidence  of  rightful  ownership.  As  between  vendor  and 
purchaser,  it  means  the  legal  estate  in  fee,  free  and  clear  of  all 
valid  claims,  liens  or  encumbrances  whatsoever.^^  It  means  a  title 
free  from  litigation,  palpable  defects,  and  grave  doubts.  It 
should  consist  of  both  legal  and  equitable  titles,  fairly  deducible 
of  record."**  "A  good  title  means  not  merely  a  title  valid  in  fact, 
but  a  marketable  title,  which  can  again  be  sold  to  a  reasonable 
purchaser  or  mortgaged  to  a  person  of  reasonable  prudence  as 
security  for  a  loan  of  money.  A  purchaser  will  not  generally  be 
compelled  to  take  a  title  when  there  is  a  defect  in  the  record  title 
which  can  be  cured  only  by  a  resort  to  parol  evidence. "^^  In  a 
contract  to  convey  a  good  title,  the  word  "good"  comprehends  all 
that  the  word  "clear"  does.*''  And  the  term  "clear  title,"  as  used 
in  such  contract,  means  that  there  are  no  incumbrances  on  the 
land.*^  Where  a  contract  of  sale  provided  that  the  vendor  was 
to  furnish  an  abstract  of  title  "showing  a  good  and  clear  title, 

"Donovan  v.  Pitcher,  53  Ala.  411,  -is  Reynolds   v.   Borcl,   86   Cal.   538, 

25   Am.   Rep.  634 ;   Converse   v.   Kel-  25  Pac.  67. 

lofjg,  7  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    590.  39  Moore    v.    Williams.    115    N.    Y. 

34  Birge  V.  Bock.  44  Mo.  App.  69.  586,  22  N.  E.  233,  5  L.  R.  A.  654,  12 

35Altschul  V.  O'Neill,  35  Ore.  202,  Am.  St.  844. 

58  Pac.  95.  4o  Qakey  v.  Cook,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  350, 

3GBloch  V.  Ryan,  4  App.  Cas.    (D.  7  Atl.  495. 

C.)  283.  *i  Roberts  v.  Bassett,  105  Mass.  409. 

37  Jones  V.  Gardner,  10  Johns.   (N. 
Y.)   269. 


97  TITLE    TO    REAL   ESTATE  §    76 

free  from  defects,"  it  was  held  that  the  contract  was  not  per- 
formed where  the  abstract  shows  defects  which  may  or  may  not 
exist  in  the  title  as  tested  by  the  original  records,  and  an  incum- 
brance which  may  or  may  not  be  barred  by  limitation/" 

§  76.     Bad,   defective,   imperfect  and   doubtful  titles. — A 

bad  title  is  one  which  conveys  no  property  to  the  purchaser  of  the 
estate/^  But  the  word  "bad,"  when  used  in  connection  with  title, 
is  merely  a  vulgarism,  and  the  fact  that  it  is  commonly  used  does 
not  make  it  any  the  less  a  vulgarism. 

A  title  is  said  to  be  defective  when  the  party  who  claims  to 
own  the  land  has  not  the  whole  title,  but  some  other  person  has 
title  to  a  part  or  portion  of  it.^*  A  defective  title  is  the  same  as 
no  title  whatever.*^ 

An  imperfect  title  is  one  where  something  remains  to  be  done 
by  the  granting  power  to  pass  the  fee  in  land.*'' 

A  doubtful  title  is  one  which  turns  upon  some  question  of  law 
or  fact  which  the  court  considers  so  doubtful  that  the  purchaser 
will  not  be  compelled  to  accept  the  title  and  incur  the  risk  of  a 
lawsuit  by  adverse  claimants.  Just  what  matters  of  law  or  fact 
are  sufficient  to  make  a  title  so  doubtful  as  to  be  unmarketable 
can  not  be  indicated  by  positive  rules.  A  doubtful  title  has  also 
been  defined  to  be  one  which  conveys  no  property  to  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  estate."  Every  title  is  doubtful  which  invites  or 
exposes  the  party  holding  it  to  litigation.*^ 

§  77.  Marketable  titles.— The  term  "marketable  title," 
when  applied  to  real  estate,  means  a  title  free  from  reasonable 
doubt.*^  A  reasonable  doubt  concerning  the  title  exists  when 
there  is  uncertainty  as  to  some  fact  appearing  in  the  course  of  its 
deduction,  and  the  doubt  must  be  such  as  affects  the  value  of  the 
property  or  will  interfere  with  its  sale.^"   It  means  a  title  that  is 

« Kane  v.  Rippey,  24  Ore.  338,  33  48  Herman  v.   Somers,    158   Pa.   St. 

Pac.  936.  424,  27  Atl.  1050,  38  Am.  St.  851. 

43  Heller   v.    Cohen,    15    Misc.    378,  49  Austin  v.  Barnum,  52  Minn.  136. 

36  N.  Y.  S.  668,  71  N.  Y.  St.  582.  53  N.  W.  1132;  Sproule  v.  Davies,  69 

44Copertini  v.  Oppermann,  76  Cal.  App.    Div.    502,    75    N.    Y.    S.    229; 

181,  18  Pac.  256.  Holmes  v.  Woods,  168  Pa.  St.  530,  32 

45  Place  V.   People,   192  111.  160,  61  Atl.  54 ;  Morrison  v.  Waggy,  43  W. 

N.  E.  354.  Va.  405,  27  S.  E.  314. 

"«  Paschal  v.  Perez,  7  Tex.  348.  ^^  Vought  v.   Williams,    120   N.    Y. 

47  Heller    v.    Cohen,    15    Misc.    378,  253,  24  N.  E.  195,  8  L.  R.  A.  591,  17 

36  N.  Y.  S.  668,  71  N.  Y.  St.  582.  Am.   St.  634;   Schenck  v.  Wicks,  23 

Utah  576,  65  Pac.  732. 
7 — TlIOMP.   Abstr. 


§    77  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  98 

reasonably  free  from  such  (loul)ts  as  will  afifect  the  market  value 
of  the  estate ;  one  which  a  reasonably  prudent  person  with  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  facts  and  their  legal  bearing  would  be  willing  to 
accept. ^^ 

The  title  should  be  not  only  good,  but  indubitable. "'''"  It  should 
at  least  be  such  a  title  as  would  insure  to  the  purchaser  a  peaceful 
enjoyment  of  the  property.'^^  If  a  reasonable  doubt  remains,  after 
the  vendor  has  produced  all  the  proof  he  is  able  to  produce,  the 
title  is  not  marketable,  and  the  purchaser  is  not  obliged  to  take 
it.^*  A  title  may  be  perfect,  and  yet  not  be  marketable.  For  in- 
stance, suppose  the  validity  of  A's  title  depends  upon  the  question 
whether  or  not  he  is  next  of  kin  to  B.  If  he  is  in  fact  the  next  of 
kin  to  B,  his  title  is  perfect.  But  if  he  is  unable  to  show  to  the 
court  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  is  such,  then  his  title, 
though  really  perfect  if  all  the  facts  could  be  shown,  will  be 
deemed  unmarketable."'^^  The  title  may  be  good  in  fact,  but  to  be 
marketable  it  must  l^e  good  of  record. ■'^^'"'  The  fact  that  the  title  is 
capable  of  being  made  good  by  the  production  of  oral  testimony 
or  by  affidavits,  does  not  make  it  a  marketable  title  where  the  rec- 
ord does  not  show  the  title  to  be  good.°^  *'The  authorities  hold 
that  to  render  a  title  marketable  it  is  only  necessary  that  it  shall 
be  free  from  reasonal)le  doubt ;  in  other  words,  that  a  purchaser 
is  not  entitled  to  demand  a  title  absolutely  free  from  every  pos- 
sible suspicion.  He  can  only  demand  such  title  as  a  reasonably 
well-informed  and  intelligent  purchaser,  acting  upon  business 
principles,  would  be  willing  to  accept. "^^  "A  title  open  to  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  is  not  a  marketable  title.  The  court  can  not  make 
it  such  by  passing  upon  an  objection  depending  upon  a  disputed 
question  of  fact  or  a  doubtful  question  of  law,  in  the  absence  of 
the  party  in  whom  the  outstanding  right  was  vested.     He  would 

51  Roberts    v.    McFadden,    32    Tex.  N.  E.  868,  3  L.  R.  A.  161 ;  Brown  v. 

Civ.  App.  47,  74  S.  W.  105.  Widen  (Iowa),  103  N.  W.  158;  Horn 

"Ormsby    v.    Graham,    123    Iowa  v.  Butler,  39  Minn.  515,  40  N.  W.  833  ; 

202.  98  N.  W.  724.  Kane  v.  Rippey,  22  Ore.  296,  23  Pac. 

53  Barnard  v.  Brown,  112  Mich.  452,  180;  Speakman  v.  Forepaugh,  44  Pa. 

70  N.  W.  1038,  67  Am.   St.  432.  St.  363. 

5*  Shrivcr  v.  Sliriver,  86  N.  Y.  575.  "  Howe   v.    Coates,   97   Minn.   385, 

55Eggers  V.  Busch,  154  111.  604,  39  107  N.  W.  397.  4  L.  R.  K.   (N.  S.) 

N.    E.   619;    Reynolds   v.    Strong.    82  1170,  114  Am.  St.  12Z\   Speakman  v. 

Hun    (N.  Y.)    202,  31   N.   Y.   S.  329,  Forepaugh,  44  Pa.  St.  363. 

63  N.  Y.  St.  778.  ''»  Cummings    v.    Doian.    52    Wash. 

5"  Bloch  V.  Ryan,  4  App.  D.  C.  283;  496,  100  Pac.  989,  132  Am.  St.  986. 
Close  V.   Stuyvesant,   132  111.  607,  24 


99  TITLE    TO    REAL    ESTATE  §    78 

not  be  bound  by  the  adjudication,  and  could  raise  the  same  ques- 
tion in  a  new  proceeding.  *  *  *  ji-  ^vould  especially  be  un- 
just to  compel  a  purchaser  to  take  a  title,  the  validity  of  which 
depended  upon  a  question  of  fact,  where  the  facts  presented  upon 
the  application  might  be  changed  on  a  new  inquiry  or  are  open  to 
opposing  influences."^'* 

§  78.  Evidences  of  title. — The  legal  title  to  land  is  made 
up  of  a  series  of  documents  required  to  be  executed  with  the 
solemnities  prescribed  by  law,  and  of  facts  not  evidenced  by  doc- 
uments, which  show  that  the  claimant  is  a  person  to  whom  the 
law  gives  the  estate,  such  as  an  heir,  a  tenant  in  dower,  and  an 
adverse  holder  for  the  statutory  period  of  limitation.  Docu- 
mentary evidences  of  title  consist  of  voluntary  grants  by  the  sov- 
ereign, deeds  of  conveyance  and  wills  by  individuals,  conveyances 
by  statutory  or  judicial  permission,  deeds  made  in  connection 
with  a  sale  of  land  for  delinquent  taxes,  proceeding  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  and  deeds  executed  by  min- 
isterial or  fiduciary  officers.  A  person  is  not  deemed  the  legal 
owner  of  land  until  there  exists  such  documents  and  facts  as  the 
law  requires  for  the  transfer  of  title  to  him.  He  may  be  entitled 
to  a  conveyance,  but  is  not  deemed  the  legal  owner  until  the 
proper  conveyance  has  been  made.*'"  It  is  with  the  instruments 
which  are  relied  upon  to  evidence  the  title,  and  to  the  outward  as- 
sertive acts  that  import  dominion,  that  the  abstracter  has  to  do  in 
compiling  an  abstract,  and  that  the  attorney  must  examine  in 
order  to  determine  the  true  status  of  the  title. 

§  79.  Title  insurance. — The  business  of  insuring  titles  to 
real  estate  has  become  quite  extensive  in  the  larger  cities  and 
older  settled  parts  of  the  country.  Financial  corporations  of 
large  capital  and  established  responsibility,  that  have,  practically, 
perpetual  chartered  life,  empowering  them  to  issue  policies  of  in- 
surance of  titles,  operative  without  limit  as  to  time,  are  to  be 
found  in  almost  every  state.  In  consideration  of  the  payment 
of  a  certain  premium,  the  amount  of  which  is  fixed  by  special 
agreement,  guided  by  rates  proportional  to  the  amount  insured, 
these  companies  issue  such  policies  to  owners  of  lands,  or  to  their 
mortgagees,  agreeing  to  insure  the  party  interested  and  his  trans- 

59  Fleming  v.  Burnham,  100  N.  Y.        eo  Pagg  y.  Rogers,  31  Cal.  294. 
1,  2  N.  E.  905. 


§    79  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  100 

ferecs,  his  heirs,  devisees,  and  personal  representatives,  against  all 
loss  or  damage,  not  exceeding  the  sum  named  in  the  pohcies, 
which  the  insured  shall  sustain,  not  only  by  reason  of  any  defects 
of  title,  or  from  incumbrances  affecting  the  designated  property, 
but  also  against  all  loss  or  damage  by  reason  of  the  unmarket- 
ability  of  the  title  of  the  insured  in  the  premises.  By  force  of 
such  policies,  the  liability  of  the  insuring  companies  extends,  not 
merely  in  favor  of  the  contracting  party  and  his  heirs,  etc.,  but 
also  in  favor  of  any  third  person  to  whom  he  may  have  trans- 
ferred the  policy.  It  also  extends  to  defects  of  title,  and  to  the 
existence  of  any  encumbrance,  whether  discoverable  or  not  by  the 
most  thorough  and  complete  searches,  provided  only  that  any 
judgments  adverse  to  the  title  shall  be  pronounced,  under  the 
conditions  named,  by  any  competent  court.  As  a  rule  the  defects 
insured  against  must  exist  at  the  time  the  contract  is  entered  into, 
and  any  defects  arising  after  the  date  of  the  policy  are  not  covered 
by  it.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  defect  should  actually  exist 
at  the  date  of  the  policy  in  order  to  bind  the  insurer  in  case  of 
subsequent  loss.  It  is  sufficient  if  there  be  in  existence  on  the 
date  of  the  policy  an  inchoate  or  potential  defects  which  the  hap- 
pening of  some  subsequent  event  renders  substantial  and  real. 
In  all  cases  of  title  insurance  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  par- 
ties are  measured  by  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  contract. 
The  policy  is  usually  issued  on  a  written  application  by  the  in- 
sured, and  it  usually  provides  that  the  application  shall  be  held 
to  be  a  warranty  of  the  facts  therein  stated.  When  the  contract 
has  been  agreed  upon  and  the  policy  issued,  it  is  subject  to  the 
same  rules  of  construction  as  are  applicable  to  policies  of  other 
kinds  of  insurance. 


CHAPTER  IV 


METHODS  OF  ACQUIRING  TITLE 


SEC. 

85. 


87. 
88. 

89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 


Title  by  descent  and  by  pur- 
chase. 

Title  by  descent  based  on  laws 
of  inheritance. 

Common-law  canons  of  descent. 
Rules  of  descent  under  the  civil 
law. 

Consanguinity  and  affinity. 
Fact  of  death. 
Fact  of  intestacy. 
Title  by  purchase  classified. 
Title  by  private  deed. 
Official  grants. 
Public  grants. 
Devise. 

Title  by  estoppel  in  general. 
Estoppel  by  record. 


SEC. 

99.  Estoppel  by  deed. 

100.  Estoppel  in  pais. 

101.  Relation. 

102.  Prescription  and  limitation. 

103.  Accretion  and  alluvion. 

104.  Title  to  riparian  lands. 

105.  Dedication. 

106.  Confirmation. 

107.  Occupancy. 

108.  Abandonment. 

109.  Eminent  domain. 

110.  Title  and  rights  acquired  by  couv 
demnation. 

111.  Escheat. 

112.  Confiscation. 

113.  Forfeiture. 


§  85.  Title  by  descent  and  by  purchase. — Most  authorities 
agree  that  title  to  real  property  is  acquired  either  by  descent  or 
by  purchase.  The  former  method  includes  only  those  cases  in 
which  property  passes  from  an  ancestor  to  his  heirs  by  virtue  of 
the  law  of  descent.  The  latter  method  includes  all  those  cases 
where  title  to  property  is  acquired  by  a  method  other  than  by 
descent.  It  is  only  when  the  law  transfers  property  to  an  heir 
that  title  is  obtained  by  descent.^  The  interests  of  dower  and 
curtesy,  though  created  by  law,  do  not  come  within  the  doctrine 
of  descents.^  But  where  the  heirs  at  law  of  a  testator  are  given 
the  same  estates  or  shares  that  the  law  would  have  cast  upon 
them  in  case  of  intestacy,  they  are  said  to  take  by  descent,  even 
though  the  estate  l^e  charged  with  incumbrances.^ 

The  principal  distinction  between  title  by  descent  and  title  by 
purchase  is  that  by  the  latter  method  the  estate  acquires  a  new  in- 
heritable quality  and  is  rendered  descendible  to  the  blood  in  gen- 
eral of  the  person  acquiring  it.    An  estate  thus  acquired  will  not, 


1  Hutchinson  Investment  Co.  v. 
Caldwell,,  152  U.  S.  65,  14  Sup.  Ct. 
504,  38  L.  ed.  356. 

24  Kent  Com.,  p.  *374,  note  (c). 


3  Jackson  v.  Alsop,  67  Conn.  249, 
34  Atl.  1106;  Thomas  v.  Miller,  161 
111.  60,  43  N.  E.  848;  Frick  Coal  Co. 
v.  Laughead,  203  Pa.  168,  58  Atl.  172. 


101 


§    86  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  102 

like  that  acquired  by  descent,  render  the  owner  answerable  for 
the  acts  of  his  ancestors.'*  Such  statutory  rules  as  require  ances- 
tral blood  as  a  prerequisite  to  descent  do  not  operate  upon  estates 
acquired  by  purchase.''  In  title  by  descent,  the  inheritance  is  cast 
upon  the  heir,  whether  he  is  willing  or  not,  immediately  upon  the 
death  of  the  ancestor. 

§  86.  Title  by  descent  based  on  laws  of  inheritance. — In- 
heritance is  not  a  natural  or  absolute  right,  Init  is  purely  a  creature 
of  statutory  law,  and  the  state  may  enact  laws  under  which  real 
])roperty  may  descend,  and  may  preclude  any  other  mode  or  law 
of  descent. "^  It  may  designate  what  person  or  persons  shall  in- 
herit an  estate,  or  whether  the  estate  shall  be  inherited  by  any 
person  whomsoever.  Hence,  at  any  time  prior  to  the  vesting  of 
an  estate  by  the  death  of  the  owner  thereof,  the  line  of  inheritance 
may  be  changed  by  statute,  and  the  statute  afifecting  such  change 
will  control  the  succession  of  the  estate,  and  may  increase  or 
diminish  the  number  of  the  heirs  at  law;  may  entirely  destroy  the 
expectancy  of  the  heir  apparent,  or  may  cast  the  descent  upon 
those  who  previously  did  not  possess  the  right  of  inheritance.^ 
But  after  the  interest  of  an  heir  has  become  vested  by  the  death 
of  his  ancestor,  it  remains  subject  to  administration,  and  may  be 
sold  to  pay  decedent's  debts  and  the  expenses  of  administration.^ 

The  right  to  inherit  is  said  to  rest  in  public  policy,  and  is  de- 
pendent upon  the  will  of  the  legislature,  except  as  restricted  by 
constitutional  provision.^  To  discover  who  are  the  rightful  heirs, 
and  to  provide  how  and  in  what  proportions  the  inheritance  shall 
pass,  is  the  purpose  of  all  statutes  and  canons  of  descent.  In 
most  of  the  states  of  this  country,  the  statutes  of  descent  are  mod- 
eled after  the  English  statutes  for  the  distribution  of  personalty, 
and  these  statutes  were  taken  from  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.^*^ 
The  great  object  of  these  statutes  of  distribution  was  to  accom- 
plish an  equal  distribution  of  the  estate.    In  this  respect  their  pro- 

<^KohI  V.  United   States,  91  U.   S.  lor,  132  Tcnn.  92.  177  S.  W.  61. 

367,  23  L.  ed.  449 ;  Burt  v.  Merchants'  ^  Gregley  v.  Jackson,  39  Ark.  487. 

Ins.  Co.,   106  Mass.  356,  8  Am.  Rep.  «  Ovcrturf   v.    Dugan,   29  Ohio    St. 

339.  230. 

^  Ramsey  v.  Ramsey,  7  Ind.  607.  »  In   re   Colbert's   Estate,  44   Mont. 

«  Wilson  V.   Storthz,   117  Ark.  418,  259,  119  Pac.  791. 

175  S.  W.  45;  National  Safe  Deposit  i"  Rountree  v.  Pursell,  11  Ind.  App. 

Co.  V.   Stead.  250  111.  584.  95   N.  E.  522,  39  N.  E.  747:    Blackborough  v. 

973;  Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Buck.  263  Davis,  1  P.  Wms.  41 ;  Lloyd  v.  Tench, 

111.  222,  104  N.  E.  1114;  Cole  v.  Tav-  2  Vesey  215. 


J 


103  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING  TITLE  §    87 

visions  were  in  striking  contrast  with  the  common-law  canons 
of  descent.  The  intention  of  the  modern  statutes  of  descent  is  to 
follow  the  lead  of  the  natural  affections  of  the  intestate,  and  to 
consider  as  most  worthy  the  claims  of  those  who  stand  nearest  to 
his  affections. ^^  While  it  is  true  that  the  descent  and  distribution 
of  property  in  most  states  is  governed  entirely  by  statute,  it  is 
also  true  that  in  the  construction  of  such  statutes  and  in  deter- 
mining the  meaning  of  the  words  and  terms  employed,  heed  is 
given  to  the  meaning  attached  to  such  words  and  terms  by  the 
common  law.  When  words  of  a  definite  signification  under  the 
common  law  are  used  in  such  statutes,  and  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  they  are  used  in  a  different  sense,  they  are  deemed  to  be 
employed  in  their  known  and  defined  common-law  meaning.^- 

§  87.  Common-law  canons  of  descent. — The  feudal  sys- 
tem introduced  in  England  a  theory  for  the  devolution  of  lands 
and  landed  property  founded  upon  military  services.  With  some 
modifications,  it  became  the  common  law  of  descent  in  that  coun- 
try. By  its  rules,  actual  seisin  or  seisin  in  deed  was  indispensable 
to  the  inheritable  quality  of  estates.  If  the  ancestor  was  not 
seised,  no  matter  how  clear  his  right  of  property,  the  heir  could 
not  inherit.  Hereditaments  descended  lineally,  but  could  never 
ascend.  The  oldest  son  was  admitted  to  the  inheritance,  to  the 
exclusion  of  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  males  before  females. 
Lineal  descendants  in  infinitum  represented  their  ancestors,  stand- 
ing in  the  same  place  the  ancestor  would  have  stood  if  living; 
and  on  failure  of  lineal  descendants,  the  inheritance  descended  to 
the  collateral  relations,  being  of  the  blood  of  the  first  purchaser, 
subject  to  the  preceding  rules.  The  collateral  heir  of  the  intestate 
was  required  to  be  his  collateral  kinsman  of  the  whole  blood. 
In  collateral  inheritances,  the  male  stock  was  preferred  to 
the  female,  and  kindred  of  the  blood  of  the  male  an- 
cestor, hov\-ever,  remote,  v.'as  admitted  before  those  of  the 
blood  of  the  female,  however  near,  unless  the  lands  in 
fact  descended  from  a  female.  These  canons  of  descent  had  two 
leading  purposes  in  view :  The  first,  to  preserve  the  inheritance 
in  the  blood  of  that  family  by  whom  it  was  originally  acquired; 

11  Garland    v.    Harrison,    8    Leigh  A.    (N.    S.)    220n,   139  Am.    St.   404; 
(Va.)  368.  Allen's  Appeal,  99  Pa.  St.  196,  44  Am. 

12  Holt    V.    Agnew,    dl    Ala.    360;  Rep.  lOln;  Apple  v.  Apple,  38  Tenn, 
Truelove  v.    Truelove,    172   Ind.   441,  348. 

86  N.  E.  1018,  88  N.  E.  516,  27  L.  R. 


87 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


104 


the  second,  to  preserve  the  inheritance  entire  by  keeping  it  for  the 
time  being  in  a  single  representative  of  that  family  by  which  it 
was  acquired.  While  these  common-law  canons  of  descent  have 
never  been  in  force  to  any  considerable  extent  in  this  country,  and 
while  our  statutes  are  designed  to  cover  every  conceivable  case 
or  state  of  circumstances  that  can  surround  the  descent  of  prop- 
erty/^ yet  as  our  laws  of  descent  are  so  interwoven  with  the 
common  law,  and  are  so  generally  based  upon  it,  a  review  of  the 
common-law  canons  will  not  be  out  of  place  in  this  connection ; 
and  an  examination  of  each  will  show  how  far  the  spirit  of  such 
canons  is  incorporated,  if  at  all,  in  our  statutes  of  descent.  These 
canons  are  usually  given  as  seven  in  number,  and  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Inheritances  shall  lineally  descend  to  the  issue  of  the  per- 
son who  died  last  actually  seised,  in  infinitum,  but  shall  never 
lineally  ascend.^* 

(2)  The  male  issue  shall  be  admitted  before  the  female.^'' 

(3)  That  where  there  are  two  or  more  males  in  equal  degree, 
the  eldest  only  shall  inherit,  but  the  females  altogether.^" 


!■•' Cloud  V.  Bruce,  61  Ind.  171; 
Bruce  v.  Bissell,  119  Ind.  525,  22  N. 
E.  4.  12  Am.  St.  436. 

1*  Bates  V.  Brown,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
710,  18  L.  ed.  535;  Rountree  v.  Pur- 
sell,  11  Ind.  App.  522.  39  N.  E.  747; 
2  Bl.  Comm.  208.  Descent  in  this 
country  is  traced  from  the  person  last 
entitled  to  the  land  regardless  of 
whether  he  was  actually  seised,  or 
whether  he  obtained  the  land  by  pur- 
chase or  descent.  4  Kent's  Comm. 
.388;  Kelly  v.  McGuire,  15  Ark.  555; 
Thompson  v.  Sanford,  13  Ga.  238; 
r.uion  V.  Burton,  Meigs  (Tenn.)  565. 
The  principle  that  inheritances  shall 
never  lineally  ascend  is  also  generally 
abrogated,  and  in  most  jurisdictions 
parents  and  grandparents  are  now 
])crmitted  to  inherit  in  case  there  be 
no  issue  of  the  intestate  owner.  Mag- 
ness  V.  Arnold,  31  Ark.  103;  Gard- 
ner V.  Collins,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.)  58,  7  L. 
ed.  347 ;  Leonard  v.  Lining,  57  Iowa 
648,  11  N.  W.  623;  Albee  v.  Vose,  76 
Maine  448 ;  McDowell  v.  Adams,  45 
Pa.  St.  430;  2  Bl.  Comm.  212.  This 
rule  of  descent  has  never  been  adopt- 
ed in  this  country,  so  that  for  all 
purposes  of  inheritance  no  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  males  and  fe- 
males   in    either    lineal    or    collateral 


lines  of  inheritance.  Albee  v.  Vose, 
76  Maine  448;  McCracken  v,  Rogers, 
6  Wis.  278. 

1^  However,  a  modified  preference 
for  males  may  be  found  in  some 
states  in  cases  where  the  estate  lias 
come  to  the  intestate  by  purchase.  In 
such  cases  it  passes  first  to  those  of 
the  paternal  ancestral  line  in  prefer- 
ence to  those  of  the  maternal  kin  in 
the  same  degree.  Kountz  v.  Davis, 
34  Ark.  590;  Magee  v.  Doe,  9  Fla. 
382 ;  In  re  Kane's  Estate,  38  Alisc.  276, 
n  N.  Y.  S.  874;  Wright  v.  Wright. 
100  Tenn.  313,  45  S.  W.  672.  In  other 
states  no  preference  is  given  to  tbi- 
male  line,  but  where  the  estate  cami- 
to  the  intestate  in  any  manner  other 
than  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  it  is 
divided  into  two  equal  parts  and 
given  one  part  each  to  the  paternal 
and  maternal  line,  and  on  failure  of 
either  the  other  takes  the  whole  es- 
tate.   Murphy  V.  Henrj',  35  Ind.  442. 

1"  This  rule  has  never  prevailed  in 
this  country,  but  instead,  all  descend- 
ants of  equal  degree  of  consanguinity 
to  the  ancestor,  take  in  equal  shares 
as  tenants  in  common,  regardless  of 
sex.  Jewell  v.  Jewell.  28  Cal.  232; 
Brewer  v.  Blougher,  14  Pet.  (U. 
S.)     178,    10    L.    ed.    408;    Jewell    v. 


105 


METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING  TITLE 


87 


(4)  That  the  lineal  descendants  in  infinitum  of  any  deceased 
person  shall  represent  their  ancestor,  that  is,  shall  stand  in  the 
same  place  as  the  person  himself  would  have  done  had  he  been 
hving/^ 

(5)  On  failure  of  lineal  descendants,  or  issue  of  the  person 
last  seised,  the  inheritance  shall  descend  to  his  collateral  relations, 
being  of  the  blood  of  the  first  purchaser,  subject  to  the  pre- 
ceding rules. ^^ 


Jewell,  28  Cal.  232 ;  Joslin  v.  Joslin 
(Iowa),  75  N.  W.  487;  Dodge  v. 
Beeler,  12  Kans.  524 ;  Benson  v.  Swan, 
60  Maine  160 ;  Benedict  v.  Beurmann, 
90  Mich.  396,  51  N.  W.  461 ;  Waldron 
V.  Taylor,  52  W.  Va.  284,  45  S.  E.  336. 
^~  2  Bl.  Comm.  217.  This  doctrine 
is  called  taking  by  right  of  represen- 
tation or  per  stirpes.  By  statute  in 
a  great  many  states  this  right  is  ex- 
tended to  grandchildren  and  more  re- 
mote descendants,  and  all  relations  of 
the  intestate,  whether  lineal  or  col- 
lateral. Under  such  statutes,  those 
nearest  in  degree  of  consanguinity  to 
the  intestate,  remaining  alive  at  his 
death,  are  taken  as  the  basis  of  dis- 
tribution. Cox  V.  Cox,  44  Ind.  368; 
Balch  V.  Stone,  149  Mass.  39,  20  N.  E. 
322.  When  all  the  heirs  are  in  the 
same  or  equal  degree  of  consanguin- 
ity to  the  intestate,  they  take  per  cap- 
ita, or  in  equal  shares.  Taylor  v. 
Cribbs,  174  Ala.  217,  56  So.  952; 
Baker  v.  Bourne,  127  Ind.  466,  26  N. 
E.  1078 ;  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed, 
44  Ind.  App.  635,  88  N.  E.  1080 ;  Snow 
V.  Snow,  ill  Mass.  389;  Staubitz  v. 
Lambert,  71  Minn.  11,  73  N.  W.  511; 
Fisk  V.  Fisk,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  195,  46  Atl. 
538;  Barber  v.  Brundage,  50  App. 
Div.  123,  63' N.  Y.  S.  347;  Ellis  v. 
Harrison,  140  N.  Car.  444,  53  S.  E. 
299;  In  re  Cremer's  Estate,  156  Pa. 
St.  40,  26  Atl.  782.  But  if  the  heirs 
are  in  different  degrees  of  consan- 
guinity, the  more  remote  take  per 
stirpes,  or  by  representation.  Kilgore 
V.  Kilgore,  127  Ind.  276,  26  N.  E.  56 ; 
Ernest  v.  Freeman,  129  Mich.  271,  88 
N.  W.  636;  In  re  Shedaker,  74  N.  J. 
Eq.  802,  70  Atl.  659;  In  re  Dunning. 
48  Misc.  482,  96  N.  Y.  S.  1110;  Pond 
V.  Bergh,  10  Paige  (N.  Y.)  140;  In 
re  Person's  Appeal,  74  Pa.  St.  121  ; 
Haynes  v.  Walker,  111  Tenn.  106,  76 


S.  W.  902.  By  statute  in  some  states 
no  representation  shall  be  admitted 
among  collaterals  beyond  the  children 
of  brothers  and  sisters.  Campbell's 
Appeal,  64  Conn.  277,  29  Atl.  494,  24 
L.  R.  A.  667;  In  re  Schlosser,  116  N. 
Y.  S.  796;  Conant  v.  Kent,  130  Mass. 
178;  In  re  Rogers'  Estate,  131  Pa. 
St.  382,  18  Atl.  871. 

IS  2  Bl.  Comm.  220.  This  rule  is 
now  altered  so  that  the  estate  goes  to 
the  lineal  ascendants,  if  any,  in  pref- 
erence to  collateral  relations.  4  Kent 
Comm.  392 ;  Magness  v.  Arnold,  31 
Ark.  103 ;  Hillhouse  v.  Chester,  3  Day 
(Conn.)  166,  3  Am.  Dec.  265;  Leon- 
ard V.  Lining,  57  Iowa  648,  11  N.  W. 
623 ;  Bolinger  v.  Beacham,  81  Kans. 
746,  106  Pac.  1094;  King  v.  Middles- 
bough  Town  &c.  Co..  106  Kv.  73,  50 
S.  W.  37,  1108,  20  Ky.  L.  1859.  In 
so  far  as  this  canon  requires  the  heir 
to  be  of  the  blood  of  the  first  pur- 
chaser, it  may  be  said  to  have  but 
limited  application  in  this  country,  as 
here  regard  is  generally  had  only  to 
the  immediate  descent  from  the  an- 
cestor last  seised.  Murphy  v.  Henr}', 
35  Ind.  442.  Those  having  the  blood 
of  the  last  ancestor  may  inherit,  and 
the  word  ancestor  in  this  connection 
means  the  person  from  whom  the  im- 
mediate descent  is  had  and  not  the 
first  purchaser.  This  includes  the 
half,  as  well  as  the  whole  blood  for 
by  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  it  is 
merely  intended  to  mark  the  class  in 
which  the  heirs  are  to  be  found.  In 
re  Ranck's  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St.  98.  4 
Atl.  924 ;  Miller  v.  Speer,  38  N.  J.  Eq. 
567;  Brower  v.  Hunt,  18  Ohio  St. 
311.  By  this  rule  an  inheritance 
could  not  pass  in  the  ascending  line, 
except  only  through  some  collateral 
ascendant;  Smith  v.  Gaines,  35  N.  J. 
Eq.  65. 


§    88  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  106 

(6)  The  collateral  heirs  of  the  person  last  seised  must  be  the 
next  collateral  kinsman  of  the  whole  blood/^ 

(7)  In  cuUatcral  inheritance  male  stock  shall  be  preferred  to 
female,  unless  where  the  lands  have  in  fact  descended  from  a 
female.'*^ 

§  88.  Rules  of  descent  under  the  civil  law. — Under  the 
civil-law  rules  of  descent  three  orders  of  succession  were  created : 
(1)  That  of  descendants,  (2)  that  of  ascendants,  and  (3)  that 
of  collaterals.  The  descendants  of  an  intestate  ancestor,  whether 
adoptive  or  natural,  or  whether  emancipated  or  not,  succeed  to 
his  estate,  without  any  distinction  as  to  sex  or  degree,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  the  other  relatives  of  such  ancestor.  If  such  de- 
scendants were  all  in  the  first  degree  of  relationship  to  the  an- 
cestor they  shared  the  succession  per  capita,  otherwise  it  passed 
per  stirpes.  If  such  ancestor  left  no  such  descendants  the  inheri- 
tance belonged  to  the  heirs  of  the  ascending  line,  with  the  excep- 
tion that  where  there  were  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole 
blood  of  such  intestate  surviving  him,  the  inheritance  was  divided 
between  them,  and  the  heirs  of  the  ascending  line  share  and  share 
alike.  But  if  there  were  no  brothers  or  sisters  of  the  whole  blood, 
the  nearest  ascendant  took  the  entire  estate  to  the  exclusion  of 

i»2  BI.  Comm.  224.     This  rule  of  42,  Utah  40,  129  Pac.  360;  Stevenson 

exckiding   the   half    blood    is    not    in  v.  Gray,  46  Ind.  App.  412,  89  N.  E. 

harmony  with  the  spirit  of  our  laws  509;  Stockton  v.  Frazier,  81  Ohio  St. 

of  descent,  and  has  never  been  adopt-  221,  90  N.  !•:.  168,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

ed   by   any   of    the    states.      In    some  603n.    But,  generally  speaking,  no  dis- 

states,  however,  a  preference  is  given  crimination  is  made  against  those  of 

to  kinsmen  of  the  whole  blood  in  the  the  half   blood,   and   they   will,   as   a 

amount   of    the    estate   to   be   taken;  rule,  inlierit  equally  with  those  of  the 

Petty  v.    Malier,    15    B.   Mon.    ( Ky.)  whole  blood  in  the  same  degree.   Car- 

591 ;  Hulme  v.  Montgomery,  31  Miss,  ter  v.   Carter,  234   111.  507,  85   N.    K. 

105;_Marlow  v.   King,   17   Tex.   177;  292;  Pond  v.  Irwin,  113  Ind.  243.  15 

and  in  others  the  half  blood  is  post-  N.   E.  272 ;    Finley  v.   Abncr,  4   Ind. 

poned  in  the  inheritance  to  those  of  Terr.  386,  69  S.  W.  911 ;  Tays  v.  Rob- 

the  whole  blood.   Chirac  v.  Rcinecker,  inson,  68  Kans.  53,  74  Pac.  623 ;  Lar- 

2    Pet.    (U.    S.)    613,    7    L.    cd.    538;  rabee  v.  Tucker,  116  Mass.  562 ;  Stark 

Keller  v.  Harper,  64  Md.  74,  1  Atl.  65 ;  v.  Stark,  55  Pa.  St.  62. 

Stark  V.  Stark,  55  Pa.  St.  62.    Where  20  b1.   Comm.  234.    This   rule  does 

the    statute   provides    that    collateral  not  obtain  in  this  country.    Generally, 

kindred  of  the  half  blood  take  equally  no   preference,   even   among  collater- 

with  those  of  tlie  whole  blood,  except  als,  is  given  on  account  of  sex.     But 

where  the  estate  came  to  the  intestate  in    some   states   male   ascendants   are 

by  gift,   devise,   or   descent   from   an  given  preference  over  female  ascend- 

ancestor,    such    kindred    of    the    half  ants.    Kountz  v.  Davis,  34  Ark.  590; 

blood   share  only  where  they  are  of  In  re  Kane's  Estate,  38  Misc.  276,  11 

the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  N.  Y.  S.  874;  Wright  v.  Wright,  100 

the  estate  came.    Gardner  v.  Gardner  Tenn.  313,  45  S.  W.  672. 


J 


107  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING  TITLE  §    89 

those  more  remote.  If  ascendants  of  the  same  degree  were  part 
in  the  paternal  hne  and  part  in  the  maternal,  the  inheritance  was 
given  in  equal  parts  to  each  line  without  any  regard  as  to  whether 
there  were  more  in  the  same  degree  in  the  one  line  than  in  the 
other.  Each  line  took  one-half  the  inheritance.  In  the  absence  of 
heirs,  either  in  the  ascending  or  descending  line,  the  collateral 
heirs  succeeded.  First,  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole-blood, 
and  then  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood.  By  right  of  rep- 
resentation the  children  of  a  deceased  brother  or  sister  were  en- 
titled to  the  share  of  their  deceased  parent,  but  this  right  of  rep- 
resentation did  not  extend  to  grandchildren  of  such  deceased 
brother  or  sister.  If  there  were  no  brothers  or  sisters  of  either 
the  whole  or  the  half-blood,  or  children  of  such  brothers  or  sis- 
ters, the  inheritance  passed  to  the  nearest  relation  in  whatever 
degree,  and  where  there  were  several  of  the  same  degree  they  took 
such  inheritance  per  capita,  not  per  stirpes."^ 

§  89.  Consanguinity  and  affinity. — Consanguinity  is  the 
connection  or  relation  of  persons  descended  from  the  same  stock 
or  common  ancestor.^'  It  is  having  in  common  the  blood  of 
such  ancestor. ^^  Some  portion  of  the  blood  of  such  common  an- 
cestor flows  through  the  veins  of  all  his  descendants,  however 
mixed  such  blood  may  be  with  that  of  others,  and  constitutes  the 
kindred  by  blood  between  any  two  of  such  descendants.  Such 
blood  relationship  is  of  two  kinds,  either  lineal  or  collateral. 
Lineal  consanguinity  is  that  which  subsists  between  persons, "one 
of  whom  is  in  a  direct  line  from  the  other,  either  upward  in  direct 
ascending  line  as  from  son  to  father  or  grandfather,  or  down- 
ward in  the  direct  descending  line,  as  from  father  to  son  or 
grandson ;  and  in  every  generation  in  lineal,  direct  consanguinity 
constitutes  a  different  degree,  reckoning  either  upward  or  down- 
ward."* Collateral  consanguinity,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  which 
subsists  between  persons  who  are  lineally  descended  from  the  same 
common  ancestor,  but  not  from  each  other."^ 

In  considering  this  subject  of  consanguinity  care  should  be 

21118.    127   Justinian,    Sanders'    In-  (N.  Y.)  495;  Blodget  v.  Brinsmaid,  9 

stitutes  388.  Vt.  27. 

22  State  V.  DeHart.  109  La.  570.  33  24  Brown  v.  Baraboo.  90  Wis.  1d1, 
So.  605;   Farmers'   Loan   &c.   Co.   v.  62  N.  W.  921,  30  L.  R.  A.  320. 
Iowa  Water  Co..  80  Fed.  467.  25  Oklahoma    Rev.    Laws    (1910)    § 

23  Holt  V.  Watson,  71  Ark.  87,  71  S.  8423 ;  McDowell  v.  Addams,  45  Pa. 
W.  262 ;  Sweezey  v.  Willis,  1  Bradf .  St.  430. 


§    90  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  108 

taken  not  to  confound  the  rules  for  ascertaining  the  degree  of 
kindred  with  the  rules  of  descent.  A  canon  of  descent  is  one 
thing,  a  rule  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  next  of  kin  is  another.-" 

Affinity  is  the  relationship  contracted  by  marriage  between  a 
husband  and  his  wife's  kindred  and  between  a  wife  and  her  hus- 
band's kindred,  in  contradistinction  from  relationship  by  consan- 
guinity or  blood. ^^  By  marriage  one  spouse  holds  by  affinity  the 
same  relation  to  the  kindred  of  the  other  that  the  other  holds  by 
consanguinity.  And  such  relationship  is  no  more  lost  by  the  dis- 
solution of  the  marriage  than  the  relationship  by  blood  i^  lost 
through  death. ^^  Relationship  by  affinity  ceases  w^ith  the  disso- 
lution of  the  marriage  creating  it,  except  so  far  as  the  children  of 
such  marriage  are  concerned.^"  But  there  is  no  affinity  between 
the  blood  relatives  of  the  husband  and  the  blood  relatives  of  the 
wife.'" 

While  the  words  "of  consanguinity"  import  the  same  as  the 
word  kindred, ^^  and  while  a  man's  kindred,  in  the  proper  sig- 
nification of  the  term,  means  such  persons  as  are  related  to  him  by 
the  ties  of  consanguinity, '^-  the  terms  must  not  be  taken  as  strictly 
synonymous,  as  the  word  kindred  is  given  a  broader  meaning 
that  may  include  relatives  in  law  and  by  affinity  or  even  by  adop- 
tion, as  well  as  those  by  blood. '^ 

§  90.  Fact  of  death. — One  can  not  take  the  property  of 
another  as  his  heir,  or  claim  a  succession  through  him,  without 
proof  of  the  death  of  such  other,  or  the  establishment  of  such 
facts  as  will  raise  a  presumption  of  his  death. ^*  The  claimant 
has  the  burden  of  proving  the  facts  necessary  to  sustain  his  right, 
including  the  death  of  the  alleged  intestate  or  of  facts  from 
which  his  death  may  be  legally  presumed. ^^ 

2"  Humphries    v.    Davis,    100    Ind.  ■''•'•  Leigh  v.  Leigh,  15  Ves.  92. 

274,  50  Am.  Rep.  788.  •''2  Wetter   v.   Walker,   62    Ga.    142; 

27  Farmers'  Loan  &c.  Co.  v.  Iowa  Farr  v.  Flood,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  24. 
Water  Co.,  80  Fed.  467;  Holt  v.  Wat-  33  Power  v.  Hafley,  85  Ky.  671,  4 
son,  71  Ark.  87,  71  S.  W.  262;  Ex  S.  W.  683;  Delano  v.  Bruerton,  148 
parte  Harris,  26  Fla.  11.  7  So.  1,  6  L.  Mass.  619,  20  N.  E.  308,  2  L.  R.  A. 
R.  A.  713,  23  Am.  St.  548;  Tegarden  698. 

V.  Phillips   (Ind.),  39  N.  E.  212.  ;••*  Boe  v.  Filleul,  26  La.  Ann.  126. 

28  Spear  v.  Robinson,  29  Maine  531  ;  ^^'  Hurdle  v.  Stockley,  6  Houst. 
Carman  v.  Newell,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.)  (Del.)  447;  Martin  v.  Roysc,  21  Ky. 
25 ;  Waterhouse  v.  Martin,  Peck,  L.  775,  52  S.  W.  1062 ;  Miller  v.  Mc- 
(Tenn.)  392.  Elwee,   12  La.  Ann.  476;  Johnson  v. 

2'' Trout  V.  Drawhorn,  57  Ind.  570.  Merithew,  80  Maine  111,  13  All.  132. 

•■'"Trout  V.  Drawhorn,  57  Ind.  570;  6  Am.  St.  162;  Schaub  v.  Griffin,  84 

Paddock  v.   Wells,  2  Barb.   Ch.    (N.  Md.  557,  36  Atl.  443;   In   re  Taylor, 

Y.)  331.  20  N.  Y.  S.  960. 


109  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    90 

Some  statutes  provide  that  where  a  person  has  been  absent  from 
his  last  place  of  residence  without  having  been  heard  from  for 
seven  years  by  those  who  would  naturally  have  heard  from  him 
if  he  had  been  alive,  and  where  diligent  and  ineffectual  search  has 
been  made  wherever  there  was  a  reasonable  probability  that  he 
could  be  found  or  information  leading  to  the  discovery  of  his 
whereabouts,  a  presumption  of  his  death  arises  and  authorizes 
letters  of  administration  upon  his  estate. ^°  There  is  no  pre- 
sumption as  to  the  time  of  death  within  the  seven  years,  and  in 
the  absence  of  proof  the  absentee  is  presumed  to  be  living  for 
seven  years  from  the  time  of  his  disappearance."  These  stat- 
utes have  a  limited  application  and  do  not  include  cases  lying  out- 
side the  letter  of  them,  and  in  cases  not  connected  wnth  admin- 
istration of  the  estates  of  absentees  the  common-law  rule  that  one 
is  not  presumed  dead  until  after  an  unexplained  absence  of  seven 
years  still  obtains. ^^^  It  is  within  the  power  of  a  state  to  provide 
for  the  administration  of  the  estates  of  persons  who  are  absent 
for  such  a  length  of  time  as  gives  rise  to  a  reasonable  presump- 
tion of  death,  and  while  probate  courts  possess  general  authority 
to  settle  estates  of  deceased  persons,  they  are  without  authority 
to  administer  the  property  of  living  persons. ^^  The  general  rule 
's.  that  letters  of  administration,  granted  upon  the  estate  of  a 
living  person,  are  absolutely  void,  and  it  makes  no  difference  if, 
through  his  absence  long  continued,  a  presumption  of  death  has 
arisen.  In  such  case  the  presumption  may  be  overthrow^n,  and  a 
decree  granting  letters  may  be  collaterally  impeached.*"  So  if 
any  person  presumed  to  be  dead  is,  in  fact,  alive,  any  distribution 
of  his  estate  to  those  who  would  be  entitled  to  it  if  he  were  dead 
would  be  void  and  would  not  affect  his  title. *^  Ordinarily,  how- 
ever, the  death  of  a  person  leaving  property  to  be  administered 
upon  is  a  matter  of  such  notoriety  that  proof  of  his  death  is  of 

"•>  Donovan   v.   Major.  253   111.    179,  198  U.  S.  458.  25  Sup.  Ct.  721,  49  L. 

97  N.  K.  231:  Policemen's  Benevolent  ed.  1125.  3  Ann.  Cas.  1121. 

Assn.  V.   Rvce.  213   111.  9,   72   N.   E.  ^o  Griffith  v.  Frazier,  8  Cranch   (U. 

764,   104  Am.   St.   190:   Henderson  v.  S.)  9.  3  L.  ed.  471:  Duncan  v.  Stew- 

Bonar,  11  Ky.  L.  219.  11   S.  W.  809;  art,   25   Ala.   408.   60  Am.   Dec.   527; 

Ksterlv's  Appeal,  109  Pa.  St.  222.  Jocluunsen   v.    Suflfolk    Sav.    Bank,   3 

•■•■  Schaub  V.  Griffin.  84  Md.  557.  36  Allen    (Mass.)    87;    Devlin    v.    Com- 

Atl.  443;   in   re   Mutual    Benefit   Co.,  monwealth.   101   Pa.   St.  273;  47  Am. 

174  Pa.  St.  1.  34  Atl.  283,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  710;  Fisk  v.  Norvel,  9  Tex.  13. 

814.  58  Am.  Dec.  128. 

3^  Connecticut   Alut.   L.   Ins.   Co.  v.  •*!  Stevenson    v.    Montgomery,    104 

Kins  47  Ind.  App.  587,  93  N.  E.  1046.  N.  E.  1075,  263  111.  93,  Ann.  Cas.  1915 

^•' Cunnius  v.  Reading  School  Dist.,  C,  112n. 


§    91  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  110 

easy  access  among  his  neighbors  and  relatives.  Whatever  may  be 
the  facts  presented  to  the  probate  court  in  support  of  death,  if 
deemed  sufficient  to  confer  jurisdiction,  is  prima  facie  evidence  of 
the  fact  of  such  death.  So  the  issue  of  letters  testamentary  or  of 
administration  is  taken  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  death  of 
the  person  named  therein  as  testator  or  intestate,  and  is  regarded 
as  the  highest  and  best  evidence  of  title  in  the  heir. 

§  91.  Fact  of  intestacy. — Intestacy  will  be  presumed  upon 
proof  of  death  and  heirship;'*-  but  this  presumption  may  be  re- 
butted.*^ Testacy  is  an  affirmative,  and  intestacy  a  negative, 
fact.**  And  one  whose  claim  to  heirship  is  uncontroverted  is  not 
called  upon  to  show  negatively  that  his  decedent  did  not  die 
testate.*""'  Where  an  unmarried  person  has  been  absent  for  such 
a  length  of  time  as  will  create  the  presumption  of  death,  he  will 
be  presumed  to  have  died  intestate. *''  Upon  the  failure  of  a  de- 
vise, the  land  descends  to  the  heirs  of  the  testator  as  intestate 
property.*^  A  statute  prescribing  rules  of  descent  when  a  person 
seised  of  lands  dies  "without  having  devised"  them,  does  not  ap- 
ply when  the  owner  dies  testate  as  to  the  lands. *^ 

§  92.  Title  by  purchase  classified. — For  convenience,  title 
by  purchase  may  be  divided  into:  (1)  Title  by  alienation,  and 
(2)  title  by  purchase  other  than  by  alienation.  Under  the  first 
division  are  included:  (1)  Alienation  by  deed  or  grant,  and  (2) 
alienation  by  devise.  Under  the  second  division,  or  title  by  pur- 
chase other  than  by  alienation,  may  be  classed  :  ( 1 )  Title  by 
escheat,  (2)  title  by  occupancy,  (3)  title  by  accretion,  (4)  title 
by  forfeiture,  (5)  title  by  abandonment,  (6)  title  by  estoppel, 
(7)  title  by  prescription,  (8)  and  title  by  adverse  possession.  In 
the  sections  following  these  various  methods  of  requiring  title 
by  purchase  will  be  briefly  considered,  and  only  those  general 

42  Sims  V.  Boynton,  32  Ala.  353,  70  435,  94  N.  E.  67,  21  Ann.  Cas.  229. 
Am.    Dec.   540 :    Murpliv  v.   Crowley,         ^4  Lyon  v.  Kain,  36  111.  362. 
140  Cal.  141,  7?,  Pac.  820;  Whitham,         ^s  Qiase  v.  Woodruff.  133  Wis.  555, 

V.  Ellsworth,  259  111.  243.   102  N.  E.  113  N.  W.  973,  126  Am.  St.  972. 
223;    McClanahan    v.    Williams.    136        4"  Barson    v.    Mulligan,    191    N.    Y. 

Ind.  30.  35  N.  E.  897 ;  Baxter  v.  Brad-  306,  84  N.  E.  75. 

bury.  20  Maine  260,  Z7  Am.  Dec.  49;         4"  Walker    v.    Bradbury,    15    Maine 

Barson  v.  Mulligan,  191  N.  Y.  306,  84  207;  In  re  Filbert,  195  Pa.  St.  295,  45 

N.  E.  75.  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  151.  Atl.  7?>2,. 

"Sielbeck    v.    Grothman,    248    111.        ■*'*  Morse  v.  White   (Mich.)   148  N. 

W.  970. 


J 


Ill  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING    TITLE  §    93 

features  that  the  examiner  of  titles  should  know  will  be  pre- 
sented. 

§  93.  Title  by  private  deed. — Conveyances  of  estates  of  in- 
heritance or  freehold  in  land,  or  of  any  interest  in  it  more  than 
for  a  short  term  of  years,  must  be  by  deed  in  writing;  and  this  is 
exjDressly  declared  by  statute  in  many  states,  and  is  implied  by 
the  statutory  provisions  of  other  states.  Statutes  providing  for 
the  conveyance  of  interests  in  real  property  by  deed  do  not  at- 
tempt to  define  a  deed  nor  to  state  all  its  essentials,  hence  resort 
must  be  had  to  the  common  law  for  a  definition  of  the  term.  The 
common-law  understanding  of  a  deed  "is  an  instrument  written 
in  parchment  or  paper,  whereunto  ten  things  are  necessarily  in- 
cident, viz. :  (1)  Writing;  (2)  parchment  or  paper;  (3  )  a  per- 
son able  to  contract;  (4)  by  a  sufificient  name;  (5)  a  person  able 
to  be  contracted  with;  (6)  by  a  sufficient  name;  (7)  a  thing 
to  be  contracted  for ;  (8)  apt  words  required  by  law ;  (9)  sealing; 
(10)  delivery."^''  While  the  word  "deed,"  at  common  law,  im- 
plied a  sealed  instrument,^*^  under  modern  statutes  the  seal  may  be 
dispensed  with.^^  The  word  "deed"  in  its  broadest  meaning  in- 
cludes all  varieties  of  sealed  instruments;  in  its  secondary  and 
more  common  meaning  it  signifies  a  writing  under  seal  conveying 
real  estate. ^^  In  some  jurisdictions  the  term  "deed"  embraces 
every  instrument  in  writing  by  which  any  real  estate  or  interest 
therein  is  created,  aliened,  mortgaged,  or  assigned,  or  by  which 
the  title  thereto  may  be  affected  in  law  or  equity,  except  last  wills 
and  leases  for  one  year  or  less.^^  A  deed  of  conveyance  is  not 
merely  evidence  of  a  gift  or  other  grant;  but  it  is  the  gift  or 
grant  itself,  and  ipso  facto  operates  to  transfer  or  convey  the 
title  of  the  property  described  to  the  donee  or  grantee. ^^  In  or- 
der for  an  instrument  to  be  good  as  a  deed  it  must  convey  a  pres- 
ent interest  in  the  property  attempted  to  be  conveyed.^^ 

«  Co.  Lit.  35b.  S2  Malsby  v.  Gamle,  61  Fla.  310.  54 

50  People  V.  Watkins.  106  Mich.  437,  So.  766;  Fisher  v.  Pender,  52  N.  Car. 

64  N.  W.  324;  Jackson  v.  Wood,  12  483. 

Johns.  (N.  Y.)  IZ;  McLeod  v.  Lloyd,  ^3  Solt  v.  Anderson,  71   Nebr.  826, 

43  Ore.  260,  71  Pac.  795.  74  Pac.  491.  99  N.  W.  678. 

s^Burk  V.   Johnson,    146  Fed.   209,  ^^Alferitz   v.   Arrivillaga,    143   Cal. 

76  C.  C.  A.  i67 ;  Tatum  v.  Tatum,  81  646,  11  Pac.  657. 

Ala.  388,   1   So.   195;  Atlanta,  &c.  R.  ss  Qivens  v.  Ott,  222  Mo.  395,   121 

Co.  V.  McKinney,  124  Ga.  929,  53  S.  S.  W.  2Z. 

E.  701,  6  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   436,  110 

Am.  St.  215. 


§    94  TITLES    AND    AliSTRACTS  112 

§  94.  Official  grants. — Official  grants  are  such  as  are 
made  by  state  or  federal  officers  acting  under  statutory  or  judi- 
cial authority,  and  which  do  not  dispose  of  public  property,  but 
transfer  title  from  one  private  person  to  another  without  the  co- 
operation of  the  former,  and  even  against  his  wish  in  certain 
cases.  They  are  illustrated  by  sales  under  execution ;  foreclosure 
sales ;  conveyances  by  guardians,  executors  and  administrators  un- 
der statutory  or  judicial  permission;  sales  for  non-payment  of 
taxes  and  assessments;  and  other  transfers  under  judicial  process, 
judgment  or  decree.  While  these  conveyances  are  variously 
termed  "judicial  sales,"  "involuntary  sales,"  etc.,  it  is  deemed 
proper  to  include  them  under  the  head  of  "official  grants"  to  dis- 
tinguish them  from  private  and  public  grants. 

The  transfer  of  real  estate  by  official  grant  is  sometimes  said 
to  be  an  involuntary  transfer  on  the  part  of  the  owner.  It  is 
true,  however,  that  when  such  owner  incurs  or  assumes  a  debt, 
he  impliedly  consents  to  or  authorizes  the  sale  of  his  property  on 
execution  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debt.  In  any  event  the 
validity  of  the  title  passed  by  such  sale  does  not  depend  upon  his 
mental  attitude,  but  upon  a  compliance  with  the  law  of  pro- 
cedure in  making  the  sale  and  transfer.  Title  by  official  grant 
will  be  discussed  at  some  length  in  subsequent  chapters,  as  great 
care  and  skill  must  be  exercised  by  both  abstracter  and  counsel  in 
dealing  with  them  as  muniments  of  title. 

§  95.  Public  grants. — A  direct  conveyance  of  public  lands 
from  the  state  or  federal  government  to  a  private  person  is 
usually  termed  a  "public  grant."  Such  conveyances  are  supposed 
to  rest  upon  a  different  foundation  from  that  of  private  convey- 
ances. They  emanate  from  the  sovereign  power,  according  to 
certain  rules  and  forms  of  proceeding  prescribed  by  itself  for  the 
regulation  of  its  own  action.  Such  a  grant  is  not  only  an  appro- 
priation of  the  land,  but  is  itself  a  perfect  title. ^^ 

Officers  are  appointed  and  commissioned  by  the  government 
for  the  express  purpose  of  conducting  and  supervising  all  the 
preliminary  proceedings  from  the  origin  to  the  consummation  of 
the  title;  and  when  these  incipient  measures  are  completed,  and 
the  grant  issued,  the  law  presumes  that  the  government  agents 
have  performed  their  duty  and  that  the  grant  is  valid. ^^     But  a 

■""'Green  v.  Liter,  8  Cranch  (U.  S.)         "Brush  v.  Ware,  16  Pet.    (U.  S.) 
229,  3  L.  ed.  545.  93,  10  L.  ed.  672. 


I 


113  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    96 

claimant  of  public  lands  acquires  no  vested  rights,  as  against  the 
sovereign,  until  all  the  prerequisites  for  the  acquisition  of  the  title 
have  been  complied  with.^*  Before  such  grants  can  be  made  the 
lands  must  be  surveyed  in  accordance  with  the  federal  laws,^''  un- 
less there  is  a  special  statute  to  the  contrary.*^" 

The  usual  method  by  which  the  sovereign  divests  itself  of  title 
to  public  lands  is  by  patent  issued  in  conformity  to  prescribed 
legal  formalities,  but  a  settler  who  has  entered  public  lands,  has 
from  such  entry,  an  inchoate  title,  which  is  in  legal  sense,  prop- 
erty, and  subject  to  defeat  only  by  his  failure  to  comply  with  the 
conditions  imposed  by  the  acts  of  congress. *^^  While  the  naked 
legal  title  remains  in  the  government  until  a  patent  is  issued,  the 
beneficial  ownership  or  equitable  title  is  vested  in  the  entryman 
from  the  time  he  receives  a  certificate  of  purchase  from  the  gov- 
ernment showing  full  payment  for  the  land.  When  such  patent 
is  issued,  it  does  not  convey  to  the  entryman  a  new  or  independent 
title  derived  from  such  entry  and  final  payment,  but  converts  the 
imperfect  or  equitable  title  into  a  perfect  legal  title. ^"  Also  a 
legislative  confirmation  of  a  claim  to  land  is  a  recognition  of  the 
validity  of  such  claim,  and  operates  as  effectually  as  a  grant  from 
the  government.*'^  The  sovereign  being  the  source  of  title  for 
all  lands,  the  original  grant  therefrom  is  the  first  link  in  the  chain 
of  title,  and  whatever  may  be  the  form  of  this  grant,  the  abstract 
should,  whenever  practicable,  begin  with  that  document. 

§  96.  Devise. — The  term  "devise"  means  primarily  a  di- 
viding or  division,  and  when  used  as  a  noun  denotes  a  gift  of 
real  property  by  will.  When  used  as  a  verb,  however,  it  de- 
notes the  act  of  disposing  of  real  property  by  will ;  and  when  used 
in  the  latter  sense  it  is  the  proper  term  to  be  used  in  a  will  to 
denote  a  gift  of  real  property.  Alienation  by  devise  is  secondary 
in  common  use  only  to  deeds  as  a  mode  of  transferring  title  to 
real  estate.  The  instrument  by  which  this  form  of  alienation  of 
land  is  effected  is  termed  a  will.     The  land  thus  alienated,  as 

58  Guthrie  v.   Beamer,  3  Okla.  652,  «<>  Carson  v.  Smith,  5  Minn.  78,  11 

41  Pac.  647.  Am.  Dec.  539. 

s«  Stark  V.  Starrs,  6  Wall.   (U.  S.)  "  Culbertson  Irr.  &c.  Co.  v.  Olan- 

402,  18  L.  ed.  925;  Rector  v.  Gaines,  der,  51  Nebr.  539,  71  N.  W.  298. 

19  Ark.  70 ;   Daniels  v.   Lansdale,  43  g2  Hagan   v.    Ellis,   39   Fla.   463,  22 

Cal.  41  (affirmed  100  U.  S.  113,  25  L.  So.  727.  63  Am.  St.  167. 

ed.  587).  63Langdean  v.  Hanes.  88  U.  S.  (21 

Wall.)  521,  22  L.  ed.  606. 

8 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    97  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  114 

well  as  the  title  thereto,  is  called  a  devise,  and  the  beneficiary 
named  in  the  instrument,  a  devisee.  The  will  is  a  legal  declara- 
tion of  the  testator's  intention  or  wish  respecting  what  shall  be 
done  after  his  death  touching  the  disposition  of  his  property.  It 
does  not  pass  a  present  interest  or  right  in  the  property,  but  such 
right  or  interest  takes  effect  only  at  his  death.  During  his  life- 
time it  is  entirely  inoperative;  in  other  words,  the  will  is  am- 
bulatory during  the  life  of  its  maker.  It  is  in  effect  reiterated 
as  his  will  at  each  moment  during  his  life.  It  will  be  distin- 
guished from  a  deed  in  that  the  latter  instrument  must  pass  a 
present  interest  in  the  land.  Whether,  therefore,  an  instrument 
be  a  deed  or  a  will,  depends  upon  whether  the  maker  intended 
the  estate  to  vest  before  his  death  and  upon  execution  of  the  in- 
strument, or  whether  he  intended  that  all  the  interest  and  estate 
should  take  effect  only  after  his  death.  If  the  former,  it  is  a 
deed;  if  the  latter,  a  will;  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  he  calls 
it  a  will  or  a  deed,  the  instrument  will  operate  according  to  its 
legal  effect."*  Where  the  instrument  is  in  the  form  of  a  deed, 
but  possession  and  enjoyment  is  postponed  until  after  the  death 
of  the  grantor,  it  is  a  deed  nevertheless"."  While  alienati'on  by 
devise  is  an  effective  mode  of  transferring  title  to  real  estate,  yet 
such  title  is  subject  to  be  defeated  by  a  sale  to  make  assets  for 
the  payment  of  the  testator's  debts  and  the  expenses  of  adminis- 
tration. 

§  97.  Title  by  estoppel  in  general. — Title  by  estoppel  "is 
where  equity,  and  in  some  cases  the  law,  in  order  to  accomplish 
the  purposes  of  justice  which  can  not  be  otherwise  reached,  drav»'s 
certain  conclusions  from  the  acts  of  one  party  in  favor  of  another, 
in  respect  to  the  ownership  of  lands,  which  it  does  not  allow  the 
first  to  controvert  or  deny.'"'''  It  arises  from  the  fact  that  he 
who  would  otherwise  be  the  owner  of  property  is  precluded  by 
his  own  act  or  representation  to  assert,-  as  against  another  claim- 
ant, his  right  or  interest  therein.  The-  doctrine  of  estoppel  does 
not  operate  to  force  a  title  on  one  against  his  will.*'^  But  it  is 
generally  held  that  when  a  real  estoppel  affecting  land  is  estab- 
lished, it  does  transfer  the  title   from  the  person  estopped,   in 

64  Adair  v.  Craig,   135  Ala.  332,  33        C63  Wash.  Real  Prop.  §  70. 
So.  902;   Wall  v.  Wall,  30  Miss.  91,         "Tucker  v.   Clarke,  2   Sandf.   Cli. 
64  Am.  Dec.  149.  (N.  Y.)  96. 

"West  V.  Wright,  115  Ga.  277,  41 
S.  E.  602. 


115  METHODS   OF    ACQUIRING    TITLE  §    98 

such  manner  that  the  person  estopped  can  not  subsequently  trans- 
fer to  another  any  substantial  interest.*^^  "The  vital  principle  of 
estoppel  is  that  he  who  by  his  language  or  conduct  leads  another 
to  do  what  he  would  not  otherwise  have  done  shall  not  subject 
such  person  to  loss  or  injury  by  disappointing  the  expectations 
upon  which  he  acted.  Such  a  change  of  position  is  strictly  for- 
bidden. It  involves  fraud  and  falsehood,  and  the  law  abhors 
both.  This  remedy  is  always  applied  so  as  to  promote  the  ends 
of  justice.  It  is  available  only  for  protection,  and  can  not  be  used 
as  a  weapon  of  assault.  It  accomplishes  that  which  ought  to  be 
done  between  man  and  man,  and  is  not  permitted  to  go  beyond 
that  limit.  It  is  akin  to  the  principle  involved  in  the  limitation 
of  actions,  and  does  its  work  of  justice  and  repose  where  the 
statute  can  not  be  invoked.""^  Like  the  office  of  injunctions  in 
equity,  estoppel  at  law  precludes  rights  that  can  not  be  asserted 
consistently  with  good  faith  and  justice,  and  prevents  wrongs  for 
which  there  might  be  no  adequate  remedy.^"  The  relation  of  the 
parties  must  be  such  that  the  estoppel  may  be  mutual."  It  fol- 
lows from  the  very  principle  on  which  the  whole  doctrine  of 
estoppel  rests,  that  they  operate  neither  in  favor  of  nor  against 
strangers,  but  affect  only  the  parties  thereto  and  their  privies, 
either  in  blood,  in  estate,  or  in  law;  and  hence  a  stranger  can 
neither  take  advantage  of,  nor  be  bound  by,  an  estoppel.  This 
principle  applies  equally  to  estoppels  by  deed,  by  record,  and  in 
pais.'^ 

§  98.  Estoppel  by  record. — By  estoppel  by  record  is 
meant  the  preclusion  by  a  party  to  deny  the  truth  of  matters  set 
forth  in  judicial  or  legislative  records.  A  judgment,  sentence, 
order,  or  decree  passed  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction, 
which  creates  or  charges  a  title  or  any  interest  in  an  estate,  is  not 
only  final  as  to  the  parties  themselves,  and  all  claiming  under 
them,  but  furnishes  conclusive  evidence  to  all  mankind  that  the 
right  or  interest  belongs  to  the  party  to  whom  the  court  ad- 

^-^  Contra  Salisbury  Savings  Soc.  v.  "<>  Van    Rensselaer    v.    Kearney,    11 

Cuttuig,    50    Conn.     113;     Thalls    v.  How.    (U.    S.)    297,    13   L     ed     703- 

Smith,    139   Ind.   496.   39   N.   E.    154;  Buckingham  v.  Hanna,  2  Ohio  551.    ' 

Ayer  v.  Philadelphia  &  Boston  B.  Co.,  -i  Wilson   v.    Holt,   91    Ala.  204    8 

159  Mass.  84,  34  N.  E.  177 ;  Mutual  So.  794. 

Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corey,  135  N.  Y.  326,  ^2  Simpson   v.    Pearson,   31    Ind.    1. 

31  N.  E.  1095.  99  Am.  Dec.  577. 

«»  Dickerson  v.  Colgrove,  100  U.  S. 
578,  25  L.  ed.  618. 


§    99  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  116 

judges  it.''^  So  the  recital  in  the  record  (^f  a  court  imparts  abso- 
lute verity,  and  all  parties  thereto  are  estopped  from  denying  its 
truth." 

The  general  rule  is  that  a  judgment  record  is  evidence  by  way 
of  estoppel  in  subsequent  actions,  only  of  such  facts  as  were 
legitimately  within  the  issues  to  ]yc  tried  therein  as  a  part  of  the 
merits  of  the  case,  and  either  expressly,  or  by  necessary  implica- 
tion, determined.^''  To  constitute  an  estoppel  by  a  former  judg- 
ment, the  precise  point  w^hich  is  to  create  the  estoppel  must  have 
been  put  in  issue  and  decided;  and  this  must  appear  from  the 
record  alone.^"  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  effect  of  a-  former 
adjudication  extends  to  all  the  issues  which  might  have  been 
raised  and  litigated  in  the  case.""  The  estoppel  of  a  judgment 
binds  the  privies  as  well  as  the  parties.'^*  A  party  to  a  suit  may  be 
estopped  by  the  averments  of  his  pleadings. "°  A  decree  alloting 
dower  to  a  widow  in  all  the  lands  of  which  her  husband  died 
seised  will  estop  her  from  subsequently  asserting  a  parol  trust 
in  her  favor  in  any  such  lands. ^°  Estoppel  by  judgment  is  merely 
an  arbitrary  arrangement  based  on  no  other  principle  than  politi- 
cal necessity. 

§  99.  Estoppel  by  deed. — An  estoppel  by  deed  is  that 
which  arises  from  the  covenants  or  recitals  in  a  deed,  by  which 
the  grantor  makes  it  appear  that  he  is  the  rightful  owner  of  the 
estate  therein  described ;  in  such  case  if  the  grantor  has  no  title 
at  the  time  of  the  conveyance,  but  afterwards  acquires  title,  either 
by  descent  or  purchase,  he  is  precluded  from  asserting  the  same 
against  his  grantee,  he  being  estopped  to  deny  that  he  had,  at  the 
time  when  he  executed  the  deed,  the  title  or  estate  descriljed  in 
such  deed.^^     Of  this  form  of  estoppel  it  has  been  said:     "No 

"  Prince  v.  Antle.   90  Ky.   138,   13  "  Donnell  v.  Wright,  147  Mo.  639, 

S.  W.  436,   1 1   Ky.   L.  927 ;   Grevem-  49  S.  W.  874. 

berg  V.  Bradford;  44  La.  400,  10  So.  ^s  Cox  v.   Crockett,   93   Va.  50,   22 

786.  S.  E.  840. 

74  Ex  parte  Rice,   102  Ala.  671,   15  "<' Winn  v.  Strickland,  34  Fla.  610, 

So.  450.  16  So.  606. 

75Fairman  v.  Bacon,  8  Conn.  418;  so  Boyd  v.  Redd,   118  N.  Car.  680, 

Woodgate   v.    Fleet,   44   N.   Y.    1,    11  24  S.  E.  429. 

Abb.  Prac.   (N.  S.)  41.  si  Croft  v.  Thornton.  125  Ala.  391, 

7«  Wixon  V.  Devine,  91  Cal.  477,  27  28    So.   84 ;   Watkins   v.    Wassell.    15 

Pac.  777;   Williams     v.     Hacker.     16  Ark.  73;  Klumpke  v.  Baker,  68  Cal. 

Colo.  113,  26  Pac.  143;  Smith  v.  Slier-  559,  10  Pac.  197;  Parker  v.  Jones,  57 

wood,  4  Conn.  276,  10  Am.  Doc.  143;  Ga.  204;  Owen  v.  Brookport,  208  111. 

Stephens  v.  Motl,  82  Tex.  81,   18  S.  35,  69  N.  E.  952;  Glendinning  v.  Su- 

W.  99.  perior  Oil  Co.,  162  Ind.  642,  70  N.  E. 


117  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    99 

person  can  be  allowed  to  dispute  his  own  solemn  deed,  which  is 
therefore  conclusive  against  him,  and  those  claiming  under  him, 
even  as  to  the  facts  recited  in  it.  The  general  rule  is  that  an  in- 
denture estops  all  w^ho  are  parties  to  it,  while  a  deed  poll  only 
estops  the  party  who  executes  it,  since  it  is  his  sole  language  and 
act."^^  An  estoppel  by  recital  binds  the  grantor  and  all  who  take 
his  estate,  privies  in  blood,  privies  in  estate,  and  privies  in  law.^^ 
The  recital  does  not  bind  persons  who  are  not  privies  of  the 
grantor,  such  as  claimants  by  adverse  or  prior  title,  or  the  gran- 
tor's creditors.**  A  party  to  a  deed  must  be,  sui  juris,  competent 
to  make  an  effectual  contract,  to  be  estopped  by  a  recital.®^  In  a 
deed  by  a  corporation,  a  recital  by  the  person  who  executes  it  in 
behalf  of  the  corporation,  that  he  was  duly  authorized  to  execute 
it,  estops  him  to  deny  that  he  was  so  authorized.**"  But,  even  as 
between  the  parties,  recital  is  not  binding  when  the  proceeding 
is  really  collateral  to  the  deed  and  the  title  thereby  conveyed.  In 
such  case  the  facts  recited  may  be  disputed.^'^  A  conveyance  is 
not  affected  by  a  false  recital  made  by  the  same  grantor  on  the 
same  day  in  conveying  an  adjoining  lot  to  a  different  grantee.** 
A  recital,  to  have  the  effect  of  an  estoppel,  must  be  a  distinct 
recital  of  particular  facts,  and  not  a  recital  in  general  terms. 
Where  a  distinct  statement  of  a  particular  fact  is  made  in  a 
recital,  and  the  parties  act  with  reference  to  that  recital,  it  is 
not,  as  between  them,  competent  for  the  party  bound  to  deny  the 
recital.*^    A  recital,  to  operate  as  an  estoppel,  must  also  be  clear 

976;  Dickerson  v.  Talbot,  53  Ky.  60;  47  S.  E.  312;  Shepherd  v.  Kahle,  120 

Benton  v.  Sentell,  50  La.  Ann.  869,  24  Wis.  57.  97  N.  W.  506 ;  Balch  v.  Arn- 

So.  297 ;    Williams    v.    Thurlow,    31  old,  9  Wyo.  17,  59  Pac.  434. 

Maine   392;    Williams    v.    Peters,    72  ^2  Shep.   Touch.  53. 

Md.  584,  20  Atl.  175 ;  Dye  v.  Thomp-  ss  Dqc  v.  Errington,  6  Bing.  N.  Cas. 

son,  126  Mich.  597,  85  N.  W.  1113;  79;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Benning,  4  Cr. 

Kaiser  v.  Earhart,  64  Miss.  492.  1  So.  C.  C.  81. 

635;  Jewell  v.   Porter,    11    Post.    (N.  »*  De  Farges  v.  Ryland,  87  Va.  404, 

H.)  34;  Moore  v.  Rake,  26  N.  J.  L.  12  S.  E.  805,  24  Am.  St.  659;  West 

584;  Jackson  v.  Winslow,  9  Cow.  (N.  v.   Pine,  4  Wash.    (U.   S.)    691,  Fed. 

Y.)    13;    Hallyburton    v.    Slagle,    130  Cas.  No.  17423. 

N.  Car.  482,  41  S.  E.  877 ;  Broadwell  s^  Bank  of   America  v.  Banks,   101 

V.  Phillips,  30  Ohio  St.  255 ;  Taggart  U.  S.  240,  25  L.  ed.  850. 

V.  Risley,  3  Ore.  306 ;  Wingo  v.  Par-  kg  gtow  v.   Wyse,  7   Conn.  214,    18 

ker,  19  S.  Car.  9 ;  Johnson  v.  Branch,  Am.  Dec.  99. 

9  S.  Dak.  116,  68  N.  W.  173;  Burkitt  "Bank  of  America  v.   Banks.    101 

V.  Twyman.    (Tex.  Civ.  App.)   35   S.  U.  S.  240,  25  L.  ed.  850. 

W.  421;  Raines  v.  Walker,  77  Va.  92;  ^^»  Bay  v.  Pasner   (Md.)  29  At!.  11. 

Walker  v.  Arnold,  71  Vt.  263,  44  Atl.  so  Carpenter  v.   Duller,  8   Mees.   & 

351 ;  Clark  v.  Lumbert,  55  W.  Va.  512,  W.  209. 


§    99  TITLES    AND    AP.STRACTS  118 

and  witlioiit  ambiguity,""  and  the  instrument  must  be  so  executed 
as  to  be  binding  on  1)oth  parties. "^ 

If  one  having  no  title  to  land  conveys  it  with  covenants  of 
warranty,  and  this  is  duly  recorded,  and  afterwards  the  grantor 
acquires  title  to  the  land,  the  estoppel  by  which  he  is  bound  under 
the  covenants  is  turned  into  a  good  estate  in  interest  in  the 
grantee,  so  that  by  operation  of  law  the  title  is  considered  as 
vested  in  him  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  conveyed  to 
the  grantor  before  he  executed  the  deed.  The  grantor  is  estopped 
to  say  he  was  not  then  seised.  Then,  if  the  grantor  executes 
another  conveyance,  and  this  and  the  deed  by  which  the  grantor 
acquired  his  title  are  both  recorded  together,  which  grantee  has 
the  better  title  ?  The  estoppel  binds  not  only  the  grantor  and  his 
heirs,  but  his  assigns  as  well.  A  second  grantee  is  therefore 
estopped  to  aver  that  the  grantor  v\'as  not  seised  at  the  time  of 
his  making  the  first  conveyance,  and  that  conveyance  being  first 
recorded  must  have  priority."^  But  if  a  mortgagor  has  title  at  the 
time  of  executing  two  mortgages,  the  fact  that  one  contains  cove- 
nants of  warranty  does  not  give  it  priority  over  the  other  which 
contains  no  such  covenants,  if  the  latter  be  first  filed  for  record.''^ 

A  quitclaim  deed  or  other  deed  without  w'arranty  does  not  have 
the  effect  of  estopping  the  grantor  from  setting  up  a  superior  right 
and  title  subsequently  acquired  from  another  source. "'^  To  sus- 
tain a  deed  made  before  the  grantor  acquires  title  is  certainly  a 
violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  registry  system,  under  which  a  record 
is  notice  only  to  subsequent  purchasers  and  incumbrancers  in  the 
Hne  of  the  title  to  which  the  recorded  deed  belongs.  It  has  been 
insisted,  therefore,  w^ith  much  force,  that  a  second  grantee,  under 
a  deed  made  after  the  grantor  had  acquired  title  and  recorded 
his  deed  to  himself,  should  be  preferred  to  the  first  grantee, 
w^hose  deed  the  second  grantee,  in  following  the  title  back  to  the 

^0  Palmer  v.   Ekins,  2    Ld.    Raym.  440;  Semon  v.  Terhune,  40  N.  J.  Eq. 

1550.  364,  2  Atl.   18;   Crane  v.  Turner,  67 

81  Chicago   &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Keegan,  N.  Y.  437;  Philly  v.  Sanders,  11  Ohio 

152  111.  413,  39  N.  E.  33.  St.  490,  78  Am.  Dec.  316;  Jarvis  v. 

»2  Christy  v.  Dana,  34  Cal.  548,  42  Aikens,    25    Vt.   635.      See,    however, 

Cal.  174;  Salisbury  Sov.  Soc.  v.  Cut-  White  &  Tudor's  Lead.    Cases  in  Eq. 

ting.   50   Conn.    113;    Boone  v.   Arm-  4th  Am.  ed.  Vol.  2,  pt,  p.  212. 

strong,    87    Ind.    168 ;    Warburton    v.  "^  Vandercook    v.    Baker,    48    Iowa 

Mattox,  Morris   (Iowa)   367;  Pike  v.  199. 

Galvin,  29  Maine  183.  30  Maine  539;  o*  Smith    v.    Pollard,    19    Vt.    272; 

Knight  V.  Tha3'er,     125     Mass.     25 ;  Doswell    v.    Buchanan,    3    Leigh   365, 

Bramlett  v.  Roberts,  68  Miss.  325,  10  (Va.)   23  Am.  Dec.  280. 
So.  56;  Gotham  v.  Gotham,  55  N.  H. 


119  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    100 

time  his  grantor  acquired  title,  would  not  find  of  record.  In  this 
view  of  the  question,  a  subsequent  purchaser  or  creditor  is  not 
bound  to  take  notice  of  a  conveyance  not  lying  in  the  line  of 
title,  though  actually  recorded ;  and  he  is  not  bound  to  search  for 
conveyances  as  against  his  grantor  previous  to  the  time  when  the 
grantor  obtained  his  title  to  the  land."*^  "A  recorded  deed  by  one 
who  has  no  title,  but  who  afterwards  acquires  the  title  by  re- 
corded deed,  is  not  constructive  notice  to  a  subsequent  purchaser 
in  good  faith  from  the  common  grantor.  We  think  when  he 
searches  till  he  finds  the  deed  by  which  his  grantor  acquires  the 
title,  he  is  not  bound  to  look  for  deeds  made  prior  to  that  time. 
Such  prior  deeds  are  not  'in  the  line  of  title,'  as  that  term  is  used 
by  conveyancers  and  searchers."^"  But  notwithstanding  the  ob- 
jections, the  title  by  estoppel  in  such  cases  is  sometimes  sustained ; 
and  if  a  purchaser  fails  to  examine  the  record,  to  ascertain 
whether  the  grantor  had  made  a  conveyance  prior  to  the  time 
of  receiving  and  recording  the  conveyance  to  himself,  he  runs  the 
risk  of  acquiring  an  imperfect  title. ^^ 

§  100.  Estoppel  in  pais. — The  doctrine  of  estoppel  in  pais 
is  that,  one  can  not  deny  the  existence  of  the  state  of  facts  which 
he,  or  one  in  privity  with  him,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
or  with  the  duty  of  knowing  the  facts,  has  asserted  to  be  true,  or 
where  he  has  by  false  representations,  intended  to  deceive,  or  by 
silence  when  under  a  duty  to  speak,  or  by  any  other  acquiescence, 
after  discovering  the  right,  or  by  conduct  calculated  to  mislead, 
induced  another  to  act,  or  refrain  from  acting,  to  his  prejudice.^** 

95  Prince  v.  Case.  10  Conn.  381,  27  372;    Buckingham  v.   Hanna,  2  Ohio 

Am.  Dec.  675  ;  Salisbury  Sav.  Soc.  v.  551. 

Cutting,  50  Conn.  113,  and  note  122;  ss  Crawford    v.    Engram    157    Ala. 

Way  V.  Arnold,  18  Ga.  181 ;  Farmers'  314.  47  So.  712 ;  Waits  v.  Moore.  89 

Loan  &c.  v.  Maltby,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.)  Ark.  19,  115  S.  W.  931;  Hancock  v. 

361 ;    Woods   v.    Farmere,    7    Watts,  King,  133  Ga.  734,  66  S.  E.  949 ;  Se- 

(Pa.)   382;  M'Lanahan  v.  Reeside,  9  berg  v.   Iowa   Trust  &c.    Bank,     141 

Watts  (Pa.)  508;  Calder  v.  Chapman,  Iowa  99,    119   N.   W.   378;   Criley  v. 

52  Pa.  St.  359,  91  Am.  Dec.  163.    See  Cassel,  144  Iowa  685,  123  N.  W.  348 ; 

also  Rawle  on  Covenants,  4th  ed.  428 ;  Schott  v.  Linscott,  80  Kans.  536,  103 

Bigelow  on  Estoppel,  331 ;  McCusker  Pac.    997 ;    Conley    v.    Murdock,    106 

V.  McEvey,  9  R.  I.  528,  11  Am.  Rep.  Maine  266.   76   Atl.  682;    Barbieri   v. 

295;  10  R.  1.606.  Messner,    106   Minn.    102    118   N.   W. 

3«  Ford  V.  Unity  Church   Soc,  120  258 ;  Mason  v.  Ross,  75  N.  J.  Eq.  136, 

Mo.  498,  25   S.  W.  394,  2i  L.  R.  A.  71  Atl.  141  ;  In  re  Saunders.  129  App. 

561,  41  Am.  St.  711.     See  also  Crock-  Div.  406,  113  N.  Y.  S.  251 ;  Rothschild 

ett  V.  Maguirc,   10  Mo.  34;  Dodd  v.  v.  Title  Guarantee  &c.  Co.,  139  App. 

Williams,  3  Mo.  App.  278.  Div.  672,  124  N.  Y.  S.  441 ;  Falls  City 

»^  Digman   v.    McCollum,    47     Mo.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Watkins,  53  Ore.  212, 


5     100  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  120 

This  form  of  estoppel  is  based  upon  the  principle  that,  if  a  party, 
having  proprietary  rights,  so  conducts  himself  in  regard  thereto 
as  to  induce  another  party  to  act  in  regard  to  the  same  property 
upon  a  different  assumption  to  his  loss,  the  former  is  thereby 
estopped  from  asserting  the  contrary  thereafter,  because  his 
otherwise  innocent  conduct  would  not  only  be  changed  to  fraud, 
but  he  would  be  enabled  to  profit  thereby.  In  other  words,  where 
one  has  done  an  act  or  said  a  thing,  and  another  has  relied  on 
the  act  or  word,  as  he  had  a  right  to  do,  and  has  shaped  his  con- 
duct accordingly,  and  will  be  injured  if  the  former  can  repudiate 
the  act,  the  actor  or  speaker  is  estopped  from  so  doing.^" 

The  essential  elements  necessary  to  create  estoppel  in  pais  are 
that  the  party  sought  to  be  estopped  has  previously,  by  words, 
acts  or  conduct  made  representations  or  concealment  of  material 
facts,  inconsistent  wath  those  forming  the  basis  of  the  present 
claim ;  that  he  knew  or  should  have  known  the  falsity  of  such 
representations,  or  pretended  to  know  the  facts  when  he  did 
not  know  them ;  that  he  had  the  present  intent  to  influence 
the  conduct  of  another  thereby,  or  should  know  that  a  reasonably 
prudent  man  would  suppose  it  was  intended  to  be  acted  on ;  that 
the  latter  w^as  ignorant  of  the  true  facts  and  had  no  convenient 
opportunity  to  learn  them ;  and  that  the  latter  in  good  faith  relied 
thereon  to  his  prejudice/  The  i>erson  claiming  the  estoppel  must 
have  been  without  knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  the  facts," 
and  must  himself  have  been  free  from  fraud,'^  since  the  doctrine 
of  estoppel,  being  a  creature  of  equity,  can  be  interposed  only  to 
prevent  injustice,  and  not  to  work  injustice.^  An  estoppel  can 
not  be  based  on  a  mere  mistake  of  law,^  and  one  can  not  claim 
estoppel  by  reason  of  an  agreement  which  he  must  have  known  as 
a  matter  of  law  was  unen forcible."  Nor  can  one  base  an  estoppel 
on  declarations  not  made  to  him,  nor  intended  to  be  communicated 

99  Pac.  884;    In  re  Kimmcl's  Estate,  i  Musconetcong  Iron  Works  v.  Del- 

226  Pa.  47.  75  Atl.  23 ;  Kenny  v.  Mc-  aware  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  J.  L.  717,  76 

Kenzie,  25   S.   Dak.  485.    127   N.   W.  Atl.  971. 

597;  Raglev-McWilliains  Lumber  Co.  ^  Logan    v.    Davis,    147    Iowa    441, 

V.  Hare.  61   Tex.  Civ.  App.  509.   130  124  N.  W.  808. 

S.  W.  864 ;  Bender  v.  Brooks,  61  Tex.  ^  Breaux    v.    Hanson    Lumber    Co., 

Civ.  App.  464,  130  S.  W.  653 ;  Dudley  125  La.  Ann.  421.  51  So.  444. 

V.  Strain  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  130  S.  W.  *  Mattox  v.  Higbtshue,  39  Ind.  95. 

778.  -'  Logan  v.  Davis,  147  Iowa  441,  124 

•'•'  Pagan  v.  Stuttgart  Normal  Insti-  N.  W.  808. 

tute,    91    Ark.    141.    120    S.    W.    404;  « Norris   v.    Letchworth,     140    Mo. 

Trimble  v.  King,  131  Ky.  1.  114  S.'W.  App.  19,  124  S.  W.  559. 
317.  22  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  880n. 


121  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §     100 

to  him/  An  estoppel  can  not  arise  in  favor  of  one  who  knows 
the  truth  f  and  where  both  parties  have  equal  knowledge  or  equal 
means  of  ascertaining  the  truth  there  can  be  no  estoppel.^  Acts 
committed  by  one  when  ignorant  of  his  rights  can  not  create  an 
estoppel/" 

That  a  state  or  the  United  States,  as  well  as  individuals,  may  be 
estopped  by  its  acts,  conduct,  silence,  and  acquiescence,  is  estab- 
lished by  a  line  of  well  adjudicated  cases."  There  are  cases,  how- 
ever, which  hold  that  the  doctrine  does  not  apply  to  a  state  as  it 
does  to  individuals/"  These  latter  holdings  are  based  upon  the 
general  doctrine  that  the  state  can  not  divest  herself  of  title 
except  by  grant  or  other  record  evidence/^ 

No  estoppel  can  ordinarily  arise  from  the  act  of  a  municipality 
or  officer  thereof  done  in  violation  or  without  authority  of  law/* 
But  it  has  been  held  that  a  city  is  estopped  to  set  up  any  claim  to 
streets,  alleys,  and  public  squares,  which  had  been  platted  as 
such,  but  had  remained  in  one  body  and  had  been  utilized  by  the 
original  owners  and  their  grantees  for  more  than  thirty  years, 
and  continuously  subject  to  taxation  as  private  property/^  The 
rights  of  property  in  land,  depending  for  proof  of  their  existence 
upon  the  testimony  of  adverse  possession,  are  also  rights  by 
estoppel  but  it  is  the  estoppel  in  pais  that  operates.  If  the  owner 
of  land  permits  another  to  occupy  it  under  a  claim  of  title  for  the 
statutory  period  of  limitation,  he  is  estopped  from  denying  that 
the  occupant  has  legal  title.  The  law  presumes  from  the  adverse 
holding,  first,  a  grant  in  fee  from  the  state,  and  second,  either 
that  the  occupant  is  that  grantee,  as  the  original  party,  or  as  a 
secondary  party  by  descent,  devise,  or  assignment ;  and  the  party 
claiming  otherwise,  is  estopped  to  show  the  contrary.  When 
the  fact  of  adverse  possession  is  established  it  is  accepted  in  law 

^  Townsend  Sav.  Bank  v.  Todd,  47  Hough   v.   Buchanan,    27    Fed.    328 ; 

Conn.    190 ;    Morgan   v.    Spangler,    14  United  States  v.  McLaughlin.  30  Fed. 

Ohio  St.  102;   McLaren  v.  Jones,  89  147  (affirmed  127  U.  S.  428.  8  S.  Ct. 

Tex.  131,  33  S.  W.  849.  1177,  32  L.  ed.  213);    Commonwealth 

«  Bngham-Young     Trust     Co.     v.  v.  Andre,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  224;  State 

Wagner,  12  Utah  1,  40  Pac.  764.  v.  Flint  &c.  R.  Co.,  89  Mich.  481,  51 

,     0  Crabtree  v.   Bank  of   Winchester,  N.  W.  103. 

'  108  Tenn.  483,  67  S.  W.  797 ;  Parkey  i^  Parish  v.  Coon,  40  Cal.  33 ;  Fan- 

V.  Ramsey,   111   Tenn.  302,  76  S.  W.  nin  Co.  v.  Riddle,  51  Tex.  360. 

812;   Cautley  v.   Morgan,  51   W.  Va.  "Saunders  v.  Hart,  57  Tex.  8. 

304,  41  S.  E.  201.  i^Seeger  v.  Alueller,  133  111.  86,  24 

10  Briggs  V.  Murray,  29  Wash.  245,  N.  E.  513. 

69  Pac.  765.  is  Smith  v.   Osage,  80  Iowa  84,  45 

"State    V.     Milk,     11     Fed.    389;  N.  W.  404,  8  L.  R.  A.  633. 


§     101  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  122 

as  substitutional  evidence  of  title  in  the  place  of  charters,  patents, 
deeds,  and  all  other  kinds  of  evidence  used  in  the  law  to  prove 
title. 

§  101.  Relation. — Relation  is  a  fiction  of  law  whereby  an 
act  done  at  one  time  operates  as  if  done  at  another  time.  By  its 
operation  effect  is  given  to  instruments,  which  without  it  would  be 
invalid.  Thus,  a  deed  not  acknowledged  until  long  after  its  ex- 
ecution has  been  held  to  take  effect  from  its  date,  the  acknowl- 
edgement operating  as  of  that  time  by  relation.^''  It  has  its  most 
frequent  application  to  sheriff's  sales,  where  the  deed  is  not  made 
for  some  time  after  the  sale,  but  when  it  is  made,  relates  back 
to  the  sale,  and,  in  so  far  as  the  defendant  in  the  execution  and 
his  privies  and  strangers  purchasing  with  notice  are  concerned, 
vests  the  title  in  the  purchaser  from  that  time."  "The  title  ac- 
quired by  the  deed  of  the  officer  relates  back  to  the  date  of  the 
judgment  lien,  for  the  judgment  is  the  source  of  his  authority, 
and  by  such  relation  the  last  act  is  carried  back  to  the  first  in  mak- 
ing out  the  title,  and  takes  priority  as  of  the  date  of  the  first, 
which  is  the  day  of  the  judgment  lien."^*  Where  a  deed  is  de- 
livered in  escrow  the  title  only  passes  on  the  performance  of  the 
condition  or  the  happening  of  the  event,  except  in  certain  cases 
where  by  the  doctrine  of  relation  the  deed  is  allowed  to  take 
effect  from  the  first  delivery.  This  relation  back  to  the  first 
delivery  is  permitted,  however,  only  in  cases  of  necessity  and 
where  no  injustice  will  be  done,  to  avoid  injury  to  the  operation 
of  the  deed  from  events  happening  between  the  first  and  second 
delivery.  ^^ 

The  doctrine  is  applicable  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the 
equities  of  the  parties  on  the  performance  of  the  conditions  of 
delivery,^"  but  is  inapplicable  to  a  case  where  the  death  of  the 
grantor  renders  a  subsequent  performance  of  conditions  impos- 
sible." As  between  the  parties  to  a  deed  it  may  sometimes,  for 
the  furtherance  of  justice,  be  permitted,  in  its  operation,  to  relate 
back  to  the  date  of  a  contract  of  purchase,  unless  to  so  permit 

i«  Lincoln    v.    Thompson,    75    Mo.  i»  Prutsman  v.  Baker,  30  Wis.  644, 

613.  11  Am.  Rep.  592. 

17  Ozark  Land  &c.  Co.  v.  Franks,  20  Whitmcr  v.  Schenk,  11  Idaho  702, 
156  Mo.  673.  57  S.  W.  540.  83  Pac.  775. 

18  Hibberd  v.  Smith,  67  Cal.  547,  21  Mclntyre  v.  Mclntyre,  147  Mich. 
4  Pac.  473,  8  Pac.  46,  56  Am.  .Rep.  365,  110  N.  W.  960. 

726. 


123  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    102 

it  would  operate  to  do  wrong  to  strangers."-  Where  a  deed  once 
executed  has  been  lost  and  the  grantor  executes  a  second  deed,  it 
may,  in  some  instanc.es,  be  permitted  to  relate  back  to  the  time 
of  the  first  deed.-^ 

§  102.  Prescription  and  limitation. — Prescription  is  a 
term  applied  to  the  mode  of  acquiring  title  to  incorporeal  hered- 
itaments by  immemorial  or  long-continued  use  and  enjoyment. 
The  period  of  such  use  and  enjoyment  now  generally  corresponds 
with  the  period  of  legal  limitation  for  obtaining  title 
to  land  by  adverse  possession.-^  To  acquire  title  by  prescrip- 
tion the  user  must  be  adverse,"^  exclusive,"''  peaceable,"'  notori- 
ous,-* and  continuous.-^  "Prescription"  implies  an  original  grant,"° 
and  can  only  be  for  things  which  may  be  created  by  grant. ^^ 

Both  prescription  and  limitation  are  dependent  for  their  valid- 
ity upon  possession,  and  in  each  case  the  possession  must  be  that 
of  him  who  claims  title  by  virtue  thereof.  In  both  cases  this 
possession  must  be  coupled  with  lapse  of  time  in  order  to  com- 
plete the  title.  In  prescription,  the  common  law  fixes  what  length 
of  enjoyment  shall  be  deemed  evidence  of  an  ownership  of  an 
incorporeal  right,  while  as  to  limitation,  being  land,  the  period 
is  fixed  by  statute  beyond  which  no  one  may  set  up  a  title  adverse 
to  the  presumed  title  of  him  who  has  for  that  length  of  time 
enjoyed  the  uninterrupted  possession  of  same.^"  The  statutes  of 
limitations  usually  provide  that  no  action  for  the  recovery  of  the 
title  or  possession  of  real  estate  shall  be  maintained  after  twenty 
years  from  the  time  the  cause  of  action  accrued,  while  in  case 
the  adverse  holder  claims  a  title  exclusive  of  any  other  right, 
founding  his  claim  upon  some  written  instrument,  judgment  or 
decree,  a  shorter  time  is  frequently  sufiicient.^^  A  title  founded 
upon  prescription  or  limitation  is  good  as  against  all  save  the 
sovereign  power,^*  and  where,  as  sometimes  happens,  it  is  diffi- 

22  Jackson  v.   Bard,    4    Johns.    (N.        2r  Carbrey      v.      Willis,      7      Allen 
Y.)  230,  4  Am.  Dec.  267.  (Mass.)  368. 

23  Hodges  V.  Spicer,  79  N.  Car.  223.         20  PoUard     v.      Barnes,     2      Cush. 
2*Nicholls  V.  Wentworth,  100  N.  Y.     (Mass.)   191. 

455.  30  Ft.   Smith  v.   AlcKibbin,  41   Ark. 

25  Dexter  v.  Tree.  117  111.  532.  45,  48  Am.  Rep.  19. 

20  Kilburn     v.     Adams,     7     Mete.  si  state  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co., 

(Mass.)   33.  45  Iowa  139. 

2- Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  McFar-  323  Washb.  Real  Prop.  51. 

Ian,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  706.  33  Adverse  Title,  Chap.  29. 

34  Gardiner  v.  Miller,  47  Cal.  570. 


§     103  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  124 

<■ 

cult  to  trace  title  from  a  definite  owner,  conveyances  are  often 
accepted  on  the  strength  of  an  adverse  holding  for  the  statutory 
period  of  limitation. 

§  103.  Accretion  and  alluvion. — Accretion  is  the  increase 
of  land  by  the  addition  of  portions  of  soil  made  by  the  washing 
of  the  sea,  a  navigable  river,  or  other  water  course  to  which  the 
land  is  contiguous,  whenever  such  increase  is  through  the  opera- 
tion of  natural  causes  and  is  deposited  gradually  so  that  the 
process  can  not  be  noticed  at  any  moment  of  time.^^  The  riparian 
rights  of  the  owner  of  land  bounded  by  a  stream  of  water  vest 
him  with  ownership  of  alluvial  accretions  gradually  formed  on 
the  adjacent  hank  by  the  action  of  waters.^** 

The  courts  have  not  been  fully  agreed  as  to  the  principle  on 
which  the  law  of  accretion  is  founded.  The  reason  of  the  rule 
giving  accretions  to  a  riparian  owner  is  that  every  owner  of  land 
bounded  by  a  stream  of  water  is  subject,  by  reason  of  the  gradual 
changing  of  the  course  thereof,  to  lose  a  portion  of  his  land,  or 
have  the  same  increased  in  quantity  by  accumulations  thereto, 
and,  inasmuch  as  he  is  wholly  without  remedy  if  a  loss  occurs 
by  the  water  washing  away  his  land,  he  is  entitled  to  whatever 
increase,  also,  that  is  caused  by  the  gradual  accretion  or  reliction.^' 
Sometimes  the  rule  is  based  on  the  riparian  owners'  right  of 
access  to  the  water.'®  When  particles  of  the  soil  of  one  owner 
is  gradually  worn  away  and  deposited  upon  the  land  of  another, 
such  other  is  entitled  to  claim  the  deposit  upon  the  theory  that 
the  soil  so  deposited  can  not  be  identified  by  its  former  owner. "^'^ 
The  new  land  formed  by  the  addition  of  sand  or  soil  by  the 
action  of  the  water  is  sometimes  called  "accretion, "'*°  but  "allu- 
vion" is  a  Ijetter  term  for  such  de}X)sit,  while  "accretion"  more 
properly  denotes  the  process  by  which  it  is  deposited."     If  an 

3'' Lovingston  v.  St.  Clair  Co.,  64  111.  ^^  Lamprey  v.  State,  52  Minn.  181, 

56,  16  Am.  Rep.  516;  Benson  v.  Mor-  53  N.  W.   1139,   18  L.  R.  A.  670,  38 

row,  61  Mo.  352;  De  Lassus  v.  Falier-  Am.  St.  541. 

ty,  164  Mo.  361,  64  S.  W.  183,  58  L.  •"■nVelles  v.   Bailey.   55   Conn.  292, 

R.  A.  193 ;  Houseman  v.  International  10  Atl.  565,  3  Am.   St.  48 ;   Stern  v. 

Nav.  Co.,  214  Pa.  552,  64  Atl.  379.  Fountain,  112  Iowa  96,  83  N.  W.  826. 

•"*'' Coultharrl   v.    Stevens,    84    Iowa  4°  Stern  v.  Fountain,   112  Iowa  96, 

241,  50  N.  W.  983.  35  Am.  St.  304;  83  N.  W.  826. 

Gill  V.  Lydick,  40  Nebr.  508,  59  N.  W.  ■»!  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ramsey, 

104 ;    Denny   v.    Cotton,   3    Tex.    Civ.  53  Ark,  314,  13  S.  W.  931,  8  L.  R.  A. 

App.  634,  22  S.  W.  122.            _  559,  22  Am.  St.  195. 

37  Sweringen  v.  St.  Louis,  151  Mo. 
348,  52  S.  W.  346. 


125  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING    TITLE  §     104 

island  be  formed  in  a  non-navigable  river  between  the  thread 
thereof  and  one  of  its  banks,  the  owner  of  such  bank  is  deemed 
the  owner  of  the  island/-  but  if  the  island  is  formed  in  the  middle 
of  the  river,  so  that  the  thread  of  the  stream  passes  through  the 
island,  it  belongs  to  the  opposite  owners  in  severalty,  the  dividing 
line  running  according  to  the  original  thread.*^  Where  islands 
are  formed  in  navigable  rivers,  lakes,  or  the  sea,  they  belong  to 
the  state  or  national  government  owning  the  land  under  the 
water.^* 

§  104.  Title  to  riparian  lands. — By  the  common  law,  both 
the  title  and  the  dominion  of  the  sea,  and  all  rivers  and  arms  of 
the  sea,  where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  and  of  all  the  lands  below 
high-water  mark,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  crown  of  Eng- 
land, are  in  the  king.  Such  waters,  and  the  lands  which  they 
cover,  either  at  all  times,  or  at  least  when  the  tide  is  in,  are 
incapable  of  ordinary  and  private  occupation,  cultivation,  and  im- 
provement ;  and  their  natural  and  primary  uses  are  public  in  their 
nature  for  highways  of  navigation  and  commerce,  domestic  and 
foreign,  and  for  the  purpose  of  fishing  by  all  the  king's  subjects/^ 
The  common  law  of  England  upon  this  subject,  at  the  time  of  the 
emigration  of  our  ancestors,  is  the  law  of  this  country,  except 
so  far  as  it  has  been  modified  by  the  charters,  constitutions,  stat- 
utes, or  usages  of  the  several  colonies  and  states,  or  by  the  con- 
stitution and  laws  of  the  United  States.  In  this  country  there  is 
no  universal  and  uniform  law  upon  the  subject,  but  each  state  has 
dealt  with  the  lands  under  the  tide  waters  within  its  borders  ac- 
cording to  its  own  views  of  justice  and  policy.  The  law  is  general 
that  private  ownership  of  land  bordering  on  tide  water  extends 
only  to  high-water  mark.  The  space  between  high  and  low-water 
mark  is  variously  dominated  "the  shore,"  "the  beach,"  "the 
flats,"  "the  strand,"  "the  sand,"  and  is  also  designated  by  several 
other  less  familiar  terms.  The  general  rule  is,  that  a  boundary  on 
the  sea,  a  bay,  navigable  or  tide  water  river  is  a  boundary  at  the 
ordinary  high-water  mark.*''    A  grant  from  the  sovereign  of  land 

42  Grand  Rapids,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  But-  ^s  Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1, 

ler,  159  U.  S.  87,  15  Sup.  Ct.  991,  40  14  Sup.  Ct.  548. 

L.  ed.  85.  4G  Long  Beach  Land  Co.  v.  Rich- 
es Ingraliam   V.   Wilkinson,  4   Pick,  ardson,    70    Cal.    206,    11     Pac.  695; 

(Mass.)  268,  16  Am.  Dec.  342.  Storer   v.    Freeman,   6    Mass.    435,    4 

4*  Cox  V.  Arnold,  129  Mo.  2,Z7,  31  S.  Am.  Dec.  155 ;  Martin  v.  O'Brien,  34 

W.  592,  50  Am.  St.  450.  Miss.  21 ;  Yard  v.  Ocean  Beach  Assn., 


§     104  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  126 

bounded  by  the  sea,  or  by  any  navigable  tide  water,  does  not  pass 
any  title  below  the  tide  water  mark,  unless  through  the  language 
of  the  grant  or  long  usage  under  it,  it  clearly  indicates  that  such 
was  the  intention.*^  The  common-law  rule  that  the  title  to  the 
shore  is  in  the  state  does  not  include  the  possibility  of  private 
title  derived  from  the  sovereign  or  obtained  by  prescription.*^  In 
the  New  England  states  the  rule  of  private  ownership  of  the  shore 
was  estal)lished  by  an  early  colonial  ordinance,  and  by  usage 
founded  thereon.'*'"'  By  virtue  of  this  ordinance  the  owner  in  fee 
of  upland  adjoining  tide  waters  whether  of  the  sea  or  of  a  tidal 
stream,  becomes  the  owner  also  of  the  adjacent  shore,  flats,  or 
beach,  one  hundred  rods  in  extent,  if  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows  that 
distance;  and  a  conveyance  of  upland  bounded  by  such  waters 
passes  the  grantor's  title  to  the  same  extent. ^°  There  is  a  pre- 
sumption that  the  grantor  conveys  the  title  to  land  covered  by 
water  so  far  as  his  own  title  extends,  whether  the  conveyance 
is  bounded  by  the  sea,  a  tidal  river,  or  a  fresh-water  stream,  un- 
less he  expressly  reserves  the  land  under  the  water,  or  the  terms 
of  the  deed  indicate  an  intention  to  reserve  it.^^  But  this  presump- 
tion may  always  be  overcome  by  language  in  the  deed  showing 
an  intention  not  to  convey  any  title  to  the  land  covered  by  water.''^ 
Of  course  the  owner  in  any  sale  may  sever  the  upland  from  the 
flats,  selling  either  without  the  other  at  his  pleasure. ^^ 

The  land  covered  by  fresh-water  streams  not  navigable  is 
prima  facie  the  property  of  the  riparian  proprietors,  to  the  center 
of  the  stream.  But  if  the  same  person  owns  the  land  on  both 
sides  of  the  stream,  he  owns  the  entire  river-bed  so  far  as  his 
lands  extend.'^*  In  many  states  the  common-law  rule  as  regards 
navigable  lakes  and  rivers  has  been  changed,  and  in  its  place  the 
civil-law  rule  has  been  adopted,  which  recognizes  as  navigable 
all  streams  and  lakes  which  are  really  so,  though  they  are  not  tide 

49  N.  J.  Eq.  306,  24  Atl.  729;  New        ^i  Houck  v.  Yates,  82  III.  179;  Paine 

York  V.  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443,  effg.  16  v.  Woods,   108  Mass.   160;  Carter  v. 

Hun  380.  Chesapeake  &c.  Co.,  26  W.  Va.  644, 

47Sliively  v.  Bowlby,   152  U.   S.  1,  53  Am.  Rep.  116. 
14  Sup.  Ct.  548,  38  L.  cd.  331.  --^  People  v.   Madison   Co.,   125   111. 

•i**Oakes  v.  DeLancey,  71  Hun   (N.  9,  17  N.  E.  147. 
Y.)  49,  aff'd.  143  N.  Y.  673,  14  N.  Y.        ^s  Ladies  Seamen's  Friends'  Soc.  v. 

S.  294.  Halstead,  58  Conn.  144.  19  Atl.  658; 

*'■'  Mass.    Colony    Laws    (ed.    1606)  Erskine  v.  Moulton,  66  Maine  276. 
p.  50.  -^1  Packer   v.    Bird,    137    U.    S.   661, 

50  Clancey  v.   Houdlette,  39  Alaine  1 1  Sup.  Ct.  210,  34  L.  ed.  819. 
451. 


•127  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §     105 

water  rivers,  and  this  is  now  the  prevailing  doctrine  in  this 
country.^^  A  division  of  waters  into  public  and  private  waters 
has  been  adopted  in  some  recent  decisions,  and  undoubtedly  the 
tendency  is  to  extend  and  assert  public  rights  against  private 
ownership  in  lakes  and  rivers,  without  much  regard  to  any  test 
or  definition  of  navigability.^*^ 

§  105.  Dedication. — Dedication  is  the  setting  apart  of 
land  for  public  use."  It  is  essential  to  every  valid  dedication 
that  it  should  conclude  the  owner,  and  that  as  against  the  public 
it  should  be  accepted  by  the  proper  local  authorities  or  by  general 
public  user.^^ 

There  are  two  kinds  of  dedications,  statutory  dedication,  which 
is  by  way  of  grant,  and  common  law  dedication,  which  arises  by 
way  of  an  estoppel  in  pais.  Where  the  statute  requires  that  the 
dedication  shall  be  evidenced  in  a  particular  way,  as  by  plats  or 
maps,  and  that  they  shall  be  acknowledged  before  some  competent 
officer,  these  requirements  must  be  strictly  complied  with,^^  The 
owner  of  land  may,  by  virtue  of  his  absolute  dominion  over  it, 
donate  or  dedicate  it  to  whomsoever  he  pleases.  He  may  give 
it  to  the  public,  to  a  body  corporate  capable  of  holding  it,  or 
to  a  natural  person,  for  such  purposes,  either  public  or  private, 
as  the  donor  sees  fit  to  appoint.  But  to  render  such  gift  effectual 
the  owner  must  grant  or  convey  to  the  donee  the  land,  or  such 
interest  therein  as  he  wishes  to  donate,  either  by  deed  or  by  some 
equivalent  mode  of  conve3^ance  recognized  by  law.  But,  by  the 
rules  applicable  to  what  is  known  as  "common-law  dedications," 
lands  or  easements  therein  may  be  dedicated  to  the  public,  so  as 
to  become  effectually  vested,  without  the  aid  of  any  conveyance. 
It  may  be  done  in  writing,  by  parol,  or  by  acts  in  pais,  or  even  by 
acquiescence  in  the  use  of  the  easement  by  the  public.     A  dedica- 

5'' Barney  v.  Keokuk,  4  U.   S.  324,  53  N.  W.   1139,   18  L.  R.  A.  670,  38 

24  L.  ed.  224;  Packer  v.  Bird,  137  U.  Am.  St.  541. 

S.  661,  11  Sup.  Ct.  210,  34  L.  ed.  819;  ^7  m.    E.   Church  v.   Mayor  &c.   of 

Hess  V.   Cheney,   83   Ala.  251,   3   So.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L.  13,  97  Am.  Dec. 

791 ;  Martin  v.  Evansville,  32  Ind.  85 ;  696. 

Wood  V.  Fowler,  26  Kans.  682.  40  Am.  ^s  Brakken    v.    Minneapolis    &c.    R. 

Rep.  330:  Lamprey  v.  State,  52  Alinn.  Co..  29  Minn.  41.  11  N.  W.  124;  Buch- 

181,  53  N.  W.  1139,  18  L.  R.  A.  670,  anan  v.  Curtis,  25  Wis.  99,  3  Am.  Rep. 

38  Am.  St.  541  ;   Benson  v.  Morrow,  23. 

61  Mo.  345 ;  Hodges  v.  W^ilhams,  95  =9  Wilder  v.  Aurora  &c.  R.  &c.  Co., 

K.  Car.  331,  59  Am.  Rep.  242.  216  111.  493,  75  N.  E.  194. 

^''  Lamprey  v.   State,  52  Minn.  181, 


§     106  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  128 

tion  of  this  character,  to  be  effectual,  must  be  to  the  pubhc,'^" 
and  not  merely  a  public  corporation/'^ 

As  a  general  rule,  in  order  to  create  a  common-law  dedication 
there  must  be  an  acceptance  in  behalf  of  the  public  by  the  public 
authorities/"  By  the  common-law  method  of  dedication  a  mere 
easement  in  the  land  dedicated  passes  to  the  public,  while  the  fee 
remains  in  the  donor  subject  to  be  sold  and  conveyed  by  him  to 
third  persons.  In  such  case  the  right  of  the  public  is  paramount 
to  that  of  the  owner  of  the  fee/'^  In  statutory  dedications  the 
fee  may  vest  in  the  public,  although  nj  express  words  creating 
such  an  estate  are  used,  but  this  jj^  only  so  in  cases  where  the 
statute  under  which  the  dedication  i  i  made  provides  that  the  fee 
shall  vest,*^*  and  counsel  should  consult  the  locc-l  statute  on  this 
proposition  wherever  dedication  is  involved  in  the  title. 

Dedication  may  be  established  against  the  owner  of  the  soil  by 
showing  that  he  has  platted  the  ground,  representing  streets  and 
alleys  on  the  plat,  and  has  sold  lots  with  reference  to  it,'^'^  or  by 
showing  that  he  has  adopted  a  map  or  plat  made  by  public  officers, 
or  other  persons, ''^  or  by  showing  that  he  has  sold  lots  describing 
them  as  bounded  by  a  street  or  road/^  Dedication  by  maps  and 
plats  are  sometimes  so  made  as  to  render  it  difficult  to  determine 
their  nature  and  extent,  and  their  construction  is  often  one  of 
difficulty  for  counsel  in  passing  upon  a  title  where  such  dedication 
is  relied  upon. 

§  106.  Confirmation. — "A  confirmation  is  the  conveyance 
of  an  estate  or  right,  that  one  hath  in  or  unto  lands  or  tenements, 
to  another  that  hath  possession  thereof,  or  some  estate  therein, 
whereby  a  voidable  estate  is  made  sure  and  unavoidable,  or 
whereby  a  particular  estate  is  increased  or  enlarged.""*  A  con- 
firmation makes  a  voidable  estate  sure,  or  increases  a  particular 

•^0  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit-  10  Sup.  Ct.  554,  33  L.  ed.  909 ;  Miller 

ham.   155  111.  514.  40  N.   E.   1014,  28  v.  Indianapolis,  123,  Ind.  196,  24  N.  E. 

L.  R.  A.  612,  68  Am.  St.  355.  228. 

Gi  Todd  V.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  19        gg  Moale  v.   Baltimore.   5   Md.   314, 

Ohio  St.  514.  61   Am.  Dec.  276;    Methodist  Church 

«2  Trine  v.  Pueblo,  21  Colo.  102,  39  v.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L.  13. 
Pac.  330.  «7  Durkin    >      Cobleigh.    156    Mass. 

«3  M.  E.  Church  v.  Hoboken,  33  N.  108,  30  N.  E.  474,  17  L.  R.  A.  270,  32 

J.  L.  13.  Am.  St.  436. 

'■*  Mayvvood   &c.    Co.  v.    Maywood.         "'^  Shep.  Touch.  311.     See  also  De 

118  111.  61.  6  N.  E.    866;    Wisby    v.  Mares  v.  Gilpin  15  Colo.  76,  24  Pac. 

Boute.  19  Ohio  St.  238.  568;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Majors, 

"^Gormley  v.  Clark,  134  U.  S.  338,  5  Mont.  Ill,  2  Pac.  322. 


I 

I 


129  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    106 

estate.  There  must  be  a  previous  estate  on  which  it  is  to  operate.^' 
This  is  the  proper  form  of  conveyance  when  one  having  ahened 
land  for  a  particular  purpose,  voidable  at  his  option,  subsequently 
desires  to  make  the  estate  of  his  grantee  certain  and  unavoidable. 
It  does  not  regularly  create  the  estate,  but  operates  on  an  exist- 
ing estate  by  strengthening  the  title  of  the  grantee  who  already 
has,  or  claims  some  right  or  interest  therein.  It  is  of  a  nature 
similar  to  a  release.'*^  If  the  original  conveyance  which  it  is  at- 
tempted to  validate  was  originally  void  it  can  not  be  rendered 
valid  by  a  confirmation,^^  but  only  confirms  its  infirmity  ;^^  al- 
though such  an  instrument  may  be  operative  as  a  deed  of  bargain 
and  sale." 

The  proper  words  used  in  a  deed  of  confirmation  are  "given," 
"granted,"  "ratified,"  "approved,"  and  "confirmed,"  although 
other  words  which  sufficiently  show  an  intention  to  confirm  may 
be  used.^*  In  modern  practice  the  quitclaim  deed  is  generally 
used  instead- of  a  confirmation. 

The  transfer  of  property  of  infants  and  other  incapacitated 
persons  may  take  place  through  the  medium  of  a  parent,  guardian, 
committee,  or  next  friend  under  order  of  a  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction,  and  when  the  transfer  is  confirmed  by  the  court  the 
title  passes  to  the  transferee  by  what  is  termed  "office  grant." 
Confirmation  by  the  court  is  a  signification  of  its  approval,  and 
the  sale  is  not  complete  without  it.^^ 

Conveyances  defective  in  form,  and  accordingly  inoperative  in 
law,  may  be  corrected,  deeds  made  to  the  wrong  grantees  may  be 
replaced  by  others  to  the  right  persons,  or  an  official  omission  of 
duty  may  be  supplied  through  office  grants  as  directed  by  statute.^" 

Congress  has  made  provision  for  the  confirmation  of  uncertain 
and  inchoate  interests  of  persons  claiming  title  through  the  na- 
tional government  or  from  foreign  powers,  and  when  confirma- 
tion is  had  by  virtue  of  such  provisions  it  is  conclusive  as  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  confirmee."  Confirmation  of  such 
claims  may  also  be  made  by  special  act  of  congress.    Confirmation 

60  Jackson   v.    Root,    18   Johns    (N.  ^^2  Bl.  Comm.  325. 

Y.)  60.  75  Johnson  v.  Cooper,  56  Miss.  608. 

70  Turk  V.  Skiles,  45  W.  Va.  82,  30  '^  Watson  v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

S.  E.  234.  88,  8  L.  ed.  876 ;  Leavitt  v.  Thornton, 

^iBarr  v.    Schroeder,   32   Cal.   609.  123  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  683,  108  N.  Y. 

'-  Branham  v.  San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585.  S.  162. 

"  Fauntlcroy  v.   Dunn,   3   B.   Mon.  '^  Meader  v.  Norton,  11  Wall.   (U. 

(Ky.)  594.  S.)  442,  20  L.  ed.  184. 

9 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§     107  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  130 

of  such  claims,  whether  made  by  commissioners,  by  the  federal 
court,  or  by  special  act,  has  been  held  as  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a  grant  from  the  government,^**  yet  it  would  seem  that 
the  confirmee  under  any  such  method  has  the  equitable  title  only 
until  a  patent  has  issued  for  the  land." 

§  107.  Occupancy. — Mere  possession  or  occupancy  is  the 
lowest  form  of  title,  but  it  is  good  in  the  occupant  against  all  the 
world  until  some  one  shows  a  better  title.  Occupancy  is  owner- 
ship with  a  present  active  use.''*'  As  a  mode  of  acquiring  title 
it  does  not  seem  to  be  recognized  in  this  country.  In  this  country 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  common  property  in  lands.  When  not 
owned  by  private  individuals,  they  are  the  property  of  either  the 
state  or  national  government.  At  the  time  of  discovery  by  the 
nations  of  Europe  the  Indians  held  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  his 
lands  by  occupancy,  but  this  holding  has  never  been  regarded  as 
property  in  the  soil,  and  this  government  has  ever  reserved  the 
right  to  extinguish  the  Indian  claim  by  purchase  or  conquest.^^ 
Squatter  sovereignty  is  no  longer  recognized,  and  the  title  to  all 
lands  rests  either  with  the  government  or  some  private  mdividual 
or  corporation.  Formerly  in  England  the  law  restricted  the  right 
of  acquiring  title  by  occupancy  to  the  single  instance  where  one 
was  tenant  for  the  life  of  another  who  outlived  him.  In  such 
case,  he  who  could  first  enter  on  the  land  might  lawfully  retain 
the  possession  thereof  so  long  as  such  person  lived,  by  right  of 
occupancy.®^  At  the  present  time,  however,  both  in  England  and 
in  this  country,  provision  is  made  by  statute  that  the  interest  left 
at  his  death  by  a  tenant  pur  autre  vie,  who  dies  prior  to  the  one 
by  whose  life  the  estate  is  measured,  is  governed  by  the  laws  of 
descent  and  distribution.®^  In  case  the  occupancy  takes  the  form 
of  adverse  possession,  or  if  it  continues  for  such  a  period  of 
time  as  to  invoke  the  protection  of  the  statute  of  limitations,  we 
then  have  title  by  adverse  possession,  or  prescription,  or,  possibly, 
by  estoppel. 

^  108.  Abandonment. — Strictly  speaking  there  can  be  no 
abandonment  of  a  legal  title  to  real  estate  by  mere  failure  to  assert 

78Challefoux  v.  Ducharme,  4  Wis.         **!  Johnston  v.  Alclntosh,  8  Wheat, 

554.  (U.  S.  )  543,  5  L.  ed.  681. 

79  Le  Beau  v.  Armitage,  47  Mo.  138.         >^^  2  Bl.  Comm.  258. 

•"^  New  England  Hospital  v.  Boston,        ^^3  Washb.  Real  Prop.  51. 
113  Mass.  518. 


131  METHODS    OF    ACQUIRING   TITLE  §     108 

it  in  the  absence  of  adverse  possession.  If  there  can  not  be  a 
devolution  of  title  by  operation  of  an  adverse  possession,  no 
abandonment  for  any  period  of  time  will  divest  the  owner  of 
title.^'*  Mere  abandonment  of  corporeal  property  does  not  effect 
a  loss  thereof;  and  in  a  strict  sense  this  is  true  of  incorporeal 
property.®^ 

The  term  "abandonment,"  as  used  in  this  connection,  has  refer- 
ence to  a  method  of  extinguishing  intangible  rights.  Thus  the 
right  which  a  disseisor  has  before  the  full  period  of  limitation 
has  run  may  be  lost  by  abandonment  before  such  time  has  ex- 
pired;^" but  if  he  holds  possession  until  his  title  has  become  per- 
fected by  limitation,  his  subsequent  abandonment  does  not  divest 
him  of  such  title.®'  The  doctrine  of  abandonment,  therefore, 
when  applied  strictly,  has  to  do  with  incorporeal  hereditaments. 
Title  is  thus  lost  by  one,  and  an  advantage  or  a  title  gained  by 
another,  when  an  owner  of  an  easement  or  other  servitude  leaves 
it  unused  under  circumstances  indicating  an  intention  not  to  reas- 
sert his  right  and  the  servient  land  is  then  properly  so  used  by 
its  owner,  or  some  other  rightful  holder,  that  he  will  be  injured 
by  any  further  use  or  employment  of  the  easement  as  such.®^  It 
must  be  remembered  that  intent  becomes  a  material  element  in 
abandonment.  Mere  non-user  for  a  certain  length  of  time  does 
not  constitute  abandonment.®^  Abandonment  is  a  question  of 
fact  to  be  determined  from  the  circumstances  of  each  particular 
case.^"  Whenever  it  may  be  inferred  as  a  matter  of  law,  from 
the  acts  of  the  owner  of  an  easement  or  servitude,  that  it  was 
his  intention  to  give  up  his  rights  and  to  lay  no  further  claim 
thereto,  such  owner  will  lose  his  title  rather  upon  the  ground  of 

**  East  Tennessee   Iron  &c.   Co.  v.  ownership,  why  may  he  not  do  so  in 

Wiggin,  68  Fed.  446,  15  C.  C.  A.  510.  the  case  of  land,  as  well  as  of  a  chat- 

^  »^  Holmes  v.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  tel?    It  might  go  to  the  government 

3  Ohio   Dec.  416.    It  has  been   said,  instead  of  the  first  occupant,  upon  the 

however,  that  "if  a  person  having  the  principle  upon   which   land  escheated 

disposing   power   absolutely,   does   an  or  became  derelict."    Dikes  v.  Miller, 

act  sufficient  in   itself,   legally  to  di-  24  Tex.  417. 

vest  his  title  with  the  express  inten-  so  Bennett   v.    Atlantic    Coast    Line 

tion  of  relinquishing  and  abandoning  Co.,  126  Ga.  411,  55  S.  E.  177. 

the  property,  it  is  not  easy  to  perceive  s-  Sage  v.   Rudnick,  67   Minn.  362, 

why  he  may  not   do   so.     Abandon-  69  N.  W.  1096. 

ment,  it  is  said,  is  the  relinquishment  ss  Farrell   v.    Lockhart,    210    U.    S. 

of  a  right;  the  giving  up  something  142.  52  L.  ed.  994. 

to  which  one  is  entitled.    If  the  owner  so  McKee  v.  Perchment,  69  Pa.  St. 

sees  proper  to  abandon  his  property,  349. 

and  evidences  his  intention  by  an  act  ^o  horning  v.  Gould,  16  Wend.   (N. 

legally    sufficient    to    vest     or     divest  Y.)   531. 


§     109  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  132 

an  estoppel  in  pais  than  upon  the  theory  of  abandonment. °^  An 
abandonment  can  not  be  made  in  favor  of  any  particular  person, 
and  must  be  without  any  intention  or  desire  that  any  other  par- 
ticular person  shall  thereby  acquire  any  rights  in  the  property.®^ 
The  abandonment  of  a  homestead  by  the  widow  or  minor  chil- 
dren destroy  their  homestead  right  in  the  premises. °^  But  their 
temporary  absence  from  the  premises  has  been  held  not  an  aban- 
donment such  as  will  deprive  them  of  the  right.''* 

§  109.  Eminent  domain. — Among  the  ways  of  acquiring 
title  by  purchase  may  be  included  title  acquired  by  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.^^  Eminent  domain  is  the  right- 
ful authority  which  exists  in  every  sovereignty  to  control  and 
regulate  those  rights  of  a  public  nature  which  pertain  to  its  citi- 
zens in  common,  and  to  appropriate  and  control  individual  prop- 
erty for  the  publi-c  benefit,  as  the  public  safety,  necessity,  con- 
venience, and  welfare  may  demand.  This  power  has  its  limits 
fixed  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several 
states  which  provide  that  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
public  use  without  just  compensation.^*^  The  right  to  exercise 
this  power  is  limited  to  cases  in  which  the  public  have  an  interest."'^ 
The  power  may  be  delegated  to  corporations,  public^^  or  private,^^ 
and  even  to  individuals,^  providing  such  corporations  or  individ- 
uals are  engaged  in  some  public  enterprise,  and  the  property  is 
taken  for  the  benefit  of  the  public." 

Cities  and  towns  take  property  in  this  manner  for  streets  and 
parks;  railroad,  turnpike,  telegraph,  telephone,  canal,  ferry,  gas, 
water,  and  irrigation  companies  condemn  land  for  right  of  way, 
and  exercise  tWs  right  when  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  legisla- 

"1  Welland    Canal   v.    Hathaway,    8  ^^  Warner  v.  Gunnison,  2  Colo.  App. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  840,  24  Am.  Dec.  51.  430,   31    Pac.  238;   Kansas     City     v. 

"2  Stephens    v.    Mansfield,    11    Cal.  Marsh   Oil   Co.,   140   Mo.   458,   41    S. 

363.  W.  943. 

93Farnan  v.   Borders,   119  111.  228,  9»  Postal    Telegraph-Cable    Co.    v. 

10  N.  E.  550;  Carrigan  v.  Rowell,  96  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  Ind.  App.  654. 

Tenn.  185,  34  S.  W.  4.  66  N.  E.  919. 

«4  Carter  v.  Randolph.  47  Tex.  Z76.  i  Pool    v.    Simmons,    134    Cal.   621. 

"5  Kohl  V.  United  States,  91  U.  S.  66    Pac.    872;    Peterson    v.    Bean,   22 

367,  23  L.  ed.  449 ;  Burt  v.  Merchants'  Utah  43,  61   Pac.  213. 

Ins.  Co.,  106  Mass.  356,  8  Am.  Rep.  2  Gaylord  v.  Sanitary  Dist.,  204  111. 

339.  576,  68  N.  E.  522,  63  L.  R.  A.  582,  98 

ec  2  Kent  Comm.  339.  Am.   St.   235 ;    Peterson   v.    Bean,   22 

"-  Board  of  Health  v.  Van  Hoesen,  Utah  43,  61  Pac.  213. 
87  Mich.  533,  49  N.  W.  894. 


133  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING   TITLE  §    109 

ture,  with  whom  rests  the  power  to  determine  the  manner  in 
which,  and  the  purposes  for  which,  it  may  be  exercised.^ 

Where  the  pubhc  necessity  requires  it,  any  kind  of  property, 
whether  tangible  or  intangible,  is  subject  to  condemnation.*  Thus, 
where  the  public  necessity  requires  it,  condemnation  may  be  had 
of  church  property,^  a  private  bridge,®  the  property  of  a  railway 
company,'  the  water  flowing  from  springs,^  the  waters  of  a 
creek,"  lands  belonging  to  the  state, ^^  property  of  a  cemetery 
association,"  a  homestead  occupied  as  a  residence,^"  the  franchise 
of  a  corporation,^^  and  lands  under  navigable  waters  owned  by 
private  individuals/*  Also  property  already  devoted  to  public 
use  may  be  thus  appropriated.^^ 

Where  it  is  desired  to  appropriate  land  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  navy  yards,  arsenals,  or  for  sites  for  post-office  build- 
ings, custom  houses  and  the  like,  the  government,  if  it  can  not 
secure  desirable  property  by  purchase,  institutes  by  its  proper 
officers  proceedings  in  the  proper  courts  within  whose  jurisdic- 
diction  the  land  lies,  to  have  the  value  of  the  land  ascertained. 
Upon  payment  of  the  amount  so  ascertained,  the  title  vests  in  the 
government.  But  this  right  is  exercised  in  another  way  when 
private  individuals  or  corporations  for  their  own  profit  embark 
in  enterprises  which  perform  some  public  service.  It  can  only 
be  exercised  by  them  where  the  property  is  taken  for  a  public 
use,  and  where  the  property  condemned  is  necessary  to  enable 
the  public  use  to  be  carried  into  effect.  It  is  also  a  condition  that 
compensation  must  be  made  to  the  owner,  and  it  is  generally 
held  that  payment  must  be  made  before  entry. ^® 

3  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Long.  69  ^^  Woodmere    Cemetery    v.    Roulo, 

Conn.  424,  2>1  Atl.  1070 ;  Chicago  &c.  104  Mich.  595,  62  N.  W.  1010. 

R.  Co.  V.  Pontiac,  169  111.  155,  48  N.  i2jockheck   v.    Board   of    Commis- 

E.  485.  sioners,  53  Kans.  780,  11  Pac.  621. 

*  Rigney  v.  Chicago,  102  111.  64.  ^^  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Southern 

5  Macon  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Riggs,  87  Ga.  Cal.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Cal.  221,  43  Pac.  602. 

158,  13  S.  E.  312.  14  Kerr  v.  West  Shore  R.  Co.,  127 

« Blaine    County     v.     Brewster,    32  N.  Y.  269.  27  N.  E.  833. 

Nebr.  264,  49  N.  W.  183.  is  Samish     River     Boom     Co.     v. 

7  Pittsburgh  Junction  R.  Co.  v.  Al-  Union   Boom   Co.,  32   Wash.  586,  1Z 

leghany  R.   Co.,    146  Pa.   St.  297,  23  Pac.  670. 

Atl.  313.  ifi  Southern   R.   Co.   v.   Hayes.    150 

«  Ely  V.  Ferguson,  91   Cal.   187,  27  Ala.  212  43  So.  487 ;  Knoth  v.  Man- 

Pac.  587.  hattan  R.  Co.,   187  N.  Y.  243,  79  N. 

»  Santa  Cruz  v.  Enright,  95  Cal.  105,  E.  1015 ;  State  v.  Wells,  142  N.  Car. 

30  Pac.  197.  590,  55  S.  E.  210;  McCord  v.  Eastern 

10  Friedrichs  v.  New  Orleans,  B.  &  R.  Co.  136  Wis.  254,  116  N.  W.  845. 
T.  Co.,  114  La.  95,  38  So.  32. 


no 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


134 


§  110.  Title  and  rights  acquired  by  condemnation. — As  a 
general  rule  the  right  or  interest  acquired  by  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  is  limited  to  the  use  of  the  property 
appropriated,  and  does  not  deprive  the  owner  of  the  fee  there- 
in/' This  is  especially  true  of  property  condemned  for  a  public 
highway, ^"^  a  turnpike, ^'^  a  street,"'^  a  park,^^  an  aqueduct,"  or  a 
telephone  route. "^  The  right  acquired  is  an  easement  running 
with  the  land,-"*  and  is  usually  regarded  as  perpetual,  but  in  case 
of  non-user  or  failure  to  pay  damages  the  land  reverts  to  the 
owner  of  the  fee  disincumbered  of  the  easement.""  While  the 
condemnation  of  land  for  railroad  purposes  will  usually  pass  an 
easement  only,^*^  yet  it  has  been  held  to  vest  a  fee  in  the  company.-' 

The  fee  simple  title  to  condemned  property  passes  only  where 
the  absolute  and  unconditional  price  is  paid  therefor,^*  or  where 
the  statute  provides  that  a  complete  title  shall  pass."^  The  power 
of  eminent  domain  "when  exercised  acts  upon  the  land  itself, 
not  upon  the  title,  or  the  sum  of  the  titles  if  there  are  diversified 
interests.  Upon  appropriation  all  inconsistent  proprietary  rights 
are  divested,  and  not  only  privies  but  strangers  are  concluded. 
Thereafter  whoever  may  have  been  the  owner,  or  whatever  may 
have  been  the  quality  of  his  estate  he  is  entitled  to  full  com- 
pensation according  to  his  interest  and  the  extent  of  the  taking, 
but  the  paramount  right  is  in  the  public,  not  as  claiming  under 
him,  by  a  statutory  grant,  but  by  an  independent  title. "^*' 


17  Morris  v.  Sdiollsville  &c.  Tpk. 
Rd.,  6  Bush  (Ky.)  671;  Shields  v. 
Norfolk  &c.  R.  Co.,  129  N.  Car.  1,  39 
S.  E.  582 ;  Muhle  v.  New  York  &c.  R. 
Co.,  86  Tex.  459,  25  S.  W.  607. 

1^  Hagaman  v.  Moore,  84  Ind.  496. 

19  Kelly  V.  Donahoe,  2  Mete.  (Ky.) 
482. 

20  Harris  v.  Chicago,  162  111.  288, 
44  N.  E.  437. 

21  Devine  v.  Lord,  175  Mass.  384,  56 
N.  E.  570. 

22  In  re  Thompson,  57  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
419,  10  N.  Y.  S.  705. 

23  Lockie  v.  Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co., 
103  111.  401. 

2*  Deavitt  v.  Washington  County,  75 
Vt.  156,  53  Atl.  563. 

2'''  Waterliury  v.  Piatt,  76  Conn.  435, 
56  Atl.  856;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Clapp.  201  111.  418.  66  N.  E.  -223; 
Remey  v.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  Co.,  116  Iowa 
133,  89  N.  W.  218. 


2"  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Colorado 
Postal  Tel.  &c.  Co.,  30  Colo.  133,  69 
Pac.  564.  97  Am.  St.  106;  Gurney  v. 
Minneapolis  Union  Elevator  Co.,  63 
Minn.  70,  65  N.  W.  136,  30  L.  R.  A. 
534. 

27  Challiss  V.  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co., 
16  Kans.  117;  Troy  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pot- 
ter. 42  Vt.  265,  1  Am.  Rep.  325. 

2'^  Driscoll  V.  New  Haven,  75  Conn. 
92.  52  Atl.  618 ;  Detroit  City  R.  Co.  v. 
Mills,  85  Mich.  634,  48  N."W.  1007; 
U.  S.  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Delaware  &c. 
R.  Co.,  62  N.  J.  L.  254,  41  Atl.  759, 
42  L.  R.  A.  572. 

2!' Fox  V.  Western  Pac.  R.  Co.,  31 
Cal.  538;  Dodson  v.  Cincinnati,  34 
Oliio  St.  276. 

•io  Weeks  v.  Grace,  194  Mass.  296; 
80  N.  E.  220,  9  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1092n,  10  Ann.  Cas.  1077. 


135  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING  TITLE  §    111 

§  111.  Escheat. — Under  the  feudal  system  an  escheat  was 
the  resumption  of  the  fee  by  the  lord  when  issue  failed  or  where 
the  estate  was  lost  by  the  crime  of  the  tenant.  In  this  country 
when  a  man  dies  intestate  and  without  heirs,  the  title  to  his  real 
property  reverts  or  escheats  to  the  people,  as  forming  part  of  the 
common  stock  of  the  community,  it  being  a  fundamental  princi- 
ple that,  if  the  ownership  of  property  becomes  vacant,  the  right 
must  necessarily  subside  into  the  whole  community  in  whom  it 
was  vested  at  the  origin  of  society.  The  state  by  sovereign  right, 
and  as  the  original  source  of  all  title,  ownership  and  right  of  pos- 
session in  lands,  becomes  entitled,  upon  the  failure  of  heirs,  to  the 
estate  of  an  intestate  as  the  final  and  ultimate  heir. 

Escheat  by  forfeiture  for  corruption  of  blood  by  attainder  for 
crime  is  prohibited  generally  in  this  country.  With  us  escheat 
takes  place  only  in  case  an  owner  dies  intestate  without  heirs 
capable  of  inheriting.^^  An  escheat  will  not  be  permitted  so 
long  as  kindred  capable  of  inheriting  can  be  found.  The  title  to 
land  can  not  be  in  abeyance  but  must  vest  somewhere,  and  where 
the  escheat  is  for  want  of  heirs,  it  takes  place  at  the  instant  the 
owner  dies  intestate  and  no  inquisition  of  office  is  needed  to  vest 
the  title. ^"  In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  when  property  is  thus 
acquired,  the  state  can  not  make  its  title  available  without  first 
establishing  it  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law.^^  But  where  an 
inquisition  is  provided  for,  it  is  only  the  means  by  which  the 
state  declares,  ascertains,  or  furnishes  record  evidence  of  an  es- 
cheat.^* Lands  which  fall  to  the  state  by  virtue  of  an  escheat  are 
not  in  the  position  of  vacant  lands,  but  come  to  the  state  with 
such  rights  as  the  last  tenant  held  in  them,"^  and  will  be  held  liable 
for  the  debts  of  the  last  owner.^*'  Statutes  providing  for  the 
disposition  of  estates  of  unknown  heirs  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  a 
species  of  escheat.  If  such  estates  are  not  claimed  it  would  seem 
that  they  would  lapse  to  the  state  as  unclaimed  estates.^^ 

At  common  law  the  lands  of  an  alien  may  be  claimed  by  the 

"1  Meadowcroft  v.  Winnebago  Co.,  ss  Wallahan    v.    Ingersoll,    117    111. 

181   111.  504,  54  N.  E.  949;   Crane  v.  123,  7  N.  E.  519. 

Reeder,  21  Mich.  24,  4  Am.  Rep.  430;  3*  Sands  v.  Lvnham,  27  Grat.  (Va.) 

Van  Kleek  v.  O'hanlon,  21   N.  J.  L.  291,  21  Am.  Rep.  348. 

582.  sr,  Hughes  v.  State,  41  Tex.  10. 

"2  State    V.    Reeder.    5   Nebr.  203;  -c  State  v.  Meyer,  63  Ind.  33. 

Mooers  v.   White,  6  Johns.  Ch.    (N.  s- state  v.  Meyer,  63  Ind.  33. 
Y.)  360:  Rubeck  v.  Gardner,  7  Watts 
(Pa.)  455. 


§112  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  136 

State  by  escheat  upon  office  found,  but  until  so  claimed  he  may 
convey  title  thereto  f^  but  it  has  been  held  that  the  estate  so  con- 
veyed may  be  forfeited  in  the  hands  of  the  grantee. ^^  At  common 
law,  in  the  absence  of  direct  heirs,  the  estates  of  illegitimates 
dying  intestate  escheated  to  the  state.*''  Upon  the  death  of  an  in- 
testate owner  without  heirs,  but  leaving  a  wife  surviving,  the 
escheat  of  the  property  does  not  affect  the  right  of  dower  in  the 
wife.^^ 

§  112.  Confiscation. — Confiscation  is  the  act  of  the  sov- 
ereign against  a  rebellious  subject,  or  against  an  alien  enemy 
during  war,  whereby  the  property  of  such  subject  or  enemy  is 
appropriated  to  the  use  of  the  state.  It  is  either  based  upon 
penal  justice  for  the  punishment  of  crimes  against  the  state  or 
upon  the  exercise  of  a  belligerent  right  against  the  property  of 
public  enemies,*^  The  term  ordinarily  implies  a  taking  by  some 
extraordinary  process,  or  for  some  extraordinary  purpose  other 
than  the  general  purpose  of  government  or  the  general  process  of 
taxation.^^  It.  may  be  employed  as  a  punishment  for  carrying 
contraband  of  war,  or  for  attempting  to  carry  supplies  to  a  place 
besieged  or  blockaded.  It  may  be  effected  by  such  means,  sum- 
mary or  arbitrary,  as  the  sovereign,  expressing  its  will  through 
lawful  channels,  may  please  to  adopt.**  The  estate  forfeited  by  a 
proceeding  in  confiscation  is  the  life  estate  of  the  offender,  the 
fee  remaining  in  him  after  the  confiscation,  but  without  power  of 
alienation  until  his  disability  is  removed.*^  It  has  been  held  that 
after  confiscation  the  fee  simple  title  was  withheld  from  confisca- 
tion exclusively  for  the  benefit  of  the  heirs  of  the  offender,  and 
that  they  alone  could  take  it  at  the  termination  of  the  life  estate 
which  was  conveyed  to  the  purchaser  at  the  confiscation  sale.*** 

§  113.  Forfeiture. — Title  by  forfeiture  is  a  title  which  the 
state  acquires  to  the  property  of  a  felon  who,  with  his  heirs,  dev- 

38  Halstead    v.    Lake    Co.,    56    Ind.  "2  The  Globe,  10  Fed.  Cas.  No.  5484. 

363  ;  Sheafife  v.  O'Neil,  1  Mass.  256 ;  «  state  v.  Sargent,  12  Mo.  App.  228. 

Montgomery  v.  Darion,  7  N.  H.  475 ;  ^4  Winchester  v.  United   States,   14 

Abrams   v.   State,   45   Wash.   327,  88  Ct.  CI.  13. 

Pac.  327.  4"^  United  States  v.  Dunnington,  146 

3»Scanlan     v.     Wright,     13     Pick  U.  S.  338,  13  Sup.  Ct.  79;  Menger  v. 

(Mass.)   523,  25  Am.  Dec.  344;  Peo-  Carruthers,  3  Kans.  App.  75,  44  Pac. 

pie  V.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  67.  1096. 

40  Doe  V.   Bates,  6  Blackf.    (Ind.)  ^o  Lgdoux  v.  Lavedan,  52  La.  Ann. 

533.  311,  27  So.  196. 

■114  Kent  Comm.  49. 


I 


137  METHODS    OF   ACQUIRING  TITLE  §    113 

isees  a«nd  legatees,  are  deprived  of  it  on  account  of,  and  as  a 
punishment  for,  high  crimes.  Such  forfeitures  are  by  constitu- 
tions of  many  states  prohibited.  The  constitution  of  the  United 
States  forbids  forfeiture  beyond  the  hfe  of  the  offender,  and 
when  forfeiture  is  enforced,  the  state  or  national  government 
takes  only  the  title  of  the  offender.*^  By  statute  in  some  states 
a  person  may  be  deprived  of  his  property  for  certain  specified 
causes,  such  for  illustration  as  in  West  Virginia  for  failure  dur- 
ing five  consecutive  years  to  enroll  it  for  taxes.^*  Some  states 
have  reserved  the  right  to  take  realty  from  a  corporation  that 
attempts  to  acquire  more  than  it  is  authorized  to  hold.*^ 

As  between  individuals  forfeiture  has  reference  to  the  method 
by  which  real  estate  reverts  to  a  former  owner  by  operation  of 
law  where  the  estate  is  upon  condition  and  there  has  been  a 
breach.  Where  the  non fulfilment  of  a  condition  works  a  for- 
feiture of  the  estate  the  grantor  may  re-enter  at  this  will.^°  Con- 
ditions involving  forfeitures  are,  however,  not  favored  in  law, 
and  in  case  it  is  doubtful  whether  a  clause  in  a  deed  or  a  covenant, 
the  courts  will  construe  the  clause  as  a  covenant  rather  than  a 
conditioiT.^^ 

4- Shields  V.   Shiflf,   124  U.   S.  351,  R.  A.  634;  Fayette  L.  Co.  v.  Louis- 

8  Sup.  Ct.  510,  31  L.  ed.  445.  ville  &c.  R.  Co.,  93  Va.  274,  24  S.  E. 

4s  King  V.   Mullins,    171   U.   S.  404,  1016. 

18  S.  Ct.  925,  43  L.  ed.  214.  so  Woodruff     v.     Trenton     Water 

49  National    Bank  v.    Matthews,   98  Power  Co.,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  489. 

U.  S.  621,  25  L.  ed.   188;  Matter  of  ^i  pgden  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  IZ 

McGraw,  111  N.  Y.  66,  19  N.  E.  233;  Iowa  328,  35  N.  W.  424,  5  Am.  St. 

Commonwealth  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  680. 
Co.,  132  Pa.  St.  591,  19  Atl.  291,  7  L. 


\ 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  PUBLIC  RECORDS 


SEC. 

115.  Public  records  generally. 

116.  Style  of  office  under  which  re- 
cording is  done. 

117.  What  constitutes  recording. 

118.  Object  of  recording  acts. 

119.  Particular  instruments  which 
may  be  recorded. 

120.  Proper  execution  and  acknowl- 
edgment as  a  prerequisite  to  re- 
cording. 

121.  Books  in  which  instruments 
must  be  recorded. 

122.  Time  of  recording. 

123.  Time  allowed  by  statute  for  re- 
cording deeds  and  other  instru- 
ments. 

124.  Place  of  recording. 


SEC. 

125.  EfTect  of  a  record  duly  made. 

126.  The  doctrine  of  notice. 

127.  Actual  notice. 

128.  Implied  notice. 

129.  Constructive  notice. 

130.  Official  tract  indexes. 

131.  General  index  of  records. 

132.  Whether  the  index  is  a  part  of 
the  record. 

133.  Records    of    attachment    and    lis 
pendens. 

134.  Index  of  judgment  records. 

135.  Tax  records. 

136.  Records  of  vital  statistics. 

137.  Abstracters'    use    of    public    rec- 
ords. 

138.  Loss  or  destruction  of  records. 


§  115.  Public  records  generally. — As  an  abstract  must  set 
out  the  items  of  record  which  affect  the  title  to  a  particular  tract 
of  land,  the  examiner  must  make  himself  familiar  with  the  pub- 
lic records  of  the  jurisdiction  in  which  the  search  is  to  be  carried 
on.  The  information  or  data  from  which  the  abstract  must  be 
compiled  will  be  found  in  certain  depositories  prescribed  by  law, 
as  will  be  hereinafter  shown. 

By  "public  record"  is  meant  any  "written  memorial  made  by 
a  public  officer  authorized  by  law  to  perform  *that  function,  and 
intended  to  serve  as  evidence  of  something  written,  said  or  done."^ 
By  such  records  interested  persons  may  ascertain  the  ownership 
of  a  particular  tract  of  land,  all  estates  or  interests  therein  and 
all  liens  and  incumbrances  thereon.  By  such  record  the  deeds 
through  which  a  purchaser  derives  his  title  are  put  in  a  perma- 
nent shape.  Because  of  the  fact  that  the  entries  made  therein  by 
a  public  officer  are  of  public  interest  and  notoriety  such  records 
are  designated  as  "public  records,"  It  is  a  public  document,  be- 
longing to  the  state,  and  is  in  no  sense  a  private  memorandum.^ 


1  Bouvier  Law  Diet..  Vol.  2.  p.  424.     Clay  v, 
-  Coleman     v.     Commonwealth,    25     262. 
Grat.    (Va.)    865,   18  Am.   Rep.   711; 

138 


Ballard,  87  Va.  787,  13  S.  E. 


139  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     116 

In  order  to  give  a  document  the  character  of  a  public  record  it 
is  not  necessary  that  there  be  an  express  statutory  requirement 
that  it  shall  be  kept,  or  that  it  be  of  such  a  nature  that  its  keep- 
ing is  indispensable.  The  acts  of  congress  and  of  the  state  legis- 
latures are  public  records,  and  when  signed  by  the  presiding  offi- 
cer of  both  houses,  approved  by  the  executive,  and  filed  in  the 
proper  public  ofiice,  they  become  permanent  public  records  of  the 
highest  type.  A  written  history  of  an  action  at  law  or  a  suit  in 
equity  from  its  commencement  to  its  termination,  drawn  up  by  the 
proper  officer  and  entered  upon  a  record  provided  for  that  pur- 
pose, is  a  public  record  of  recognized  dignity.  In  this  country 
every  conveyance  of  real  estate  by  deed  or  mortgage  is  subject  to 
recording  laws,  by  which  its  priority  as  respects  other  convey- 
ances depends  for  the  most  part  upon  priority  of  record.  These 
laws  grew  up  with  the  country,  and  records  made  in  pursuance  of 
such  laws  are  public  records.  Such  acts  of  the  different  states 
are  alike  in  their  purpose  and  in  their  most  important  features, 
but  differ  in  minor  matters  and  in  details.  Records  made  in  pur- 
suance of  such  acts  are  of  controlling  efficacy  in  the  state  w^here 
made,  and  full  faith  and  credit  is  given  in  each  state  of  the  rec- 
ords of  every  other  state. 

§  116.  Style  of  office  under  w^hich  recording  is  done. — 
Public  records  must  be  kept  by  proper  authority,  and  the  officer 
making  the  entries  must  have  express  or  implied  authority  to 
make  same,^  and  the  instrument  must  be  filed  with  such  accom- 
paniments as  make  it  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  receive  it  for 
registration.* 

The  officer  charged  with  the  duty  of  keeping  such  record  and 
of  making  entries  therein  is  variously  named  in  the  diff'erent 
jurisdictions.  In  some  states  the  authority  and  duty  of  receiv- 
ing and  recording  deeds  is  incident  to  an  office  primarily  created 
for  a  diff'erent  purpose.  Thus  in  Illinois  the  clerk  of  the  circuit 
court  in  all  counties  having  a  population  of  less  than  sixty  thou- 
sand has  the  duty  of  registering  deeds.  In  Nebraska  the  county 
clerk  in  all  counties  having  a  population  not  exceeding  eighteen 
thousand  and  three  is  the  proper  recorder  of  deeds.  In  Maine, 
New  Hampshire,  Alassachusetts,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Minne- 

3  Adams  v.  Buhler,  131  Ind.  66,  30        *  Cunninggim   v.    Peterson,    109   N. 
N.  E.  883.  Car.  33,  13  S.  E.  714. 


§     117  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  140 

sola,  Kansas,  Nebraska  and  the  Dakotas  the  officer  is  called  a 
"registrar  of  deeds;"  in  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee,  a  "reg- 
ister;" in  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado,  Idaho,  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Montana,  Pennsylvania  and  West  Virginia,  a  "recorder;"  in 
Delaware  and  Missouri,  a  "recorder  of  deeds;"  and  in  Iowa,  Ne- 
vada, Ohio  and  Oregon,  a  "county  recorder."  In  Connecticut, 
Rhode  Island  and  New  Hampshire,  the  town  clerk  has  the  duty 
of  recording  the  deeds  to  real  estate  within  the  corporate  limits 
of  towns,  but  in  all  other  states  the  county  is  the  unit  for  record- 
ing all  instruments  relating  to  real  property.  In  the  city  of  New 
York  the  "register  of  deeds"  records  all  instruments  of  convey- 
ance pertaining  to  real  estate  within  the  city  limits,  but  dee'ds  to 
lands  outside  the  city  are  recorded  by  the  clerk  of  the  county 
w^herein  the  land  is  situated.  In  New  Jersey,  Virginia,  Kentucky, 
Texas,  Maryland,  Florida,  Mississippi  and  Georgia,  the  clerk  of 
the  court  of  the  county  has  the  duty  of  recording  such  instru- 
ments. In  Alabama  such  record  is  made  and  kept  by  the  judge  of 
the  probate  court.  In  Washington  this  duty  is  performed  by  the 
county  auditor, 

§  117.  What  constitutes  recording. — A  deed  is  sufficiently 
recorded  by  depositing  it  with  the  person  in  charge  of  the  regis- 
tration office,  though  such  person  be  neither  the  official  recorder 
nor  a  deputy  of  his,  for  the  recorder  is  responsible  for  the  acts  of 
the  person  whom  he  has  placed  in  charge  of  the  office  and  the 
acts  of  such  person  in  custody  of  the  records  are  the  acts  o-f  the 
recorder.'"^  The  registration  of  a  conveyance  being  purely  a  min- 
isterial act,  the  recorder  is  not  disqualified  from  acting  by  reason 
of  his  being  a  party  to  the  deed."  The  recorder  is  usually  re- 
quired by  statute  to  attest  the  record  by  his  signature,  but  in  th.e 
absence  of  such  requirement  a  copy  of  the  record  is  admissible  in 
evidence  though  this  has  not  been  signed  by  the  officer.^  The 
payment  of  the  recording  fee  is  not  a  prerequisite  to  a  valid  rec- 
ord of  a  deed  if  the  recorder  receives  it  for  record.  If  he  waives 
his  right  to  a  prepayment  .of  such  fee,  he  is  bound  to  make  a 
proper  record  of  the  deed.^  But  where  the  statute  provides  that 
the  registration  tax  shall  be  paid  before  the  instrument  is  re- 

5  Cook  V.   Hall.  6  Gil.    (111.)    575;  ^  wilt  v.  Cutler,  38  Mich.  189. 

Bishop  V.  Cook.  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  326,  «  Bussing  v.  Crain,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

8  Brockenborough     v.     Melton,     55  593;  People  v.  Bristol,  35  Mich.  28. 
Tex.  493. 


141  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     117 

corded,  such  payment  must  be  made  before  the  instrument  left 
for  record  will  operate  as  notice  to  creditors  or  innocent  pur- 
chasers for  value. ^  Even  a  provision  of  a  statute,  that  no  deed 
shall  be  admitted  to  record  until  the  fee  for  recording  is  paid,  is 
regarded  as  directory  merely,  and  the  record  is  valid.  The  re- 
corder in  such  case  assumes  the  fee  or  tax.^"  But  if  a  deed  is 
sent  to  a  recorder  by  mail  or  otherwise  to  be  recorded,  without 
the  fee  for  recording,  and  the  recorder  in  consequence  of  not  re- 
ceiving the  fee  "pigeon-holes"  it,  the  deed  is  not  lodged  for  rec- 
ord so  as  to  be  notice  to  a  subsequent  bona  fide  creditor  of  the 
vendor."  But  if  the  recorder  receives  the  deed  without  the  fee 
being  paid  and  enters  it  as  a  deed  received,  or  indorses  such  entry 
upon  the  deed,  and  he  allows  the  entry  to  stand,  he  can  not  be 
held  to  contradict  such  entry  upon  finding  that  his  fees  are  not 
in  fact  paid.^"  Under  a  statute  giving  instruments  of  title  effect 
from  the  time  they  are  filed  for  record,  and  requiring  the  recorder 
to  keep  a  book  for  indexing  all  papers  presented  for  record,  the 
failure  of  such  officer  to  keep  the  index  will  not  prejudice  the 
title  of  one  leaving  his  deed  for  record. ^^  Nor  will  a  mistake  on 
the  part  of  the  officer  in  making  the  record  prejudice  the  grantee; 
he  being  protected  by  leaving  his  deed  for  record. ^^ 

A  mortgage  duly  filed  for  record  is,  in  contemplation  of  law, 
deemed  recorded,  and  becomes  notice  to  all  the  world.  But  if 
it  is  subsequently  withdrawn  from  the  files  by  the  mortgagee  be- 
fore being  spread  upon  the  record,  it  is  ineffectual  as  notice  until 
reinstated. ^^  A  grantee  who  deposits  his  deed  for  record  in  the 
auditor's  office,  which  deed  is  received  by  that  officer,  discharges 
his  duty  of  notice  to  the  public,  and  his  title  can  not  be  prejudiced 
through  the  fault  of  the  auditor.  A  title  paper  is  deemed  to  be 
filed  when  it  is  delivered  to  the  proper  officer,  and  by  him  received 
to  be  kept  on  file  or  recorded.^*'  When  a  person  deposits  his  title 
papers  in  the  proper  custody  and  for  the  proper  purpose  to  charge 
others  with  notice,  he  has  discharged  his  whole  duty  in  the  mat- 

»  Martin  v.  Bates,  20  Ky.  L.   1798.  erson  v.  Bowers,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  295,  11 

50  S.  W.  38;  Orr  v.  Sutton.  119  Alinn.  Atl.  142. 

193.  137  N.  W.  973,  42  L.  R.  A.   (N.        12  simon  v.  Sewell.  64  Ala.  241. 
S.)  146.  13  Cook  V.  Hall,  6  Gil.  (111.)  579. 

10  Hoffman  v.  Mackall.  5  Ohio  St.         i*  Merrick  v.  Wallace,  19  111.  496. 
124,  64  Am.  Dec' 637;  Lucas  v.  Claf-         i"' Worcester  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cheeney, 

flin,  76  Va.  269.  87  111.  602. 

iiBurnham   v.    Farmers'    Loan    &c.         i«  Oats  v.  Walls.  28  Ark.  244 ;  Reed 

Co.,  44  Nebr.  438,  63  N.  W.  45 ;  Dick-  v.  Acton,  120  Mass.  130. 


§     118  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  142 

ter.  The  law  does  not  impose  upon  him  the  task  of  following  the 
officer  to  see  that  he  discharges  his  official  duties  in  respect  to  the 
matter/^ 

§  118.  Object  of  recording  acts. — Registry  laws  are  in- 
tended to  furnish  the  best  and  most  easily  accessible  evidence  of 
the  title  to  real  estate ;  to  the  end  that  those  designing  to  purchase 
may  be  fully  informed  of  instruments  of  prior  date  affecting  the 
subject  of  their  contemplated  purchase,  and  also  that  having 
availed  themselves  of  this  means  of  knowledge  they  may  rest 
there,  and  purchase  in  absolute  security;  provided,  that  they  do  so 
without  knowledge,  information  or  such  suggestions  from  other 
facts,  as  would  be  gross  negligence  to  ignore,  of  some  antecedent 
conveyance  or  equitable  claim.  The  object  of  recording  acts  is  to 
impart  information  to  parties  dealing  wath  property  respecting  its 
transfers  and  incumbrances,  and  thus  to  protect  them  from  prior 
secret  conveyances  and  liens. '^  The  policy  of  such  acts  is  that  the 
title  to  real  estate  and  all  that  effects  it  should  be  disclosed  by  the 
public  records,  and  upon  the  theory  that  the  record  makes  such 
disclosure,  the  rule  obtains  that  a  purchaser  may  rely  upon  the 
title  as  it  appears  of  record,  and  that  he  will  be  protected  against 
unrecorded  conveyances,  outstanding  equities,  secret  liens  and 
conditions  of  which  he  has  no  notice, ^^  These  acts  in  substance 
provide  that  all  conveyances  of  real  estate  shall  be  void  as  against 
subsecjuent  purchasers  in  good  faith  without  notice,  unless  they 
are  recorded  in  the  registry  of  deeds  for  the  county  where  the 
land  lies."° 

Every  subsequent  purchaser  is  bound  to  take  notice  of  a  re- 

1' Lytic  V.   Arkansas,   9  How.    (U.  ligan,   108  Ind.  419,  9  N.  E.  392,  58 

S.)  314,  13  L.  ed.  153;  Oats  v.  Walls,  Am.  Rep.  49;  Testart  v.  Belot,  31  La. 

28  Ark.  244 ;  Merrick  v.  Wallace,  19  Ann.  795 ;  Bailey  v.  Myrick,  50  Maine 

111.  486;  Lee  V.  Bcrmingham,  30  Kans.  171;    Columbia    Bank    v.    Jacobs,    10 

312,   1   Pac.  72> ;   Mangold  v.   Barlow,  Mich.  349,  81  Am.  Dec.  792 ;  Cogan  v. 

61  Miss.  593,  48  Am.  Rep.  84;  In  re  Cook,  22  Minn.  137;  Roll  v.  Rea,  50 

Woods'  Appeal,  82  Pa.  St.  116;  Nich-  N.  J.  L.  266,  12  Atl.  905;  Harrington 

ols  V.  Reynolds,   1   R.   I.  30,  36  Am.  v.  Erie  County  Sav.  Bank,  101  N.  Y. 

Dec.  238;  Throckmorton  v.  Price,  28  257,  4  N.   E.  346;   Ramsev  v.  Jones, 

Tex.  605,  91  Am.  Dec.  334;  Ferris  v.  41   Ohio   St.  685;    Pancake  v.  Couff- 

Smith,  24  Vt.  27.  man.    114    Pa.    St.    113,    7    Atl.    67; 

^^  Patterson    v.    De    La    Ronde,    8  Wright  v.  Lassiter,  71  Tex.  604,   10 

Wall.  (U.  S.)  292,  19  L.  ed.  415.  S.    W.    295;    Hart    v.    Farmers'    &c. 

inVilliams   v.   Jackson,    107   U.    S.  Bank,  Zi  Vt.  252;  Hoyt  v.  Jones,  31 

478,  2   Sup.   Ct.   814,  27   L.   ed.  529;  Wis.  389. 

Kearnes  v.  Hill,  21  Fla.  185;  Hathorn  -"See  statutes  of  various  states. 
V.  Maynard,  65  Ga.  168;  Quick  v.  Mil- 


143  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    118 

corded  deed  in  the  line  of  title  previously  recorded,  although  he 
has  no  actual  notice  of  it.  If  he  has  relied  upon  the  representa- 
tions of  his  grantor  in  regard  to  the  title  to  the  premises  without 
consulting  the  record,  which  is  always  open  to  his  inspection,  he 
has  done  so  at  his  peril ;  and  although  he  may  in  such  case  be  an 
innocent  purchaser  in  fact,  he  is  not  regarded  as  such  in  law,^'- 
The  purpose  of  such  acts  is  by  registration  to  impart  constructive 
notice  of  deeds  and  other  instruments  affecting  the  title  to  real 
estate,  and  to  authorize  priority  of  title  in  accordance  with  pri- 
ority of  registration.  In  general,  registration  is  equivalent  to 
actual  notice,  and  actual  notice  is  equivalent  to  registration.  But 
the  record  imparts  constructive  notice  only  to  such  instruments  as 
the  statutes  require  or  authorize  the  recording  of.  And  though 
the  recording  of  the  instrument  is  authorized,  if  entries  are  made 
in  the  reception-book,  or  in  the  index,  which  are  not  required  or 
authorized  to  be  made,  purchasers  are  not  charged  with  construct- 
ive notice  of  such  entries.^" 

Unless  an  instrument  is  such  as  the  law  requires  to  be  recorded, 
putting  it  on  the  record  is  of  no  avail  as  notice  to  persons  dealing 
with  the  same  grantor  and  the  same  land.  As  between  the  parties 
themselves,  registration  is  generally  unnecessary  and  without  ef- 
fect.^^  It  is  as  against  subsequent  purchasers  or  incumbrancers 
for  value  without  notice,  that  recording  is  necessary;  and  as 
against  such  purchasers  recording  is  necessary  to  protect  any  title 
or  interest  in  the  land,  though  this  be  a  mere  easement  such  as  a 
right  of  way.^*  Though  recording  is  not  necessary  as  against  the 
grantor's  heirs,  it  is  necessary  as  against  a  purchaser  from  such 
heirs  having  no  notice  of  the  prior  conveyance.-^  There  are,  how- 
ever, a  few  cases  in  which  it  has  been  held  that  the  protection  af- 

21  Buchanan  v.  International  Bank,  v.  Hampton,  46  Mo.  404 ;  Stevens  v 
78  111.  500;  Acer  v.  Westcott,  46  N.  Morse.  47  N.  H.  532;  Brem  v.  Lock- 
Y.  384,  7  Am.  Rep.  355.  hart,  93  N.  Car.  191. 

22  Ahern  v.  Freeman,  46  Minn.  156,  24  Warnock  v.  Harlow,  96  Cal  298 
48  N.  W.  677,  24  Am.  St.  206.  31  Pac.  166,  31  Am.  St.  209;  Prescott 

23  Smith  V.  Branch  Bank,  21  Ala.  v.  Beyer,  34  Minn.  493.  26  N.  W.  732 ; 
125;  Warnock  v.  Harlow,  96  Cal.  Merriman  v.  Hyde,  9  Nebr  113  2  n' 
298.  31  Pac.  166,  31  Am.  St.  209;  W.  218;  Russell  v.  Nail,  2  Tex  Civ" 
Christy  v.  Burch,  25  Fla.  942,  2  So.  App.  60.  20  S.  W.  1006,  23  S.  W.  901 
258;  Roane  v.  Baker,  120  111.  308,  11  25  Kennedy  v.  Northup,  15  111  148- 
N  E.  246;  Shirk  v.  Thomas,  121  Ind.  Earle  v.  Fiske,  103  Mass.  491;  Welch 
147,  22  N.  E.  976,  16  Am.  St.  381 ;  v.  Ketcham,  48  Minn.  241,  51  N.  W. 
Davis  V.  Lutkiewiez.  11  Iowa  254,  ZZ  113;  Youngblood  v.  Vastine,  46  Mo 
N.  W.  670 :  Van  Husan  v.   Heames,  239,  2  Am.  Rep.  509. 

96  Mich.  504,  56  N.  W.  22;  Stevens 


§119  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  144 

forded  b}-  the  registration  laws  against  unrecorded  conveyances 
extends  only  to  purchasers  from  the  grantor  himself,  and  not  to 
purchasers  from  his  heirs  or  devisees.^" 

§  119.     Particular  instruments  which  may  be  recorded. — 

Statutes  very  generally  provide  that  all  instruments  in  any  man- 
ner affecting  the  title  to  land  shall  be  apparent  on  the  record,  so 
that  interested  parties  may  easily  and  accurately  trace  the  title 
to  all  interests  therein."  Such  requirement  is  either  specifically 
made,  or  may  be  implied.  Thus  where  the  statute  provided  for 
recording  of  "deeds,"  it  was  held  that  the  term  embraced  every 
instrument  in  writing  by  which  any  real  estate  or  interest  therein 
is  created,  aliened,  mortgaged,  or  assigned,  or  by  which  title  to 
real  estate  may  be  affected  in  law  or  equity,  except  wills  and 
leases  for  one  year  or  less."*  Where  recording  acts  make  no  men- 
tion of  instruments  eo  nomine,  but  the  expression  is,  in  effect, 
that  all  transfers  of  any  interest  in  land  must  be  recorded,  they 
have  been  held  to  embrace  mortgages  and  assignment  of  mort- 
gages,^^ equitable  mortgages,^"  agreement  for  extension  of  a 
mortgage,^^  an  instrument  by  a  first  mortgagee  waiving  his  pri- 
ority in  favor  of  a  subsequent  incumbrancer,^"  mortgages  of 
school  certificates,'^^  mortgage  of  a  leasehold  estate,"''*  leases  and 
assigiiment  of  leases,^^  deed  of  gift,^*^  deed  of  assignment,^^ 
revocation  of  a  power  of  attorney,^*  grant  of  an  easement  or 

2«Hill   V.    Meeker,   24   Conn.   211;  3i  Kraft  v.   Holzman,  206  111.  548, 

Hancock  v.  Beverly,  6  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  69  N.  E.  574. 

531.  32Clason  v.  Shepherd,  6  Wis.  369. 

27  Bush  V.  Golden,  17  Conn.  594;  33  Dodge  v.  Silverthorn,  12  Wis. 
Shaw  V.  Wilshire,  65  Maine  485  ;  Hen-  644. 

derson  v.  Pilgrim,  22  Tex.  464.  siLgmbgck  &  Bretz  Eagle  Brewing 

28  Ames  V.  Miller,  65  Nebr.  264,  91  Co.  v.  Kelly,  63  N.  J.  Eq.  401,  51  Atl. 
N.  W.  250.  794. 

29  Hassey  v.  Wilke,  55  Cal.  528;  ^5  Such  seems  to  be  the  case  in 
Ames  V.  Miller,  65  Nebr.  204,  91  N.  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Arizona,  Alaska, 
W.  250 ;  Decker  v.  Boice,  83  N.  Y.  Colorado,  Georgia,  Iowa,  Illinois, 
220;  Gibson  v.  Thomas,  180  N.  Y.  Kansas,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Miss- 
483,  IZ  N.  E.  484;  Merrill  v.  Luce,  issippi,  Missouri,  Nevada,  New  Mex- 
6  S.  Dak.  354,  61  N.  W.  43,  55  Am.  ico,  Oregon  and  Texas.  And  see 
St    894.  Grouse  v.  Mitchell,  130  Mich.  347,  90 

30  Pierce  v.   Jackson,   56  Ala.   599;  N.  W.  Z2,  97  Am.  St.  479. 
Putnam  v.  White,  76  Maine  551 ;  AI-  36  Foster  v.  Mitchell,  15  Ala.  571. 
derson  v.  Ames,  6  Md.  52 ;  Edwards  37  Reeves  v.  Estes,  124  Ala.  303,  26 
V.  McKcrnan,  55  Mich.  520,  22  N.  W.  So.    935;    Steifel   v.    Barton,    IZ    Md. 
20;   Glamorgan  v.  Lane,  9  Mo.  446;  408,  21  Atl.  63;   Eggleston  v.  Harri- 
Hunt  v.  Johnson,   19  N.  Y.  279;   In  son,  61  Ohio  St.  397,  55  N.  E.  993. 

re  Russell's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St..  319;  ss  Arnold  v.  Stevenson,  2  Nev.  234. 
Smith  V.  Neilson,  13  Lea  (Tenn.)  461. 


145  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    119 

right  of  way,^^  receipt  given  for  an  advancement,^"  a  written  rati- 
fication by  an  adult  of  a  conveyance  made  by  him  during  minor- 
ity.*^ contracts  of  sale  of  real  estate,*^  title  bonds/^  party  wall 
contracts,**  certificate  of  sale  issued  to  a  purchaser  at  an  execu- 
tion or  foreclosure  sale,*^  an  instrument  acknowledging  the  non- 
payment of  purchase-money  and  giving  the  vendor  the  right  of 
possession  until  payment,*''  an  assignment  of  purchase-money 
notes  secured  by  a  lien,*^  an  instrument  by  a  partner  releasing  his 
interest  in  partnership  real  estate.*^ 

Where  a  statute  applies  in  terms  to  the  recording  of  deeds  by 
natural  persons  it  has  been  held  to  include  deeds  of  corporations 
also.*^  The  statutes  of  some  states  require  maps  and  plats  of 
land  to  be  recorded.^"  Also  wills  are  sometimes  required  to  be 
recorded  like  deeds  and  other  conveyances  inter  vivos.^^  But  in 
many  states  there  is  no  such  requirement.^-  But  the  courts  have 
refused  to  extend  the  acts  by  construction  so  as  to  embrace  such 
instruments  as  a  bond  for  the  support  of  a  mortgagee,^^  an  assign- 
ment of  an  unrecorded  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,^*  a  bond  for 
title  and  writings  assigning  it,^^  or  an  assignment  of  a  land  cer- 
tificate.^*' 

Patents  from  the  United  States  are  not  within  the  purview  of 
recording  acts  unless  they  are  specially  included;"  the  original 

39  Prescott  V.  Beyer,  34  Minn.  493,        46  Melross  v.  Scott,  18  Ind.  250. 
26  N.  W.  12>;  Taylor  v.  Albermarle         ^^  First    Nat.    Bank    v.    Edgar,    65 

Steam  Nav.  Co.,  105  N.  Car.  484,  10  Nebr.  34,  91  N.  W.  404. 
S.     E.     897 ;     Parker     v.     Meredith        48  Pegram  v.  Owens,  64  Tex.  475. 
(Tenn.),  59  S.  W.  167.  49  Sheehan    v.    Davis,    17   Ohio    St. 

40Pinckney  v.   Pinckney,   114  Iowa  571. 
441,  87  N.  W.  406.  -^'O  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548, 

41  Black  V.  Hills,  36  111.  Zl(i,  87  Am.  17  Sup.  Ct.  966,  42  L.  ed.  270. 

Dec.   224;    Weaver   v.    Carpenter,   42  •'^i  Harrison   v.    Weatherly,    180   111. 

Iowa  343.  418,  54  N.  E.  237;  Evansville  Ice  and 

42  Kent  V.  Williams.  146  Cal.  3,  79  Cold  Storage  Co.  v.  Winsor,  148  Ind. 
Pac.  527 ;  Baltimore  &  O.  S.  W.  R.  682,  48  N.  E.  592 ;  Keith  v.  Keith,  97 
Co.  v.  Brubaker,  217  111.  462,  75  N.  E.  Mo.  223,    10   S.   W.  597;    Lovejoy  v. 
523 ;  McPheeters  v.  Ronning,  95  Minn.  Raymond,  58  Vt.  509,  2  Atl.  156. 
164,  103  N.  W.  889.  52  Currell  v.  Villars,  72  Fed.  330. 

43McFarran  v.  Knox,  5  Colo.  217;  53  Noyes    v.    Sturdivant,    18    Maine 

De  Wolf  v.  Pratt,  42  111.  198;  Macrae  104. 

y   Goodbar,  80  Miss.  315,  31  So.  812;  54  Early    Times    Distillery    Co.    v. 

Hunt  v.  Johnson,  19  N.  Y.  279;  Scar-  Zeiger,  11  N.  Mex.  221,  67  Pac.  734. 

borough  v.  Arrant,  25  Tex.   129.  5.5  Cochran  v.  Adler,   121   Ala.  442 

44  Parsons   v.    Baltimore   Bldg.   &c.  25   So.  761. 

^ssn.,  44  W.  Va.  335,  29  S.  E.  999,  50  Palkner  v.  Jones,   12  Ala.   165. 

S^'^j  St.  769.  n-  Rhinehart  v.  Schuyler,  7  111.  473 ; 

c,%;^^'^ber  v.  Kastner,  5  Ariz.  324,  David   v.    Rickabaugh,   32   Iowa   540; 

w-      r         "'    I^aymond  V.   PauH,   21  Sands  v.  Davis,  40  Mich.   14;   PZvitts 

W>s.  531.  V.    Roth,    61    Tex.    81  ;    Sayward    v. 

10 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


^     120  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  146 

record  in  iho  p^ciicrril  I.iml  office  from  wliicli  (licy  arc  issued  bc- 
iiii;  held  notice  io  the  world  of  their  existence/'' 

ll  is  provided  hy  statute  in  nearly  all  the  stales,  lhouj;li  in 
somewhat  \aryinj;  terms,  that  a  power  of  attorney  lo  convey 
or  incumher  real  estate  must  he  executed,  acknowledged  and 
recunkHl  in  the  same  manner  that  conveyances  are,  and  the 
record  of  the  deed  or  other  instrument  without  the  power  has  no 
legal  effect/'"  While  modern  recording  acts  generally  include 
lH)wers  of  attorney,""  yet  it  would  seem  that  they  need  not  he  re- 
corded where  there  are  no  provisions  specifically  enumerating 
them  and  making  them  suhject  to  the  operation  of  the  acls/'^ 

si  120.  Proper  execution  and  acknowledgment  as  a  pre- 
requisite to  recording. — The  lirst  recpiisite  to  the  valid  record 
of  any  instrument  affecting  the  title  of  real  estate  is  that  it  shall 
he  executed  according  to  law.  If  defectively  executed,  it  is  not 
generally  entitled  to  he  recorded;  hut  even  if  it  is  recorded  it  is 
not  constructive  notice,  so  as  to  vest  in  a  grantee,  mortgagee  ov 
other  incumbrancer,  any  interest  in  the  jiremises  as  against  a  sub- 
se(iuent  i)urchaser  in  good  faith  without  notice/'"  The  record- 
ing acts  generally  prescribe  certain  formalities  in  the  execution 
of  such  instruments  which  must  be  complied  with  to  entitle  them 
to  be  recorded.  Thus  the  real  estate  to  be  conveyed  or  incum- 
bered must  be  described  so  as  reasonably  to  enable  subse((uent 
piu'chasers  or  incumlirancers  to  identifv  the  land;  otherwise  the 
record  of  the  instrument  is  not  constructive  notice.''''     It  has  been 

T!ionii)soM.  11  Wasli.  7()(),  40  I'ac.  379.  Maine  4-V> ;  C'ockcv  v.  \tilnc,  lO  Md. 

Rut  SCO  Coles  V.   IkTryiiill,  37  Minn.  200 ;  lilood  v.  IU.hkI,  J3  Pick.  (Mass.) 

50.  33  N.  \V.  213.  8:  C.alpin  v.  Ahhott,  0  Mich.  17;  Co- 

"**  Loniax  v.  Pickcriii}?,  165  111.  431,  k^ii  v.  Codk,  22   Miiui.   137;   Bass  v. 

46  N.    !•:.  238;   Stevens  v.  Geiser,  71  I-lstill.  .^0  Miss.  300 ;  Hisliop  v.  Sclinei- 

Tcx.  140.  8  S.  W.  610.  der,    49    Mo.    472,    2    .Am.    Kep.    533; 

f"'CarnaIl   v.   Dnvall.  22   Ark.   1.36;  I-rver  v.   Kockefeller.  63   N.   Y.  2()8; 

Craves  v.  Ward.  2   Dnv.    (Kv.)   301;  Todd    v.    Ontlaw.    79    N.    Car.    235; 

I.owry  v.  Harris,  12  Minn.  (C.ii.  1()6)  VVliite    v.    Dennian,    1    Ohio    St.    110; 

255.  McKean    &    F.Ik    Land    Imp.    Co.    v. 

«»Gratz   v.   Land  &-c.   Co..  82   Fed.  Mitchell.  35  Pa.  St.  269.  78  Am.  Dec. 

.^81:    HaKor    v.    Spect.    52    Cal.    579;  .U5 ;   Hollidav  v.   Cromwell.   26  Tex. 

IhiRhes   V.    Wilkinson,   37   Miss.  482.  188;  Pope  v.  Henrv.  24  Vt.  560;  Prin- 

"•' Valentine     v.     Piper,     22     Pick.  )>le  v.  Dunn,  37  Wis.  449,  19  Am.  Rep. 

(Mass.)  85.  33  Am.  Dec.  715.  772. 

"•-•  MeMinn    v.    O'Connor,    27    Cal.  "•''  Bright  v.  Bnckman,  39  Fed.  243 ; 

238;    Snnuur    v.    Rhodes.    14    Conn.  Adams   v.    lulRerton.   48   Ark.   41'),    3 

\3S:   Keech  v.    luiritinez,  28  Fla.  .W,  S.    W^    628;    Chamherlain    v.    Bell,    7 

10  So.  91;  Ilerndon  v.  Kimhall,  7  da.  Cal.  292,  68  Am.   Dec.  260;   Rodders 

432,  50  Am.  Dec.  406;  Barney  v.  Lit-  v.  KavanauRh,  24  111.  583;  Mnrphy  v. 

tie,   15   Iowa  527;   Brown  v.  Lunt.' 37  Hendricks.    57    Ind.    593;    Peters    v. 


147 


PUBLIC    RECORDS 


held,  however,  that  n  deed,  llunii;h  wnd  on  its  face,  is  nevertheless 
entitled  to  record."' 

Registration  is  cmist motive  niuice  only  of  what  appears  on  the 
face  of  the  instrument.  It  is  niU  notice  of  what  one  might  pos- 
sihly  ascertain  hv  such  inquiries  as  an  examination  of  the  record 
might  induce  a  prudent  man  to  make."''  Fnit  when  a  descrip- 
tion in  a  deed  or  mortgage  is  erroneous,  and  it  is  apparent  what 
the  error  is.  the  record  is  constructive  notice  of  the  deed  or  mort- 
gage of  the  land  intended  to  be  described.""  If  the  description  is 
such  as  reasonably  to  put  one  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  property  in- 
tended to  be  conveyed  or  mortgagctl.  anil  to  lead  him  to  ascertain 
what  that  property  is,  the  record  will  atYord  constructive  notice 
of  a  conveyance  or  mortgage  of  that  property."' 

The  record  of  a  deed  without  the  signature  of  the  grantor  is 
not  constructive  notice;  and  this  is  so  though  the  instrument  was 
in  fact  signed,  but  the  signature  was  omitted  by  mistake  from  the 
record.""*  A  signaim-e  is  binding  if  made  at  the  proper  time  and 
duly  acknowledged,  whether  signed  by  the  person  owning  the 
same,  or  by  some  one  else  by  his  consent.""' 

Conveyances  must  generally  be  executed  under  seal  to  entitle 
them  to  be  recorded.'^'  In  several  states  the  use  of  a  seal  has  been 
wholly  dispensed  with  by  statute.''  In  others  a  scroll  is  given 
the  same  elYect  as  a  seal.'"  lUn  where  the  use  of  a  seal  or  of  its 
equivalent  is  required,  and  an  instrument  imrporting  to  be  a  mort- 
gage is  not  executed  under  a  seal,  it  is  not  entitled  to  be  re- 
corded; and  if  it  be  copied  in  the  records,  it  does  not  impart  notice 


Ham,  62  Iowa  656.  18  N.  W.  2%; 
Green  v.  W'itherspoon.  o7  La.  Ann. 
751  ;  Barrow  v.  Baughmaii.  9  Mich. 
213:  Bailev  v.  Galpin.  40  ]\Iinn.  ol9, 
41  N.  W.  1054;  Ksigle.-^ton  v.  Watsoii. 
53  Miss.  339;  Banks  v.  Amnion,  27 
Pa.  St.  172:  Waters  v.  SpotYord.  58 
Tex.  115;  Warren  v.  SNnne,  7  W.  Va. 
474. 

•■-•Bliss  V.  Tidrick.  2?  S.  Dak.  533, 
127  N.  W.  852.  Ann.  Cas.  1912C  671. 

';--;McLonth  v.  Hnrt,  51  Tex.  115. 

'''•  ."Xnderson  v.  Banghnian,  7  Mich. 
69,  74  Am.  Dec.  699;  Wolfe  v.  Dver, 
95  Mo.  545,  8  S.  W.  551 :  People  v. 
Storms.  97  N.  Y.  3(>1 :  Tonsley  v. 
Tonsley.  5  Ohio  St.  7S. 

"'  Tranum  v.  \\'ilkinson,  81  Ala. 
408,  1  So.  201  ;  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Dayton,  116  111.  257,  4  N.  E.  492;  Roh- 
erts  V.  Bauer,  35  La.  Ann.  453;  An- 


derson V.  Baughinan.  7  Mich.  09.  74 
Am.  Dec.  099 ;  Knox  Co.  v.  Brown, 
103  Mo.  22.\  15  S.  W.  382;  Tonsley 
V.  Tonslev.  5  Ohio  St.  7S;  Nve  v. 
Moody.  70  Tex.  434.  8  S.  W.  O06. 

"■^  Shepherd  v.  Bnrkhalter,  13  Ga. 
443.  58  Am.  Dec.  523. 

'■'^  Tohnson  v.  Van  W'lsor,  43  Mich. 
208.  '5  N.  W.  265. 

"<^  Hehron  v.  Centre  Harbor,  UN. 
TT.  571  ;  F.vans  v.  Mendel.  3  Pa.  St. 
239. 

"^  This  is  true  in  .Mabania.  Ar- 
kansas, California.  Colorado.  Indiana, 
Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana, 
Michigan.  Mississippi,  Montana,  Ne- 
braska. Nevada.  Nortli  Dakota,  Ohio, 
Oklahoma.  South  Dakota,  Tennessee, 
Texas   and   Wyoming". 

'-  In  the  following  states  the  seal  is 
required  but  a  scroll  answers   for  a 


§     120  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  148 

to  subsequent  purchasers  or  incumbrancers.'"^  A  seal  need  not  be 
copied  in  the  record.  All  that  is  necessary  is,  that  the  record 
should  afford  some  indication  that  the  instrument  was  under 
seal."'* 

The  record  of  a  deed  not  executed  in  compliance  with  a  stat- 
ute requiring  that  it  shall  be  attested  by  two  witnesses  is  not  con- 
structive notice. ^^ 

An  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  the  instrument  before  some 
officer  is,  in  most  of  the  states,  an  essential  prerequisite  to  record- 
ing. Without  an  acknowledgment,  or  with  one  that  is  defective, 
the  record  of  the  instrument  is  unauthorized  and  is  not  construct- 
ive notice.^"  The  registration  of  a  conveyance,  acknowledged  or 
proved  before  an  officer  who  has  not  been  duly  appointed  or  quali- 
fied, has  no  effect  in  rendering  it  operative  against  subsequent 
purchasers.''^  When  a  statute  requires  that  a  certificate  of  the 
official  character  of  the  officer  before  whom  the  acknowledgment 
was  made  shall  accompany  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  the 
filing  of  the  instrument  for  record  without  the  latter  certificate 
does  not  constitute  a  record  of  it.  Upon  the  same  principle,  also, 
when  a  statute  requires  that  the  officer  shall  certify  that  he  is  per- 
sonally acquainted  with  the  party  making  the  acknowledgment, 
the  omission  so  to  do  renders  null  the  acknowledgment  and  the 
record.'*^  The  requirement  must  be  substantially  complied  with.''' 

seal:      Arizona,     Delaware,     Florida,  Blood  v.  Brood,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  80; 

Georgia,    Idaho,     Illinois,     Maryland,  Parret  v.   Shaubhut,   5  Minn.  32^,  80 

Miniiesota,     Missouri,     New     Jersey,  Am.  Dec.  424;  Bass  v.  Estill,  50  Miss. 

New    Mexico,    North    Carolina,    Ore-  300 ;  Bishop  v.  Schneider,  46  Mo.  472, 

gon,    Pennsylvania,    Utah,    Virginia,  2  Am.  Rep.  533 ;  Irwin  v.  Welch,  10 

Washington,  West  Virginia  and  Wis-  Nebr.    479,    6    N.    W.    753 ;    Frost    v. 

consin.  Beekman,  1  Johns.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  288; 

""  Racouillat  v.    Sansevain,  32   Cal.  Todd    v.    Outlaw,    79    N.    Car.    235 ; 

376;   Arthur   v.   Screven,   39   S.   Car.  White  v.   Denman,    1    Ohio    St.    110; 

77,  17  S.  E.  640.  Flcschner    v.    Sumpter,    12    Ore.    161, 

'*  Smith  V.  Dall.  13  Cal.  510;  Sum-  6  Pac.  506;  Woolfolk  v.  Graniteville 

mer  v.   Mitchell,  29  Fla.   179,   10  So.  Mfg.  Co.,  22  S.  Car.  332;  Hill  v.  Tay- 

56,  14  L.  R.  A.  815,  30  Am.  St.  106.  lor,  77  Tex.  295,  14  S.  W.  366;  Wood 

■'■''  Gardner   v.    Moore,   51    Ga.  268 ;  v.    Cochrane,   39  Vt.   544 ;    Raines    v. 

Thompson  v.  Morgan,  6  Minn.    (Gil.  Walker,  77  Va.  92;  Cox  v.  Wayt,  26 

199)    292;   Van   Thorniley  v.    Peters,  W.   Va.  807;   Girardin  v.   Lampe,   58 

26  Ohio  St.  471 ;  Potter  v.  Stransky,  Wis.  267.  16  N.  W.  614.     In  the  fol- 

48  Wis.  235,  4  N.  W.  95.  lowing  states  acknowledgment  is  not 

'"''  Dufphey  v.  Frenaye,  5  St.  &  P.  a  prerequisite  to   registration  :     Ala- 

(Ala.)  215;  Jacoway  v.  Gault,  20  Ark.  bama,  Colorado,  Connecticut,  Illinois, 

190,    73    Am.    Dec.    494;    Willard    v.  Michigan  and  Washington. 
Cramer,    36    Iowa   22 ;    Meskimen    v.        '•''  Worsham  v.  Freeman,  .34  Ark.  55. 
Day.  35  Kans.  46,  10  Pac.  14;  Sitler        "  Kdsey   v.   Dunlap,   7   Cal.   160. 
V.  McComas,  66  Md.  135,  6  Atl.  527 ;        7o  Ritter  v.  Worth,  58  N.  Y.  627. 


149  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    121 

The  certificate  of  acknowledgment  is  not  conclusive;  but  when  it 
is  correct  in  form,  and  is  apparently  executed  by  one  authorized  to 
act  in  the  matter,  and  within  his  jurisdiction,  it  is  sufficient  to  ad- 
mit the  deed  to  record,  and  is  prima  facie  good.^°  Delivery  is 
another  incident  necessary  to  giving  effect  to  the  conveyance  even 
as  to  the  parties  to  it.^^  Although  the  deed  be  recorded,  if  it  has 
not  been  delivered,  but  the  delivery  was  authorized,  a  subsequent 
conveyance  by  the  grantor,  or  a  subsequent  judgment  against  him, 
will  take  precedence/^'  Although  a  deed  is  of  no  effect  until  there 
has  been  a  delivery  of  it  to  the  grantee,  yet  if  it  is  made  for  a  good 
consideration,  as,  for  instance,  an  existing  debt  and  is  filed  for 
record  without  delivery,  a  subsequent  acceptance  of  the  deed  has 
been  held  to  ratify  the  making  and  recording  of  it,  and  to  give 
it  legal  effect  from  the  time  of  filing,  as  against  intermediate  in- 
cumbrancers.*' 

§  121.     Books  in  which  instruments  must  be  recorded. — 

In  most  of  the  states  all  instruments  relating  to  the  title  to  real 
estate  are  recorded  in  the  same  books  of  record,  but  in  several 
states  it  is  provided  that  all  mortgages  shall  be  recorded  in  sep- 
arate books  kept  for  this  purpose  only.-*  A  record  not  made  in 
the  proper  book  does  not  operate  as  constructive  notice.*^  The 
record  of  a  deed  in  the  mortgage  record  is  not  constructive  notice 
of  the  deed  to  subsequent  purchasers.*'* 

Usage  may  determine  the  validity  of  a  record.  Thus,  where 
mortgages  of  real  and  personal  property  are  required  to  be  re- 
corded in  separate  books,  and  a  mortgage  embracing  both  real 
and  personal  property  is  recorded  only  in  the  book  of  real  estate 
mortgages  it  is  held  to  be  sufficiently  recorded  to  be  constructive 
notice  of  the  lien  on  the  personal  property,  if  it  appear  that  it  is 
the  custom  to  record  such  mortgages  in  this  manner  without 
making  a  double  record.     But  where  a  mortgage  covers  both 

80  People  V.  Snyder,  41  N.  Y.  397.  388;  Baker  v.  Lee,  49  La.  Ann.  874, 

81  Freeman  v.  Peay.  23  Ark.  439;  21  So.  588;  Parsons  v.  Lent,  34  N.  J. 
Goodwin  V.  Owen,  55  Ind.  243 ;  Ward  Eq.  67 ;  Dcane  v.  Hutchinson,  40  N. 
V.  Small.  90  Ky.  198.  12  Ky.  L.  58.  13  J.  Eq.  83,  2  Atl.  292 ;  Van  Thorniley 
S.  W.  1070;  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  10  v.  Peters,  26  Ohio  St.  471. 

Mass.  452,  6  Am.  Dec.   146.  ««  Neslin  v.  Wells,  104  U.  S.  428,  26 

82  Woodbury  v.  Fisher,  20  Ind.  387,  L.  ed.  802 ;  Colomer  v.  Morgan,  13 
83  Am.  Dec.  325.  La.  Ann.  202;  Abraham  v.  Mayer,  7 

83  Carnall  v.  Duval,  22  Ark.  136.  Misc.  250.  27  N.  Y.  S.  264,  58  N.  Y. 
8*  See  statutes  of  various  states.  St.  29;  In  re  Luch's  Appeal,  44  Pa. 
85  Kent  V.  Williams,  146  Cal.  3.  79     St.   519;   Drake   v.   Reggel,    10   Utah 

Pac.  527;   Gossett  v.   Tolen,  61   Ind.    376,  Zl  Pac.  583. 


§    121  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  150 

realty  and  personalty  the  recording  of  it  in  the  record  of  personal 
property  mortgages  does  not  constitute  a  compliance  with  the  re- 
quirement of  the  statute  concerning  the  recording  of  the  real 
estate  mortgages/^'  The  record  of  a  deed  of  standing  timber 
made  in  a  book  called  "Miscellaneous  Records,"  in  which  it  is 
customary  in  the  state  to  record  exceptional  instruments  offered 
for  record,  such  as  contracts  of  sale,  leases,  and  various  other 
kinds  of  property,  is  constructive  notice  of  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties claiming  under  such  deed.^'*  The  record  of  an  assignment  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors,  embracing  real  property,  is  not  void  as  to 
nonconsenting  creditors  because  it  was  not  transcribed  by  the  re- 
corder in  the  proper  book  of  records,  but  was  transcribed  in  a 
book  marked  "Miscellaneous,"  and  the  only  question  that  can 
arise  by  reason  of  the  improper  record  is  as  to  its  effect  on  subse- 
quent purchasers  and  mortgagees  in  good  faith.  As  to  them  the 
record  would  seem  to  be  good  under  a  statute  providing  that  an 
instrument  is  deemed  to  be  recorded  when  it  is  deposited  in  the 
recorder's  office  with  the  proper  officer  for  record.**^  When  it  is 
provided  that  mortgages  shall  be  recorded  in  books  kept  for  that 
purpose  separate  from  other  instruments,  a  mortgage  recorded 
as  a  deed  is  not  effectual  as  against  subsequent  bona  fide  pur . 
chasers  or  mortgagees  even  if  the  mortgage  be  in  form  an  absoi 
lute  deed,  but  intended  as  security  for  a  loan  of  money.®"  But  it 
has  been  held  that  the  record  of  the  mortgage,  in  form  a  deed,  in 
the  book  of  deeds  gives  notice."^  If  a  mortgage  is  not  recorded  in 
the  mortgage  books,  and  it  can  not  be  found  by  the  index  to  these 
books,  it  therefore  is  not  regarded  as  properly  recorded.®-  Such 
an  instrument  is  of  course  valid  as  between  the  parties,®^  and, 
though  the  record  is  a  nullity,  it  becomes  operative  in  case  the 
mortgagee  afterward  acquires  the  equity  of  redemption.®*  Where 
the  statute  provides  for  the  keeping  of  separate  books  for  the 
recording  of  deeds  and  mortgages,  it  is  held  that  a  lease  recorded 

87  Harriman    v.    Woburn    Electric  man,  52  Pa.  St.  359,  91  Am.  Dec.  163 ; 

Light   Co.,    163    Mass.   85,   39   N.   E.  Knowlton  v.  Walker,  13  Wis.  264. 

1004.  'JiKennard  v.  Mabry,  78  Tex.  151, 

8«  Mee  V.   Benedict,   98  Mich.  260,  14  S.  W.  272. 

57  N.  W.  175,  22  L.  R.  A.  641,  39  Am.  ^2  in  re  Luch's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St. 

St.  543.  519. 

sy  Watkins  v.  Wilhoit,  104  Cal.  395,  o^  James  v.  Morey,  6  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 

38  Pac.  53.  Y.)  417,  2  Cow.  246,  14  Am.  Dec.  475. 

»o   Colomer  v.  Morgan,  13  La.  Ann.  »*  Grellet  v.  Heilshorn,  4  Nev.  526; 

202;    Warner   v.   Winslow,    1    Sa'ndf.  Parsons  v.  Lent,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  67. 
Ch.    (N.   Y.)   430;    Calder  v.   Chap- 


151  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    122 

in  a  miscellaneous  record  and  indexed  as  a  deed,  was  not  con- 
structive notice  to  a  subsequent  mortgagee  of  a  mortgage  clause 
contained  therein. ^^ 

A  subsequent  purchaser  or  mortgagee  who  has  actual  notice  of 
the  mortgage  which  is  improperly  recorded,  as  an  absolute  con- 
veyance, of  course  takes  a  title  subject  to  such  mortgage,  just 
as  he  would  if  the  mortgage  had  not  been  recorded  at  all.  A  stat- 
ute which  is  merely  directory  to  the  recorder  in  this  respect  would 
not  invalidate  a  record  of  the  mortgage  not  being  in  the  record 
books  specially  used  for  mortgages.^''  Except  in  states  whose 
statutes  require  a  different  construction,  the  record  of  a  convey- 
ance in  the  form  of  an  absolute  deed,  in  a  book  kept  for  the  re- 
cording of  deeds  ought  to  be  held  to  impart  effectual  notice  of 
the  rights  or  interests  conveyed,  although  a  statute  requires  mort- 
gages to  be  recorded  in  separate  books. ^^  Where  an  instrument 
was  copied  into  a  book  that  had  not  been  in  use  for  recording 
purposes  for  many  years,  it  was  held  that  the  book  was  improper 
for  that  purpose  and  that  the  instrument  was  not  duly  recorded.^* 

The  filing  of  a  mechanic's  lien  creates  a  lien,  but  where  the  law 
provides  that  it  shall  be  recorded  in  the  "Miscellaneous  Record," 
the  "Mechanic's  Lien  Record"  would  not  be  competent  record 
evidence  to  take  the  place  of  the  original  instrument. "^  Where  a 
recorder  records  a  mechanic's  lien  in  the  wrong  book,  the  defect 
can  be  cured. ^ 

§  122.  Time  of  recording. — In  the  usual  course  of  record- 
ing each  instrument  deposited  with  the  recording  officer  is  imme- 
diately indorsed  with  an  official  time  stamp  or  other  memoran- 
dum of  the  fact  and  time  of  filing,  and  placed  among  the  acces- 
sible files  of  newly-deposited  and  untranscribed  instruments  until 
it  can  be  copied  in  the  records  at  length.  In  due  order  and  course 
of  time,  sometimes  specified  by  statute,  the  recorder  enrolls  it 
in  the  record  books.  The  record  is  notice  from  the  time  of  filing 
the  deed  for  record.  It  is  sometimes  provided  by  statute  that  a 
deed  shall  be  deemed  to  be  recorded  when  it  is  filed  for  record,  or 
noted  in  an  entry  bock  or  index  by  the  recorder  as  received.  But, 

S5  Gordon  v.  Constantine  Hydraulic  °^  Sawyer  v.  Adams,  8  Vt.  172,  30 

Co.,  117  Mich.  620.  76  N.  W.  142.  Am.  Dec.  459. 

96  Smith  V.  Smith,  13  Ohio  St.  532.  oo  Adams    v.    Buhler,    131    Ind.   66, 

97  Kennard  v.  Mabry,  78  Tex.  151,  30  N.  E.  883. 

14  S.  W.  272.  1  Wilson  v.  Logue,  131  Ind.  191,  30 

N.  E.  1079,  31  Am.  St.  426. 


I 


§  122 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


152 


aside  from  any  express  statutory  provision,  the  judicial  inter- 
pretation of  the  effect  of  the  fiHng  is  generally  the  same.-  The 
record  as  notice  dates  from  the  moment  the  instrument  was  left 
for  record,  and  was  indorsed  by  the  recorder  and  entered  upon  the 
index  or  entry  book,  although  it  w^as  not  actually  spread  upon 
the  record  for  months,  or  for  any  length  of  time  afterward;^  or 
be  lost  and  not  recorded  at  all,*  though  according  to  some  author- 
ities the  record  is  constructive  notice  from  the  time  of  filing  the 
instrument  for  record  only  in  case  it  is  subsequently  copied  ac- 
curately upon  the  record  book.^  The  entry  in  the  index  or  entry 
book  is  constructive  notice  until  the  instrument  is  spread  in  full 
upon  the  record.  It  may  be  kept  in  the  office  and  referred  to 
until  it  is  transcribed,  and  the  original  instrument  so  filed  is 
notice  to  all  the  world."  When  it  is  spread  upon  the  record,  how- 
ever, it  is  notice  of  only  what  appears  upon  the  record.^ 

As  to  the  time  when  an  instrument  was  left  for  record,  the  cer- 
tificate of  the  recorder  is  conclusive  as  between  the  grantee  or 
mortgagee  and  a  subsequent  purchaser  or  creditor  who  has  at- 
tached the  mortgaged  land  subsequently  to  the  time  stated  in  the 
certificate.^  If  the  recording  officer  has  failed  to  note  the  time  of 
receiving  an  instrument  for  record,  this  may  be  shown  by  parol 
evidence.    The  requirement  that  the  recording  officer  shall  note 


2  Leslie  v.  Hinson,  83  Ala.  266,  3 
So.  443;  Oats  v.  Walls,  28  Ark.  244; 
Watkins  v.  Wilhoit,  104  Cal.  395,  35 
Pac.  646;  Lewis  v.  Hinman,  56  Conn. 
55,  13  Atl.  143;  Haworth  v.  Taylor, 
108  111.  275 ;  Kessler  v.  State,  24  Ind. 
313 ;  Lee  v.  Bermingham,  30  Kans. 
312,  1  Pac.  IZ ;  Bank  of  Kentucky  v. 
Haggin,  1  A.  K.'  Marsh.  (Ky.)  306; 
Gillespie  v.  Rogers,  146  Mass.  610,  16 
N.  E.  711 ;  Sinclair  v.  Slawson,  44 
Mich.  123,  6  N.  W.  207,  38  Am.  Rep. 
235 ;  Mangold  v.  Barlow,  61  Miss. 
593,  48  Am.  Rep.  84;  Bishop  v. 
Schneider,  46  Mo.  472,  2  Am.  Dec. 
533;  Perkins  v.  Strong,  22  Nebr.  725, 
36  N.  W.  292;  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Dake,  87  N.  Y.  257 ;  Davis  v.  Whit- 
aker,  113  N.  Car.  279,  19  S.  E.  699,  41 
Am.  St.  793 ;  Bercaw  v.  Cockerill,  20 
Ohio  St.  163;  Glading  v.  Frick,  88 
Pa.  St.  460;  Woodward  v.  Boro,  16 
Lea  (Tenn.)  678;  Lignoski  v.  Crook- 
er,  86  Tex.  324,  24  S.  W.  278;  Hors- 
ley  V.  Grath,  2  Grat.    (Va.)    471,  44 


Am.  Dec.  393;  St.  Croix  Land  &  L. 
Co.  V.  Ritchie.  IZ  Wis.  409,  41  N.  W. 
345. 

3  Kiser  v.  Heuston,  38  111.  252;  Sin- 
clair V.  Slawson,  44  Mich.  123,  6  N. 
W.  207,  38  Am.  Rep.  235;  In  re 
Woods'  Appeal,  82  Pa.  St.  116;  Crews 
V.  Taylor,  56  Tex.  461. 

^  Lee  V.  Bermingham,  30  Kans.  312, 
1  Pac.  17) ;  Perkins  v.  Strong,  22  Nebr. 
725,  36  N.  W.  292 ;  Vaughn  v.  Moore, 
89  Va.  925,  17  S.  E.  326. 

s  Ritchie  v.  Griffiths,  1  Wash.  St. 
429,  25  Pac.  341,  12  L.  R.  A.  384,  22 
Am.  St.  155. 

«  Nichols  V.  Reynolds,  1  R.  I.  30,  36 
Am.  Dec.  238 ;  Bigelow  v.  Topliff,  25 
Vt.  273,  60  Am.  Dec.  264. 

7  Potter  V.  Dooley,  55  Vt.  512. 

8  Hatch  V.  Haskins,  17  Maine  391 ; 
Adams  v.  Pratt.  109  Mass.  59;  Bul- 
lock V.  Wallingford,  55  N.  H.  619; 
Edwards  v.  Barwise,  69  Tex.  84,  6 
S.  W.  677. 


153  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    122 

the  time  of  recording  an  instrument  is  directory  merely,  when 
there  is  no  question  of  rights  depending  on  priority  of  record. 
His  failure  to  perform  his  legal  duty  does  not  defeat  the  effect  of 
the  delivery  for  record.^  When  the  time  of  receiving  an  instru- 
ment for  record  is  entered  in  the  index  book  and  shows  upon  its 
face  that  it  was  not  made  at  the  time  of  such  reception,  the  pre- 
sumption of  the  correctness  of  the  registrar's  entry  is  lost,^°  and 
parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  when  the  deed  was  actually 
received  for  record.  The  filing  of  a  mortgage  for  record  affords 
no  notice  if  the  deed  be  withdrawn  before  it  is  recorded.^^ 

If  the  statute  is  such  that  no  notice  is  imparted  until  the  con- 
veyance is  actually  spread  upon  the  record,  though  when  this  is 
done  the  notice  relates  back  to  the  time  of  the  deposit  of  the  deed 
for  record,  where  there  is  a  conflict  of  dates  between  the  time  of 
the  actual  record  as  it  appears  upon  the  record  book  and  the  con- 
structive record  by  indorsement  made  upon  the  deed  when  it  was 
deposited,  the  recorded  date  prevails  over  the  true  date.^"  As 
between  two  mortgagees  whose  mortgages  are  executed  and  re- 
corded on  the  same  day,  that  which  was  first  delivered  for  rec- 
ord has  priority,^^  and  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  which 
was  first  deposited  for  record.^*  To  ascertain  which  is  prior,  the 
fractional  parts  of  a  day  are  considered. ^^  In  case  no  entry  is 
made  upon  the  record  of  the  time  of  the  recording  of  the  mort- 
gage, when  the  statute  required  no  such  entry,  and  it  appears 
from  the  record  to  have  been  recorded  at  an  early  day,  it  will  be 
presumed  that  the  record  was  made  within  the  time  required  by 
law  after  the  execution  of  it.^''  Where  a  statute  provides  that  a 
mortgage  shall  take  effect  from  the  time  of  its  deposit  for  record, 
it  has  been  held  that  a  mortgage  which  has  not  been  deposited  for 
record  with  the  proper  officer  before  the  assignm.ent  of  the  same 
property  by  the  mortgagor  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors  takes 
effect,  such  mortgage  is  not  a  valid  lien  on  the  property  as  against 
the  assignee  or  the  creditors,  and  does  not  become  so  by  being 

9  Thorn  v.  Mayer,  12  Misc.  487,  33        i3  Brookfield    v.    Goodrich,    32    111. 
N.  Y.  S.  664,  67  N.  Y.  St.  389.  363. 

10  Hay  V.  Hill,  24  Wis.  235.  i*  Spaulding  v.  Scanland,  6  B.  Mon. 
"Lawton  v.   Gordon,  37  Cal.  202;      (Ky.)  353. 

Worcester  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cheeney,  87  ^^  Lgrnon  v.  Staats,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 

111.  602;  Clarmorgan  v.  Lane,  9  Mo.  592. 

442.  16  Hall  V.  Tunnell,  1  Houst.  (Del.) 

12  Donald  v.  Beals,  57  Cal.  399.  320. 


§     123  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  154 

subsequently  recorded/'  A  mortgage  may  be  recorded  after  the 
death  of  the  mortgagor,  if  he  has  in  his  lifetime  made  delivery  of 
it/*^  It  has  been  held  that  a  statute  extending  the  time  for  record- 
ing deeds  is  valid. ^" 

§  123.  Time  allowed  by  statute  for  recording  deeds  and 
other  instruments. — The  recording  acts  of  the  several  states 
provide  that  deeds  and  mortgages  shall  be  recorded  within  a 
specified  time  after  execution.  Thus  in  Alabama  unconditional 
deeds  and  mortgages  to  secure  debts,  created  at  the  date  thereof, 
are  void  as  to  purchasers,  mortgagees  and  judgment  creditors 
without  notice,  unless  recorded  within  thirty  days  from  date.^° 
But  under  a  subsequent  statute  mortgages  to  secure  debts,  created 
at  the  date  thereof,  are  made  void  as  to  purchasers,  mortgagees 
and  judgment  creditors,  without  notice,  unless  recorded  before 
the  accrual  of  the  right  of  such  purchasers,  mortgagees  or  judg- 
ment creditors.'^ 

In  Delaware  a  mortgage  for  purchase-money  recorded  within 
thirty  days  after  its  execution  has  precedence  of  any  judgment 
or  other  lien  of  prior  date.  Other  deeds  and  mortgages  must  be 
recorded  within  three  months  after  delivery  in  order  to  avail 
against  a  subsequent  creditor,  mortgagee  or  purchaser  for  a  val- 
uable consideration  without  notice."" 

In  Georgia,  deeds  must  be  recorded  within  one  year  and  mort- 
gages within  thirty  days  from  date,  or  they  will  be  postponed  to 
other  liens  or  purchases  made  prior  to  the  record  without  notice 
of  the  unrecorded  conveyances.  The  record  of  a  mortgage  not 
made  within  the  time  prescribed  is  notice  from  the  time  of  rec- 
ord."^ 

In  Indiana,  deeds  and  mortgages  not  recorded  within  forty-five 
days  from  their  execution  are  fraudulent  and  void  as  against  sub- 
sequent purchasers,  lessees,  or  mortgagees  in  good  faith  and 
a  valuable  consideration."*  But  under  a  subsequent  statute  of 
that  state  deeds  and  mortgages  take  priority  according  to  the  time 

i7Betz  V.  Snyder.  48  Ohio  St.  492,  21  Alabama  Code   (1907),  §  3383. 

28  N.  E.  234,  13  L.  R.  A.  235.  22  Del.   Rev.  Code    (1874),  pp.  504, 

1*  Haskell  v.  Bissell,  11  Conn.  174;  505,  §  21;  Del.  Laws,  1881,  chap.  520; 

Gill  V.  Pinney,  12  Ohio  St.  38.  Del.  Laws  1883,  p.  509. 

13  Spivev  V.  Rose,  120  N.  Car.  163,  23  Qa.    Code    1882.    §§    1959,    1960, 

26S.  E.  701.  2705;  Ga.  Civ.  Code   (1910),  §  3260. 

20  Alabama   Code    (1896),   §§   1005,  -*lnd.  Rev.  Stat.    (1888),  §§  2931, 

1016.  2932. 


155  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    123 

of  filing  for  record,  and  are  fraudulent  and  void  as  to  subsequent 
purchasers  or  mortgagees  in  good  faith  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion, having  their  deeds  or  mortgages  first  recorded.-^ 

In  Kentucky,  deeds  other  than  deeds  of  trust  and  mortgages  by 
residents  of  the  state,  sixty  days  from  date;  by  persons  residing 
out  of  the  state  in  the  United  States,  four  months;  by  persons 
out  of  the  United  States,  twelve  months.^*' 

In  Maryland,  deeds  and  mortgages,  within  six  months  from 
date." 

In  Oregon,  deeds  and  mortgages  must  be  recorded  within  five 
days  after  execution,-^ 

In  Pennsylvania,  deeds  executed  within  the  state  must  be  re- 
corded within  six  months  after  execution,  but  if  executed  with- 
out the  state,  they  must  be  recorded  within  twelve  months  after 
their  execution.'^  But  by  recent  statute,  applicable  to  Philadel- 
phia alone,  deeds  and  other  conveyances  are  valid  as  against  sub- 
sequent purchasers  only  from  the  date  of  record.^" 

In  South  Carolina,  deeds,  deeds  of  trust  and  mortgages,  and 
statutory  liens  are  valid,  so  as  to  affect  subsequent  creditors  or 
purchasers  for  valuable  consideration  without  notice,  only  when 
recorded  within  forty  days  from  the  time  of  execution. ^^  The 
time  for  recording  such  instruments  have  been  limited  in  a  recent 
statute  to  ten  days.^- 

In  Virginia,  any  conveyance  recorded  within  ten  days  from  the 
day  of  its  acknowledgment  shall,  unless  it  be  a  mortgage,  or  a 
deed  of  trust  not  in  consideration  of  marriage,  be  as  valid  as  to 
creditors  and  subsequent  purchasers  as  if  recorded  on  the  day  of 
acknowledgment."^ 

With  the  exception  of  the  above  statutes,  however,  there  is  a 
general  uniformity  to  the  effect  that  the  registration  of  deeds  and 
mortgages  is  effective  as  constructive  notice  from  the  time  only 
when  they  are  filed  for  record.  The  tendency  is  decidedly  toward 
abolishing  the  provisions  giving  a  specified  time  to  record  convey- 
ances.   The  effect  of  provisions  allowing  time  for  the  recording 

25Ind.  Burns'  Ann.  Stat.  (1914),  29  Pa.  Purdon's  Dig.  1905,  p.  1181, 
§  3962.                                                          §  155. 

26  Ky.  Gen.  Stat.  1888,  p.  315,  §  14;  so  Purdon's  Ann.  Dig.,  p.  2110,  §  5. 
But  see  Kv.  Stat.  (1909),  §§  496,  497.  315.  Car.  Civ.  Code  (1902),  §  2456. 

27  Md.  Ann.   Code    (1911),  art.  21,  -  S.  Car.  Code  (1912),  §  3542. 
§§  13-15.  33  Va.  Code  (1904),  §  2467. 

28  Ore.  Laws   (1910),  §  7129. 


§     123  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  156 

of  instruments  after  execution  is  not  to  invalidate  the  conveyance 
or  mortgage,  as  between  the  parties,  if  not  recorded  within  the 
time  specified.  It  is  admissible  in  evidence  and  is  an  equitable 
lien,  although  not  so  recorded.^*  The  failure  to  comply  with  this 
requirement  only  goes  to  the  effect  of  the  conveyance  as  to  sub- 
sequent purchasers.  As  to  purchasers  whose  conveyances  are 
registered  before  a  deed  recorded  after  the  expiration  of  the  lim- 
ited time,  the  date  is  ineffectual.^^  Of  two  conveyances  of  equal 
equity,  recorded  within  the  time  limited  after  execution,  that 
which  is  first  recorded  has  priority .^°  The  effect  of  these  pro- 
visions is  that  the  record,  when  made  within  the  prescribed  time, 
relates  back  to  the  delivery  of  the  instrument,  and  gives  it  prior- 
ity over  an  instrument  of  subsequent  date  or  delivery,  although 
this  has  already  been  recorded.^^  But  the  record  will  not  relate 
back  to  the  date  of  the  delivery  of  the  instrument  if  this  was  not 
then  completely  executed,  ready  to  be  recorded.  It  will  not  so 
relate  back  in  case  the  deed  was  not  attested  and  acknowledged 
as  required  by  statute  to  entitle  it  to  be  recorded.^'  A  record 
made  after  the  prescribed  time  operates  as  notice  only  from  the 
time  of  delivery  of  the  instrument  for  record.^''  As  between  con- 
veyances neither  of  which  is  recorded  within  the  prescribed  time, 
the  ordinary  rule  of  priority  of  record  prevails,  and  preference  is 
given  to  the  instrument  first  recorded.*" 

The  terms  of  the  statute  may  determine  the  question  of  prior- 
ity between  instruments  not  recorded  within  the  prescribed  time. 
If  the  second  deed  is  executed  after  the  first  deed  has  been  re- 
corded, though  not  within  the  time  limited,  the  first  deed  has  pri- 
ority.*^ If  the  second  deed  be  made  before  the  first  deed  is  re- 
corded and  the  second  deed  be  recorded  within  the  time  limited, 

34  Charter  v.   Graham,   56   III.    19 ;  ss  White  v.  Magarahan,  87  Ga.  217, 

Sixtli   Ward   Bldg.   Assn.   v.   Wilson,  13  S.  E.  509. 

41  Md.  506;  Plume  v.  Bone,  13  N.  J.  so  DeLane  v.  Moore,   14  How.   (U. 

L.  63.  S.)  253,  14  L.  ed.  409 ;  Adair  v.  Davis. 

s'^  Cowan   V.   Green,  2   Hawks    (N.  71    Ga.    769;    Gilchrist   v.    Gough,   63 

Car.)  384.  Ind.  576.  30  Am.  Rep.  250;  Harding 

;^'>Wood  V.   Lordier,   115   Ind.  519.  v.  Allen,  70  Md.  395,  17  Atl.  2>11 ;  Mc- 

18  N.  E.  34 ;  Den  v.  Roberts.  4  N.  J.  Mamee  v.  Huckabee.  20  S.  Car.   190. 

L.  315;  Dungan  v.  American  Life  Ins.  ^'^  Reasoner  v.   Edmundson,   5   Ind. 

&c.  Co.,  52  Pa.  St.  253.  393 ;    Fleschner   v.    Sumpter,    12   Ore. 

37  Clarke  v.  White,  12  Pet.  (U.  S.)  161,  6  Pac.  50o;  Collins  v.  Aaron,  162 

178,  9  L.  ed.  1046;  Betz  v.  Mullin,  62  Pa.  St.  539,  29  Atl.  724. 

Ala.  365 ;  Nichols  v.  Hampton,  46  Ga.  ^i  Adair  v.  Davis,  71  Ga.  769. 
253 ;  Clairborne  v.  Holmes,  51   Miss. 
146. 


I 


157  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    124 

but  the  first  deed  be  not  so  recorded,  though  recorded  before  the 
second  deed,  the  second  deed  has  priority  by  virtue  of  relation 
back  to  the  time  of  its  execution.*-  Such  a  provision  is  .a  perni- 
cious one,  and  is  a  source  of  much  more  unfairness  and  fraud 
than  it  can  possibly  prevent.  It  particularly  aims  to  the  with- 
drawal of  the  protection  of  the  registry  law  for  the  period  al- 
lowed for  registration.  A  purchaser  is  never  sure  of  his  own  pri- 
ority until  he  has  waited  for  the  prescribed  time  to  elapse  after 
the  recording  of  the  deed  to  himself. 

§  124.  Place  of  recording. — The  registration  of  instru- 
ments affecting  the  title  to  real  estate  must  be  made  in  the  reg- 
istry district  within  which  the  land  lies,  which  is  generally  a 
county.*'  But  in  New  Hampshire,  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut 
registration  must  be  made  in  the  town  where  the  land  lies.  The 
fact,  however,  that  a  deed  was  not  recorded  in  the  county  where 
the  land  lay  is  not  evidence  that'the  grantor  did  not  intend  to  con- 
vey lands  lying  therein,  as  it  was  not  his  duty  to  see  to  the  record- 
ing.** In  some  of  the  new  states  in  which  there  is  territory  which 
is  not  yet  organized  into  counties,  special  provision  is  made  for 
the  recording  of  deeds  of  lands  lying  within  such  unorganized 
territory,  as  by  providing  that  the  record  shall  be  made  in  the 
county  in  which  such  unorganized  territory  is  attached  for  judi- 
cial purposes,*^  After  the  organization  of  a  new  county,  a  deed 
properly  recorded  under  the  law  as  it  existed  at  the  time  of  the 
record  need  not  be  recorded  anew,*'^  for  the  record  already  made 
does  not  cease  to  be  constructive  notice;*^  but  a  deed  that  had 
been  executed  but  not  recorded  at  the  time  of  the  organization  of 
a  new  county,  should  be  recorded  in  that  county.*^  An  owner,  the 
deed  of  whose  land  has  once  been  properly  recorded  in  the  county 

42Legerv.  Doyle.  11  Rich.  (S.  Car.)  44  Black   v.    Skinner    Mfg.    Co.,    53 

109,  70  Am.  Dec.  240;   McNamee  v.  Fla.  1090,  43  So.  919. 

Huckabee,  20  S.  Car.  190.  45  Meagher  v.  Drury,  89  Iowa  366, 

43  Lewis   V.   Baird,   3   McLean    (U.  56  N.  W.  531. 

S.)  56,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8316;  Green  v.  4g  Lumpkin  v.  Muncey,  66  Tex.  311, 

Green,    103    Cal.    108,    2,7    Pac.    188 ;  17  S.  W.  7Z2. 

Kennedy  v.  Harden,  92  Ga.  230,   18  47  Thomas  v.  Hanson,  59  Minn.  274, 

S.  E.  542 ;  St.  John  v.  Conger,  40  111.  61  N.  W.  135. 

535;    Geer    v.    Missouri    Lumber    &c.  48  Astor  v.  Wells,  4  Wheat  (U.S.) 

Co.,   134  Mo.  85,  34  S.  W.   1099,   56  466,  4  L.  ed.  616 ;  Garrison  v.  Haydon, 

Am.  St.  489;  Jencks  v.   Smith,  IN.  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  222,  19  Am.  Dec. 

Y.  90,  3  Denio  592,  4  How.  Prac.  183 ;  70. 
Stewart  v.  McSweeney,  14  Wis.  468. 


§    124  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  158 

^vhere  the  land  lies,  need  not  have  it  again  recorded  in  a  new  or 
different  county  into  which  the  land  subsequently  falls/'-* 

If  the  land  embraced  in  the  instrument  is  situated  in  more  than 
one  county,  it  should  be  recorded  in  each  county  in  which  any 
part  of  the  land  is  situated.""*  Under  some  statutes  a  deed  con- 
veying land  lying  partly  in  two  or  more  counties  is  allowed  to  be 
recorded  in  that  county  in  which  the  greater  part  lies,  and  make 
such  record  full  constructive  notice.^^ 

It  is  intended  that  the  registry  laws  shall  enable  a  person  inter- 
ested in  the  title  to  land  to  ascertain  from  the  records  of  the 
county,  or  through  the  registry  district  within  which  the  land  is 
situated,  what  conveyances  there  are  affecting  that  land.  So  the 
recording  of  a  deed  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  which  the  land 
is  situated  does  not  operate  as  constructive  notice."  Thus  where 
a  new  county  had  been  created,  and  a  grantee,  not  being  advised 
of  the  change,  recorded  his  deed  in  the  old  county  instead  of  the 
new,  the  registration  was  regarded  as  worthless  as  notice."^  A 
subsequent  change  of  the  county  boundaries  by  which  the  land  be- 
came part  of  another  county  does  not  impose  upon  the  grantee 
the  duty  of  recording  his  deed  again  in  such  county.^*  But  if  the 
county  lines  have  never  been  established,  the  grantee  must  at  his 
peril  ascertain  in  what  county  the  land  is  situated.^''  If  a  county 
is  divided  into  two  registry  districts,  a  deed  recorded  in  one  dis- 
trict of  land  situated  in  the  other  is  not  properly  recorded  and  the 
record  is  not  constructive  notice.  When  a  deed  already  recorded 
is  recorded  in  another  county,  a  certificate  of  the  recorder  of  the 
prior  record  is  not  a  part  of  the  deed,  and  need  not  be  copied  in 
the  second  record.^"  Where,  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  a 
deed,  the  land  conveyed  was  in  a  county  which  was  divided  be- 

49  Divings  v.  Gosnell,  133  N.  Car.  Hayden,  60  Tex.  223 ;  Perrin  v.  Reed, 
574,  45  S.  E.  942.  35  Vt.  2 ;  Stewart  v.  AlcSweeney,  14 

50  Kennedy  v.  Harden,  92  Ga.  230,    Wis.  468. 

18  S.  E.  542;  Woodbury  v.  Manlove.  53  Astor  v.  Wells,  4  Wheat.  (U.  S.) 

14  111.  213;  Van  Meter  v.  Knight.  32  466,  4  L.  ed.  616. 

Minn.  205,  20   N.  W.   142;   Wells  v.  ^4  Beaver  v.  Frick  Co.,  53  Ark.  18. 

Wells,  47  Barb.    (N.  Y.)   416;   In  re  13  S.  W.  134;  Chambers  v.  Haney,  45 

Oberholtzer's  Appeal,  124  Pa.  St.  583,  La.  Ann.  447,  12  So.  621  ;  Koerper  v. 

17  Atl.  143.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  132.  41 

■"'1  Shiveley    v.    Gilpin,    23    Ky.    L.  N.    W.    656;    Melton    v.    Turner,    38 

2090,  66  S.  W.  763.  81. 

52  Harper  v.  Tapley,  35  Miss.  506;  ^r,  joneg  v.  Powers,  65  Tex.  207. 

King  v.  Portis,  11  N.  Car.  25  :  Haw-  ^6  Stinnett  v.  House,   1   Posey  Un- 

ley  v.  Bullock,  29  Tex.  216;  Adams  v.  rep.  Cas.   (Tex.)   484. 


159  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    125 

fore  the  deed  was  recorded,  it  should  be  recorded  in  the  county 
in  which  the  land  is  situated  at  the  time  of  recording.^' 

A  power  of  attorney  to  convey  land  must  be  registered  in  any 
county  in  which  the  grantor  may  at  the  time  or  thereafter  have 
land  to  convey ;  but  the  fact  that  it  is  recorded  in  one  county,  does 
not  make  a  deed  executed  under  the  power  recordable  as  to  land 
in  another  county, ^^  A  deed  of  assignment  embracing  lands  in  a 
county  other  than  that  of  the  residence  of  the  assignor  must  be 
recorded  in  such  county.^^ 

§  125.  Effect  of  a  record  duly  made. — The  record  of  a 
deed  or  mortgage  is  constructive  notice  to  all  subsequent  pur- 
chasers and  mortgagees  of  the  same  interest  or  title  from  the 
grantor  or  from  one  deriving  title  from  him.*'°  As  to  them  the  in- 
strument takes  effect,  not  because  of  its  prior  execution,  but  by 
reason  of  its  prior  record.  Subsequent  purchasers  are  bound 
conclusively  by  the  record  of  the  deed  or  other  conveyance  in 
the  line  of  their  title  as  much  as  the  mortgagor  himself. *^^  It  is 
notice  only  to  subsequent  purchasers  and  incumbrancers  under  the 
same  grantor,  or  through  one  who  is  the  common  source  of  title 
in  the  line  of  title  to  which  the  recorded  deed  belongs.^^  The  reg- 
istry of  a  conveyance  of  an  equitable  title  is  not  notice  to  a  pur- 
chaser of  the  legal  title  from  a  person  who  appears  by  the  record 
to  be  the  real  owner.*^^  It  is  not  notice  to  those  who  have  prior 
rights  of  record,  or  even  to  those  whose  rights  are  contempora- 
neous with  those  of  the  grantor,  as,  for  instance,  to  his  coten- 
ants;  therefore  a  mortgage  by  one  tenant  in  common,  though 
duly  recorded,  is  not  notice  to  his  cotenant  of  its  existence,  or  of 
the  claim  of  the  mortgagor  of  the  exclusive  ownership  of  the 
land."* 

A  deed  or  mortgage  duly  recorded  is  notice  not  only  of  the  ex- 

5"  Green  v.  Green,  103  Gal.  108,  Zl  Humphreys  v.  Newman.  51  Maine  40; 

Pac.  188.  Clabaugh  v.  Byerly,  7  Gill  (Md.)  354, 

5s  Muldrow   V.    Robinson,    58    Mo.  48  Am.  Dec.  575 ;  Doyle  v.  Stevens,  4 

331.  Mich.  87;  McPherson  v.  Rollins.  107 

55>Eggleston  v.   Harrison,  61   Ohio  N.  Y.  316,   14  N.  E.  411,   1  Am.  St. 

St.  397,  55  N.  E.  993.  826 ;   Soiider  v.   Morrow,  Z2>   Pa.   St. 

eoRager  v.  Spect,  52  Gal.  579;  Bush  83;  Barbour  v.  Nichols,  3  R.  I.  187; 

V.  Golden,  17  Conn.  594 ;  Buchanan  v.  Edwards  v.  Barwise,  69  Tex.  84,  6  S. 

International  Bank,  78  111.  500;  Chi-  W.  677;  Wells  v.  Smith,  2  Utah  39. 

cago,  P.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Vaughn,  •'!  Tripe  v.  Marcv,  39  N.  H.  439 

206  111.  234,  69  N.   E.    113;    Blair  v.  02  McCabe  v.  Grey,  20  Gal.  509. 

Whitaker,  31  Ind.  App.  664,  69  N.  E.  "3  Tarhell  v.  West,  86  N.  Y.  280. 

182;  Ogden  v.  Walters,  12  Kans.  282;  C4  Leach  v.  Beattie,  Zl  Vt.  195. 


§    126  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  160 

istence  of  the  deed  or  mortgage,  but  of  all  its  contents,  so  far  as 
these  fall  within  the  line  of  the  chain  of  title."'"'  It  is  notice,  too, 
of  the  covenants  contained  in  it.*"^  It  is  notice  of  any  easement  or 
privilege  created  by  the  deed  or  referred  to  in  it."  The  registry 
of  a  deed  or  mortgage  is  equivalent  to  a  registry  of  it  to  all  per- 
sons who  may  subsequently  be  interested  in  the  property  and 
fully  protects  the  grantee's  rights.  A  mortgage  having  once  ob- 
tained priority  by  record  does  not  lose  its  place  by  being  held  by 
any  one  under  an  unrecorded  assignment.^"*  The  destruction  of 
the  record  in  any  manner  affects  the  constructive  notice  afforded 
by  the  recording  of  the  deed.^'*  Any  one  purchasing  land  in  good 
faith,  without  notice  of  an  unrecorded  mortgage,  takes  it  dis- 
charged of  the  lien;^°  and  he  can  convey  a  good  title  to  it  al- 
though the  mortgage  is  recorded  before  he  conveys  and  his  ven- 
dee has  notice  of  it.'^ 

If  one  having  no  title  to  land  conveys  it  with  covenants  of  war- 
ranty, and  this  is  duly  recorded,  and  afterward  the  grantor  ac- 
quires title  to  the  land,  the  estoppel  by  which  he  is  bound  under 
the  covenants  is  turned  into  a  good  estate  in  interest  in  the  grantee, 
so  that  by  operation  of  law  the  title  is  considered  as  vested  in  him 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  conveyed  to  the  grantor 
before  he  executed  the  deed.'"  To  sustain  a  deed  made  before  the 
grantor  acquires  title  is  certainly  a  violation  of  the  spirit  of  the 
registry  system,  under  which  a  record  is  notice  only  to  subsequent 
purchasers  and  incumbrancers  in  the  line  of  the  title  to  which  the 
recorded  deed  belongs.^^ 

§  126.  The  doctrine  of  notice. — The  doctrine  of  notice  as 
affecting  priority  is  generally  adopted  both  in  England  and  in  this 
country.  Subsequent  purchasers  who  have  notice  of  a  prior  un- 
recorded deed  or  mortgage  are  affected  by  their  knowledge  of  it 
in  the  same  way  that  the  prior  record  of  the  instrument  would 

65  Sowden   v.   Craig.  26  Iowa   156,  ^^  Paxton  v.  Brown,  61  Fed.  874,  10 

96  Am.  Dec.  125 :  McPherson  v.  Rol-  C.  C.  A.  135. 

lins,  107  N.  Y.  316,  14  N.  E.  411,  1  ^o  Neslin   v.  Wells,   104  U.  S.  428, 

Am.  St.  826;  Grandin  v.  Anderson,  15  26  L.  ed.  802. 

Ohio  St.  286.  "  Tarbell  v.  West,  86  N.  Y.  280. 

««  Morris  v.  Wadsworth,  17  Wend.  '^2  Salisbury    Sav.    Soc.    v.    Cutting, 

(N.  Y.)   103.  50  Conn.   113. 

"Bellas  V.   Lloyd,  2  Watts    (Pa.)  ^3  pord  v.  Unitv  Church   Soc,   120 

401.  Mo.  498,  25  S.  W.  394,  23  L.  R.  A. 

«8  Brinckerhoff  v.  Lansing,  4  Johns.  561,  41  Am.  St.  711. 
Ch.   (N.  Y.)  65,  8  Am.  Dec.  538. 


161  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     126 

affect  them/*  Judgment  creditors  having  such  notice  stand,  in  a 
Hke  position."  The  doctrine  is  the  same  under  statutes  which  de- 
clare without  quahfication  that  an  unacknowledged  or  unrecorded 
deed  shall  be  void  as  against  purchasers,  or  as  against  all  persons 
who  are  not  parties  to  the  conveyance.'^"  The  record  is  con- 
structive notice  only ;  but  it  is  notice  to  all  the  world  that  comes 
after.  Any  other  notice  must  in  the  nature  of  things  be  limited 
in  the  extent  of  it,  but,  so  far  as  it  goes,  its  effect  is  equitable  not 
any  less,  certainly,  than  that  of  the  record.  Having  notice  of  a 
deed  or  mortgage  defectively  recorded,  or  not  recorded  at  all,  a 
subsequent  purchaser  can  not  claim  priority  for  his  own  deed." 
As  between  him  and  the  prior  grantee  or  mortgagee,  it  is  the 
same  as  if  the  prior  deed  or  mortgage  had  been  duly  recorded."^ 

Therefore  priority  among  mortgagees  and  grantees  depends 
not  only  upon  the  date  of  their  deeds  and  the  date  of  their  record, 
but  also  upon  the  knowledge  they  have  of  the  true  state  of  facts 
as  to  the  title,  and  of  the  rights  and  equities  of  those  who  have 
not  fixed  their  priority  by  duly  recording*  their  deeds.'^^  It  has 
been  questioned  whether  the  courts  ought  ever  to  have  suffered 
the  question  of  actual  notice  to  be  agitated  against  one  whose 
conveyance  is  duly  registered. *** 

The  basis  of  the  doctrine  of  notice  is,  that  it  is  unconscientious 
and  fraudulent  to  permit  a  junior  purchaser  to  defeat  a  prior 
conveyance  or  incumbrance  of  which  he  has  knowledge.^^  But  it 
has  been  doubted  whether  this  doctrine  does  not  give  occasion  to 
more  fraud  than  it  prevents  and  whether  vigilance  in  recording 
the  mortgage  should  not  be  rewarded  as  much  as  vigilance  in  ob- 
taining it.^-    The  recording  acts  charge  subsequent  purchasers 

74  Hutchinson     v.     Hutchinson,     16        7g  Bullock  v.  Whipp,  15  R.  I.  195,  2 
Colo.  349,  26  Pac.  814 ;  Thompson  v.     Atl.  309. 

Maxwell,  16  Fla.  Ill ;  Peters  v.  Ham,  "  Coe   v.    Winters,    15    Iowa   481 ; 

62  Iowa  656.  18  N.  W.  296;  Short  v.  Johnston  v.  Camby,  29  Md.  211 

Fogle,    42    Kans.    349,    22    Pac.   223 ;  78  Hill  v.  McNichol,  76  Maine  314  ; 

Cook  V.  French,  96  Mich.  525,  56  N.  Smallwood  v.  Lewin,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  60. 

W.  101 ;   Keith  &  Perry  Coal  Co.  v.  79  Sheffey  v.  Bank,  Z2>  Fed.  315. 

Bmgham,   96   Mo.   96.    10   S.   W.   32;  so  Donahue  v.   Mills,  41   Ark.  421; 

Hendrickson  v.  Woolley,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  Calumet  Canal  &  Dock  Co.  v.  Russell, 

o07;  Dmgley  v.  Bon,  130  N.  Y.  607,  68  111.426;   Allen  v.  Cadwell,  55  Mich. 

29  N.  E.  1023 ;  Morrill  v.  Morrill,  53  8,  20  N.  W.  692. 

Vt.  74,  38  Am.  Rep.  659;  Rowell  v.  si  Harrington    v.    Allen,    48    Miss. 

Wilhams.  54  Wis.  636,  12  N.  W.  86.  492. 

75  Jordan  v.  Mead,  12  Ala.  247;  S2  Mayham  v.  Coombs,  14  Ohio  428. 
Manaudas  v.   Mann,  25  Ore.  597,  Zl 

Pac.  55. 

11 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§     127  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  162 

with  constructive  notice  of  all  instruments  of  record  in  the  ap- 
parent chain  of  title,  and  not  with  notice  of  all  instruments  of 
record  by  whomsoever  made  relating  to  the  land  in  question. 
When  a  purchaser  searches  the  records  till  he  finds  the  deed  by 
which  his  grantee  acquired  his  title,  he  is  not  bound  to  look  for 
deeds  of  an  antecedent  grantor  recorded  after  the  deed  to  his 
grantor.  The  record  of  the  deed  is  constructive  notice  only  to 
subsequent  purchasers  under  the  same  grantor.**^ 

The  rule  that  the  purchaser  in  good  faith  is  not  affected  with 
notice  of  a  prior  deed  from  an  antecedent  grantor,  recorded  sub- 
sequently to  the  deed  to  his  grantor,  though  prior  to  his  own  pur- 
chase deed,  has  the  support  of  the  better  authorities.-*  There 
are,  however,  quite  a  number  of  decisions  to  the  contrary.**^  As 
a  general  rule  a  purchaser  is  not  bound  to  search  the  records  for 
incumbrances  as  against  a  title  that  does  not  appear  of  record.^" 
Generally,  therefore,  the  record  of  any  mortgage  prior  to  the  con- 
veyance by  which  the  mortgagor  took  his  title  is  no  notice  of  the 
incumbrance  to  a  subsequent  purchaser.**^  Yet  the  circumstances 
may  be  such  that  a  purchaser  will  be  bound  to  search  the  records 
for  incumbrances  as  against  a  title  which  does  not  appear  of  rec- 
ord ;  as,  for  instance,  when  he  has  actual  notice,  prior  to  the  date 
of  the  conveyance  to  himself,  of  an  equitable  interest  to  another 
in  the  land  by  reason  of  his  possession  of  it  under  a  parol  con- 
tract of  purchase. "^^ 

§  127.  Actual  notice. — Actuai  notice  literally  means  direct 
personal  knowledge.''"'  Yet  the  term  is  often  used  in  a  broader 
sense  as  including  notice  implied  from  indirect  or  circumstantial 

83  Carbine   v.    Pringle,   90   111.   302;  so  stockwell   v.    State,    101    Ind.    1; 

'Hill    V.    McNicliol,     76     Maine    314;  Losey  v.  Simpson,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  246; 

Morse  v.  Curtis,  140  Mass.  112,  2  N.  Cook  v.  Travis,  20  N.  Y.  400. 

E.   929,    55   Am.    Rep.    456 ;    Ford    v.  ^7  Montgomery  v.   Keppell,  75   Cal. 

Unity  Church   Soc,    120  Mo.  498,  25  128,  19  Pac.  178,  7  Am.  St.  125 ;  Tar- 

S.  W.  394,  23  L.  R.  A.  561,  41   Am.  bell  v.  West,  86  N.  Y.  280;  Calder  v. 

St.  711  ;   Calder  v.  Chapman,  52   Pa.  Chapman,  52  Pa.  St.  359,  91  Am.  Dec. 

St.   359.   91    Am.    Dec.    163;    Day   v.  163. 

Clark,  25  Vt.  397.  ss  Emeric  v.  Aldarado.  90  Cal.  444, 

^*  See  note  83.  27  Pac.  356;  Losey  v.  Simpson,  11  N. 

«s  Mahoney   v.    Middleton,   41    Cal.  J.  Eq.  246. 

41;   English  v.  Waples,   13  Iowa  57;  ^'-^  Crassen    v.    Swoveland,    22    Ind. 

Van  Aken  v.  Gleason,  34  Mich.  477;  427;    Baltimore   v.    Williams.   6    Md. 

Woods  V.  Garnett,  72  Miss.  78.  16  So.  235;   Lamb  v.   Pierce,   113   Mass.  12; 

390;  Wcstbrook  v.  Gleason,  79  N.  Y.  Rogers  v.  Jones,  8  N.  H.  264;  Will- 

23;  Erwin  v.  Lewis,  Z2  Wis.  276.  ianison  v.  Brown,  15  N.  Y.  354. 


163  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    127 

evidence.^''  Whether  actual  notice  exists  in  any  particular  case, 
and  whether  it  is  sufficient  to  charge  the  party  whom  it  is  sought 
to  affect  by  it,  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  considered  and  deter- 
mined upon  the  evidence  in  each  particular  case.  It  is  deemed 
effectual  and  sufficient  when  the  evidence  shows  that  the  matter 
relating  to  the  prior  claim  or  interest  of  another,  constituting 
notice  of  it,  was  brought  distinctly  to  the  knowledge  and  atten- 
tion of  the  person  it  is  sought  to  affect. ^^ 

Whether  "actual  notice"  means  actual  knowledge  or  includes 
constructive  knowledge,  in  statutes  requiring  actual  notice  to 
affect  a  purchaser,  is  a  question  upon  which  the  decisions  are  not 
in  harmony.  Some  courts  have  held  that,  although  a  purchaser 
has  knowledge  that  the  lands  had  been  sold  and  purchased  by  an- 
other person,  yet  if  no  deed  had  been  recorded,  and  the  purchaser 
had  no  knowledge  that  a  deed  had  been  made,  he  is  not  charged 
with  actual  notice.^-  This  construction  gives  full  effect  to  the  reg- 
istry laws  and  enables  purchasers  to  rely  upon  them  fully  and  im- 
plicitly w^ithout  searching  the  outside  world  to  ascertain  the  true 
state  of  the  title.  It  simply  requires  of  all  persons  w^ho  hold  or 
claim  any  interest  in  real  estate,  that  they  shall  use  due  care  and 
diligence  in  placing  their  rights  beyond  all  danger  by  obtaining 
and  putting  upon  record  proper  title  papers.  But  in  states  in 
which  there  are  statutes  requiring  "actual  notice"  or  "knowledge" 
to  affect  a  purchaser,  a  less  strict  interpretation  of  the  word  is 
adopted,  and  actual  notice  does  not  imply  actual  knowledge. 
While  actual  notice  of  an  unrecorded  deed  is  distinguished  from 
mere  notice  such  as  would  be  imparted  from  actual,  open  and 
visible  occupation,  whether  known  to  the  purchaser  or  not,  yet  the 
words  are  held  to  include  constructive  knowledge  imparted  from 
actual,  open  and  visible  occupation,  where  such  occupation  is  in 
fact  known  to-  the  purchaser,^^  or  from  other  facts  which  con- 
structively charge  him  with  notice.  Notice  is  regarded  as  actual 
when  the  purchaser  either  knows  of  the  adverse  claim  to  title,  or 
is  conscious  of  having  the  means  of  such  knowledge.^* 

00  Knapp  V.  Bailey,  79  Maine  195,  9  gold  v.  Bryan,  3  Md.  Ch.  488 ;  State 

Atl    122,  1  Am.  St.  29.  Bank  v.   Frame,    112  Aio.   502.  20   S. 

»i  Michigan    Mutual   Life   Ins.   Co.  W.  620;  McKinzie  v.  Perrill.  15  Ohio 

V.  Conant,  40  Mich.  530.  St.  162,  45  Am.  Dec.  565;    Musgrove 

°2Lamb  v.  Pierce,   113  Mass.  72.  v.   Bonser,  5  Ore.  313,  20  Am.   Rep. 

"3  Allen  V.  McCalla,  25  Iowa  464,  96  1Z1 ;  Brinkman  v.  Jones,  44  Wis.  498. 
Am.    Dec.   56;    Greer  v.   Higgins,   20        ^4  Connecitcut  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co. 

Kans.  420;  Knapp  v.  Bailey,  79  Maine  v.  Smith,  117  Mo.  261,  22  S.  W.  623. 

195,  9  Atl.  122,  1  Am.  St.  29;  Ring-  38  Am.  St.  656. 


§     127  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  164 

Notice  implied  by  circumstances  has  ])een  called  actua.  notice 
in  the  second  degree.^^  The  degrees  and  kinds  of  actual  notice 
are  without  number,  ranging  from  a  formal  written  statement  of 
the  lien,  giving  all  its  detail,  to  a  mere  verbal  declaration  of  the 
fact  of  its  existence ;  it  may  be  one  given  expressly  as  a  notice,  or 
it  may  have  come  in  an  accidental  way.  But  neither  the  manner 
of  the  notice  nor  the  purpose  of  it  is  material."'^  A  mere  remark 
or  supposition  that  some  other  person  claims  an  interest  in  prop- 
erty will  not  affect  a  person  with  notice  of  such  interest.''^ 

Of  course,  formal  and  technical  notice  can  be  given  only  by 
the  person  interested;  but  a  stranger  can  give  information  which 
will  affect  a  purchaser  by  putting  him  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  fact. 
Information  from  a  person  directly  interested  in  the  property  is 
entitled  to  more  weight  than  the  statements  of  a  stranger  are 
entitled  to;  but  it  may  be  stated  as  a  general  proposition  that,  if 
the  information  be  derived  from  any  other  source  entitled  to 
credit,  and  it  be  definite,  it  will  be  equally  binding  as  if  it  came 
from  the  party  himself.'^**  What  is  sufficient  to  put  a  purchaser 
upon  inquiry,  and  affect  him  with  the  facts  which  the  inquiry 
might  lead  to,  it  is  difficult  to  state  in  the  form  of  a  rule  univer- 
sally applicable.  In  each  case  it  must  be  determined  whether  the 
facts  and  considerations  disclosed  are  such  as  to  charge  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  purchaser  with  the  duty  of  following  up  the 
inquiry.^^  In  general,  a  notice  of  a  claim,  right,  or  interest  af- 
fecting a  title  is  sufficient  if  it  is  such  a  notice  as  a  man  of  ordi- 
nary intelligence  would  act  upon  if  it  affected  his  ordinary  busi- 
ness affairs.^ 

A  purchaser  knowing  of  the  existence  of  a  debt  for  unpaid 
purchase-money  is  not  charged  with  notice  of  an  unrecorded 
mortgage  securing  such  purchase-money.-  But  a  purchaser  with 
such  knowledge  is  put  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  existence  of  the 
vendor's  lien,  and  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  it,  if  it  exists,  in 

05  Wilson  V.   Miller,   16  Iowa   111;  ss  Lawton  v.   Gordon,  Zl  Cal.  202; 

Knapp  V.  Bailey,  79  Maine  195,  9  Atl.  Jaeger  v.  Hardy.  48  Ohio  St.  335,  27 

122,  1  Am.  St.  29.  N.   E.  863;   Mulliken  v.   Graham,   72 

o«  Wailes  v.  Cooper,  24  Miss.  208.  Pa.    St.   484 ;    Martel   v.    Somers,   26 

^"^  Lambert  v.  Newman,  56  Ala.  623  ;  Tex.   551. 

Hall  V.   Livingston,  3   Del.   Ch.  348;  »'•' Baker  v.  Bliss,  39  N.  Y.  70. 

Ratteree  v.  Conley,  74  Ga.  153 ;  Chi-  i  Bradlee  v.   Whitney,    108   Pa.   St. 

cago  V.  Witt.   75   111.  211;   Weare  v.  362. 

Williams,  85  Iowa  253,  52  N.  W.  328;  2  Pollak  v.  Davidson,  87  Ala.  551, 

Butlers   v.    Stevens,   26    Maine    484;  6  So.  312. 
Shepard  v.  Shepard,  36  Mich.  173, 


165  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     128 

a  state  where  such  a  lien  is  recognized.^  A  purchaser  may  be 
charged  with  notice  by  the  fact  that  he  is  paying  a  very  inade- 
quate price  for  the  property.*  Notice,  to  supply  the  place  of  reg- 
istry, must  be  sufficient  to  make  inquiry  upon;  it  must  be  more 
than  what  is  barely  sufficient  to  put  the  party  upon  inquiry.^  In 
general  it  may  be  said  that  the  facts  disclosed  amount  to  notice 
when  they  are  such  as  render  it  incumbent  upon  the  purchaser 
or  mortgagee  to  inquire,  and  at  the  same  time  enable  him  to 
prosecute  the  inquiry  successfully." 

As  a  general  rule  a  purchaser  is  not  put  upon  inquiry  by  notice 
of  a  deed  not  in  the  line  of  title  under  which  he  claims.''  The  in- 
quiry should  be  prosecuted  by  recourse  to  reliable  and  disinter- 
ested sources  of  information.  It  is  not  safe  or  sufficient  to  rely 
upon  the  statements  of  the  vendor,  or  of  one  who  has  a  motive 
for  misleading  the  inquirer.^  If  a  purchaser  put  upon  inquiry 
fails  to  prosecute  it  with  due  diligence  he  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed to  have  notice  of  the  facts  that  a  due  inquiry  would  have 
disclosed.'' 

§  128.  Implied  notice. — Implied  notice  arises  out  of  the 
legal  relation  of  a  person  who  has  no  notice  with  another  who  has 
notice.  Implied  notice  is  a  branch  of  actual  notice,  and  is  im- 
puted to  a  person  when  he  is  conscious  of  having  the  means  of 
knowledge  which  he  does  not  use,  or  that  he  has  such  relations 
with  another  that  the  knowledge  of  the  latter,  though  not  com- 
municated, is  imputed  to  him.  Thus  notice  to  the  principal  is  im- 
plied from  notice  to  his  agent.  When  an  agent  acquires  knowl- 
edge of  any  matters  or  instruments  affecting  the  title  of  any 
lands,  about  the  purchase  or  mortgage  of  which  he  is  employed, 
and  this  knowledge  is  such  that  it  is  his  duty  to  communicate  it 
to  his  principal,  the  law  imputes  this  knowledge  to  the  principal ; 

3  Overall  v.  Taylor,  99  Ala.  12.   11  E.   291,    19  L.   R.   A.    105;    Smith   v. 

So.  738.  Schweigerer,  129  Incl.  363,  28  N.  W. 

*Durant    v.    Crowell,    97    N.    Car.  696. 

367,  2   S.   E.  541.  7  Satterfield  v.  Malone,  35  Fed.  445, 

■'  Tompkins   v.   Henderson,  83   Ala.  1  L.  R.  A.  35. 

391,  3  So.  774;   Reed  v.  Gannon,  50  «  Overall  v.  Taylor.  99  Ala.  12.   11 

N.  Y.  345.  So.  738;  Blatchley  v.  Osborn,  33  Conn. 

"  Tompkins  v.   Henderson,  83   Ala.  226. 

391.  3  So.  774;   Thompson  v.  Pioche,  »  Foster  v.  Stallvvorth,  62  Ala.  547; 

44  Cal.  508;  Boswell  v.  Goodwin,  31  Gaines   v.    Saunders,    50   Ark.   322,    7 

Conn.  74,  81  Am.  Dec.  169 ;  Hunt  v.  S.   W.   301 ;    Montgomery  v.    Keppel, 

Dunn,  74  Ga.  120 ;  Rock  Island  &  Pac.  75   Cal.    128,    19   Pac.   178;    Mason   v. 

R.  Co.  V.  Dimick,  144  111.  628,  32  N.  Mullahy,  145  111.  383,  34  N.  E.  36. 


§128  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  166 

or.  in  other  words,  notice  to  the  principal  of  such  matters  or  in- 
struments is  implied/"  Such  notice  is  sometimes  called  construc- 
tive notice,  but  it  is  really  implied  from  the  identity  of  principal 
and  agent,  and  not  imputed  by  virtue  of  a  construction  placed 
upon  their  conduct  or  relation.  The  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  different  kinds  of  notice  is  not  always  observed  but  this  is 
a  matter  of  very  little  practical  Importance,  because  the  effect  of 
notice,  whether  it  be  called  actual,  implied,  or  constructive,  is  the 
same.  Notice  to  an  agent,  to  bind  the  principal,  must  be  brought 
home  to  the  agent  while  engaged  in  the  business  and  negotiation 
of  the  principal,  and  when  it  would  be  a  breach  of  trust  in  the 
former  not  to  communicate  the  knowledge  to  the  latter.^^ 
X^^hether  the  notice  must  be  in  the  same  transaction,  or  in  some 
transaction  in  which  the  principal  is  concerned,  is  a  question  upon 
which  the  authorities  are  not  agreed.  Some  courts  hold  that 
notice  to  the  agent  binds  the  principal  only  when  it  is  given  or 
acquired  by  him  in  the  transaction  in  which  the  principal  employs 
him.^^  Other  courts  have  adhered  to  the  doctrine  that  the  prin- 
cipal is  affected  by  the  agent's  knowledge  of  any  prior  lien,  trust, 
or  fraud  affecting  the  property,  no  matter  when  acquired.^''  The 
notice  must  be  of  some  matter  material  to  the  transaction;  of 
something  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the  agent  to  make  known  to 
the  principal."  When  the  same  agent  or  attorney  is  employed  by 
both  parties  in  the  same  transaction  his  .knowledge  is  then  the 
knowledge  of  both  the  vendor  and  vendee,  or  both  the  mortgagor 
and  mortgagee. ^^  When  an  agent  is  guilty  of  any  fraud,  for  the 
carrying  out  of  which  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  conceal  it 
from  his  principal,  notice  of  it  can  not  be  imputed  to  the  latter.^*^ 

10  Smith    V.    Aycr,    101    U.    .S.    320.  26  L.  ed.  164;  Satterfield  v.  Malone, 

25   L.   cd.   955 ;   Donald  v.   Beals,   57  35  Fed.  445,  1  L.  R.  A.  35. 

Cal.   399;   Clark   v.    Fuller.   39   Conn.  12  McConnick    v.    Wheeler,    36    111. 

238;    Walker   v.    Schreiber,   47    Iowa  114.  85  Am.  Dec.  388;  Rand  v.  Davis 

529;  Willis  v.  Vallette,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  (Tex.).  27  S.  W.  939;  Blumenthal  v. 

186;    Allen   v.    Poole.    54    Miss.    Z22>\  Brainard,  38  Vt.  402.  91  Am.  Dec.  350. 

Hickman   v.   Green,   123   Mo.    165.  27  i=*  Arrinpton   v.    Arrington.    114   N. 

S.  W.  440,  29  L.  R.  A.  39;  Coggswell  Car.  151,  19  S.  E.  351 ;  Hart  v.  Farm- 

V.    Griffith,   23   Nehr.   334,   36   N.   W.  ers  &c.  Bank,  Z2>  Vt.  252. 

538;   Hovey  v.   Blanchard,   13   N.  H.  "  Wyllie  v.  Pollen,  32  L.  J.  (N.  S.) 

145 ;  Stanley  v.  Chamberlin,  39  N.  J.  Ch.  782. 

L.  565;  Slatterlv  v.  Schwannecke,  118  1=  Losey  v.   Simpson.  11   N.  J.  Eq. 

N.  Y.   543.  23   N.   E.  922;   Cowan  v.  446. 

Withrow,   111   N.  Car.  306,   16  S.  E.  i"  Dillaway  v.  Butler,  135  Mass.  479 ; 

397;  Biglcy  v.  Jones,  114  Pa.  St:  510,  National  Life   Ins.  Co.  v.  Minch,   53 

7  Atl.  54.  N.  Y.  144. 

"  Rogers  v.  Palmer,  102  U.  S.  263, 


167  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     129 

Notice  is  not  necessarily  implied  out  of  the  relationship  of  hus- 
band and  wife.^'  But  where  a  husband  buys  land  for  his  wife, 
with  knowledge  of  a  prior  unrecorded  deed,  the  wife  is  charge- 
able with  such  knowledge/^ 

A  purchaser  from  one  of  two  joint  owners  is  chargeable  with 
notice  of  the  interest  of  the  other,  when  this  interest  is  shown  by 
the  conveyance,  to  which  he  must  look  for  his  vendor's  title. ^'^ 
If  a  purchaser  has  knowledge  that  the  land  is  partnership  prop- 
erty, and  he  attempts  to  purchase  the  individual  interest  of  one 
partner,  be  buys  subject  to  the  equitable  rights  of  the  other  part- 
ners.-" Notice,  to  affect  a  corporation,  must  be  brought  home  to 
the  president  and  directors,  or  to  some  officer  to  w^hom  the  matter 
to  which  the  notice  relates  has  been  specially  given  in  charge."^ 

§  129.  Constructive  notice. — Constructive  notice  is  that 
which  is  imputed  to  a  person  upon  strictly  legal  inferences  of 
matters  which  he  necessarily  ought  to  know,  or  which,  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  ordinary  diligence,  he  might  know.  It  excludes  actual 
notice.  It  can  not  be  controverted."  The  most  familiar  instance 
of  constructive  notice  is  that  which  under  the  registry  laws  is 
afforded  by  the  record  of  the  deed.  Every  subsequent  inquirer 
is  bound  to  know  the  existence  and  contents  of  such  deed,  and  it 
is  not  admissible  for  him  to  show  that  his  attorney  examined  the 
records  and  failed  to  find  the  deed  of  record. ^^ 

But  there  are  various  other  kinds  of  constructive  notice,  and  a 
purchaser  or  mortgagee  is  as  much  bound  by  the  knowledge  thus 
imputed  to  him  of  the  matters  and  instruments  affecting  the  title 
to  property,  as  he  would  be  if  he  were  informed  of  them  by  a 
deed  properly  recorded.  Whether  the  person  charged  with  such 
notice  actually  had  knowledge  of  the  facts  affecting  the  property 
in  question,  or  might  have  learned  them  by  inquiry,  or  w'hether 
he  studiously  abstained  from  inquiry  for  the  very  purpose  of 
avoiding  notice,  he  is  alike  presumed  to  have  had  notice.  Con- 
structive notice  is  imputed  either  upon  the  ground  of  fraud  or  of 

"  Satterfield  v.  Malone,  35  Fed.  445,  ran,   142  U.  S.  417,  12  Sup.  Ct.  239, 

1  L.  R.  A.  35.  35  L.  ed.  1063. 

1^  McMaken  v.  Niles,  91  Iowa  628,  22  Simmons  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Do- 

60  N.  W.  199.  ran,   142  U.  S.  417,  12  Sup.  Ct.  239, 

19  Campbell  v.  Roach,  45  Ala.  667.  35  L.  ed.  1063. 

20  Tillinghast  v.  Champlin,  4  R.  I.  23  Edwards  v.  Barwise,  69  Tex.  84, 
173,  67  Am.  Dec.  510.  6  S.  W.  677. 

21  Simmons  Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Do- 


§     129  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  168 

negligence.  It  does  not  exist  without  the  one  or  the  other.  No- 
tice of  the  existence  of  an  adverse  right,  title  or  lien,  without  the 
particulars  of  it,  is  sufficient.'*  Having  notice  of  the  existence  of 
an  adverse  right,  title,  or  lien,  the  purchaser  is  chargeable  with 
constructive  notice  of  all  its  contents."'' 

When  a  person  claims  under  a  deed  which  by  its  recitals  leads 
him  to  other  facts  affecting  the  title  to  the  property,  he  is  pre- 
sumed to  know  such  facts;  or  it  would  be  gross  negligence  in  him 
not  to  make  inquiry  as  to  the  facts  he  is  thus  put  in  the  way  of 
ascertaining."®  When  a  purchaser  can  not  make  out  his  title  ex- 
cept through  a  deed  which  leads  him  to  the  knowledge  of  another 
fact,  he  will  be  deemed  to  have  knowledge  of  that  fact.^^  A  pur- 
chaser from  one  whose  title-deed  describes  him  as  "trustee"  has 
notice  of  a  trust  of  some  kind,  and  is  put  upon  inquiry  as  to  the 
existence  and  nature  of  the  trust,  though  the  word  "trustee" 
without  the  name  of  the  beneficiary  or  any  declaration  of  trust, 
may  be  sufficient  in  itself  to  create  a  trust.^*  Persons  dealing 
with  a  trustee  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  scope  of  his  author- 
ity, and  even  a  third  person  taking  a  title  which  comes  through 
a  trustee,  and  having  notice  of  facts  which  would  put  him  upon 
inquiry  whether  the  trustee  was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his 
authority,  is  not  protected.-''  One  who  purchases  land  by  a  deed, 
which  expressly  recites  that  the  premises  are  subject  to  a  mort- 
gage, has  notice  of  the  mortgage  from  the  recital,  and  can  not 
claim  against  it,  although  it  he  not  recorded.^"   Where  there  is  a 

24Willink  V.  Morris  &c.  Co.,  4  N.  490;  Acer  v.  Westcott,  46  N.  Y.  384, 

J.  Eq.  377.  7  Am.  Rep.  355 ;  Bonner  v.  Ware,  10 

25  Webb  V.  Robbins,  77  Ala.  6 ;  Mar-  Ohio  465  ;  Parke  v.  Neeley,  90  Pa.  St. 

tin  V.  Cauble,  72  Ind.  67.  52 ;  Kansas  City  Land  Co.  v.  Hill,  87 

26Corbitt  V.    Clennv,   52   Ala.   480;  Tenn.  589,   11   S.  W.  797;   Renick  v. 

Hassey  v.  Wilke.  55  Cal.  525 ;  Hamil-  Dawson,     55     Tex.     102 ;     Willis     v. 

ton  V.  Nutt,  34  Conn.  501 ;  Rosser  v.  Adams,    66    Vt.    223,    28    Atl.    1033 ; 

Cheney,  61    Ga.  468;   Dean  v.   Long,  Whitlock  v.  Johnson,  87  Va.  323,   12 

122  111.  447,  11   N.  E.  34;  Cincinnati,  S.  E.  614;  Dailey  v.  Kastell,  56  Wis. 

L,  St.  L.  &  C.  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Smith,  127  444,  14  N.  W.  635. 

Ind.  461.  26  N.  E.  1009;  Clark  v.  Hoi-  27  Loring  v.  Groomer,  110  Mo.  632, 

land,  72  Iowa  34,  33  N.  W.  350,  2  Am.  19  S.  W.  950. 

St.  230;  Pike  v.  Collins.  33  Maine  38;  28  Marbury  v.  Ehlen,  72  Md.  206, 
Bryan  v.  Harvey,  18  Md.  113;  Sar-  19  Atl.  648,  20  Am.  St.  467;  Mercan- 
gent  V.  Hubbard,  102  Mass.  380;  Wait  tile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Parson,  54  Minn. 
V.  Baldwin,  60  Mich.  622,  27  N.  W.  56.  55  N.  W.  825,  40  Am.  St.  299. 
697,  1  Am.  St.  551  ;  Ross  v.  Worth-  -'!.  Kirsch  v.  Tozier,  143  N.  Y.  390, 
ington.  11  Minn  (Gil.  323)  438,  88  38  N.  E.  375.  42  Am.  St.  729. 
Am.  Dec.  95;  Deason  v.  Taylor,  53  so  Hull  v.  Sullivan,  63  Ga.  196;  Gar- 
Miss.  697;  Mason  v.  Black,  87  Mo.  rett  v.  Puckett.  15  Ind.  485;  Howard 
,^29;  Buchanan  v,  Balkum,  60  N.  H.  v.  Chase,  104  Mass.  249;  Westervelt 
406;  Jennings  v.  Dixey,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  v.  Wyckoff,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  188. 


169  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §    130 

recital  in  a  prior  deed  that  the  sale  was  made  upon  credit,  a  sub- 
sequent purchaser  is  bound  to  inquire  whether  the  purchase- 
money  has  been  paid  or  whether  the  vendor  has  a  lien  for  it ;  and 
the  mere  fact  that  the  time  of  payment  of  the  purchase-money,  as 
recited  in  the  deed,  has  elapsed  does  not  authorize  him  to  pre- 
sume that  it  was  paid."^  Where  the  mortgaged  premises  have 
been  sold  in  parcels  to  different  persons  at  different  times,  in  the 
absence  of  any  intervening  equities  the  several  parcels  are  subject 
to  the  mortgage,  and  are  to  be  resorted  to  in  the  inverse  order  of 
alienation. ^^  A  purchaser  having  actual  notice  of  a  mortgage  is 
affected  with  notice  of  any  other  incumbrances  which  are  re- 
ferred to  in  that  mortgage,  or  in  other  deeds  to  which  the  deeds 
first  referred  to  may  in  turn  refer. ^^ 

A  general  description  of  the  deed  is  sufficient  to  put  all  parties 
interested  upon  inquiry,  and  to  charge  them  with  notice  of  all 
facts  that  could  be  obtained  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence 
and  the  prosecution  of  the  inquiry  in  the  right  direction.^*  The 
limit  of  inquiry  necessary  in  any  case  is  that  required  by  the  use 
of  reasonable  diligence.  What  is  reasonable  diligence  can  not  be 
determined  by  any  general  rule,  but  must  vary  with  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case. 

§  130.  Official  tract  indexes. — By  statute  in  some  states 
the  recording  officer  is  required  to  keep,  in  IxDoks  suitable  for  the 
purpose,  a  tract  index  of  each  instrument  of  record  affecting  the 
title  to  each  particular  tract  of  land  in  the  county  or  district. 
From  this  index  the  officer  furnishes,  on  demand  of  any  person, 
and  on  payment  of  the  fee,  if  any  provided  therefor,  an  abstract 
of  title  to  any  land  in  such  county  or  district.  Where  such  offi- 
cial tract  index  is  in  use  the  private  abstracter  is  enabled  to  com- 
pile an  abstract  with  less  difficulty  than  he  would  otherwise  ex- 
perience. As  a  rule  he  has,  with  the  general  public,  free  access  to 
this  tract  index  in  compiling  an  abstract  for  a  client,  yet  in  the  ab- 
sence of  express  statutory  permission,  he  may  not  copy  it  into 
other  books  for  use  in  his  business  as  an  abstracter  of  titles.  Such 
tract  indexes  are  to  be  distinguished  from  other  records  such  as 
are  usually  denominated  "public  records."^^    These  official  tract 

31  Deason  v.  Taylor.  53  Miss.  697 ;  s^  Howard  Ins.  Co.  v.  Halsey,  8  N. 
Tydings  v.  Pitcher,  82  Mo.  379.  Y.  271.  59  Am.  Dec.  478. 

32  Iglehart  v.  Crane.  42  111.  261 ;  Mc-  ^4  Seymour  v.  Darrow.  31  Vt.  122. 
Kinney  v.  Miller,  19  Mich.  142.  ^s  Davis    v.    Abstract    Construction 

Co.,  121   111.  App.   121. 


131 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


170 


indexes  are  usually  made  by  so  ruling  and  arranging  the  paper 
that  opposite  to  the  description  of  each  quarter  section,  sectional 
lot,  town,  city  or  village  lot  or  other  subdivision  of  land  in  the 
county,  which  a  convenient  arrangement  may  require  to  be  noted, 
there  shall  be  left  a  blank  space  of  ample  proportions  in  which  to 
enter  the  letter  or  numeral  indicating  each  volume,  and  the  class 
of  records  of  such  volume,  designating  deeds  by  the  letter  D, 
mortgages  by  the  letter  M,  miscellaneous  instruments  by  the  ab- 
breviation Misc.,  and  the  register  of  attachments,  sales  and  no- 
tices by  the  letter  R,  together  with  the  page  of  the  volume  upon 
which  any  deed,  mortgage  or  other  instrument  affecting  the  title 
to  or  mentioning  such  tract  or  any  part  thereof  shall  heretofore 
have  been  or  may  hereafter  be  recorded  or  entered. 

§  131.  General  index  of  records. — There  is  no  uniform 
method  of  indexing  public  records  in  use  in  this  country,  but 
some  sort  of  system,  more  or  less  perfect,  will  be  found  in  every 
state.  The  official  in  charge  of  the  records  is  usually  required  to 
keep  a  general  index  in  which  he  must  enter  every  instrument  or 
writing  received  by  him  for  record,  under  the  respective  and  ap- 
propriate heads.  The  following  is  illustrative  of  the  form  of 
such  general  index : 


No.  of         Time  of 
Instrument  Reception 


Name  of 
Grantor 


Name  of 
Grantee 


Descrip- 
tion of 
Land 


Name  of 
Instru- 
ment 


Volume 
and  page 

where 
recorded 


To 

whom 
delivered 


Fee 
received' 


The  officer  is  required  to  make  correct  entries  in  the  index  of 
every  instrument  or  writing  received  by  him  for  record,  under 
the  respective  and  appropriate  heads,  entering  the  names  of  the 
grantors  in  alphabetical  order.  He  is  required  immediately  upon 
the  receipt  of  any  such  instrument  for  record  to  enter  in  the  ap- 
propriate column,  and  in  the  order  of  time  in  which  it  is  received, 
the  day,  hour  and  minute  of  its  reception.  He  is  also  required 
to  enter  in  the  appropriate  columns  of  the  index  a  description  of 
the  land,  the  name  of  the  instrument,  the  volume  and  page  where 
the  instrument  is  recorded,  to  whom  it  was  delivered  when  re- 
corded,  and  the   fee   received'.     The   index  above   described  is 


171 


PUBLIC    RECORDS 


§  132 


usually  intended  for  all  instruments  of  conveyance.  The  statutes 
sometimes  provide  for  the  keeping  of  another  and  additional  in- 
dex in  which  are  shown  instruments  of  a  miscellaneous  character. 
In  this  index  the  instruments  are  numbered  .consecutively,  the 
kind  of  instrument  designated,  and  where  such  instrument  is 
recorded  or  filed.  An  illustration  of  the  form  of  such  index  is  as 
follows : 


No.  of 

Kind  of 
Instrument 

Where  Recorded  or  Filed 

Instrument 

Volume 

Page 

Letters  of  Title 

Generally  an  instrument  is  deemed  recorded  at  the  time  it  is 
noted  in  the  index,  and  statutes  not  infrequently  provide  that 
wherever  the  recording  officer  has  made  in  any  index  required 
by  law  to  be  kept  in  his  office,  in  the  index  column  provided  for 
describing  the  land  affected  by  the  instrument  indexed,  the  words 
"see  record,"  "see  deed,"  "see  mortgage,"  or  other  instrument, 
as  the  case  may  be,  such  entry  shall  be  sufficient  reference  to  the 
record  of  such  instrument  if  it  be  in  fact  recorded  at  large  in  the 
place  so  referred  to. 

§  132.  Whether  the  index  is  a  part  of  the  record. — Unless 
otherwise  provided  by  statute  the  index  is  generally  considered  no 
part  of  the  record,  and  a  mistake  in  it  does  not  invalidate  the 
notice  afforded  by  a  record  otherwise  properly  made.^^  Although 
a  deed  be  omitted  from  the  index,  there  is  constructive  notice  of 
it  which  aft'ects  all  subsequent  purchasers  from  the  time  it  was  left 
for  record."    The  general  policy  of  the  recording  acts  is  to  make 


3«  Chatham  v.  Bradford,  50  Ga.  327, 

15  Am.  Rep.  692 ;  Gilchrist  v.  Gough, 
63  Ind.  576,  30  Am.  Rep.  250 ;  Bishop 
V.  Schneider,  46  Mo.  472,  2  Am.  Rep. 
533 ;  Lincoln  Bldg.  &  Sav.  Assn.  v. 
Hass,  10  Nebr.  581,  7  N.  W.  327; 
Semon  v.  Terhune,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  364, 
2  Atl.  18;  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Dake,  87  N.  Y.  257;  Davis  v.  Whit- 
aker,  114  N.  Car.  279,  19  S.  E.  699, 
41  Am.  St.  793 ;  Green  v.  Garrington, 

16  Ohio   St.  548,  91   Am.   Dec.   103; 


Musgrove  v.  Bonser,  5  Ore.  313,  20 
Am.  Rep.  734 ;  Stockwell  v.  McHenry, 
107  Pa.  St.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  475; 
Barrett  v.  Prentiss,  57  Vt.  297;  Ely 
V.  Wilcox,  20  \^'is.  523,  91  Am.  Dec. 
436. 

3'  Perkins  v.  Strong,  22  Nebr.  725, 
36  N.  W.  292 ;  Stockwell  v.  McHenry, 
107  Pa.  St.  237,  52  Am.  Rep.  475; 
Throckmorton  v.  Price,  28  Tex.  605, 
91  Am.  Dec.  334;  Curtis  v.  Lyman,  24 
Vt.  338,  58  Am.  Dec.  174. 


^     133  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  172 

the  filing  of  a  deed  duly  executed  and  acknowledged,  with  the 
proper  recording  ofiicer,  constructive  notice  from  that  time ;  and 
although  it  be  provided  that  the  registrar  shall  make  an  index  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  a  correct  and  easy  reference  to  the  books 
of  reference  in  his  office,  the  index  is  designed,  not  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  party  recording  his  conveyance  but  for  the  conven- 
ience of  those  searching  the  records;  and,  instead  of  being  a  part 
of  the  record,  it  only  shows  the  way  to  the  record.  It  is  in  no 
way  necessary  that  a  conveyance  shall  be  indexed,  as  well  as 
recorded,  in  order  to  make  it  a  valid  notice. ^^  When  a  grantee 
has  delivered  his  deed  to  the  recorder,  notice  of  its  contents  is 
imparted  from  that  time,  if  it  is  correctly  spread  upon  the  record. 
He  has  done  all  the  law  requires  of  him  for  his  protection.  The 
.purpose  of- the  index  is  only  to  point  to  the  record,  but  consti- 
tutes no  part  of  it.^^ 

But  in  Iowa,  Washington  and  Wisconsin,  the  index  is  an  essen- 
tial part  of  the  record,  and  a  deed  filed  but  not  indexed,  or  even 
one  copied  into  the  record  but  not  indexed,  does  not  impart  con- 
structive notice,^"  In  such  states  the  laws  require  a  descriptive 
index  to  be  kept,  and  prescribe  the  requisites  of  the  index,  and  the 
index  is  regarded  as  an  integral  part  of  the  complete  and  valid 
registration.^^  But  the  omission  of  the  description  in  such  index 
is  cured  by  the  recording  of  the  deed  at  length  in  the  proper 
record.*^  The  record,  though  complete  in  every  other  respect 
except  that  it  is  not  properly  indexed,  does  not  operate  as  con- 
structive notice/^ 

§  133.  Records  of  attachment  and  lis  pendens. — In  most 
states  recording  officers  are  required  to  keep  a  separate  book  or 
register  divided  into  two  columns  with  appropriate  headings,  in 
which  he  shall  enter  an  abstract  of  every  writ  of  attachment  or 
copy  thereof  and  certificate  of  real  estate  attached,  of  every  cer- 
tificate of  sale  of  real  estate,  and  of  every  notice  of  the  pendency 
of  any  action  affecting  real  estate,  which  may  be  filed  pursuant  to 
law  in  his  office,  specifying  the  day,  hour  and  minute  of  its 

38  Davis  V.  Whitakcr,   114  N.   Car.  155;  Oconto  Co.  v.  Jerrard,  46  Wis. 

279.  19  S.  E.  699,  41  Am.  St.  793.  317,  50  N.  W.  591. 

'•>'>  Bishop  V.  Schneider,  46  Mo.  472,        4i  Barney  v.  McCarty,  15  Iowa  510, 

2  Am.  Rep.  533.  83  Am.  Dec.  427. 

■*o  Whallev  v.  Small,  25  Iowa  184 ;         42  Pringle  v.  Dunn.  37  Wis.  449,  19 

Ritchie  V.   Griffiths,   1   Wash.  429.  25  Am.  Rep.  772. 
Pac.  341,  12  L.  R.  A.  384,  22  Am.  St.         «  Howe  v.  Thayer.  49  Iowa  154. 


173  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     134 

reception,  the  names  of  the  several  parties  mentioned  therein, 
designating  separately  plaintiffs  and  defendants ;  the  names  of  the 
attorneys  of  the  respective  parties;  the  date  when  the  land  was 
sold;  the  description  of  all  such  real  estate  mentioned,  and  the 
amount  of  indebtedness  claimed  in  any  such  writ,  and  the  amount 
for  which  any  such  land  was  sold.  He  is  usually  required  to 
keep  an  index  for  such  record,  showing  in  alphabetical  order,  sep- 
arately, the  names  of  each  party  plaintiff  and  each  party  de- 
fendant, and  the  page  on  which  such  name  is  found. 

The  force  and  effect  of  the  recording  of  a  deed  or  mortgage  are 
limited  not  only  by  the  actual  notice  which  the  grantee  may  have 
of  prior  unrecorded  conveyances,  but  also  by  constructive  notice 
of  rights  and  claims  of  other  parties,  furnished  by  the  pendency 
of  an  action  in  relation  to  the  title  of  the  property,  notice  of  the 
pendency  of  which  has  been  filed  according  to  law.^*  But  only 
those  persons  are  charged  with  notice,  or  are  affected  by  a  lis 
pendens,  who,  pending  the  suit,  purchase  from  a  party  to  the 
suit,*'  or  derive  title  from  one  so  purchasing.*'' 

§  134.  Index  of  judgment  records. — As  a  rule  all  judg- 
ments, decrees  and  orders  rendered  or  made  by  any  court  in  cases 
where  the  title  to  land  shall  have  been  in  controversy  or  operating 
to  pass  title  thereto  or  otherwise  affect  the  title,  is  required  to  be 
recorded  in  the  office  of  the  register  of  deeds  of  the  county  where 
any  part  of  the  lands  are  situated,  in  the  same  manner  and  with 
like  effect  as  conveyances.  But  as  judgments  and  decrees  of  a 
court  of  record  are  required  by  law  to  be  recorded  in  the  office  of 
the  clerk  of  the  court  in  order  to  constitute  a  lien  on  the  real 
estate  of  the  defendant,  the  proper  place  to  look  for  judgments 
against  a  particular  person  is  in  the  judgment  dockets  in  the 
clerk's  ofiice.  Clerks  are  usually  required  to  keep  a  judgment 
index  and  cross-index  arranged  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the 
names  of  the  plaintiff  and  defendant.  The  requirement  that  a 
cross-index  shall  be  kept  is  not  merely  directory.  It  is  important 
and  necessary.  It  is  intended  to  enable  any  person  to  learn  that 
there  is  a  docketed  judgment  in  favor  of  a  certain  party  or  parties, 
and  against  certain  other  parties,  and  where  to  find  it  on  the 
docket.     The  inquirer  is  not  required  to  look  through  the  whole 

«  Lacassagne  v.  Chapuis.  144  U.  S.     15  Atl.  497.  2  L.  R.  A.  48,  6  Am.  St. 
119.  12  Sup.  Ct.  659,  36  L.  ed.  368.        760. 
45  Green   v.   Rick,   121    Pa.    St.   130,         ^g  Norton  v.  Birge,  35  Conn.  250. 


§135  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  174 

docket  to  learn  if  there  be  a  judgment  against  a  particular  person. 
The  purpose  is  that  the  index  shall  point  to  a  judgment  against 
the  particular  person  inquired  about,  if  there  be  a  judgment  on 
the  docket  against  him.*^ 

It  is  provided  by  statute  in  some  states  that  a  judgment  is  not 
a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor  as  against  subse- 
quent bona  fide  purchasers  without  notice  unless  properly  in- 
dexed."* In  some  states,  before  a  judgment  is  entered  on  the 
judgment  docket,  the  clerk  is  required  to  enter  it  in  a  judgment 
book  or  daily  journal,  and  after  such  entry  he  must  immediately 
docket  the  judgment.  The  entry  on  the  journal  stand  in  the 
place  of  the  record,  and  must  always  be  consulted  in  making  a 
search  for  judgments.  Both  a  plaintiff's  index  and  a  defendant's 
index  will  be  found  in  some  offices.  The  entries  in  these  indexes 
are  usually  made  upon  the  filing  of  a  suit,  and  where  no  lis 
pendens  has  been  filed,  discovery  may  be  made  here  of  a  suit 
pending.  In  the  absence  of  a  proper  index  of  judgments,  recourse 
must  be  had  to  the  judgment  dockets. 

§  135.  Tax  records. — It  will  be  shown  in  a  subsequent 
chapter  that  taxes  and  assessments  are  everywhere  made  liens 
upon  the  real  estate  of  the  taxpayer,  and  no  examination  is  com- 
plete without  a  thorough  search  at  the  tax  offices  for  delinquent 
taxes,  tax  sales,  forfeitures  and  judgments.  The  indexes  to  the 
records  in  the  clerk's  or  auditor's  office  are  usually  sufficient  to 
afford  all  the  information  necessary.  It  has  been  held  that  until  a 
tax  deed  is  properly  indexed  it  is  not  deemed  recorded;  but  the 
indexing,  if  done  afterwards,  will  relate  back  to  the  record."'' 

Search  must  also  be  made  for  special  assessments  for  local  im- 
provements. These  are  usually  found  in  the  records  of  street, 
alley  and  sewer  improvement  assessments  in  the  treasurer's  office, 
as  certified  by  the  proper  municipal  officer. 

§  136.  Records  of  vital  statistics. — The  scope  of  the  ex- 
amination of  a  title  is  limited  to  the  public  records,  and  the 
examiner  need  not  extend  his  search  to  matters  in  pais.  But  it 
sometimes  becomes  important  to  know  the  facts  relating  to  birth, 

47  Dewey  v.  Sugg,  109  N.  Car.  328,  ^n  Lombard  v.  Culbertson,  59  Wis. 
13  S.  E.  923,  14  L.  R.  A.  393.  433,  18  N.  W.  399. 

^'^  Citizens'     Bank     of     Stanton     v. 
Young.  78  Nebr.  312,  110  N.  W.  1003. 


175  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     137 

marriage,  or  death  of  a  person.  In  such  cases  it  may  become 
necessary  to  pursue  inquiries  outside  the  record  to  supply  the 
missing  hnk.  Doubtful  questions  of  pedigree  may  sometimes  be 
cleared  up  by  entries  made  in  church  or  parish  records.  These 
matters  may  sometimes  be  shown  from  the  records  of  vital  sta- 
tistics required  to  be  kept  by  certain  officials.  Statutes  sometimes 
provide  for  local  registrars  whose  duty  it  is  to  make  and  keep  a 
complete  and  accurate  copy  of  each  birth,  death,  and  marriage 
certificate  received  by  him,  and  which  must  be  filed  and  preserved 
in  his  office  as  a  record  of  such  birth,  death  or  marriage.  These 
records  are  accessible  to  any  person  desiring  such  information 
as  may  be  disclosed  thereby. 

§  137.  Abstracter's  use  of  public  records. — The  public 
records  are  public  property,  and  are  kept  for  the  public  benefit, 
and,  although  their  custody  and  safe  keeping  are  committed  by 
law  to  designated  officials,  yet,  as  a  general  rule,  everyone  has  the 
right  to  examine  them,  and  to  make  such  copies  thereof  as  he 
may  see  fit,  free  of  charge.  This  right  need  not  be  declared  by 
statute, ^°  but  statutes  will  be  found  in  many  states  expressly  con- 
ferring this  right.  Independent  of  any  statute  declaring  a  right 
of  inspection  or  requiring  such  record  to  be  kept,  the  records  of 
a  public  officer  become  such  public  records  as  are  subject  to  the 
free  and  general  inspection  by  the  public.^^  Under  a  statute 
providing  that  every  conveyance  of  real  estate,  and  every  instru- 
ment of  writing  setting  forth  an  agreement  to  convey  any  real 
estate,  or  whereby  any  real  estate  may  be  affected,  proved,  ac- 
knowledged, certified,  and  recorded  in  the  manner  prescribed 
shall,  from  the  time  of  filing  the  same  with  the  recorder  for 
record,  impart  notice  to  all  persons  of  the  contents  thereof,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  corporation  organized  for  the  purpose  of 
furnishing  abstracts  and  guaranteeing  titles  may,  free  of  charge, 
through  its  agents  and  employes,  during  regular  business  hours, 
inspect  and  make  memoranda  and  copies  of  all  files  and  records 
in  the  office  of  the  county  recorder,  in  so  far  as  they  relate  to 
current  transactions  in  which  it  is  authorized  or  employed  to 
make  searches,  furnish  abstracts,  or  guarantee  titles  by  persons 
having  or  seeking  to  acquire,  an  interest  in  property ;  the  exam- 

50  Lum  V.  McCarty,  39  N.  J.  L.  ^i  Brown  v.  Knapp,  54  Mich.  132, 
287.  19  N.  W.  778,  52  Am.  Rep.  800. 


§  138  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  176 

ination  to  be  made  at  such  times  and  under  such  circumstances 
as  will  not  prevent  the  recorder  or  his  assistants  from  discharging 
their  duties,  nor  interfere  with  the  right  of  other  persons  to  have 
access  to  the  records."  But  under  such  statute,  the  right  to  so 
inspect  and  copy  public  records  has  been  denied  persons  and 
corporations  seeking  thereby  data  from  which  to  compile  an  in- 
dependent set  of  abstract  books  to  be  used  for  profit  in  their 
private  business/^  Under  a  statute  which  provided  that  all  books 
and  papers  required  to  be  kept  by  the  county  officers  shall  be 
open  to  the  inspection  and  examination  of  any  person,  it  has  been 
held  that  this  right  of  inspection  should  be  exercised  only  by 
persons  who  have  an  interest  in  the  record,  or  by  someone  for 
them,  for  the  purpose  of  information,  and  was  not  intended  to 
give  a  right  to  parties  to  engage  in  private  speculation  in  con- 
nection with  the  information  there  received. °*  But  both  reason 
and  authority  sustain  the  right  of  a  person  or  corporation  en- 
gaged in  the  business  of  abstracting,  to  freely  examine  all  public 
records,  and  make  reasonable  memoranda  therefrom,  under  rea- 
sonable rules  and  regulations. °^ 

§  138.  Loss  or  destruction  of  records. — The  destruction 
of  the  record  in  no  manner  afifects  the  constructive  notice  afforded 
by  the  recording  of  the  deed.^"  Thus  where  a  deed  has  been 
once  recorded,  a  subsequent  burning  or  other  destruction  of  the 
records  will  not  render  the  same  ineffectual  as  notice  to  subse- 
quent purchasers. ^^  If  the  deed  itself  has  been  preserved,  the 
recorder's  certificate  of  its  having  been  duly  recorded  is  of  the 
highest  class  of  evidence. ^^  So,  also,  the  index  book  in  which  the 
deed  is  described,  and  its  record  certified  in  the  proper  book,  are 
good  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  deed  was  recorded. ^^    Other 

•"•2  State  V.  Grimes,  29  Nev.  50,  84  Fisher,  98  N.  Car.  20,  3  S.  E.  822. 

Pac.  1061,  5  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  545,  124  •'''«  Paxson  v.  Brown,  61  Fed.  874,  10 

Am.  St.  883.  C.  C.  A.  135;  Franklin  Sav.  Bank  v. 

53  Bean   v.   People,   7   Colo.  200,   2  Taylor,    131    111.   376,   23   N.   E.  397: 

Pac.  909;  Colescott  v.  King,  154  Ind.  Hyatt  v.  Cochran,  69  Ind.  436;  Addis 

621,  57  N.  E.  535.  v.    Graham.    88    Mo.    197;    Fitch    v. 

'-*  Brewer  v.   Watson,  71    Ala.  299,  Boyer,  51  Tex.  336. 

46  Am.  Rep.  318;  Bean  v.  People,  7  ^^  Cooper  v.   Flesner,  24  Okla.  47, 

Colo.   200.   2    Pac.   909;    Cormack   v.  103  Pac.   1016,  23  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

Wolcott,  37  Kans.  391,  15  Pac.  245.  1180,  20  Ann.  Cas.  29. 

^5  Randolph  v.   State,  82  Ala.   527,  ss  Alvis  v.  Morrison,  63  111.  181,  14 

2  So.  714,  60  Am.  Rep.  761  :   Boylan  Am.  Rep.  117. 

V.  Warren,  39  Kans.  301,  18  Pac.  174,  ^^  Smith  v.  Lindsey,  89  Mo.  76,  1 

7  Am.  St.  551  ;  People  v.  Richards,  99  S.  W.  88. 
N.  Y.  620,   1   N.  E.  258;  Newton  v. 


177  PUBLIC    RECORDS  §     138 

secondary  evidence  may  be  shown  that  the  deed  was  filed  for 
record ;''°  and  when  this  is  the  case,  the  testimony  of  an  attorney 
of  a  purchaser,  that  he  examined  an  abstract  of  title  to  the  prop- 
erty, which  purported  to  be  a  full  and  complete  abstract,  and  did 
not  find  a  prior  deed  of  trust  upon  the  premises,  is  not  sufficient 
to  show  that  there  was  no  record  of  it,  as  it  does  not  follow  that 
the  abstract  was  what  it  purported  to  be.''^ 

Where  the  registry  ofiice  and  its  records  have  been  destroyed 
by  fire,  evidence  of  the  execution  of  a  mortgage  and  of  its  loss, 
Avith  slight  circumstances  in  regard  to  the  recording  of  it,  have 
been  held  enough  to  sustain  a  presumption  that  it  was  recorded, 
as  against  another  mortgagee  who  claims  priority  on  the  ground 
that  such  mortgage  was  never  recorded. '^^ 

The  legislatures  of  some  states  have  passed  acts  providing  for 
the  re-recording  or  restoration  of  burnt  records,  and  some  courts 
have  held  that  the  acts  are  broad  enough  to  determine  and  estab- 
lish a  title  even  as  against  a  party  holding  or  claiming  a  con- 
tingent interest. "^^  A  restoration  of  the  record  may  be  had,  if 
desired,  upon  proof  of  proceedings  for  foreclosure  of  a  mort- 
gage in  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction,  a  decree  of  sale,  a  sale 
under  it,  and  its  approval  by  the  court,  and  the  delivery  of  a 
certificate  of  purchase;  and  the  court  will  thereupon  order  the  ex- 
ecution of  a  deed  to  the  purchaser,  and  a  surrender  of  possession 
to  him.''*  A  court  of  equity  will  not  restore  a  burnt  record  when 
such  restoration  would  not  show  good  title  in  the  petitioner  but 
would  only  cloud  the  title  of  the  defendant. "^^ 

GO  Stebbins  v.  Duncan,  108  U.  S.  32,  rison   v.   McMurray,   71   Tex.    122,   8 

2  Sup.  Ct.  313,  27  L.  ed.  641 ;  Cowles  S.  W.  612. 

V.  Hardin,  91  N.  Car.  231.  es  McCampbell    v.    Mason,    151    111. 

«i  Steele  v.  Boone,  75  111.  457.  500,  38  N.  E.  672. 

62Heacock  v.  Lubuke,  107  111.  396;  c*  Curyea  v.  Berry,  84  111.  600. 

Alston  V.  Alston,  4  S.  Car.  116;  Har-  «5  Beattie  v.  Whipple,  154  III.  273, 

40  N.  E.  340. 


12 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


CHAPTER  VI 
abstracter's  indexes  and  reference  books 

SEC.  SEC. 

145.  Importance  of  indexes  and  ref-  150.  The  tract  index, 
erence  books.  151.  Index  of  irregulars. 

146.  The  government  tract  book.  152.  Index  of  tax  sales. 

147.  Surveyor's  field  notes.  153.  Index  of  judgments. 

148.  Books  of  original  entries.  154.  Miscellaneous    indexes   and    ref- 

149.  Instrument  number  index.  erence  books. 

§  145.  Importance  of  indexes  and  reference  books. — The 
primitive  method  of  compiHiig  abstracts  from  the  indexes  and 
records  of  the  pubHc  depositories  is  seldom  practiced  even  in  the 
more  recent  settled  parts  of  the  country.  Such  a  method  of 
search  is  not  only  tedious  and  laborious,  but  where  the  title  is  in 
the  least  degree  intricate  or  complicated,  the  search  is  apt  to  be 
incomplete  and  unreliable.  Modern  business  methods,  and  the 
ever  increasing  number  of  transactions  affecting  the  title  to  real 
estate,  have  developed  a  speedier  and  a  more  reliable  method  of 
conducting  the  business  of  compiling  abstracts.  Every  modern 
abstract  office  is  now  equipped  with  what  is  commonly  called  tract 
indexes,  in  which  the  various  instruments  of  record  are  indexed 
under  the  heading  or  description  of  the  real  property  affected 
thereby,  and  which,  when  completed  and  kept  up  to  date,  consti- 
tute an  index  to  the  records  by  tracts  instead  of  by  the  names  of 
the  parties  to  such  instruments.  These  tract  indexes  are  now 
considered  indispensable  to  the  convenient  and  proper  transaction 
of  the  business  of  compiling  abstracts  of  title.  By  their  use  the 
abstracter  is  enabled  to  quickly  produce  a  perfect  chain  of  re- 
corded title  to  any  tract  of  land  in  his  county  or  district.  There 
is  a  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  methods  of  compiling  tract  indexes, 
and  the  number  of  separate  books  used,  but  certain  fundamental 
ideas  will  be  found  embodied  in  every  system  worth  mentioning. 
Perhaps  no  system  in  use  is  complete  and  perfect  within  itself, 
and  it  would  be  impossible  to  suggest  a  system  that  would  apply 
with  equal  facility  in  all  localities.  The  time  and  labor  required 
to  complete  and  keep  up  a  set  of  tract  indexes  will  depend  upon 
the  number  of  transactions  had  in  reference  to  the  lands  involved. 
In  the  older  and  more  densely  populated  counties  the  task  will 

-  178 


179  INDEXES    AND    REFERENCE    BOOKS  §     146 

be  much  greater  than  in  the  more  recently  settled  counties.  In 
order  that  the  books  may  be  relied  upon  for  what  they  contain, 
great  care  and  skill  must  be  exercised  in  abstracting  every  instru- 
ment of  record  affecting  each  and  every  tract  or  parcel  of  land 
in  the  county  or  district  intended  to  be  covered,  and  the  data  must 
be  so  arranged  that  it  may  be  readily  referred  to  in  making  up  an 
abstract.  In  succeeding  sections  the  reader's  attention  is  called  to 
some  of  the  more  important  matters  to  be  noticed  in  compiling  a 
set  of  abstract  books. 

§  146.  The  government  tract  book. — Since  the  inaugura- 
tion of  our  system  of  disposing  of  the  public  lands  it  has  been  the 
duty  of  each  register  or  receiver  of  a  land  district  to  keep  a  dia- 
gram or  plat  of  each  township  in  his  district  showing  the  sections 
and  fractional  parts  thereof  as  per  the  government  survey.  He 
was  required  to  note  on  these  plats  in  connection  with  each  tract 
disposed  of,  the  form  of  the  entry,  the  name  of  the  claimant,  the 
character  of  the  entry,  the  number  of  the  certificate,  the  date  of 
filing  or  entry,  the  price  paid,  the  cancellation  and  re-entry,  if  any, 
and  the  issuance  of  the  patent,  with  the  date  and  name  of  the 
patentee.  Many  of  the  land  offices  have  long  since  been  abolished, 
but  the  records  made  have  been  preserved  by  depositing  them  with 
some  state  official,  designated  by  law%  in  which  the  land  office  w^as 
located.  A  copy  of  any  township  plat  may  be  obtained  upon  ap- 
plication made  to  the  proper  custodian  of  the  records,  but  w^here 
the  land  office  is  still  in  operation,  application  for  copies  must  be 
made  to  the  district  register  or  receiver.  It  is  to  the  government 
land  office  records  that  the  abstracter  must  look  for  data  that  con- 
stitutes the  foundation  of  all  his  indexes.  In  case  these  records 
do  not  show  issuance  of  a  patent  application  must  be  made  to  the 
General  Land  Office  at  Washington.  In  a  great  many  places 
township  plats  containing  all  the  data  referred  to  above  wall  be 
found  in  some  county  office,  and  the  abstracter  may  use  same  in 
compiling  his  tract  indexes. 

§  147.  Surveyor's  field  notes. — The  plats  and  surveys 
made  by  the  United  States  government  can  not  be  contradicted 
by  parol  evidence,  or  by  private  surveys  and  plats. ^     Corners 

1  Chapman  v.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487,  Morrill.  91  Mich.  29,  51  N.  W.  700; 
11  Pac.  764;  Spawr  v.  Johnson,  49  Arneson  v.  Spawn.  2  S.  Dak.  269,  49 
Kans.    788,   31    Pac.   664;    Brown   v.     N.  W.  1066,  39  Am.  St.  783. 


^     148  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  180 

shown  to  have  been  originally  made  by  government  surveyors  are 
conclusive,  and  must  be  accepted  as  true  corners,  no  matter  how 
inaccurately  they  may  have  been  originally  established."  Where 
there  is  a  discrepancy  in  a  government  survey  between  the  monu- 
ments and  distances  given  in  the  field-notes,  the  monuments  will 
control,  even  though  the  result  be  that  some  of  the  quarter  sec- 
tions will  contain  less  than  their  proper  number  of  acres.^  Calls 
for  monuments  in  the  field-notes  of  a  government  survey  control 
in  relocating  the  boundaries  to  land.*  Monuments  and  boundary 
lines  as  established  by  the  government  survey  control  the  descrip- 
tion of  lands  patented  by  the  United  States,  and  mistakes  in  sur- 
veys can  not  be  corrected  by  the  judicial  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment.^ Field  notes  and  plats  of  the  original  government  sur- 
vey are  competent  evidence  in  ascertaining  where  monuments  are 
located  in  case  a  government  corner  is  destroyed  or  the  point 
w'here  it  was  originally  placed  can  not  be  found,  or  the  location 
of  the  original  corner  is  in  dispute,  but  when  it  is  shown  by  un- 
contradicted evidence  that  a  section  corner  was  located  at  a  cer- 
tain point,  such  location  must  control.^'  Hence,  the  importance 
of  having  access  to  the  field-notes  and  plats  of  the  original  gov- 
ernment surveyor  can  not  be  overlooked  and  no  abstract  office  is 
complete  without  a  copy  of  same.  Copies  may  be  obtained  from 
the  register  of  the  district  land  office,  or  where  the  office  has  been 
abolished,  from  the  state  officer  having  custody  of  same  as  pro- 
vided by  law. 

§  148.  Books  of  original  entries. — The  modern  abstract 
office  must  contain  a  series  of  books  in  which  to  enter  the  daily 
transactions  in  the  various  record  offices  of  the  county.  In  these 
books  are  set  forth  a  brief  description  of  each  and  every  instru- 
ment filed  of  record  during  the  day,  and  of  each  and  every  trans- 
action in  any  manner  affecting  the  title  to  any  land  in  the  county. 
The  fullness  with  which  the  entry  is  made  will  be  determined  by 
the  nature  of  the  instrument  or  transaction.  It  should  contain 
no  more  nor  less  than  is  necessary  to  make  a  proper  posting  of 
the  transaction  or  instrument  on  the  tract  index.     In  counties 

2Billingsley  v.   Bates,  30  Ala.  376,  ^Tognazzini    v.    Morganti,   84    Cal. 

68  Am.  Dec.   126;   Liberty  v.   Burns,  159,  23  Pac.  1085. 

114  Mo.  426;   19  S.   W.   1107;    21    S.  ^  Cragin  v.   Powell,   128  U.   S.  691, 

W.  728.  9  Sup.  Ct.  203,  32  L.  ed.  566. 

sQgilvie   V.   Copeland,   145    111. -98,  e  \Voods  v.  West,  40  Nebr.  307,  58 

33  N.  E.  1085.  N.  W.  938. 


181 


INDEXES    AND   REFERENCE    BOOKS 


§   148 


where  a  large  volume  of  business  Is  transacted  daily  in  the  record- 
ing offices  it  is  possible  to  make  only  a  brief  note  of  each  instru- 
ment, showing  its  date,  its  nature,  the  parties  thereto,  and  a 
brief  description  of  the  land.  But  where  the  volume  of  daily 
business  is  small  the  notes  may  be  extended  to  any  length  desired. 
The  original  entry  books  may  be  arranged  in  any  manner  to  suit 
the  convenience  of  the  abstracter,  the  only  requirement  being 
that  the  daily  transactions  should  appear  under  heads  following 
the  order  of  time  of  their  appearance  on  the  public  records.  The 
following  example  is  submitted : 

May  1,  1918 


Inst. 
No. 


Grantor 


Grantee 


Description 


Inst. 


Date 


Remarks 


The  entries  in  these  books  may  l^e  made  up  from  the  original 
instruments  filed  in  the  recording  offices  from  day  to  day,  or 
they  may  be  made  up  from  the  reception  indexes  in  the  record- 
er's office  where  such  indexes  are  kept,  but  in  the  latter  case  there 
is  always  a  possibility  that  the  instrument  may  be  filed,  and  hence 
a  matter  of  record,  though  not  indexed,  at  the  time  of  the  search. 
Where  the  entry  is  made  from  the  original  instrument  on  file  there 
is  presented  an  opportunity  of  discovering  an  error  in  transcrib- 
ing the  instrument  by  the  examiner  comparing  his  entry  with  the 
record.  In  sparsely-settled  counties  the  entry  is  sometimes  ex- 
tended so  as  to  constitute  a  complete  abstract  of  every  instrument 
filed  of  record,  but  this  method  of  entry  is  impracticable  in  coun- 
ties where  a  large  number  of  instruments  are  filed  each  day.  The 
long  form  of  entries  has  the  advantage  of  enabling  the  abstracter 
to  compile  his  abstract  without  having  to  go  through  the  records, 
the  abstract  being  made  up  from  the  data  in  the  book  of  original 
entries.  But  this  method  has  the  disadvantage  of  not  disclosing 
errors  made  by  the  officer  in  transcribing  the  instrument.  The 
abstract  is  supposed  to  be  a  copy  of  the  record  and  not  a  copy  of 
the  instrument  of  which  the  record  is  intended  to  be  a  copy.  If 
the  abstract  be  made  up  from  the  original  entry  it  should  be  com- 


§     149  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  182 

pared  with  the  record  to  ascertain  if  any  mistakes  were  made  in 
transcribing  the  instrument  on  the  record.  By  this  precaution 
any  mistakes  in  making  up  the  original  entry  will  also  be  dis- 
covered. 

§  149.  Instrument  number  index. — Every  instrument 
filed  for  record  should  be  given  a  number,  and  this  number  should 
be  inserted  in  the  proper  column  of  the  book  of  original  entries, 
as  well  as  in  the  tract  book  when  it  is  made  up.  For  the  purpose 
of  ready  reference  in  compiling  an  abstract  a  separate  index  of 
instrument  numbers  should  be  kept.  In  the  first  column  of  this 
index  should  be  entered  the  number  given  the  instrument  when  the 
same  is  filed  for  record,  and  on  the  day  the  instrument  is  spread 
upon  the  record  the  book  and  page  of  the  record  should  be  en- 
tered in  the  index  opposite  the  number  of  the  instrument.  This 
instrument  number  index  may  be  made  up  as  follows : 


Instrument  No. 


Book 


Page 


It  is  optional  with  the  abstracter  who  makes  long  form  entries 
to  keep  an  instrument  number  index,  but  if  it  is  his  practice  to 
compare  his  entries  with  the  record,  the  instrument  number  index 
will  be  of  great  service. 

§  150.  The  tract  index. — It  is  essential  to  the  convenient 
and  proper  transaction  of  the  business  of  compiling  abstracts  that 
those  engaged  in  it  provide  themselves  with  a  set  of  tract  books. 
In  these  books  are  entered  the  various  instruments  of  record  un- 
der the  heading  or  description  of  the  real  estate  affected  thereby, 
and  when  completed  will  constitute  an  index  to  the  records  by 
tracts  instead  of  by  the  names  of  the  parties.  Thus  a  division 
or  page  of  the  index  is  set  apart  to  a  lot  or  subdivision  of  land, 
and  in  said  division  or  on  said  page  is  entered  in  consecutive  order 
of  record  thereof  the  number  of  the  instrument  as  given  it  when 
filed  of  record,  the  names  of  the  parties,  a  description  of  the  land, 
the  kind  of  instrument,  and  the  volume  and  page  where  the  same 
is  recorded.  The  date  of  the  instrument,  the  date  of  recording, 
and  the  consideration  may  also  be  entered  in  their  proper  place. 
This  index  should  contain  all  instruments  and  transactions  of 


183 


INDEXES    AND  REFERENCE    BOOKS 


150 


record  affecting  the  title  to  the  division  or  tract  of  land  described 
in  the  caption,  unless  a  separate  book  is  kept  for  certain  instru- 
ments, in  which  case  such  instruments  may  be  omitted  from  the 
tract  index.  All  entries  made  in  the  original  entry  book  should 
be  transferred  to  the  tract  index  under  the  description  of  the  land 
affected  by  the  instrument,  and  should  be  arranged  under  the 
proper  heads  provided  in  the  outline.  When  properly  made  up 
the  tract  index  should  embrace  under  each  particular  tract  or  sub- 
division of  land  in  the  county  an  epitome  of  every  deed,  mort- 
gage, agreement,  release,  attachment,  sale,  lis  pendens,  or  other 
instrument  or  transaction  of  record,  in  any  way  affecting  title  to 
such  tract  or  subdivision,  or  mentioning  same,  oi*  any  part 
thereof.  Where  any  part  of  a  section  in  a  particular  township 
and  range  in  the  county  has  been  subdivided  into  blocks  and  lots, 
the  subdivision  is  laid  out  by  devoting  to  each  page  a  limited 
number  of  the  lots,  and  everything  relating  to  these  lots  is  posted 
on  the  page.  Certain  pages  of  the  index  are  devoted  to  the  origin 
of  the  titles  to  the  subdivided  tracts,  and  any  instrument  describ- 
ing the  property  as  acre  property,  or  describing  all  interest  in  the 
subdivision,  or  describing  inaccurately  land  covered  by  the  sub- 
division, is  posted  under  this  "origin."  All  instruments  which 
seem  to  describe  subdivided  property  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is 
difficult  to  determine  what  lots  and  blocks  are  affected  by  it  are 
also  placed  in  this  "origin."  The  size  of  the  pages  to  be  used 
for  tract  books  and  the  number  of  volumes  needed,  will  be  de- 
termined by  the  present  and  prospective  volume  of  business  in  the 
county.  At  the  top  of  each  page  should  appear  the  caption, 
which  consists  of  a  description  of  the  tract,  subdivision,  or  lots. 
The  page  should  be  ruled  across  with  light  lines,  and  divided  into 
the  required  number  of  columns  by  heavy  vertical  lines.  At  the 
top  of  each  column  should  be  placed  the  respective  heads.  A  sam- 
ple page  of  a  tract  index  is  as  follows  : 

Sec.  1,  Tp.  25  N.,  R.  8  E. 


G'Z. 

Grantor     Grantee 

Description 

Kind 
of 
Inst. 

Consid- 
eration 

Date  of 
Inst. 
Date 
ofRec. 

Entry 

Book 

to  Page 

Record 

Book 

and  Page 

Remarks 

§     151  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  184 

§  151.  Index  of  irregulars. — instruments  and  transactions 
will  frequently  be  found  on  the  public  records,  which  from  their 
peculiar  nature  and  character,  should  not  be  posted  in  the  tract 
index  proper.  Among  these  may  be  classed  affidavits  as  to 
dower,  heirship  or  kindred  matters,  general  powers  of  attorney, 
instruments  of  release  and  satisfaction,  confirmations  and  assign- 
ments, conveyances  describing  no  property  or  property  of  indefi- 
nite location,  and  the  like.  This  index  consists  of  two  books, 
one  for  the  names  of  grantors  arranged  in  alphabetical  order,  the 
other  for  the  names  of  grantees  arranged  alphabetically.  This 
index  is  made  up  from  the  books  of  original  entries,  and  is  used, 
in  compiling  abstracts,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  judgment  index. 
It  should  always  be  consulted  in  making  up  the  chain  by  running 
through  the  names  of  grantors  and  grantees  to  find  if,  during  the 
period  covered  by  the  examination,  any  person  has  held  title  to 
the  land  in  question,  or  possessed  any  equities  therein.  In  com- 
piling this  index  one  volume  should  contain  in  the  first  column 
the  names  of  grantors  arranged  alphabetically,  with  the  name  of 
the  grantee  set  opposite  in  the  next  column.  The  other  volume 
should  contain  in  the  first  column  the  names  of  the  grantees  ar- 
ranged alphabetically,  with  the  name  of  the  grantor  set  opposite 
in  the  next  column.  In  each  book  opposite  the  names  of  the  par- 
ties, and  in  an  appropriate  column,  should  be  entered  a  brief 
statement  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  instrument.  All  other  mat- 
ters, such  as  the  instrument  number,  the  description  of  the  prop- 
erty, if  any  given,  the  nature  of  the  instrument,  the  date  of  the 
instrument,  the  date  of  reccjrd,  the  book  and  page  where  record 
may  be  posted  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  tract  index. 

§  152.  Index  of  tax  sales. — It  is  sometimes  the  practice  of 
abstracters  to  post  in  the  tract  index  everything  pertaining  to 
taxes  except  tax  sales,  and  these  latter  are  included  in  a  separate 
volume  kept  for  the  purpose.  This  is  perhaps  the  better  method, 
as  a  large  majority  of  the  entries  of  tax  sales  become  dead  matter 
upon  redemption,  and  for  this  reason  the  tract  index  should  not 
be  burdened  with  them.  If  a  separate  index  of  tax  sales  is  kept 
there  should  be  entered  under  the  description  of  the  tract  in  the 
caption,  a  description  of  the  land  sold,  the  name  of  the  person 
against  whom  the  tax  was  assessed,  the  nature  of  the  tax,  as 
general,  special,  state,  county,  municipal,  special  assessment,  etc., 
the  amount  of  the  tax,  the  year  for  which  it  was  levied,  the  date 


185 


INDEXES    AND   REFERENCE    BOOKS 


153 


of  sale,  and  the  name  of  the  purchaser,  A  column  on  the  right 
hand  margin  of  the  page  should  be  left  in  which  to  note  the  fact 
of  redemption.  The  page  of  the  index  should  be  arranged  as 
follows : 

Sec.  ,  Tp.  ,  R.  . 


Descrip- 
tion 

Name  of 
DeHnquent 

Nature  of 
Taxes 

Amount       ^^^Sj?,^ 
Sold  for          ,-h.ch 

Date  of 

Sale 

Name  of 
Purchaser 

Redemption 

This  index  should  always  be  consulted  in  compiling  an  ab- 
stract, and  the  entries  made  therein  compared  with  the  tax  rec- 
ords. Much  labor  may  be  saved  by  noting  all  redemptions  on  the 
date  they  are  made. 

§  153.  Index  of  judgments. — All  judgments  for  money, 
or  such  as  create  a  lien  on  land  should  be  indexed  in  a  separate 
book  kept  for  that  purpose.  Decrees  and  sales  in  chancery,  or 
proceedings  in  court  of  an  equitable  nature  directly  involving  the 
title  to  land,  should  not  be  indexed  in  this  judgment  index,  but 
should  be  posted  in  the  tract  index. 

The  index  of  money  judgments  is  very  simple  in  its  arrange- 
ment, consisting  of  an  entry  in  alphabetical  order  of  the  names  of 
the  judgment  debtor  in  each  case  as  they  appear  on  the  court's 
records  from  day  to  day.  Opposite  the  name  of  the  judgment 
debtor,  and  in  columns  provided  for  their  reception  should  be 
entered  in  consecutive  order,  the  name  of  the  judgment  creditor, 
the  court  in  which  the  judgment  is  docketed,  the  number  of  the 
case,  the  nature  of  the  action,  the  date  of  the  judgment,  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  and  costs,  and  the  fact  of  satisfaction. 
In  compiling  an  abstract  this  index  is  used  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  tax  index.     A  sample  page  of  the  index  is  submitted : 


No.  of 
Inst. 

Name  of 
Defendant 

Name  of 
Plaintiff 

Court 

No.  of 
Case 

Nature 
of  Action 

Date  of 
Judgment 

Amount  of 
Judgment 

Fact  of 
Satisfaction 

1  

An  execution  sale  under  a  money  judgment  should  be  noted  in 
the  general  tract  index. 


§154  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  186 

§  154.  Miscellaneous  indexes  and  reference  books. — In 
addition  to  the  indexes  and  reference  books  described  in  the  fore- 
going sections,  many  abstracters,  especially  in  large  cities  and 
populous  counties,  keep  certain  special  indexes  and  supplemental 
reference  books  which  are  deemed  advantageous  to  the  proper 
conduct  of  their  business.  Thus,  it  has  become  the  practice  of 
many  abstracters  to  keep  an  index  of  special  assessments  instead 
of  including  them  in  the  tract  index  or  in  the  index  of  tax  sales. 
Also,  where  inheritance  taxes  are  levied  on  the  estates  of  dece- 
dents, an  index  is  sometimes  provided  for  their  reception.  Spe- 
cial indexes  are  sometimes  kept  for  probate  proceedings,  and  all 
matters  pertaining  to  estates  of  decedents,  minors,  and  other  per- 
sons under  legal  disability.  Again,  some  abstracters  keep  what 
they  term  a  "vowel  index."  In  this  index  the  names  of  all 
grantees  are  posted  in  alphabetical  order,  opposite  each  of  which 
name  is  noted  the  book  and  page  of  the  record  where  the  name 
appears  and  a  reference  to  the  book  and  page  of  the  abstracter's 
original  entry  set.  By  use  of  this  index  the  interest  of  any 
grantee,  whether  present  or  past,  may  be  readily  ascertained  with- 
out consulting  any  book  except  that  of  the  original  entries.  Some 
offices  may  contain  other  indexes  and  reference  books  not  men- 
tioned herein,  but  it  is  thought  that  a  sufficient  number  have  been 
described  to  enable  the  reader  to  provide  such  as  will  be  necessary 
to  carry  on  his  business  with  accuracy,  and  with  a  minimum  of 
labor. 


CHAPTER  VII 

COMPILATION  OF  AN  ABSTRACT 
SEC.  SEC. 

160.  Introductory  remarks.  168.  Abstracter's  notes. 

161.  Scope  and  extent  of  the  exami-  169.  Exhibiting  instruments    for   ref- 
naticn.  erence. 

162.  Preliminary  sketch  of  chain.  170.  Showing  irregular  instruments. 

163.  Formal  parts  of  the  abstract.  171.  Showing  mistakes  made  in  trans- 

164.  The  caption.  cribing  instruments. 

165.  Arrangement  of  the  abstract.  172.  Abbreviations. 

166.  Synopsis  of  instruments  and  pro-  173.  Preserving  copy  of  abstract, 
ceedings.  174.  Abstractor's  certificate. 

167.  Fullness  of  synopsis. 

§  160.  Introductory  remarks. — In  the  preceding  chapter 
we  attempted  to  describe  certain  indexes  and  reference  books 
wherein  the  abstracter  enters  the  material  parts  of  every  instru- 
ment or  transaction  of  record  affecting  the  title  to  each  particular 
tract  of  land  and  city  or  town  lot  in  the  county.  The  purpose  of 
these  books,  as  we  have  explained,  is  to  afford  a  ready  reference 
to  the  public  records  where  such  instruments  may  be  found,  and 
to  facilitate  the  work  of  compiling  abstracts  therefrom.  In  the 
present  chapter  we  propose  to  call  the  reader's  attention  to  the 
manner  of  using  these  books,  and  the  public  records  of  which 
they  are  a  copy,  in  compiling  abstracts,  and  to  offer  some  sug- 
gestions relative  to  the  form  of  the  completed  abstract. 

When  complete  the  abstract  should  contain  a  statement  of  every 
fact,  and  the  contents  of  every  instrument  or  transaction  of 
record,  affecting  the  land  covered  by  the  search,  so  full  that  no 
reasonable  inquiry  shall  remain  unanswered,  so  brief  that  the 
mind  of  the  reader  shall  not  be  distracted  by  irrelevant  details, 
so  methodical  that  counsel  may  form  an  opinion  on  each  instru- 
ment as  he  proceeds  in  his  reading,  and  so  clear  that  no  new  ar- 
rangement or  dissection  of  the  evidence  shall  be  required.  The 
abstract  should  present  a  summary  of  the  public  records  of  all 
grants,  patents,  conveyances,  wills,  mortgages,  judgments,  taxes, 
assessments,  mechanic's  liens,  attachments,  lis  pendens  notices, 
judicial  orders  or  decrees  affecting  the  title  in  any  way,  and  all 
other  liens  which  may  incumber  the  title.    It  should  contain  what- 

187 


§     161  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  188 

ever  concerns  the  sources  of  title  and  its  conditions,  whether  these 
tend  to  confirm  the  title  or  to  impair  it.  Every  part  of  a  recorded 
instrument  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  condition  of  the 
title  should  be  set  out. 

§  161.     Scope  and  extent  of  the  examination. — Mention 
has  already  been  made  of  the  period  for  which  title  should  be 
shown/  but  in  this  connection  we  deem  it  important  to  refer  to 
the  subject  more  in  detail  even  at  the  risk  of  repetition.     In  the 
preparation  of  an  original  abstract  to  land,  and  the  contract  of 
employment  places  no  limitation  upon  the  period  for  which  the 
search  is  to  be  made,  it  is  customary  to  carry  the  search  back  to 
the  time  when  the  title  emanated  from  the  government,  and  to 
continue  it  to  the  date  of  the  certificate,  showing  not  only  all  con- 
veyances affecting  the  title  for  the  period,  but  all  liens  or  incum- 
brances of  record  affecting  the  title,  and  in  the  case  of  titles  de- 
rived from  the  judgments  or  decrees  of  courts  in  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, as  well  as  ministerial  acts  of  officers  of  the  government. 
It  should  show  the  essential  parts  of  every  instrument  in  the  chain 
of  title  for  the  period,  such  as  the  names  of  the  parties,  description 
of  the  property  conveyed  or  devised,  words  of  grant  or  devise, 
and  the  like.    In  the  older  states  it  is  sometimes  impossible,  owing 
to  the  condition  of  the  records,  to  trace  a  title  from  the  original 
patent.     In  such  cases  it  is  said  the  title  should  be  shown  for  a 
period  of  not  less  than  forty  years.    The  abstracter  first  finds  the 
patentee  from  the  government,  if  the  records  permit  him  to  go 
l)ack  that  far.     The  patentee  being  found,  his  name  is  searched 
for  in  the  alphabetical  list  of  grantors  to  find  a  conveyance  from 
him.     When  a  conveyance  from  him  to  another  person  is  found 
the  patentee  becomes  a  stranger  to  the  title,  the  search  being  con- 
tinued in  the  alphabetical  list  of  grantors  from  the  date  of  the 
conveyance  to  such  other  person,  and  so  on  down  to  the  convey- 
ance by  the  last  grantor  in  the  chain  of  title.     But  the  examiner 
is  not  bound  to  look  for  deeds  of  any  person  through  whom  the 
title  passed,  before  the  date  of  his  record  title."    And  where  there 
is  an  agreement  to  make  a  search  from  and  after  a  certain  speci- 
fied date  the  examiner  is  not  bound  to  inquire  or  state  whether 
the  title  vested  in  any  grantee  during  the  time  covered  by  the 
search  is  affected  by  any  prior  mortgage  or  conveyance,  or  by  any 

iChao    1    §  8  •  2Dodd    v.    Williams,    3    Mo.    App. 

278. 


189  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §     162 

estoppel  growing  out  of  any  covenants  in  any  such  conveyance.'' 
A  properly  prepared  tract  index  will  disclose  at  a  glance  any  con- 
veyance or  mortgage  from  a  grantee,  recorded  within  a  short 
time  before  he  obtained  title  and  will  give  actual  notice  of  any 
such  instrument. 

In  the  absence  of  instructions  to  the  contrary,  an  abstracter  is 
bound  to  examine  and  certify  for  judgments  against  any  grantee 
who  has  taken  title  to  the  land  during  the  period  covered  by 
the  search.  These  propositions  seem  simple  and  certain.  It  is 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  good  abstract  making  to  dili- 
gently search  for  judgments  against  every  grantee  of  the  title  at 
least  back  to  such  time  as  the  statute  of  limitations  would  be  a 
bar  to  their  enforcement.  A  tax  or  judgment  lien  may  have  its 
inception  at  a  time  antedating  the  period  of  the  search,  but  at- 
taching during  such  period,  and  it  would  be  gross  neglect  not  to 
show  it  on  the  abstract. 

§  162.  Preliminary  sketch  of  chain. — Before  the  final  draft 
of  the  abstract  is  attempted  the  various  indexes  and  reference 
books  should  be  carefully  searched  and  a  note  made  of  each  in- 
strument or  transaction  in  any  way  affecting  the  title  to  the 
land  under  consideration.  The  tract  index  will  show  all  con- 
veyances, incumbrances  and  liens.  The  index  of  tax  sales  will 
disclose  all  sales  or  forfeitures  for  nonpayment  of  taxes.  Where 
special  indexes  are  kept  for  confirmed  special  assessments  such 
assessments  should  be  found  in  such  index,  but  if  it  is  the  practice 
to  post  them  in  the  general  tract  index,  they  should  be  looked  for 
in  the  latter  book.  Money  judgments  which  are  a  lien  on  the 
land  will  be  found  in  the  judgment  index.  Execution  sales,  and 
sales  made  in  pursuance  of  an  order  or  decree  of  a  court  of 
equity  are  usually  posted  in  the  general  tract  index,  but  if  separ- 
ate indexes  are  kept  for  these  they  must  be  looked  for  in  these 
indexes.  The  irregular  index  must  be  searched  for  powers  of 
attorney,  instruments  of  release  and  satisfaction,  confirmations 
and  assignments,  affidavits  as  to  dower,  heirship  or  kindred  mat- 
ters, and  all  conveyances  describing  no  property  or  property  of 
indefinite  location.  After  a  brief  note  has  been  made  of  each 
instrument  or  transaction  found  in  this  search  of  the  indexes  the 
examiner  should  proceed  to  verify  same  with  the  entries  in  his 

3  Wakefield    v.    Chowen,    26    Minn.     379,  4  N.  \V.  618. 


§     163  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  190 

book  of  original  entries  and  with  the  records  in  the  registry 
offices.  If  the  original  entries  were  made  in  long  form  the  greater 
portion  of  the  abstract  can  be  made  up  from  this  book  without 
consulting  the  records.  This  practice,  however,  is  not  recom- 
mended, as  a  mistake  in  transcribing  the  instrument  may  be  dis- 
covered by  a  comparison  of  the  original  entry  with  the  record. 
When  this  verification  is  completed,  the  examiner  has  before  him 
a  complete  abstract  of  each  instrument,  proceeding,  etc.,  affecting 
the  title  to  the  property  under  consideration.  These  are  then 
numbered  and  arranged  in  the  order  of  their  appearance  on  the 
completed  abstract.  The  abstracter  should  make  his  comparisons 
with  the  record  and  not  with  the  index  thereof,  unless  the  party 
employing  him  agrees  that  in  the  making  of  the  abstract  the 
examiner  may  rely  upon  the  index  alone  for  his  information.^ 

§  163.  Formal  parts  of  the  abstract. — The  documents  and 
facts  upon  which  a  title  is  based  should  not  only  be  methodically 
stated,  but  should  be  assembled  in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable 
counsel  in  passing  upon  the  sufficiency  of  the  title  to  perform  his 
work  with  the  least  possible  confusion.  The  time  of  counsel 
may  be  saved,  and  his  labor  greatly  facilitated,  if  the  entries  be 
made  in  logical  and  chronological  order.  Every  abstract  should 
be  headed  with  a  caption  containing  a  description  of  the  real 
estate  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  examination.  Thus  the 
mind  of  the  reader  is  directed  at  once  to  the  person  for  whom  the 
search  is  made,  the  property  it  relates  to,  and  when  the  search  was 
made.  The  caption  does  not  always  mention  the  person  for 
whom  the  search  was  made,  or  the  time  when  made,  1)ut  is  usually 
confined  to  a  description  of  the  land.  It  is  the  practice  of  some 
abstracters  to  follow  the  caption  with  a  plat  showing  the  location 
of  the  land  with  reference  to  the  section  or  addition  wherein  it  is 
situated.  The  various  searches  are  next  arranged  under  classified 
heads  and  numbered  consecutively  from  the  beginning.  The  ab- 
stract closes  with  a  certificate  signed  by  the  examiner  setting 
forth  the  scope  and  extent  of  the  examination. 

§  164.  The  caption. — We  have  already  said  that  the  office 
of  the  caption  is  to  apprise  the  reader  of  the  subject-matter  of 
the  examination,  and  to  accomplish  this  object  a  correct  descrip- 
tion of  the  property  is  all  that  is  required.     But  the  custon;i 

4  Crook  V.   Chilvers,  99  Nebr.  684,     157  N.  W.  617. 


191  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §     165 

generally  prevails  of  stating  in  connection  with  the  description 
the  time  from  which  the  search  is  made.  It  was  the  practice  of 
English  abstracters  to  state  in  the  caption  whose  title  it  is,  and 
for  what  interest,  but  since  it  is  the  duty  of  counsel  to  determine, 
from  the  examination  as  a  whole,  the  party  in  whom  the  title  is 
vested,  and  the  nature  of  such  title,  there  no  longer  exists  any 
reason  for  such  statement.  A  title  is  made  up  of  a  series  of  docu- 
ments and  of  facts,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  abstracter  to  set  forth 
in  methodical  order  a  statement  of  the  contents  of  these  docu- 
ments and  facts,  leaving  to  counsel  the  duty  of  determining  in 
whom  the  title  rests,  and  to  what  extent,  if  any,  it  is  incumbered. 

The  following  form  of  a  caption  is  submitted: 

Abstract  Of  Title  to  The  Northwest  quarter  of  the  Southeast 
quarter  of  Section  thirty-two  (32)  in  Township  one  hundred 
twenty-eight  (128)  north  of  Range  seventy  (70)  west  of  the  fifth 
(5th)  principal  meridian,  in  McPherson  County,  State  of  South 
Dakota,  and  containing  forty  (40)  acres  more  or  less. 

The  above  form  of  caption  is  used  for  an  original  examination, 
but  should  the  examination  be  only  a  continuation  of  a  former 
search,  the  words  "Continuation  of"  should  precede  the  word 
"Abstract"  in  the  first  line  of  the  caption,  and  the  description 
should  be  followed  by  a  statement  of  the  time  from  which  the 
search  dates,  thus  : 

This  examination  commencing  Jan.  12,  1896. 

If  it  is  desired  to  state  in  the  caption  both  the  time  of  begin- 
ning and  the  time  of  ending  the  search,  as  is  sometimes  the 
practice,  the  description  should  be  followed  by  a  statement  similar 
to  the  following:  This  examination  beginning  Jan.  12,  1896, 
and  ending  Aug.  26,  1910,  inclusive  of  both  dates. 

The  time  covered  by  the  search  should  always  be  stated  in  the 
certificate  of  the  examiner  at  the  close  of  the  abstract. 

Where  the  search  is  to  extend  from  the  date  of  a  particular 
conveyance,  or  where  it  is  to  be  special,  the  caption  should  defi- 
nitely state  the  extent  and  scope  of  the  search,  or  this  should  be 
distinctly  set  forth  in  the  certificate. 

§  165.  Arrangement  of  the  abstract. — An  abstract  may 
contain  every  matter  of  record  and  every  fact  in  any  way  affecting 
the  title  to  a  particular  tract  of  land,  and  yet  be  very  confusing 
from  the  mere  inattention  of  the  searcher  to  the  details  of  ar- 
rangement.   It  is  the  practice  of  most  abstracters  to  group  all  the 


§     166  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  192 

instruments  or  transactions  of  a  certain  class  together  and  to  set 
them  out  in  chronological  order.  Thus  deeds  and  grants  are 
usually  shown  in  the  order  of  their  appearance  on  the  records. 
Mortgages  and  liens  are  sometimes  shown  in  the  same  manner. 
While  it  is  the  better  practice  to  show  liens  and  incumbrances 
under  classified  heads,  mortgage  liens  are  better  shown  in  regular 
chronological  order  in  the  chain.  When  considered  simply  as 
liens,  mortgages  might,  before  default  or  foreclosure,  with  pro- 
priety, be  shown  with  other  liens,  but  after  default  and  fore- 
closure they  constitute  muniments  of  title,  and  should  appear 
in  the  chain  in  regular  chronological  order.  By  placing  all  mere 
liens,  charges,  and  incumbrances  under  one  classification  the  sym- 
metry of  the  title  is  best  preserved,  and  counsel  is  enabled  to 
obtain  a  clearer  view^  of  the  title  than  he  could  possibly  obtain 
were  they  inserted  in  the  chain  in  the  order  of  time  at  which 
they  took  effect.  When  liens  or  incumbrances  are  inserted  in 
the  chain  in  chronological  order  with  other  instruments,  the  re- 
leases or  discharges  should  appear  immediately  after  them,  re- 
gardless of  the  time  when  such  releases  or  discharges  took  effect. 

The  instruments  or  transactions  forming  muniments  of  title 
constitute  the  links  in  the  chain,  and  these  links  should  be  placed 
in  the  chain  in  chronological  sequence,  from  the  earliest  to  the 
latest.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned,  patents,  grants,  deeds, 
mortgages  after  default  and  foreclosure,  decrees,  judgments  and 
orders  affecting  the  land,  and  tax  deeds.  A  sheriff's  deed  under 
execution  should  appear  in  the  order  mentioned,  and  should  be 
immediately  preceded  by  the  judgment.  Official  deeds  made  in 
pursuance  of  a  decree  or  order  of  court  are  muniments  of  title 
and  should  be  preceded  by  the  proceedings  and  decrees  upon 
which  they  are  based. 

At  the  end  of  the  chain  should  be  shown  under  classified  heads, 
judgments  against  the  person,  mechanic's  liens,  taxes  and  tax 
sales,  mortgages  not  yet  due,  and  any  other  liens  or  incumbrances 
shown  by  the  public  records. 

Experience  has  demonstrated  that  an  abstract  arranged  in  the 
order  suggested  above  gives  the  least  trouble  to  counsel  in  making 
his  analysis  of  the  title.  The  arrangement  shows  a  permanent 
chronological  record  of  the  title  for  the  time  covered  by  the  ex- 
amination. 

§  166.  Synopsis  of  instruments  and  proceedings. — In  this 
country  there  is  no  uniform  style  or  system  used  in  displaying 


193  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §     166 

the  various  instruments  and  proceedings  on  the  abstract.  Each 
individual  abstracter  is  at  Hberty  to  exercise  his  own  tastes  in  the 
matter,  and  to  employ  whatever  system  which  seems  to  him  most 
convenient  and  practical.  A  great  many  abstracters,  especially  in 
the  older  states,  still  employ,  with  more  or  less  variation  there- 
from, the  system  of  English  abstracters.  What  is  known  as  the 
"New  England  Abstract"  is  apparently  an  offshoot  from  the 
English  system,  which  it  resembles  in  many  respects.  By  the 
New  England  method  the  page  of  the  abstract  is  ruled  by  vertical 
lines  into  four  columns.  At  the  top  of  the  page  and  immediately 
above  these  columns  is  written  the  name  of  the  grantor  and  the 
date  from  which  his  title  is  traced.  In  the  first  column  on  the 
left  is  placed  the  date  of  execution,  date  of  acknowledgment,  date 
of  recording,  and  the  name  of  the  officer  taking  the  acknowledg- 
ment. In  the  next  column  to  the  right  is  noted  the  book  and 
page  of  the  record.  The  next  column  contains  the  names  of  the 
grantees,  the  consideration,  notes  referring  to  dower  and  home- 
stead, the  words  of  grant,  covenants,  and  notes  regarding  de- 
fects in  form.  In  the  last  column  to  the  right  is  inserted  the 
description,  the  incumbrances,  conditions,  recitals,  etc. 

The  form  of  synopsis  employed  by  most  abstracters  of  this 
country,  especially  throughout  the  middle  and  western  states  is 
very  simple,  and  is  generally  commended  by  the  legal  profession. 
By  this  method  the  matter  pertaining  to  a  particular  transaction 
forming  a  muniment  of  title  is  headed  by  a  caption,  containing 
the  names  of  the  parties  thereto,  the  capacity  or  office  in  which 
the  parties  act  or  receive,  and  whatever  else  is  deemed  necessary 
in  the  way  of  explanation  or  identification.  This  caption  is  some- 
times written  across  the  page,  but  more  often  it  is  placed  at  the 
left  hand  side  of  the  page  and  separated  from  the  remainder  of 
the  page  by  a  line  or  bracket.  To  the  right  of  this  line  or 
bracket  is  inserted  the  nature  of  the  instrument  or  transaction,  its 
date,  the  date  of  recording,  the  book  and  page  where  recorded, 
and  if  a  court  proceeding,  the  case  number  and  the  name  of  the 
court.  Following  this,  and  written  across  the  entire  page,  the 
recitals  are  set  out.  These  may  be  paragraphed  as  required,  but 
need  not  be  separated  otherwise.  Notes  may  be  distinguished 
from  other  matter  by  slight  indentation.  For  the  convenience  of 
counsel  in  making  notes,  a  margin  one  inch  or  more  in  width  is 

13 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§     167  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  194 

usually  reserved  on  tlie  left  side  of  each  page.  Examples  of  the 
form  of  synopsis  we  have  just  described  will  be  shown  hereafter. 
It  will  be  observed  that  this  form  of  synopsis  is  not  only  neat  and 
compact  in  appearance,  but  enables  the  reader  to  see  at  a  glance 
any  i^ortion  of  an  instrument  without  having  his  attention  diver- 
ted to  other  parts  of  the  abstract. 

§  167.  Fullness  of  synopsis. — We  have  said  that  the  pur- 
pose of  an  abstract  is  to  enable  one  interested  in  the  title  to  a 
particular  tract  of  land  to  determine  its  sufficiency  without  hav- 
ing to  refer  to  the  original  source  for  information.  This  would 
include  all  the  material  ])arts  of  the  records  of  all  grants,  patents, 
conveyances,  wills,  documents  and  all  judicial  proceedings  which 
may  afTect  the  title  in  any  way,  and  of  all  mortgages,  judgments, 
taxes,  assessments,  mechanic's  liens,  lis  pendens  notices  or  other 
liens  which  may  incumber  the  title.  There  should  be  set  out 
every  part  of  an  instrument  or  proceeding,  which  may  have  a 
bearing  on  the  title,  and  one  who  has  procured  an  abstract  has  a 
right  to  assume  that  any  part  which  is  not  set  out  has  no  bearing. 
The  abstracter  must  decide  for  himself  whether  an  instrument 
or  any  part  thereof  is  required  to  be  transcribed  literally,  or 
should  be  abstracted  merely.  It  is  not  always  an  easy  matter 
for  the  average  abstracter  to  determine  what  parts  of  a  particu- 
lar instrument  or  proceeding  are  material  and  what  parts  are  not 
material.  When  in  doubt  about  whether  he  should  set  out  a 
particular  part  of  an  instrument,  he  should  take  no  chances  by 
omitting  it.  The  tendency  is  to  include  too  much,  rather  than  not 
enough.  Much  time  and  labor  of  counsel  is  saved  if  all  unnec- 
essary verbage  and  redundant  matter  is  omitted  from  the  abstract. 
It  rarely  ever  occurs  that  an  instrument  may  not,  with  perfect 
safety,  be  digested  in  such  a  way  as  to  show  its  pith  and  substance 
without  impairing  its  significance. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  certain  instruments  ap- 
pearing in  a  chain  of  title  are  best  presented  in  the  language  of 
the  originals.  Thus,  an  abstract  of  a  conveyance  containing  con- 
ditional or  strictive  clauses  should  quote  these  clauses  fully,  and 
should  not  merely  state  them  according  to  what  seems  to  the  ab- 
stracter to  be  their  legal  effect,  and  as  the  construction  to  be 
placed  on  such  clauses  may  depend  on  other  parts  of  the  instru- 
ment, a  copy  of  the  entire  instrument  should  be  set  out.  Every 
part  of  a  will,  except,  perhaps,  the  preamble  and  bequests  or  gifts 


195  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §    168 

of  personalty,  should  be  set  out  literally,  in  order  that  counsel  may 
have  an  opportunity  of  judging  by  the  context  as  well  as  by  the 
particular  words,  the  effect  of  the  devise. 

§  168.  Abstracter's  notes. — It  is  the  practice  of  many  ab- 
stracters to  insert  explanatory  notes  and  comments  relative  to 
certain  matters  contained  in  the  abstract.  These  are  often  highly 
important  and  useful  in  clearing  up  obscure  statements,  and  in 
assisting  counsel  in  arriving  at  a  proper  estimate  of  the  matters 
to  which  they  relate.  The  abstracter,  by  his  constant  use  of  the 
public  records  and  private  papers,  becomes  familiar  with  the 
histories  of  titles  and  learns  of  weaknesses  and  defects,  and  he 
is  bound  to  disclose  to  his  employer  all  pertinent  information  ac- 
quired by  him  in  the  course  of  his  investigations.  Such  informa- 
tion should  be  appended  immediately  after  the  instrument  or 
transaction  to  which  it  relates,  but  should  this  be  impracticable, 
it  may  be  inserted  at  the  end  of  the  abstract,  immediately  before 
the  certificate.  If  it  becomes  desirable  or  necessary  to  insert 
notes  in  the  abstract,  they  should  be  confined  to  a  brief  statement 
of  facts,  and  none  should  be  inserted  which  do  not  in  some  way 
tend  to  clarify  or  explain  an  ambiguity  in  the  entry  to  which  they 
relate.  Frequent  and  voluminous  note  making  only  serves  to  con- 
fuse and  distract  the  mind  of  the  examining  counsel,  but  when 
they  are  pertinent  and  concise  they  become  a  valuable  contribution 
to  the  examination. 

§  169.  Exhibiting  instruments  for  reference. — Instru- 
ments outside  the  chain,  but  which  are  collaterally  connected  with 
the  title  are  frequently  exhibited  for  the  purpose  of  reference  in 
obtaining  a  clearer  view  of  the  title  under  consideration.  Where 
this  is  done  the  instrument  should  be  shown  immediately  after  the 
deed  or  other  instrument  which  it  affects  or  explains,  and  should 
be  preceded  by  a  note  stating  that  it  is  shown  for  the  purpose  of 
reference  only. 

§  170.  Shov^ing  irregular  instruments. — A  search  of  the 
index  of  irregulars  \x\\\  often  disclose  certain  instruments  of  an 
irregular  and  independent  character,  which  are  not  muniments 
of  title,  but  which,  from  their  nature  and  contents,  are  required 
to  be  shown  in  order  to  throw  light  upon  some  instrument  or 
transaction  claimed  as  a  muniment  of  title.  Thus  a  certain  in- 
strument outside  the  chain  of  title  being  made  up  may  contain  an 


§     171  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  196 

affidavit  of  dower,  heirship,  or  kindred  matters  which  may  have 
an  important  bearing  iijKjn  the  title  under  consideration,  and 
should  be  properly  set  out.  The  contents  of  instruments  in- 
tended primarily  to  affect  lands  other  than  those  being  abstracted 
may  affect  collaterally  the  lands  under  consideration. 

§  171.  Showing  mistakes  made  in  transcribing  instru- 
ments.— It  is  the  duty  of  the  abstracter  to  exhibit  instru- 
ments as  they  appear  on  the  public  records  regardless  of  the  fact 
that  they  have  been  incorrectly  transcribed.  The  abstracter's 
book  of  original  entries  is  made  up  from  the  original  instrument 
when  it  is  filed  for  record,  but  in  compiling  the  abstract  he  com- 
pares this  entry  with  the  record,  and  may  discover  an  error  in 
transcribing.  After  satisfying  himself  that  the  recording  officer 
has  made  a  mistake,  it  becomes  the  abstracter's  duty  to  note  on  the 
abstract  the  fact  of  such  mistake  and  make  reference  to  the  orig- 
inal document.  This  note  should  follow  the  synopsis  of  the  er- 
roneous document  as  an  appendix  thereto. 

§  172.  Abbreviations. — The  use  of  abbreviations  by  the 
abstracter  in  preparing  his  notes  and  making  up  his  indexes  and 
reference  books  is  a  matter  wholly  within  his  own  choice,  but  he 
should  be  able  to  interpret  them  readily.  Much  time  and  labor 
may  be  saved  by  abbreviating  the  names  of  the  points  of  the 
compass  with  the  initial  letter  thereof.  In  the  same  manner  the 
different  classes  of  conveyances  may  be  abbreviated.  Govern- 
mental subdivisions  of  land  are  invariably  abbreviated  in  these 
books  and  in  the  abstracter's  notes.  In  compiling  the  abstract, 
however,  the  form  found  in  the  record  must  be  used.  If  a  name 
or  word  is  abbreviated  in  the  record  it  must  appear  in  the  abstract 
in  the  same  form,  and  if  they  are  written  out  in  full  in  the 
record  they  must  be  wTitten  out  in  full  in  the  abstract,  and  where 
words  are  abbreviated  in  the  record  their  abbreviation  in  the  ab- 
stract should  be  enclosed  in  quotation  marks.  This  relieves  the 
abstracter  of  the  responsibility  of  interpreting  them.  We  do  not 
wish  to  infer  that  abbreviations  may  not  be  made  of  terms  used 
in  the  record  when  they  are  such  as  are  commonly  accepted  in 
compiling  legal  documents,  but  we  deem  it  the  safer  practice  to 
copy  into  the  abstract  whatever  abbreviations  may  be  found  on 
the  record. 


197  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §173 

§  173.  Preserving  copy  of  abstract. — As  a  matter  of  self- 
protection,  if  for  no  other  reason,  the  abstracter  should  make  and 
carefully  preserve  a  copy  of  each  and  every  abstract  compiled  by 
him.  This  may  be  readily  done  by  use  of  a  letter  press,  or  pref- 
erably by  use  of  the  carbon  sheet  if  the  typewriter  is  used.  Aside 
from  their  use  in  verifying  work  delivered  to  clients,  they  obviate 
the  necessity  of  an  examination  of  the  records  in  case  the  ab- 
stracter is  called  upon  to  prepare  another  abstract  of  the  same 
propert}'^  or  a  subdivision  thereof.  These  copies  should  be  ar- 
ranged in  book  form  and  the  pages  carefully  numbered.  There 
should  be  noted  on  the  tract  index  opposite  the  entry  of  the  in- 
strument under  consideration  the  volume  and  page  of  the  copy 
book  where  the  duplicate  copy  may  be  found. 

§  174.  Abstracter's  certificate. — Immediately  at  the  end 
of  the  abstract  proper  should  be  written  the  abstracter's  cer- 
tificate of  search.  This  should  briefly  show  the  fact  that  he  has 
examined  the  indexes  to,  and  the  records  of,  conveyances,  mort- 
gages, judgments,  lis  pendens,  mechanics'  liens,  tax  sales,  and  con- 
firmed special  assessments,  and  that  there  are  no  conveyances, 
judgments,  liens,  tax  sales,  forfeitures  and  confirmed  special  as- 
sessments for  the  period  covered  by  the  abstract,  except  as  noted 
in  the  abstract.  The  number  of  pages  of  the  abstract  should  be 
given  in  the  certificate.  The  certificate  should  be  dated  as  of  the 
date  of  the  examination,  and  signed  by  the  examiner.  Where  the 
entries  on  the  abstract  are  in  all  respects  true,  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  certificate,  and  the  abstract  and  certificate  are  satis- 
factory to  the  person  ordering  them,  the  examiner  has  completed 
his  contract.  If  he  has  not  performed  his  work  in  a  thorough 
and  skilled  manner,  or  if  he  discovers  that  it  is  impossible  for 
him  to  furnish  a  complete  and  trustworthy  abstract,  it  becomes 
his  duty  to  state  that  fact  in  his  certificate.  If  he  fails  in  this 
respect  his  employer  will  have  a  right  to  rely  on  the  completeness 
of  the  abstract.^  The  examiner  can  not,  by  a  vague  and  obscure 
certificate,  limit  his  liability.  If  he  states  in  his  certificate  that 
he  finds  of  record  no  liens  on  the  property  in  question,  this  is 
equivalent  to  stating  that  there  are  none  of  record.''  Where  the 
certificate  to  an  abstract  stated  that  it  was  a  "full,  true  and  com- 

°  Chase  v.  Heaney,  70  III.  268.  «  Philadelphia  v.  Anderson,  142  Pa. 

St.  357,  27  Atl.  976. 


§     174  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  198 

pletc  abstract  of  the  title,"  this  was  held  to  cover  suits  affecting 
the  title  as  well  as  conveyances  or  incumbrances/  We  have  seen 
that  an  abstracter  may  limit  his  liability  by  a  certificate  that  he 
has  examined  the  records  in  certain  offices  only.  Thus,  where  a 
certificate  states  that  a  careful  search  has  been  made  of  the  rec- 
ords of  the  office  of  the  county  clerk,  the  clerk  of  the  district 
court,  the  county  treasurer,  and  that  there  are  no  liens  of  record 
upon  the  property  described  except  as  mentioned  in  the  abstract, 
it  was  held  that  an  omission  from  the  abstract  of  a  prior  mortgage 
upon  the  property,  then  of  record  in  the  office  of  the  register  of 
deeds,  it  was  held  that  on  account  of  the  limitation  contained  in 
the  certificate,  there  could  be  no  recovery  in  a  suit  upon  the  bond 
of  the  abstracter  for  loss  occasioned  by  such  omission.®  The 
contents  of  the  certificate  should  conform  to  the  agreement  be- 
tween the  abstracter  and  his  employer,  and  should  be  definite  and 
certain  in  its  statements.  If  the  examination  was  made  from  the 
records  this  fact  should  be  stated,  and  where  it  was  made  from  the 
examiner's  indexes  the  certificate  should  so  state.  The  following 
form  of  certificate  will  illustrate  the  points  we  have  been  con- 
sidering : 

Certificate  of  Abstracter 

This  is  to  certify  that  I  have  made  a  careful  examination  of 
the  records  in  the  Recorder's  Office,  the  General  Judgment  Dock- 
ets of  the  Marion  Circuit,  Superior  and  Probate  Courts,  the  Lis 
Pendens  Records  of  complaints  and  attachments,  the  tax  Dupli- 
cates and  Municipal  Assessment  Records  in  the  Treasurer's  Of- 
fice, and  the  Indexes  of  Tax  Sales  in  the  Auditor's  Office,  all  in 
Marion  County,  Indiana,  as  said  records  and  dockets  are  now  en- 
tered, and  I  find  that  there  are  no  instruments  of  conveyance  or 
unsatisfied  incumbrances  of  record  or  on  file  in  any  of  the  offices 
aforesaid  in  any  manner  affecting  the  title  to  the  real  estate  de- 
scribed in  the  caption  of  this  abstract,  except  such  as  are  shown 
above  and  included  on  pages  one  to  twenty-five  of  this  abstract. 

Witness  my  hand  and  seal  this  12th  day  of  April,  1901. 

John  Jones,  Abstracter. 

7  Thomas  v.  Schee,  80  Iowa  237,  45  *  Thomas  v.  Carson,  46  Nebr.  765, 
N.  W.  539.  65  N.  W.  899. 


199  COMPILATION    OF    ABSTRACT  §     174 

Where  the  abstract  is  a  continuation  of  a  former  abstract  made 
by  the  same  party  the  certificate  may  take  the  following  form  : 

Certificate  of  Continuation 

I,  John  Jones,  hereby  certify  that  I  have  made  a  careful  re- 
examination of  the  records  in  the  Recorder's  Office,  the  General 
Judgment  Dockets  of  the  Marion  Circuit,  Superior  and  Probate 
Courts,  the  Lis  Pendens  Records  of  complaints  and  attachments, 
the  Tax  Duplicates  and  Municipal  Assessment  Records  in  the 
Treasurer's  Office,  and  the  Indexes  of  Tax  Sales  in  the  Auditor's 
Office,  all  in  Marion  County,  Indiana,  as  said  records  and  dock- 
ets are  now  entered,  and  that  there  are  no  conveyances,  judg- 
ments, mechanics'  liens,  unpaid  taxes,  instruments  or  liens  of  any 
kind,  of  record  or  on  file  in  any  of  the  offices  aforesaid  in  any 
manner  affecting  the  title  to  the  real  estate  described  in  the  cap- 
tion to  the  within  abstract,  except  as  shown  in  this  continuation 
of  abstract  and  included  on  pages  one  to  five  thereof. 

Continued  from  April  12,  1901. 

Witness  my  hand  and  seal  this  1st  day  of  September,  1910. 

John  Jones,  Abstracter. 

Where  the  abstracter  is  employed  to  make  and  furnish  an  ab- 
stract of  title  to  certain  land  from  a  date  when  the  title  is  as- 
sumed to  be  in  a  given  person,  the  name  of  such  person  and  the 
fact  that  the  title  is  assumed  to  be  in  him  at  the  time  the  examina- 
tion is  to  commence  should  be  set  out  in  the  certificate. 

Where  instruments  are  shown  for  reference  only  there  is  no 
necessity  for  following  the  chain  of  title  to  which  it  properly  be- 
longs, but  a  note  should  be  placed,  either  immediately  after  the 
abstract  of  the  instrument,  or  in  the  certificate,  explaining  the 
purpose  for  which  the  instrument  is  shown,  and  reciting  the  fact 
that  no  examination  was  made  for  conveyances  or  judgments 
against  any  person  connected  with  such  collateral  title. 

Where  the  real  estate  described  in  the  caption  is  in  two  or  more 
separate  parcels  or  tracts,  and  the  date  of  the  commencement  of 
the  examination  is  not  the  same  for  each  tract,  the  date  from 
which  the  examination  was  made  for  the  respective  tracts  must 
be  mentioned  in  the  certificate. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


BEGINNING  OF  TITLE 


SEC.  SEC. 

180.  Inceptive   stages    of    title   gcner-  199. 
ally.  200. 

181.  Source  of   title   shown   by  com-  201. 
plete  chain. 

182.  Methods  of  transfer  under  gov-  202. 
ernment  land  laws.  203. 

183.  Who  may  acquire  title  to  public  204. 
lands.  205. 

184.  Power  of  congress  to  dispose  of  206. 
public  lands.  207. 

185.  Disposal  of  state  lands.  208. 

186.  Direct  legislative  grants. 

187.  Form  and  construction  of  direct  209. 
legislative  grants. 

188.  Abstracting  legislative  grant.  210. 

189.  Confirmation  acts  and  decrees. 

190.  Transfer  by  public  sale.  211. 

191.  Appropriation  by  private  entry. 

192.  Nature  of  entryman's  title. 

193.  Lands  subject  to  entry.  212. 

194.  Statement  of  the  entry.  213. 

195.  Receipts,  certificates,  etc.,  issued  214. 
by  register  or  receiver.  215. 

196.  Pre-emption.  216. 

197.  Pre-emptor's  right  or  title. 

198.  Contracts    and    conveyances    be- 
fore entry. 


Graduation  acts. 
Homestead  and  free  grants. 
Nature    of    rights    acquired    by 
homesteader. 

Donations  and  bounty  lands. 
Land  warrants  and  scrip. 
Desert  land  entries. 
Timber  and  stone  lands. 
Timljer  culture  claims. 
Swamp  land  grants. 
School      and      university      land 
grants. 

Statement    where    title    founded 
on  school  land  grant. 
Grants     for     internal     improve- 
ment. 

Initial      statement     of     abstract 
where   title  based   on   grant    for 
internal  improvements. 
Land  grants  to  railroads. 
Grant  for  public  highway. 
Private  land  claims. 
Town  site  entry. 
Initial     statement     of     abstract 
where     title     obtained     through 
town  site  entry. 


55  180.  Inceptive  stages  of  title  generally.  —  All  lands 
ceded  to  the  confederation  by  individual  states,  as  well  as  those 
acquired  by  the  present  government  from  foreign  powers,  was, 
for  the  most  part,  free  from  any  claims  of  ownership  by  indi- 
viduals, and  l)ecame  the  exclusive  property  of  the  national  govern- 
ment, to  be  disposed  of  to  such  persons,  at  such  times,  in  such 
modes,  and  by  such  titles,  as  seemed  expedient.  In  admitting 
new  states  into  the  union,  this  right  of  disposition  of  the  public 
lands  has  been  uniformly  reserved  in  the  admission  act.  But  by 
the  terms  of  their  charters  some  of  the  original  colonies  which 
became  states  reserved  the  right  when  the  union  was  formed  to 
hold  and  dispose  of  the  lands  within  the  lx)undaries  of  their  re- 

'   200 


201  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    180 

spective  grants  independently  of  the  nation.^     The  ownership  of 
the  United  States  of  lands  within  the  limits  of  the  original  states 
is  based  upon  cessions  from  the  states.^     In  acquiring  territory 
from   foreign  powers  by  treaties  and  annexation,   the  United 
States  agreed  that  titles  held  by  grant  from  such  foreign  powers 
should  be  respected  and  treated  as  valid.     But  lands  vacant  and 
unappropriated  at  the  date  of  the  treaty  or  cession  became  part 
of  the  public  lands  of  the  United  States,^  and  the  new  states  which 
have  been  formed  out  of  such  territory  have  no  title  to  vacant 
and  unappropriated  lands  within  their  borders,*  save  in  so  far 
as  such  lands  have  been  granted  to  them  by  the  federal  govern- 
ment.^    "The  system  adopted  for  the  disposition  of  public  lands 
embraces  the  interests  of  all  the  states,  and  proposes  the  equal 
participation  therein  of  all  the  people  of  all  the  states.     This 
system  is,  therefore,  peculiarly  and  exclusively  the  exercise  of  a 
federal  power.     The  theater  of  its  accomplishment  is  the  seat  of 
the  federal  government.     The  mode  of  that  accomplishment,  the 
evidences  or  muniments  of  right  it  bestows,  are  all  the  work  of 
federal  functionaries  alone."^     It  is  beyond  the  power  of  a  state 
or  territory,  by  its  law,  to  interpose  and  dictate  to  the  federal 
government,  to  whom,  and  in  what  mode,  and  by  what  title,  the 
public  lands  shall  be  disposed  of.     The  land  laws  provide  for  cer- 
tain preliminary  steps  to  be  taken  before  title  passes  from  the  sov- 
ereign to  the  individual.     Such  provisions  are  embodied  in  the 
various  acts  of  congress  passed  from  time  to  time  in  furtherance 
of  the  plan  to  develop  the  country,  and  these  steps  constitute  the 
initial  link  in  the  chain  of  title  when  traced  from  the  government. 
Wherever  practicable  the  abstract  should  start  out  with  a  recital 
of  these  preliminary  proceedings,  but  in  the  older  sections  of  the 
country  where  titles  originated  in  colonial  or  state  grants  these 
preliminary  steps,  of  course,  do  not  appear,  and  the  abstract 
should  commence  with  some  other  well  authenticated  fact  ante- 
dating the  period  prescribed  by  statute  for  the  bringing  of  an 
action  to  recover  land. 

1  People  V.  Livingston,  8  Barb.  (N.     United   States  v.  Berrigan,  2  Alaska 
Y.)   253;  Pollard  v.  Hagan,  3  How.     442. 

(U.  S.)  212.  11  L.  ed.  565.  *  Stoner  v.  Royar,  200  Mo.  444,  9S 

2  Pollard  V.  Hagan,  3  How.  (U.  S.)     S.  W.  601. 

212.  11  L.  ed.  565.  ^  Ward  v.  Mulford.  32  Cal.  365. 

3  People  V.  Folsom.  5  Cal.  2,7Z ;  Ter-        «  Irvine  v.  Marshall.  20  How.    (U. 
ritory  v.  Lee.  2  Mont.   124;   State  v.     S.)   558,  15  L.  ed.  994. 

Kennard,  57  Nebr.  711,  78  N.  W.  282; 


§     181  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  202 

As  one  of  the  results  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  title  to  the  ter- 
ritory occupied  by  the  thirteen  colonies,  and  of  the  so-called 
"Northwest  Territory,"  passed  to  the  colonies  and  states.  Indi- 
vidual claims,  however,  based  upon  grants  from  the  crown  or 
colonial  governments,  were  made  to  portions  of  this  territory, 
and  such  claims  have  been  respected  and  confirmed  by  special  acts 
of  congress  or  in  conformity  to  general  laws  on  the  subject.' 

§  181.  Source  of  title  shown  by  complete  chain. — The 
practical  question  to  be  determined  by  the  examiner  is  the  source 
of  title,  whether  it  appear  in  the  abstract  or  not.  In  most  com- 
munities these  general  sources  are  understood,  and  there  is  gen- 
erally some  conceded  starting-point,  as  the  patent,  a  deed  from  a 
canal  trustee,  etc.  A  complete  chain  of  title,  especially  of  the 
states  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Michigan,  Illinois  and  Wisconsin,  com- 
prising the  Northwest  Territory,  will  show  :  ( 1 )  The  proclama- 
tion of  discovery ;  (2)  the  grant  by  the  king  of  Great  Britain  and 
his  council  to  the  original  Virginia  patentees;  (3)  the  treaty  of 
peace,  whereby  the  colonists  were  confirmed  in  their  rights;  (4) 
the  Act  of  Virginia  of  1783,  authorizing  the  Virginia  delegates  to 
cede  the  Northwest  Territory;  (5)  the  Ordinance  of  1787;  (6) 
the  treaties  of  the  United  States  with  the  Indians  w'hereby  they 
vacated;  (7)  the  government  survey  which  defined  the  boun- 
daries; (8)  the  act  of  congress  which  placed  the  land  on  the  mar- 
ket ;  (9)  the  certificate  of  the  receiver  of  the  land  office ;  and  ( 10 ) 
the  patent  from  the  government.  It  is  seldom  practicable,  or 
even  necessary  to  include  these  inceptive  measures  in  the  abstract, 
as  nothing  passes  a  perfect  title  to  public  lands  but  a  patent;  the 
sole  exception  being  a  direct  grant  by  act  of  congress. 

§  182.  Methods  of  transfer  under  government  land  laws. 
— Title  to  the  public  lands  is  vested  in  the  United  States,^  and 
congress  has  the  sole  power  of  disposition  thereof  and  of  making 
all  needful  rules  and  regulations  with  respect  to  the  public  do- 
main.^ and  has  the  absolute  right  to  prescribe  the  times,  the  con- 
ditions, and  the  modes  of  disposing  of  any  part  of  it.'** 

"United  States  v.  King,  .3  How.  (U.  ris,  2  Sawj'.  (U.  S.)  176,  24  Fed.  Cas. 
S.)   ni.  11  L.  ed.  824;  McMicken  v.     No.  14371. 

United  States,  97  U.  S.  204.  24  L.  ed.         '■>  Gibson  v.  Chouteau,  13  Wall.  (U. 
947.  S.)  92,  20  L.  ed.  534. 

s  Union  Mill  and  Mining  Co.  v.  Fer-         ^^  Gibson  v.  Chouteau,  13  Wall.  (U. 

S.)  92,  20  L.  ed.  534. 


203  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    183 

Only  a  brief  mention  can  be  here  made  of  the  different  methods 
employed  from  time  to  time  by  the  federal  government  in  dispos- 
ing of  public  lands.  For  details  of  these  methods  the  reader  is 
referred  to  the  United  States  Revised  Statutes  and  the  Statutes 
at  Large."  Under  these  laws  may  be  included  :  (1)  Public  and 
private  sales;  (2)  appropriation  by  private  entry;  (3)  transfer 
by  pre-emption;  (4)  homestead  and  free  grants;  (5)  desert  land 
entries;  (6)  timber  culture  claims;  (7)  bounty  land  claims;  (8) 
swamp  land  grants;  (9)  school  land  grants;  (10)  grants  for  in- 
ternal improvement;  (11)  railroad  grants;  (12)  mineral  land 
grants,  and  (13)  grants  for  public  highways.  The  jurisdiction 
of  the  land  department  over  public  lands  continues  so  long  as  the 
legal  title  remains  in  the  United  States.  The  issuance  of  a  pat- 
ent, or  such  other  act  as  passes  the  legal  title  from  the  govern- 
ment, is  the  final  act  and  the  expression  and  entry  of  the  final 
judgment,  of  the  officers  of  the  land  department,  and  marks  the 
termination  of  the  jurisdiction  of  these  officers.^'  While  the 
various  measures  passed  for  the  disposal  of  the  public  domain 
create  vested  interests  or  give  rise  to  equitable  rights,  the  legal 
title  remains  in  the  government  until  the  issuance  of  the  patent 
or  the  performance  of  such  other  act  as  passes  the  title  of  the  gov- 
ernment.^" The  mere  right  to  acquire  public  lands,  even  if  it  be 
preferential,  is  not  property  in  the  lands. ^* 

§  183.  Who  may  acquire  title  to  public  lands. — The  va- 
rious acts  of  congress  providing  for  the  disposal  of  public  lands 
prescribe  the  qualifications  necessary  to  entitle  persons  to  acquire 
title  thereunder.  Such  acts  usually  provide  that  the  applicant 
shall  be  the  head  of  a  family, ^^  a  widow, ^'^  or  a  person  over  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years/^  and  shall  be  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,^^  or  has  declared  his  intention  to  become  such  at  the  time 
of  his  entry."  An  entry  by  an  alien,  however,  has  been  held 
voidable  but  not  void,  his  rights  in  this  respect  being  subject  onl}' 

"U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  §§  2207-2490.  is  Ely  v.  Ellinton,  7  Mo.  302. 

12  Peyton  v.  Desmond,  129  Fed.  1,         "  Page  v.  Hobbs,  27  Cal.  483. 

63  C.  C.  A.  651.  ,  "  Tatro  v.  French,  33  Kans.  49,  5 

13  Northern  Lumber  Co.  v.  O'Brien,     Pac.  426. 

124  Fed.  819;    Sims  v.   Morrison,  92  ^^  Bogan    v.    Edinburgh    American 

Minn.  341,  100  N.  W.  88.  Land  Mtg.  Co.,  63  Fed,  192,  11  C.  C. 

1*  Seattle  &  L.  W.   Waterway  Co.  A.  128. 

V.  Seattle  Dock  Co.,  35  Wash.  503,  77  lo  Merriam    v.    Bachioni,    112    Cal. 

Pac.  845.  191,  44  Pac.  481. 


§    184  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  204 

to  such  limitations  as  the  particular  states  may  prescribe.^"  Thus 
it  has  been  held  that  a  person  of  foreign  birth  who  is  otherwise 
duly  qualified,  is  entitled  under  the  pre-emption  laws,  after  hav- 
ing in  due  form  declared  his  intention  of  becoming  a  citizen,  and 
before  becoming  fully  naturalized,  to  file  and  maintain  a  pre- 
emption claim. ^^  The  statutes  sometimes  exclude  persons  who 
are,  at  the  time  of  entry,  seised  in  fee  simple  of  a  designated  num- 
ber of  acres  of  land  in  any  state  or  territory.^^  Under  the  terms 
of  the  statutes  corporations  are  not  entitled  to  acquire  public 
lands, "^  and  entry  made  by  an  individual  acting  on  behalf  of  a 
corporation  to  which  he  conveys  the  land,  is  invalid.^*  Officers, 
clerks  and  employes  of  the  general  land  office  are  prohibited  from 
directly  or  indirectly  purchasing  or  becoming  interested  in  the 
purchase  of  any  of  the  public  lands.^^  Under  the  pre-emption 
laws  one  person  can  not  enter  public  lands  for  the  use  and  benefit 
of  another.^"  Also  a  pre-emption  for  a  partnership  can  not  be 
made  by  one  member  of  the  firm.^^ 

§  184.     Power  of  congress  to  dispose  of  public  lands. — The 

United  States  being  the  primary  source  of  title  to  all  public  lands, 
congress  has  full  power  to  dispose  of  it^^  whether  it  is  within  the 
limits  of  a  state  or  a  territory.^"  The  power  to  designate  the  per- 
sons or  classes  of  persons  to  whom  conveyances  of  the  public 
land  may  be  made  is  vested  in  congress.^"  The  land  department 
has  no  arbitrary,  unlimited  or  discretionary  power  to  sell  or  grant 
public  lands,^^  but  the  federal  government  or  its  officers  may  make 
such  regulations  for  their  use  and  disposal  as  are  authorized  by 
law.^^  A  grant  to  a  state  to  be  disposed  of  by  the  latter  may  be 
made  subject  to  conditions  for  such  disposal. ^^  The  question, 
whether  a  title  to  a  portion  of  the  public  domain  has  passed  from 
the  United  States,  must  depend  exclusively  upon  the  laws  of  the 

20  10  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.,  §  649.  28  United  States  v.  Ashton,  170  Fed. 

21  Boyce  v.  Danz,  29  Mich.  146.  509. 

22  Gourley  v.  Countryman,  18  Okla.  29  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Karges,  169 
220.  90  Pac.  427.  Fed.  459. 

23  Salina  Stock  Co.  v.  United  States,  ^o  Gibson  v.  Chouteau.  13  Wall.  (U. 
85  Fed.  339,  29  C.  C.  A.  181.  S.)   92,  20  L.  ed.  534;  United  States 

2-*  Pacific  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Gentry,  v.  Shannon,  151  Fed.  863. 

38  Ore.  275,  61  Pac.  422,  65  Pac.  597.  ^^  Hoyt  v.   Weyerhauser,   161   Fed. 

-'•  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  257.  324. 

2«  Robinson  v.  Jones,  31   Nebr.  20,  '2  Stewart  v.  United  States,  206  U. 

47  N.  W.  480.  S.  185.  27  Sup.  Ct.  631,  51  L.  ed.  1017. 

27  In  re  Groome,  94  Cal.  69,  29  Pac.  •'*•■'•  Brigham   City  v.   Rich,   34  Utah 

487.  130.  97  Pac.  220. 


205  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §     185 

United  States,  and  when  it  has  so  passed  it  then  becomes  subject 
to  state  laws.^* 

§  185.  Disposal  of  state  lands. — The  legislature  of  a  state 
has  the  sole  power  of  disposition  of  lands  belonging  to  it  within 
its  boundaries,^^  and,  as  in  the  case  of  the  federal  government,  it 
has  the  power  to  designate  the  persons  or  class  of  persons  to 
whom  conveyance  may  be  made."''  This  right  of  disposition 
may  be  by  direct  legislative  grant,"  or  by  patent  issued  under 
statutory  authority.^'* 

The  state  may  impose  conditions  for  the  disposal  of  its  lands, 
compliance  with  which  is  necessary  to  vest  title.^^  It  may  make 
special  agreements  of  sale,*"  and,  so  far  as  its  own  rights  are  con- 
cerned, may  validate  what  has  been  irregularly  done.*^  The  title 
to  state  lands  may  be  transferred  by  special  act,*^  or  by  patent  is- 
sued in  conformity  with  law/^ 

There  is  a  lack  of  uniformity  among  the  states  in  the  modes  of 
disposing  of  public  lands,  and  it  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of 
this  work  to  describe  them.  In  most  of  them  a  patent  is  effectual 
to  pass  the  title,  although  the  issuance  of  a  patent  is  not  necessary 
w^here  there  has  been  a  direct  legislative  grant.**  It  is  not  neces- 
sary, however,  to  the  passing  of  a  complete  title  that  a  patent 
should  be  delivered,  or  even  accepted  by  the  grantee.*"  The 
patent  operates  merely  as  a  quitclaim  of  the  state's  interest  in 
the  land.*"  No  valid  title  to  state  lands  can  be  acquired  until  all 
the  statutory  requirements  have  been  complied  with.*^ 

Like  a  certificate  of  sale  of  federal  lands,  a  certificate  of  sale 
issued  of  state  lands  does  not  pass  a  fee  simple  title;  but  such 

34  Wilcox  V.  Jackson,  13  Pet.  (U.  ^o  Ellerd  v.  Cox,  52  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
S.)   498,   10  L.  ed.  264.  60,  114  S.  W.  410. 

35  Chisholm  V.  Caines,  67  Fed.  285;  "  Steele  v.  Bryant,  132  Ky.  569,  116 
Patterson  v.  Trabue,  3  J.  J.   Marsh.  S.  W.  755. 

(Ky.)    598;    State   v.    Lanier,   47   La.  42  Hall  v.  Jarvis,  65  111.  302;  Cary 

Ann.  568,  17  So.  130;  Weiler  v.  Mon-  v.  Whitney,  48  Maine  516. 

roe  County,  76  Miss.  492,  25  So.  352 ;  43  Lovin  v.  Carver,  150  N.  Car.  710, 

Wyman  v.   Taylor,   124   N.   Car.  426,  64  S.  E.  775 ;  Miller  v.  Moss,  65  Tex. 

32  S.  E.  740.  179. 

3'' State   V.   Nashville   University,  4  44  Hall  v.  Jarvis,  65  111.  302;   Cary 

Humph.   (Tenn.)    157.  v.  Whitney,  48  Maine  516. 

37  Hall  v.  Jarvis,  65  111.  302;    Cary  45  shearer   v.    Clay,    1    Litt.    (Ky.) 

V.  Whitney,  48  Maine  516.  260. 

3s  Chinoweth  v.  Haskell,  3  Pet.  (U.  4c.  innes  v.  Crawford,  2  Bibb.  (Ky.) 

S.)  92,  7  L.  ed.  614;  Lovin  v.  Carter,  412. 

150  N.  Car.  710,  64  S.  E.  775.  47  Dunn  v.  Ketchum,  38  Gal.  93. 

3^  State  V.  Cross  Lake  &c.  Fishing 
Club,  123  La.  208,  48  So.  891. 


§     186  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  206 

certificate  entitles  the  purchaser  to  the  l^eneficial  interest  in  the 
land,  and  clothes  him  with  the  right  of  possession,  enjoyment, 
descent,  devise  and  aHcnation.  But  the  state  does  not  surrender 
the  dominion  and  control  of  the  land  until  the  issuance  of  the 
patent.''^  The  certificate  of  sale  of  state  lands  must  be  issued 
by  the  duly  authorized  officer.  It  should  describe  the  land  sold, 
the  amount  of  the  purchase-price,  the  amount  paid,  and  the 
amount  remaining  due,  if  any,  and  the  time,  place  and  terms  of 
payment  of  such  remainder. 

§  186.  Direct  legislative  grants. — Congress  has  power  to 
convey  public  lands  to  individuals,  states  or  corporations  by  direct 
legislative  act  without  the  issuance  of  a  patent  to  the  grantee. "'^ 
Large  areas  of  the  public  domain  have  been  disposed  of  in  this 
manner,  especially  during  the  early  days  of  the  republic.  For 
example,  direct  grants  have  been  made  to  a  number  of  the  newer 
states  for  school  and  university  purix)ses.  Also  to  railroads  as 
aids  in  their  construction. 

A  direct  grant  of  public  land  by  congress  to  a  state  or  an  indi- 
vidual vests  in  the  grantee  the  most  substantial  title  known  to 
our  law.^"  Where  the  act  contains  words  of  present  grant  the 
grantee  obtains  a  perfect  and  irrevocable  title. ''^  Where  the  act 
at  once  divests  the  government  of  all  property  in  the  land,  the  in- 
dividual or  state,  as  the  case  may  be,  becomes  the  absolute  owner 
thereof  in  fee  simple,  and  the  subsequent  issuance  of  a  patent  only 
furnishes  documentary  evidence  of  such  title. ''^  A  grant  of  pub- 
lic lands  to  be  selected  within  a  larger  area  does  not  pass  title  to 
any  particular  tract  until  the  selection  has  been  made  and  ap- 
proved/'^' 

§  187.  Form  and  construction  of  direct  legislative  grants. 
— No  particular  terms  need  be  used  in  a  legislative  grant  of  pub- 
lic lands,  but  it  will  be  sufficient  to  pass  title  if  the  words  used 
show  an  intention  on  the  part  of  congress  or  the  legislature  that 
certain  lands  shall  be  separated  from  the  mass  of  federal  or  state 
lands  and  set  apart  and  appropriated  to  the  grantee. ^^     The  form 

43  Hart  V.  Gibbons.  14  Tex.  213.  sey,  70  Ala.  507,  Dean  v.  Bittner,  17 

40  Morrow    v.    Whitney,    95    U.    S.  Mo.  101. 

551,  24  L.  ed.  456;  Hall  v.  Jarvis,  65  -'2  Morrow  v.  Whitnev,  95  U.  S.  551, 

111.  .302;  Republican  River  Bridge  Co.  24  L.  ed.  456. 

V.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.,  12  Kans.  409.  ^'3  Shaw  v.  Kellogg,  170  U.  S.  312, 

^"  Dousman  v.  Hove,  3  Wis.  466.  18  Sup.  Ct.  632.  42  L.  ed.  1050. 

^1  Strother   v.    Lucas,    12    Pet.    fU.  ^*  Republican    River   Bridge   Co.  v. 

S.)  454,  9  L.  ed.  1137;  Swann  v.  Lind-  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.,  12  Kans.  409. 


207  BEGINNING    OF-  TITLE  §     188 

must  necessarily  vary  with  the  exigencies  of  each  particular  case, 
but  the  act  must  contain  apt  words.^^  If  there  is  any  ambiguity 
or  uncertainty  in  a  legislative  grant,  that  interpretation  is  put 
upon  it  which  is  most  favorable  to  the  state;  that  the  words  of  the 
grant,  being  attributable  to  the  party  procuring  the  legislation, 
will  receive  a  strict  construction  as  against  the  grantee. ^"^  A 
grant  of  land  from  the  state  must  describe  the  land  so  that  it  can 
be  certainly  identified,"  although  it  need  not  be  strictly  accurate 
in  all  respects.^® 

§  188.  Abstracting  legislative  grant. — Where  the  title  to 
land  has  its  inception  in  a  direct  legislative  grant  the  initial  state- 
ment of  the  abstract  should  contain  a  brief  recital  of  the  act.  It 
should  contain  the  title  of  the  act,  the  date  of  its  enactment,  the 
words  of  grant  used  in  the  act,  and  the  conditions  or  restrictions, 
if  any,  annexed  to  the  grant.  If  the  grant  be  from  the  federal 
government  to  the  state  for  a  specified  purpose,  the  statement 
should  show  an  acceptance  on  the  part  of  the  state  authorities  and 
a  compliance  with  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  granting  act. 
The  statement  should  contain:  (1)  A  description  of  the  land 
by  the  proper  number  of  the  section  or  part  thereof,  as  the  case 
may  be,  and  the  township  and  range;  (2)  a  brief  synopsis  of  the 
act  constituting  the  original  grant;  (3)  selection  of  the  land  by 
the  proper  authorities  from  a  larger  area  included  in  the  grant ; 
and  (4)  approval  of  selection  by  the  president.  The  form  of  the 
statement  is  not  important,  nor  is  it  advisable  to  set  out  more  than 
will  disclose  the  fact  that  the  grant  was  by  direct  act  of  congress, 
or  the  legislature,  and  that  all  the  conditions  necessary  to  complete 
the  grant  have  been  complied  with.  The  following  example  is 
submitted : 

Act  of  Congress. 


United  States 

to 

Southern  Pacific  Railroad 
Company  of  California. 


Dated  March  3,  1871. 
^  Filed  May  4,  1896. 
"  Recorded  in  Book  M,  page  45. 


An    act,    entitled,    "An    act 
granting  lands  to  the  Southern  Pacific  Railroad  Company  of 

55  Foley  V.  Harrison,  15  How.   (U.        ^'^  Merritt  v.  Bunting,  107  Va.  174, 
S.)  433,  14  L.  ed.  461.  57  S.  E.  567. 

56  Oakland  v.  Oakland  Water  Front         ^s  Kidd   v.    Central   Trust   &c.    Co., 
Co.,  118  Cal.  160,  50  Pac.  277;  Creech  23  Ky.  L.  1402,  65  S.  W.  355. 

V.  Johnson,    116  Ky.  441,  25   Ky.   L. 
657,  76  S.  W.  185. 


§  189  TITLES  AND  ARSTRACTS  208 

California  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  construction  of  a  rail- 
road." Enacts  that  there  be,  and  hereby  is,  granted  to  the  South- 
ern Pacific  Railroad  Company  of  California,  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  in  the  construction  of  said  railroad,  every  alternate  sec- 
tion of  public  land,  not  mineral,  designated  by  odd  numbers, 
whenever,  on  the  line  thereof,  the  United  States  having  full  title, 
not  reserved,  sold,  granted,  or  otherwise  appropriated,  and  free 
from  pre-emption  or  other  claims  of  right,  at  the  time  the  line 
of  said  road  is  designated  by  a  plat  thereof,  filed  in  the  office  of 
the  commissioner  of  the  general  land  office. 

Plat  of  line  of  said  railroad  filed  with  the  commissioner  of  the 
general  land  office  September  12,  1878. 

§  189.  Confirmation  acts  and  decrees. — It  has  always 
been  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  respect  the  rights  of  pri- 
vate property  in  territory  ceded  to  it,  but  at  the  same  time  it  has 
maintained  the  right  to  provide  reasonable  means  for  determining 
the  validity  of  titles  within  such  territory.  It  may  require  all 
persons  having  claims  to  lands  within  such  territory  to  present 
them  for  recognition,  and  to  decree  that  all  claims  which  are  not 
thus  presented  shall  be  considered  abandoned.^"  Undoubtedly 
private  rights  of  property  within  territory  ceded  to  the  United 
States  were  not  affected  by  the  change  of  sovereignty  and  juris- 
diction, and  were  entitled  to  protection,  whether  the  claimant  had 
the  full  and  absolute  ownership  of  the  land,  or  merely  an  equitable 
interest  therein,  which  required  some  further  act  of  the  govern- 
ment to  vest  in  him  a  perfect  title.  But  the  duty  of  providing  the 
mode  of  securing  these  rights  and  of  fulfilling  the  obligations 
imposed  upon  the  United  States  by  the  treaties,  belonged  to  the 
political  department  of  the  government;  and  congress  might 
either  itself  discharge  that  duty  or  delegate  it  to  the  judicial  de- 
partment.^** In  many  of  the  western  and  southwestern  states 
titles  often  rest  upon  confirmed  claims  of  inchoate  rights  de- 
rived from  the  governments  of  Spain  and  Mexico.  These  rights 
have  been  confirmed  by  special  commissions  appointed  for  that 
purpose,  or  by  the  federal  courts. 

Where  the  title  to  be  abstracted  has  its  inception  in  grants  from 
some  foreign  nation  which  owned  the  land  prior  to  its  acquisition 
by  the  United  States,  the  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  issuance 

•'■'0  Barker  v  Harvey,  181  U.  S:  481.  «o  De  la  Croix  v.  Chamberlain,  12 
21  Sup.  Ct.  690,  45  L.  ed.  963.  Wheat,  (U.  S.)  599,  6  L.  ed.  741. 


209  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    190 

of  the  patent  by  the  United  States  should  form  the  initial  state- 
ment of  the  abstract.  So,  whenever  practicable,  the  statement 
should  include  the  decree  of  confirmation,  or  at  least  a  reference 
to  it,  together  with  a  note  of  the  survey  and  approval.  If  the 
government  has  confirmed  the  title  it  becomes  absolute,  and  the 
subsequent  issuance  of  a  patent  is  of  value  only  as  record  evidence 
of  ownership  by  the  patentee.''^ 

§  190.  Transfer  by  public  sale. — Under  the  early  system 
of  land  laws  in  this  country  it  was  the  custom  to  offer  land,  as 
soon  as  surveyed,  at  public  sale,  in  pursuance  of  a  proclamation 
issued  by  the  president,  and  at  a  minimum  price.*^'  The  land  was 
sold  to  the  highest  bidder,  provided  the  highest  bid  was  not  below 
one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  acre,  except  in  cases  where 
the  land  to  l^e  sold  lay  along  a  railroad,  within  the  limits  granted 
by  act  of  congress,  in  which  case  the  minimum  price  at  which  it 
could  be  sold  was  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents  an  acre.  Sales  un- 
der the  Act  of  1796  were  made  partly  on  credit,  but  the  Act  of 
1820  required  full  cash  payments.  The  amount  sold  to  any  one 
purchaser  ranged  from  foity  to  six  hundred  and  forty  acres,  and 
even  in  larger  tracts  if  the  same  were  found  vacant.  The  sale 
was  required  to  be  advertised  for  from  three  to  six  months,  and 
a  period  of  two  weeks  was  adopted  for  receiving  bids.  Upon 
payment  of  the  purchase-price  a  receipt  was  issued  to  the  pur- 
chaser by  the  receiver  of  the  local  land  office,  and  an  entry  of  the 
sale  was  thereupon  made  in  the  tract  book  kept  by  such  officer. 
The  issue  of  the  patent  was  the  final  act  of  transfer  to  the  pur- 
chaser. Owing  to  the  injustice  to  actual  settlers  by  depriving 
them  of  valuable  improvements  made  on  the  land  prior  to  the 
sale,  this  method  of  disposition  gradually  fell  into  disuse,  and  is 
now  abolished  as  to  practically  all  the  public  lands.''^ 

§  191.  Appropriation  by  private  entry. — The  term  "en- 
try" was  borrowed  by  congress  from  the  land  laws  of  Virginia. 
It  is  the  first  step  of  a  purchaser,  except  in  sales  at  public  auction, 
for  acquiring  public  lands,  and  consists  of  filing  an  application  for 
a  definite  portion  of  the  public  domain  which  has  been  previously 
surveyed.     It  covers  a  homestead  and  townsite  entry,  as  well  as 

"Ryan  v.  Carter,  93  U.  S.  78,  23  ^2  See  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.  §§  2353, 
L.  ed.  807.  2357-2360. 

63  26  U.  S.  Stat.  1099,  §§  9,  10. 

14 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§     192  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  210 

a  private  entry  made  by  a  settler  after  the  clos(,'  of  the  public 
sales.*^^  As  generally  nnderstcod,  however,  the  term  "entry"  ap- 
plies to  the  act  by  which  an  individual  acquires  an  inceptive  right 
to  purchase  at  private  sale  a  designated  portion  of  the  public  do- 
main.'^^ 

A  person  desiring  to  obtain  public  land  by  entry  presents  to 
the  register  of  the  local  land  office  a  memorandum  in  writing  de- 
scribing the  tract  desired  by  the  proper  number  of  the  section  or 
part  thereof,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  the  township  and  range,  sub- 
scribing his  name  thereto,  to  which  memorandum  the  register  at- 
taches his  certificate,  reciting  the  fact  that  the  pjirticular  tract  is 
subject  to  private  entry  and  specifying  the  price  per  acre.  This 
memorandum  and  certificate  is  then  taken  to  the  receiver,  and 
upon  payment  to  him  of  the  purchase-price  he  issues  duplicate 
receipts  therefor,  one  of  which  is  delivered  to  the  applicant,  to 
be  surrendered  on  receiving  his  patent,  and  the  other,  together 
with  the  original  memorandum,  is  delivered  to  the  register,  who 
enters  the  memorandum  on  file  and  issues  his  certificate  of  pur- 
chase of  the  land.  The  memorandum,  together  with  the  regis- 
ter's certificate  of  purchase,  is  then  sent  to  the  general  land  office 
for  official  sanction.'^'^ 

The  land  department  has  authority  at  any  time  before  issue  of 
patent  to  inquire  whether  an  entry  was  made  in  conformity  with 
law,  and  to  correct  or  annul  the  same,  but  it  can  not  arbitrarily 
destroy  the  equitable  title  acquired  by  the  entryman  and  held  by 
him  or  his  assignee.  The  certificate  of  purchase  issued  to  the 
purchaser,  or  the  receiver's  final  receipt  of  payment  entitles  the 
lawful  holder  to  a  patent,  but  it  does  not  convey  the  title."  After 
the  lapse  of  twenty  years  there  is  a  presumption  that  a  patent  has 
been  issued  to  the  holder  of  the  certificate.^'^ 

§  192.  Nature  of  entryman's  title. — As  a  general  rule  the 
issuance  of  a  patent  in  the  name  of  the  United  States  is  necessary 
to  pass  the  title  in  public  lands  to  a  private  owner.'"'^     By  the  is- 

6*  Denny  v.   Dodson,   32   Fed.   899,  "s  Culbertson  v.  Coleman,  47  Wis. 

13  Sawy.  68.  193,  2  N.  W.  124. 

65  Chotard  v.  Pope,  12  Wheat.  (U.  eo  Hagan   v.    Ellis,   39   Fla.  463,  22 

S.)  586,  6  L.  ed.  111.  So.  121,  63  Am.  St.  167 ;  Knapp  v.  Al- 

"••'  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.,  §  2245.  exander-Edgar  Lumber  Co.,  145  Wis. 

G7  Bowne  v.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  415,  528.  130  N.  W.  504.  140  Am.  St.  1091. 

48  N.  W.  336.  Niles  v.  Cedar  Point  Club,  175  U.  S. 

300,  20  Sup.  Ct.  124,  44  L.  ed.  171. 


211  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §     192 

suance  of  the  patent  the  title  relates  back  to  the  date  of  the  entry/® 
and  takes  character  from  that  date.'^  If  an  entryman  die  before 
the  patent  is  issued,  title  passes  directly  to  his  heirs,  who  take  by 
purchase  and  not  by  descent.^"  Where  the  right  to  a  patent  is 
vested  in  the  purchaser,  the  government  holds  a  naked  legal  title 
in  trust  for  him."  A  certificate  of  purchase  issued  to  a  pur- 
chaser, or  the  land  receiver's  final  receipt  of  payment  for  the 
land  does  not  of  itself  convey  the  title, ^*  but  it  gives  the  holder  an 
equitable  title,  and  is  binding  upon  the  government."  The  ac- 
ceptance and  approval  of  an  application  to  purchase  public  land 
vests  in  the  applicant  an  equitable  title,  though  the  purchase-price 
has  not  been  paid,  which  is  perfected  as  of  the  date  of  the  applica- 
tion by  the  subsequent  payment  of  the  purchase-price  and  the  is- 
suance of  the  patent."  Some  cases  hold,  however,  that  it  gives 
the  holder  a  sufficient  legal  title  to  enable  him  to  maintain  eject- 
ment." An  entryman  who  has  obtained  a  receiver's  receipt  for 
the  purchase-price  has  sufficient  title  upon  which  to  maintain  or 
defend  a  suit  concerning  the  land."  By  statute  in  many  states  a 
person  who  has  acquired  a  complete  right  to  a  patent  for  public 
lands  is  deemed  to  have  the  complete  legal  title,  or  that  the  land 
office  certificate  of  final  payment  shall  be  evidence  of  the  legal 
title  in  the  holder.^^ 

As  soon  as  an  entryman  becomes  entitled  to  a  patent,  he  may 
sell  or  convey  the  land  as  though  the  patent  had  been  issued. ^°  A 
substantial  right  accrues  when  payment  is  made  and  certificate  or 
receipt  received.®^  The  transfer  of  such  certificate  passes  to  the 
transferee  the  equitable  title  to  the  land,^^  or,  if  transferred  as 
collateral  security,  creates  an  equitable  lien.^^  If  the  assignment 
of  the  certificate  of  entry  is  filed  in  the  general  land  office  the 

"°  Boise  City  v.  Wilkinson,  16  Idaho  Moore  v.  Coulter,  31  Ga.  278;  Carman 

150,  102  Pac.  148.  v.  Johnson,  29  Mo.  84. 

^1  Creamer  v.  Briscoe,  101  Tex.  490,  ■^«  Thompson  v.  Basler,  148  Cal.  646, 

109  S.  W.  911.  84  Pac.  161,  113  Am.  St.  321. 

^2  Brann    v.    Mathieson,    139  Iowa  '«  Knabe  v.  Burden,  88  Ala.  436.  7 

409,  116  N.  W.  789.  So.  92;   Combs  v.  Jolly,  28  Cal.  498; 

"  McClung  V.  Steen,  32  Fed.  373.  Matthews  v.  Goodrich,  102  Ind.  557, 

■^4  Bowne    v.    Wolcott,    1    N.    Dak.  1  N.  E.  175 ;  Tidd  v.  Rines,  26  Minn. 

415,  48  N.  W.  336.  201,  2  N.  W.  497. 

'=^  American    Mtg.    Co.    v.    Hopper,  ^o  d^]q  y.  Griffith,  93  Miss.  573,  46 

56  Fed.  67 ;   Fulton  v.   Doe,  5   How.  So.  543. 

(Miss.)  751.  ^iBudd  v.   Gallier,   50   Ore.  42,   89 

'"'  Nicholson  v.  Congdon,  95  Minn.  Pac.  638. 

188.  103  N.  W.  1034.  "  Sillyman  v.   King.  36  Iowa  207; 

^^  Bates   V.   Herron,   35    Ala.     117;  Burdick  v.  Wentworth,  42  Iowa  440. 

83  Wallace  v.  Wilson,   30   Mo.  335. 


§    193  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  212 

patent  will  be  issued  to  the  assignee,^*  but  in  case  it  is  issued  to 
the  entrynian  he  will  take  and  hold  the  title  in  trust  for  the  benefit 
of  the  assignee.^'^'  Title  by  patent  from  the  United  States  is  title 
by  record,  and  delivery  of  the  instrument  to  the  patentee  is  not 
essential, ®'' 

§  193.  Lands  subject  to  entry. — It  has  been  the  practice 
of  the  land  department  of  the  government  not  to  allow  private 
entries  until  the  land  has  been  previously  offered  for  sale  at  pub- 
lic auction.®^  There  is  no  presumption  that  lands  are  open  to 
entry. ^^  They  are  not  thus  open  until  provision  is  made  for 
issuing  grants  thereto,^^  and  in  disposing  of  them  the  legislature 
acts  in  subordination  to  the  constitution.®''  The  area  of  land  open 
for  entry  by  a  particular  proclamation  of  the  president  depends  on 
the  construction  to  be  given  such  proclamation.''^  Public  lands 
heavily  covered  with  timber  may  be  entered  under  the  timber  land 
act,  though  after  removal  of  the  timber  they  will  be  arable.''*^ 
When  lands  have  once  been  sold  by  the  United  States  and  the 
purchase-money  paid,  the  lands  so  sold  are  segregated  from  the 
public  domain  and  are  no  longer  subject  to  entry.  A  subsequent 
sale  and  grant  of  the  same  lands  would  be  absolutely  null  and 
void  so  long  as  the  first  sale  continued.®^  Lands  already  patented, 
granted,  confirmed  to  the  grantee,  or  otherwise  reserved,  are  not 
sul)ject  to  entry. °*  Where  a  portion  of  the  public  domain  has 
been  appropriated  to  public  or  other  special  purposes,  it  is  usually 
expressly  excepted  from  the  operation  of  all  general  legislative 
grants  and  land  laws,  but  even  without  being  thus  excepted  no 
such  grant  or  law  will  be  construed  to  embrace  them  or  to  operate 
upon  them.°'^  Where  public  lands  have  been  thrown  open  to  entry 
and  sale,  but  subsecjuently  withdrawn  until  private  rights  claimed 

8*  Clark  V.  Hall,  19  Mich.  356.  ^'O  Montana  v.  Rice,  204  U.  S.  291, 

85  Magruder  v.  Esmay,  35  Ohio  St.  27  Sup.  Ct.  281.  51  L.  ed.  490. 

221.  »i  Saylor  v.  Frantz,  17  Okla.  Z1 ,  86 

8«  Rogers   v.    Clark   Iron    Co.,    104  Pac.  432. 

Minn.  198.  116  N.  W.  739.  "^  Thayer  v.  Spratt,  189  U.  S.  346, 

"  Chotard  v.  Pope.  12  Wheat.   (U.  23  Sup.  Ct.  576,  47  L.  ed.  845, 

S.)   587,  6  L.  ed.  IZl  \  United  States  "■*  Simmons  v.   Wagner,    101   U.   S. 

V.  Railroad  Bridge  Co.,  6  McLean  (U.  260  25  L.  ed.  910. 

S.)  517,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  16114.  »*  Lineheck   v.   Vos,   160  Fed.   540; 

^8  Bowser  v.  Westcott,  145  N.  Car.  Call  v.  Los  Angeles-Pacific  Co.,   162 

56.  58  S.  E.  748.  Fed.  926;   Sullivan  v.  Solis,  52  Tex. 

89  Ware  v.   Hager,  31   Ky.  L.  728,  Civ.  App.  464,  114  S.  W.  456. 

103  S.  W.  283.                                -  95  Wilcox   v.  Jackson,    13   Pet.    (U. 

S.)  498,  16  L.  ed.  264. 


I 


213  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    194 

therein  have  been  adjudicated,  such  withdrawal  has  the  same  ef- 
fect as  a  reversion,  and  the  land  is  thereby  withdrawn  from  the 
market."'^  Surveyed  pubHc  lands  which  have  not  been  offered  for 
sale  may  be  obtained  under  the  provisions  of  the  pre-emption 
law."  Mineral  lands  are  not  subject  to  private  entry,  but  are  dis- 
posed of  in  accordance  with  special  acts. 

§  194.  Statement  of  the  entry. — An  abstract  should  in- 
clude a  concise  statement  of  what  appears  upon  the  public  records 
affecting  the  title  to  the  property  in  question,  whether  it  shows 
an  equitable  title,  a  legal  title,  or  no  title.^^  In  most  of  the  states 
not  included  in  the  original  thirteen,  where  all  public  grants  of 
land  to  individuals  are  comparatively  recent,  it  is  customary  to 
carry  the  title  back  to  its  emanation  from  the  government.  It 
sometimes  becomes  important  to  extend  the  examination  back  to 
the  time  when  the  government  parted  with  the  equitable  title,  al- 
though a  patent  from  the  government  usually  constitutes  the  first 
link  in  the  chain  of  title.  If,  for  any  reason,  it  is  deemed  neces- 
sary to  state  the  inceptive  steps  leading  up  to  the  patent,  the  ab- 
stracter must  confine  his  inquiry  to  the  particular  method  em- 
ployed by  the  government  in  making  disposition  of  lands  of 
which  the  tract  to  be  abstracted  is  a  part.  In  a  former  section 
we  detailed  the  procedure  for  acquiring  public  land  by  private 
entry.  Certain  instruments  of  writing  in  respect  to  the  particular 
tract  of  public  land  sought  to  be  obtained  from  the  government 
resulted  from  this  procedure.  The  first  of  these  was  the  appli- 
cant's written  memorandum.  This  was  followed  by  the  register's 
certificate  reciting  the  fact  that  the  tract  was  subject  to  private 
entry  at  a  certain  price.  Then  comes  the  receiver's  receipt  in 
duplicate  of  payment.  And  lastly  the  register's  certificate  of 
purchase.  The  register  of  the  local  land  office  was  the  proper 
custodian  of  all  these  instruments  except  one  of  the  receipts  of 
payment  and  the  certificate  of  purchase,  the  receipt  going  to  the 
applicant  and  the  certificate  to  the  general  land  office.  It  was 
upon  presentation  of  the  receipt  of  payment  and  the  approval  of 
the  certificate  of  purchase  that  the  patent  was  issued  to  the  ap- 
plicant.    All  the  acts  leading  up  to  the  issuance  of  the  patent 

96  Wisconsin  Central  R.  Co.  v.  For-  os  Smith  v.  Taylor,  82  Cal.  533,  23 

sythe,  159  U.  S.  46,  15  Sup.  Ct.  1020,  Pac.  217;  Heinsen  v.  Lamb,   117   111. 

40  L.  ed.  70.  549,  7  N.  E.  75 ;  Union  Safe  Deposit 

"7  Meyers   v.    Croft,    13    Wall.    (U.  Co.  v.  Chisholm,  33  111.  App.  647. 
S.)  291,  20  L.  ed.  562. 


§     195  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  214 

constitute  the  entry,  and  a  brief  recital  of  such  entry  should  form 
the  first  statement  of  the  abstract  of  every  title  having  its  origin 
in  j)rivate  entry,  and,  whenever  practicable,  this  statement  should 
be  followed  by  a  copy  of  the  receiver's  duplicate  certificate  of  pur- 
chase. The  order  of  the  statement  should  be:  (1)  A  descrip- 
tion of  the  land  by  the  proper  number  of  the  section  or  part 
thereof,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  the  township  and  range;  (2)  the 
name  of  the  entryman;  (3)  the  date  of  the  entry;  (4)  the  loca- 
tion of  the  local  land  office  where  entry  was  made,  and  (5)  the 
number  of  the  certificate  of  purchase.  In  case  there  has  been  a 
cancellation  of  the  original  entry  and  a  re-entry  made,  the  state- 
ment should  include  the  fact  of  such  cancellation  and  the  date  of 
the  re-entry  together  with  the  number  of  the  certificate  of  re- 
entry. In  making  the  entry  the  statute  under  which  it  is  made 
should  be  followed,  and  if  the  entryman  has  complied  with  all  the 
requirements  for  making  a  valid  entry  he  is  entitled  to  a  cer- 
tificate of  purchase,  and  has  an  equitable  interest  in  the  land, 
though  a  patent  has  not  been  issued  therefor.^^  This  entry  gives 
the  claimant  color  of  title  which  may  be  the  foundation  for  ac- 
quiring title  by  advance  possession.  If  it  is  deemed  proper  to 
show  the  entry  a  brief  note  of  the  facts  is  all  that  is  necessary, 
thus : 

The  North  West  quarter  of  Section  ten.  Township  twenty-five, 
North  of  Range  eight  East,  in  Grant  County,  Indiana,  was  en- 
tered by  Franklin  Thompson,  March  25th,  1836,  at  the  United 
States  Land  Office  at  Ft.  Wayne,  Indiana.    Certificate  No.  640. 

§  195.  Receipts,  certificates,  etc.,  issued  by  register  or  re- 
ceiver,— A  receipt  from  the  receiver  of  the  local  land  office, 
showing  the  payment  of  the  purchase-price  of  lands,  is  evidence 
of  an  equitable  title  in  the  holder  thereof,^  and  in  many  cases  it 
has  been  accorded  a  dignity  and  effect  equal  to  that  of  a  patent. 
While  the  latter  instrument  passes  the  legal  title  to  the  land,  the 
receipt  has  the  effect  to  prevent  the  government  from  making  a 
subsequent  valid  sale  of  the  land.  This  receipt  is  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  law  has  been  complied  with  in  making  the  entry, ^ 
and  has  been  held  to  give  a  title  good  as  against  all  the  world  ex- 

09  Wilson  V.  Byers,  11  111.  76.  La.   155 ;   Bigelow  v.   Blake,   18  Wis. 

^  Godding  V.    Deker,   3   Colo.   App.  520. 

198,  32  Pac.  832 ;  Doe  v.  Stephenson,  2  Whittaker  v.  Pendola,  78  Cal.  296, 

9   Ind.   144 ;   Newport  v.   Cooper,   10  20  Pac.  680. 


I 


215  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    196 

cept  the  United  States.^  Upon  the  question  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
certificate  of  purchase  or  the  receipt  of  payment  of  the  purchase- 
price,  there  is  a  conflict  in  the  cases.  The  state  courts  generally 
hold  that  the  instrument  gives  the  holder  a  sufficient  legal  title 
to  enable  him  to  maintain  ejectment;*  while  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  has  held  that  a  patent  is  necessary  to  pass  the 
title. ^  The  receiver's  final  receipt  is  an  acknowledgment  by  the 
government  that  it  has  received  full  pay  for  the  land  and  that  it 
holds  the  legal  title  in  trust  for  the  entryman.''  When  the  entry- 
man  has  paid  for  the  land  and  taken  the  receiver's  receipt,  he 
thereby  became  the  equitable  owner  of  the  land,  and  thereafter 
the  government  has  no  right  or  power  to  sell  it  or  to  hold  it  open 
to  pre-emption  by  another.^  The  absence  of  any  record  in  the 
local  land  office  showing  payment,  does  not  overcome  the  evidence 
of  title  afforded  by  the  register's  receipt.^  The  initial  statement 
of  the  abstract  should  show  to  whom  the  receipt  was  issued,  its 
number,  date  of  issue,  place  where  recorded,  volume  and  page  of 
record,  together  with  the  fact  of  the  receiver's  acknowledgment 
of  payment  of  a  specified  sum  of  money  for  a  tract  of  land  lo- 
cated in  a  designated  land  district.  The  receiver's  receipt  may 
be  shown  as  follows  : 

Receiver's  Receipt  No.  7886. 

Dated  Aug.  30th,  1886. 

Filed   Sept.    10th,    1886,   at    1 

p.  M. 

Recorded  in    Book    3   Deeds, 

page  193. 
Consideration,  $200.00. 


United  States 

to 
John  Lippert. 


Covering  the  N.  W.  quarter  of  Sec.  32,  Tp.  128,  Range  70 
West  of  the  5th  Principal  Meridian  in  Kingsbury  County,  South 
Dakota. 

The  proper  location  for  the  above  statement  is  immediately 
after  the  note  of  entry, 

§  196.  Pre-emption. — W^e  have  discussed  the  mode  of  dis- 
posing of  pubHc  lands  during  the  early  stages  of  our  land  sys- 

3  Cox  V.  Easter,  1  Port.  (Ala.)  130.        e  Caldwell  v.  Bush,  6  Wyo.  342,  45 

4  Bates  V.  Herron,     35     Ala.     117;     Pac.  488. 

Moore  v.  Coulter.  31   Ga.  278 ;   Car-  7  Cornelius  v.  Kissel,  128  U.  S.  457, 

man  v.  Johnson,  29  Mo.  84.  9  Sup.  Ct.  122,  32  L.  ed.  482. 

5  Niles  V.  Cedar  Point  Club,  175  U.  »  Witcher  v.  Conklin,  84  Cal.  499, 
S.  300,  20  Sup.  Ct.  124,  44  L.  ed.  171.  24  Pac.  302. 


§     196  TITLES    AND    AI5STRACTS  216 

tern,  and  referred  to  the  injustice  to  actual  settlers  resulting  from 
sales  at  public  auction  and  private  entry.  It  was  to  correct  this 
evil  that  the  government  early  adopted  the  mode  of  disposition 
known  as  "pre-emption."  By  this  mode  persons  possessed  of  par- 
ticular qualifications,  who  have  settled  on  and  improved  public 
lands,  were  given  the  right  to  a  pre-emption  or  preference^  in 
purchasing  the  same  when  they  are  offered  for  sale  by  the  gov- 
ernment. Under  the  provisions  of  the  pre-emption  laws  large 
portions  of  the  public  domain  have  been  taken  up.^°  To  create  a 
right  of  pre-emption  it  was  necessary  that  there  be  settlement, 
inhabitation  and  improvement  by  the  pre-emptor — conditions 
which  can  not  be  met  when  the  land  is  in  the  occupation  of  an- 
other.^^  The  law  required  a  residence  both  continuous  and  per- 
sonal. The  settler  was  excused  for  temix)rary  absence  caused  by 
well-founded  apprehensions  of  violence,  by  sickness,  by  the  pres- 
ence of  an  epidemic,  by  judicial  compulsion,  or  by  an  engagement 
in  the  military  or  naval  service. ^^ 

The  pre-emption  laws  provided  that  any  adult  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  or  a  head  of  a  family,  might  gain  the  first  right  to 
purchase  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  or  less,  by  actually  settling 
thereon,  and  inhabiting  and  improving  it,  and  erecting  on  it  a 
dwelling-house.  He  was  required  to  make  his  entry,  his  declara- 
tion entered  on  the  books  of  the  land  commissioner  of  his  intent 
to  purchase,  within  thirty  days  after  commencing  such  occupa- 
tion, and  his  payment  of  the  purchase-price  within  twelve  months 
thereafter.  He  w-as  also  required  to  establish  his  right  to  pre- 
emption, proving,  among  other  things,  that  he  did  not  own  more 
than  one-half  section  of  land  in  any  other  state  or  territory 
and  had  not  abandoned  any  other  home  in  the  state  or  territory 
where  the  pre-empted  land  lay.  Having  done  these  things,  and 
obtained  a  certificate  thereof  from  the  land  commissioner,  he  was 
deemed  to  hold  a  personal  right  to  acquire  the  legal  title  to  the 
land.^^ 

The  term  "bona  fide,"  as  applied  to  a  pre-emption  claimant, 

« Shields     V.     Walker,     2      Overt.  ^^  u.    S.    Rev.    Stat.    §§    2257-2288; 

(Tenn.)    118n.  Whitney  v.  Taylor,   158  U.  S.  85,  15 

10  Meyers  v.  Croft,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.)  Sup.  Ct.  796.  39  L.  ed.  906;  Tarpey  v. 
291.  20  L.  ed.  562.  Madsen,   178  U.   S.  215,  20  Sup.  Ct. 

11  Hosmer  v.  Wallace,  97  U.  S.  575,  849,  44  L.  ed.  1042 ;  Bogan  v.  Edin- 
24  L.  ed.  1130.  l)urg    American    Land    Mfg.    Co.,   63 

i2Bohall  V.  Dilla,  114  U.  S.  47,  5    Fed.  192,  11  C.  C.  A.  128. 
Sup.  Ct.  782,  29  L.  ed.  61. 


217  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §     197 

was  intended  to  designate  one  who  had  settled  upon  land  subject 
to  pre-emption,  with  the  intention  to  acquire  the  title  thereto,  and 
had  complied,  or  was  proceeding  to  comply,  in  good  faith,  with 
the  requirements  of  the  law  to  perfect  his  right  to  it."  He  is  then 
entitled  to  a  certificate  of  entry  from  the  local  land  officer,  and, 
ultimately,  to  a  patent  to  the  lands  from  the  government/^  A  set- 
tlement made  on  the  land  by  another  person,  who  cultivated  it  for 
the  proprietor,  was  sufficient  to  constitute  "an  actual  settlement," 
though  the  proprietor  did  not  reside  in  person  on  the  estate  or 
within  the  territory.'"  But  no  right  of  pre-emption  could  be 
established  by  settlement  and  improvement  on  public  lands,  where 
the  claimant  forcibly  intruded  upon  the  possession  of  one  who  had 
already  settled  upon,  improved  and  enclosed  the  same  land." 
Such  an  intrusion,  although  made  under  the  pretense  of  pre- 
empting the  land,  was  deemed  a  naked,  unlawful  trespass,  and 
could  not  initiate  a  right  of  pre-emption.'^ 

The  basis  of  the  pre-emptor's  right  consisted  in  his  settlement 
upon,  cultivation,  and  improvement  of  the  land,  and  this  gave  him 
the  first  opportunity  of  purchasing  the  tract  at  the  minimum  price 
fixed  by  the  government,  when  it  became  subject  to  sale." 

The  early  pre-emption  acts  applied  only  to  the  lands  that  had 
been  surveyed,  but  the  later  acts  permitted  pre-emption  of  unsur- 
veyed  lands.'"  By  the  Act  of  Congress  of  March  3,  1891,  all 
the  then  existing  pre-emption  laws  were  repealed,  except  a  few 
sections. '' 

Where  the  title  to  a  particular  tract  has  its  inception  under  the 
pre-emption  laws,  the  various  steps  taken  before  entry  are  un- 
important, and  shed  no  light  on  the  title  after  issue  of  the  certifi- 
cate. Hence  the  abstract  should  begin  with  a  brief  note  of  the 
entry,  as  shown  in  a  previous  section. 

§  197.     Pre-emptor's  right  or  title. — The  pre-emptor  for- 


14  Hosmer  v.  Wallace,  97  U.  S.  575,  802 ;    Megerle    v.    Ashe.    33    Cal.    74 ; 
24  L.  ed.  1130.  Byrne  v.  Morehouse.  22  111.  611 ;  Bow- 

15  Hutchings  v.  Low,  15  Wall.   (U.  ers  v.  Keesecker,  14  Iowa  301 ;  Ems- 
S.)  77,  21  L.  ed.  82.  lie  v.  Young,  24  Kans.  732;  Camp  v. 

isHickie  V.  Starke,  1  Pet.   (U.  S.)  Smith.     2     Minn.      (Gil.     131)      155: 

94,  7  L.  ed.  67.  Franklin  v.  Kellev,  2  Nebr.  79 ;  Garcia 

17  Trenouth   v.    San   Francisco,    100  v.  Callender,  125  N.  Y.  307,  26  N.  E. 
U.  S.  251,  25  L.  ed.  626.  283;  Dillingham  v.  Fisher,  5  Wis.  475. 

18  Atherton  v.  Fowler,  96  U.  S.  513,  20  12  Stat,  at  L.  §  457. 

24  L.  ed.  732.  2126  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  1097. 

19  Doe  V.  Beck,  108  Ala.  71,  19  So. 


§     198  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  218 

merly  had  no  transferable  right  prior  to  the  issuing  of  the  patcnt.^^ 
The  right  thus  acquired  by  the  settler  was  not  a  title'^  nor  a  com- 
mon-law estate, -■'  nor  was  it  an  interest  in  the  land  or  the  legal  title 
thereto.-^  It  was  not  even  an  option  to  purchase  the  land,  for  the 
government  w-as  under  no  obligation  to  sell  to  the  settler  at  any 
time.^"*  It  was  merely  a  right  of  occupancy  with  preference  as  to 
purchasing  when  the  government  should  elect  to  sell."  The  legal 
title  could  be  obtained  thereafter  by  means  of  a  patent. 

Where  a  party  obtains  a  certificate  of  entry  at  a  public  land 
office,  he  obtains  an  imperfect  title,  but  upon  which,  it  has  been 
held,  he  can  maintain  an  action  of  ejectment  against  any  person 
not  having  a  better  title. ^'^  A  pre-emptive  right  descended  to  the 
heirs  of  the  settler;  but  could  not  be  assigned  against  the  govern- 
ment, nor  reached  on  execution.^^  But  the  holder  of  a  pre-emp- 
tion certificate  which  has  been  issued  by  the  United  States,  en- 
tered, and  paid  for  by  him,  has,  previous  to  a  patent,  such  an 
equitable  estate  in  the  land  as  will  subject  it  to  sale  under  execu- 
tion by  the  statutes  of  lowa."^*^ 

§  198.  Contracts  and  conveyances  before  entry. — By  the 
Act  of  1834  the  pre-emption  rights  of  settlers  on  public  lands 
were  permitted  to  be  assigned,  and  the  assignment  passed  an 
equitable  title. ^'  But  by  the  Act  of  1841  the  sale  of  pre-emptive 
rights  to  public  lands  acquired  by  settlement  and  improvement 
were  forbidden. "^^  It  was  the  policy  of  congress  in  enacting  the 
pre-emption  laws  to  confine  the  benefits  of  those  laws  to  actual 
settlers  upon  the  public  lands  and  to  prohibit  all  contracts  and 
understandings  entered  into  prior  to  the  issuing  of  the  final  cer- 
tificates of  entry,  by  which  the  benefit  of  the  entry  would  inure 
directly  or  indirectly  to  any  third  party.  All  assignments  and 
transfers  of  the  pre-emption  right  are  declared  to  be  null  and  void, 
and  it  is  provided  that  any  person  claiming  the  benefit  of  such  pre- 

22  Arbour  v.  Nettles,  12  La.  Ann.  28  Callahan  v.  Davis,  90  Mo.  78,  2 
217;    Glenn   v.   Thistle.  23   Miss.  42;     S.  W.  216. 

Paulding  V.  Grimslev,  10  Mo.  210.  29  Myers  v.  Croft,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

23  Grand  Gulf  R  &c.  Co.  v.  Bryan,  291,  20  L.  ed.  562;  Bernier  v.  Bernier, 
8  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  234.  147  U.  S.  243,  13  Sup.  Ct.  244,  Zl  L. 

2iWittenbrock     v.     Wheadon,     128  ed.   152. 

Cal.  150,  60  Pac.  664.  79  Am.  St.  32.  so  Levi  v.  Thompson,  4  How.    (U. 

25Delaunay  v.    Burnett,  9  111.  454.  S.)   17,  11  L.  ed.  856. 

28  Doe  V.  Beck,  108  Ala.  71,  19  So.  ^i  Marks  v.   Dickson  20  How.    (U. 

802.  S.)   501.  15  L.  ed.  1002, 

27  Brown  v.  Throckmorton,   11.  111.  32  Qujnby  v.  Conlan,  104  U.  S.  420, 

529.  26  L.  ed.  800. 


219  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §     199 

emption,  before  he  shall  be  allowed  to  enter  the  lands  pre-empted, 
shall  make  oath  before  the  registrar  or  receiver  of  the  land  dis- 
trict in  which  the  land  is  situated,  stating,  among  other  things, 
that  he  has  not  settled  upon  and  improved  such  land  to  sell  the 
same  on  speculation,  but  in  good  faith  to  appropriate  it  to  his 
own  exclusive  use,  and  that  he  has  not  directly  or  indirectly  made 
any  agreement  or  contract  in  any  way  or  manner  with  any  person 
whatever,  by  w^hich  the  title  which  he  may  acquire  from  the 
government  of  the  United  States  shall  inure,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
to  the  benefit  of  any  person  other  than  himself.^''  But  this  did 
not  prevent  the  pre-emptor  from  selling  his  land  after  the  entry.^* 
The  provision  of  the  Act  of  1841,  rendering  null  and  void  all 
assignments  and  transfers  of  pre-emption  rights,  has  been  held 
to  apply  only  to  the  preference  right  to  purchase  at  a  minimum 
price,^^  and  did  not  preclude  the  pre-emptor  from  selling  or  other- 
wise disposing  of  the  land  after  the  entry  had  been  made.^®  So 
under  the  act  last  referred  to,  pre-emptors,  who  have  proved  up 
their  claims,  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  government  as  other 
purchasers, ^^  and  their  grantees  become  beneficiaries  under  the 
patent  though  issued  to  the  pre-emptors.^®  But  contracts  made  by 
actual  settlers  of  the  public  lands,  concerning  their  possessory 
rights  and  the  title  to  be  acquired  in  future  from  the  United 
States,  are  valid  as  between  the  parties  to  the  contract,  except  in 
cases  where  congress  has  imposed  restrictions  on  such  contracts.^^ 
In  this  connection  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  government 
has  the  power  to  annul  all  entries  of  public  lands  at  any  time  be- 
fore patent  issues,  and  a  purchaser  from  a  pre-emption  entryman 
assumes  the  risk  attendant  upon  an  exercise  of  this  power/" 

§  199.  Graduation  acts. — In  1854  congress  passed  an  act 
providing  for  a  scale  of  prices  for  public  lands  which  had  been 
on  the  market  for  ten  years  and  upward.*^  From  the  time  of  the 
enactment  of  this  statute  until  its  repeal  in  1862  large  quantities 

33  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  §§  2262,  2263;  37  Cady  v.  Eaghmey,  54  Iowa  615,  7 
Close  V.   Stuvvesant.   132  111.  607,  24     N.  W.  102. 

N.  E.  868.  3"L.  R.  A.  161.  ss  Camp    v.    Smith,    2    Minn.    (Gil. 

34  Myers  v.  Croft,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.)     131)  155. 

291,  20  L.  ed.  562.  so  Davenport    v.    Lamb.    13    Wall. 

35  Meyers  v.  Croft,  13  W^all.  (U.  S.)      (U.  S.)  418,  20  L.  ed.  655. 

291,  20  L.  ed.  562.  4o  Taylor  v.  Weston,  11  Cal.  534,  20 

36  Robbins  v.  Bunn,  54  111.  48,  5  Pac.  62 ;  Guidry  v.  Woods,  19  La.  334, 
Am.  Rep.  75.  36  Am.  Dec.  677. 

41 10  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  574. 


§    200  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  220 

of  land  were  disposed  of  under  its  provisions.  The  purpose  of  the 
act  was  to  aid  the  pre-emption  law  which  it  closely  resembled  in 
its  essential  features.  The  price  of  public  lands  under  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act  ranged  from  twelve  and  one-half  cents  to  one 
dollar  per  acre,  which  could  be  paid  in  cash.  The  rights  conferred 
by  this  act  were  strictly  personal,  and  were  based  on  actual  settle- 
ment and  cultivation,  made  or  to  be  made.  The  rights  acquired 
were  not  assignable,  and  the  patents  w^ere  issued  to  the  original 
purchaser  only.  The  procedure  for  acquiring  title  under  this 
act  was  substantially  the  same  as  that  for  acquiring  title  under 
the  pre-emption  laws,  differing  only  in  minor  details.  Where 
patents  have  not  been  issued  on  entries  made  under  this  act  owning 
to  the  lack  of  the  required  proof  of  settlement  and  cultivation, 
the  confirmatory  Act  of  1857  permits  the  delivery  of  patents  on 
application  therefor,  without  such  proof,  where  the  entry  was 
allowed  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  latter  act.  In  the  prepara- 
tion of  an  abstract  for  land  acquired  under  this  act  it  is  neither 
customary  nor  necessary  to  incorporate  the  proceedings  prior  to 
entry  which  is  the  first  material  stage. 

§  200.  Homestead  and  free  grants. — The  principal  mode 
by  which  individuals  now  obtain  title  to  public  lands  is  under 
homestead  laws,  the  first  of  which  was  enacted  in  1862.*^  The 
provisions  of  the  federal  statutes  with  regard  to  homesteads  are 
in  many  respects  similar  to  those  in  regard  to  pre-emption.  In 
obtaining  title  to  public  land  under  these  laws  a  settler  who  pos- 
sesses certain  qualifications,  goes  through  certain  formalities,  oc- 
cupies and  improves  a  particular  tract  of  public  land_  for  a  speci- 
fic time,  and  at  the  expiration  of  such  time  a  patent  for  the  land 
issues  from  the  government  to  the  settler  without  any  charge  save 
the  payment  of  certain  fees  to  the  land  officers.  A  homestead 
entry  is  the  initial  step  taken  in  the  land  office  toward  "acquiring 
ownership  under  the  homestead  law,  and  precedes  the  perform- 
ance on  the  part  of  a  homestead  claimant  of  the  conditions  of  resi- 
dence upon  and  improvement  of  land  which  constitutes  the  real 
consideration  for  the  transfer  of  the  title  and  which  are  condi- 
tions precedent  to  the  vesting  of  title  in  the  homestead  settler.'*' 
Under  the  homestead  laws  three  things  must  be  done  in  order  to 
constitute  an  entry  on  the  land  :     ( 1 )  The  applicant  must  make 

42  12  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  392.  '  43  McCune  v.   Essig,   118   Fed.  273. 


221  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    200 

affidavit  setting  forth  the  facts  which  entitle  him  to  make  such 
entry;  (2)  he  must  make  formal  application;  and  (3)  he  must 
make  payment  of  the  money  required.  When  these  three  req- 
uisites are  comphed  with,  and  the  certificate  of  entry  is  executed 
and  delivered  to  him,"  the  entry  is  complete ;  the  land  is  entered. 
If  either  one  of  these  integral  parts  of  an  entry  is  defective,  the 
register  and  receiver  are  justified  in  rejecting  the  application.** 
The  homestead  laws  authorize  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  or 
one  who  has  declared  his  intention  of  becoming  a  citizen,  who 
is  an  adult  or  the  head  of  a  family,  or  being  under  age  has  served 
in  the  army  or  navy  of  the  United  States  in  case  of  war  for  not 
less  than  fourteen  days,  and  who  does  not  own  as  much  as  one 
hundred  and  sixty  acres  of  land  in  any  state  or  territory,  and  who 
has  not  previously  exercised  a  homestead  right  under  the  fed- 
eral law,  to  take  possession  of  not  more  than  one  hundred  and 
sixty  acres,  and  in  good  faith  to  occupy  and  cultivate  it  for  five 
years,  and  thereby  to  obtain  a  right  to  acquire  it  from  the  gov- 
ernment without  any  payment  other  than  the  fees  of  the  land 
office.*' 

To  acquire  a  valid  right  under  the  homestead  law,  the  settler 
must  actually  occupy  the  land  in  absolute  good  faith  with  the  in- 
tention of  permanently  residing  thereon.**^  Such  occupation  must 
be  evidenced  by  those  things  which  are  essential  to  its  beneficial 
use.*^  A  physical  presence  of  the  settler  on  public  lands  at  all 
times  is,  however,  not  necessary  to  constitute  legal  possession,*^ 
nor  need  the  settler  himself  construct  the  improvements  required 
by  law.*^  A  valid  right  to  public  lands  can  be  initiated  only  by 
persons  qualified^"  after  compliance  with  all  legal  requirements.'^ 
A  homestead  right  may  be  initiated  by  actual  bona  fide  settlement 
on  the  land  or  by  entry  at  the  local  land  office,'^  and  a  homestead 
entry,  valid  on  its  face,  segregates  land  from  the  public  domain 
until  canceled  or  forfeited.'^  Where  the  title  has  its  inception  un- 
der the  homestead  laws  the  abstract  should  contain  a  statement  of 

4*  Hastings  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitney,  *^  Trodick  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 

132  U.  S.  357,  10  Sup.  Ct.  112,  33  L.  164  Fed.  913. 

ed.  363.  ^0  Call  v.  Los  Angeles  Pac.  Co.,  162 

4!^  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  §§  2289,  2302.  Fed.  926. 

4«Whaley   v.    Northern    Pacific    R.  si  Ayres  v.  United  States,  42  Ct.  CI 

Co.,  167  Fed.  664.  (U.  S.)  385. 

47  Gordon  v.  Ross-Higgins  Co.,  162  ^2  Holt  v.  Classen,  19  Okla.  131,  91 

Fed.  637.  Pac.  866. 

4SNeal  V.  Kayser,  12  Ariz.  118,  100  ■"•s  McMichael  v.  Murphy,   12  Okla. 

Pac.  439.  155,  70  Pac.  189. 


§    201  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  222 

all  proceedings  had  during  the  interval  between  entry  and  issue 
of  the  certificate.  The  data  for  such  statement  can  be  procured 
from  a  transcript  of  the  register's  tract  book. 

§  201.  Nature  of  rights  acquired  by  homesteader. — When 
the  preliminary  entry  is  made  the  right  of  possession  is  conferred 
on  the  entryman/'*  although  the  legal  title  does  not  pass  from  the 
government  until  the  issuance  of  a  patent.'^'  The  receiver's  re- 
ceipt issued  to  a  homestead  entryman  in  possession  gives  such 
title  to  the  entryman  as  to  enable  him  to  maintain  or  defeat  a 
suit  concerning  the  land.''*^  But  the  holder  of  a  certificate  of 
entry  in  possession  of  the  land  can  not  defend  against  ejectment 
brought  by  the  grantee  in  fee  of  the  government,  whether  such 
grantee's  patent  was  issued  before  or  after  the  issuance  of  the 
certificate.^^  No  right  can  be  acquired  by  one  person  who  enters 
upon  land  for  the  purpose  of  taking  it  as  a  homestead,  while  it  is 
in  the  actual  possession  of  another,  during  the  latter's  temporary 
absence. ^^  A  person  entering  a  homestead  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  acquires  a  vested  right  therein  at  the  expiration  of 
five  years  from  entry,  but  no  estate  in  the  land  vests  in  him  until 
he  has  complied  with  the  required  conditions. ^^  A  settler  who 
has  entered  public  land,  has,  from  such  entry,  an  inchoate  title, 
which  is,  in  a  legal  sense,  property  and  subject  to  be  defeated  only 
by  his  failure  to  comply  with  the  conditions  imposed  by  law.*^**  A 
homestead  entry,  so  long  as  it  remains  a  subsisting  entry,  pre- 
cludes a  subsequent  entry. ''^  The  mere  application  for  a  home- 
stead entry  on  government  land  vests  no  right  in  such  applicant 
when  such  application  is  denied.*^" 

§  202.  Donations  and  bounty  lands. — Congress  has  from 
time  to  time  passed  what  are  known  as  "Donation  Acts,"  which 
were  designed  to  induce  settlements  on  isolated  portions  of  the 

=4  Stearns  v.  United  States,  152  Fed.  Pac.  475;  Lovell  v.  Wall,  31  Fla.  75 

900,  82  C.  C.  A.  48;  Tiernan  v.  Miller,  12  So.  659;  Newkirk  v.  Marshall,  35 

69  Nebr.  764,  96  N.  W.  661.  Kans.   77,    10    Pac.    571  ;    Coleman   v. 

"Thompson    v.    Easier,     148     Cal.  McCormick,   27    Mo.    179,   3Z    N.   W. 

646,  84  Pac.  161,  113  Am.  St.  321.  556. 

^'^  Case  V.  Edgeworth,  87  Ala.  203,  co  Culhertson   Irr.  &  Water   Power 

5  So.  783.  Co.  V.  Olander,  51   Nebr.  539,  71   N. 

"  Lowery  v.   Baker,    141    Ala.  600,  W.  298. 

Z7  So.  637.  «i  Holt  v.  Murphy,   15  Okla.  12,  79 

^8  Rourke  v.  McNally,  98  Cal.  291,  Pac.  275. 

Z2,  Pac.  62.  (-^  Baldwin  v.   Keith,   13   Okla.  624, 

="  Thrift  V.  Delaney,  69  Cal.  188,  -10  75  Pac.  1124. 


223  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    202 

public  domain.  Such  acts  were  local  in  character  as  well  as 
limited  in  duration.  Among  the  first  of  these  acts  was  one 
passed  in  1842,  which  applied  to  certain  public  lands  in  the  penin- 
sula of  Florida.*'"  By  the  provisions  of  this  act  any  person,  able 
to  bear  arms,  was  given  a  quarter  section  of  such  land  if  he  be- 
came an  actual  settler  thereon. 

The  act  known  as  the  "Oregon  Donation  Act,"  passed  in  1850, 
gave  to  every  white  settler  upon  public  land  within  a  specified 
district  a  half  section  if  a  single  man,  and  an  entire  section  if 
married.'^*  This  act  embraced  all  the  public  lands  of  the  territory 
of  Oregon  lying  east  and  west  of  the  Cascade  mountains,  and  in 
1853  the  terms  of  the  act  were  extended  so  as  to  include  the 
public  lands  of  the  territory  of  Washington.  The  early  decisions 
of  the  courts  of  Oregon  and  the  inferior  federal  courts  held  that 
the  act  was  a  grant  in  praesenti  and  vested  in  the  settler  an  estate 
in  fee  from  the  filing  of  his  notification,  subject  to  be  defeated 
by  his  failure  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  the  act.^^  But  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  that  the  grant  did  not 
take  effect  so  as  to  pass  anything  more  than  a  possessory  right 
in  the  land  occupied  until  the  completion  of  the  four  years'  rebi- 
dence  and  cultivation  and  full  compliance  with  all  the  other  re- 
quirements of  the  act.''*'  The  act  required  for  the  completion 
of  the  settler's  right  to  a  patent  not  only  that  he  should  reside 
upon  the  land  and  cultivate  it  for  four  years  but  that  he  should 
give  notice  to  the  surveyor-general  of  the  precise  land  claimed; 
such  notice  was,  by  the  Amendatory  Act  of  1853,  required  to 
be  given  in  advance  of  the  public  survey."  Upon  full  compliance 
by  the  settler  with  the  conditions  of  the  act,  his  right  became 
vested  and  passed  beyond  the  control  of  congress."^  A  married 
woman  was  entitled  to  take  under  this  act,  not  as  a  settler,  but 
on  account  of  her  wifeship,"^  but  her  share  of  land  under  the  act 
was  not  a  separate  estate  in  her,  for,  by  the  existing  laws  of 
Oregon,  her  estate  in  the  premises  for  their  joint  lives  was  cast 
upon  the  husband.^*'  The  act  contained  a  provision  rendering 
void  all  contracts  for  the  sale  of  conveyance  of  the  land  before 

63  5  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  502.  "  Brazee    v.    Scliofield,    124    U.    S. 

«*9  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  496.  495.  8  Sup.  Ct.  604,  31  L.  ed.  484. 

65  Adams  v.  Burke.  3  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  "^  Stark  v.  Starrs,  6  Wall.   (U.  S.) 

415.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  49 ;  Love  v.  Love,  413.  18  L.  ed.  925. 

8  Ore.  23.  "■'  Ford  v.  Kennedy,  1  Ore.  166. 

«6Hall  v.  Russell,  101  U.  S.  503,  25  '«  Wythe  v.  Smith.  4  Sawy.  (U.  S.) 

L.  ed.  829.  17,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  18122. 


§  202  •   TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  224 

the  settler  obtained  a  patent  therefor,  but  this  provision  was  re- 
pealed by  the  Act  of  1855  permitting  the  settler  to  make  sale 
after  he  had  resided  for  four  years  upon  the  land/^ 

In  1854  congress  passed  an  act  similar  to  the  one  just  dis- 
cussed, but  applying  to  public  lands  in  the  territory  of  New- 
Mexico.''  Only  male  persons  then  residing  in  the  territory,  or 
who  should  remove  there  prior  to  1858,  could  obtain  land  under 
this  act. 

In  1815  congress  passed  the  New  Madrid  Act  which  provided 
for  the  relief  of  landowners  in  New  Madrid  County,  Mo.,  whose 
lands  had  been  injured  by  earthquakes.  By  its  provisions  such 
persons  were  authorized  to  locate  a  like  quantity  of  land  on  any 
of  the  puljlic  domain  of  said  territory  in  lieu  of  the  injured 
lands."''  This  act  was  not  a  direct  grant  of  land,  but  merely  an 
offer  on  the  part  of  the  government  to  exchange  its  land  for  that 
which  had  been  injured,^*  and  when  the  exchange  was  effected  the 
injured  lands  reverted  to  the  federal  government.  Such  exchange 
was  etYected  by  the  recorder  of  land  titles  issuing  to  the  claimant 
upon  proof  of  his  ownership  of  injured  land  a  certificate  showing 
his  right  to  locate;  whereupon  the  deputy-surveyor  made  a  loca- 
tion of  the  land  applied  for,  and  returned  to  the  recorder  a  plat 
of  the  survey  and  a  notice  in  writing,  designating  the  tract  located 
and  the  name  of  the  claimant.  This  return  was  recorded  by  the 
recorder,  who  transmitted  to  the  general  land  ofSce  a  report  of 
the  claims  allowed,  and  issued  to  the  claimant  a  certiiicate  showing 
his  right  to  a  patent,  the  certificate  on  being  surrendered  to  the 
commissioner  of  the  general  land  office  entitled  the  clamiant  to 
take  the  patent."  The  locator  acquired  no  vested  intere.st  in  the 
land  located  until  the  survey  of  the  land  was  returned  and  re- 
corded in  the  recorder's  office,  at  which  time  the  locator  acquired 
equitable  title  to  the  land,  the  legal  title  remainmg  in  the  govern- 
ment until  issue  of  the  patents.^" 

In  1784  Virginia  ceded  to  the  United  States  her  territory 
northwest  of  the  Ohio  river,  reserving  the  right  to  supply  defi- 
ciencies in  grants  to  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  war  of  the  Revo- 
lution.    By  an  act  passed  in  1804  such  officers  and  soldiers  en- 

71  Barney  v.   Dolph,  97  U.    S.  652,  fr.  Hot  Springs  Cases.  92  U.  S.  698. 

24  L.  ed.  1063.  23  L.  ed.  690,  11  Ct.  CI.  238. 

-2  10  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  §  308.  7*'  Fenn  v.  Holme,  21  How.  (U.  S.) 

"3  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  211,  Ch.  45.  481,  16  L.  ed.  198. 
7*  Holme  V.  Strautman,  35  Mo.  293. 


1 


225  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    203 

titled  to  bounty  lands  in  Ohio  were  required  to  complete  their 
locations  within  three  years  and  to  make  a  return  of  their  sr.r^eys 
to  the  secretary  of  war  within  five  years  after  the  passage  of 
the  act." 

In  1782  congress  passed  what  has  been  called  "North  Carolina 
Grants,"  providing  for  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  that  state  who 
served  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution.  The  additional  homestead 
granted  to  Union  soldiers  by  the  federal  laws  is  not  in  the  nature 
of  an  application  under  the  homestead  laws,  but  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  bounty  extended  by  the  government  to  its  soldiers  in  the 
war  of  the  Rebellion. ^^ 

§  203.  Land  warrants  and  scrip. — Some  important  trans- 
fers of  title  to  public  lands  from  the  federal  government  to  in- 
dividuals have  taken  place,  in  compensation  for  services  in  the 
army  or  navy.  These  were  obtained,  as  prescribed  by  the 
statutes,  by  "warrants  for  bounty  lands;"  and  have  been  held 
by  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  United  States,  or  their  families,  by 
virtue  of  such  grants."  These  warrants  might  be  located  on  the 
public  lands  of  the  United  States  and  were  receivable  at  the  rate 
of  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  acre  in  full  or  part  pay- 
ment for  such  land  as  the  case  might  be.*°  The  holder  of  such 
warrants  had  an  absolute  right  to  locate  land  under  them,  and  to 
receive  a  patent  for  the  land  located.^^  Such  warrants  were  not 
canceled  nor  did  the  title  thereto  pass  from  the  locator  until  they 
were  accepted  in  payment  for  land  by  the  government.^^  Entry 
under  a  bounty  land  warrant  gave  to  the  entryman  an  equitable 
title  to  the  land,  the  legal  title  remaining  in  the  government  until 
the  issue  of  the  patent.^^  But  the  legal  as  well  as  the  equitable 
title  passes  from  the  federal  government  without  issuance  of 
patent,  if  the  congressional  grants  provide  that  the  title  shall  pass 
on  selection.^*  Bounty  land  warrants  were  regarded  as  lands, 
and  on  the  death  of  the  owner,  passed  to  his  heirs.^^  Previous  to 
the  cession  of  the  Northwest  Territory  to  the  United  States  by 
the  state  of  Virginia,  that  state  had  issued  to  its  Revolutionary 

"  2  U.  S.  Stat,  at  L.  274  §  2.  ^-  Johnson  v.  Gilfillan.  8  Minn.  395. 

78  United   States  v.  Lair,    118  Fed.  §3  Gray  v.  Jones.  14  Fed.  83,  4  Mc- 
98.  Crary   (U.  S.)   515;  Swisher  v.  Sen- 

79  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  §^  2414,  2446.  senderfer,  84  Mo.  104. 

80  Saunders  v.  Niswanger,  11  Ohio  «-i  Price  v.  Dennis,  159  Ala.  625,  49 
St.  298.  So.  248. 

81  Merrill  v.  Hartwell,  11  Mich.  200.  ^^=  Atwood  v.  Beck,  21  Ala.  590. 

15 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    204  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  226 

veterans  land  warrants  receivable  in  payment  of  any  land  owned 
by  the  state,  and  the  United  States  took  this  property  chargeable 
with  the  obligation  to  satisfy  the  holders  of  such  warrants  under 
acts  of  congress. 

There  has  also  been  issued  a  species  of  location  certificates 
known  as  "Indian  or  half-breed  scrip."  This  form  of  scrip  is 
not  transferrable  and  can  be  located  only  in  the  name  of  the 
person  to  whom  issued.  No  receipt  or  certificate  of  purchase  is 
issued  to  the  holder,  the  scrip  and  api)lication  being  the  muni- 
ments of  title  which  are  returned  to  the  general  land  office,  and 
the  certificate  of  the  commissioner  showing  the  location  of  the 
scrip  by  the  proper  party  is  competent  evidence  to  show  title  from 
the  government.^''  Likewise  the  states  have  enacted  laws  under 
which  land  warrants  or  scrip  have  been  issued,  entitling  the 
holders  to  locate  them  upon  the  public  lands  of  the  state  and  to 
receive  patents  for  such  lands.  Such  warrants  or  scrip  have  been 
held  to  be  assignable  either  in  whole  or  in  part."  Such  assign- 
ment may  be  made  by  indorsement  on  the  warrant  or  upon  a 
separate  paper.**^  The  owner  of  such  warrants  or  scrip  after  their 
location  may  convey  his  interest  in  the  land  so  located  before  a 
patent  is  issued. ^^ 

§  204.  Desert  land  entries. — In  1877  congress  passed 
what  is  known  as  the  "Desert  Land  Act,"  which  gives  to  any 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  or  any  person  of  requisite  age  who 
may  be  entitled  to  become  a  citizen,  and  has  filed  his  declaration 
to  become  such,  upon  payment  of  twenty-five  cents  per  acre,  to 
file  a  declaration  under  oath  with  the  register  and  receiver  of  the 
land  district  in  which  any  desert  land  is  situated  that  he  intends 
to  reclaim  a  tract  of  desert  land  not  exceeding  one  section,  by 
conducting  water  upon  the  same,  within  the  period  of  three  years 
thereafter.^"  At  any  time  within  the  designated  period  of  three 
years  after  filing  said  declaration,  and  upon  making  satisfactory 
proof  to  the  register  and  receiver  of  the  reclamation  of  the  tract, 
and  upon  the  payment  of  an  additional  sum  of  one  dollar  per 
acre,  the  claimant  becomes  entitled  to  a  patent.^^     Upon  entry 

86  Wilcox  V.  Jackson,  109  111.  261.         S.)   371,  3  L.  ed.  593;   Bludworth  v. 

87  Miller  V.  Texas  &c.  R.  Co.,  132  Lake,  35  Cal.  255 ;  Peevy  v.  Hurt,  32 
U.  S.  662,  10  Sup.  Ct.  206,  33  L.  ed.     Tex.  146. 

487.  =">U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  1548. 

88  McArthur  v.  Gallaher,  8  Ohio  '-'^  United  States  v.  Healy,  160  U.  S. 
512.  136,  16  Sup.  Ct.  247,  40  L.  ed.  369. 

89  Vowles  V.  Craig,  8   Cranch    (U. 


227  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    205 

and  the  payment  of  twenty-five  cents  per  acre  the  entryman  be- 
comes entitled  to  possession  of  the  land  entered  for  three  years 
from  the  date  of  his  entry.^^ 

The  occasion  on  which  the  desert  character  of  the  land  is  to  be 
ascertained  is  at  the  time  of  filing  the  declaration.  It  is  a  suffi- 
cient reclamation  to  entitle  the  entryman  to  a  patent  that  he  has 
acquired  the  right  to  sufficient  water  to  irrigate  the  land,  and  has 
constructed  main  ditches  sufficient  to  carry  it  over  the  accessible 
parts  of  the  tract,  for  purposes  of  cultivation  in  the  ordinary 
manner  though  he  has  not  actually  used  or  cultivated  the  land.^^ 
Upon  compliance  with  all  conditions  and  requirements  of  the  act 
the  entryman  became  vested  with  such  title  to  the  land  as  passed 
to  his  heirs  and  devisees  in  case  of  his  death  before  the  issuance 
of  the  patent.''*  The  Act  of  1877,  fixing  the  price  of  desert  lands 
at  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  acre,  has  been  held  not  to 
embrace  the  alternate  sections  reserved  by  congress  in  a  railroad 
land  grant,  but  their  price  is  fixed  at  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents 
per  acre  by  the  proviso  of  the  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  §  2357,  and  land 
entered  under  the  act  of  1877,  when  the  price  was  two  dollars  and 
fifty  cents  per  acre,  can  not  be  patented,  after  the  passage  of  the 
act  of  1891,  upon  paying  only  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per 
acre.^^ 

§  205.  Timber  and  stone  lands. — In  1878  congress  passed 
an  act  providing  that  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  may  pur- 
chase, under  certain  conditions,  lands  of  the  United  States  which 
are  valuable  chiefly  for  stone  or  timber  and  are  unfit  for  culti- 
vation, to  an  amount  not  exceeding  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres.^® 
By  the  provisions  of  this  statute  the  applicant  must  file  with  the 
register  of  the  proper  district  a  written  statement  in  duplicate, 
one  of  which  is  transmitted  to  the  general  land  office,  designating 
by  legal  subdivisions  the  particular  tract  of  land  he  desires  to 
purchase,  setting  forth  that  the  same  is  unfit  for  cultivation,  and 
chiefly  valuable  for  its  timber  or  stone;  that  the  tract  is  unin- 
habitated ;  that  he  has  made  no  other  application  under  the  act ; 
that  he  does  not  intend  to  purchase  the  same  for  speculation,  but 
in  good   faith  to  appropriate  it  to  his  own  exclusive  use  and 

»2Sallee  v.  Corder,  67  Cal.  174,  7  o*  Phillips  v.  Carter,  135  Cal.  604, 
Pac.  455.  67  Pac.  1031,  87  Am.  St.  152. 

«^  United  States  v.  Mackintosh,  85  '-'■'  United  States  v.  Healy,  160  U.  S. 
Fed.  333,  29  C.  C.  A.  176.  136,  16  Sup.  Ct.  247,  40  L.  ed.  369. 

i'^U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  p.  1545. 


§    206  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  228 

benefit;  and  that  lie  has  not  directl}'-  or  indirectly  made  any 
agreement  or  contract  in  any  way  or  manner  with  any  person  or 
persons  whatsoever,  by  which  the  title  which  he  might  acquire 
from  the  government  should  inure,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  the 
benefit  of  any  other  person  except  himself;  which  statement 
must  be  verified  by  the  oath  of  the  applicant  before  the  register 
or  receiver  of  the  land  office  within  the  district  where  the  land  is 
situated. °^  It  will  be  observed  that  the  statute  does  not  limit  the 
dominion  which  the  purchaser  has  over  the  land  after  it  is  pur- 
chased from  the  government  or  restrict  in  the  slightest  his  power 
of  alienation ;  but  that  it  only  prohibits  his  entering  the  land  under 
an  agreement  whereby  he  w^as  acting  for  another;  that  he  might 
make  a  valid  entry  of  the  land  though  with  the  view  of  disposing 
of  the  same  after  he  had  completed  the  purchase,  provided  that 
at  or  before  the  time  of  such  purchase  he  had  not  entered  into  an 
agreement  with  another,  whereby  such  other  should  receive  any 
of  the  benefit  of  such  purchase. ^"^  The  act  included  land  which 
had  not  been  ofifered  at  public  sale  according  to  law.^'"*  Persons 
entitled  to  purchase  under  this  act  must  be  citizens  of  the  United 
States  or  persons  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
such.^  The  minimum  price  for  which  such  land  could  be  sold 
was  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents  per  acre. 

The  filing  of  an  application  to  purchase  under  this  act  may 
initiate  a  right  to  purchase  as  against  a  subsequent  applicant  for 
the  same  privilege  but  the  mere  filing  of  such  application  confers 
upon  the  applicant  no  right  as  against  the  United  States,  and 
that,  until  the  applicant  has  acquired  a  vested  right  in  the  land,  it 
is  within  the  power  of  the  government  to  withdraw  it  from  sale 
or  make  any  other  disposition  of  it.^  But  upon  payment  by  the 
applicant  of  the  purchase-price,  and  the  delivery  of  the  certificate 
or  receipt  therefor,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  land  commissioner, 
on  receiving  the  papers  and  testimony  in  the  case  from  the  local 
land  office,  to  cause  a  patent  to  issue  to  the  purchaser.^ 

§  206.  Timber  culture  claims. — In  1878  congress  passed 
an  act  giving  to  every  person  over  twenty-one  years  of  age,  or 

»7  Olson  V.  United  States,  133  Fed.  ^  Lewis  v.  Shaw,  70  Fed.  289. 

849,  67  C.  C.  A.  21.  2  United  States  v.  Braddock,  50  Fed. 

»8  United  States  v.  Budd,  144  U.  S.  669. 

154.  12  Sup.  Ct.  575,  36  L.  ed.  384.  s  Montgomery  v.  United  States,  36 

90  United   States  v.   Budd,  43  Fed.  Fed.  4,  13  Sawy.  383. 
630. 


229  BEGINNING    OF   TITLE  §    207 

the  head  of  a  family,  and  who  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
or  had  declared  his  intention  to  become  such,  the  right  to  receive 
a  patent  for  public  land  to  be  acquired  by  the  planting  and  culture 
of  timber  thereon.*  The  applicant  was  required  to  make  affi- 
davit before  the  register  or  receiver,  or  the  clerk  of  some  court  of 
record,  or  officer  authorized  to  administer  oaths  in  the  district 
where  the  land  was  situated,  that  the  tract  of  land  which  he  de- 
sires to  enter  is  composed  exclusively  of  prairie  lands,  or  other 
lands  devoid  of  timber;  that  the  filing  an  entry  is  made  for  the 
cultivation  of  timber,  and  for  his  own  exclusive  use  and  benefit; 
that  he  has  made  the  application  in  good  faith,  and  not  for  the 
purpose  of  speculation,  or  directly  or  indirectly  for  the  use  or 
benefit  of  any  other  person  or  persons;  that  he  intends  to  hold 
and  cultivate  the  land,  and  to  fully  comply  with  the  provisions 
of  the  act;  and  that  he  has  not  previously  made  an  entry  under 
the  act.^  Before  the  entryman's  right  to  a  patent  accrued  he  had 
the  same  right  of  possession  as  any  other  entryman,"^  and  was  the 
owner  of  the  trees  standing  on  the  land,^  but  prior  to  the  time 
when  his  right  to  a  patent  accrued  the  entryman  had  no  vested 
right  in  the  land,  and  the  right  passed,  upon  his  death,  to  his 
heirs  as  grantees  from  the  government.^ 

The  applicant  for  land  under  this  act  was  not  required  to  reside 
on  the  land,  or  make  any  improvements  thereon  except  the  plant- 
ing and  cultivation  of  timber  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  act. 
At  the  expiration  of  eight  years  from  the  date  of  entry  a  patent 
may  issue  upon  final  proof  that  the  conditions  of  the  act  have  been 
fully  complied  with.  It  would  seem  that  the  act  does  not  prevent 
a  claimant,  who  has  made  his  entry  in  good  faith,  from  con- 
tracting to  sell  his  claim  prior  to  the  final  proof.^ 

§  207.  Swamp  land  grants. — In  1850  congress  passed 
what  is  known  as  the  "Swamp  Land  Act."^"  By  that  act  it  was 
provided  that  "to  enable  the  state  of  Arkansas  to  construct  the 
necessary  levees  and  drains  to  reclaim  the  swamp  and  overflowed 
lands  therein,  the  whole  of  these  swamps  and  overflowed  lands, 

4U.    S.   Rev.    Stat.    1878,    §§   2464,  7  Carner  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co..  43 

2468.  Minn.  375,  45  N.  W.  713. 

■"^Watkins    Land    Co.   v.    Creps,    72  «  Cooper  v.  Wilder,  111  Cal.  191,  43 

Kans.  333,  83  Pac.  %9.  Pac.  591.  52  Am.  St.  163. 

•'Braum    v.     Mathieson,    139    Iowa  '•'  Church  v.  Adams,  37  Ore.  355.  61 

409,  116  N.  W.  789.  Pac.  639. 

10  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2479. 


§    207  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  230 

made  unfit  thereby  for  cultivatiuii,  which  shall  remain  unsold  at 
the  passage  of  this  act,  shall  be  and  are  hereby  granted  to  said 
state."  The  fourth  section  declared  that  the  provisions  of  the 
act  should  be  extended  to,  and  their  benefits  conferred  on  each  of 
the  other  states  of  the  Union  in  which  such  swamp  or  overflowed 
lands  might  be  situated.  All  such  lands  selected  and  reported  to 
the  general  land  office  prior  to  March  3rd,  1857,  so  far  as  the 
same  remained  vacant  and  unappropriated,  and  not  interfered 
w'ith  by  actual  settlement  under  other  federal  land  laws,  were  con- 
firmed to  the  respective  states  by  a  subsequent  act."  The  land 
department  could  not  set  aside  these  selections,  because  they 
were  confirmed  by  this  act,  and  the  United  States  could  convey 
no  title  after  this  to  any  of  these  lands  unless  they  came  within 
the  exceptions  of  the  act  last  referred  to."  The  Act  of  1850  ap- 
propriated as  a  grant  in  praesenti  to  the  states  then  in  existence, 
of  all  the  swamp  lands  in  their  respective  jurisdictions;  but  the 
title  to  the  swamp  lands  within  a  territory  did  not  pass  out  of  the 
United  States  by  that  act.^^  By  this  act  the  title  to  all  lands 
determined  by  the  general  land  department  to  be  swamp  lands 
passed  to  the  state  as  of  the  date  the  act  took  effect.^*  The  act 
being  a  grant  in  praesenti,  the  title  to  such  lands  passed  at  once 
to  the  state  in  which  they  lay,"  but  the  determination  and  identity 
of  what  lands  were  and  what  lands  were  not  swamp  lands  was 
left  to  the  secretary  of  the  interior.^''  It  would  seem  that  the 
correct  rule  is  that  the  legal  title  passed  to  the  state  only  upon 
issuance  of  patent, ^^  although  it  has  been  frequently  asserted  that 
the  Swamp  Land  Act  followed  by  an  identification  of  the  land 
had  the  effect  to  pass  title  without  the  necessity  of  a  patent. ^^ 
Where  the  grant  to  the  state  is  on  condition,  a  purchaser  from 
the  state  takes  the  land  subject  to  such  condition.^''   Swamp  land 

"  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2484.  Pac.  361  ;    State  v.   Portsmouth   Sav. 

12  Martin   v.    Marks,  97  U.   S.  345,     Bank,  106  Ind.  435,  7  N.  E.  379. 

24  L.  ed.  940.  i"  Brown    v.   Hitchcock,    173   U.    S. 

13  Rice  V.  Sioux  Citv  &c.  R.  Co.,  110    473,   19  Sup.  Ct.  485,  43  L.  ed.  772; 
U.S.  695, 4  Sup.  Ct.  177.  28  L.  ed.  289.     Henry  v.   Brannan,   149  Ala.  323,  42 

1*  Diana     Shooting     Ckih     v.     La-  So.  995;    Schlosser  v.   Hemphill,    118 

moreux,  114  Wis.  44,  89  N.  W.  880,  Iowa  452,  90  N.  W.  842. 

91  Am.  St.  898.  is  Kernan    v.    Griffith,    27    Cal.    87; 

15  Kelly  V.  Cotton  Belt  Lumber  Co.,  Tolleston  Club  v.  State,  141  Ind.  197, 

74  Ark.  400,  86  S.  W.  436;  People  v.  38  N.  E.  214,  40  N.  E.  690. 

Warner,  116  Mich.  228,  74  N.  W.  705;  i"  Reclamation    Di.strict    No.    70    v. 

Simpson    v.    Stoddard    Co.,    173    Mo.  Sherman,   11  Cal.  App.  399,  105  Pac. 

421.  IZ  S.  W.  700.  277. 

icTubbs  V.  Wilhoit.  IZ  Cal.  61,  14 


231  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    208 

grants  whereto  the  state  has  completed  the  title  may  be  sold,  but 
if  set  aside  for  or  granted  to  a  particular  incompatible  public 
purpose  they  are  withdrawn  from  settlement.^"  A  survey  is  or- 
dinarily necessary  before  a  grant  to  swamp  land  can  be  made."' 
A  patent  issued  to  a  state  is  conclusive  against  collateral  attack,^^ 
and  can  not  be  impeached  in  an  action  at  law  by  showing  that  the 
land  is  not  in  fact  swamp  land.^^ 

Where  the  United  States  has  sold  lands  which  would  be  in- 
cluded under  the  Swamp  Land  Act  of  1850,  such  sales  have 
been  held  invalid,-"  but  a  state  has  authority  to  ratify  and  con- 
firm a  sale  thus  made  by  the  federal  government.-^ 

§  208.  School  and  university  land  grants. — The  federal 
government  has  always  maintained  a  generous  policy  in  respect 
to  grants  for  educational  purposes,^''  and  in  pursuance  of  that 
policy  congress  has  from  time  to  time  granted  lands  to  the  states 
for  such  purposes.  Such  grants  have  usually  been  of  section 
sixteen,  or  sections  sixteen  and  thirty-six  in  each  township."  In 
addition  to  this,  grants  have  been  made  to  the  states  and  territories 
of  seventy-two  sections  of  land  in  each  for  the  support  of  the 
state  university.-^  All  of  such  grants  have  been  held  to  be  in 
praesenti,^^  and  absolute  for  the  purpose  therein  specified,  and 
not  upon  a  condition  subsequent.^''  These  grants  constitute  a  sol- 
emn compact  between  the  federal  government  and  the  state, 
whereby  the  latter  becomes  the  purchaser  of  the  school  sections 
ioi-  a  valuable  consideration,  with  full  power  to  sell  or  lease  the 
same  for  the  use  of  schools,^'  and  after  the  state  has  accepted  the 
grant  it  can  not  be  withdrawn."-  Upon  the  completion  of  the 
grant  the  title  to  such  lands  vests  in  the  state,'^  but  under  some 

20  West  V.  Roberts,  135  Fed.  350,  68  Stringfellow.   2   Kans.   263 ;   State  v. 

C    C   A   58  Blasdell,  4  Nev.  241. 

'ziSchiosser  v.  Hemphill,  118  Iowa  2s  u.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901.  p.  13_84. 

452  90  N   W   842.  -"  Spravberry  v.  State,  62  Ala.  4o9 ; 

22  French  v.  Fyan,  93  U.  S.  169,  23  Hermocilla  v.  Hubbell,  89  Cal.  5.  26 
L    ed    8P  Pac.  611;   State  v.  Jennings,  47  Fla. 

'23  Warner  Vallev  Stock  Co.  v.  Cal-  302.  35  So.  986. 

derwood,  36  Ore.  228,  59  Pac.  115.  3°  Schneider  v.  Hutchinson,  35  Ore. 

24  Ringo  V.  Rotan,  29  Ark.  56.  253,  57  Pac.  324.  76  Am.  St.  474. 

23  Bruce  v.  Patton,  54  Ark.  455,  16  ^i  Morgan  County  School  v. 
S.  W.  195.  Schroll.  120  111.  509,  12  N.  E.  243,  60 

2Gjohanson  v.  Washington,  190  U.  Am.  Rep.  575.  ,  ^     -r    , 

S.  179,  23  Sup.  Ct.  825.  47  L.  cd.  1008.        s-  Daggett  v.  Bonewitz,     107     Ind. 

2-  Dickens  v.  Mahana.  21  How.  (U.  276.  7  N.  E.  900. 
S.)  276.  16  L.  ed.  158;  State  v.  New-        33  Long  v.  Brown,  4  Ala.  622. 
ton,  5   Blackf.    (Ind.)    455;    State  v. 


§    209  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  232 

grants  the  state  holds  the  title  to  the  land  in  trust  for  the  use  and 
benefit  of  the  schools  of  the  respective  townships  in  which  the 
lands  are  situated.^'*  Where  such  lands  are  unsurveyed  at  the 
time  of  grant  title  does  not  vest  in  the  state  until  the  survey  is 
completed,*''^  whereupon  the  title  passes  from  the  government  ,to 
the  state  without  the  issuance  of  a  patent.^''  But  under  an  act  of 
congress  reserving  land  for  school  purposes  it  was  held  that  such 
reservation  did  not  amount  to  an  absolute  grant  of  the  lands  to 
the  territory,  and  even  after  their  survey,  they  were  under  the 
domination,  protection  and  control  of  the  United  States  govern- 
ment.^^ Where  a  state  is  authorized  by  act  of  congress  to  make 
a  selection  from  the  public  lands  for  the  benefit  of  the  county 
schools  and  the  selection  is  duly  made  and  noted  on  the  records 
of  the  Interior  Department,  the  fee  to  the  lands  so  selected  is 
vested  ipso  facto  in  the  state. ^^  Where  lands  included  in  sections 
granted  to  states  for  school  purposes  have  been  previously  dis- 
posed of  by  the  government  to  individuals,  the  rights  or  titles  of 
such  individuals  are  not  affected  by  such  school  land  grants. ^^ 

§  209.  Statement  where  title  founded  on  school  land 
grant. — We  have  seen  that  a  grant  of  public  lands  to  a  state 
for  the  use  of  schools  is  an  absolute  grant,  and  such  grant  and  its 
acceptance  by  the  state  constitute  a  solemn  compact  between  the 
state  and  the  United  States  whereby  the  state  becomes  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  school  sections  with  full  power  to  sell  same.  The 
legal  title  to  such  lands  is  in  the  state, ^"^  in  trust  for  the  support 
of  the  schools  of  the  respective  townships  in  which  the  lands  lie.*^ 
The  title  usually  vests  in  the  state  at  once,  but  where  the  lands 
are  unsurveyed  title  does  not  vest  until  the  survey  is  completed 
and  the  grant  is  accepted  by  the  state.    It  frequently  happens  that 

3*Widner  v.  State,  49  Ark.  172.  4  -s  State   v.   Tanner,   IZ   Nebr.    104, 

S.  W.  657 ;   State  v.  Springfield  Tp.,  102  N.  W.  235. 

6  Ind.  83;  State  v.  Stark,  111  La.  594.  ^"^  Mullan  v.  United  States,  118  U. 

35    So.   760;    Edwards   v.    Butler,   89  S.  271,  6  Sup.  Ct.  1041,  30  L.  ed.  170; 

Miss.  179,  42  So.  381 ;  State  v.  Cun-  Bullock  v.  Rouse,  81  Cal.  590,  22  Pac. 

ningham,  88  Wis.  81,  57  N.  W.  1119,  919. 

59  N.  W.  503.  40  Daggett  v.  Bonewitz,  107  Ind.  276, 

3'-  Sherman  v.  Buick,  45  Cal.  656 ;  7  N.  E.  900. 

State  V.  Jennings,  47  Fla.  307,  35  So.  ^i  Long  v.  Brown,  4  Ala.  622 ;  Wid- 

986.  ncr  v.  State,  49  Ark.  172,  4  S.  W.  657; 

•■'«  State  V.  Jennings,  47  Fla.  307,  35  State  v.   Stark,   111   La.  594,  35   So. 

So.  986.  760. 

37  United  States  v.  Elliott,  12  Utah 
119.  41  Pac.  720. 


233  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    210 

the  state  does  not  acquire  title  to  these  particular  sections  on 
account  of  their  previous  disposition  by  the  government.  In  such 
case  the  law  of  indemnity  gives  the  state  the  right  to  select  other 
lands  contiguous  thereto  in  lieu  of  such  sections.  The  selection  of 
these  lieu  lands  must  be  certified  and  approved  by  the  secretary 
of  the  interior,  and  noted  on  the  records  of  the  department. 
When  all  the  requirements  of  the  selection  have  been  comphed 
with,  the  title  vests  in  the  state  as  of  the  date  of  the  selection. 
So,  where  the  title  to  be  abstracted  had  its  inception  in  a  donation 
by  the  government  to  the  state  for  school  purposes,  the  beginning 
statement  will  include:  (1)  The  donative  act,  (2)  acceptance  of 
the  grant  by  the  state,  (3)  the  act  of  the  state  legislature  provid- 
ing for  the  sale  of  the  land,  and  (4)  the  deed  of  the  proper  officer 
authorized  by  law  to  convey  the  land.  And  if  the  land  is  a  part 
of  lands  selected  in  lieu  of  section  sixteen  or  thirty-six  the  state- 
ment should  contain:  (1)  The  fact  of  such  selection,  (2)  the 
act  authorizing  the  selection,  (3)  the  grant  to  the  state  of  lands 
for  school  purposes,  and  (4)  acceptance  by  the  state. 

§  210.  Grants  for  internal  improvement. — Congress  has 
from  time  to  time  granted  public  lands  to  states  to  aid  in  the 
building  of  roads,  bridges,  canals,  and  other  internal  improve- 
ments. Some  of  these  grants  have  been  for  such  improvements 
generally,  while  other  grants  designate  the  kind  of  improvements 
which  they  are  intended  to  aid.  Whether  or  not  such  grants  are 
in  praesenti  depends  upon  the  intention  of  congress  as  expressed 
in  the  words  of  the  grant.^^  Also  whether  the  conditions  ex- 
pressed in  the  grant  are  conditions  precedent  or  subsequent  is  a 
matter  to  be  determined  by  the  wording  of  the  grant.^^  Where 
a  grant  of  public  lands  to  a  state  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a 
military  road  excepted  therefrom  all  lands  theretofore  "reserved 
to  the  United  States  or  otherwise  appropriated  by  act  of  congress 
or  other  competent  authority,"  lands  within  the  limits  of  the 
grant  which  was  at  the  time  excepted  by  a  settlement  under  a  pre- 
emption or  homestead  claim  duly  filed,  was  land  "appropriated" 
and  within  the  exception,  and  did  not  pass  to  the  state  under  the 
grant  for  the  construction  of  the  road.**  Grants  for  internal  im- 
provement are  frequently  of  certain  amounts  of  land  to  be  selected 

"2  Van  Valkenburg  v.  McCloud,  21         44  Eastern    Oregon     Land     Co.     v. 
Cal.  330.  Brosnan,    147,   Fed.   807. 

*3  Wheeler  v.  Chicago,  68  Fed.  526. 


§211  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  234 

by  the  state,  or  by  the  land  officers/'  and  until  such  selection  has 
been  made  and  approved  by  the  land  department  the  grant  does 
not  attach  to  any  particular  lands.  But  when  such  selection  has 
been  made  and  approved  by  the  land  department  the  title  at  once 
vests  in  the  state/'"'  A  patent  to  the  state  under  a  grant  in  aid  of 
internal  improvements  takes  effect  as  of  the  date  of  the  location 
and  selection  of  the  land.*^ 

Instead  of  granting  the  land  to  states  in  aid  of  internal  im- 
provements congress  has  seen  fit  in  some  cases  to  grant  in  aid 
of  such  improvements  a  certain  percentage  of  the  net  proceeds  of 
public  lands  lying  within  the  state  to  be  subsequently  sold  by  the 
United  States  ;*®  but  under  such  a  grant  the  state  is  not  entitled 
to  a  percentage  on  the  value  of  lands  disposed  of  by  the  federal 
government  in  satisfaction  of  military  land  warrants/* 

§  211.  Initial  statement  of  abstract  where  title  based  on 
grant  for  internal  improvements. — What  we  said  in  a  pre- 
vious section  of  this  chapter  with  reference  to  direct  legislative 
grants  will  apply  to  grants  to  states  for  internal  improvements. 
If  the  title  to  the  land  to  be  abstracted  had  its  inception  in  a  grant 
to  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  canal  the  initial 
statement  should  show :  (1)  The  act  of  congress  making  the 
grant,  (2)  location  and  selection  of  the  land  by  proper  authority, 
and  (3)  act  of  state  legislature  providing  for  trustees  to  make 
sale. 

If  the  original  grant  was  to  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  building 
a  railroad  the  statement  should  contain :  ( 1 )  The  act  of  congress 
making  the  grant,  (2)  the  act  of  the  state  legislature  providing 
for  commissioners,  and  (3)  the  determination  of  the  character 
of  the  railroad  lands.  But  where  the  grant  is  made  directly  to  the 
railroad  company,  the  statement  should  show  a  compliance  with 
the  conditions  of  the  grant;  such  as  the  location  of  the  road,  the 
filing  of  a  map  of  such  location,  acceptance  and  approval  by  the 
secretary  of  the  interior,  fixing  of  the  general  route  of  the  road 
or  any  other  condition  of  the  grant  the  performance  of  which  is 
necessary  to  pass  title. 

«  Koch  V.  Streuter,  232  III.  594,  83  ^^  Indiana  v.  United  States,  148  U. 

N.  W.  1072.  S.  148,  13  Sup.  Ct.  564,  Zl  L.  cd.  401. 

46  Godwin   v.   Davis,   74  Miss.  742,  4u  lowa    v.    McFarland,    110   U.    S. 

21  So.  764.  471,  4  Sup.  Ct.  210,  21  L.  ed.  198. 

*^  Patterson  v.  Tatum,  3  Savvy.  (U. 
S.)   164,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  10830. 


235  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    212 

§  212.  Land  grants  to  railroads. — /\id  has  been  given  to 
railroads  in  many  instances  by  a  direct  grant  of  land  by  the  fed- 
eral government,  and  in  other  cases  the  grant  is  made  to  a  state 
for  the  benefit  of  the  railroad  company.  In  the  latter  instance 
the  position  of  the  state  is  that  of  a  trustee  for  the  company.'" 
A  congressional  land  grant  has  the  effect  of  a  legislative  enact- 
ment, and  the  intention  of  the  legislature  is  to  be  sought  and  en- 
forced.^'  The  statute  making  the  grant  abrogates  common-law 
rules  so  far  as  they  conflict  with  its  provisions."  Congressional 
grants  are  usually  construed  to  pass  the  land  at  once,  but  to  con- 
vey it  upon  condition  subsequent,  ahhough,  of  course,  a  grant 
may  be  upon  condition  precedent.^^  Whether  the  grant  is  upon 
condition  precedent  or  condition  subsequent  must,  it  is  obvious, 
be  determined  from  the  statute  making  the  grant.^*  In  other 
words,  the  grant  is  usually  regarded  as  conveying  a  title  upon 
condition  subsequent.  Under  acts  granting  a  right  of  way  over 
all  government  lands  along  certain  routes,  the  railroad  has  been 
held  to  acquire  a  right  of  way  over  sections  numbered  sixteen 
and  thirty-six,  although  such  sections  have  been,  before  the  grants 
were  made,  designated  generally  as  school  sections,  but  have  not 
been  definitely  disposed  of.''  Grants  to  railroads  by  congress  can 
not  be  construed  to  include  routes  not  contemplated  by  the  char- 
ters of  the  companies  at  the  time  of  the  grant. "^ 

Where  a  grant  of  land  to  a  railroad  company  becomes  effective 
it  relates  back  to  the  time  of  the  enactment  of  the  statute."  The 
general  rule  as  to  the  time  such  grants  become  effective  is  that 
they  take  effect  when  the  route  is  located  and  the  sections  thereby 
identified,'^  that  is,  they  are  usually  grants  in  praesenti,  which, 
when  maps  of  definite  location  are  filed  and  approved,  take  effect 
by  relation  as  of  the  date  of  the  act.'^    It  is  generally  held  that 

50  Rice  V.  Minnesota  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  ^=5  Coleman  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co., 

Black    (U.    S.)    358,    17   L.   ed.    147;  38  Minn.  260,  36  N.  \V.  638. 

Kansas  City,   L.   &   S.   K.  R.   Co.  v.  ^«  Jackson  v.  Dines,  13  Colo.  90,  21 

Attorney-General.    118    U.    S.   682,    7  Pac.  918. 

Sup.  Ct.  66,  30  L.  ed.  281.  •'"  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 

=51  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar-  ney,  113  U.  S.  618,  5  Sup.  Ct.  606,  28 

ney,  113  U.  S.  618,  5  Sup.  Ct.  606,  28  L.  ed.  1109. 

L.  ed    1109  ^*  St.  Paul  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Northern 

"  St.    Paul    M.   &    M.   R.    Co.    v.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  139  U.  S.  1,  11  Sup.  Ct. 

Greenhalgh,  26  Fed.  563.  389.  35  L.  ed.  11. 

53  United   States   v.    Southern   Pac.  ^''  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lipman, 

R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  132.  148  Cal.  480,  83  Pac.  445. 

5*  State  V.  Rusk,  55  Wis.  465,  13  N. 
W.  452. 


§    212  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  236 

congress,  by  a  grant  of  land  to  a  railroad  to  aid  in  its  construc- 
tion, confers  a  present  title  to  the  designated  sections  along  this 
route,  with  such  restrictions  upon  their  use  and  disposal  as  to 
secure  them  for  the  purpose  of  the  grant,  subject  to  be  defeated, 
however,  on  noncompliance  with  the  terms  of  the  grant."'* 

It  is  not  necessary  that  a  patent  should  be  issued  to  the  com- 
pany,''^ since  the  effect  of  a  patent  to  lands  granted  by  such  an 
act  is  not  to  vest  title  to  them,  but  to  afford  record  evidence 
thereof.*^"  By  operation  of  the  act  itself,  or  the  conditions  having 
been  fully  complied  with  as  to  a  portion  of  the  road,  the  railroad 
company's  title  to  lands  given  along  that  portion  becomes  perfect 
and  indefeasible.''^  A  general  rule  is  that,  until  a  survey  and 
definite  location  of  the  road  have  been  made,  and  a  map  of  the 
proposed  route  has  been  filed,  the  railroad  acquires  no  rights  ad- 
verse to  those  of  others  taking  claims  under  general  laws."*  A 
grant  of  land  by  the  federal  congress  does  not  operate  upon  lands 
theretofore  reserved."^  Lands  withdrawn  from  sale  are  re- 
served.'^'^  By  a  federal  grant  a  railroad  company  does  not  ac- 
quire a  vested  interest  in  particular  lands,  within  or  without 
place  limits,  merely  by  filing  a  map  of  the  general  route  and  hav- 
ing same  approved  by  the  secretary  of  the  interior,  although  the 
definite  location  of  its  line  of  road,  and  the  filing  and  acceptance 
of  a  map  thereof  in  the  office  of  the  commissioner  of  the  general 
land  office  lands  within  primary  or  place  limits  not  theretofore 
reserved,  sold,  granted,  or  otherwise  disposed  of,  and  free  from 
pre-emption  or  other  claims  of  right,  become  segregated  from  the 
public  domination,  and  no  rights  in  such  place  lands  will  attach 
in  favor  of  a  settler  or  occupant  who  becomes  such  after  definite 
location.  Also  that  no  rights  to  lands  within  indeterminate  limits 
will  attach  in  favor  of  a  railroad  company  until  after  selections 
made  by  it  with  the  approval  of  the  secretary  of  the  interior."^ 

In  some  of  the  grants  provision  is  made  that,  in  the  event  that 

«o  Wisconsin    C.   R.    Co.    v.    Price  Land  Co.  v.  Griffey,  72  Iowa  505,  34 

County,   133  U.   S.  496,   10   Sup.   Ct.  N.  W.  304. 

341.  33  L.  ed.  687.  "=  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Mus- 

«i  Whitehead  v.  Plummer,  76  Iowa  ser  &c.  Co.,  68  Fed.  993,  16  C.  C.  A. 

181,  40  N.  W.  709.  97. 
fi2  Pengra  v.  Munz,  29  Fed.  830.  ««  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  For- 
es United    States  V.   Northern   Pac.  sythe,  40  L.  ed.  70,  159  U.  S.  46,  IS 

R.  Co.,  41  Fed.  842.  Sup.  Ct.  1020. 

6*  Sioux  City  &  I.  F.  Town  Lot  &  "  Sjoli  v.  Dreschel,  199  U.  S.  564, 

26  Sup.  Ct.  154.  50  L.  ed.  311. 


237  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    213 

a  certain  part  of  the  road  is  completed  within  a  certain  time,  title 
to  a  specified  quantity  of  land  shall  vest  in  the  company,  and 
another  designated  part  shall  vest  when  another  or  other  parts  of 
the  road  is  completed,  and  under  such  grants  it  is  held  that,  upon 
the  completion  of  a  part  of  the  road  entitling  it  to  a  designated 
quantity  of  land,  title  to  that  quantity  will  vest  although  the  other 
part  of  the  road  may  not  be  completed  within  the  time  limited. "^^ 

§  213.  Grant  for  public  highway. — In  1866  congress 
passed  an  act  granting  the  right  to  construct  highways  over  gov- 
ernment lands  not  reserved  for  public  use.*^^  This  grant,  like  all 
other  grants  of  the  public  domain  made  by  congress,  did  not  affect 
the  rights  of  those  on  the  lands  in  advance  of  the  grant.  The  act 
was  not  intended  to  operate  upon  persons  who  had  taken  posses- 
sion under  a  bona  fide  claim  or  color  of  title,  even  though  the 
settlement  was  made  in  advance  of  the  public  survey.  The 
act  does  not  make  any  distinction  as  to  the  methods  recognized  by 
law  for  the  establishment  of  a  highway.  It  is  an  unequivocal 
grant  of  a  right  of  way  for  public  highways  over  public  lands, 
without  any  limitation  as  to  the  method  for  their  establishment.^" 
The  right  of  the  public  to  a  strip  needed  for  a  highway  under  the 
act  dates  only  from  the  time  the  initiatory  steps  are  taken  which 
ripen  into  a  completed  title.  In  this  respect  it  resembles  the 
Oregon  Donation  Act,  the  Pre-emption  Act,  and  the  Homestead 
Act,  and  is  subject  to  the  same  rules  governing  these  acts.'^^ 

It  is  always  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  construing  a  congressional 
grant  that  the  act  by  which  it  is  made  is  a  law  as  well  as  a  con- 
veyance, and  that  such  effect  must  be  given  to  it  as  will  carry  out 
the  intent  of  congress.  There  can  not  be  a  grant  unless  there 
is  a  grantee,  and  consequently  there  can  be  no  present  grant  un- 
less there  is  a  present  grantee.  So  the  act  under  discussion  is  a 
grant  which  remains  in  abeyance  until  the  highway  is  established 
under  some  public  law  authorizing  its  establishment  and  takes 
effect  as  a  grant  from  that  time.  It  is  held  that  under  this  act 
and  an  act  of  a  territory  declaring  all  section  lines  public  roads, 
that  persons  filing  on  public  lands  take  the  same  subject  to  the 

«8  Courtright  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.  37  Wash.  682,  80  Pac.  262,  70  L.  R.  A. 
R.  Co.,  35  Iowa  386.  1027. 

«»U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.  1878,  §  2477.  "i  McAllister  v.  Okanogan  County, 

^"Okanogan    County   v.    Cheatham,     51  Wash.  647.  100  Pac.  146,  24  L.  R. 

A.  (N.  S.)  764. 


^  214  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  238 

right  of  way  along  the  section  lines  for  highways  and  are  not 
entitled  to  compensation. '- 

The  rule  seems  to  be  well  settled  that  a  highway  may  be  estab- 
lished by  prescription  over  government  lands  within  the  purview 
of  this  grant."  But  it  is  held  that  there  must  at  least  be  such  a 
use  and  for  such  a  period  as  is  required  to  establish  highways  un- 
der the  law  of  the  state  where  the  state  statute  fixes  it  at  less  than 
the  common-law  period  of  twenty  years. ^'^ 

§  214.  Private  land  claims. — Large  areas  of  the  present 
territory  of  the  United  States  were,  prior  to  the  formation  of  our 
government,  under  the  sovereignty  of  various  foreign  nations. 
These  nations  had  made  numerous  grants  of  lands  to  individuals 
prior  to  the  time  when  the  various  territorial  acquisitions  to  the 
United  States  occurred.  The  titles  claimed  under  these  grants 
are  termed  "Private  Land  Claims,"  and  numerous  questions  con- 
cerning such  titles  have  from  time  to  time  arisen  out  of  these 
grants."'  Titles  in  the  original  thirteen  colonies  begin  with  the 
grant  from  some  foreign  power.  Many  titles  in  Florida,  Texas 
and  California  date  back  to  original  Spanish  grants.  Others  em- 
braced in  the  Territory  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  begin  with  a 
grant  from  the  French  crown,  but  all  these  have  been  confirmed 
by  the  United  States  government. 

During  the  colonial  period  the  various  colonies  were  either 
royal  or  proprietary.  Li  the  royal  provinces  the  crown  exercised 
the  right  of  granting  lands,  while  in  the  proprietary  governments 
the  proprietors  had  the  power  to  dispose  of  lands.  Matters  re- 
lating to  the  modes  of  disposition  at  that  time  are  now  of  no 
practical  importance.  The  only  questions  with  reference  to  such 
grants  which  are  of  interest  to  us  are  those  relating  to  their  con- 
struction and  effect,  as  to  which  it  may  be  stated  that  the  general 
rules  of  construction  are  the  same  as  those  relating  to  original 
conveyances.'"  But  the  grants  from  Spain,  Mexico  and  France 
have  been  the  subject  of  much  litigation  from  time  to  time,  espe- 
cially when  such  grants  were  overlaid  by  the  claims  of  the  first 

"2  Keen   v.   Board,   8   S.   Dak.   558,  "  United  States  v.  Ducros,  15  How. 

67  N.  W.  623.  (U.    S.)    38.    14   L.   ed.   591;   United 

73  Township  of  Walcott  v.  Skauge,  States   v.    Pena,      175   U.    S.   500,   20 

6  N    Dak.  382.  71  N.  W.  544 ;  Smitli  Sup.  Ct.  165.  44  L.  ed.  251 ;  Brown  v. 

V.  Mitchell,  21  Wash.  536,  58  Pac.  667.  O'Connor,  1  Cal.  419. 

■^4  Vogler    V.    Anderson,    46    Wash.  "'■  Attorney-General  v.  Delaware  &c. 

202,  89  Pac.  551.                              •  R.  Co.,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  631. 


239  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    214 

settlers.  These  grants  from  other  countries  have  usually  been 
expressly  protected  by  provisions  in  the  treaties  executed  at  the 
time  of  the  accession."  The  claims  based  upon  grants  from 
Mexico  and  Spain  were  confirmed  by  treaties  with  Mexico  in 
1848,  and  also  in  1853."  Likewise  claims  based  upon  grants 
from  France  were  protected  in  a  Treaty  of  1803  with  France." 
Regardless,  however,  of  treaties,  the  law  of  nations  protects  the 
inhabitants  of  a  ceded  territory  in  their  proprietary  rights.^'' 
Moreover,  congress  has,  by  express  legislation  recognized  and 
confirmed  the  claims  of  persons  to  land  and  territory  ceded  to 
the  United  States.*^  Before  an  alleged  grant  under  a  former 
government  will  be  recognized  by  the  United  States,  it  must  ap- 
pear to  have  emanated  from  a  public  official  having  power  to 
make  it,^"  and  acting  under  the  authority  of  such  former  govern- 
ment.^^ In  order  to  derive  title  to  a  land  grant  under  Spanish 
authority,  such  grant  must  be  shown  to  have  been  perfect  and 
complete;^*  and  complete  grants  are  to  be  presumed  from  long 
continued  possession.*^  Spanish  and  Mexican  grants  to  be  valid 
must  be  capable  of  identification,*'^  and  if  identifiable  may  be  con- 
firmed,*^ and  when  legally  confirmed,  the  title  is  valid.** 

Under  the  Mexican  law,  when  a  grant  of  land  is  made  by  the 
government,  a  formal  delivery  of  possession  to  the  grantee  by  a 
magistrate  of  the  vicinage  is  essential  to  the  complete  investiture 
of  title.  This  proceeding,  called  in  the  language  of  the  country, 
the  delivery  of  juridical  possession,  involves  the  establishment  of 
the  boundaries  of  the  land  granted  when  there  is  any  uncertainty 
with  respect  to  them.  A  record  of  the  proceeding  is  preserved 
by  the  magistrate,  and  a  copy  delivered  to  the  grantee.*^  The  ab- 
sence of  documents  evidencing  ancient  Spanislr  grants  may  be 

■^^  Ward  V.  Mulford,  32    Cal.    365 ;  ^^  Carino    v.    Insular    Government, 

Magee  v.  Doe,  9  Fla.  382.  212  U.  S.  449,  29  Sup.  Ct.  334,  53  L. 

^8U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901.   §  767.  ed.  594. 

""  Les  Bois  v.  Bramell,  4  How.  (U.  §6  Gwin  v.  Calegaris,  139  Cal.  384, 

S.)  449,  11  L.  ed.  1051.  7Z  Pac.  851. 

80  Barker  v.  Harvey,  181  U.  S.  481,  s^  Mobile  Transportation  Co.  v.  Mo- 
21  Sup.  Ct.  690,  45  L.  ed.  963.  bile,  187  U.  S.  479.  23  Sup.  Ct.  170, 

81  United  States  v.  Morant,  123  U.  47  L.  ed.  266. 

S.  335.  8  Sup.  Ct.  189,  31  L.  ed.  171.  *»  Catron  v.  Laughlin.  11  N.  Mex. 

*-  Woodworth  v.  Fulton,  1  Cal.  295.  604,  72  Pac.  26. 

^^  Faxon   v.  United   States,   171   U.  ^'^  Van  Reynegan  v.  Bolton,  5  Otto 

S.  244,  18  Sup.  Ct.  849,  42  L.  ed.  151.  (U.  S.)  2i,  24  L.  ed.  351. 

^*  Sena  v.  American  Turquoise  Co., 
14  N.  Mex.  511,  98  Pac.  170. 


§    215  TITLES    AND    AUSTRACTS  240 

explained  l)y  showing  a  reasonable  probability  that  they  may  have 
been  lost  or  destroyed.*'" 

§  215.  Town  site  entry. — The  purpose  of  town  site  laws  is 
to  enable  persons  who  have  settled  upon  portions  of  the  public 
domain,  and  who  desire  to  lay  out  and  establish  a  town  or  city, 
to  procure  title  to  unoccupied  public  lands  from  the  United  States 
at  a  minimum  price,  and  to  enable  other  persons  desiring  to  pur- 
chase lots  within  an  established  city  or  town,  upon  the  public 
lands,  to  i)rocure  a  valid  title  thereto.^^  In  enacting  these  laws, 
congress  had  in  view  the  interests  of  the  individual  settlers  rather 
than  a  benefit  to  municipalities. °"  The  statutes  provide  that  the 
corporate  authorities  of  the  tow^n,  if  it  is  incorporated,  or  the 
judge  of  the  county  court,  if  the  town  is  not  incorporated,  shall 
file  at  the  local  land  office  the  claim  to  the  land  for  town  site 
purposes."^  This  constitutes  the  entry,  and  when  payment  is  made 
the  title  to  the  land  vests  in  the  official  making  such  entry,  but 
only  as  trustee,  however,  for  the  occupants  according  to  their 
shares.''*  But  this  trust  terminates  when  all  the  land  in  the  tract 
included  in  a  town  site  has  been  disposed  of."^  The  occupants 
obtain  their  title  through  such  trustee  by  deed,^^  but  such  deed 
need  not  recite  that  the  trustee  had  power  to  execute  same.''^ 
The  deed  from  the  trustee  is  valid  although  no  patent  has  issued 
to  him,  since  the  patent,  when  issued  takes  effect  as  of  the  date 
of  the  entry. ^^  The  disposition  of  the  lots  in  the  town  and  the 
application  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  thereof  is  regulated  by 
the  legislative  authority  of  the  state  or  territory  in  w^hich  the 
town  is  situated.''^ 

It  is  a  prerequisite  to  an  entry  under  the  town  site  law  that  the 
land  be  actually  settled  upon  and  occupied  as  a  town  site,  and 
the  mere  platting  of  the  land  as  a  town  is  not  sufficient.^ 

Lands  dedicated  by  the  government  to  use  for  homesteads  is 

90  State  V.  Oritz,  99  Tex.  475,  90  S.  »5  Aspen  v.  Rucker,  10  Colo.  184,  15 
W.  1084.  Pac.  791. 

91  Pascoe  V.  Green,  18  Colo.  326,  32  »"  Sherry  v.  Sampson,  11  Kans.  611. 
Pac.  824.  97  Green   v.   Barker,   47   Nebr.   934, 

92  Jones  V.  Petaluma,  38  Cal.  397.  66  N.  W.  1032. 

93  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.)  §  2387;  New-  »«  Taylor  v.  Winona  &c.  R.  Co.,  45 
house  V.  Simino,  3  Wash.  648,  29  Pac.  Minn.  66,  47  N.  W.  453. 

263.  '■•9  Clark   v.    Titus,   2   Ariz.    147,    11 

94  Martin  v.   Hoff,  7  Ariz.  247,  64     Pac.  312. 

Pac.    445 ;     Buffalo    v.     Harling,     50        i  Carson  v.  Smith,  12  Minn.  543. 
Minn.  551,  52   N.  W.  931;   Goldberg 
V.  Kidd,  5  S.  Dak.  169,  58  N.  W.  574. 


241  BEGINNING    OF    TITLE  §    216 

not  subject  to  town  site  entry."  Town  site  entries  may  be  made 
on  mineral  lands,  but  no  title  is  thereby  acquired  if  the  lands  were 
known  to  be  mineral  lands  at  the  time  of  the  entry. ^  All  the 
interest  which  an  occupant  has  in  the  land  prior  to  the  entry  of  the 
town  site  is  an  inchoate  right  to  the  benefit  of  the  town  site  law 
in  case  the  property  shall  be  purchased  from  the  United  States 
by  the  corporate  authorities  or  the  county  judge  under  the 'pro- 
visions of  that  law.* 

§  216.  Initial  statement  of  abstract  where  title  obtained 
through  town  site  entry. — In  the  cities  and  towns  of  many  of 
the  western  states  the  title  to  real  estate  passed  from  the 
government  under  town  site  acts.  We  discussed  this  method 
of  acquiring  title  in  the  preceding  section,  and  it  only 
remains  for  us  to  call  attention  to  what  should  be  included  in 
the  initial  statement  of  the  abstract  in  case  the  title  passed  from 
the  government  by  this  method.  It  is  important  to  remember 
that  the  method  of  acquiring  title  under  the  Acts  of  1864  and 
1865  is  somewhat  different  from  the  method  prescribed  by  the 
Act  of  1867.  By  the  former  method  a  purchase  on  sale  or  pre- 
emption at  minimum  figures  is  permitted,  provided  certain  pre- 
liminary conditions  are  complied  with.  These  conditions  consist 
of  the  filing  with  the  recorder  a  plat  or  map  of  the  town  in  con- 
formity with  the  lots  and  blocks  and  coinciding  with  the  rights 
of  occupants.  When  the  public  surveys  have  been  made  the 
exterior  boundary  lines  should  conform  to  the  lines  of  such  sur- 
veys. The  map  must  further  show  the  name  of  the  town  or  city. 
the  streets,  alleys,  parks  and  various  other  subdivisions,  their 
area  and  measurements.  The  plat  or  map  must  be  sworn  to  by 
the  proper  municipal  officer,  and,  when  the  town  or  city  is  within 
the  limits  of  an  organized  land  district,  a  copy  of  the  plat  or  map 
must  be  filed  with  the  local  officer  of  such  district,  and  a  copy 
forwarded  to  the  general  land  office  within  one  month  from  the 
filing  with  the  recorder.  By  the  Act  of  1867  the  inhabitants  of 
cities  and  towns  on  the  public  lands  are  given  the  privilege  of 
entering  lands  occupied  as  town  sites  at  a  minimum  price  of  one 
dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  acre.    The  entry  is  made  by  the 

2  Long-Bell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Martin,         *  Stringf  ellow  v.  Cain,  99  U.  S.  610, 
11  Okla.  192,  66  Pac.  328.  25  L.  ed.  421. 

3  Tombstone    Town    Site    Cases,  2 
Ariz.  272,  15  Pac.  26. 

16 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    216  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  242 

corporate  authorities  of  the  town,  if  it  is  incorporated,  or,  if  it  is 
not  incorporated,  the  judge  of  the  county  court  of  the  county  in 
which  the  town  is  situated,  may  enter  the  land  as  trustee  for  the 
occupants  of  the  town.  By  whichever  of  these  methods  the  title 
was  acquired,  the  initial  statement  of  the  abstract  should  show  a 
compHance  with  the  conditions  of  the  particular  act  under  which 
title  was  acquired.  If  the  proceedure  was  under  the  Act  of  1864 
and  the  supplemental  Act  of  1865,  a  plat  of  so  much  of  the  town 
as  is  necessary  to  show  the  property  in  question  should  be  in- 
cluded, and  in  addition  thereto  all  the  necessary  steps  preliminary 
to  the  issuance  of  the  patent  should  be  shown.  But  where  the 
proceedure  was  under  the  Act  of  1867,  the  statement  should  not 
be  materially  different  from  a  case  of  ordinary  entry. 


CHAPTER  IX 

FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS 


SEC.  SEC. 

220.  Patents  in  general.  226.  Operation  and  effect  of  patents. 

221.  Necessity  of  patent  to  pass  title.  227.  Construction  of  patents. 

222.  Form  and  requisites  of  patents.  228.  Conclusiveness  of  patents. 

223.  Delivery,  acceptance  and  record-  229.  Rescission,   cancelation  and  cor- 
ing of  patents.  rection  of  patents. 

224.  Validity  of  patents.  230.  Abstracting  patents. 

225.  Patents    issued    after    death    of 
claimant. 

§  220.  Patents  in  general. — A  patent  is  an  instrument  is- 
sued by  the  state  or  federal  government  to  one  to  whom  it  has 
transferred  or  agreed  to  transfer  land,  in  order  to  vest  in  the 
transferee  the  complete  legal  title.  It  is  the  deed  of  the  govern- 
ment, state  or  federal,  by  which  it  passes  title  to  its  lands. ^  It 
is  the  last  official  act  of  the  government  in  its  procedure  to  divest 
itself  of  title  to  public  lands.  Until  its  execution  in  proper  form 
the  fee  remains  in  the  government,  and  the  power  of  the  land 
department  over  the  land  continues.^  The  federal  patent  is  said 
to  be  the  highest  and  best  deed  known  to  the  law.^  Where  the 
government  previously  had  the  title,  the  patent  becomes  the  high- 
est evidence  of  title  in  the  person  to  whom  it  is  issued.*  The  is- 
suance of  a  patent  by  the  government  affords  prima  facie  evi- 
dence that  all  prerequisites  of  the  law  necessary  to  its  issuance 
have  been  complied  with.^ 

§  221.  Necessity  of  patent  to  pass  title. — Except  in  cases 
where  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government  has  made  a  grant 
taking  effect  in  praesenti  a  patent  is  necessary  to  pass  a  perfect 
title  to  public  land.*^    Consequently,  when  there  has  been  no  such 

1  United  States  v.  Mullan,  10  Fed.  *  Bagnell  v.  Broderick,  13  Pet.  (U. 
785,  7  Sawy.  466;  Stinson  v.  Call,  163  S.)  436,  10  L.  ed.  235;  Irvine  v.  Tar- 
Mo.  323,  63  S.  W.  729.  bat,  105  Cal.  237,  38  Pac.  896. 

2  Stimson  Land  Co.  v.  Ravi^son,  62  ^  Bradshaw  v.  Edelen,  194  Mo.  640, 
Fed.  426.  92  S.  W.  691. 

3  Texas  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  159  c  wilcox  v.  Jackson,  13  Pet.  (U. 
U.  S.  66,  15  Sup.  Ct.  994.  40  L.  ed.  S.)  498,  10  L.  ed.  264;  Carter  v.  Rud- 
11;  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  For-  dy,  166  U.  S.  493,  17  Sup.  Ct.  640,  41 
sythe,  159  U.  S.  46,  15  Sup.  Ct.  1020,  L.  ed.  1090. 

40  L.  ed.  71. 

243 


J;    222  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  244 

previous  grant,  the  patent  is  necessary  for  the  transfer  of  the 
legal  title.'  lu-en  where  there  has  been  a  direct  legislative  grant, 
a  patent  will  generally  issue,  not  for  the  purpose  of  passing  the 
title,  however,  but  to  furnish  evidence  of  the  transfer,  or  to  show 
compliance  with  the  conditions  of  the  grant,  obviating  the  neces- 
sity of  other  proof  in  case  of  any  legal  controversy  over  the 
title. ^  A  patent  may  issue  upon  the  confirmation  of  a  title  by 
legislative  act  of  a  claim  of  a  previously  existing  title,  in  which 
case  it  is  documentary  evidence,  having  the  dignity  of  a  record  of 
the  existence  of  that  title,  or  of  such  equities  respecting  the  claim 
as  to  justify  its  recognition  and  confirmation.^  Thus  a  patent 
issued  to  a  confirmee  of  a  Spanish  or  Mexican  grant  is,  in  its 
operation,  like  the  deed  of  any  other  grantor,  and  passes  only 
such  interest  as  the  United  States  possessed.  It  is  a  record  of  the 
government  of  its  action  and  judgment  with  respect  to  the  title 
of  the  patentee  existing  at  the  date  of  the  cession  of  the  territory 
to  the  United  States.'" 

§  222.  Form  and  requisites  of  patents. — The  federal  stat- 
utes prescribe  the  form  and  requisites  of  a  valid  patent  to  public 
lands  of  the  United  States.  Such  patents  must,  of  course,  con- 
form in  all  their  features  to  the  requirements  of  law.  State  laws 
respecting  the  issuance  of  patents  for  state  lands  differ  to  such 
an  extent  in  the  several  states  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to 
indicate  here  every  particular  in  which  a  state  patent  may  be  upon 
its  face  defective.  Federal  patents  are  issued  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States,  and  are  required  to  be  signed  by  the  president, 
or  in  the  name  of  the  president  by  his  secretary,  or  by  an  executive 
clerk,  and  countersigned  by  the  recorder  of  the  general  land 
office.^'  It  must  be  sealed  by  the  great  seal  of  the  land  office.'" 
But  neither  the  president  nor  any  officer  of  the  government  has 
any  power  to  sign  or  cause  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be 

7  Langdon  v.  Sherwood,  124  U.  S.  121  U.  S.  488,  7  Sup.  Ct.  985,  30  L. 
74,  8  Sup.  Ct.  429,  31  L.  ed.  344;  ed.  1039;  Miller  v.  Tobin,  16  Ore. 
Roads  V.  Symmes,  1  Ohio  281,  13  Am.     540,  16  Pac.  161. 

Dec.  621  ;   Brownsville    v.    Basse,    36        ^^  Leese  v.  Clark,  20  Cal.  387. 
Tex.  461.  "  Rev.  Stat.  §  458   (U.  S.)   Comp. 

8  Morrow  v.  Whitney,  95  U.  S.  551 ;     St.  1901,  p.  259. 

24  L.  ed.  456 ;  Wright  v.  Roseberry,  12  McGarrahan  v.  New  Idria  Min- 

121  U.  S.  488,  7  Sup  Ct.  985,  30  L.  ed.  ing  Co.,  96  U.  S.  316,  24  L.  ed.  630 ; 

1039.  Duluth,  &  I.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Roy,   173 

BLangdeau  v.  Hanes,  88  U.  S-  521,  U.  S.  587,  19  Sup.  Ct.  549,  43  L.  ed. 

22  L.  ed.  606;  Wright  v.  Roseberry,  820. 


245  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS  §  223 

affixed  to  a  patent,  except  such  as  is  conferred  by  a  federal  stat- 
ute/^ The  validity  of  the  patent  depends  upon  a  strict  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  the  statute  respecting  its  signing, 
sealing,  and  recording/*  Each  and  every  one  of  the  integral 
parts  of  the  execution  is  essential  to  the  perfection  of  the  patent, 
and  until  all  of  the  requirements  have  been  complied  with  the 
government  has  not  executed  a  patent  for  a  grant  of  land/^ 

A  patent  issued  by  the  state  must  usually  be  signed  by  the 
governor,  and  sealed  with  the  seal  of  the  state/*''  Recitals  in 
patents  are  governed  by  the  same  rules  that  govern  recitals  in 
deeds,  and  a  person  who  traces  his  title  to  a  patent  is  charged  with 
notice  of  the  facts  contained  in  its  recitals/^ 

§  223.     Delivery,  acceptance  and  recording  of  patents. — 

Title  by  patent  from  the  United  States  is  title  by  record,  and 
the  delivery  of  the  instrument  to  the  patentee  is  not,  as  in  a  con- 
veyance by  a  private  person,  essential  to  pass  the  title.  While  it 
is  customary  to  deliver  a  patent  to  the  claimant,  as  in  the  case  of 
deeds,  yet  delivery  of  it  is  not  necessary/^ 

Acceptance  of  the  patent  on  the  part  of  the  patentee  is  necessary 
to  the  taking  effect  of  the  patent,^^  but  acceptance  will  be  pre- 
sumed from  the  efforts  of  the  patentee  to  procure  the  patent,^** 
or  from  the  benefit  he  is  to  derive  therefrom."^ 

The  patent  is  required  to  be  recorded  in  the  general  land  office, 
in  books  kept  for  that  purpose, ^^  but  is  not  required  to  be  recorded 
in  the  county  where  the  land  is  located/^  The  acts  of  congress 
provide  for  the  record  of  all  patents  for  land  in  an  office,  and  in 
books  kept  for  that  purpose.  An  officer  called  the  "recorder"  is 
appointed  to  make  and  keep  these  records.  He  is  required  to 
record  every  patent  before  it  is  issued,  and  countersign  the  instru- 

13  McGarrahan  v.   New  Idria  Min.  Pac.  647 ;  Rogers  v.  Clark  Iron  Co., 

Co.,  49  Cal.  331,    (afifd.  in  96  U.    S.  104  Minn.  198,  116  N.  W.  739;  Say- 

316,  24  L.  ed.  630.)  ward  v.  Thompson,  11  Wash.  706,  40 

1*  McGarrahan  v.  New  Idria  Min-  Pac.  379. 

ing  Co.,  96  U.  S.  316,  24  L.  ed.  630.  i'->  Le  Roy  v.  Jamison,  3  Sawy.  (U. 

15  McGarrahan  v.  New  Idria  Min-  S.)   369,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  8271. 

ing  Co.,  96  U.  S.  316,  24  L.  ed.  630.  ^o  United  States  v.   Schurz,  102  U. 

i«  State  V.  Morgan,  52  Ark.  150,  12  S.  378,  26  L.  ed.  167. 

S.   W.  243;   Hulick   v.    Scovil,   9   111.  21  Wood  v.   Pittman,   113  Ala.  207, 

159;  Exum  v.  Brister,  35  Miss.  391;  20  So.  972. 

Jarrett   v.    Stevens,    36   W.    Va.   445,  22  United  States  v.   Schurz,   102  U. 

15  S.  E.  177.  S.  378.  26  L.  ed.  167. 

1^  Bonner  v.  Ware,  10  Ohio  465.  2.3  Lomax  v.  Pickering,  173  U.  S.  26, 

18  Eltzroth  V.  Ryan,  89  Cal.  135,  26  19  Sup.  Ct.  416,  43  L.  ed.  601. 


§    224  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  246 

ment  to  be  delivered  to  the  grantee.  This,  then  is  the  final  record 
of  the  transaction, — the  legally  prescribed  act  which  completes 
the  "title  by  record,"  and  when  this  is  done  the  grantee  is  vested 
with  that  title.-* 

The  state  statutes  in  regard  to  the  recording  of  conveyances 
do  not  apply  to  patents  issued  by  the  state  to  its  lands.  Such  in- 
struments may  be  recorded,  and  generally  are,  but  their  effect  as 
vesting  title  and  affording  notice  is  not  dependent  upon  their  being 
recorded.  A  statute  authorizing  the  recording  of  such  convey- 
ances without  acknowledgment  is  permissive  only.^^  Upon  the 
due  execution  and  recording  of  the  patent  the  grantee  is  entitled 
to  the  possession  thereof. ^"^ 

§  224.  Validity  of  patents. — Officers  of  the  government, 
in  issuing  patents,  act  ministerially,  and  can  rightfully  act  only 
in  pursuance  of  some  express  provision  of  law.  They  are  pre- 
sumed to  do  their  duty,  and  courts  of  law  accord  the  presump- 
tion of  validity  to  all  proceedings  necessary  to  uphold  the  patent 
executed  by  them.-^  Thus  if  the  patent  is  regular  on  its  face  it  is 
of  itself  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  preliminary  steps  required 
by  law  for  its  issuance  had  been  regularly  taken  before  it  was 
issued, ^^  that  the  patent  was  regularly  issued,  is  valid,  and  passes 
the  legal  title. -^  And  a  valid  patent  can  not  be  invalidated  by 
subsequent  legislation. ^° 

A  patent  from  the  state,  not  void  on  its  face,  can  not  be  col- 
laterally attacked.^*  But  a  court  of  law  will  always  treat  as  void 
a  patent  which  appears  on  its  face  to  have  been  issued  without 
authority  of  law,^"  and  a  court  of  equity  will  afford  relief  as 
against  others  than  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,*  where  there 

'     24  United  States  v.   Schurz,   102  U.  N.  W.  469 ;  Rogers  v.  Clark  Iron  Co., 

S.   378,   26   L.    ed.    167;    Marbury   v.  104  Minn.  198,  116  N.  W.  739. 

Madison,  1  Cranch  (U.  S.)   137,  2  L.  29jenkins  v.  Trager,  40  Fed.  726; 

ed.  60.  Steeple  v.  Downing.  60  Ind.  478 ;  Hill 

-^  Patterson  v.   Langston,  69  Miss.  v.  Miller,  36  Mo.  182. 

400,  11  So.  932.  30  Kidd  v.  Central  Trust  &c.  Co.,  23 

2"  United  States  v.  Schurz,   102  U.  Ky.  L.  1402,  65  S.  W.  355. 

S.  378,  26  L.  ed.  167.  si  Frellscn   v.    Crandell,   217   U.   S. 

27  Ledbettcr  v.  Borland,  128  Ala.  71,  30  Sup.  Ct.  490,  54  L.  ed.  670;  Hill 
418,  29  So.  579.  v.  Miller,  36  Mo.  182  ;  New  York,  C.  & 

28  Hooper  v.  Young.  140  Cal.  274,  74  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Aldridge,  135  N. 
Pac.  140,  98  Am.  St.  50;  Smith  v.  Y.  83,  32  N.  E.  50,  17  L.  R.  A.  516; 
Pipe,  3  Colo.  187 ;  Combs  v.  Dodd,  4  Steiner  v.  Coxe,  4  Pa.  St.  13. 

Rob.  (La.)  58;  Webber  v.  Pere  Mar-  32  Ledbetter  v.  Borland,  128  Ala. 
quette  Boom  Com.,  62  Mich.  626,  30    418,  29  So.  579. 


247  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS  §  225 

has  been  fraud  in  its  procurement  or  mistake  in  its  issuance,  even 
though  the  patent  is  vaHd  on  its  face.^^ 

Where  a  patent  has  been  issued  to  a  person  other  than  the  one 
entitled  thereto,  the  latter  may  procure  a  decree  establishing  a 
constructive  trust  in  his  favor,  and  requiring  the  patentee  to  make 
a  conveyance  to  him.^'*  A  patent  for  lands  which  have  been  re- 
served by  the  government  authorities  from  disposal,  is  void.^^ 
Also  a  patent  to  land  previously  patented  passes  no  title. ^'^  A 
patent  issued  to  a  person  not  in  existence  is  a  nullity,  but  where 
it  is  issued  to  a  person  under  an  assumed  name  it  is  valid,  and  a 
conveyance  by  such  person  under  his  assumed  name  passes  the 
title  to  the  grantee. ^^  Every  purchaser  under  a  patent  is  charged 
with  notice  of  any  defect  appearing  upon  its  face.^* 

§  225.  Patents  issued  after  death  of  claimant. — Statutes 
usually  provide  that  when  a  person,  entitled  to  claim  the  benefits 
of  a  settler  or  entryman,  dies  before  obtaining  a  patent,  the  pat- 
ent is  generally  issued  to  his  widow  or  heirs.^''  In  such  case  the 
heirs  do  not  take  the  title  by  descent  from  their  ancestor,  but  the 
land  is  conveyed  to  them  directly  from  the  government  by  virtue 
of  the  privilege  of  purchase  given  to  them  expressly  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute.*"  The  laws  of  descent  of  the  state  in  which 
the  land  is  situated  governs  in  determining  who  are  the  grantees 
in  such  a  patent.*^  A  patent  issued  to  the  heirs  of  a  deceased 
entryman  passes  title  directly  to  them  as  substituted  beneficiaries, 
who  take  by  purchase  and  not  by  descent,  and  the  title  vests  in 
such  heirs  by  the  grant,  and  not  as  successors  to  the  interest  of  the 
deceased  entryman.*-  If  the  patent  is  issued  in  the  name  of  the 
holder  of  the  certificate  after  his  death,  it  takes  effect  for  the  ben- 
efit of  his  heirs  or  devises.*^  Where  a  patent  is  issued  to  a  man's 

33  St.    Louis    Smelting    &    Refining  3^  Thomas   v.    Wyatt,   31    Mo.    188, 

Co.,  V.  Kemp,  104  U.  S.  636,  26  L.  ed.  11  Am.  Dec.  640. 

875;  Sparks  v.  Pierce,  115  U.  S.  408,  38  Bell  v.  Duncan,  11  Ohio  192. 

6  Sup.  Ct.  102,  29  L.  ed.  428;  Sanford  39  wittenbrock     v.     Wheadon.    128 

V.  Sanford,  139  U.  S.  642,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  150,  60  Pac.  664,  79  Am.  St.  32. 

666,  35  L.  ed.  290;  Gibson  v.  Chou-  ^o  Caldwell  v.  Miller,  44  Kans.  12. 

teau,  39  Mo.  536.  23   Pac.   946;    Dawson   v.   Mayall,  45 

31  Widdicombe  v.  Childers,   124  U.  Minn.  408,  48  N.  W.  12. 

S.  400,  8  Sup.  Ct.  517,  31  L.  ed.  427.  4i  Braun   v.   Mathieson,    139    Iowa 

35Klauber  v.  Higgins,  117  Cal.  451,  409,  116  N.  W.  789. 

49  Pac.  466.  42  Braun    v.    Mathieson,    139    Iowa 

3e  Hamilton  v.  Steele  (Ky.),  117  S.  409,  116  N.  W.  789. 

W.  378 ;    Stone  v.    Perkins,  217   Mo.  ^s  Schedda    v.    Sawyer,    4    McLean 

586,  117  S.  W.  717.  (U.    S.)    181,    Fed.    Cas.   No.    12443; 

Stubblefield  v.  Boggs,  2  Ohio  St.  216. 


§    226  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  248 

"legal  representative",  or  to  his  "heirs",  it  is  held  to  be  the  inten- 
tion of  the  land  department  to  leave  the  question  open  to  inquiry 
in  the  proper  court  as  to  the  party  to  whom  the  patent  shall 
inure/*  Where  a  patent  was  issued  to  the  heirs  of  a  deceased 
pre-emptor  dying  without  having  consummated  his  claim,  it  was 
held  that  their  title  was  superior  to  that  of  a  grantee  of  the  pre- 
emptor  holding  under  a  conveyance  executed  after  final  proof.*''' 

§  226.  Operation  and  effect  of  patents. — While  the  naked 
legal  title  to  public  lands  is  in  the  government  until  the  issuance 
of  a  patent  therefor,  the  beneficial  ownership  or  equitable  title 
is  vested  in  an  entryman  from  the  time  he  receives  a  certificate  of 
purchase  from  the  land  office,  showing  full  payment  therefor. 
A  patent  from  the  government,  issued  in  pursuance  of,  and  based 
solely  and  exclusively  upon,  a  prior  entry  accompanied  by  full 
payment  of  the  purchase-price,  does  not  convey  to  the  entryman 
a  new  and  independent  title  disconnected  with  his  equitable  title 
derived  from  such  entry  and  final  payment,  but  converts  the  im- 
perfect or  equitable  title  into  a  perfect  legal  title. *'^  The  patent 
carries  the  legal  title  in  fee  simple,*^  and  divests  the  land  depart- 
ment of  all  authority  over  and  control  of  the  land.**  The  gov- 
ernment may,  however,  revoke  the  patent  because  of  an  irreg- 
ularity pertaining  to  its  issue. *^ 

When  the  patent  is  issued,  it  dates  back,  as  against  intervening 
claimants,  to  the  time  when  the  equitable  title  vested  in  the  pat- 
entee by  payment  of  the  purchase-price,  or  otherwise. ^^  But  a 
patent  for  lands  which  have  been  reserved  by  the  government 
from  disposal,  is  void,  and  conveys  no  title  to  the  patentee.^^ 

§  227.  Construction  of  patents. — Government  patents  or 
grants  must  be  construed  liberally  as  to  the  government  and 

44  Cooper  V.  Wilder  (Cal.),  41  Pac.  149,  5   Sup.   Ct.   399,  28  L.  ed.  962; 

26.  Hagan  v.   Ellis,   39  Fla.  463,  22   So. 

4-;  Tennessee   Coal    I.    &   R.    Co.   v.  727,  63  Am.  St.  167;   Johnson  v.  Pa- 

Tutwiler,  108  Ala.  483,  18  So.  668.  cific  Coast  Steamship  Co.,  2  Alaska 

40  Hagan   v.   Ellis,   39   Fla.  463,  22  224. 

So.  727,  63  Am.  St.  167.  49  Smith  v.  Crandall,  118  La.  1052, 

47  Niles   V.    Cedar    Paint   Club,    175  43  So.  699. 

U.'S.  300,  20  Sup.  Ct.  124,  44  L.  ed.  so  Gibson  v.  Chouteau,  13  Wall.  (U. 

171;    Fordyce  v.   Woman's   Christian  S.)    92,   20   L.   ed.   534;    Hus.sman   v. 

Nat.  Library  Assn.  79  Ark.  550,  96  S.  Durham.   165  U.   S.   114,   17  Sup.  Ct. 

W.  155,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  485;  Wig-  253,  41   L.  ed.  664;  Waters  v.  Bush, 

gins  V.  Lusk,   12  111.   132 ;  Verden  v.  42  Iowa  255. 

Coleman,  4  Ind.  457.                       ■  ^i  Klauber  v.  Higgins,  117  Cal.  451, 

4sBicknell  v.  Comstock,  113  U.  S.  49  Pac.  466. 


249  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS  §  228 

Strictly  as  to  the  grantee  or  patentee,  and  nothing  will  be  taken  to 
pass  by  implication.^^    The  reason  for  this  rule  is  that  the  state 
or  government  is  entitled  to  be  protected  against  the  encroach- 
ments of  private  interests  upon  its  sovereign  rights  and  against 
the  greed  of  monopolistic  corporations.'^    It  has  been  held,  how- 
ever, that  the  rule  does  not  apply  in  its  full  extent  to  public 
grants  made  upon  adequate  consideration.'*   So,  where  the  grant 
is  gratuitous,  it  will  be  construed  strictly  as  against  the  grantee.'^ 
But  a  grant  which  is  made  in  fulfilment  of  a  pre-existing  obliga- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  government  toward  the  grantee  is  not 
deemed   gratuitous    and    will   be    construed    favorably    for   the 
grantee.^"     Public  grants  are  not  to  be  destroyed  or  be  held  in- 
effectual for  uncertainty  if  by  any  reasonable  means  the  intention 
of  the  parties  can  be  shown,  and  these  means  are  not  to  be  con- 
fined to  what  appears  on  the  face  of  the  instrument."     Where 
there  is  ambiguity  in  the  descriptive  words  of  a  grant  respecting 
the  quantity,  character,  or  duration  of  the  estate  conveyed,  evi- 
dence of  the  intention  of  the  parties  at  the  time  the  instrument 
was  executed  is  admissible  in  interpreting  it.'^    If  the  description 
indicates  the  boundaries  of  the  land  granted,  such  boundaries 
will  control  a  recital  as  to  the  quantity  of  land  included  in  the 
grant.'^    When  the  government  grants  land  for  a  consideration, 
and  does  not  reserve  any  rights  or  interests  that  would  ordinarily 
pass  by  the  rules  of  law,  and  does  no  act  which  indicates  an  in- 
tention to  make  such  reservation,  the  grant  includes  all  that 
would  pass  by  it  if  it  were  a  private  grant.*^° 

§  228.  Conclusiveness  of  patents. — The  issuance  of  a  pat- 
ent to  lands  over  which  the  land  department  has  jurisdiction  as 
a  quasi  judicial  tribunal  is  both  a  judgment  and  a  conveyance,^^ 

52  United  States  v.  Arredondo.  6  (U.  S.)  562,  9  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4,  951; 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  691,  8  L.  ed.  547;  Swann     Hodge  v.  Donald,  55  Tex.  344. 

V.  Jenkins,  82  Ala.  478,  2  So.  136;  "People  ex  rel  Underbill  v.  Sax- 
Oakland  V.  Oakland  Water  Front  Co..  ton,  15  App.  Div.  263,  44  N.  Y.  S. 
118  Cal.  160,  50  Pac.  277;  Wilcoxon  211. 

V.  McGhee,  12  111.  381.  54  Am.  Dec.  ^s  Mulford  v.  Le  Franc.  26  Cal.  88  ; 

409;  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  24  Adams  v.  Frothingham,  3  Mass.  352, 

Minn.  517.  3  Am.  Dec.   151 ;   Kanne  v.  Otty,  25 

53  DeWitt  V.  Elmira  Transfer  Co.,  Ore.  531,  36  Pac  537. 

134  N.  Y.  495,  32  N.  E.  42.  ^^  Stein  v.  Ashby.  24  Ala.  521. 

5*  Cbarles  River  Bridge  v.  Warren  «"  Jobnson    v.    Johnson,    14    Idaho 

Bridge,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  346;  Langdon  561.  95  Pac.  499. 

V.  New  York,  93  N.  Y.  129.  "^  Le    Marcbel    v.    Teagarden,    152 

55  Globe  Mill  Co.  v.  Bcllingbam  Bay  Fed.  662 ;  Paterson  v.  Ogden,  114  Cal. 
Imp.  Co..  10  Wash.  458.  38  Pac.  1112.  43,  74  Pac.  443,  99  Am.  St.  31. 

56  Forsythe  v.   Ballance,  6  McLean 


§    228  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  250 

and  is  impervious  to  collateral  attack/'-    The  patent  is  conclusive 
in  a  court  of  law''^  as  to  the  character  of  the  land  conveyed,"*  as 
to  the  description  of  the  land/'"'  and  the  extent  of  the  right  passing 
under  the  grant.'"'  The  recitals  in  a  patent  are  evidence  against  all 
persons  claiming  under  it  or  by  title  arising  or  originating  subse- 
quent to  it/^  But  the  judgment  and  conveyance  of  the  department 
do  not  conclude  the  rights  of  the  claimants  to  the  land.    Such 
rights  rest  on  established  principles  of  law  and  fixed  rules  of  pro- 
cedure, which  condition  their  initiation  and  prosecution,  the  appli- 
cation of  which  to  the  facts  of  each  case  determine  its  right  deci- 
sion; and,  if  the  officers  of  the  land  department  are  induced  to  is- 
sue a  patent  to  the  wrong  party  by  an  erroneous  view  of  the  law, 
or  by  a  gross  or  fraudulent  mistake  of  the  facts,  the  rightful  claim- 
ant is  not  remediless.^*^    The  courts  will  exercise  their  equitable 
powers  to  control  and  limit  the  operation  of  a  patent  as  between 
adverse  claimants  whenever  it  has  been  made  to  appear  that  by  a 
mistaken  application  of  the  law  to  the  facts  of  the  case  by  the 
officers  of  the  land  department  the  patent  has  been  issued  to  the 
wrong  person,  or  when  the  holder  of  the  legal  title  under  it  has 
obtained  it  by  fraud  upon  the  rights  of  one  who  is  entitled  to  it.'^'' 
The  general   rule  of  law,   which  accords  the  presumption   of 
validity  to  all  proceedings  necessary  to  uphold  a  patent  issued  by 
the  federal  government,  does  not  prevent  the  court  from  treating 
as  void  a  patent  which  appears  on  its  face  to  have  been  issued 
without  authority,  and  proof  extrinsic  of  the  instrument  itself 
is  admissible  to  ascertain  whether  it  was  issued  without  author- 
ity.^°     When  the  officers  of  the  land  department  grant  lands 
according  to  an  actual  survey  of  the  United  States,  and  when 
there  is  a  conflict  between  the  quantity  expressed  in  the  patent 
and  that  shown  by  the  actual  survey  established,  the  survey  will 
control."^ 

c2  Le    Marchel    v.    Teagarden,     152  «"  Bachop  v.  Critchlow,  142  Pa.  St. 

Fed.  662;   Chauvin  v.  Louisiana  Oys-  518.  21  Atl.  984. 

ter  Commission,  121  La.  10,  46  So.  38.  "**  James  v.  Germania  Iron  Co.,  107 

c^  Knabe  v.  Burden,  88  Ala.  436,  7  Fed.  597,  46  C.  C.  A.  476. 

So    92  •^"  Murray  v.  Montana  &c.  Mfg.  Co., 

«4  Paterson  v.  Ogden,   141  Cal.  43,  25  Mont.  14.  63  Pac.  719. 

74  Pac   443,  99  .A.m.  St.  31.  7o  Lcdbetter    v.    Borland,    128    Ala. 

G5  Aliller  V.  Grunsky,   141   Cal.  441,  418,  29  So.  579. 

66  Pac.  858,  75  Pac.  48.  "^  Stonewall  Phosphate  Co.  v.  Pey- 

c«Barringer  v.   Davis    (Iowa),   112  ton,  39  Fla.  726,  23  So.  440. 
N.  W.  208. 


251  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS  §  229 

§  229.     Rescission,  cancelation  and  correction  of  patents. 

We  have  seen  that  the  issuance,  recording  and  acceptance  of  a 

patent  divests  the  government  of  all  title  to  the  land  granted  and 
control  over  same,  and  neither  the  executive  nor  the  land  depart- 
ment has  any  power  to  recall,  cancel,  annul  or  rescind  the  patent 
for  any  cause  whatsoever.  But  the  only  way  in  which  a  patent 
improperly  issued  can  be  annulled  is  by  decree  of  court  in  a  suit 
instituted  by  the  government  for  that  purpose."  In  bringing  such 
suit  the  government  does  not  act  in  its  capacity  as  a  sovereign,  but 
as  a  litigant  bound  by  the  same  rules  as  a  private  citizen." 

Equity  may  relieve  against  a  patent  fraudulently  obtained 
either  by  cancelation  of  the  patent  or  by  declaring  the  patentee 
a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  complainant,  but  the  latter  relief 
may  be  granted  only  where  the  fraud  complained  of  operated 
to  prevent  the  complainant  from  establishing,  in  the  proceedings 
before  the  officers  of  the  land  department,  his  own  right  to 
a  patent.^^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  a  patent  will  not 
be  canceled  on  the  ground  that  it  was  procured  by  the  fraud  of 
the  patentee  where  the  land  has  passed  into  the  hands  of  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  and  without  notice  of  the  fraud, 
even  though  such  purchase  was  made  before  such  patent  was 
issued  and  while  the  patentee  had  only  an  equitable  title."  If 
a  patent  has  been  erroneously  issued,  through  fraud,  mis- 
take or  wrong  views  of  the  law,  to  one  party,  when  another 
was  legally  entitled  to  it,  it  may  be  canceled  at  the  suit  of  the 
government,^''  provided  the  rights  of  an  innocent  purchaser  has 
not  intervened."  A  patent  issued  by  mistake  which  is  recalled 
and  canceled  before  any  acceptance  does  not  pass  any  title  from 
the  government.^®  But  the  land  department  has  no  power  to  can- 
cel an  entry  for  fraud  or  because  the  lands  entered  were  not  sub- 
ject to  entry  without  giving  the  entryman  notice  and  a  hearing." 

The  rule  is  well  settled  that  where  an  attempt  is  made  to  annul 

"In  re  Emblen,   161  U.   S.  52,   16  131,  31  L.  ed.  182;  People  v.  Swift, 

Sup.  Ct.  487,  40  L.  ed.  613 ;  Gilmore  96  Cal.  165,  31  Pac.  16. 
V.  Sapp.  100  111.  297  ;  Bradley  v.  Dells        " «  Janes  v.  Wilkinson,  2  Kans.  App. 

Lumber  Co.,  105  Wis.  245,  81  N.  W.  361,  42  Pac.  735. 
394.  '^'  United   States  v.  Burlington  &c. 

"  Lynch  v.  United  States,  13  Okla.  R.  Co.,  98  U.  S.  334,  25  L.  ed.  198. 
142,  72>  Pac.  1095.  ^nVood  v.  Pittman,  113  Ala.  207, 

7*  Jameson  v.  James,  155  Cal.  275,  20  So.  972. 
100  Pac.  700.  'QDelles   v.    Second    Nat.    Bank,    7 

^5  Colorado  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Uni-  Wyo.  66,  65  Pac.  190,  75  Am.  St.  875. 
ted  States,  123  U.  S.  307,  8  Sup.  Ct. 


§  230 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


252 


or  avoid  grants,  patents  or  other  solemn  evidences  of  title,  em- 
anating from  the  government  under  its  official  seal,  the  great  im- 
portance and  necessity  of  the  stability  of  titles  demands  that  the 
effort  to  set  them  aside,  annul  or  avoid  them,  or  to  correct  mis- 
takes in  them,  shall  only  be  successful  when  the  evidence  is  clear, 
strong  and  satisfactory.**" 

§  230.  Abstracting  patents. — The  initial  step,  in  all  ordi- 
nary cases  being  the  patent  from  the  United  States,  the  abstract 
begins  with  that  document.  If  the  patent  can  not  be  found  re- 
corded in  the  office  of  the  recorder  or  registrar  of  deeds  in  the 
county  in  which  the  land  is  situated,  an  office  copy  may  be  pro- 
cured from  the  general  land  office  at  Washington,  upon  filing 
there  the  affidavit  of  the  owner  stating  his  ownership  and  occupa- 
tion of  the  land,  and  the  purpose  for  which  the  copy  is  wanted. 
The  points  to  be  noticed  in  the  abstract  are,  the  date  of  the 
issue,  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  it  was  issued,  the  words 
of  inheritance,  the  recital  of  the  payment  of  the  purchase-money, 
the  person  by  whom  the  payment  was  made,  the  recital  of  any 
assignment  by  the  certificate  holder,  his  representatives  or  as- 
signs, the  signing,  sealing  and  volume  and  page  of  the  record  at 
Washington  and  in  the  county  where  the  land  lies. 

The  following  is  deemed  a  sufficient  showing  of  a  patent  from 
the  United  States  government : 

Patent. 

Certificate  No.  9887. 

Date  of  Certificate,  January  15, 

1885. 
Certificate    recorded    February 

17,  1886. 
Certificate  recorded  in  Book  98, 

page  74. 
Date  of  patent,  May  15,  1890. 
Patent    recorded    August    17, 

1890. 
Patent   recorded   in   Book   99, 
page  635. 

Consideration,  $200.00,  paid 
by  patentee.     Grants,  the  Southwest  quarter  of  Section  No.  31, 


United  States 


to 


Samuel  Hawkins. 


80  Maxwell    Land-Grant    Case,    121     949;  United   States  v.  Budd,   144  U. 
U.  S.  325,  7  Sup.  Ct.  1015,  30  L.  ed.     S.  161,  12  Sup.  Ct.  575,  36  L.  ed.  384. 


253  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  PATENTS  §  230 

Township  No.  25.  North  of  Range  8  East,  containing  160  acres, 
to  said  Samuel  Hawkins. 

Where  the  patent  has  issued  it  is  customary  to  omit  all  refer- 
ence to  the  certificate  or  receipt  except  the  number  thereof. 

Where  the  patent  shown  consists  of  a  copy  recently  received 
from  the  General  Land  Office  record,  the  commissioner's  certifi- 
cate should  follow  immediately  after  the  abstract  of  the  patent; 
or,  as  is  now  generally  the  practice,  an  abstract  of  the  entry, 
showing  the  issuance  and  date  of  the  receiver's  receipt  and  cer- 
tificate, its  number,  and  the  book  and  page  where  recorded,  should 
immediately  precede  the  abstract  of  the  patent. 

The  formal  execution  of  a  state  patent  must  conform  to  the 
statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  its  issue.  The  legislative  act  under 
which  the  grant  was  issued  must  be  abstracted,  showing  the  date 
of  the  passage  of  the  act,  and  for  what  purpose  the  grant  was 
made.  All  matters  showing  a  compliance  with  the  conditions  of 
the  grant  must  appear.  The  patent  or  grant  must  show  the  sig- 
nature of  the  public  officer  thereto,  must  be  sealed  with  the  offi- 
cial state  seal,  must  be  dated  and  recorded.  Every  step  required 
by  law  to  divest  the  state  of  its  title  must  be  shown. 


CHAPTER  X 

SURVEYS,  PLATS  AND  SUBDIVISIONS 
SEC.  SEC. 

235.  Historical    view    of    government  239.  Plats  and  subdivisions, 
land  survey.  240.  Maps  and  plats  as  evidence. 

236.  Laying  off  the   land   into   town-  241.  Effect   of    reference   in    descrip- 
ships.  tions  to  maps  or  plats. 

237.  Laying    off    the    townships    into  242.  Abstracting  plat  and  subdivision, 
sections.  243.  Vacation  of  plat. 

238.  Subdividing  the  sections.  244.  Dedication  by  maps  or  plats. 

§  235.  Historical  view  of  government  land  survey. — In 
order  to  prepare  public  lands  for  sale  and  settlement,  it  became 
necessary  to  survey  it  into  suitable  tracts.  Accordingly,  in  1784, 
the  Continental  Congress  appointed  a  committee  to  devise  a  sys- 
tem of  land  measurement.  The  first  plan,  which  has  been  used 
to  some  extent  in  Virginia,  was  to  take  a  square  tract  of  land, 
which  was  called  "hundreds,"  as  the  unit  of  measurement.  This 
tract  was  ten  miles  each  way,  and  the  sections  were  numbered 
from  one  to  one  hundred,  beginning  at  the  northwest  corner  and 
numbering  to  the  east  and  back  again.  In  1785  the  plan  was 
amended  at  the  suggestion  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  chairman  of 
the  committee,  by  reducing  the  unit  of  measurement  to  six  miles 
each  way.  This  unit  was  called  a  "township,"  and  the  sections 
thereof  were  numbered  from  one  to  thirty-six,  beginning  at  the 
southeast  corner,  and  thence  alternately  west  and  east.  Finally, 
in  1805,  the  present  complete  system  of  survey  was  adopted. 
This  system  was  first  applied  to  the  survey  of  the  Northwest 
Territory,  and  the  system  has  been  employed  in  surveying  the 
lands  of  the  states  of  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Florida  and  all  the 
states  north  of  the  Ohio  and  west  of  the  Mississippi  river,  except 
Texas.  A  map  of  the  United  States,  published  by  the  General 
Land  Office,  shows  every  meridian,  base  line  and  township  that 
has  been  surveyed  by  this  method  in  the  different  states. 

The  work  of  surveying  the  public  lands  is  now  a  part  of  the 
work  of  the  General  Land  Office,  one  division  of  the  department 
of  the  interior,  and  is  under  the  control  of  the  Commissioner  of 
the  General  Land  Office,  who  is  subject  to  the  direction  of  the 

■   254 


255  SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS  §    236 

President.  Prior  to  March  3,  1849,  it  had  been  a  part  of  the 
duties  assigned  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  next  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  then  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

§  236.  Laying  off  the  lands  into  townships. — In  making 
a  survey  of  lands  by  the  existing  rectangular  system  it  is  neces- 
sary to  have  some  substantial  point  from  whence  a  start  may 
be  made.  Such  a  point  is  selected  as  can  readily  be  referred  to, 
usually  the  mouth  of  some  river,  and  from  such  point  a  line  is 
run  due  north  to  the  north  line  of  the  state  or  district  to  be  sur- 
veyed. This  first  line  is  called  the  prime  meridian.  To  illustrate  : 
The  first  prime  meridian  is  a  line  running  north  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Great  Miami  River  in  Ohio,  and  forms  the  western  boun- 
dary of  that  state;  the  second  is  a  line  running  north  from  the 
Little  Blue  Creek  in  Indiana;  the  third  is  a  line  running  north 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  River;  the  fourth  is  a  line  running 
north  from  the  mouth  of  the  Illinois  River;  and  the  fifth  is  a  line 
running:  north  from  the  mouth  of  the  Arkansas  River.  In  the  same 
manner  other  prime  meridians  are  drawn  farther  west,  there  being 
twenty-four  in  all,  and  where  the  sectional  system  of  survey  is 
employed  these  prime  meridians  are  first  established.  Lines  are 
next  run  north  and  south  parallel  with  the  principal  meridians  six 
miles  apart,  beginning  at  the  principal  meridians.  These  lines 
mark  the  country  off  into  strips  six  miles  wide,  and  each  strip  is 
called  a  range.  These  ranges  are  numbered,  beginning  with  one, 
east  and  west  of  the  principal  meridian.  Owing  to  the  curvature 
of  the  earth's  surface  these  range  lines  get  nearer  together  as  they 
are  extended  toward  the  magnetic  pole.  In  order  to  keep  the 
ranges  as  near  as  possible  to  the  prescribed  width  of  six  miles,  at 
every  twenty-four  miles  north  from  the  base  line  a  stop  is  made 
and  the  survey  is  moved  over  again  so  that  the  lines  will  be  six 
miles  apart  again.  Where  a  survey  west  from  one  meridian  meets 
a  surA'ey  east  from  another,  the  last  row  of  townships  or  range 
surveyed  may  not  be  of  the  regulation  width  of  six  miles.  After 
the  range  lines  are  run,  the  east  and  west  lines  are  established. 
The  first  one  drawn  is  designated  the  base  line,  and  all  cross  the 
meridian  lines  at  right  angles.  Other  lines  drawn  parallel  with 
the  base  lines  and  six  miles  apart  cut  the  ranges  into  squares 
forming  the  congressional  townships.  These  townships  are  num- 
bered, beginning  with  one,  north  and  south  from  the  base  line. 

The  accompanying  diagram  is  designed  to  show  the  first  work 


§  237 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


256 


of  a  government  survey,  which  is  to  divide  the  tract  into  town- 
ships. The  ranges,  which  are  numbered  at  the  lower  part  of  the 
diagram,  are  six  miles  wide  at  the  base.  The  hnes  running  east 
and  west  are  six  miles  apart  and  are  called  parallels ;  every  fourth 
one  is  called  a  standard  parallel,  or  correction  line  for  the  reason 
that  distances,  lessened  by  convergency,  as  above  explained,  are 
corrected  on  these  lines  and  made  the  same  as  at  the  base  line. 
The  range  lines  and  parallels  divide  the  surveyed  territory  into 
townships,  designed  to  be  six  miles  square.  The  numbering  of 
the  townships  is  shown  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  diagram. 
Guide  meridians  are  run  as  often  as  may  be  necessary  for  the 
purpose  of  straightening  the  standard  meridian  lines  as  they  be- 
come irregular  in  consequence  of  the  corrections  made  on  the 
standard  parallels. 


1  Sian 

dard 

Pare 

illel 

5 

(0 
Ti 

4 

1.1 
Q) 

Si 

U 
Of 

3 

!?i 

Q. 

2 

31 

ase 

Lin 

e     ^ 

1 

i  ^ 

ill 

H 

I 

I 

1 

§  237.  Laying  ofiF  the  townships  into  sections. — We  have 
seen  that  in  making  a  survey  of  a  new  part  of  the  country  the 
township  lines  are  established  first.  When  this  is  done  the  sec- 
tions are  located  and  the  corners  marked  by  placing  a  stake  or 
stone  at  the  comer,  or  by  digging  a  hole  in  the  ground  or  erect- 
ing a  mound  on  the  spot.  In  wooded  districts  a  tree  is  some- 
times blazed  near  the  section  corner.     These  markers  are  called 


257  SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS  §    237 

"monuments  of  a  survey."  An  ideal  township  under  this  system 
of  surveying  would  produce  thirty-six  exact  sections  of  six  hun- 
dred and  forty  acres  each,  but  owing  to  the  fact,  as  already  ex- 
plained, that  two  north  and  south  lines  get  nearer  together  as  they 
are  extended  north,  the  north  end  of  each  township  is  about  three 
rods  narrower  than  the  south  end.  Also,  owing  to  inaccurate  sur- 
veying, the  east  and  west  lines  which  bound  the  townships  on  the 
north  and  south,  do  not  always  run  parallel  to  each  other.  This 
produces  a  township  of  more  or  less  than  thirty-six  exact  sections 
of  six  hundred  and  forty  acres  each.  To  provide  for  this  irreg- 
ularity the  rows  of  sections  on  the  north  and  west  sides  of  the 
township  are  made  to  contain  an  irregular  number  of  acres,  which 
are  called  "fractional  sections."  All  of  the  sections  of  the  town- 
ship except  those  in  the  rows  bordering  on  the  north  and  west 
lines  of  the  township  are  made  to  contain  six  hundred  and  forty 
acres  each,  while  the  remaining  ones  are  laid  off  out  of  the  land 
remaining  in  the  township.  Thus  we  have  a  township  of  thirty- 
six  sections,  twenty-five  of  which  are  full  sections,  containing  six 
hundred  and  forty  acres  each,  and  eleven  are  fractional  sections, 
containing  a  greater  or  less  number  of  acres.  The  sections  of  a 
congressional  township  are  numbered  from  one  to  thirty-six,  be- 
ginning at  the  northeast  corner,  and  counting  west  therefrom, 
and  then  proceeding  east  on  the  tier  of  sections  next  below,  and 
so  on  until  section  thirty-six  is  reached  in  the  southeast  corner  of 
the  township. 

The  accompanying  diagram  contains  one  full  township  and 
adjacent  parts  of  the  townships  bounding  the  same  on  the  north 
and  west.  The  subdivision  of  townships  is  usually  surveyed  by  a 
different  crew  of  surveyors  than  those  which  survey  the  tract  into 
townships.  The  first  work  of  subdivision  is  to  run  lines  parallel 
with  the  east  line  of  the  township  and  one  mile  apart,  and  to  locate 
monuments  or  stakes  upon  these  lines  a  distance  of  one-half  mile 
apart.  Lines  one  mile  apart  and  parallel  with  the  south  line  of 
the  township  are  next  run,  thus  dividing  the  township  into  one- 
mile  squares,  called  sections,  which  are  designated  by  number, 
as  shown  in  the  diagram.  After  measuring  five  and  one-half 
miles  north  from  the  south  line  of  the  township,  the  distance  re- 
maining may  be  a  few  feet  more  or  a  few  feet  less  than  one-half 
mile,  owing  to  the  discrepancy  of  the  two  measurements;  hence 
the  quarter  sections  on  the  north  are  usually  fractional;  those 

17 — Thomp.  Ab5tr. 


§  238 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


258 


on  the  west  of  each  township  arc  also  fractional,  for  a  similar 
reason. 


36 

1 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 

12 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

18 

17 

16 

15 

14 

13 

24 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

30 

29 

28 

27 

26 

25 

36 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

§  238.  Subdividing  the  sections. — A  section  is  the  small- 
est subdivision  of  which  the  lines  are  actually  run  on  the  ground, 
but  smaller  subdivisions  are  recognized,  these  being  the  "quarter 
section,"  containing  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres,  formed  by 
running  lines  at  right  angles  from  points  on  the  section  boun- 
daries half  way  between  the  corners;  "half  of  quarter  sections,"' 
containing  eighty  acres,  and  "quarter  quarter  sections,"  of  forty 
acres  each.  The  areas  of  the  various  divisions  do  not,  however, 
always  correspond  exactly  to  the  figures  above  given,  owing  to 
irregularities  in  the  surveys,  and  the  convergence  of  the  meridians 
in  going  north.  The  descriptions  of  parts  of  the  fractional  sec- 
tions differ  somewhat  from  the  descriptions  in  the  full  sections, 
and  it  is  accomplished  by  having  lots  numbered  in  each  of  the 
irregular  sections.  If  section  one  contains  more  or  less  than  six 
hundred  and  forty  acres  it  is  surveyed  so  as  to  make  three  hundred 
and  twenty  acres  in  the  south  half  and  the  remaining  acres  con- 
stitute the  north  half.  Then  each  of  the  north  quarters  is  divided 
into  lots  by  a  line  running  east  and  west.  The  south  half  of  the 
northeast  or  northwest  quarter  is  made  to  contain  eighty  acres 


259 


SURVEYS^    PLATS   AND    SUBDIVISIONS 


238 


and  is  called  "lot  one"  of  that  quarter.  The  remainder  of  the 
quarter  is  called  "lot  two"  and  will  contain  more  or  less  than 
eighty  acres,  as  the  section  is  larger  or  smaller  than  six  hundred 
and  forty  acres.  In  sections  six,  seven,  eighteen,  nineteen,  thirty 
and  thirty-one  the  surplus  or  deficient  acreage  is  placed  in  the 
west  half  of  the  section  and  the  east  half  is  made  to  contain  the 
prescribed  three  hundred  and  twenty  acres,  except  in  section  six, 
which  is  also  fractional  in  the  north  half.  Where  the  fractional 
part  occurs  on  the  west  side  of  the  section,  the  lots  are  made  to 
run  north  and  south  with  lot  one  next  to  the  center  line  of  the 
section.  Lot  one  always  contains  eighty  acres,  while  the  remain- 
ing lot  numbered  two  contains  more  or  less  than  eighty  acres,  as 
the  section  is  more  or  less  than  a  full  section  of  six  hundred  and 
forty  acres.  When  the  section  is  very  large  more  than  two  lots 
are  made  in  a  quarter.  In  such  case  several  eighty-acre  lots  are 
marked  off  in  the  fractional  quarters.  As  many  full  eighty-acre 
lots  are  surveyed  as  possible  and  the  last  lot  of  the  quarter  at  the 
north  end  is  left  to  contain  as  near  eighty  acres  as  it  may,  so  that 
it  does  not  contain  one  hundred  and  sixty  acres  or  more.  The 
lots  are  then  numbered  from  one,  beginning  at  the  center  line  of 
the  section.     Where  the  fractional  section  is  of  the  regulation 

N 


W 


of  NW% 

of  NW>^ 

NE  !^ 

/eoA. 

of  NWJ4 

SVz  of  NW^/a 
eoA. 

SOUTH  Vz 
3Z0A 

Diagram  No.  1 


§  238 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


260 


length  but  is  so  narrow  that  a  quarter  thereof  contains  less  than 
eighty  acres,  the  section  is  divided  into  quarter  quarters  the  same 
as  if  it  were  a  full  section,  but  each  quarter  quarter  containing 
less  than  forty  acres. 

The  accompanying  diagram  No.  1  is  designed  to  illustrate  the 
division  of  a  section  into  parts  formed  by  regular  surveyed 
lines,  and  to  furnish  a  description  of  the  various  subdivisions. 

Diagram  No.  2  is  designed  to  illustrate  the  method  of  describ- 
ing government  lands  bounded  on  the  west  by  guide  meridians, 
and  also  lands  bordering  on  meandering  waters.     Whenever  a 


N 


W 


JO 


12 


13 


11 


14 


10 


15 


Diagram  No.  2 


guide  meridian  is  run,  it  is  evident  that  all  sections  lying  di- 
rectly east  must  be  extended  to  it,  thus  making  all  such  sections 
more  than  a  square  mile ;  the  north  and  south  quarter  line  of  each 
section  is  run  as  in  other  sections,  and  all  that  portion  west  of  it 
is  divided  into  lots  as  shown  in  this  diagram.  Assuming  the  sec- 
tion, illustrated  by  diagram  No.  2,  to  belong  to  Township  112  of 
Range  17  West  of  the  fifth  principal  meridian,  the  tract  marked 
"A"  should  be  described  as  follows:  "Lot  four  (4)  of  the 
northwest  quarter  {%)  of  section  eighteen  (18),  of  township 
one  hundred  twelve  (112). north,  of  range  seventeen  (17)  west, 
of  the  fifth  (5th)  principal  meridian,  containing  twenty-two  and 
fifteen-hundredths  (22.15)  acres,  more  or  less,  according  to  the 


261  SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS  §    239 

government  survey  thereof."  The  tract  marked  "B"  should  be 
described  in  a  similar  manner;  the  "southeast  quarter"  of  section 
18  must  be  substituted  for  the  "northwest  quarter";  in  other  re- 
spects the  descriptions  would  be  the  same  except  as  to  acreage. 

§  239.  Plats  and  subdivisions. — Statutes  usually  provide 
that  persons  in  laying  off  any  town  or  addition  thereto,  or  any 
addition  to  any  city  or  town,  or  any  subdivision  of  any  lots  or 
lands  within  the  limits  of  any  city  or  town  shall,  previous 
to  the  sale  of  any  lots  in  such  town,  addition  or  subdivision, 
cause  to  be  recorded  in  the  recorder's  office  of  the  proper  county 
a  correct  plat  of  such  town,  addition  or  subdivision,  with  the  pub- 
lic grounds,  streets  and  alleys  properly  marked,  showing  the 
length  and  width  of  each  and  with  the  lots  regularly  numbered 
and  the  size  thereof  marked  upon  the  plat.  This  plat  is  generally 
required  to  be  acknowledged  by  the  owner  to  entitle  it  to  record. 
Before  admitting  the  plat  to  record,  however,  it  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  and  approved  by  the  duly  authorized  town  or  city 
board,  a  certificate  of  which  approval  must  be  attached  to  the  plat. 
Sometimes  the  surveyor  is  required  to  describe  the  land  surveyed 
and  officially  certify  to  same.  A  plat  of  an  addition  to  a  town  or 
city  implies  a  previous  survey  and  marking  upon  the  ground,  and 
one  claiming  under  a  deed  describing  the  property  surveyed  by 
reference  to  such  plat  may  show  the  existence  of  the  stakes  indi- 
cating the  lines  as  marked  by  the  surveyor.^  In  case  of  a  contest 
as  to  the  boundary  line  between  a  street  and  the  abutting  lots,  the 
original  survey  will  control  the  recorded  plat." 

A  municipality,  in  accepting  and  approving  a  plat,  performs  a 
discretionary  or  judicial  act,  which  the  courts  will  not  review 
unless  some  distinct  legal  duty  has  been  violated.^  The  approval 
of  the  plat  of  a  proposed  addition  to  a  city  by  the  common  council 
does  not  constitute  an  acceptance  of  the  streets  thereon  laid  out, 
or  amount  to  an  act  of  jurisdiction  over  them,  or  impose  an  ob- 
ligation upon  the  city  to  keep  them  in  repair,  although  such  plat 
vests  the  fee  of  the  streets  therein  described  in  the  city.*  The  ex- 
ecution, acknowledgment  and  recording  of  a  plat,  in  conformity 

1  Burke  V.  McCowen,  115  Cal.  481,  -^  Funke  v.  St.  Louis,  122  Mo.  132, 
47  Pac.  367.  26  S.  W.  1034. 

2  Thrush  v.  Graybill,  110  Iowa  585,  *  Downend  v.  Kansas  City.  156  Mo. 
81  N.  W.  798.  60,  56  S.  W.  902,  51  L.  R.  A.  170. 


§    240  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  262 

with  the  statute  operates  as  effectively  as  a  deed  to  convey  the 
title  to  the  streets  therein  mentioned  to  the  municipality.^ 

§  240.  Maps  and  plats  as  evidence. — The  original  plat  of 
a  survey,  when  duly  executed,  acknowledged,  approved  and  re- 
corded according  to  law,  may  always  be  used  in  evidence  to  show 
the  position  of  the  land,  and  is  evidence  of  the  most  potent  kind 
in  determining  the  location  of  the  lines  and  corners/'  But  an  un- 
official tracing  or  copy  of  a  map  is  not  admissible  in  evidence/ 
A  plat,  the  accuracy  of  which  is  attested  by  the  evidence  of  the 
surveyor  who  made  it,  is  admissible  in  evidence  on  the  question 
of  boundary  without  proof  of  its  execution,  authentication  and 
record/  In  a  suit  of  one  railway  company  against  another  rail- 
way company  to  prevent  the  latter  company  from  constructing  a 
railroad  track  across  a  certain  tract  of  land,  of  which  the  plain- 
tiff company  alleged  ownership,  on  a  hearing  of  the  application 
for  an  interlocutory  injunction,  it  was  held  not  error  to  admit  in 
evidence  the  affidavit  of  the  surveyor  and  an  attached  plat  of  the 
land ;  it  being  deposed  by  the  witness  that  he  had  made  the  survey 
and  the  plat,  and  that  it  truly  represented  the  land  in  dispute/ 

§  241.  Effect  of  reference  in  descriptions  to  maps  or  plats. 
— It  is  a  very  common  practice  of  conveyancers  to  refer  in  a  con- 
veyance to  a  map  or  plat.  Such  a  reference  has  the  effect  of  in- 
corporating the  map  or  plat  in  the  conveyance. ^°  The  fact  that 
the  plat  referred  to  is  invalid,  because  not  made  and  filed  in  ac- 
cordance w'ith  statutory  provisions,  does  not  affect  the  deed.  A 
reference  to  a  void  plat  for  a  description  is  just  as  effectual  as  a 
reference  to  a  valid  plat,  if  the  description  is  correct  and  the  plat 
referred  to  is  accessible."  When  there  is  a  conflict  between  a 
map  or  a  plat  referred  to  and  an  actual  survey  the  latter  controls, 
and  the  reference  to  the  map  or  plat  may  be  rejected  as  sur- 
plusage.^- 

■■■*  Wollacott  V.  Chicago,  187  III.  504,  i"  Mastcrson    v.    Munroc,    105    Cal. 

58  N.  E.  426.  431.  38  Pac.  1106,  45  Am    St.  57;  In 

''•  Bell  County  Land  &  Coal  Co.  v.  re  Ferguson's  Appeal,  117  Pa.  St.  426, 

Hcndrickson,  24  Ky.  L.  371,  68  S.  W.  11    Atl.  885;    State   Savings   Bank   v. 

842.  Stewart,  93  Va.  447,  25  S.  E.  543. 

^  Ellison    V.    Barnstrator,    153    Ind.  ^^  Nichols  v.  New  England  Furni- 

146,  54  N.  E.  433.  ture  Co.,  100  Mich.  230,  59  N.  W.  155. 

sjusten  V.  Schaaf,  175  111.  45,51  N.  i- Cleveland  v.  Choate,  77  Cal.  73, 

E.  695.  18  Pac.  875 ;  Racine  v.  Case  Plow  Co., 

9  Atlanta  &  W.   P.   R.   Co.   v.   At-  56  Wis.  539,  14  N.  W.  599. 
lanta  &c.  R.  Co.,  125  Ga.  529,  54  S.  E. 
736. 


263  SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS  |    242 

The  boundaries,  monuments,  courses  and  distances  laid  down 
on  a  map  referred  to  are  as  much  to  be  regarded  the  true  descrip- 
tions of  the  land  as  if  they  were  expressly  recited  in  the  deed/" 
When  lands  are  granted  according  to  an  official  plat  of  a  survey, 
the  plat  itself,  with  all  its  notes,  lines,  descriptions  and  landmarks, 
becomes  as  much  a  part  of  the  grant  or  deed  by  which  they  are 
conveyed,  and  controls  so  far  as  limits  are  concerned,  as  if  such 
descriptive  features  were  written  out  upon  the  face  of  the  deed 
or  the  grant  itself/* 

§  242.  Abstracting  plat  and  subdivision. — Inasmuch  as 
plats  and  subdivisions  depend  for  their  validity  upon  the  statute 
of  each  particular  state  the  manner  of  presentation  in  the  abstract 
will  be  governed  largely  by  the  local  statute.  The  synopsis  should 
contain  the  dedication  and  title  of  the  subdivision,  the  name  of 
the  owner  or  owners,  the  date  of  dedication,  the  fact  of  acknowl- 
edgment by  owner  or  owners,  the  certificate  of  the  officer  taking 
the  acknowledgment,  the  surveyor's  certificate,  approval  by  the 
civic  authorities,  and  the  date  of  recording  the  plat.  The  map 
or  plat  of  the  subdivision  is  sometimes  appended,  but  as  a  rule 
the  book  of  plats  and  page  thereof  where  it  may  be  found  is  all 
that  is  shown.  The  following  is  submitted  as  an  example  of  such 
synopsis : 

Plat,  entitled  "Clifton  Place." 
Dated  February  7,  1903. 
Recorded  February  9,  1903. 
►  Plat  Book  No.  13,  page  18. 


Subdivision 

by 

Edwin  Armstrong. 


Surveyor's  certificate,  by  An- 
cil  Smith,  dated  February  6, 
1903,  certifies  that  he  has  surveyed  a  part  of  the  Southeast  Quar- 
ter of  Section  22,  Township  16  North,  Range  3  East,  of  Marion 
County,  Indiana,  beginning  at,  etc.  [set  out  description  by  sur- 
veyor], into  lots  and  blocks,  as  shown  upon  the  annexed  plat; 
that  said  survey  and  plat  was  made  by  order  and  direction  of  Ed- 
win Armstrong ;  that  said  plat  correctly  represents  all  the  exterior 
boundaries  of  the  land  surveyed  and  the  divisions  thereon  made; 

^3  Erskine  v.  Aloulton.  66  Maine  ^i  Cragin  v.  Powell,  128  U.  S.  691, 
276;  Cunningham  v.  Boston  &c.  R.  9  Sup.  Ct.  203,  32  L.  ed.  566;  Woods 
Co.,  153  Alass,  506,  27  N.  E.  660.  v.  West,  40  Nebr.  307,  58  N.  W.  938. 


§    243  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  264 

and  that  he  has  fully  complied  with  the  provisions  of  the  law  in 
surveying,  subdividing,  and  platting  the  same. 

Acknowledged  by  Edwin  Armstrong,  as  owner,  February  7, 
1903. 

Where  plats  and  subdivisions  have  been  made  by  executors, 
administrators,  guardians  or  trustees  under  order  or  direction  of 
court,  the  synopsis  should  contain  the  court  proceedings  respecting 
same. 

§  243.  Vacation  of  plat. — Most  statutes  provide  that  any 
plat  of  lands  lying  without  the  corporate  limits  of  a  city  or  town, 
or  any  part  thereof,  may  be  vacated  by  the  owner  or  owners 
thereof  at  any  time  before  the  sale  of  any  lots  therein,  by  a  writ- 
ten instrument  declaring  the  same  to  be  vacated.  Such  instru- 
ment is  usually  required  to  be  executed  and  acknowledged  and 
recorded  in  like  manner  as  deeds  of  land.  The  effect  of  such  va- 
cation operates  to  destroy  the  force  and  effect  of  the  plat,  and 
to  divest  all  public  rights  in  streets,  alleys  and  other  public 
grounds  therein  laid  out  or  described  in  such  plat.  If  any  of  the 
lots  have  been  sold  the  plat  may  be  thus  vacated  if  the  owners  of 
the  lots  join  in  the  execution  of  the  vacating  instrument. 

Also  provision  is  made  for  vacating  plats  and  additions  within 
or  without  the  limits  of  a  town  or  city  by  court  proceedings  insti- 
tuted by  the  owner  or  owners  of  any  lot  or  lots  therein.  After 
vacation  the  descriptions  of  the  several  lots  and  parcels  of  the 
plat  is  preserved  as  set  forth  in  the  plat  to  which  the  proportionate 
parts  of  any  street  or  alley,  or  part  thereof  vacated,  shall  be 
added,  unless  the  owners  of  ever}^  part  or  parcel  thereof  consent 
in  writing  that  such  lands  be  described  as  before  such  plat  was 
made,  or  by  acreage,  metes  or  lx)unds,  or  other  proportionate 
description. 

Where  the  vacation  is  l^y  written  instrument  as  first  above  de- 
scribed, a  synopsis  of  the  instrument  is  all  that  need  be  set  out  in 
the  abstract,  but  where  the  vacation  is  by  court  proceedings,  all 
the  steps  taken  in  such  proceeding  must  be  shown. 

Where  no  conveyances  of  lots  have  been  made  the  synopsis  of 
the  vacation  should  follow  immediately  after  the  subdivision  and 
plat  affected  thereby,  but  where  conveyances  have  been  made,  such 


Vacation 

by 

Frank  A.  Maus. 


265  SURVEYS,    PLATS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS  §    244 

conveyances  will  intervene  in  chronological  order.     Vacation  by 
written  instrument  may  be  shown  thus : 

Declaration  of  vacation  of 
Frank  A.  Maus',  New  York 
Street  Subdivision  to  Indian- 
apolis, Ind.,  being  a  parf  of 
}►  S.  E.  14  of  Sec.  3,  Tp.  15 
North,  of  Range  3  East. 

Dated  May  27,  1896. 

Recorded  June  8,  1896. 

Book  196,  page  45. 

Recites  that  Frank  A.  Maus,  who  is  the  sole  owner  of  all  the 
lots  in  said  subdivision  as  shown  in  the  plat  recorded  May  1, 
1896,  in  plat  book  11,  page  82,  and  vacates  the  same  for  the  pur- 
pose of  restoring  the  property  to  its  condition  before  same  was 
platted,  meaning  and  intending  to  declare  vacated,  and  does  de- 
clare, vacated  the  whole  of  said  plat  and  subdivision. 

Acknowledged  May  27,  1896. 

§  244.  Dedication  by  maps  or  plats. — Dedication  may  be 
established  against  the  owner  of  land  by  showing  that  he  has 
platted  the  ground,  representing  streets  and  alleys  on  the  plat, 
and  has  sold  lots  with  reference  to  it,^^  or  by  showing  that  he  has 
adopted  a  map  or  plat  made  by  public  officers  or  other  persons,^*' 
or  by  showing  that  he  has  sold  lots,  describing  them  as  bounded 
by  a  street  or  road."  Merely  laying  out  grounds,  or  merely 
platting  or  surveying  them,  without  actually  throwing  them  open 
to  use  or  actually  selling  lots  with  reference  to  the  plat,  will  not, 
as  a  general  rule,  constitute  a  dedication,^^  and  even  when  lots 
were  sold  with  reference  to  an  unrecorded  plat,  showing  a  street, 
it  was  held  that  a  finding  that  there  was  no  dedication,  was  justi- 
fied where  it  appeared  that  the  owner  maintained  obstructions 
across  the  same  and  told  the  purchaser  that  it  was  a  private  way,^^ 
So,  there  may  be  statements  in  the  conveyance,  or  the  like,  that 

15  United  States  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  108.  30  N.  E.  474,  17  L.  R.  A.  270,  32 
Co.,  154  U.  S.  225,  14  Sup.  Ct.  1015,     Am.  St.  436. 

38  L.  ed.  971 ;  Miller  v.  Indianapolis,         ^^  DeNef  e  v.  Agency  City,  143  Iowa 

123  Ind.  196,  24  N.  E.  228.  2Z1 ,  121  N.  W.  1049. 

16  In  re  Brooklyn  St.,  118  Pa.  St.  !»  People  v.  Sperry,  116  Cal.  593, 
640,  12  Atl.  664,  4  Am.  St.  618.  48  Pac.  IIZ. 

"Durkin   v.   Cobleigh,     156    Mass. 


244 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


266 


show  that  the  reference  was  merely  for  purposes  of  description 
and  that  there  is  no  dedication.-"  But,  ordinarily,  the  sale  of  a 
single  lot  with  reference  to  the  plat  will  complete  the  dedication.^^ 
The  rights  which  spring  from  a  recorded  plat,  designating  spaces 
as  public  ways,  are  very  comprehensive  and  inure  to  the  benefit 
of  persons  who  purchase  under  such  a  plat  as  well  as  to  the  benefit 
of  the  public,  for  such  persons  have  a  right  to  the  whole  way  as 
a  street,  and  the  owner  can  not  close  the  street  on  either  side  of 
them.^- 

It  is  not  only  those  who  buy  land  or  lots  abutting  on  a  street 
or  road  laid  out  on  a  map  or  plat  that  have  a  right  to  insist  upon 
the  opening  of  the  street  or  road;  but  where  streets  and  roads  are 
marked  on  a  plat  and  lots  are  bought  and  sold  with  reference  to 
the  plat  or  map,  all  who  buy  with  reference  to  the  general  plan 
or  scheme  disclosed  by  the  plat  or  map  acquire  a  right  in  all  the 
public  ways  designated  thereon  and  may  enforce  the  dedication.-^ 
The  plan  or  scheme  indicated  on  the  map  or  plat  is  regarded  as 
a  unity  and  it  is  presumed,  as  it  well  may  be,  that  the  public  ways 
add  value  to  all  the  lots  embraced  in  the  general  scheme  or  plan.-* 


20  Baltimore  v.  Fear,  82  Md.  246,  33 
Atl.  637. 

-1  Fereday  v.  Mankedick,  172  Pa. 
St.  535.  34  Atl.  46. 

--  Indianapolis  v.  Kingsburv,  101 
Ind.  200,  51  Am.  Rep.  749. 


23  Strunk  v.  Pritchett,  27  Ind.  App. 
582,  61  N.  E.  973. 

2*  Conrad  v.  West  End  Hotel  &c. 
Land  Co.,  126  N.  Car.  776,  36  S.  E. 
282. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ASCERTAINMENT  OF  QUANTITY  OF  LAND 

SEC.  SEC. 

250.  Computation  of  land  areas  and  255.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezium, 
distances.  or  any  other  irregular  polygon. 

251.  Tables  of  measure.  256.  To   find    the    area    of    irregular- 

252.  To   find   the  area  of   a  tract  in  shaped  tracts. 

shape  of  a  parallelogram.  257.  Efifect  of  the  use  of  the  words 

253.  To  find  the  area  of  a  triangle.  "more  or  less"  in  a  description. 

254.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezoid. 

§  250.  Computation  of  land  areas  and  distances. — Occa- 
sions will  often  arise  in  the  examination  and  interpretation  of 
titles  to  make  computations  and  measurements  with  a  view  of 
ascertaining  areas  and  distances.  While  a  technical  knowledge 
of  surveying  and  civil  engineering  is  not  required  of  either  ab- 
stracter or  counsel,  both  should  have  sufficient  ability  in  this  re- 
spect to  make  such  calculations  as  are  ordinarily  required  to 
properly  perform  their  respective  duties.  They  should  be  familiar 
with  the  different  methods  now  or  formerly  used  in  parceling 
land,  as  well  as  the  standard  tables  of  land  measurement.  It 
would  serve  no  useful  purpose  here  to  explain  in  detail  the  sys- 
tems of  land  measurement  in  vogue  in  different  sections  of  the 
country  and  at  different  periods  of  our  history,  but  in  succeed- 
ing sections  we  will  include  the  tables  sanctioned  by  law  in  the 
United  States  for  measuring  both  surface  and  distance  and  to 
illustrate  how  areas  and  distances  may  be  approximately  ascer- 
tained by  simple  arithmetical  computations.  Gross  mistakes  in 
descriptions,  or  in  the  alleged  area  of  lands,  may  be  discovered  by 
making  a  map  or  plat  of  the  land,  and,  from  the  measurements 
or  area  given,  making  such  calculations  as  will  determine  the 
question  involved.  The  only  instruments  needed  for  this  work 
are  a  semi-circular  protractor,  a  pair  of  dividers  and  a  scale  of 
equal  parts.  A  scale  divided  into  the  fiftieth  parts  of  an  inch 
is  very  convenient  on  account  of  the  accuracy  with  which,  by 
means  of  it,  the  links  of  the  Gunter's  chain  can  be  measured. 

267 


§    251  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  268 

§  251.  Tables  of  measure. — The  standard  tables  for  land 
measurements  in  this  country  are  the  same  as  those  of  England. 
The  table  for  linear  measure  is  as  follows  : 

12  inches  make  1  foot,  abbreviated  ft. 

3  feet  make  1  yard,  abbreviated  yd. 

5^  yards,  or  16^/2  feet,  make  1  rod,  abbreviated  rd. 
40  rods  make  1  furlong,  abbreviated  fur. 

8  furlongs,  or  320  rods,  make  1  mile,  abbreviated  mi. 
The  table  for  square  measure  is  as  follows : 
144  square  inches  make  1  square  foot,  abbreviated  sq.  ft. 
9  square  feet  make  1  square  yard,  abbreviated  sq.  yd. 
30^   square  yards  make  1  square  rod,  abbreviated  sq.  rd. 
40  square  rods  make  1  rood,  abbreviated  R. 

4  roods  make  1  acre,  abbreviated  a. 

640  acres  make  1  square  mile,  abbreviated  sq.  mi. 
In  making  surveys  of  government  lands  and  in  all  subsequent 
subdivisions,  except  small  tracts  and  town  lots,  measurements  are 
made  by  Gunter's  chain.    This  chain  is  66  feet  in  length,  divided 
into  100  links,  each  of  which  links  is  7.92  inches  long.    The  table 
of  linear  measure  where  this  chain  is  used  is  as  follows : 
7.92  inches  make  1  link,  abbreviated  1. 
25  links  make  1  rod,  abbreviated  rd. 

4  rods,  or  66  feet,  make  1  chain,  abbreviated  ch. 
80  chains  make  1  mile,  abbreviated  mi. 
The  table  of  square  measure  where  the  chain  is  used  is  as  fol- 
lows : 

625  square  links  make  1  pole,  abbreviated  p. 
16  poles  make  1  square  chain,  abbreviated  sq.  ch, 
10  square  chains  make  1  acre,  abbreviated  a. 
640  acres  make  1  square  mile,  abbreviated  sq.  mi. 

36  square  miles  make  1  township,  abbreviated  tp. 
The  Gunter's  chain  was  intentionally  so  constructed  as  to  make 
100,000  square  links  to  the  acre.    If  the  dimensions  are  expressed 
in  feet,  as  is  usually  the  case  in  surveys  of  small  tracts  and  town 
lots,  an  acre  contains  43.560  square  feet. 

§  252.  To  find  the  area  of  a  tract  in  shape  of  a  parallelo- 
gram.— A  figure  bounded  by  four  straight  lines  and  having 
its  opposite  sides  parallel,  is  called  a  parallelogram.  Where  the 
lines  form  right  angles  it  is  sometimes  called  a  rectangle.  The 
area  of  such  a  figure  is  found  by  multiplying  the  base  by  the  alti- 


269  ASCERTAINMENT    OF    QUANTITY   OF    LAND  §    253 

tude.  Thus,  a  tract  of  land  in  the  shape  of  a  parallellogram,  14 
chains,  27  Hnks  long,  and  9  chains,  75  links  wide,  contains  1,391,- 
325  square  links;  and  as  100,000  square  links  make  an  acre, 
1,391,325  square  links  make  13.91325  acres.  The  fractional  part 
of  an  acre  represented  by  the  decimal  .91325  may  then  be  reduced 
to  roods,  square  rods,  etc.,  or  to  square  chains,  poles,  etc.,  as  may 
be  desired,  by  the  process  of  multiplication  and  pointing  off  deci- 
mals. Thus,  .91325  multiplied  by  4,  the  number  of  roods  in  an 
acre,  will  give  3.653,  being  the  number  of  roods  and  decimal 
parts  of  a  rood;  and  if  these  decimals  are  multiplied  by  40,  the 
number  of  square  rods  in  a  rood,  the  product  will  be  26.12,  being 
the  number  of  square  rods  and  decimal  parts  of  a  square  rod. 
Continuing  this  process  the  decimal  .12  of  a  rod  may  be  reduced 
to  square  yards,  the  result  being  3.63,  the  number  of  square 
yards  and  decimal  parts  of  a  square  yard,  and  if  the  decimals  .63 
are  multiplied  by  9,  the  number  of  square  feet  in  a  square  yard, 
the  product  will  be  5.67,  the  number  of  square  feet  and  decimal 
parts  of  a  square  foot.  The  decimal  .67  may  be  reduced  to 
square  inches  by  multiplying  it  by  144,  the  number  of  square 
inches  in  a  square  foot,  the  result  being  96.48,  the  number  of 
square  inches  and  decimal  parts  of  a  square  inch.  The  tract 
would,  therefore,  contain  13  acres.  3  roods,  26  square  rods,  3 
square  yards,  5  square  feet  and  96.48  square  inches ;  or  to  express 
it  decimally  in  acres,  13.91325  acres. 

§  253,  To  find  the  area  of  a  triangle. — A  plain  figure 
bounded  by  three  straight  lines,  and  having  consequently  three 
angles,  is  called  a  triangle.  Where  one  of  these  angles  is  a  right 
angle,  the  figure  is  called  a  right-angle  triangle.  The  area  of  a 
tract'  of  land  in  the  shape  of  a  right-angle  triangle  is  found  by 
multiplying  the  base  by  the  perpendicular,  and  dividing  the 
product  by  2.  The  number  of  acres  and  parts  thereof  may  then 
be  ascertained  in  the  same  manner  as  shown  in  the  preceding  sec- 
tion. But  when  the  tract  is  triangular  in  shape  but  has  no  right 
angles,  a  different  method  of  computing  the  area  must  be  em- 
ployed. Where  the  length  of  the  three  sides  of  such  a  triangle 
are  known,  the  area  is  found  by  adding  the  three  sides  together, 
and  taking  the  half  sum;  from  this  half  sum  each  side  is  sub- 
tracted separately;  then  multiply  the  half  sum  and  the  three  re- 
mainders continuously  together.  The  square  root  of  the  product 
will  be  the  area.    Thus  a  triangular  tract  whose  sides  are  342,384, 


§    254  TITLES    AND    AP.STKACTS  270 

and  436  feet  respectively,  contains  6,298.14  square  feet.  By 
dividing  the  number  of  square  feet  by  43,560.  the  number  of 
square  feet  in  an  acre,  the  number  of  acres  and  fractional  parts 
of  an  acre  is  obtained. 

j;  254.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezoid. — A  trapezoid  is  a 
plane  figure  bounded  by  four  straight  lines,  two  of  whose  sides 
are  parallel  and  two  oblique.  To  find  the  area  of  a  tract  of  land 
in  the  shape  of  a  trapezoid,  add  the  two  parallel  sides  together 
and  multiply  half  the  sum  by  the  distance  between  the  parallel 
sides.  Thus  a  tract  bounded  by  two  parallel  lines,  respectively 
25  and  45  chains  long  and  distant  from  each  other  20  chains,  con- 
tains 600  square  chains,  or  60  acres. 

§  255.  To  find  the  area  of  a  trapezium,  or  any  other  ir- 
regular polygon. — A  trapezium  is  a  plane  figure  bounded  by 
four  straight  lines  but  having  no  two  sides  parallel.  The  area  of 
a  tract  of  land  in  the  shape  of  a  trapezium  or  of  any  other  irregu- 
lar tract  having  more  than  four  sides  is  found  by  dividing  the 
figure  into  as  many  triangles  and  trapeziums  as  may  be  convenient, 
then  find  the  area  of  each  separately  and  combine  the  results.  If 
the  land  is  bounded  by  four  straight  lines,  no  two  of  which  are 
parallel  with  each  other  and  the  length  of  each  side  is  given,  and 
the  two  opposite  angles  are  supplements  of  each  other,  the  area 
may  be  found  by  adding  all  the  four  sides  together  and  taking 
the  half  sum;  subtract  each  side  se])arately  from  the  half  sum; 
multiply  the  four  remainders  continuously  together,  and  extract 
the  square  root  of  the  last  product  which  will  be  the  area. 

§  256.  To  find  the  area  of  irregular  shaped  tracts. — 
Where  one  of  the  boundaries  of  a  tract  of  land  consists  of  a  body 
of  water,  a  stream  or  any  other  irregular  line  and  for  this  reason 
the  surface  can  not  be  measured  by  dividing  the  tract  into  trian- 
gles and  trapeziums,  resort  is  had  to  the  plan  of  drawing  a  base 
line  as  near  as  practicable  to  the  boundary  and  measuring  from  it 
in  several  places,  at  equal  distances  to  the  boundary  line.  To  half 
the  sum  of  the  first  and  last  breadths,  add  the  sum  of  all  the  in- 
termediate breadths,  and  multiply  the  result  by  the  common  dis- 
tance between  the  breadths  to  find  the  area.  If  the  breadths  were 
taken  at  unequal  distances,  the  contents  may  be  detemiined,  with 
tolerable  accuracy,  by  adding  all  the  breadths  together,  dividing 


271  ASCERTAINMENT    OF    QUANTITY    OF    LAND  §    257 

the  sum  by  the  whole  number  of  them  for  the  mean  breadth,  and 
multiplying  that  by  the  length  of  the  base  line. 

§  257.  Effect  of  the  use  of  the  words  "more  or  less"  in  a 
description. — The  words  "more  or  less",  after  a  statement 
of  the  quantity,  are  intended  to  cover  only  a  reasonable  excess  or 
deficit.  If  the  difference  is  very  great  it  is  evidence  of  a  mistake 
which  a  court  of  equity  may  correct.  The  presence  of  these  words 
does  not  imply  that  the  purchaser  takes  the  risk  of  the  quantity. 
If  the  variation  is  slight,  the  purchaser  has  no  remedy;  but  if  the 
variation  is  large  or  material,  he  may  be  relieved  from  paying  for 
the  deficient  quantity.^  The  use  of  these  words  does  not  bar  an 
inquiry  into  a  fraud  or  misrepresentation  as  to  quantity  on  the 
part  of  the  grantor  and  a  very  material  variation  in  quantity  is 
itself  some  evidence  of  such  fraud  or  misrepresentation.^ 

The  words  "more  or  less"  and  the  word  "about"  used  in  con- 
nection with  quantity  or  distances,  are  words  of  safety  and  pre- 
caution. They  are  intended  merely  to  cover  some  slight  or  un- 
important inaccuracy  and  while  enabling  an  adjustment  to  the 
imperative  demands  of  fixed  monuments,  they  do  not  weaken  or 
destroy  the  statements  of  distance  and  quantity  when  no  other 
guides  are  furnished.' 

lEstes  V.  Odom,  91  Ga.  600,  18  S.  2  Estes  v.  Odom,  91  Ga.  600,  18  S. 

E.    355 ;    Hosleton    v.    Dickinson,    51  E.  355. 

Iowa  244,  1  N.  W.  550;  Williamson  V,  3  Qakes    v.    DeLancey,    133    N.    Y. 

Hall,  62  Mo.  405 ;  Belknap  v.  Sealey,  227,  30  N.  E.  974,  28  Am.  St.  628. 
14  N.  Y.  143,  67  Am.  Dec.  120. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  FORMAL   PARTS   OF  DEEDS 


SEC. 

260.  Formal  parts  of  a  deed  enumer- 
ated and  described. 

261.  Names  and  descriptions  of  par- 
ties. 

262.  Grantors. 

263.  Grantees. 

264.  Designating  nature  and  kind  of 
conveyance. 

265.  Date  of  the  deed. 

266.  Consideration. 

267.  Operative  words. 

268.  Words  of  inheritance. 

269.  Description  and  boundaries. 

270.  Sufficiency  of  description. 

271.  Identification    of    description    by 
act  of  the  parties. 

272.  How  description  construed. 

273.  Recitals  in  deeds. 

274.  Habendum,  or  the  estate  created. 

275.  E.xccptions  and  reservations. 

276.  Conditions  precedent  and  subse- 
quent. 


SEC. 

277.  Restrictions    as    to    the    use    of 
land. 

278.  Covenants  for  title. 

279.  Defective   covenants. 

280.  Signature  to  the  deed. 

281.  Sealing. 

282.  Attestation. 

283.  Acknowledgment. 

284.  Examples  of  defective  acknowl- 
edgments. 

285.  How  acknowledgment  shown  in 
abstract. 

286.  Delivery. 

287.  Registration. 

288.  Correcting  errors  in  record,  and 
re-recording. 

289.  Ancient  deeds. 

290.  Technical   and   particular    words 
and  phrases. 

291.  Repugnant    or    conflicting    parts 
of  a  deed. 


§  260.  Formal  parts  of  a  deed  enumerated  and  described. 
— The  abstract  should  contain  a  brief  summary  of  the  formal  and 
essential  parts  of  every  deed  of  conveyance  found  in  the  chain 
of  title.  The  principal  parts  of  a  deed  consist  of  the  premises,  the 
habendum,  the  tenendum,  the  reddendum,  the  conditions,  the  war- 
ranty, the  covenants,  and  the  conclusion.  The  term  "premises" 
is  used  to  designate  all  those  parts  of  the  deed  which  go  before 
the  habendum,  and  includes  the  names  of  the  parties  with  their 
titles  and  additions,  a  recital  of  all  such  matters  of  fact  as  are 
necessary  to  explain  the  reason  upon  which  the  conveyance  is 
founded,  the  consideration,  and  a  correct  description  of  the  prop- 
erty. The  habendum  immediately  follows  the  premises  and  states 
what  estate  the  grantee  shall  have  in  the  property  granted,  its  dur- 
ation, and  to  what  use.  In  naming  the  grantee  in  the  premises, 
if  the  words  "and  his  heirs"  are  added,  the  grantee  takes  an  estate 
in  fee  simple,  though  the  habendum  clause  be  wholly  omitted. 
The  tenendum  clause  was  formerly  used  to  express  the  tenure  by 

272 


272i  FORMAL    PARTS    OF    DEEDS  §    261 

which  the  estate  granted  was  holden,  and  followed  Immediately 
after  the  habendum,  but  was  later  joined  to  the  habendum.  The 
reddendum  originally  followed  next  after  the  tenendum  and  by  it 
the  grantor  excepted  or  reserved  something  to  himself  out  of 
that  which  he  before  granted.  Following  the  reddendum  comes 
the  clause  containing  the  conditions.  The  warranty  was  a  cove- 
nant real  by  which  the  grantor  of  an  estate  of  freehold  and  his 
heirs  were  bound  to  warrant  the  title.  The  next  clause  contained 
the  covenants,  by  which  the  parties,  or  one  of  them,  was  obliged 
to  do  something  beneficial  to,  or  to  abstain  from  something  which, 
if  done,  might  be  prejudicial  to  the  other.  The  last  part  of  the 
deed  is  the  conclusion,  which  mentions  the  execution  and  the  date, 
either  expressly  or  by  reference  to  the  beginning.  This  is  some- 
times called  the  "testimonium  clause,"  and  includes  the  signing 
and  sealing,  and  the  special  release  of  dower,  if  such  a  provision 
is  inserted  in  it,  the  attestation  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  if  any 
are  required,  the  words  of  attestation,  and  the  number  of  the  sub- 
scribing witnesses.  After  the  attestation  clause  comes  the  revenue 
stamp,  if  one  is  required.  Last  of  all  comes  the  acknowledgment 
or  proof  of  the  deed,  and  the  certificate  showing  the  conformity 
with  the  law  of  another  state  where  its  validity  depends  upon  its 
being  made  in  conformity  with  such  law. 

All  the  above  formal  parts  of  a  deed  are  not  material  in  every 
case,  as  there  may  be  deeds  containing  neither  exceptions,  reser- 
vations, conditions,  nor  covenants.  It  is  for  the  abstracter  to  de- 
termine what  parts  are  material  and  what  may  be  safely  omitted. 
A  brief  consideration  of  the  various  formal  parts  of  a  deed  are 
given  in  succeeding  sections.  A  digest  of  the  law  of  the  various 
states  relative  to  the  formal  parts  of  deeds  will  be  found  in  the 
appendix. 

§  261.  Names  and  descriptions  of  parties. — In  every  valid 
deed  of  conveyance  there  must  be  parties — competent,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  give  title,  and  on  the  other  to  take.  Hence  the  parties 
to  a  deed  form  the  first  important  subject  of  inquiry  in  abstracting 
such  an  instrument.  They  should  be  shown  with  the  same  cer- 
tainty of  identity  as  in  the  deed  itself.  Where  the  parties  are 
omitted  from  or  erroneously  designated  in  the  deed  the  error  or 
omission  should  be  mentioned  in  the  abstract  in  order  that  the 
attorney  may  found  such  objections  upon  the  fact  as  he  may  deem 

18 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    262  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  274 

proper.  It  is  usual  for  abstracters  to  head  the  entry  after  the 
manner  of  a  legal  caption  by  placing  on  the  left  hand  margin  of 
the  paper  the  name  of  the  grantor  and  grantee  and  uniting  them 
by  a  bracket. 

The  parties  should  be  correctly  described  by  their  Christian 
names  as  well  as  surnames.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  party 
to  a  deed  be  described  by  name,  if  he  be  otherwise  so  described 
that  he  may  be  identified.^  The  full  names  of  the  parties  should 
be  correctly  set  forth  in  the  deed  and  copied  in  the  abstract.  Such 
irregularities  as  the  omission  of  the  middle  name  of  a  party,  a 
difference  in  the  spelling  of  the  name  of  the  grantor,  as  recited 
in  the  deed  and  signed  thereto,  and  designating  the  grantee  by  a 
wrong  baptismal  or  Christian  name,  does  not  for  that  reason  ren- 
der the  deed  void,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  they  are  one  and  the 
same  person.^  Where  the  grantor  in  a  deed  is  described  as  "party 
of  the  first  part,"  and  the  name  of  the  party  of  the  first  part  is 
given,  which  is  the  identical  name  signed  to  the  deed,  as  grantor, 
whose  acknowledgment  as  such  was  taken  and  the  name  of  such 
grantor  also  appears  in  the  warranty  clause,  the  deed  was  held 
valid  as  against  strangers  to  the  title  although  the  name  of  the 
grantor  is  omitted  from  the  granting  clause.^ 

§  262.  Grantors. — In  deeds  poll  the  parties  are  reterred 
to  as  grantor  and  grantee,  and  are  usually  named  or  otherwise 
designated  in  the  body  of  the  instrument.  The  party  conveying 
is  usually  designated  as  the  grantor  or  conveying  party.  He 
should  be  so  designated  in  the  body  of  the  instrument,^  although 
it  is  held  that  one  signing  a  deed  is  bound  as  grantor,  though  he 
is  not  named  as  such  in  the  body  of  the  deed.^  In  properly  con- 
struing deeds  as  to  w^hich  this  question  may  arise,  much,  of  course, 
must  depend  upon  the  context  as  well  as  upon  the  purpose  of  ex- 
ecuting the  deed  by  one  not  named  as  grantor.  Thus  where  no 
names  are  mentioned  at  all  in  the  body  of  the  instrument,  but 
such  expressions  are  used  as  "we  convey,"  and  the  deed  is  ex- 
ecuted by  several,  it  was  held  to  be  the  deed  of  all  executing  it." 

1  Hamilton  v.  Pitcher,  53  Mo.  334.  v.   Rhew,   108   N.   Car.  696,   13   S.   E. 

^  Morse  v.  Carpenter,  19  Vt.  613.  174,  23  Am.  St.  76. 

3  Runyan  v.   Snyder,  45   Colo.   156,  '''  Hargis  v.  Ditmore,  86  Ky.  653,  9 

100  Pac.  420.  Kv.  L.  783.  7  S.  W.  141 ;  Hronska  v. 

■•  Batchelor  v.   Brereton,   112  U.   S.  Janke.  66  Wis.  252.  28  x\.  W.  166. 

396,  5  S.  Ct.  180,  28  L.  ed.  748 ;  King  «  Slieldon  v.  Carter,  90  Ala.  380,  8 

So.  63. 


275  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  262 

One  who  signs,  seals,  and  delivers  a  deed,  though  not  named 
therein  as  a  grantor,  is  still  bound  as  a  grantor,  and  the  deed  is 
operative  as  a  conveyance  of  his  estate/  A  deed  signed  by  one  not 
named  as  a  grantor  is  not  his  deed,^  yet  if  the  grantor's  name  is 
mentioned  in  the  body  of  the  deed,  his  signing  the  deed  by  a 
wrong  name  will  not  invalidate  it,  if  it  sufficiently  appears  that 
the  same  person  was  intended,  or  that  the  variance  was  due  to 
clerical  error.^ 

A  description  of  a  party  to  a  deed  by  name,  residence,  and 
occupation  does  not  within  itself  identify  the  party,  but  only 
furnishes  the  means  and  affords  a  presumption  of  identification/" 
Though  the  name  written  in  the  deed  is  not  the  same  as  the  name 
signed  to  it,  the  variance  may  be  so  slight  as  not  to  destroy  the 
presumption  that  they  are  intended  for  the  same  person."  Also, 
where  an  error  occurs  in  the  name  or  residence  of  the  grantor 
apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  deed,  and  from  its  contents  sus- 
ceptible of  correction  so  as  to  identify  the  grantor  with  certainty, 
such  error  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  deed/"  The  grantor 
may  be  identified  by  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  as  where 
the  officer  certifies  that  he  knows  the  person  signing  the  deed  to  be 
the  same  described  in  it,  and  who  executed  it/^  The  grantor  may 
convey  the  land  by  any  name  which  he  may  use  as  a  signature, 
and  the  title  will  pass  to  his  grantee,  though  he  received  the  title 
under  a  different  name,  but  it  must  be  shown  that  the  names  used 
applied  to  one  and  the  same  person/'*  And  if  the  grantor  signs 
the  deed  by  his  Christian  name  only,  his  name  in  full  appearing 
in  the  body  of  the  deed,  the  signing  is  sufficient  and  binding/^ 

The  middle  name  or  initial  of  a  grantor  is  not  a  part  of  his 
legal  name,  which  consists  of  one  given  name  and  one  surname/^ 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  omission  of  such  middle  name,  or 
the  insertion  of  a  wrong  middle  name  or  initial  in  a  deed  does 
not  affect  its  validity/^    But  in  some  instances,  the  middle  name, 

7  Sterling  v.  Park,  129  Ga.  309,  58  S.  12  Dodd  v.  Bartholomew,  44  Ohio 
E.  828,   13   L.   R.  A.    (N.   S.)    298n,     St.  171,  S  N.  E.  866. 

121  Am.  St.  224,  12  Ann.  Cas.  201.  i3  Ballard    v.    Carmichael,    83    Tex. 

8  Gaston  v.  Weir,  84  Ala.  193.  4  So.     355,  18  S.  W.  734. 

258;  Adams  v.  Medsker,  25  W.  Va.  i*  Lyon  v.  Kain,  36  111.  362. 

127.  "Zann  v.   Haller,  71    Ind.   136,  36 

»  Middleton  v.  Findla,  25  Cal.  76.  Am.  Rep.  193. 

10  Tinder  v.   Tinder,    131    Ind.   381,  ic  Banks  v.  Lee,  73  Ga.  25. 

30  N.  E.  1077.  1'  Nicodemus    v.    Young,    90    Iowa 

11  Lvon  V.  Kain,  36  111.  362 ;  Dodd  v.     423,  57  N.  W.  906. 
Bartholomew,  44  Ohio  St.  171;  5  N. 

E.  866. 


§    262  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  276 

or  its  initial  is  regarded  a:,  a  material  part  of  a  name,  and  espe- 
cially is  this  true  when  the  first  name  is  not  given,  but  only  its 
initial/®  If  the  name  under  which  one  has  purchased  land  is  not 
his  correct  name,  nor  idem  sonans,  and  he  conveys  by  his  correct 
name,  his  identity  as  purchaser  may  be  proved ;  but  until  such 
proof  is  made,  and  the  deed  to  him  is  reformed,  his  deed  does 
not  convey  title. ^^  Where  a  deed  is  that  of  a  partnership  it 
should  be  signed  by  all  the  partners,  unless  all  the  partners  be 
present  and  authorize  one  member  to  sign  for  all.^° 

A  difference  in  the  spelling  of  the  name  of  the  grantor,  as 
recited  in  the  deed  and  as  signed  thereto  does  not  invalidate  the 
deed  if  it  can  be  shown  that  they  are  one  and  the  same  person;"^ 
but  it  is  such  an  irregularity  as  must  be  noted  on  the  abstract  in 
order  that  it  may  be  cleared  up  by  proper  affidavit.  If  a  deed 
be  executed  by  a  person  not  mentioned  therein  as  grantor,  that 
fact  should  be  noted  also.  If  a  deed  be  signed  by  a  party  acting  in 
a  representative  capacity,  and  he  is  not  designated  in  the  body 
of  the  instrument  as  such  representative,  the  deed  is  defective.^" 

Where  the  deed  is  executed  by  an  attorney  in  pursuance  of  a 
power,  it  is  defective  unless  the  recitals  in  the  body  of  the  instru- 
ment shows  that  it  is  the  act  of  the  principal.  It  must  also  show 
that  the  person  executing  same  had  power  and  authority  to  act  in 
the  premises.  Unless  such  power  was  under  seal,  the  deed  is 
invalid."^ 

A  deed  is  void  which  shows  on  its  face  that  it  w^as  executed  b}' 
a  commissioner  appointed  by  a  court  in  a  state  other  than  that 
in  which  the  land  is  situated.  Also  a  conveyance  by  an  executor 
who  does  not  profess  to  act  under  the  testamentary  power  is 
invalid."*  Where  the  provisions  of  a  deed  purporting  to  be  in 
trust  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  but  discloses  an  attempt  to 
hinder  or  delay  creditors,  is  void  on  its  face."^ 

The  abstract  should  contain  the  names  of  all  the  grantors,  the 
character  in  which  they  act.    These  names,  wherever  they  appear, 

18  State  V.  Higgins,  60  Minn.  1,  61  22  Bobb  v.  Barnum,  59  Mo.  394. 

N.  W.  816,  27  L.  R.  A.  74,  51  Am.  St.  23  Plummer     v.     Russell,     2     Bibb 

490.  (Ky.)  174. 

13  Peckham  v.  Stewart,  97  Cal.  147,  24  Contee  v.   Lyons,   19  D.   C.  207 ; 

31  Pac.  928.  Dowdy  v.  McArthur,  94  Ga.  577,  21 

20  McGahan  v.  Bank,  156  U.  S.  218,  S.  E.  148. 

15  S.  Ct.  347  39  L.  ed.  403.          .  25  Johnson  v.  Thweatt,  18  Ala.  741. 

2iTustin    V.    Faught,   23    Cal.   237; 
Lyon  V.  Kain,  36  111.  362. 


J 


277  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  263 

should  be  carefully  compared  with  each  other,  and  any  variances 
carefully  noted.  If  the  grantor  be  an  executor,  administrator, 
trustee,  attorney  in  fact,  public  official,  officer  of  court,  or  officer 
of  a  corporation,  the  mode  of  designation  and  the  manner  of  sign- 
ing must  be  noted,  and  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  grantor's 
powers  examined.  If  the  conveyance  was  made  in  an  official  or 
representative  capacity,  that  fact  should  appear  in  the  description 
of  the  grantor  and  so  noted  on  the  abstract.  Where  the  deed 
gives  the  residence  of  the  grantor,  this  need  not  be  set  out  in  the 
abstract,  unless  such  residence  be  outside  the  state,  in  which  case 
it  may  aid  in  determining  his  identity  in  the  search  for  judgments. 
Any  irregularity,  error,  or  omission  of  the  grantor's  name  in  the 
deed  should  be  noted  on  the  abstract,  so  that  counsel  may  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  the  grantor  has  been  sufficiently  designated. 
The  names  of  the  grantor  appearing  in  the  granting  clause,  at  the 
end  of  the  deed,  and  in  the  acknowledgment,  should  be  carefully 
compared  for  discrepancies,  and  should  any  appear,  they  must 
be  properly  noted. 

The  abstracter  should  not  only  see  that  the  grantor  is  properly 
named  or  designated,  but  he  should  see  whether  the  instrument 
has  been  executed  by  all  parties  whose  concurrence  in  the  deed 
is  necessary  to  convey  a  good  title.  If  the  deed  be  that  of  a 
husband,  he  should  see  whether  the  wife  joined,  and  vice  versa. 
If  the  conveyance  be  by  one  who  had  an  equitable  estate  only,  as 
frequently  happens,  he  should  see  whether  the  party  having  the 
legal  title  has  joined  as  grantor. 

§  263.  Grantees. — The  same  degree  of  care  in  setting  out 
the  names  and  descriptions  of  grantors  should  be  observed  in  des- 
ignating grantees.  The  grantee  is  usually  designated  in  the 
premises  by  his  name,  but  this  is  not  indispensable,  for  if  from 
the  whole  instrument  it  appears  who  he  is,  it  will  suffice.^*'  If, 
however,  there  is  nothing  on  the  face  of  the  instnmient  indicating 
who  the  grantee  is,  it  is  defective  and  passes  no  title. "^  So,  if 
the  name  of  the  grantee  is  left  blank,  with  no  other  designation 
of  him  in  the  deed,  the  instrument  is  inoperative  as  a  conveyance 
so  long  as  it  remains  in  this  condition.-^     The  fact  that  one  is 

26  Bay  V.  Posner,  78  Md.  42,  26  Atl.         2s  Harden  v.  Grace,  167  Ala.  453,  52 
1084;  Newton  v.  McKay,  29  Mich.  1.     So.  425,  Ann.  Cas.  1912A,  537. 

"Allen  V.  Allen,  48  Minn.  462,  51 
N.  W.  473. 


§    263  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  278 

named  in  the  consideration  clause  of  a  deed  does  not  make  him 
a  grantee.-"  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  grantee  be  named  at  all, 
if  he  is  so  described  that  he  can  be  clearly  ascertained.'^" 

A  deed  to  the  heirs  of  a  living  person,  without  naming  them, 
is  void  for  uncertainty,^^  unless  there  be  something  in  the  deed 
from  which  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  word  "heirs"  was  not 
used  in  its  technical  sense,  but  as  meaning  children.^-  A  deed  to 
an  immediate  estate  in  land,  made  to  a  grantee  not  in  being,  is 
absolutely  void.^^ 

It  is  not  indispensable  that  the  name  of  the  grantee,  if  given, 
should  be  inserted  in  the  premises.  If  the  instrument  shows  who 
he  is,  if  it  designates  him,  and  so  identifies  him  that  there  is  no 
reasonable  doubt  respecting  the  party  constituted  grantee,  it  is 
not  of  vital  consequence  that  the  matter  which  establishes  his 
identity  is  not  in  the  common  or  best  form,  or  in  the  usual  or 
most  appropriate  position  in  the  instrument.^* 

It  is  the  general  rule  that  where  the  statute  requires  both  the 
husband  and  wife  to  join  in  a  deed  of  her  property,  a  conveyance 
by  the  wife  directly  to  the  husband  is  a  nullity,  and  this  upon  the 
ground  that  the  husband  can  not  be  both  the  grantor  and 
grantee. ^"^  A  deed  directly  from  a  married  woman  to  her  husband 
is  void  at  law.^°  But  the  disability  of  husband  and  wife  to  con- 
vey, the  one  to  the  other,  has  been  expressly  removed  by  statute 
in  some  states. ^'^ 

A  corporation,  having  a  legal  existence  and  being  capable  of 
taking  title  to  land,  may  be  a  grantee,  and  should  be  described  by 
its  official  name.  But  a  conveyance  to  an  unincorporated  com- 
pany which  is  shortly  afterwards  duly  organized  as  a  corporation, 
and  goes  into  possession  under  the  deed,  passes  a  title  to  such 
corporation  as  against  one  not  holding  by  a  superior  title,  but 
under  a  subsequent  tax  sale.^^    The  misnomer  of  a  corporation 

29  Hardin  V.  Hardin,  32  S.  Car.  599,  S5  Breit  v.  Yeaton,     101     111.     242; 

11  S.  E.  102.  Johnson  v.  Jouchert,  124  Ind.  105,  24 

3"  Clark  V.  Northern  Coal  &c.  Co.,  N.  E.  580,  8  L.  R.  A.  795. 

33  Ky.  L.  1047,  112  S.  W.  629;  Gilles-  so  Connar  v.  Leach.  84  Md.  571,  36 

pie  V.   Rogers,   146  Mass.  610,   16  N.  Atl.  591 ;  Jarrell  v.  Crow,  30  Tex.  Civ. 

E.  711.  App.  629,  71  S.  W.  397. 

■^1  Booker  v.  Tarwater,  138  Ind.  385,  ^^  Such  statutes  exist  in  Iowa,  New 

37  N.  E.  979.  York,  North  Carolina.  Ohio,  Oregon. 

3- Tinder  v.   Tinder,   131    Ind.  381,  Washington  and  perhaps  a  few  other 

30  N.  E.  1077.          _  states. 

23  Davis    V.    Hollinsworth,    113    Ga.  ^h  (;iif  ton  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  Ran- 

210,  38  S.  E.  827,  84  Am.  St.  233.  dell,  82  Iowa  39,  47  N,  W.  905. 

3*  Newton   v.    McKay,  29   Mich.   1. 


279  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  264 

intended  to  be  the  grantee  does  not  invalidate  the  deed  when  the 
true  name  of  the  corporation  appears  in  the  covenant  of  warranty 
or  other  part  of  the  deed,""  or  when  it  appears  in  any  way  from 
the  deed  itself  what  corporation  was  intended.*"  A  misnomer 
of  a  corporation  has  the  same  legal  effect  as  the  misnomer  of  an 
individual  f^  and  it  is  only  necessary  in  either  case  that  it  should 
clearly  appear  from  the  deed  by  name  or  description  that  a  par- 
ticular grantee  capable  of  identification  was  intended. 

A  partnership  not  being  a  legal  person,  either  natural  or  artifi- 
cial, can  not,  as  such,  be  the  grantee  of  the  legal  title  to  land.*' 
The  conveyance  should  be  to  the  individual  members,  naming 
them,  and  describing  them  as  constituting  a  firm.  In  this  manner 
they  take  the  legal  title  as  tenants  in  common  subject  to  partner- 
ship equities.*^ 

While  the  words  "junior"  or  "senior"  is  no  part  of  a  person's 
name,  they  are  often  used  in  deeds  to  distinguish  the  party 
named  from  another  person  of  the  same  name.  The  person  in- 
tended, however,  may  be  shown  in  some  other  way,  as  by  giving 
his  residence.**  Where  the  deed  discloses  errors,  omissions,  or 
discrepancies  in  designating  the  grantee,  these  should  be  shown  on 
the  abstract. 

§  264.     Designating  nature  and  kind  of  conveyance. — The 

nature  or  kind  of  conveyance  should  be  shown  by  a  written  des- 
ignation thereof  on  the  right  hand  margin  of  the  sheet  opposite 
the  caption  containing  the  names  of  the  parties.  Such  charac- 
terization of  the  deed  has,  of  course,  no  legal  efficacy,  but  only 
serves  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  the  kind  of  deed 
being  considered.  The  true  character  of  the  deed  can  only  be 
ascertained  from  a  general  survey  of  the  deed  as  a  whole.  The 
kinds  of  deeds  most  frequently  referred  to  are  "warranty  deeds" 
and  "quitclaim  deeds."  The  former  is  nothing  more  than  a  deed 
containing  a  covenant  of  warranty,*^  and  by  common  understand- 
ing it  has  come  to  mean  a  deed  that  warrants  a  good  title.  A 
quitclaim  deed  is  simply  a  deed  of  release,  and  operates  to  pass 

2»  Centenary  M.  E.  Church  v.  Park-  «  Blanchard  v.  Floyd,  93  Ala.  53, 

er,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  307,  12  Atl.  142.  9   So.   418 ;    Morse   v.    Carpenter,    19 

^oAsheville    Division    v.   Aston,    92  Vt.  613. 

N.  Car.  578.  44  Cobb  v.  Lucas.  15  Pick  (Mass.)  7. 

*i  Ryan  v.  Martin,  91  N.  Car.  464.  ^5  Allen  v.  Hazen,  26  Mich.  142. 

^2  Silverman   v.   Kristufek,    162   111. 
222,  44  N.  E.  430. 


§    265  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  280 

all  the  estate,  ri^ht,  title,  or  interest  that  the  grantor  has  in  the 
premises.  So  where  the  deed  contains  a  covenant  of  general 
warranty,  it  should  be  designated  in  the  abstract  as  a  "Warranty 
Deed,"  but  if  the  covenant  of  warranty  be  absent  and  words  of 
release  are  used,  or  if  the  deed  is  described  as  a  quitclaim  deed, 
the  abstract  should  show  it  to  be  a  "Quitclaim  Deed."  It  is  often 
said  that  quitclaim  deeds  differ  from  warranty  deeds  in  that  the 
former  contain  no  covenants  of  warranty,  but  whether  a  deed  is  a 
quitclaim  or  not  depends  largely  upon  the  words  used,  and  the 
circumstances  showing  the  purpose  of  the  instrument,  while  the 
mere  absence  of  a  covenant  of  warranty  does  not  constitute  it  a 
((uitclaim."  It  is  for  the  examining  counsel  to  determine  from 
the  words  used  the  kind  and  character  of  the  conveyance  in  ques- 
tion. 

§  265.  Date  of  the  deed. — While  the  date  is  no  part  of  the 
deed,  it  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  time  of  its  execution  and 
delivery,*^  The  date  is  sometimes  inserted  at  the  close,  in  the 
testimonium  clause,  and  if  it  be  later  than  the  date  expressed 
at  the  beginning  of  the  deed  it  will  be  treated  as  the  true  date." 

The  deed  takes  effect  only  from  the  time  of  its  delivery,  and 
the  time  of  delivery  may  always  be  shown. ***  Since  a  date  is  no 
material  part  of  a  deed,  a  false  or  impossible  date  will  not  in- 
validate it,  where  the  real  date  can  be  proved,  and  the  deed  will 
take  effect  from  the  time  of  its  delivery.""  Prima  facie,  the  date 
specified  in  the  deed  is  the  date  of  its  delivery,"  although  this 
presumption  may  be  rebutted,"-  and  a  party  to  a  deed  is  not 
estopped  by  force  of  any  expressed  date  in  the  deed  from  show- 
ing that  delivery  took  place  at  some  other  time."^  The  pre- 
sumption that  a  deed  was  delivered  on  the  day  it  bears  date  is  not 
overcome  by  the  fact  that  the  acknowledgment  bears  a  later  date."* 
The  mere  fact  that  the  date  of  a  deed  in  a  chain  of  title  is  subse- 

^'i  Taylor  v.  Harrison,  47  Tex.  454,  "^o  Floyd  v.   Ricks,    14  Ark.  286,   58 

26  Am.  Rep.  304.  Am.  Dec.  374. 

47  Meech    v.    Fowler,    14    Ark.    29 ;  "'i  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
Ward  V.   Dougherty,  75   Cal.  240,    17  ham,   155   111.  514,  40  N.   E.   1014,  28 
Pac.  193  7  Am.  St.  151 ;  Faulkner  v.  L.  R.  A.  612.  46  Am.  St.  355. 
Adams,  126  Ind.  459.  26  N.  E.  170.  ■-2  Blake  v.  Fash.  44  111.  302. 

••**  Kurtz  V.  Hollingshead,  4  Cranch  •'■^  Laws  of  Eng.  Vol.  10,  p.  382  (o). 

C.  C.  (U.  S.)  180,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  7953.  •"■i  Hardin   v.  Crate,     78     111.     533; 

*^  Treadwell    v.    Reynolds.    47    Cal.  Raines  v.  Walker,  77  Va.  92. 
171;    Mitchell   v.   Bartlett,   51    N.   Y. 
447. 


1 


281  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  266 

qiient  to  the  date  of  its  acknowledgment  does  not  justify  a  refusal 
to  take  a  conveyance  of  the  land  on  the  ground  that  the  title  is  not 
clear.  The  real  date  of  the  delivery  of  the  deed  may  be  subse- 
quent to  its  acknowledgment,  and  even  after  registration.^^ 

The  rights  of  parties  are  often  made  to  depend  upon  an  ac- 
curate statement 'of  time,  and  the  date  of  a  deed  may  become  im- 
portant in  determining  questions  of  priority  or  in  ascertaining 
whether  all  the  statutory  requirements  in  force  at  the  time  of  ex- 
ecution have  been  complied  with.^*' 

As  deeds  are  usually  drawn  the  first  recital  in  the  premises  is 
the  date.  This  should  be  correctly  copied  in  the  abstract  imme- 
diately below  the  line  designating  the  character  of  the  instrument. 
One  line  is  usually  sufficient  for  the  purpose.  If  no  date  is  given 
this  fact  should  be  noted  in  the  place  where  the  date  would  other- 
wise belong.  If  there  is  a  defect  or  disparity  of  dates,  both  or  all 
dates  must  be  noted  so  as  to  bring  the  matter  prominently  before 
the  notice  of  examining  counsel. 

§  266.  Consideration. — At  the  present  time  there  is  an  ap- 
parent conflict  of  authority  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  consideration 
for  the  conveyance  of  real  estate.  Many  cases  hold  that  a  deed  is 
valid  made  without  a  consideration  in  fact,  and  without  any  being 
expressed. ^^  In  a  comparatively  recent  case,  however,  it  was  held 
in  effect  that  a  deed  without  a  consideration  expressed  is  invalid. ^^ 
But  as  between  the  parties  to  a  deed  at  the  present  day,  no  con- 
sideration, expressed  or  unexpressed,  is  necessary  in  those  states 
where  there  are  statutes  to  the  effect  that  all  conveyances  of  land 
signed  and  sealed  by  the  grantor,  having  good  authority  to  con- 
vey, shall  be  valid  to  pass  the  same,  without  any  other  act  or 
ceremony  whatever.^®  A  deed  of  conveyance,  though  it  be  wholly 
voluntary,  operates  to  pass  title,  as  between  the  parties,  as  ef- 
fectually as  if  it  had  been  made  for  an  adequate  valuable  con- 
sideration.*''*  So  also  a  deed  of  conveyance  under  seal  imports  a 
consideration,  and  none  need  in  the  first  instance  be  pleaded  or 

ssDresel  v.  Jordan,  104  Mass.  407.  559.    41    Am.    Rep.    756;    Trafton    v. 

5<5  Smith  V.  Porter,  10  Gray  (Mass.)  Hawes,    102    Mass.   533,   3   Am.    Rep. 

66.  494;  Chambers  v.  Chambers,  227  Mo. 

"Randall   v.    Ghent,    19    Ind.   271;  262,  127  S.  W.  86,  137  Am.  St.  567; 

Howard  v.  Turner,   125  N.  Car.  107,  Robertson    v.    Hefley,    55     Tex.     Civ. 

34  S.  E.  229.  App.  368.  118  S.  W.  1159 

58  Catlin  Coal  Co.  v.  Lloyd,  180  •■o  Martin  v.  Caldwell  49  Ind.  App. 
III.  398,  54  N.  E.  214,  72  Am.  St.  216.  1,  96   N.   E.  660;   Comstock  v.   Son, 

59  Houston    V.    Blackman,    66    Ala.  154  Mass.  389,  28  N.  E.  296. 


§    267  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  282 

proved."  The  acknowledgment  of  a  consideration  in  a  deed  is 
prima  facie  evidence  of  a  valuable  consideration  paid  and  the 
amount  paid.''"  A  valuable  consideration  is  not  always  a  money 
consideration.  It  may  consist  in  anything  which  the  parties  es- 
teem of  value,  anything  that  is  a  benefit  to  the  grantor  or  a  dam- 
age to  the  grantee. ^^ 

A  concise  statement  of  the  consideration  should  follow  that  of 
the  particulars  of  registration  in  the  synopsis.  The  nature  of  it 
should  be  stated,  as  money  or  natural  affection,  that  inquiry  may. 
if  necessary,  be  made,  wherever  the  deed  is  liable  to  be  called  in 
question  as  in  violation  of  the  statute  against  fraudulent  convey- 
ances. The  recital  of  the  payment  should  be  stated,  because  its 
absence  is  notice  to  the  grantee  that  the  prior  grantor  is  unpaid, 
and  that,  therefore,  a  vendor's  lien  for  purchase  money  exists 
against  the  property.  The  necessity  of  stating  the  consideration, 
and  by  whom  it*was  paid,  arises  from  the  equitable  doctrine  that 
a  conveyance  not  appearing  to  be  induced  by  value  paid  by  the 
grantee  or  damage  suffered  by  him,  must  be  assumed  to  have  been 
intended  to  be  held  by  the  grantee  in  trust  for  the  grantor,  or 
other  person  who  paid  the  consideration  money.  If  the  deed  ex- 
presses no  consideration,  this  fact  should  be  shown  in  the  same 
place  indicated  for  the  consideration  statement,  where  one  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  deed. 

§  267.  Operative  words. — The  operative  w^ords  of  a  deed 
of  conveyance  are  the  words  by  which  the  estate  passes  from  the 
grantor  to  the  grantee,  and  they  are  usually  embodied  in  that  part 
of  the  premises  known  as  the  granting  clause,  but  it  is  sufficient 
if  they  are  found  in  any  part  of  the  instrument,  and  are  so  used 
as  to  express  an  intention  to  convey.''*  Previous  to  Lord  Coke's 
time  it  was  the  established  practice  to  insert  in  deeds  of  convey- 
ance all  the  words  which  were  appropriate  to  the  different  forms 
of  deeds,  but  at  present  the  word  "grant"  is  sufficient  to  amount 
to  a  grant,  a  feoffment,  a  lease,  a  release,  confirmation  or  sur- 
render. And  the  words  "give,"  "grant,"  "bargain"  and  "sell" 
seem  to  be,  according  to  the  authorities,  sufficient  for  all  purposes 

ci  Saunders  v.  Blythe,  112  Mo.  1,  20  Leech.  33  S.  Car.  175,  11  S.  E.  631,  26 

S.  W.  319.  Am.   St.  667. 

"s  Mills  V.  Dow's  Admr.,  133  U.  S.  •"'^  Branson  v.  Studabaker,   133  Ind. 

423.  10  Sup.  Ct.  413,  33  L.  ed.  717..  147.  33  N.  E.  98;  Bridge  v.  Welling- 

«3  Charleston    C.   &    C.    R.    Co.    v.  ton,  1  Mass.  219. 


283  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  268 

as  operative  words  transferring  the  title.  In  fact,  any  words 
which  denote  an  intention  to  transfer  the  title  are  sufficient  to 
make  an  effectual  deed.''^ 

Where,  however,  by  statute  or  common  law,  certain  technical 
words  are  made  necessary  in  a  conveyance,  their  equivalents  will 
not  suffice.  Where  the  statutory  form  of  deed  is  not  employed, 
attention  should  be  given  to  the  operative  words  of  conveyance 
in  the  deed.  A  document  containing  no  words  of  conveyance 
can  never  operate  as  a  deed.*^*^  Some  words  of  conveyance  must 
be  used  in  every  deed  or  no  title  will  pass."  Even  where  a  statute 
provides  that  any  instrument  in  writing  signed  by  the  grantor  is 
effectual  to  transfer  the  legal  title,  if  such  was  the  intention  of 
the  grantor,  gathered  from  the  entire  instrument,  some  words 
of  conveyance  are  necessary,  and  a  court  has  no  right  to  put  them 
in  by  interpretation.*^^  But  a  deed  without  sufficient  words  of  con- 
veyance in  the  granting  clause  will  pass  a  fee  if  words  sufficient 
for  that  purpose  appear  in  other  parts  of  the  deed.*'^ 

In  states  where  certain  technical  words  of  grant  are  made  nec- 
essary to  a  valid  conveyance  the  examining  attorney  should  see 
that  these  precise  words  are  employed  and  should  object  to  a  deed 
which  does  not  contain  them.  As  words  of  grant  are  necessary 
to  the  validity  of  the  deed,  and  as  they  often  imply  covenants, 
it  is  important  that  they  be  set  out  in  the  synopsis  of  the  deed  in 
the  abstract.  The  operative  words  of  deed  usually  follow  the 
recital  of  the  consideration,  and  this  order  should  be  observed  in 
stating  them  in  the  abstract. 

§  268.  Words  of  inheritance. — At  common  law,  to  create 
an  estate  in  fee  simple  by  deed  it  is  essential  that  the  limitation 
shall  be  to  the  grantee  "and  his  heirs,"  and  no  other  words  and  no 
description  of  the  estate  is  sufficient,  even  though  the  meaning  be 
the  same  and  the  intention  clear.^°  If  the  grant  be  to  a  corpora- 
tion sole,  the  word  "successors"  is  the  proper  word  to  use  in  order 
to  pass  a  fee;'^  but  in  the  case  of  a  corporation  aggregate  no 

fiSGambril  V.  Doe.  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  "^  Bridge    v.    Wellington,    1    Mass. 

140,  44  Am.  Dec.  760;  Cobb  v.  Hines,  219. 

44  N.  Car.  343,  59  Am.  Dec.  559.  ^o  Young  v.  Mahoning  Co..  53  Fed. 

«6Cobb  V.   Hines,  44   N.   Car.   343.  895;    McDill  v.   Meyer,  94  Ark.   615, 

59  Am.  Dec.  559;  Brown  v.  Manter,  128    S.   W.   364;    Boggan    v.    Somers, 

21  N.  H.  528,  53  Am.  Dec.  223.  152  N.  Car.  390,  67  S.  E.  965 ;  Lemon 

6"  Gambril  v.  Doe,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  v.   Graham,    131    Pa.   St.  447,    19  Atl. 

140,  44  Am.  Dec.  760.  48.  6  L.  R.  A.  663. 

6s  Bell  V.  McDuffie,  71  Ga.  264.  ^i  Qkott  v.  Gabert,  86  Tex.  121,  23 

S.  W.  985. 


S    269  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  284 


words  of  limitation  are  necessary.""  Even  under  the  common 
law  rule,  no  technical  words  of  limitation  are  required  in  a  strict 
quitclaim  deed."''  The  rule  is  otherwise,  however,  where  the  quit- 
claim is  by  one  tenant  in  common  to  a  cotenant.^*  Where  words 
of  inheritance  do  not  appear  in  a  deed,  but  are  used  in  another 
instrument  to  which  the  deed  refers,  a  fee  simple  title  will  pass 
by  the  deed.'^^  The  common  law  rule  requiring  the  use  of  words 
of  limitation  and  inheritance  has  been  changed  by  statute  in  many 
states;  and  in  some  states  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  a  fee  simple 
was  intended,  unless  a  less  estate  is  expressly  limited  or  appears 
to  be  conveyed  by  operation  of  law."  Irrespective  of  statutes  on 
the  subject,  it  is  declared  that  the  strict  rule  of  the  common  law 
should  not  be  applied  for  the  reason  that  it  often  defeats  Ihe  plain 
intention  of  the  parties." 

Some  abstracters  are  disposed  to  regard  words  of  limitation 
and  inheritance  in  deeds  as  of  little  importance,  but  inasmuch 
as  they  mark  the  period  which  is  to  determine  the  estate,  or  limit 
the  quantity  of  the  estate,  they  must  be  scrutinized  with  great 
care.  These  words  are  usually  found  in  the  hal^endum  clause 
immediately  following  the  words  "to  have  and  to  hold."  Wher- 
ever found  in  a  deed  it  is  a  good  practice  to  copy  the  words  ver- 
batim in  the  abstract. 

§  269.  Description  and  boundaries. — Next  in  importance 
after  the  parties  to  the  deed  is  the  description  of  the  property  at- 
tempted to  be  conveyed,  but  for  convenience  its  place  in  the  ab- 
stract should  be  immediately  after  the  words  of  conveyance.  Al- 
though the  property  be  accurately  described  in  the  heading  of  the 
abstract  it  is  thought  best  to  describe  it  in  the  synopsis  of  each 
deed  in  the  chain  of  title  exactly  as  it  is  described  in  the  instru- 
ments of  conveyance,  so  that  any  discrepancies  may  be  readily 
found  by  the  examiner.  That  part  of  the  description  which  per- 
tains to  the  situation  of  the  land  in  a  given  county  and  state  may 
be  abridged,  but  the  remainder  of  the  description  should  be  in  the 

''^  Wilcox    V.    Wheeler,  47    N.    H.         ""Lemon  v.    Graliam,   131    Pa.  447, 

488.  19  Atl.  48,  6  L.  R.  A.  663. 

^•■'Rector  v.  Waugh,  17  Mo.   13,  57         ""Words   of    inheritance    rnust    be 

Am.  Dec.  251.  nsed  in  deeds  in   Pennsylvania,  New 

'■*  Rector  v.  Waugh,  17  Mo.  13,  57    Jersey,     Delaware.     South    Carolina, 

Am    Dec.  251.  Florida,  Ohio  and  Wyoming. 

"  Cole  V.  Lake  Co.,  54  N.  H.  242. 


285  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  270 

exact  words  of  the  deed.  Every  description  of  the  property  found 
in  the  various  instruments  in  the  chain  of  title  should  be  carefully 
compared  with  the  description  in  the  commencement  or  caption  of 
the  abstract,  and  any  variance,  either  in  form  or  substance,  noted. 
The  practice  of  omitting  the  description  entirely,  but  inserting  in 
its  stead  the  words  "description  same  as  in  caption,"  or  simply 
noting  any  variation  from  the  boundaries,  lines,  or  monuments 
as  stated  in  the  caption,  is  not  to  be  recommended. 

§  270.  Sufficiency  of  description. — Among  the  more  im- 
portant particulars  to  be  looked  for  in  the  description  of  the  prop- 
erty in  a  deed  are :  ( 1 )  The  state,  county  and  town  where  the 
land  is  situated;  (2)  public  or  private  surveys;  (3)  monuments, 
either  natural  or  artificial,  from  which  courses  and  distances  are 
laid  off;  (4)  streets  and  highways,  a  point  on  which  may  have 
formed  the  starting  point  and  end  of  the  description;  (5)  the 
boundaries  of  the  land  and  their  measurements,  known  as  metes 
and  bounds,  and  (6)  the  quantity  and  area  of  the  land.  Not  all 
the  above  particulars,  however,  are  mentioned  in  any  one  de- 
scription. In  the  orderly  arrangement  of  the  parts  of  a  deed,  the 
description  of  the  parcel  or  tract  follows  immediately  after  the 
operative  words. 

The  description  should  contain  all  the  particulars  necessary  to 
clearly  and  accurately  identify  the  property,  such  as  its  location 
in  a  town  and  county  named,  its  boundaries,  their  measurements, 
and  the  total  area.  A  house  in  a  town  is  usually  described  as  sit- 
uated on  a  particular  street  or  road,  and  the  dimensions  of  the 
lot  of  land  are  usually  given  in  linear  feet,  or,  where  laid  out  or 
platted,  it  is  usually  described  by  the  lot  number;  while  land  in 
the  country  is  usually  described  by  reference  to  government  sur- 
veys, or  to  private  surv^eys  of  the  particular  property,  and  the 
boundaries  are  often  fixed  by  reference  to  the  land  of  adjoining 
owners.  Also,  boundaries  are  sometimes  determined  by  reference 
to  fixed  monuments,  or  by  their  distance  from  streets  or  natural 
or  permanent  objects.  Deeds  which  do  not  describe  or  designate 
the  lands  are  invalid  for  uncertainty,  and  where  the  description 
is  wholly  omitted,  it  can  not  be  supplied  by  extrinsic  evidence. ^^ 
While  descriptions  will  be  construed  liberally,  so  far  as  possible, 

78  Shoemaker  v.  McMonigle,  86  Ind.     421 ;    Crooks    v.   Whitf  ord,   47    Mich. 

283,  11  N.  W.  159. 


§    271  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  286 

to  carry  out  the  intention  of  the  parties,  nothing  passes  by  a  deed 
but  what  is  described  in  it,  whatever  the  intention  of  the  parties 
may  have  been.  The  main  object  of  a  description,  however,  is 
to  furnish  a  means  of  identification,""  and  when  a  description  is 
sufficient  to  enable  a  surveyor  to  identify  the  land  with  reasonable 
certainty,  it  is  a  sufficient  description.**"  Parol  evidence  is  ad- 
missible to  identify  the  property,  or  to  fit  the  description  to  the 
premises,  but  not  to  contradict  the  description.^^  A  misnomer  of 
the  city,  town,  or  county  in  which  the  land  is  situated  does  not 
invalidate  the  deed  if  the  description  is  sufficient  to  identify  the 
land.'^"  The  rule  is  that  the  description  will  be  sufficient  if  the 
land  can  be  identified  with  reasonable  certainty,  and  this  rule  is 
taken  in  connection  with  that  other  rule  which  holds  that  to  be 
certain  which  can  be  made  certain.*^  A  description  from  which 
it  is  possible  to  ascertain  and  identify  the  land  intended  to  be 
conveyed  is  sufficient.  And  a  deed  which  contains  no  other  de- 
scription than  a  reference  to  another  deed  containing-  a  full  de- 
scription is  sufficient.^*  If  the  description  of  the  premises  given 
in  a  deed  furnishes  a  sufficient  means  of  locating  and  identifying 
the  land,  the  conveyance  will  be  sustained,  though  some  of  the 
particulars  of  description  may  be  erroneous  or  inconsistent.^^ 

Both  examiner  and  counsel  should  carefully  compare  the 
description  in  each  deed  forming  the  chain  of  title  with  every 
other  deed  therein,  and  with  the  description  in  the  caption  of  the 
abstract. 

§  271.  Identification  of  description  by  act  of  the  parties. 
— A  description  which  in  itself  does  not  identify  the  land  may  be 
cured  by  the  acts  of  the  parties. ^'^    If  the  parties  to  a  deed  which 

"^  St.  Stephen's  Evangelical  Luther-  «•"  Winnipisiogee  Paper  Co.  v.  New 

an  Church  v.  Pierce,  8  Del.  Ch.  179,  Hampshire   Land   Co..   59    Fed.    542; 

68  Atl.  194.  Thompson     v.     Southern     California 

«o  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Cullen,  Motor  Road  Co..  82  Cal.  497.  22>  Pac. 

Z2  Ky.  L.  1110,   108  S.  W.  857;   Bo-  130;  Austin  v.  Dolbee,  101  Mich.  292, 

gard  V.  Barhan,  52  Ore.  121,  96  Pac.  59  N.  W.  608. 

673,  132  Am.  St.  676 ;  Dunn  v.  Taylor  ^*  Phelps    v.    Phelps,    17    Md.    120 ; 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.)    107  S.  W.  952.  Glover  v.   Shields,  Zl  Barb.    (N.  Y.) 

^1  Chattahoochie    &    G.    R.    Co.    v.  374. 

Pilchcr,  163  Ala.  401,  51  So.  11  ;  Wat-  S5  Vose  v.  Bradstreet,  27  Maine  156; 

ters  V.  Rome  &c.  R.  Co.,  133  Ga.  641,  Bell  v.  Woodward,  46  N.  H.  315. 

66   S.    E.  884;    Cathey    v.    Buchanan  "^'^Vejar   v.    Mound    City   Assn.,   97 

Lumber  Co.,  151  N.  Car.  592,  66  S.  E.  Cal.  659.  32  Pac.  713 ;  McNamara  v. 

580.  Seaton,  82  111.  498. 

*2  Perry  v.  Clark,  157  Mass.  330,  32 
X.  E.  226. 


287  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  272 

does  not  describe  the  property  with  certainty,  either  before  or 
after  the  date  of  the  same,  mark  out  or  identify  and  appropriate 
certain  land  as  the  exact  and  identical  parcel  conveyed,  or  to  be 
conveyed,  by  such  deed,  it  will  be  held  to  be  effective  to  convey 
such  land.  Their  declaration  and  acts  at  the  time  of  the  convey- 
ance may  be  proved  to  determine  the  intent  of  the  parties.^'  When 
a  tract  of  land  intended  to  be  conveyed  is  not  identified  in  the 
conveyance,  the  parties  may  afterwards  survey  and  stake  out  the 
land  conveyed,  and  if  the  grantee  then  takes  possession,  this  as- 
certains the  grant  and  gives  effect  to  the  deed.®*  Also  a  convey- 
ance by  metes  and  bounds,  accompanied  by  transfer  of  possession 
and  marking  the  boundaries  by  natural  objects,  has  been  held  to 
pass  title,  though  no  particular  locality  is  set  forth  in  the  deed. 
Where  the  grantee  takes  possession  of  a  tract  of  land  under  a  deed 
which  fails  to  give  the  boundary  of  one  side,  the  court  will  supply 
the  side  omitted  and  hold  the  description  sufficient.  Such  acts  of 
identification  can  only  be  shown  by  matter  in  pais,  of  which  the 
abstracter  has  no  concern  in  his  work  of  compiling  the  abstract. 
His  conclusions  are  deduced  from  an  examination  of  the  records, 
and  unless  the  parties  have  recorded  the  matter  embodying  their 
acts  of  identification  he  is  not  bound  to  make  any  note  of  such 
acts  in  the  abstract. 

§  272.  How  description  construed. — In  construing  a  de- 
scription of  land,  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  a  controlling 
fact,^^  and  such  intention  must  be  determined  from  the  deed.^° 
The  circumstances  and  surroundings  of  the  parties  and  their 
conduct  subsequent  to  the  execution  of  the  instrument  are  to  be 
considered ;  and  in  case  of  conflicting  descriptions  that  construc- 
tion should  be  adopted  which  will  give  effect  to  the  intention  of 
the  parties. ^^  The  whole  description  of  a  deed,  inartificially 
drawn,  should  be  read  together  without  giving  special  prominence 
to  any  one  expression.  A  marked  line  referred  to,  being  indis- 
putably established,  the  remainder  of  the  description  should  be 
read  so  as  to  harmonize  with  it.°^ 

^'Harris   v.   Oakley,    130   N.   Y.   1,  "o  Clement  v.  Bank  of  Rutland.  61 

28  N.  E.  530.  Vt.  298.  17  Atl.  717,  4  L.  R.  A.  425. 

ssRay  V.   Pease,  95  Ga.   153,  22   S.  oi  Hubbard  v.  Whitehead,  221   Mo. 

E.    190;    Simpson     v.      Blaisdell,     85  672,  121  S.  W.  69. 

Maine   199,   27   Atl.    101,   35   Am.    St.  "2  Bentley   v.    Napier     (Ky.     App.) 

348.  122  S.  W.  180. 

'^'^  Rioux  V.   Cormier,   75   Wis.   566, 
44  N.  W.  654. 


§    272  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  288 

When  the  land  is  described  by  a  designated  subdivision  of  a 
section,  it  ordinarily  means  the  government  subdivision,  but  the 
intention  of  the  parties  to  convey  a  definite  piece  of  land  actually 
located  will  prevail  over  this  presumption."''  Where  a  deed  refers 
to  the  deed  under  which  the  grantor  obtained  title  to  the  property, 
that  deed  is  admissible  in  evidence  to  identify  the  land  conveyed."^ 

When  land  is  described  in  a  deed  as  bounded  on  one  side  by 
the  land  of  a  third  person,  the  true  boundary  line  of  such  third 
person's  land  must  be  taken  as  the  boundary  line,  and  not  the  line 
as  it  was  understood  and  agreed  to  exist  at  the  time  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  deed,  if  there  is  a  variance  between  such  two  lines.""' 
A  boundary  line  described  in  a  deed  controls  an  alleged  agreed 
line  laid  off  by  the  parties  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  deed, 
where  the  lines  do  not  coincide.^"  A  general  description  of  land 
in  a  deed  by  giving  the  name  by  which  the  estate  is  commonly 
known  is  controlled  by  a  subsequent  particular  description.^^ 
Where  there  are  two  descriptions  of  the  property  in  a  deed,  one 
of  which  describes  the  land  with  reasonable  certainty,  and  the 
other,  giving  some  additional  particulars,  is  incorrect,  the  incor- 
rect particular  or  circumstance  of  description  will  be  rejected  as 
surplusage."^ 

It  is  a  well  established  rule  of  construction  that  monuments 
used  in  fixing  the  boundary  lines  of  real  estate  prevail,  in  cases 
of  discrepancies,  over  courses  and  distances.""  The  reason  of  this 
rule  is,  that  mistakes  are  deemed  more  likely  to  occur  with  respect 
to  courses  and  distances  than  in  regard  to  objects  which  are  visi- 
ble and  permanent.^  But  the  rule  does  not  hold  good  if  it  clearly 
appears  from  the  description,  in  the  light  of  surrounding  circum- 
stances, that  the  courses  and  distances  as  given  correctly  describe 
the  land  intended  to  be  conveyed.^    Aside  from  this,  the  order  in 

93  Town    V.    Greer,    53    Wash.    350,  Crooker,    97    Ind.    163,   49    Am.    Rep. 

102  Pac.  239.  437 ;  Merrick  v.  Merrick,  37  Ohio  St. 

'■'*  Steele    v.    Bryant,    132    Kv.    569,  126,  41  Am.  Rep.  493. 

116  S.  W.  755.  ooAyers  v.  Watson,  113  U.  S.  594, 

'•'■'  Bell  V.  Redd,  133  Ga.  5,  65  S.  E.  5  Sup.  Ct.  641,  28  L.  ed.  1093. 

90.  1  Morrow  v.  Whitney,  95  U.  S.  551, 

»«  Holden  v.  Alexander,  82  S.  Car.  24  L.  ed.  456 ;  Clements  v.  Pearce,  63 

441,  62  S.  E.  1108.  Ala.  284. 

'■'7  Dochterman  v.  Marshall,  92  Miss.  2  White  v.  Liming,  93  U.  S.  514,  23 

747.  46  So.  542.  L.  ed.  938;  Higinbotham  v.  Stoddard, 

»8  Vestal  V.  Garrett,  197  111.  398.  64  72  N.  Y.  94;   Hale  v.  Cottle,  21  Ore. 

N.   E.   345;   Cumberledge   v.    Brooks,  580,  28  Pac.  901. 
235  111.  249,  85  N.  E.  197 ;  Lannian  v. 


289  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  272 

which  calls  are  to  be  resorted  to  in  locating  lands  is  :  ( 1 )  Natural 
boundaries,  (2)  artificial  marks,  (3)  adjacent  boundaries,  and 
(4)  courses  and  distances.^  Of  course,  where  the  monument  is 
lost  or  destroyed  and  can  not  be  located  by  oral  testimony,  resort 
will  be  had  in  fixing  the  boundaries  to  course  and  distance.* 

Another  rule  of  construction  is  that,  conveyances  of  land 
bounded  by  an  existing  street  or  highway  carry  the  title  to  the 
center  of  the  street  or  highway,  unless  the  description  discloses 
a  contrary  intent.  This  rule  is  said  to  be  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  legal  terminus  of  a  boundary  by  a  monument  is  at 
the  central  point  of  the  monument.^  Another  reason  given  for  the 
rule  is,  that  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  grantor  had  no  intention 
of  reserving  a  fee  in  the  street  or  highway  adjoining  the  land 
conveyed,  when  the  way  has  ceased  to  be  a  benefit  to  him.^ 

Where  the  land  conveyed  borders  on  tide-waters  the  grantee 
takes  only  to  high-water  mark,"  unless  there  is  something  in  the 
deed  to  indicate  an  intention  to  pass  the  title  to  low-water  mark.^ 
This  rule  applies  to  grants  from  the  sovereign  as  well  as  from  pri- 
vate persons.®  In  some  states  a  deed  to  lands  bordering  on  a 
navigable  stream  extend  the  title  to  the  middle  of  the  main  chan- 
nel thereof. ^°  In  other  states  it  is  held  that  the  grantee's  title  is 
carried  to  the  edge  of  the  water  at  high  water ;  and  still  others, 
to  the  edge  at  low  water.^^  Where  the  land  borders  on  lake  or 
pond,  some  courts  hold  that  the  grantee's  title  extends  to  the  bed 
of  the  lake  or  pond,  while  others  hold  that  the  water's  edge  marks 
the  boundary.  ^- 

2  Chapman  v.  Hamblet,   100  Maine  72   Am.    St.   269 ;    Kentucky   Lumber 

454,  62  Atl.  215;   Vanish  v.   Tarbox,  Co.  v.  Green,  87  Kv.  257,   10  Ky.  L. 

49  Minn.  268,  51  N.  W.  1051.  139,  8  S.  W.  439;  Hall  v.  Alford,  114 

4  Blackburn  v.  Nelson,  100  Cal.  336,  Mich.  165,  72  N.  W.  137,  38  L.  R.  A. 
34  Pac.  775.  205 ;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

5  Paine  v.  Consumers'  Storage  Co.,  Piatt,  53  Ohio  St.  254,  41  N.  E.  243, 
71  Fed.  626,  19  C.  C.  A.  99 ;  Olin  v.  29  L.  R.  A.  52 ;  Chandos  v.  Mack,  77 
Denver  &c.  R.  Co..  25  Colo.  177,  53  Wis.  573,  46  N.  W.  803,  10  L.  R.  A. 
Pac.  454.  207.  20  Am.  St.  139. 

•'Overland  Machinery  Co.  v.  Alpen-  ^i  Williams  v.  Glover,  66  Ala.  189; 

f  els,  30  Colo.  163,  69  Pac.  574 :  Huff  St.  Louis  L  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Ram- 

V.  Hastings  Express  Co.,  195  111.  257,  sey,  53  Ark.  314.  13  S.  W.  931,  8  L. 

63^N.  E.  105.  R.  A.  559,  22  Am.  St.  195;  McManus 

^  Long  Beach  Land  &  Water  Co.  v.  v.  Carmichael,  3   Iowa   1 ;   Fulmer  v. 

Richardson,  70  Cal.  206,  11  Pac.  695.  Williams,  122  Pa.  St.  191,  15  Atl.  726, 

»  Oblenis  v.  Creeth,  67  Fed.  303.  1  L.  R.  A.  603.  9  Am.  St.  88. 

"Shivelv  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  14  12  Concord  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Robertson, 

Sup.  Ct.  548.  38  L.  ed.  331.  66  N.  H.  1,  25  Atl.  718,  18  L.  R.  A. 

i"Bellfountain    Imp.    Co.    v.    Nied-  679. 
ringhaus,   181   111.  426,  55  N.  E.   184, 

19 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    273  TITLES    AND    AP-Sl  KACTS  290 

§  273.  Recitals  in  deeds. — Tn  the  ordinary  forms  of  deeds 
in  general  use  in  this  country  there  are  no  f(jrmal  narrative  or 
introductory  recitals.  They  formerly  were  a  key  to  the  operative 
part  of  the  deed,  and  immediately  followed  the  description  of  the 
parties,  though  at  the  present  time,  in  deeds  poll,  such  recitals  as 
are  used  are  often  placed  at  the  end  of  the  description  of  the 
property.  They  usually  consist  merely  of  a  reference  to  the  deeds 
under  which  the  grantor  derives  his  title.  Recitals  may  also  be 
used  to  show  the  reasons,  objects,  or  purposes  for  which  the  con- 
veyance is  made."  "Recitals"  is  a  term  which  may  also  be  ap- 
plied to  statements  regarding  the  estate  or  title  found  in  any  part 
of  the  deed. 

Recitals  of  whatever  kind  should  be  set  out  in  the  abstract  fully 
and  in  the  order  in  which  they  appear  in  the  deed ;  condensing  the 
matter  only  where  it  would  be  impracticable  to  copy  the  exact  lan- 
guage of  the  deed.  The  importance  of  stating  in  the  abstract  the 
recitals  in  deeds  arises  from  the  circumstance  that  they  are  always 
notice  to  a  grantee  or  mortgagee  of  the  facts  recited,  and  of  every- 
thing to  which,  if  followed  up  by  reasonable  inquiry,  they  will 
naturally  lead;  and  they  may  operate  by  way  of  estoppel,  so  as 
to  prevent  the  party  making  them  from  controverting  their 
truth. ^*  Where,  however,  the  recitals  in  a  deed  do  not  agree  with 
the  operative  part,  the  terms  of  the  operative  part  will  control.^"* 
Numerous  cases  illustrating  the  doctrine  of  constructive  notice 
from  recitals  in  deeds  under  which  the  purchaser  claims  may  be 
found  in  the  reports.  They  show  the  necessity  of  a  careful  peru- 
sal of  every  deed  in  the  chain  of  title.  Thus  the  land  may  be 
subject  to  some  restriction  as  to  its  use  contained  in  a  deed  from 
some  former  owner,^''  or  it  may  be  subject  to  a  trust, ^^  or,  by  the 
recital  in  the  consideration  clause  of  a  deed  by  a  former  owner, 
through  which  conveyance  the  present  grantee  must  derive  his 
title,  that  the  consideration  is  "to  be  paid,"  the  land  in  the  present 
grantee's  hands  may  be  subject  to  a  vendor's  lien  for  the  pur- 
chase money. ^^    No  covenants  are  implied  from  the  mere  recitals 

13  McCoy  V.   Fahrney,    182   III.   60,  i*"' Whitney   v.    Union    R.     Co.,     11 

55  N.  E.  61.  Gray   (Mass.)   359.  71   Am.  Dec.  715. 

"Cordova  v.  Hood,   17  Wall.    (U.  i^  Dean    v.    Long,    122    III.    447,    14 

S.)   1.  21  L.  ed.  587.  X.  E.  34. 

15  Miller  V.  Tunica  County,  67  Miss.  i"*  Cordova  v.  Hood,    17  Wall.    (U. 

651,  7  So.  429.  S.)  21  L.  ed.  587;  Deason  v.  Taylor, 

53  Miss.  697. 


291  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  274 

of  a  deed,  such  as  that  the  premises  contain  a  specified  number  of 
acres,  though  in  some  instances  such  recitals  estop  the  grantor 
from  asserting  an  after-acquired  claim,  or  denying  the  existence 
of  the  facts  recited." 

§  274.  Habendum,  or  the  estate  created. — The  office  of 
the  habendum  is  to  limit  the  estate.-"  And  the  word  "limit"  as 
used  in  this  connection,  means  to  mark  out  or  define.  Its  pur- 
pose is  to  declare  or  define  the  estate  of  the  grantee  in  the  thing 
granted — whether  it  is  for  life,  in  fee,  etc.  The  habendum  is  not 
an  essential  part  of  a  deed,  if  the  estate  is  otherwise  limited  or 
defined.  Thus  the  nature  and  duration  of  the  estate  are  some- 
times defined  in  the  premises.  In  naming  the  grantee  in  the 
granting  clause,  if  the  words  "and  his  heirs"  are  added,  the 
grantee  takes  the  estate  in  fee  simple,  though  the  habendum 
clause  be  wholly  omitted.-^  Discrepancies  frecjuently  arise  be- 
tween the  premises  and  the  habendum.  For  instance,  an  estate 
of  one  kind  may  be  limited  in  the  premises  and  a  different  estate 
limited  in  the  habendum.  In  such  cases  the  habendum  is  not  con- 
trolling, and  the  estate  as  given  in  the  premises  stands."'  The 
habendum,  where  it  is  not  repugnant,  may  explain,  enlarge,  or 
qualify,  but  can  not  contradict  or  defeat  the  estate  granted  in  the 
premises."^  Thus  the  habendum  may  supply  the  quantum  or  ex- 
tent of  the  estate  when  the  premises  fail  to  describe  same,"*  or, 
the  estate  may  be  limited  in  the  habendum,  although  not  men- 
tioned in  the  premises,"^  or,  where  the  premises  by  uncertain  im- 
plication attempts  to  define  the  estate,  resort  must  be  had  to  the 
express  limitation  defined  in  the  habendum.""^  In  most  of  the 
statutory  forms  of  deeds  there  is  no  habendum;  and  irre- 
spective of  such  statutes  it  is  not  an  essential  part  of  a  deed,  if 
the  estate  is  otherwise  limited  or  defined.     In  conveyances  creat- 

"  Ferguson  v.  Dent,  8  Mo.  667.  23  Breed  v.  Osborne,  113  Mass.  318; 

20McDill    V.    Meyer,    94    Ark.    615,  Rines  v.  Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394,  9  S. 

128  S.  W.  364;  Totten  v.  Pocahontas  W.  798. 

Coal  >k  Coke  Co.,  67  W.  Va.  639,  68  24  Doren    v.    Gillum,    136    Ind.    134, 

S.  E.  373.  35  N.  E.  1101. 

21  Montgomery  v.  Sturdivant,  41  25  Wommack  v.  Whitmore,  58  Mo. 
Cal.   290;    Major   v.    Bukley,   51    Mo.  448. 

227;    Karchner   v.   Hoy.    151    Pa.    St.        26  Jacobs  v.  All  Persons,     12     Cal. 

383.  25  Atl.  20.  App.    163,    106   Pac.   896;    Riggin    v. 

22  Hughes  V.  Hammond,  136  Ky.  Love,  72  111.  553;  Bodine  v.  Arthur, 
694,  125  S.  W.  144,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  91  Ky.  53,  12  Ky.  L.  650,  14  S.  W. 
S.)  808;  Link  v.  MacNabb,  111  Md.  904. 

641,  74  Atl.  825. 


^    275  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  292 

ing  trusts,  and  in  assignments  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  etc., 
the  habendum  may  appropriately  declare  the  trusts  on  which  the 
property  is  to  be  held."' 

§  275.  Exceptions  and  reservations. — In  conveying  lands 
the  grantor  often  wishes  U)  retain  some  part  of  the  land  described 
or  to  have  some  right  therein.  This  is  accomplished  by  inserting 
in  the  deed  the  proper  clauses  of  exception  and  reservation.  The 
office  of  the  exception  clause  in  a  deed  is  to  withhold  from  its 
operation  some  part  or  parcel  of  the  thing,  which,  but  for  the 
exception,  would  pass  by  the  general  description  to  the  grantee. 
While  on  the  other  hand,  a  reservation  is  the  creation  of  some  new 
right  issuing  out  of  the  thing  granted,  and  which  did  not  exist  as 
an  independent  right,  in  behalf  of  the  grantor  and  not  of  a 
stranger,-^  A  reservation  is  never  a  part  of  the  estate  itself,  but 
is  something  taken  back  out  of  that  already  granted,  as  rent,  or 
the  right  to  cut  timber,  or  to  do  something  in  relation  to  the 
estate ;  while  an  exception  is  of  some  part  of  the  estate  not  granted 
at  all.''' 

It  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  between  an  exception  and  a 
reservation  in  a  conveyance,  and  the  terms  "reserving"  and  "ex- 
cepting"' are  not  conclusive  in  determining  which  is  intended,  but 
this  must  be  determined  by  the  character  and  effect  of  the  pro- 
vision itself. ■''°  The  appropriate  word  or  words  for  the  creation 
of  an  exception  are,  "saving  and  excepting"  or  "excepting"  alone. 
While  the  word  commonly  used  to  create  a  reservation  is  "reserv- 
ing." But  these  words  are  often  used  together,  and  in  such  cases 
it  becomes  difficult  to  determine  whether  a  particular  clause  is  a 
reservation  or  an  exception.  In  one  case  it  was  held  to  create  a 
reservation,  rather  than  an  exception. ^^  Sometimes  these  terms 
are  used  indiscriminately,  and  what  is  described  in  a  conveyance 
as  an  exception  is  often  held  to  be  a  reservation.""  Technically 
the  term  "reservation"  is  applicable  only  to  rents  and  services  and 
whatever  things  are  stipulated  to  be  rendered  for  the  tenure  of 

27  Nightingale    v.    Ilidden.    7    R.    I.  ^o  Youngcrman  v.  Polk  County,  110 

lis.  Iowa  731,  81  N.  W.  166. 

2«  Brown  v.  Cranberrv  Tron  &c.  Co.,  -"  Gould   v.   Howe,   131    111.  490,  23 

59   Fed.   434;    Marshall   v.   Trumbull,  N.  E.  602. 

28  Conn.  183.  73  Am.  Dec.  667 ;  Daw-  •'*i  Biles   v.   O.   &   G.   H.    R.   Co.,    5 

son  V.  Western  Maryland  R.  Co.,  107  Wash.  509,  32  Pac.  211. 

Md.  70,  68  Atl.  301.  14  L.  R.  A.   (N.  ^2  wdlman  v.  Churchill,  92   Maine 

S.)   809.   126  Am.   St.  337n,   15 'Ann.  193,  42  Atl.  352. 
Cas:  678. 


293  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  276 

the  land,  but  its  application  has  been  extended,  and  easements  are 
now  said  to  be  reserved;  but  their  reservation  is  said  to  operate 
by  way  of  impHed  grant. ^^  An  exception  retains  the  title  in  the 
thing  excepted  in  the  grantor,  though  the  purpose  for  which  the 
exception  is  made  be  a  future  one.^*  Examples  of  reservations 
are:  a  right  of  way,  of  w^ater,  of  light,  or  of  any  other  right  or 
profit  to  arise  out  of  the  thing  granted  by  whatever  name  the 
parties  may  give  to  the  reservation.^^  But  if  a  particular  way 
already  existing  is  reserved,  the  reservation  may  be  construed  as 
an  exception,  if  from  the  deed  itself,  and  the  situation  of  the 
parties,  such  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the  parties.^'' 
If  a  reservation  be  doubtful  it  must  be  construed  in  favor  of  the 
grantee.^^ 

Liens  for  purchase  money,  annuities,  charges  for  support  and 
maintenance  of  the  grantor,  and  the  like,  are  frequently  reserved 
on  the  faces  of  conveyances;  and  require  careful  attention  on  the 
part  of  both  the  abstracter  and  examining  counsel.  Everything, 
whether  in  the  nature  of  an  exception  or  a  reservation  should  be 
copied  verbatim  in  the  abstract.  Counsel  will  often  experience 
difficulty  in  determining  whether  the  language  used  constitutes  a 
reservation  or  an  exception.  He  may  be  called  upon  to  determine 
whether  the  language  used  expresses  an  intention  to  retain  an 
incorporeal  right  for  life,  or  whether  it  is  to  retain  a  definite  part 
of  the  thing  granted. ^^  A  reservation  is  always  in  favor  of  the 
grantor,  and,  if  it  does  not  contain  words  of  inheritance,  it  exists 
only  for  the  life  of  the  grantor.^^ 

§  276.  Conditions  precedent  and  subsequent. — A  condi- 
tion precedent  is  one  to  be  performed  before  the  estate  vests,**' 
while  a  condition  subsequent  is  one  to  be  performed  after  the 
vesting  and  the  intent  of  which  is  to  defeat  the  estate."    Whether 

='••' Whitney    v.     Fitchburg    R.     178  ss  Kngel  v.  Aver,  85  Alaine  448,  27 

60  N.  E.  384.  Atl.  352! 

"*  Brown  v.  Cranberry  Iron  &c.  Co.,  -'■>  Ashcroft  v.  Eastern  R.   Co..   126 

59  Fed.  434;  Wood  v.  Boyd,  145  Mass.  Mass.  196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672. 

176.  13  N.  E.  476.  4o  Borst  v.  Simpson,  90  Ala.  373,  7 

■'''  Kister  V.  Reeser,  98  Pa.  St.  1,  42  So.   814   Phillips   v.   Gannon,   246   111. 

Am.  Rep.  608,  98,    92    N.    E.   616;    Sullivan-Sanders 

3<^  Chappell  V.  N'ew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  Lumber  Co.  v.  Reeves,  58  Tex.  Civ. 

62  Conn.  195,  24  Atl.  997,  17  L.  R.  A.  App.  488,   125  S.  W.  96. 

"^^O.  41  Bryan    v.    Bliss-Cook    Oak    Co., 

37  Jacobs  V.  Roach,  161  Ala.  201,  49  178  Fed.  217;  Piatt  v.  Piatt.  42  Conn, 

^o-  5/6.  330 ;   Phillips  v.  Gannon,  246  111.  98, 

92  N.  E.  616. 


§    276  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  294 

the  condition  be  one  or  the  otlier  depends  upon  the  intention  of 
the  parties  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument,  there  being 
no  technical  words  which  distinguish  them,*"^  and  a  doubtful  con- 
dition will  be  construed  as  subsequent  rather  than  precedent. ■*■'" 
The  presence  of  a  re-entry  clause,  while  not  indispensable,  is  al- 
ways important  as  evidence  of  an  intention  to  impose  a  condition 
subsequent.^* 

Under  a  deed  creating  a  condition  subsequent  the  title  vests  in 
the  grantee,  and  remains  in  him  until  it  is  divested  by  the  entry 
of  the  grantor;*^  but  in  a  condition  precedent  the  title  does  not 
vest  at  all  unless  the  condition  is  first  performed.**^  A  condition 
will  not  be  raised  by  implication  from  the  mere  declaration  in  the 
deed  that  the  conveyance  is  made  for  a  special  and  particular  pur- 
pose without  being  coupled  with  words  appropriate  to  make  such 
a  condition. ^^ 

A  condition  is  created  by  the  use  of  such  words  as  "on  condi- 
tion," "provided,"  "so  as,"  "so  that,"  "if  it  happen,"  or  any  other 
like  appropriate  w^ords  which  import  that  the  vesting  or  con- 
tinuance of  the  estate  is  to  depend  upon  the  observance  of  the 
provision  named.  These  words  of  condition  should  be  a  part 
of  the  habendum  or  come  directly  after  it.*^  If  used  in  this  place 
the  words  of  condition  qualify  the  grant,  controlling,  but  not 
contradicting,  the  more  general  words  used  in  the  premises.  If 
the  words  of  condition  are  found  in  any  other  part  of  the  deed, 
as,  for  example,  among  the  covenants,  or,  as  is  often  the  case,  in 
the  premises,  as  a  part  of  the  statement  of  consideration,  their 
unusual  and  inappropriate  position  may  have  an  influence  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  deed.*'"*  Where  the  short  form  statutory 
deed  is  used,  in  which  the  habendum  is  absent,  about  the  only 
place  in  the  usual  printed  form  for  the  insertion  of  a  condition 
is  just  after  the  description  of  the  property,  and  this  appears  to 
be  the  place  where  the  condition  is  inserted  when  this  form  of 

42  Osgood  V.  Abbott,  58  Maine  IZ.  346,  7  L.  ed.  701;  Chute  v.  Washburn, 

«  Phillips    V.    Gannon,   246    111.   98,  44  Minn.  312,  46  N.  W.  555. 

92  N.  E.  616.  4-  Faith   v.    Bowles,   86   Md.    13   TH 

4'iDruecker  v.  McLaughlin,  235  111.  Atl.  711,  63  Am.  St.  489. 

367.  85  N.  E.  647.  «  Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  South  &  N. 

i-^  Spect  V.  Gregg,  51  Cal.  198;  Spof-  A.  R.  Co.,  100  Ala.  396,  14  So.  207; 

ford  V.  True,  ?)Z  Maine  283,  54  Am.  Warner  v.  Bennett,  31  Conn.  468. 

Dec.  621.  4'..  Graves   v.    Deterling,    120   N.   Y. 

4uFinlay  v.  King,   3   Pet.    (U.'  S.)  447,  24  N.  E.  655. 


295  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS 


277 


deed  is  used.""  In  whatever  form  or  position  the  condition  ap- 
pears in  the  deed  it  should  be  copied  verbatim  in  the  abstract,  and 
its  position  in  the  deed  with  reference  to  other  clauses  should  be 
clearly  indicated. 

§  277.  Restrictions  as  to  the  use  of  land. — Restrictions 
upon  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  land  conveyed  are  generally 
regarded  as  covenants,  and  not  conditions.^'  But  if  there  is  any 
doubt  whether  a  provision  is  a  restrictive  covenant  or  a  condition, 
it  will  be  held  to  be  the  former.^-  A  restriction  may,  of  course, 
if  such  be  the  intention  of  the  parties,  be  so  expressed  as  to  make 
it  a  condition  f^  but  where  the  restriction  is  a  covenant,  and  not  a 
condition,  its  breach  occasions  no  forfeiture.^*  Whether  or  not 
the  recitals  in  a  deed  create  an  estate  upon  condition  or  constitute 
a  mere  covenant,  must  be  ascertained  from  the  language  em- 
ployed, the  situation  of  the  parties,  their  relation  to  the  subject 
of  the  transaction  and  the  object  in  view.^^  An  agreement  in  the 
deed  limiting  the  use  of  the  premises  is  a  covenant,  not  a  condi- 
tion, and  its  violation  will  not  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate 
granted.^*^  Where  land  is  conveyed  for  certain  purposes  and  there 
is  no  provision  for  re-entry  for  condition  broken,  or  words  indi- 
cating an  intention  that  the  appropriation  of  the  premises  to  any 
other  purpose  should  defeat  the  estate  granted,  the  provision  does 
not  constitute  a  condition." 

A  restriction  on  the  use  of  real  property  is  an  encumbrance,^® 
and  the  words  creating  same  should  be  copied  in  the  abstract  so 
that  counsel  may  determine  their  scope  and  import.  Restrictions 
are  to  be  fairly  and  reasonably  interpreted  according  to  their  ap- 
parent purpose  of  protection  or  advantage  intended  by  the  par- 
ties. They  will  be  upheld  if  not  against  public  policy  or  a  pro- 
hibition of  the  use  of  the  land  granted.     They  will  never  be 

5"  Preston    v.    Bosworth,    153    Ind.  ville    Packing   Co.,    140   Fed.   701,    72 

458,  55  N.  E.  224,  74  Am.  St.  313.  C.  C.  A.  195. 

^1  Stone    V.    Houghton,    139    Mass.  ^^  Graves  v.  Deterling,  41  Hun  643, 

175,  31  N.  E.  719;  Graves  v.  Deter-  3  N.  Y.  St.  128. 

ling,  120  N.  Y.  447,  24  N.  E.  655.  ^r  Tinker  v.  Forbes,  136  111.  221,  26 

^-  Seaboard  Air  Line  R.  Co.  v.  An-  N.  E.  503. 

niston  Mfg.  Co.,  186,  Ala.  264,  65  So.  ^s  Halle   v.    Newbold,    69   Md.   265, 

187.  14    Atl.   662 ;    Lodge    v.    Swampscott, 

=^3  Adams  v.  Valentine,  33   Fed.   1 ;  216  Mass.  260,  103  N.  E.  635 ;  Foster 

Dana  v.  Wentworth,  111  Mass.  291.  v.  Foster,  62  N.  H.  46;  Dieterlen  v. 

5i  Graves   v.    Deterling,    120    N.    Y.  Miller,  114  App.  Div.   (N.  Y.)  40,  99 

447,  24  N.  E.  655.  N.  Y.  S.  699,  19  N.  Y.  Ann.  Cas.  26. 

s^  Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Nash- 


§    27S>  TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS  296 

inil)lied  unless  such  appears  to  be  the  ])rcsumc{l  intention  of  the 
parties. 

The  burden  or  obHgation  of  a  restrictive  covenant,  made,  upon 
the  conveyance  of  land,  by  the  grantor  or  grantee,  will  in  some, 
but  not  in  all.  jurisdictions,  pass  to  and  bind  a  subsequent  trans- 
feree of  the  land  affected  thereby.  Even  in  jurisdictions  where 
such  covenant  is  held  not  to  run  with  the  land,  an  agreement  as 
to  the  use  of  land  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  affect  a  sub- 
sequent purchaser  of  the  land  who  takes  with  notice  of  the  agree- 
ment. The  question  is  not  whether  the  covenant  runs  with  the 
land,  but  whether  a  party  shall  be  permitted  to  use  the  land  in  a 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  contract  entered  into  by  his  vendor, 
and  with  notice  of  which  he  purchased.'"  It  should  be  remem- 
bered in  investigating  a  title  that  one  important  effect  of  a  recital 
in  a  deed  is  that  of  giving  notice  to  all  who  derive  title  through 
the  deed.  So,  where  a  deed  in  the  chain  of  title  contains  the  re- 
cital of  a  restriction  as  to  the  use  of  the  land,  a  subsequent  grantee 
of  the  land  takes  it  subject  to  the  restriction."" 

§  278.  Covenants  for  title. — Covenants  for  title  are  agree- 
ments by  the  grantor  in  solemn  form  inserted  in  the  deed  for  the 
protection  of  the  grantee  in  case  the  latter's  title  should  be  after- 
ward overthrown,  or  incumbrances  upon  the  property  successfully 
asserted.  As  a  general  rule  the  grantee's  right  to  relief  against 
the  grantor,  in  case  he  should  suffer  loss  through  a  defective 
title  after  the  contract  has  been  executed  by  a  conveyance,  de- 
pends upon  the  covenants  in  the  deed.  In  the  absence  of  cov- 
enants for  title,  the  general  rule  prevails  that  the  grantee  is,  in 
the  absence  of  fraud  or  mistake,  absolutely  without  relief  at  law 
or  in  equity.  Consequently,  it  is  important  that  the  deed  should 
contain  covenants  adequate  for  his  protection,  and  in  those  states 
where  the  grantee  is  held  entitled  to  a  conveyance  with  general 
covenants,  his  right  should  never  be  deemed  to  have  been  parted 
with,  except  upon  clear  evidence  that,  by  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, the  grantor  was  bound  only  to  execute  a  quitclaim  deed,  or 
a  deed  without  any  covenants  whatever. 

In  this  country  the  usual  covenants  in  an  ordinary  warranty 

'■'"Whitney   v.   Union    R.     Co.,     11        '"> Whitney   v.   Union    Ry.    Co.,    11 
Grav   (Mass.)   359,  71  Am.  Dec.  715.     (Mass.)  359,  71  Am.  Dec.  715. 
Talfmadge  v.  East  River  Bank,  26  N. 
Y.  105. 


297  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  278 

deed  are  those  :  ( 1 )  Of  seisin,  (2)  of  good  right  to  convey,  (3) 
against  incumbrances,  (4)  of  warranty,  (5)  for  quiet  enjoyment, 
and  (6)  for  further  assurance."^  These  covenants  are  either 
general  or  special.  They  are  general  when  against  the  acts, 
claims  and  demands  of  any  and  all  persons  whomsoever;  and 
special  when  they  are  against  the  acts  and  claims  of  the  grantor 
or  of  any  person  claiming  by,  through  or  under  him.  The  latter 
is  commonly  called  a  quitclaim,  and  is,  with  respect  to  defects 
of  title  not  arising  from  some  act  of  the  grantor  or  those  claim- 
ing under  him,  no  more  in  effect  than  a  conveyance  without  cov- 
enants of  any  kind. 

No  particular  form  or  words  are  necessary  to  create  a  covenant. 
It  may  be  created  without  the  use  of  the  word  "covenant"  in  the 
clause  containing  the  stipulation."^  It  may  be  embodied  in  a  re- 
cital in  any  part  of  the  deed,  and  a  single  sentence  may  contain 
several  covenants."^  A  deed  of  conveyance  may,  however,  be 
perfectly  valid,  and  may  convey  title,  without  covenants  of  any 
kind,  if  in  other  respects  it  conforms  to  law.  In  such  case  the 
grantee  assumes  the  risk  of  soundness  of  title.  He  can  not  show 
a  parol  agreement  which  will  convert  a  deed  without  covenants 
into  one  with  them.  Where,  in  a  chain  of  title,  there  is  a  series 
of  deeds  with  general  covenants  for  title,  the  title  is  sometimes 
regarded  as  more  secure  than  where  the  conveyances  are  quit- 
claim deeds,  or  deeds  with  limited  or  special  covenants  only,  the 
presence  of  which  has  been  said  to  afford  some  ground  for 
suspicion  that  there  is  some  defect  in  the  title."* 

By  statute  in  many  states,  covenants  for  title  are  implied  from 
the  use  of  certain  words  of  conveyance.  In  other  states  the  stat- 
utes provide  that  no  covenants  shall  be  implied  in  a  conveyance  of 
real  estate,  whether  such  conveyance  contains  special  covenants 
or  not,  but  these  statutes  are  held  not  to  apply  to  leases."^  Where 
it  is  provided  by  statute  that  the  use  of  certain  words  in  a  convey- 
ance themselves  import  covenants  for  title,  their  use  is  as  effectual 
for  that  purpose  as  though  such  covenants  had  been  expressly  con- 
tained in  the  deed.'''^    Where,  by  virtue  of  statute,  covenants  for 

"4  Kent  Com.  471.  ters  v.   Cartier,  80  Mich.   124,  45   N. 

"2  Randel  v.  Chesapeake  &c.  Canal  W.  73,  20  Am.  St.  508. 

Co.,  1  Har.  (Del.)   151.  •■■^  Boreel  v.  Lawton,  90  N.  Y.  293; 

•"■3  Johnson     v.     Hollensworth,     48  Shaft  v.  Carey,   107  Wis.  273,  83   N. 

Mich.  140,  11  N.  W.  843.  W.  288. 

«*  Johnson   v.   WilHams.    Zl    Kans.  «« Ragle   v.    Dedinan   50    Ind.    App. 

179,  14  Pac.  537,  1  Am.  St.  243 ;  Pe-  359,  98  N.  E.  367. 


§    279  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  298 

title  are  implied  from  the  use  of  certain  words  of  conveyance,  no 
implied  covenants  will  arise  when  inconsistent  with  the  express 
covenants,  or  when  it  appears  from  the  language  used  by  the 
parties  that  it  was  not  intended  that  any  such  covenant  as  that 
implied  by  the  statute  should  take  effect."  Statutes  provide  that 
covenants  for  title  are  implied  from  the  use  of  such  words  as 
"grant,  bargain,  and  sell/'*"^  "grant  and  convey/'"'*  "convey  and 
warrant,"'"  and  "bargained  and  sold.'"'  By  statute  or  by  judicial 
decisions  in  some  states,  the  covenant  of  warranty  is  made  to 
include  the  other  covenants  of  title."  In  states  where  covenants 
are  implied  from  the  use  of  certain  words  of  grant,  the  words 
used  should  be  literally  transcri1>ed.  Where  the  deed  is  in  form 
a  "warranty  deed,"  but  does  not  contain  any  of  the  customary 
covenants,  the  omission  should  be  noted  in  the  abstract. 

§  279.  Defective  covenants. — A  vast  number  of  objections 
to  title  are  founded  upon  errors  and  irregularities  in  expressing 
covenants  in  deeds.  Clerical  mistakes  and  inadvertent  omissions  in 
this  respect  are  of  frequent  occurrence,  and  the  abstracter  should 
use  extreme  care  in  abstracting  that  portion  of  every  deed  con- 
taining covenants  of  any  kind.  It  is  a  common  practice  for  con- 
veyances to  introduce  a  covenant  in  some  such  words  as  "that  the 
grantor  covenants  to  warrant  and  defend  as  against  all  persons 
claiming  by,  through,  from  or  under  himself,  and  none  other." 
Now,  these  super-added  words  qualify  the  covenant  of  warranty 
and  make  the  covenant  what  is  sometimes  called  a  qualified  war- 
ranty, and  reduce  the  deed  to  the  quality  of  a  mere  quitclaim 
deed.'^  In  attempting  to  express  a  covenant  of  seisin  in  one  case 
the  grantor  used  the  word  "signed"  instead  of  "seised,"  and  it 
w^as  held  that  a  court  of  law  could  not  read  "seised"  for  "signed," 
so  as  to  make  the  sentence  in  which  it  was  used  operative  as  a 

"  Douglass  V.  Lewin,  131  U.  S.  75,  ^o  Dalton    v.    Taliaferro.      101      111. 

9  Sup.  Ct.  634,  33  L.  ed.  53;  Dun  v.  App.  592;  Jackson  v.  Green,  112  Incl. 

Dietrich.  3  X.  Dak.  3,  53  N.  W.  81.  341.  14  N.  E.  89. 

•^^Heflin    v.    Phillip.s,    96    Ala.    561.  -i  Douglas  v.  Lewis,   131  U.  S.  75, 

11    So.   729;    Brodie  v.    Watkins,    31  9  S.  Ct.  634,  33  L.  ed.  53. 

Ark.  319 :   McDonough  v.  Martin,  88  "  Van  Wagner  v.  Van  Nostrand,  19 

Ga   675.  16  S.  E.  59.  18  L.  R.  A.  343 ;  Iowa  422 ;  Smith  v.  Jones.  97  Ky.  670, 

Altringer  v.   Capeheart.  68  Mo.  441 ;  17  Ky.  L.  456.  31  S.  W.  475 ;  Messer 

Mcmmert  v.  McKeen,  112  Pa.  St.  315,  v.  Oestreich,  52  Wis.  684,  10  N.  W.  6. 

4  Atl    54?  "  Bennett  v.  Davis.  90  Mame  457, 

c'J  Crugcr  V.  Ginnuth.  3  W^ills,  Civ.  38  Atl.  372 ;  Doane  v.  Willcutt.  5  Gray 

Cas.  Ct.  App.   (Tex.)  24.                '  (Mass.)   328,  66  Am.  Dec.  369. 


299  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  280 

covenant  of  seisin.'*  Covenants  of  seisin  in  a  warranty  deed, 
wherein  the  grantor  covenants  "for  his  heirs,  executors,  and  ad- 
ministrators," creates  no  liabiHty  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  for 
a  breach  of  such  covenant." 

§  280.  Signature  to  the  deed. — By  the  early  common  law 
no  signing  was  necessary  to  give  effect  and  validity  to  a  deed  of 
conveyance,  as  the  seal  alone  was  the  test  of  its  existence. ^"^  But 
the  English  statute  of  frauds  and  similar  statutes  in  most  of  the 
states  of  this  country  expressly  provide  that  all  deeds  of  convey- 
ance shall  be  signed  by  the  party  making  them,  or  by  his  agent 
duly  constituted."  As  to  the  manner  of  signing,  all  that  is  re- 
quired is  that  the  deed  should  be  signed  so  as  to  show  that  the 
grantor  intended  it  as  his  act  and  deed.^^  Nor  is  it  essential  that 
the  signature  be  at  the  end  of  the  deed,  but  it  will  be  sufficient  if 
it  appear  in  the  body  of  the  instrument,  especially  if  the  deed 
was  written  by  the  grantor  himself  who  has  inserted  his  name 
in  it,'^^  or  even  in  case  the  deed  was  written  by  another,  who  in- 
serted the  grantor's  name  at  the  latter's  direction,  and  was  ac- 
knowledged by  the  grantor  and  delivered  as  his  deed.*°  But  the 
statutes  of  many  states  provide  that  the  instrument  must  be  ''sub- 
scribed," and  under  such  requirement  the  deed  should  be  signed 
at  the  bottom  or  end  thereof,  as  it  has  been  held  that  there  is  a 
difference  between  the  "signing"  and  "subscribing"  of  an  instru- 
ment.®^ The  mere  signing,  sealing,  and  acknowledging  a  deed, 
in  which  another  person  is  named  as  grantor,  does  not  make  it 
the  deed  of  the  person  so  signing  who  is  not  named  as  grantor,®" 
and  the  naming  of  a  person  in  a  deed  as  grantor  does  not  ordi- 
narily make  it  his  deed  unless  it  is  signed  and  sealed  by  him.®^  But 
a  deed  written  by  a  person  who  inserts  his  name  as  a  grantor  is 

"*  Hagler   v.    Simpson,   44   N.    Car.  ^o  Devereux    v.    McMahon,    108    N. 

384.  Car.  134,  12  S.  E.  902,  12  L.  R.  A.  205. 

Ts  Rufner  v.  McConncl,  14  111.  168 ;  »«  Newton  v.  Emerson,  66  Tex.  142, 

Traynor  v.  Palmer,  86  111.  477;  Bowne  18  S.  W.  348. 

V.  Wolcott,  1  N.  Dak.  497,  48  N.  W.  si  Winston  v.  Hodges.  102  Ala.  304, 

426.  15   So.  528.     But  see  Cal.   Canneries 

7«  Jerome  v.  Ortman,  66  Mich.  668,  Co.  v.  Seatena,  117  Cal.  447,  49  Pac. 

33  N.  W.  759.                                           *  462. 

'''■  Hutcliins     V.     Bj-rnes,     9     Gray  ^^  Harrison  v.  Simons,  55  Ala.  510: 

(Mass.)  367;  Devereux  v.  McMahon.  Payne   v.    Parker,    10   Maine    178,   25 

108  N.  Car.  134.  12  S.  E.  902,  12  L.  Am.  Dec.  221. 

R.  A.  205;  Wright  v.  Wakeford,   17  ^3  Thomas  v.  Caldwell,  50  111.  138; 

Ves.  (Jr.)   454a.  Adams  v.  Medsker,  25  W.  Va.   127. 

^s  Armstrong   v.    Stovall,   26   Miss. 
275. 


§    281  TITLES    AXD    ARSTRACTS  300 

valid,  thoiio^h  not  siil)scribc(l  l)y  him.  where  there  is  proof  that  he 
dehvered  the  instrument  to  the  grantee,  or  other  evidence  showing 
his  intention  to  make  his  signature  final. ^*  The  deed  may  be  exe- 
cuted by  the  grantor's  mark  in  place  of  his  signature,  and  it  is  not 
essential  that  the  words  ''his  mark"  should  accompany  the  mark 
where  it  appears  that  the  mark  was  made  by  him,  or  was  made  by 
another  in  his  presence  and  adopted  by  him,^^  nor  is  it  necessary 
that  a  signing  l)y  mark  should  be  specially  attested  by  witnesses, 
unless  witnesses  to  deeds  otherwise  signed  are  required.®'' 

A  deed  of  conveyance  can  not  be  executed  by  a  third  person  for 
the  grantor  in  his  absence  unless  such  third  party  is  authorized  to 
do  so  by  an  instrument  under  seal.  It  is  the  custom  in  many  places 
to  insert  in  the  deed  a  brief  recital  of  the  power  of  attorney,  its 
place  of  record,  etc..  which  is  proper  and  desirable,  but  has  been 
held  to  have  no  effect  as  showing  authority.^^  The  attorney  may 
execute  the  deed  by  signing  the  name  of  the  principal  alone,  with- 
out signing  his  own,  but  the  usual  method  is  to  sign  lx)th  the  prin- 
cipal's name  and  his  own,  and  not  merely  that  of  the  principal. ^^ 

A  deed  by  a  corporation  is  properly  executed  by  an  authorized 
officer  signing  the  corporate  name,  adding  his  own  signature 
and  official  title,  and  affixing  the  corporate  seal.  The  conveyance 
should  purport  to  be  that  of  the  corporation,  and  not  merely  that 
of  its  officers. ^^  The  abstracter  should  carefully  observe  and  note 
in  the  abstract  any  departure  from  the  legal  requirements  as  to 
signing  the  deed;  especially  in  the  cases  of  deeds  by  married 
women,  conveyances  by  delegated  authority  and  by  corporations. 

§281.  Sealing. — Seals  are  a  relic  of  that  period  when 
men,  as  a  rule,  could  not  write.  When  signatures  became  com- 
mon acquirements,  a  seal  was  supposed  to  impart  a  certain 
solemnity  to  the  act  of  signing  and  deliberation  upon  the  con- 
tents of  the  instrument.  While  there  has  been  a  tendency  in  mod- 
ern times  to  dispense  wnth  the  seal,  some  states  still  retain  the 
formality  of  using  the  seal  in  the  execution  of  deeds.  Where 
the  use  of  the  seal  is  not  dispensed  with  by  statute,  it  is  an  essen- 

^*  Newton  V.  Emerson,  66  Tex.  142,  ^^  Waggencr  v.  Waggener,  3  T.  B. 

18  S.  W.  348.  Mon.  (Ky.)  542. 

^''  Sellers  v.  Sellers.  98  N.  Car.  13,  '<«  Wood     v.     Goodridge,     6     Cush. 

3  S.  E.  917.  (Mass.)    117,  52  Am.  Dec.  771. 

>"<■'  Finley  v.  Prescott.  104  Wis.  614,  "-•'  Norris  v.  Dains,  52  Ohio  St.  215, 

80  N.  W.  930,  47  L.  R.  A.  695.           '  39  N.  E.  660,  49  Am.  St.  716. 


301  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  282 

tial  part  of  a  deed/"^  and  the  mere  recital  in  the  testimonium 
clause  of  an  instrument  signed  and  delivered  for  a  deed,  that  the 
parties  have  affixed  their  seals,  will  not  make  it  a  sealed  instru- 
ment if  no  scroll  or  mark  is  affixed."^  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is 
in  fact  sealed,  the  omission  of  a  recital  of  the  fact  in  the  in- 
strument does  not  destroy  its  effect  as  a  deed.°"  In  jurisdictions 
where  the  common-law  seal  is  required,  there  should  generally 
be  some  wafer  annexed  or  impression  made,  as  it  has  been  re- 
cently held  that  the  letters  "L.  S."  do  not  make  a  common-law 
seal,^^  and  in  another  case  it  was  held  that  the  word  "seal"  with 
a  brace  at  each  end,  printed  when  the  blank  was  printed,  and 
following  the  grantor's  signature,  was  not  a  seal.^*  However,  it 
appears  that  the  courts  in  some  jurisdictions  have  been  more  lib- 
eral on  the  question  as  to  what  is  a  seal,  and  have  authorized  the 
use  of  a  scroll  instead.^^ 

In  many  states  no  seal  of  any  kind  is  essential  to  the  validity 
of  a  deed;  but  where  an  impression  upon  the  paper  itself,  or  a 
scroll  is  required,  it  is  often  required  to  be  recognized  as  such 
in  the  body  of  the  instrument.  This  is  usually  the  office  of  the 
testimonium  clause.  If  not  so  recognized,  the  scroll  is  apt  to  be 
disregarded  and  the  paper  held  to  be  unsealed  and  inoperative  as 
a  deed.^"  In  some  cases  the  acknowledgment  of  the  instrument 
as  a  deed  supplies  the  failure  of  the  grantor  to  recognize  the  seal 
in  the  body  of  the  instrument.^" 

Where  a  seal  or  scroll  is  required  the  examiner  should  see  that 
there  are  as  many  scrolls  or  seals  as  there  are  signatures  to  the 
instrument.  It  is  only  in  case  the  execution  is  defective  or  some- 
thing has  been  omitted  that  the  abstract  need  contain  any  refer- 
ence to  the  execution,  but  any  defects  or  omissions  must  be  lit- 
erally transcribed.  , 

§  282.  Attestation. — No  attestation  w^as  necessary  to  the 
validity  of  a  deed  at  comuKm  law.  and  is  not  now  necessary  ex- 
cept when  required  by  statute.     Under  some  statutes  requiring 

"0  Brown  v.  Dickey.  106  Maine  97,  "*  Manning    v.    Perkins.    86    Maine 

75  Atl.  .382:  Todd  v.  Union  Dime  Sav.  419.  29  Atl.  1114. 

Inst..  118  N.  Y.  337.  2?,  N.  E.  299.  •■'■>  In  re  Hacker's  Appeal,  121   Pac. 

"^Comlcy  V.  Ford.  65  W.  Va.  429,  192,   15  Atl.  500,   1  L.  R.  A.  861. 

64  S.  E.  447.  '"' Clegg    v.    Lemessurier,    15    Grat. 

"-Cummins    v.    Woodruff,    5    Ark.  (Va.)   108. 

116.  !'"  Cosner    v.    McCrum    40    W.    Ysl. 

»■•  Barnard  v.  Gantz,  140  N.  Y.  249,  339.  21  S.  E.  739. 
35  X.  E.  430. 


§    283  TITLES    AXD    AHSTRACTS  302 

attestation,  unattested  deeds  are  in  effect  void,  though  the  stat- 
utes do  not  expressly  declare  them  so.'''^  An  acknowledgment 
does  not  dispense  with  the  necessity  of  attestation  unless  the  stat- 
ute so  provides.""  To  constitute  a  good  attestation  the  witnesses 
must  sign  the  deed  as  w^itnesses  in  the  presence  of  the  grantor,  or, 
if  in  his  absence,  at  his  special  request  to  attest  the  instrument,' 
and  if  the  witnesses  failed  to  sign  at  the  time  of  the  execution, 
though  present,  and  if  they  sign  afterward  without  the  request  of 
the  parties,  it  is  not  a  good  attestation.^  Under  a  statute  which 
in  general  terms  requires  the  witnesses  to  su1)scribe  or  sign  the 
deed  as  a  witness,  a  witness  who  makes  his  mark  is  sufficient;'' 
but  such  is  not  the  rule  where  the  statute  provides  that  the  witness 
must  be  able  to  write  and  must  write  his  name  as  a  witness.^ 

The  attestation  clause  has  been  held  not  essential  to  the  validity 
of  the  deed  where  the  instrument  is  attested  and  signed  by  the 
witnesses.'"'  In  order  that  it  may  appear  on  the  instrument  that 
the  witnesses  sign  in  this  capacity,  their  signatures  usually  follow 
a  brief  attestation  clause  placed  at  the  end  of  the  instrument  and 
to  the  left  of  the  grantor's  signature.  This  clause  varies  in  form, 
the  more  usual  forms  being:  "Signed,  sealed  and  delivered  in 
the  presence  of,"  "sealed  in  the  presence  of,"  "in  the  presence  of," 
or.  in  some  states,  simply  one  word,  as  "attest,"  or  "witness"  is 
used. 

In  jurisdictions  where  attestation  is  required,  any  omission  or 
irregularity  respecting  it  should  be  noted  on  the  abstract,  but  if 
the  attestation  be  in  compliance  with  the  statute  there  is  no  neces- 
sity of  any  note  concerning  attestation. 

§  283.  Acknowledgment. — An  acknowledgment  is  a  dec- 
laration made  before  a  competent  officer,  l)y  one  who  has  executed 
an  instrument,  that  it  is  his  act  and  deed.  The  certificate  of 
acknowledgment  is  the  formal  statement  of  the  officer  of  the 
fact  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  party  that  the  instrument  is 
his  act  and  deed.     The  term  "acknowledgment"  is  often  used  as 

^8"Winstcfl  Sav.  Bank  &c.  Assn.  v.  -  TTollenl)ack  v.  Fleming,  6  Hill  (N. 

Spencer,    26    Conn.     195;     Crane     v.  Y.)  303. 

Reeder,  21  Mich.  24.  4  Am.  Rep.  430.  ^  Devercux   v.    McMahon,     102    N. 

"f»  Tarpey   v.    Desert    Salt     Co.,     5  Car.  284.  9  S.  E.  635. 

Utah  205,  14  Pac.  338.  «  Stewart  v.  Beard,  69  .Ma.  470. 

1  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corey.  54  ■^' Blalock  v.  Miland,  87  Ga.  573,  13 

Hun   (N.  Y.)   493,  27  N.  Y.  St.  608,  S.  E.  551. 
7  N.  Y.  S.  939,  Rcv'd  135  N  .Y.'  326, 
31  N.  E.  1095. 


I 


303  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  283 

designating  the  certificate."  The  chief  purpose  of  the  acknowl- 
edgment is  to  afford  proof  of  the  due  execution  of  the  deed  by 
the  grantor,  sufficient  to  authorize  the  recorder  to  record  it. 
But  a  deed  without  acknowledgment,  or  defectively  acknowledged, 
generally  passes  the  title  equally  with  one  acknowledged,  as 
against  the  grantor  and  his  heirs  ;^  but  without  an  effectual  ac- 
knowledgment, a  deed  can  not  be  recorded  so  as  to  impart  notice 
of  the  conveyance  to  the  world.^  Acknowledgment  has  also  been 
held  essential  in  certain  cases  in  order  to  render  the  instrument 
effective.^  But  it  will  be  observed  that  the  statutes  usually  make 
an  unacknowledged  deed  without  effect  as  agamst  a  purchaser, 
not  as  between  the  parties  to  such  deed.^**  The  certificate  of  ac- 
knowledgment must  disclose  the  place  or  venue  where  it  has  been 
taken,  as  it  must  appear  that  the  officer  acted  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  his  jurisdiction.^^ 

A  statutory  requirement  that  the  official  character  of  the  offi- 
cer taking  the  acknowledgment  be  authenticated  must  be  strictly 
complied  with.^"  This  authentication  is  usually  done  by  the  clerk 
of  the  court  in  whose  office  the  evidence  of  the  official  character 
of  the  officer  taking  the  acknowledgment  is  kept.  The  authentica- 
tion, however,  is  not  generally  required  where  the  officer  taking 
the  acknowledgment  has  an  official  seal,  and  performs  the  act 
under  his  hand  and  seal. 

Where  the  statute  requires  a  married  woman  to  be  examined 
privily,  the  certificate  of  the  officer  must  state  that  he  so  examined 
her,  and  that  she  acknowledged  the  instrument  to  be  her  free  and 
voluntary  act.  Also  where  the  statute  requires  that  a  married 
woman  shall  state  that  she  does  not  wish  to  retract  her  act  and 
deed,  the  certificate  will  be  fatally  defective  if  it  does  not  recite 
that  fact.'^ 

The  recital  that  the  grantor  appeared  before  the  officer  and 
acknowledged  the  deed  is  the  gist  of  the  whole  certificate.     The 

«  Rogers  v.  Pell,  154  N.  Y.  518,  49  N.  E.  868;  Zacharia  v.  Cohen  Co.,  140 

^-  E.  75.  Iowa  682.    119   N.    W.    136;    Burton- 

/TT    o  s*".      Lessee   v.   Davis,   6   Pet.  Whayne  Co.  v.  Farmer's  &  Drovers' 

(U    S.)   124,  8  L.  ed.  342;  Wilson  v.  Bank,  130  Ky.  389,  113  S.  W.  445,  114 

Wilson,  85  Nebr.  167,  122  N.  W.  856.  S.  W.  288. 

8  Bass  V.  Estill,  50  Miss.  300;  Cof-  ^i  Hudson    v.    Webber,    104    Maine 

fey  V.  Hendricks,  66  Tex.  676,  2   S.  429,  72  Atl.  184. 

^^•^^             „„.  12  Phillips    y     People,    11    111.    App. 

iii?^T  ]\))^^'^^  ^^^'^-  C'^-  ^PP-)  ^40;  Knighton  v.   Smith,   1   Ore.  276. 

L^  1       ^^^-  13  Churchill  V.  Monroe.  1  R.  I.  209; 

10  Baker   v.    Baker,   239   111.   82,   87  Grove  v.  Zumbro,  14  Grat.  (\'a  )  501. 


§    283  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  304 

word  "acknowledged"  is  not  indispensable,  but  unless  the  fact 
of  acknowledgment  be  made  to  appear  by  the  use  of  that  word  or 
its  equivalent,  the  certificate  will  be  fatally  defective."  It  is  the 
better  practice  for  the  officer  to  insert  the  date  of  the  certificate 
in  the  attestation  clause;  but  this  is  not  indispensable  unless  made 
so  by  statute.^^  It  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  certificate  shall 
be  signed  by  the  officer  by  whom  it  is  made  and  the  recital  of  his 
name  in  the  body  of  the  certificate  will  not  suffice.^''  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  officer  shall  add  to  his  signature  his  official  des- 
ignation, if  the  capacity  in  which  he  acts  elsewhere  appears  in  the 
certificate.^^  \\'here  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  the  certificate 
shall  be  under  the  signature  and  seal  of  the  officer,  the  omission 
of  the  seal  will  be  fatal. ^^ 

In  a  few  states  the  acknowledgment  of  deeds  before  certain 
designated  officers,  is  an  essential  element  of  execution,  but  in 
most  of  the  states  the  only  object  of  the  acknowledgment  is  to 
furnish  the  recording  officer  with  proof  that  the  deedjs  genuine, 
while  as  between  the  parties,  except  where  one  of  the  grantors  is 
a  married  woman,  the  deed  is  valid  without  the  acknowledgment. 
While,  as  a  general  rule,  deeds  are  valid  and  effective  as  between 
the  parties  without  acknowledgment,  that  formality  is  of  vital 
importance  to  the  grantee.  For,  unless  all  the  formalities  in  this 
respect  are  observed,  the  deed,  though  admitted  to  record,  will 
not  be  notice  to  subsequent  purchasers  and  creditors  of  the 
grantor,  who  might,  iri  consequence,  deprive  the  grantee  of  the 
estate.  Besides,  a  defective  certificate  of  acknowledgment  is  re- 
garded as  a  defect  in  the  grantee's  title,  and  should  he  afterward 
wish  to  sell  the  estate  the  defect  might  seriously  interfere.  There 
has  been  no  more  prolific  source  of  objections  to  title  than  irreg- 
ular or  informal  certificates  of  acknowledgment.  It  therefore 
behooves  the  abstracter  to  subject  the  deed  to  the  closest  scrutiny 
for  any  departure  from  the  required  form,  and  to  note  in  the  ab- 
stract any  omission  or  irregularity  respecting  the  acknowledg- 
ment. Counsel  should  insist  on  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  form  ex- 
pressly provided  by  statute.  As  a  general  rule,  substantial  com- 
pliance with  a  statutory  form  of  acknowledgment  is  all  that  is 

1*  Cabell  V.  Gruhbs.  48  Mo.  35.v  ^^  Brown  v.  Farran,  3  Oliio  140. 

I'-Webb  V.  Huff,  61  Tex.  677.  is  Mason   v.   Brock,   12   111.  273,  52 

16  Carlisle  v.  Carlisle,  78  Ala..  542.    Am.  Dec.  490. 


305  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  284 

required.  Words  of  equivalent  import  may  be  substituted  for 
the  words  used  in  the  statute  or  in  the  form/^ 

§  284.     Examples   of   defective   acknowledgments. — It    is 

thought  proper  in  this  connection  to  direct  the  reader's  attention 
to  some  of  the  more  common  errors  and  omissions  in  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  deeds,  as  a  vast  number  of  objections  to  title  are 
founded  upon  defects  in  this  respect. 

Where  the  statute  prescribes  a  form  of  acknowledgment,  a  sub- 
stantial compliance  therewith  is  necessary.  It  has  been  held  that 
the  omission  from  a  statutory  form  of  certificate  of  the  words 
"for  the  purposes  therein  contained''  is  fatal. ^'^  Under  a  statute 
providing  that  "the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  shall  state  the 
act  of  acknowledgment,"  and  that  a  specified  form  containing  a 
recital  that  the  party  executed  the  instrument  as  his  "free  act 
and  deed"  may  be  used,  it  was  held  that  a  certificate  omitting  that 
the  instrument  was  the  free  act  and  deed  of  the  grantor  was  not 
a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  statute. ^^  Where  a  statute  pro- 
vides that  the  deeds  of  corporations  must  be  acknowledged  by 
the  president  and  secretary,  an  acknowledgment  by  the  vice-presi- 
dent and  assistant  secretary  of  a  corporation  was  held  insuffi- 
cient.^" Under  a  statute  requiring  the  officer  to  certify  that  the 
person  making  the  acknowledgment  is  personally  known  or 
proved  to  him  by  competent  evidence  to  be  the  identical  person 
who'  executed  the  deed,  it  is  held  not  sufficient  for  the  officer  to 
state  simply  that  the  deed  was  acknowledged  by  the  grantor 
named  in  the  deed,  without  declaring  the  officer's  knowledge  of 
the  identity."^  It  is  not  sufficient  for  the  officer  to  say  that  he  is 
"satisfied  of  such  identity.""*  Where  the  name  of  the  grantor  as 
recited  in  the  certificate  is  unlike  the  name  of  the  grantor  as 
recited  in  the  deed,  the  acknowledgment  is  invalid.^^  If  the  per- 
son who  acknowledged  the  deed  is  not  in  any  way  identified  as 
the. person  who  executed  the- deed,  the  omission  of  the  name  of  the 
grantor  from  the  certificate  is  a  fatal  defect.^^    It  is  indispensable 

19  Kelly  V.  Calhoun,  95  U.   S.  710,  120  U.  S.  575,  7  Sup.  Ct.  730,  30  L. 
24  L.  ed.  544.  ed.  789. 

20  Childers  v.  Wm.  H.  Coleman  Co.,  24  Kimball  v.   Semple.  25  Cal.  440 ; 
122  Tenn.  109.  118  S.  W.  1018.  Fryer  v.  Rockefeller,  63  N.  Y.  268. 

21  Gross  V.  Watts,  206  Mo.  2,72,,  104  25  McKenzie  v.  Stafiford,  8  Tex.  Civ. 
S.  W.  30,  121  Am.  St.  662.  App.  121,  27  S.  W.  790. 

22Erickson  v.  Conniff,  19  S.  Dak.  ^'' Hiss  v.  McCabe,  45  Md.  77; 
41,  101  N.  W.  1104.  Smith's  Lessee  v.  Hunt,  13  Ohio  260, 

23  Schley  V.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.    42  Am.  Dec.  201. 

20 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    285  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  306 

that  the'  certificate  shall  show  the  fact  of  acknowledgment.  The 
statement  that  the  person  who  appears  before  the  officer  is  known 
to  him  as  the  person  who  executed  the  deed,  for  the  purpose 
therein  stated,  has  been  held  to  be  insufficient."'  A  certificate  re- 
citing that  the  grantor  appeared  "and  acknowledged  that  " 

signed,  sealed,  and  delivered  the  same  is  not  sufficient,  because 
it  does  not  show  that  the  grantor  acknowledged  that  he  executed 
the  deed.^* 

Where  the  certificate  fails  to  show  private  examination  of  a 
married  woman,  but  shows  instead  that  she  was  examined  "ac- 
cording to  law,"  it  does  not  show  a  compliance  with  the  require- 
ment of  the  statute. ^^  Under  a  statute  providing,  as  the  part  of 
a  certificate  of  acknowledgment  by  a  married  woman,  that  she 
"does  not  wish  to  retract"  her  execution  of  the  conveyance,  the 
omission  of  this  statement  or  words  of  equivalent  import  is  held 
to  render  the  certificate  fatally  defective. ^° 

§  285.  Howr  acknowledgment  shown  in  abstract. — Where 
the  form  of  acknowledgment  is  such  as  fills  the  requirements  of 
the  law  at  the  time  when  it  was  taken,  a  brief  mention  of  the  fact 
of  the  acknowledgment  and  its  date  is  all  that  is  required.  This 
should  be  placed  immediately  after  recital  of  the  date  and 
place  of  recording,  or  it  may  be  inserted  at  the  end  of  the  synopsis, 
and  may  be  in  form  thus : 

Acknowledged  March  1,  1912. 

Slight  deviations  from  the  prescribed  form,  or  minor  omis- 
sions, may  be  described  as  follows : 

Acknowledged  March  1,  1912.  No  fac  simile  of  notarial  seal 
or  any  indications  thereof  by  scroll  appears,  but  body  of  certificate 
contains  a  statement  that  the  officer  who  made  it  affixed  his  seal 
of  office. 

But  where  the  defect  or  omissions  are  such  as  to  render  the 
certificate,  invalid,  the  entire  certificate,  or  so  much  thereof  as 
will  clearly  show  the  defect  or  omission,  should  be  set  out  in  the 
abstract.  Thus  where  the  statute  requires  the  certificate  to  show 
the  separate  examination  of  a  married  woman,  and  the  certifi- 

2- Short  V.  Conlce,  28  111.  219;  Ca-  =»  Meddock  v.  Williams,  12  Ohio 
bell  V.  Grubb.  48  Mo-.  353.  ?>n . 

^^Buell  V.  Irwin,  24  Mich.  145;  •''•'>  Bateman.  Petitioner,  11  R.  I.  585 ; 
Huff  V.  Webb,  64  Tex.  284.  •  Ruleman    v.    Pritchett.    56   Tex.   482 ; 

AIcMullen  v.  Eagan,  21  W.  Va.  233. 


307  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  286 

cate  in  question  omits  s.uch  statement,  that  part  of  the  certificate 
of  acknowledgment  relating  to  such  married  woman  should  be 
set  out. 

§  286.  Delivery. — The  execution  of  a  conveyance  is  not 
complete  and  no  title  passes  by  the  deed  until  there  is  a  delivery 
of  the  same  to  the  grantee,  either  actual  or  constructive.  The 
customary  mode  of  delivery  is  the  actual  handing  over  of  the 
deed  by  the  grantor  to  the  grantee  with  the  expressed  intention 
of  passing  the  title,  but  this  method  is  not  absolutely  essential. 
The  controlling  question  of  delivery  in  all  cases  is  one  of  inten- 
tion and  the  delivery  is  complete  when  there  is  an  intention  mani- 
fested on  the  part  of  the  grantor  to  make  the  instrument  his  deed, 
and  he  does  some  act  putting  it  beyond  his  power  to  revoke. ^^  No 
particular  form  or  ceremony  is  necessary  in  making  the  deliv- 
ery.^^  It  may  be  by  acts  without  words,  or  words  without  acts, 
or  boih.  Anything  which  clearly  manifests  an  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  grantor  that  the  deed  shall  presently  become  operative 
and  effectual,  that  the  grantor  loses  all  control  over  it,  and  that 
the  grantee  is  to  become  possessed  of  the  estate,  constitutes  a 
sufficient  delivery.^^  The  act  of  delivery  must  be  accompanied 
by  an  intent  that  the  deed  shall  become  operative  as  such,  and  it 
must  be  delivered  in  such  manner  as  to  terminate  the  control  of 
the  grantor  over  the  instrument.^* 

Where  the  grantor  deposits  his  deed  with  a  third  person,  to  be 
held  by  the  latter  until  the  grantor's  death,  and  then  delivered  to 
the  grantee  therein  named,  the  grantor  reserving  no  dominion  or 
control  over  the  deed  during  his  lifetime,  the  delivery  is  complete, 
and  an  immediate  estate  vests  in  the  grantee,  subject  to  a  life  es- 
tate in  the  grantor.^^  After  the  grantor  has  made  delivery  in  this 
m.anner  he  can  not  change  his  intention  and  withdraw  the  deed 
without  the  consent  of  his  grantee. ^'^    But  an  unauthorized  deliv- 

31  Black  V.    Sharkey,    104   Cal.   279,  33  Moore  v.  Trott,  156  Cal.  353,  104 

37  Pac.  939;    Weber  v.  Christen,   121  Pac.  578,  134  Am.  St.  131;  Callerand 

111.  91.  11  N.  E.  893,  2  Am.  St.  68.  v.   Piot,  241   111.    120,  89  N.   E.  266; 

3-  Melvin  v,  Melvin.  8  Cal.  App.  684,  Hoagland  v.  Beckley,   158  Mich.  565, 

79  Pac.  696;    Shute  v.   Shute,   82   S.  123  N.  W.  12;  Maxwell  v.  Harper.  51 

Car.  264,  64  S.  E.  145.  Wash.  351.  98  Pac.  756 :  Klabunde  v. 

33  Riegel  V.  Riegel,  243  111.  626,  90  Casper,  139  Wis.  491,  121  N.  W.  137. 

N.  E.  1108.  36  Maxwell  V.  Harper,     51     Wash. 

3*Hearn  v.   Purnell,   110   Md.  458,  351,  98  Pac.  756. 
72  Atl.  906;  Gaylord  v.  Gaylord,  150 
N.  Car.  222,  66  S.  E.  1028. 


§    286  TITLES    AXU    ABSTRACTS  308 

ery  to  a  third  person  may  he  sul)seqiiently  ratified  hy  the  j^rantor; 
and  the  grantee  may  ratify  the  receipt  of  a  deed  hy  a  third  person 
for  him.^^ 

The  grantor  must  part  with  control  over  the  deed;  a  dehvery 
to  a  third  person  with  directions  to  keep  the  deed,  and  if  the 
grantor  never  calls  for  it,  to  deliver  it  to  the  grantee  does  not  con- 
stitute delivery.^'^  A  deed  must  become  operative  upon  its  exe- 
cution, or  not  at  all.  It  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  delivered 
on  the  day  it  bears  date,  if  it  was  acknowledged  on  the  same 
date,^**  but  this  presumption  may  be  overcome  by  proof. ""^  It  has 
sometimes  been  said  that  the  date  of  the  acknowledgment,  when 
that  differs  from  the  date  of  the  deed,  is  to  be  presumed  to  be  the 
date  of  delivery,  though  this  presumption  may  be  overcome  by 
proof  of  an  earlier  date  of  delivery/^ 

Possession  of  the  deed  by  the  grantee  at  any  time,  unexplained, 
raises  the  presumption  of  a  delivery  to  him  by  the  grantor,^"  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  mere  fact  of  the  grantee's  possession  of 
the  deed  does  not  necessarily  amount  to  a  delivery,  since  the  deed 
may  have  been  obtained  by  theft  or  fraud,*^  or  the  grantee  may 
hold  it  as  agent  of  the  grantor,**  or  he  may  have  possession  of  it 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  examination.*" 

To  complete  the  delivery  of  a  deed  acceptance  on  the  part  of 
the  grantee  is  essential.  The  acceptance  may  be  either  actual  or 
presumed,  but  the  general  rule  is  that  the  grantee's  acceptance 
must  be  proved  by  some  act,  declaration,  or  circumstance.  Thus 
acceptance  will  be  implied  from  the  act  of  the  grantee  in  demand- 
ing possession  of  the  premises,*"  or  from  his  performance  of  con- 
ditions.*' 

That  the  recording  of  a  deed  affords  a  presumption  of  a  legal 
delivery  to  the  grantee  is  supported  by  the  weight  of  authority, 

s^' Rhea  v.  Planters  Mut.  Ins.  Assn.,  Ann.  Cas.  215;    Schurtz  v.  Colvin,  55 

n  Ark.  57.  90  S.  W.  850.  Ohio  St.  274,  45  N.  K.  527. 

38  Fortune  v.  Hunt,  149  N.  Car.  358,  «  Golden  v.  Hardesty,  93  Iowa  622, 
63  S.  E.  82.  61  N.  W.  913 ;  Sauter  v.  DoUman,  46 

39  Cover  V.   Manaway.   115    Pa.   St.  Minn.  504,  49  N.  W.  258. 

338.  8  Atl.  393,  2  Am.  St.  552.  "*  Dietz  v.  Parish,  44  N.  Y.  Super. 

•«o  Eaton  V.   Trowbridge,   38   Mich.  Ct.  190. 

454.  ■*•''  Lee  v.   Richmond,   90   Iowa  695, 

41  Henry  v.  Bradshaw,  20  Iowa  355.  57  N.  W.  613 ;  Comer  v.  Baldwin,  16 

42  Wright  V.  Wright,  11  Fed.  795;  Minn.  172. 

Fenton  v.  Aliller,  94  Mich.  204.  53  N.  ^o  Stonehill   v.    Hastings,    135    .^pp. 

W.  957;  Mercantile  Safe  Deposit  Co.  Div.  48,  119  N.  Y.  S.  897. 

V.  Huntington,  89  Hun  465.  35  N.  Y.  ^'  Stockwell    v.    Shalit,    204    Mass. 

S.  390,  69  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  776,  2  N.  Y.  270,  90  N.  E.  570. 


309  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  287 

and  some  cases  go  so  far  as  to  hold  that  the  recording  of  a  deed 
is  sufficient  if  not  conclusive  evidence  of  its  delivery/^  Questions 
respecting  the  delivery  of  deeds  present  but  few  features  to  the 
abstracter,  as  he  views  the  instruments  as  they  appear  on  the 
record,  and  the  record  seldom  discloses  anything  that  would  indi- 
cate nondelivery. 

§  287.  Registration. — In  this  country  every  conveyance 
of  real  estate  by  deed  or  mortgage  is  subject  to  registry  laws,  by 
which  its  priority  as  respects  other  conveyances  depends  for  the 
most  part  upon  priority  of  record.  Priority  of  record,  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  gives  priority  of  title ;  and  this  priority  dates  from  the 
time  the  instrument  is  delivered  to  the  recorder  for  record. 
Hence  the  date  of  record  becomes  an  all-important  matter  in  de- 
termining questions  of  priority,  especially  when  the  instrument 
itself  bears  no  date. 

All  the  particulars  respecting  the  deed  should  be  taken  from  the 
records  whenever  practicable,  but  in  case  the  enrolling  officer  has 
neglected  to  transcribe  the  instrument  until  long  after  the  same 
Avas  left  for  record,  the  abstracter  must  cover  the  period  of  his 
search  by  examining  the  original  document. 

A  vast  number  of  objections  to  title  are  founded  upon  errors 
or  irregularities  in  the  registration  of  deeds  under  which  title  is 
claimed.  Want  of  regular  registration,  there  being  no  other 
proof  of  its  existence,  is  a  fatal  objection  to  the  title.*''  A  deed 
defectively  recorded,  or  not  recorded  at  all,  is  in  some  states  a 
good  equitable  lien,  so  that  while  it  has  no  effect  as  against  sub- 
sequent purchasers  in  good  faith,  yet  it  is  superior  to  the  claims 
of  general  creditors  who  were  such  at  the  date  of  the  deed.^*'  The 
recording  of  a  deed  in  the  wrong  book  does  not  charge  subse- 
quent purchasers  with  notice  of  its  contents.^^  It  is  held  that  a 
record  which  is  erroneous  on  account  of  mistakes  is  constructive 
notice  only  of  its  contents,  and  not  of  facts  which  it  would  con- 
tain were  it  correct.""  As  between  the  parties  to  a  deed,  its  valid- 
ity is  not  affected  by  mistakes  of  the  recording  officer  in  transcrib- 
es Cecil  V.  Beaver,  28  Iowa  241,  4  --i  Cady  v.  Purser.  131  Cal.  552,  63 
Am.  Rep.  174.  Pac.  844.  82  Am.  St.  391. 

4»Bartlett  V.  Blanton,  4  J.  J.  Marsh,  "Davis  v.  Ward.  109  Cal.  186.  41 
(Ky.)  426.  Pac.  1010,  50  Am.  St.  29. 

50  Lake  v.  Doud,  10  Ohio  415. 


§    288  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  310        \ 

ing  it.'"'  The  constructive  notice  imported  by  the  record  of  an 
instrument  is  strictly  limited  to  that  which  is  set  forth  on  its  face ; 
and  if,  in  a  deed  as  recorded,  the  particular  land  in  controversy 
is  not  so  described  as  to  identify  it  with  reasonable  certainty,  the 
record  is  not  notice  to  subsequent  bona  fide  purchasers  or  judg- 
ment creditors, ^^  The  omission  from  the  record  of  a  copy  of  the 
seal  on  a  deed  purporting  to  be  executed  under  seal  does  not 
affect  its  validity.'''^  Where  there  is  a  clerical  error  in  recording 
the  name  of  the  notary  public  before  whom  a  deed  was  attested, 
the  record  is  still  constructive  notice  of  the  grantee's  title. ^^  After 
the  date  of  the  deed  in  the  synopsis  should  come  the  fact  of  its 
registry,  including  the  date,  the  volume  and  page,  and  the  title 
of  the  record  and  the  office  to  which  it  belongs.  These  particu- 
lars logically  belong  at  the  conclusion  of  the  synopsis,  but  for  the 
convenience  of  the  examining  counsel  they  should  be  inserted  as 
indicated  above.  These  particulars  should  follow  each  other  in 
the  order  given  above,  and  should  be  as  brief  and  concise  as  pos- 
sible. 

§  288.     Correcting  errors  in  record,  and  re-recording. — A 

register  may  correct  an  error  in  the  record  at  any  time  subsequent 
to  the  registration.  If  he  has  omitted  to  indicate  the  seal  or 
scroll  opposite  the  grantor's  signature,  he  may  afterward  supply 
the  omission,  or  may  record  the  deed  anew.'^''  Where  the  doctrine 
prevails  that  the  record  is  notice  of  only  what  appears  of  record, 
though  this  be  defective,  a  correction  of  a  mistake  in  the  record 
made  by  the  register  can  not  affect  the  rights  of  a  purchaser  with- 
out notice  of  the  mistake  who  has  become  such  after  the  record 
was  made,  but  before  the  making  of  the  correction. ^^  There  are 
authorities,  however,  to  the  effect  that  the  register  has  no  author- 
ity to  correct  the  record.^"  The  effect  of  a  record  as  notice  or  as 
evidence  is  not  confined  to  the  first  recording  of  a  deed,  but  at 
least  equal  weight  is  to  be  given  to  a  later  record  properly  made. 

•"  Thomas  v.  Stuarfs  Ex'r,  91  Va.         "  Sellers  v.  Sellers,  98  N.  Car.  13, 

694,  22  S.  E.  511.  3  S.  E.  917. 

5*  Bank  of  Ada    v.     Gullikson,  64        -'^  Chamberlain  v.  Bell,  7  Cal.  292, 

Minn.  91,  66  N.  W.  131.  68  Am.  Dec.  260. 

ssSiblyv.  England,  90  Ark.  420,  119        ^^  Jennings   v.   Dockham,   99   Mich. 

S.  W.  820.  253,  58  N.  W.  66;  Doe  v.  Dugan,  8 

5«  Robcrson  v.  Downing     Co.,  120    Ohio  87,  31  Am.  Dec.  432. 

Ga.  833,  48   S.   E.  429,   102  Am.  St. 
128,  1  Am.  Cas.  724. 


311  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  289 

Where  an  instrument,  incorrectly  transcribed  at  the  date  of 
examination,  has  been  subsequently  corrected  by  the  register,  this 
fact  should  be  noted  in  the  abstract  by  setting  out  the  corrected 
matter.  This  should  come  at  the  close  of  the  synopsis  as  a  sup- 
plemental foot-note. 

A  notice  of  re-record  should,  whenever  practicable,  be  placed 
immediately  after  the  synopsis  of  the  original,  and  should  be  in 
form  similar  to  the  following : 

^  .    ,  ]  Warranty  Deed, 

aeorge  M.  Caldwell,  unmarried,     t\  .    ■>  j        ^    mm 
^  Dated  June  1,  1902. 

to  j-  Recorded  June  28,  1902. 

T,v      -n^    T  1.  Vo^-  28.  page  10. 

Ehas  F.  Johnson.  ^  Consideration,  $1,000. 

Conveys  land  in  Grant  county,  Ind.,  described  as  follows:  (de- 
scription). A  re-record  of  the  deed  recorded  Sept.  27,  1890,  in 
Deed  Record  18,  page  200  (and  shown  at  No.  12  of  this  ab- 
stract. ) 

§  289.  Ancient  deeds. — A  deed  more  than  thirty  years  old 
proven  to  have  come  from  a  proper  place  of  custody,  and  having 
nothing  suspicious  about  it,  is  called  an  "ancient  deed."  It  is 
presumed  to  be  genuine  without  express  proof  of  its  execution.*"' 
So  a  deed  shown  to  be  thirty  years  old  or  more  may  be  received 
in  evidence  without  proof  of  execution.  But  this  rule  applies  only 
to  original  deeds,  not  to  copies,  nor  the  record  of  such  deeds." 
The  rule,  however,  does  not  dispense  with  proof  of  the  truth  of 
recitals  in  such  deed  constituting  the  basis  of  the  grantor's  right 
or  power  to  convey.''-  It  may  be  presumed  from  the  lapse  of  time 
that  the  magistrate  taking  the  acknowledgment  to  such  a  deed 
acted  within  his  jurisdiction,  that  it  was  properly  acknowledged, 
and  hence  that  it  was  properly  recorded. •'^  The  presumption  of 
due  execution  arising  in  case  of  ancient  deeds  extends  to  a  power 
of  attorney  under  which  such  a  deed  purports  to  have  been  ex- 
ecuted.''* 

Where  a  deed  in  the  chain  of  title  is  of  long  standing,  and  the 

CO  Davis  V    Wood,   161   Mo.   17,  61        "s  Koch  v.  Streuter,  232  111.  594,  83, 
S.  W.  695 ;  Havens  v.  Seashore  Land     N.  E.  1072. 
Co..  47  N.  J.  Eq.  365.  20  Atl.  497.  gs  Hudson    v.    Webber,    104   Maine 

eiMcCleerv  v.  Lewis,  104  Maine  23,     429,  72  Atl.  184. 
70  Atl.  540,  19  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  438n.        «*  Renter  v.   Stuckart,   181   111.  529, 

54  N.  E.  1014. 


§    290  TITLES    AND    AI^STRACTS  312 

rights  of  parties  thereunder  liave  become  estabhshed  by  adverse 
possession,  the  same  particularity  need  not  be  observed  in  setting 
out  their  formal  parts  in  the  abstract  as  is  recpired  in  the  case  of 
later  deeds.  Legislatures  sometimes  enact  what  are  termed 
"curative  acts,"  which  act  retrospectively  on  past  causes  and  ex- 
isting rights,  validating  irregularities  in  legal  proceedings  or  giv- 
ing effect  to  contracts  between  parties  which  might  otherwise  fall 
for  failure  to  comply  with  technical  legal  requirements."^  The 
most  common  of  these  acts  relate  to  defects  and  irregularities  in 
acknowledgments  and  registration  of  deeds  made  a  specified  time 
prior  to  their  passage.  Under  such  acts,  when  questions  of  prior- 
ity arise,  a  deed  is  to  be  considered  as  having  been  originally 
properly  acknowledged  and  recorded.""  A  curative  act  may  apply 
to  the  acknowledgment  of  a  deed  involved  in  a  suit  which  is  pend- 
ing at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  act,  as  there  can  be  no  vested 
right  in  a  rule  of  evidence."  But  while  such  an  act  will  cure  de- 
fects in  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  it  will  not  validate 
defects  in  the  deed  itself,  as,  for  instance,  where  it  is  not  signed 
by  the  grantor."*^  Statutes  of  this  character  relate  only  to  the 
ceremony  of  the  execution  of  a  deed,  and  if  a  deed  is  not  de- 
fective in  execution  or  acknowledgment  there  is  nothing  for  the 
curative  act  to  operate  upon."'* 

§  290.     Technical  and  particular  words  and  phrases. — The 

intention  of  the  parties  to  a  conveyance,  when  apparent  and  not 
repugnant  to  any  rule  of  law,  will  control  technical  terms.'^"  Thus 
where  a  technical  word  or  phrase  is  used,  evidently  in  a  sense  dif- 
ferent from  its  technical  signification,  it  will  be  construed  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  grantor  intended."  There  are  words  in  deeds 
which  have  a  technical  meaning,  and  are  construed  accordingly ; 
but  language  in  deeds,  not  technical,  must  be  taken  in  its  ordi- 
nary and  usual  sense.'" 

It  was  formerly  the  practice  to  use  a  great  many  words  and 

65  Meigs  V.  Roberts.  162  N.  Y.  371,  "o  Prentice    v.    Dulutli     Storage    & 

56  N.  E.  838,  76  Am.  St.  322.  Forwarding  Co.,  58  Fed.  437,  7  C.  C. 

«« East  V.   Pugh,   71    Iowa   162,   Zl  A.  293. 

N  W  309  71  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.   Beal,  47 

«>7  Reid  V.  Hart.  45  Ark.  41.  Cal.  151. 

c8  Greenwood  v.  Jenswold,  69  Iowa  '-  Bradshaw   v.   Bradbury,    64    Mo. 

53.  28  N.  W.  433.  334. 

"9  Bowden  v.  Bland,  53  Ark.  53,  13 
S.  W.  420,  22  Am.  St.  179. 


313  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  290 

phrases  without  regard  to  their  true  meaning,  and  it  is  still  the 
common  practice  to  insert  in  deeds  nearly  all  the  operative  terms 
ever  needed  in  conveying  real  estate.  In  modern  conveyances, 
however,  most  of  these  terms  are  surplusage.  The  deed  of  bar- 
gain and  sale  is  the  instrument  of  transfer  almost  exclusively 
in  use  at  the  present  time,  though  the  technical  words  originally 
used  in  other  forms  of  conveyances  are  often  joined  with  the  ap- 
propriate words  of  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  The  words  "bar- 
gain and  sell"  are  not  essential  to  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  If 
the  only  reason  urged  for  construing  a  particular  clause  in  a  deed 
is  founded  upon  the  technical  words  used,  they  will  be  disre- 
garded in  determining  the  effect  to  be  given  to  the  conveyance, 
and  such  a  construction  adopted  as  on  a  general  view  seems  most 
likely  to  carry  the  intention  of  the  parties  into  effect."  Where, 
however,  by  statute  or  common  law,  certain  technical  words  are 
made  necessary  in  a  conveyance,  equivalent  words  will  not  an- 
swer. Thus  an  instrument  in  which  the  only  words  of  grant  are 
"sell"  or  "sign  over",  can  not  take  effect  as  a  deed.^* 

Where  words  or  phrases  commonly  used  in  deeds,  but  which 
have  no  legal  signification,  are  omitted  from  a  deed,  that  fact 
need  not,  of  course,  be  noted  on  the  abstract;  but  where  tech- 
nical words  of  limitation  or  inheritance  are  omitted  from  a  deed 
purporting  to  convey  only  a  limited  estate  or  interest,  the  omis- 
sion of  such  technical  words  should  be  shown  together  with  what- 
ever operative  words  appear,  to  supply  those  omitted  or  to  indi- 
cate the  intention  of  the  parties. 

There  is  no  general  rule  of  construction  applicable  to  particular 
words  and  phrases  in  a  deed.  The  primary  object  in  all  cases  is 
to  carry  out  the  manifest  intention  of  the  parties.  It  may  be 
helpful  in  this  connection  to  mention  some  instances  of  how  cer- 
tain particular  words  and  phrases  have  been  construed.  The 
word  "appurtenances"  means  land,  and  passes  title  to  the  garden, 
curtilage,  and  close  adjoining  the  house,  but  does  not  include  land 
other  than  the  land  conveyed. '°  The  words  "in  addition  to"  de- 
note that  something  is  added  to  what  precedes  it.'*^  The  words 
"have  granted"  signify  the  same  as  the  word  "do  hereby  grant."" 

"Post  V.  Weil,  115  N.  Y.  361,  22  (Mass.)   293;   Otis  v.  Smith,  9  Pick 

N.  E.  145,  5  L.  R.  A.  422,  12  Am.  St.  (Mass.)  293. 

809.  70  Panton  v.  Tefft,  22  111.  366. 

''■*  McKinney  v.  Settles.  31  Mo.  541.  ^t  pigrson  v.  Armstrong,     1     Iowa 

"  Ammidown     v.     Ball,     8     Allen  282,  63  Am.  Dec.  440. 


§    291  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  314 

The  words  "to"  and  "from."  when  used  to  express  boundaries. 
are  ordinarily  terms  of  exclusion,  and  the  terminus  is  not  in- 
cluded.'^ A  grant  "of  the  use  of  timber"  has  been  held  not  to  pass 
title  to  the  soil,  but  only  an  incorporeal  right  to  use  timber 
thereon.'*  The  word  "convey"  is  as  efifective  in  passing  title  as 
the  word  "grant. "*°  The  words  "go  to"  in  a  deed  of  conveyance 
will  pass  title. ""^  Likewise  the  words  "assign  and  convey"  will 
pass  a  freehold  estate.**^  The  words  "and  all  the  buildings  there- 
on" have  no  legal  operation  in  a  conveyance  of  land.*^  The 
words  "more  or  less,"  following  a  description  of  land  in  a  deed, 
means  about  the  specified  number  of  acres,  and  are  designed  to 
cover  only  such  small  errors  of  surveying  as  usually  occur  in 
surveys.'* 

§  291.  Repugnant  or  conflicting  parts  of  a  deed. — If  a 
deed  of  conveyance  contains  two  clauses  which  are  repugnant  to 
each  other,  the  first  will  prevail.^^  But,  if  possible,  the  repug- 
nant provisions  will  be  so  construed  as  to  carry  out  the  true  in- 
tent of  the  parties,  and  to  accomplish  this  purpose  the  deed  will 
be  considered  as  a  whole. '^^  Still,  if  the  purpose  of  the  deed  can 
clearly  be  ascertained,  repugnant  words,  though  they  appear  first 
in  the  deed,  must  yield  to  that  purpose.®^  A  construction  which 
will  create  a  repugnance  between  dififerent  parts  of  a  deed  should 
be  avoided.^*  If  there  is  a  repugnancy  between  the  language  of 
the  grantor  expressed  in  the  deed  and  words  incorporated  therein 
as  a  recital  from  some  other  instrument,  the  language  of  the 
grantor  will  prevail  over  the  recital.*'' 

The  habendum  may  limit,  restrain,  lessen,  enlarge,  explain, 
vary,  or  qualify,  but  not  entirely  contradict  or  be  repugnant  to 
the  estate  granted  in  the  premises;''"  but  the  granting  clause  will 
control  the  habendum  unless  the  latter  clearly  expresses  the  intent 

78  Bonney  v.  Morrill.  52  Maine  252.    696,  63  Atl.  965 ;  Blackwell  v.  Black- 

79  Clark  V.  Way,  11  Rich.  (S.  Car.)     well,   124  N.  Car.  269,  Z2  S.   E.  676. 
621.  ^^  McDougal    v.    Musgrave,    46    W. 

«o  Patterson  v.  Carneal.  3  Marsh  A.  Va.  509.  ZZ  S.  E.  281. 
K.   (Kv.)  618.  13  Am.  Dec.  508.  "Goldsmith    v.    Goldsmith,   46   W. 

"Folk   V.   Yarn.   9   Rich.   Eq.    (S.  Va.  426.  ZZ  S.  E.  266. 
Car.)  303.  «8  chew  v.  Kellar,  171   Mo.  215,  71 

82  Hutchins  V.  Carleton,   19  N.  H.  S.  W.  172. 

487.  89  Scott  V.  Michael,  129  Ind.  250,  28 

83  Crosby  v.  Parker.  4  Mass.  110.  N.  E.  546. 

84  Crislip   V.    Cain    19   VV.   Va.   438.  9°  Hafner  v.  Irwin,  20  N.  Car.  433, 

85  Pritchett  v.  Jackson,     103  '  Md.  34  Am.  Dec.  390. 


315  FORMAL  PARTS  OF  DEEDS  §  291 

of  the  paVties.^^  A  clause  will  not  be  construed  as  repugnant  to 
the  grant  and  therefore  void  so  as  to  defeat  the  manifest  inten- 
tion of  the  parties."-  If  two  parts  of  a  deed  may  well  stand  to- 
gether consistently  with  the  rules  of  law,  they  will  be  construed 
to  have  that  effect  rather  than  be  held  repugnant."^  The  premises 
is  never  controlled  by  the  covenants,  although  the  covenants  may 
be  considered  in  aid  of  a  construction  of  what  is  granted.^*  In 
case  there  are  two  inconsistent  descriptions  equally  explicit,  that 
will  control  which  best  expresses  the  intention  of  the  parties  as 
manifested  by  the  whole  instrument. ^^ 

91  Owensboro   &   N.   R.   R.   Co.   v.        "s  Corbin  v.  Healy,  20  Pick.  (Mass.) 
Griffith,  92  Ky.  137,  17  S.  W.  277.  514. 

92  Faivre  v.  Daley,  93  Cal.  664,  29        ^*  Mills  v.  Catlin,  22  Vt.  98. 

Pac.  256.  95Wade  V.  Deray,     50     Cal.     376; 

DriscoU  V.  Green,  59  N.  H.  101. 


CHAPTER    XIII 


GENERAL  CLASSIFICATION  OF  PRIVATE  CONVEYANCES 


SEC 

295.  Modern  kinds  of  deeds. 

296.  Indentures  and  deeds  poll. 

297.  Construction  of  deeds. 

298.  Validity  of  conveyances. 

299.  Warranty  deeds. 

300.  Abstracting  warranty  deeds. 

301.  Quitclaim  deeds. 

302.  Abstracting  quitclaim  deeds. 

303.  Deeds  with  special  warranties. 

304.  Statutory  forms  of  deeds. 

305.  Common-law  deeds. 

306.  Deed  of  release. 

307.  Deeds  of  confirmation. 

308.  Deeds  of  surrender. 

309.  Deeds  of  assignment. 


310.  Deeds  of  defeasance. 

311.  Conveyances  to  take  eflfect  in  the 
future. 

312.  Deeds  conveying  base,  qualified, 
and  conditional  estates  or  inter- 
ests. 

313.  Conveyances  with  restrictive 
conditions  and  covenants. 

314.  Conveyances  of  land  in  the  ad- 
verse possession  of  another. 

315.  Fraudulent  conveyances. 

316.  Conveyances  subject  to  incum- 
brance. 

317.  Dedicatory  deeds. 

318.  Deeds  creating  resulting  trusts. 


§  295.  Modem  kinds  of  deeds. — The  conveyance  or  trans- 
fer of  title  to  real  estate  from  an  individual  by  an  appropriate 
instrument,  is  a  private  conveyance.  The  instruments  commonly 
employed  in  conveyances  of  this  character  are  the  "warranty 
deed,"  technically  known  as  the  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  and  the 
"quitclaim  deed,"  or  deed  of  release  and  quitclaim. 

The  warranty  deed  is  one  containing  a  covenant  of  warranty — 
either  general  or  special,  and  by  common  understanding  has  come 
to  mean  a  deed  that  warrants  a  good  title. ^'  Where  the  grantor 
agrees  to  warrant  and  defend  the  title  against  the  lawful  claims 
of  all  persons  whomsoever,  it  may  be  termed  a  general  warranty 
deed,  but  where  he  promises  protection  only  against  certain  per- 
sons or  claims,  it  may  be  called  a  special  warranty  deed.  Modern 
warranty  deeds  and  quitclaim  deeds  are  but  the  evolutions  of  con- 
veyances at  common  law,  and  they  are  effectual  to  convey  what- 
ever title  or  interest  the  grantor  may  possess. 

The  common-law  deeds  of  release,  confirmation,  surrender  and 
assignment,  have  been  largely  replaced  by  the  quitclaim  deed; 
while  the  old  form  of  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  has  given  way 
to  the  shorter  form  of  bargain  and  sale  deed,  with  or  without 


1  Allen  v.  Hazen,  26  Mich.  142.. 


316 


317  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    296 

covenants  of  warranty,  or  with  a  covenant  against  the  grantor's 
acts.  Originally,  a  quitclaim  deed  was  intended,  and  indeed  op- 
erated, only  where  the  grantee  already  held  possession  of  the 
land,  or  some  title  to  it,  and  the  grantor  intended  to  renounce  all 
his  right  or  title  in  favor  of  the  grantee.  But  it  was  soon  used 
where  a  person  intended  to  sell  and  convey  land,  but  not  to  give 
any  warranty.  Deeds  also  differ  not  only  that  they  may  suit  the 
particular  purposes  of  the  parties  and  the  terms  of  their  bargain, 
but  those  used  in  each  state  differ  somewhat  in  form  from  those 
used  in  another  state.  But  these  differences  are  generally,  if  not 
always,  differences  only  of  form,  and  are  seldom  essential  to  the 
meaning  and  effect  of  the  deeds. 

§  296.  Indentures  and  deeds  poll. — Deeds  are  either  in- 
dentures or  deeds  poll.  The  former  is  a  deed  executed  by  two  or 
more  parties.  It  commences  with  the  words,  "This  indenture," 
then  follows  a  statement  of  the  date,  the  names  and  descriptions 
of  the  parties,  the  recitals,  the  consideration,  the  operative  words, 
the  parcels,  the  habendum,  the  covenants,  and  at  the  close  the 
testimonium  clause,  which  refers  to  the  date  of  the  instrument 
stated  at  the  beginning.  A  deed  of  indenture  is  the  deed  not  only 
of  the  grantor,  who  alone  executes  it,  but  also  of  the  grantee,  to 
whom  the  conveyance  is  made,  although  it  be  not  sealed  and  de- 
livered by  him.-  In  its  usual  form,  it  is  executed  in  duplicate,  and 
originally  the  duplicates  were  cut  apart  in  the  middle  by  an  in- 
dented or  irregular  line,  which  gave  to  it  the  name  "indenture."^ 

A  deed  poll  is  a  deed  made  by  one  party  only.  If  it  contains 
no  recitals,  the  introductory  words  are,  "Known  all  men  by  these 
presents,"  etc.  If  there  are  recitals,  the  introductory  words 
should  be,  "To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come"  the  grantor 
"sends  greeting,"  followed  by  the  recitals,  which  are  introduced 
by  "whereas." 

Deeds  poll  are  generally  used  in  the  New  England  states ;  while 
in  other  states  the  deed  of  indenture  is  in  general  use.  The  form 
of  a  deed  poll  may  be  converted  into  an  indenture  by  changing  the 
word  "grantor"  to  "the  party  of  the  first  part"  in  the  beginning 
of  the  deed.  And  a  deed  by  indenture  may  be  made  a  deed  poll 
by  changes  of  an  opposite  kind. 

2  Woodruff  V.  Woodruff  44  N.  J.  s  Bowen  v.  Beck,  94  N.  Y.  86,  46 
Eq.  349.  16  Atl.  4,  1  L.  R.  A.  380.  Am.  Rep.  124. 


§    297  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  318 

If  the  grantor  in  a  deed  poll  is  a  married  woman,  and  it  is  in- 
tended that  she  shall  relinquish  he;-  dower,  her  name  must  be 
mentioned  in  the  testimonium  clause,  and  it  must  be  distinctly 
stated  that  she  signs  the  deed  in  token  of  her  relinquishment  or 
release  of  dower.  But  where  a  deed  of  indenture  is  used,  and  she 
is  joined  in  the  beginning  as  grantor  with  her  husband,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  anything  should  be  said  in  the  deed  about  her  re- 
lease of  dower  or  homestead. 

§  297.  Construction  of  deeds. — The  main  object  in  con- 
struing a  deed  is  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  parties  and 
give  it  effect.*  And  this  intention  must  be  arrived  at  from  the 
language  of  the  instrument  in  the  absence  of  any  showing  of  a 
mistake  or  oversight  on  the  part  of  the  draftsman.^  The  whole 
deed  and  every  part  thereof  should  be  considered  in  order  to  as- 
certain the  intention  of  the  parties,  and  when  such  intention  is 
ascertained  the  deed  should  be  so  construed  as  to  give  effect  to  it.** 
For  the  purpose  of  showing  such  intention,  contemporaneous 
writings  by  the  parties  may  be  used.'' 

Such  a  construction  should  be  adopted  as  will  give  force  and 
effect  to  a  deed  rather  than  one  that  will  render  it  of  no  effect.* 
When  the  terms  of  a  deed  are  perfectly  plain  and  unambiguous 
their  meaning  and  effect  can  not  be  changed  or  overturned  by 
the  unexpressed  intention  of  the  parties.^ 

Conditions  in  a  deed  which  are  repugnant  to  the  grant  are 
void.^**  As  a  general  rule  where  the  estate  is  expressly  set  forth 
in  the  premises  it  can  not  be  defeated  by  repugnant  words  in  the 
habendum. ^^  This  rule  does  not  apply  where  it  appears  from  the 
language  of  the  whole  deed  that  there  was  an  intention  that  the 
habendum  should  control  or  limit  the  estate  or  interest  taken  un- 
der the  caption  or  granting  clause. ^^ 

^Triplett  v.  Williams.  149  N.  Car.  »  Geneva  v.  Henson,  195  N.  Y.  447, 

394,  63  S.  E.  79,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  88  N.  E.  1104. 

514n;  Pack  v.  Whitaker,  110  Va.  122,  lo  Levy  v.  McDonnell.  92  Ark.  324, 

65  S.  E.  496.  122  S.  W.  1002,  135  Am.  St.  183. 

•'^  Hudson    V.    Hudson    (Ky.    App.)  i^Triplett  v.  Williams,  149  N.  Car. 

121  S.  W.  973.  394,  63  S.  E.  79.  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

"Brown  v.  Reeder,  108  Md.  653,  71  514n;   Teague  v.    Sowder,    121   Tenn. 

Atl.  417.  132.  114  S.  W.  484. 

7  Putzel   V.    Van    Brunt,    40   N.    Y.  12  Hudson   v.   Hudson    (Ky.   App.) 

Super.  Ct.  501.  121  S.  W.  973. 

"^  Maxwell  v.  Harper,  51  Wash.  351, 
98  Pac.  756. 


319  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    298 

Courts  will  construe  clauses  in  deeds  as  covenants  rather  than 
as  conditions,  if  they  can  reasonably  do  so/"  The  parties  to  a 
deed  are  presumed  to  make  it  with  reference  to  the  state  or  condi- 
tion of  the  premises  at  the  time,  and,  if  the  description  is  suffi- 
cient, when  made,  no  subsequent  change  in  conditions  can  inval- 
idate it/*  Where  the  property  is  described  in  clear  and  unambig- 
uous language,  no  question  of  construction  arises,  and  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  will  not  be  allowed  to  control,  though  it  is 
shown  to  be  different  from  that  expressed  in  the  deed/^  But  if, 
on  inspection  of  the  deed,  the  identity  of  the  land  is  altogether 
uncertain,  the  court  should  pronounce  the  deed  void." 

All  parts  of  the  deed  are  to  be  construed  together,  and  that 
description  adopted  which  wall  give  effect  to  the  deed,  rather 
than  one  w^hich  would  render  it  void  for  uncertainty/'  General 
expressions  in  the  deed  will  be  controlled  by  more  specific  ones/^ 
Surplusage  is  to  be  rejected/''  Presumptions  are  construed  most 
strongly  against  the  grantor,-"  and  in  case  of  two  conflicting  de- 
scriptions, the  grantee  will,  on  this  principle,  be  permitted  to  elect 
under  which  he  will  hold."^ 

§  298.  Validity  of  conveyances. — Besides  the  defects  of 
form  and  substance  which  tend  to  invalidate  a  conveyance,  and 
which  are  determinable  from  an  inspection  of  the  instrument, 
other  defects,  shown  only  by  evidence  aliunde,  may  render  the  in- 
strument invalid.  Such,  for  instance,  is  want  of  capacity  or  as- 
sent, mistake,  fraud,  misrepresentation,  concealment,  duress,  un- 
due influence,  and  inadequacy  or  illegality  of  consideration.  The 
deed  may  be  regular  on  its  face,  and  executed  in  due  conformity 
with  law,  and  at  the  same  time  be  invalid  because  of  the  exist- 
ence of  some  one  of  the  defects  enumerated  above.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind,  however,  that  the  existence  of  such  defects  do  not 
always  render  the  deed  absolutely  void,  but  may,  under  certain 
circumstances,   render  it  voidable  only.     Thus,   the  deed  of  a 

i^Haydon  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  is  Hannibal    &c.    R.    Co.   v.    Green, 

222  Mo.  126,  121  S.  W.  15.  68  Mo.  169. 

"  Sengfelder  v.  Hill,  21  Wash.  371,  i-'  Kruse  v.  Wilson.  79  111.  233. 

58  Pac.  250.  -"  Charles  River  Bridge  v.  \\'arren 

15  Kimball  V.   Semple.   25   Cal.   440.  Bridge.  11  Pet.  (U.  S.)  420,  9  L.  ed. 

i«Cox  V.  Hart,   145  U.   S.  376,   12  Hi,  938. 

Sup.  Ct.  962,  36  L.  ed.  741.  ^i  Armstrong  v.  Mudd,  10  B.  Mon. 

i^Gano   V.    Aldridge,   27    Ind.   294;  (Ky.)    144,  50  Am.  Dec.  545. 
Anderson  v.   Baughman,   7  Mich.  69, 
74  Am.  Dec.  699. 


§    299  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  320 

minor  conveying  his  land  for  a  valuable  consideration  is  voidable, 
and  not  void."  Even  a  deed  of  gift,  or  deed  without  considera- 
tion, is  voidable  rather  than  void.-" 

A  deed  utterly  void  is  as  one  which  never  existed.  It  confers 
no  right  or  title  upon  the  party  named  as  grantee.  But  a  deed 
fraudulent  as  to  creditors  and  purchasers,  and  voidable  by  them, 
is  nevertheless  valid  as  between  the  parties  to  it,  and  the  title  is 
deemed  to  have  passed  and  vested  in  the  grantee,  liable  to  be  di- 
A-ested  at  the  suit  of  the  party  aggrieved.  A  void  deed  is  incapa- 
ble of  confirmation  or  of  being  made  good  by  any  subsequent  act 
of  the  party,  while  one  which  is  merely  voidable  may  be  made 
good  by  matter  ex  post  facto.-* 

The  rules  respecting  innocent  purchasers  without  notice  are  in- 
tended to  protect  those  who  purchase  a  legal  estate  and  pays  the 
entire  purchase-money  without  notice  of  an  outstanding  equity. 
They  do  not  protect  one  who  acquires  no  semblance  of  title. -^ 
Thus  if  the  grantor  held  under  a  forged  deed,  the  grantee  would 
not  be  protected,  while  if  the  deed  was  genuine,  but  merely  void- 
able, as  having  been  procured  by  fraudulent  representations,  or  as 
having  been  executed  in  fraud  of  creditors,  and  the  grantee  had 
no  notice  of  the  fact,  he  could  not  be  deprived  of  the  estate.  The 
deed  of  a  person  lacking  capacity  to  convey  passes  no  title,  even 
as  against  a  purchaser  for  value  without  notice.  The  grantee  can, 
of  course,  ascertain  the  competency  of  the  grantor  only  by  in- 
quiry in  pais.  But  these  inquiries  are  seldom  made  in  respect  to 
remote  grantors,  the  risk  in  such  cases  being  generally  considered 
slight. 

§  299.  Warranty  deeds. — What  is  popularly  termed  a 
"warranty  deed"  is  simply  a  deed  containing  a  covenant  of  war- 
ranty, and  1)y  common  understanding  has  come  to  mean  a  deed 
that  warrants  a  good  title.-"  This  form  of  deed  is  usually  treated 
in  the  books  as  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  though  the  technical 
w^ords  originally  used  in  other  forms  of  conveyances  are  often 
joined  with  the  appropriate  words  of  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale. 
In  fact,  almost  every  deed  made  upon  a  pecuniary  consideration 

=2  Tucker  v.  Moreland,  10  Pet.  (U.  24  Hone  v.  Woolsey,  2  Edw.  Ch.  (N. 
S.)  58,  9  L.  ed.  345.  Y.)  289. 

-3  Slaughter  v.  Cunningham.  24  Ala.  ^5  Vattier  v.  Hinde,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
260.  60  Am.  Dec.  463;  Oxlev  v.  Trvon,  252,  8  L.  ed.  675;  Cogel  v.  Raph,  24 
25  Iowa  95.  Minn.  194. 

20  Allen  V.  Hazcn,  26  Mich.  142. 


I 


321  CLASSIFICATION    OF   PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    299 

is  regarded  as  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale.  Whatever  the  words 
used,  if  they  import  a  present  sale  for  a  pecuniary  considera- 
tion, and  the  deed  can  not  operate  as  a  lease  and  release  by  reason 
that  the  grantee  is  not  in  possession,  nor  as  a  contract  to  stand 
seised  to  uses,  because  there  is  no  consideration  of  blood  or  mar- 
riage, effect  will  be  given  to  it  as  a  bargain  and  sale.'^ 

The  words  "bargain  and  sell"  are  not  essential  to  a  deed  of 
this  character.  No  technical  words  are  required  to  raise  a  use. 
If  the  words  used  and  the  consideration  paid  create  a  contract 
of  sale,  or  bargain,  a  trust  is  instantly  raised  upon  which  the 
statute  of  uses  operates.  The  statute  performs  the  task  of  the 
ancient  livery  of  seisin.  Thus  the  words  "remise,  release,  and 
quitclaim"  are  sufficient  to  raise  a  trust  or  use  for  the  benefit  of 
the  bargainee,  which  the  statute  transfers  into  possession."'^  The 
words  "release  and  assign"  have  the  same  effect;  and  so  the 
words  "make  over  and  confirm,"-^  or  the  words  "make  over 
and  grant. "^° 

In  most  states  there  are  statutory  provisions  authorizing  the 
transfer  of  title  to  real  estate  by  simple  forms  of  conveyance, 
which,  in  their  operation,  much  resemble  the  common-law  grant, 
except  that  they  are  confined  to  things  incorporeal.  Even  where 
there  are  such  statutory  provisions,  the  words  "bargain  and  sell" 
are  ordinarily  used  in  the  deed.  In  such  states  it  is  difficult, 
though  for  most  purposes  unimportant,  to  say  whether  a  par- 
ticular conveyance  operates  by  force  of  the  statute  of  uses  or 
under  the  local  statute. 

An  agreement  to  convey  by  a  good  and  sufficient  warranty 
deed  requires  a  good  and  perfect  title,  as  well  as  a  good  and  suffi- 
cient warranty  deed.^^  The  use  of  the  following  clauses  just  be- 
fore the  clause  of  execution  constitute  the  deed  a  warranty  deed : 
And  I,  the  said  A.  B.  (the  grantor),  for  myself,  my  heirs,  ex- 
ecutors, and  administrators,  do  covenant  with  the  said  C.  D.  (the 
grantee),  his  heirs  and  assigns  that  I  am  lawfully  seised  in  fee 
of  the  aforesaid  premises;  that  they  are  free  from  all  encum- 

27  Chiles  V.  Conley,  1'  Dana  (Ky.)  ^^  Jackson  v.  Alexander,  3  Johns. 
21;  Lynch  v.  Livingston,  8  Barb.   (N.     (N.  Y.)  484,  3  Am.  Dec.  517. 

Y.)  463.  ^1  Little   v.    Paddleford,    13    N.    H. 

28  Jackson  v.  Fish,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  167;  Burwell  v.  Jackson,  9  N.  Y.  535, 
456.  Seld.  Notes  243. 

2»  Jackson  v.   Root,    18  Johns.    (N. 
Y.)  60. 

21 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


5    300  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  322 

brances ;  that  I  have  good  right  to  sell  and  convey  the  same  to  the 
said  C.  D.  as  aforesaid;  and  that  I  will,  and  my  heirs,  executors, 
and  administrators  shall,  warrant  and  defend  the  same  to  the  said 
C.  D..  his  heirs  and  assigns  forever,  against  the  lawful  claims  and 
demands  of  all  persons. 

§  300.  Abstracting  warranty  deeds. — Where  the  deed  to 
be  abstracted  is  an  ordinary  deed  of  bargain  and  sale  in  the  usual 
form  and  without  unusual  conditions  and  stipulations,  it  is  cus- 
tomary to  note  only  the  prominent  features  of  the  instrument,  it 
being  taken  for  granted  that  all  the  formalities  of  execution  have 
been  complied  with.  While  every  point  upon  which  the  validity 
of  the  title  under  the  deed  depends  should  l)e  noted,  care  should 
be  exercised  not  to  include  unimportant  or  irrelevant  matters. 
The  abstracter  may  save  himself,  as  well  as  counsel,  much  un- 
necessary labor  by  confining  his  notations  to  a  brief  and  method- 
ical statement  of  only  the  salient  features  of  the  instrument.  A 
detailed  statement  of  unimportant  recitals  render  the  abstract 
cumbersome  and  only  tend  to  distract  and  confuse  the  mind  of  the 
reader.  An  ordinary  warranty  deed  may  be  sufficiently  presented 
as  follows : 


John  Jones,  and  Sarah  A.,  his  ^ 
wife, 

to 


Henry  C.  Brown. 


Warranty  Deed. 
Dated  Jan.  1,  1917. 
}►  Recorded  Jan.  20,  1917. 
Deed  Record.  Vol.  40.  page  25. 
Consideration,  $10,000.00. 


Conveys  land  in  Grant  county,  Ind.,  described  as  the  northwest 
quarter  of  the  southeast  quarter  of  section  nine,  township  twenty- 
five  north,  range  eight,  east  of  the  third  principal  meridian. 

Acknowledged  Jan.  1,  1917. 

If  the  abstract  was  made  from  the  original  deed  instead  of  the 
record  thereof  that  fact  should  be  noted  immediately  after  the 
foregoing  synopsis.  \Miere  a  deed  is  abstracted  as  shown  al30ve 
it  may  be  assumed  that  the  abstracter  has  done  his  work  properly, 
and  that  the  deed  as  appears  of  record  was  executed  and  acknowl- 
edged in  conformity  with  all  the  requirements  of  law.  It  is  pre- 
sumed also  that  the  deed  contains  only  such  recitals  as  are  com- 
mon to  all  deeds  of  bargain  and  sale,  and  that  it  contains  all  the 
covenants  necessary  to  convey  a  good  and  indefeasible  title.    It 


323  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    3Ul 

is  the  practice  of  some  abstracters  to  note,  after  the  entry  regard- 
ing the  acknowledgment,  that  the  deed  contains  full  covenants 
of  seisin  and  warranty;  but  this  is  discretionary  with  the  ab- 
stracter. At  the  end  of  the  abstract  of  each  deed,  a  separate 
memorandum  should  be  made  of  any  defect  or  matter  of  doubt 
that  appears.  If  the  habendum  is  expressed  in  any  other  than  the 
usual  formal  words,  the  variation  should  be  noticed. 

§  301.  Quitclaim  deeds. — A  quitclaim  deed,  or  in  other 
words  a  deed  of  release,  never  operated  as  a  conveyance  in  a  tech- 
nical sense,  but  merely  as  an  enlargement  of  the  estate  of  the 
releasee  if  he  was  at  the  time  in  possession  of  the  land,  or  had 
some  estate  to  be  enlarged,  such  as  an  estate  for  years."' 

The  usual  words  in  a  release  are  "remise,  release  and  forever 
quitclaim,"  and  the  usual  words  in  a  quitclaim  deed  are  the  same 
with  the  added  words  of  "all  the  right,  title,  and  interest"  that 
the  grantor  has  in  the  premises.  The  words  used  may,  however, 
constitute  the  deed  one  of  bargain  and  sale,  and  not  a  mere  quit- 
claim deed.^^  By  statute  in  many  states,  and  by  usage  in  others, 
a  quitclaim  deed,  or  deed  of  release,  operates  to  pass  all. the  estate 
the  releasor  could  convey  by  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  or  by 
any  other  form  of  deed.^*  It  conveys  all  the  title  the  grantee  has 
at  the  time  of  its  execution, ^^  but  it  can  never  inure  to  convey  any 
after-acquired  title,  which  was  not  actually  owned  in  equity  at  the 
time  of  the  deed.^*^ 

The  grantor  m  a  quitclaim  deed  does  not  affirm  the  possession 
of  any  title,  and  is  not  precluded  from  thereafter  acquiring  a 
valid  title,  and  from  attempting  to  enforce  it;  and,  conversely, 
the  grantee  in  such  deed  may  deny  having  received  any  estate  by 
the  deed.^^ 

The  grantee  in  a  quitclaim  deed  to  real  estate  is  presumed  to 
take  it  with  notice  of  all  outstanding  interests  and  claims  of 
which  he  can  obtain  knowledge  by  the  exercise  of  a  reasonable  de- 
gree of  diligence,  in  the  examination  of  all  the  public  records 

32  Porter  v.  Perkins,  5  Mass.  233,  3--  Nidever  v.  Ayers,  83  Cal.  39.  23 
4  Am.   Dec.   52;    Kyle   v.   Kavanagh,     Pac.  192. 

103  Mass.  356,  4  Am.  Rep.  560 ;  Kerr  3o  Anderson  v.    Yoakum.     94     Cal. 

V.  Freeman,  33  Miss.  292.  227 ;   Montgomery  v.   McCumber.   128 

33  Taylor  v.  Harrison,  47  Tex.  454,  Ind.   374,   27   N.    E.    1114;    People  v. 
26  Am.  Rep.  304 ;  Cummings  v.  Dear-  Miller,  79  Mich.  93,  44  N.  W.  172. 
born.  56  Vt.  441.  37  San  Francisco  v.  Lawton,  18  Cal. 

3*  Sherman  v.  Sherman,  23  S.  Dak.     465,  79  Am.  Dec.  187. 
486,  122  N.  W.  439. 


§    301  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  324 

affecting  the  title  to  the  property  incUided  in  such  deed,  and  from 
inquiries  which  he  might  make  of  persons  whom  the  records 
show  had  redeemed  the  property  included  in  such  deed,  and  from 
inquiries  which  he  might  make  of  persons  whom  the  records 
show  had  redeemed  the  property  from  tax-sale  and  had  paid 
subsequent  taxes  thereon,  or  were  otherwise  ostensibly  interested 
in  such  property. ^^  In  other  words,  a  grantee  in  a  quitclaim  deed 
is  not  a  bona  fide  purchaser.^**  In  Maine,  however,  it  is  held  that 
the  grantee  in  a  quitclaim  deed  may  be  a  bona  fide  purchaser,^" 
and  in  a  recent  case  in  Indiana  the  court  said,  that  "while  there  is 
some  conflict  in  the  authorities  upon  this  question,  we  think  the 
correct  doctrine  under  the  recording  acts  is  that  one  may  l^ecome 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  under  a  quitclaim  deed,  the  same  as  under 
any  other  form  of  conveyance. "^^  In  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that 
a  quitclaim  deed  in  the  ordinary  form  is  sufficient  to  convey  title 
free  and  clear  of  an  equitable  right  to  a  purchaser  for  value  with- 
out notice  of  the  equity.*^  If  a  deed  purports  in  terms  to  convey 
only  the  right,  title  and  interest  of  the  grantor  to  the  premises 
described  therein,  instead  of  conveying  in  terms  the  land  itself, 
a  general  covenant  of  warranty  contained  in  the  deed  is  limited  to 
that  right  or  interest,  and  can  not  be  broken  by  the  enforcement 
of  a  paramount  title  outstanding  against  the  grantor  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance.*^  Where  a  deed  purports  to  convey  only  the 
right,  title,  and  interest  of  the  grantor  in  the  land  described 
therein,  but  contains  a  covenant  of  warranty,  the  scope  of  the 
covenant  may  be  limited  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  conveyance 
at  the  date  thereof.''^  A  general  covenant  will  not  enlarge  the 
title  under  a  deed  conveying  in  terms  the  grantor's  right,  title, 
and  interest,  but  will  be  limited  to  the  interest  of  the  grantor  at 
the  time  of  the  conveyance.''^  Where  the  terms  of  a  deed  of  con- 
veyance, taking  the  whole  together,  show  that  the  instrument  is 
in  its  essence  a  quitclaim  deed,  and  that  the  makers  intended  no 
warranty  except  as  against  themselves  and  their  own  acts,  no 

■■'8  Smith  V.  Rudd,  48  Kans.  296,  29  ^2  Livingston  v.  Murphy,  187  Mass. 

Pac.  310.  315.  12  N.  E.  1012.  105  Am.  St.  400. 

■«»  Peters  v.   Carticr,  80  Mich.   124,  ^s  Reynolds  v.  Shaver,  59  Ark.  299, 

45  N.  W.  !?>,  20  Am.  St.  508.  43  Am.  St.  36. 

4"  Bradley  v.  Merrill,  88  Maine  319,  44  Bates  v.   Foster.   59   Maine    157; 

34  Atl.  160.  Allen    v.    Holton,    20    Pick    (Mass.) 

41  Smith    V.    McClain,    146   Ind.   77,  458;  Merritt  v.  Harris.  102  Mass.  328. 

45  N.  E.  41.  4.'-.  Kimball  v.   Semple,  25  Cal.  440; 

Gibson  v.  Chouteau,  39  Mo.  536. 


325  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    302 

covenant  will  be  raised  out  of  a  recital  of  facts,  or  out  of  a  use  of 
words  of  conveyance."  A  quitclaim  deed  may  be  used  as  a  means 
of  releasing  claims  of  record  against  real  estate.*^ 

§  302.  Abstracting  quitclaim  deeds. — In  abstracting  an 
ordinary  quitclaim  deed  only  the  prominent  features  need  be 
noted.  The  method  of  presentation  exemplified  in  the  case  of  a 
warranty  deed  may  be  followed,  except  that  the  instrument 
should  be  designated  a  "quitclaim  deed"  in  the  place  of  a  "war- 
ranty deed,"  as  in  the  example  given  for  abstracting  a  warranty 
deed.  It  is  not  customary  to  recite  the  operative  words  of  the 
deed,  as  the  use  of  the  word  "convey"  in  connection  with  its  des- 
ignation as  a  "quitclaim  deed,"  will  be  sufficient  to  indicate  its 
character  and  legal  import.  But  in  case  the  deed  contains  a  statu- 
tory covenant  of  warranty,  the  words  of  the  covenant  should  be 
set  out,  as  they  have  the  same  effect  as  an  express  covenant  in 
giving  the  grantee  the  benefit  of  his  grantor's  subsequently 
acquired  title,  and  making  it  in  effect  a  warranty  deed.*"*  But  a 
conveyance  in  terms  of  the  grantor's  right,  title  and  interest  is 
not  enlarged  in  scope  by  a  general  covenant,  but  such  covenant 
must  be  limited  to  fit  the  estate  and  interest  of  the  grantor." 
As  the  legal  effect  of  a  quitclaim  deed  is  to  pass  all  the  "right, 
title,  interest,  claim,  demand,"  etc.,  of  the  grantor,  the  omission 
or  insertion  of  such  words  in  the  abstract  is  immaterial ;  but  when 
such  words  are  followed  by  covenants  of  any  kind,  particularly  of 
warranty,  it  is  good  practice  to  set  out  every  part  of  the  instru- 
ment which  tends  to  disclose  the  nature  of  the  instrument  and 
estate  conveyed. 

§  303.  Deeds  with  special  warranties. — The  covenant  of 
warranty  in  a  deed  may  be  restricted  to  certain  persons  or  claims, 
as  where  the  grantor  warrants  the  title  against  all  persons  claim- 
ing through  him.^^  Such  covenant  of  special  warranty  does  not 
preclude  the  grantor  from  setting  up  an  after-acquired  title 
against  the  grantee,^^  and  the  grantee  has  no  remedy  for  failure 

46McDonough   v.    Martin,    88    Ga.  Y.)  287;  Western  Min.  &  Mfg.  Co.  v. 

675,  16  S.  E.  59,  18  L.  R.  A.  349.  Peytona  Cannel  Coal  Co.,  8  W.  Va. 

47  Wood  V.  Rusher,  42  Minn.  389,  406. 

44  N.  W.  127.  ^1  Davenport  v.  Lamb,  13  Wall.  (U. 

*8  Pratt  V.  Pratt.  96  111.  184.  S.)  418,  20  L.  ed.  655;  Doane  v.  Will- 

4»Hanrick    v.    Patrick,    119    U.    S.  cutt,  5  Gray  (Mass.)  328,  66  Am.  Dec. 

156,  7  Sup.  Ct.  147,  30  L.  ed.  396.  369. 

=0  Sanders  v.    Betts,   7  Wend.    (N. 


§    304  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  326 

of  title  arising  from  a  paramount  title  held  by  others  than  those 
claiming  through  his  grantor.'^^- 

The  covenant  of  nonclaim,  sometimes  used,  is  the  same  in 
effect  as  a  special  covenant  of  warranty.'^^  General  covenants  in 
a  deed,  whether  they  be  expressed  or  implied  from  the  use  of  the 
words  "grant,  bargain  and  sell,"  are  not  restricted  in  their  opera- 
tion by  special  covenants  unless  the  different  covenants  are  so 
irreconcilable  that  they  can  not  all  have  their  full  force,  or  unless 
the  limited  covenant  refers  to,  or  is  connected  with  the  general 
covenants  in  such  a  manner  as  to  show  the  intention  of  the 
grantor  was  to  restrain  the  force  and  effect  of  the  general  cove- 
nants."* 

In  construing  a  deed  which  covenanted  that  the  grantors  "will 
warrant  specially  the  land  hereby  conveyed ;  that  they  have  the 
right  to  convey  the  said  land  to  the  said  grantees;  that  the  said 
grantees  shall  have  quiet  possession  thereof,  free  from  all  encum- 
brances; that  they  shall  execute  such  further  assurances  of  said 
land  as  may  be  requisite;  and  that  they  have  done  no  act  to  en- 
cumber the  same,"  it  was  held  that  the  word  "specially"  governs 
all  the  succeeding  covenants.^^ 

In  most  states  a  special  warranty  against  the  claims  of  the 
grantor,  and  of  all  persons  claiming  through  him,  is  expressed  by 
the  use  of  the  words  "warrant  specially."  or  "with  special  war- 
ranty." Where  special  covenants  of  warranty  are  expressed  in 
the  deed  they  should  be  noticed  in  the  abstract,  and  where  such 
covenants  are  implied  from  the  operative  words  in  the  deed  the 
operative  words  should  be  set  out  in  the  abstract. 

§  304.  Statutory  forms  of  deeds. — In  early  times  deeds 
of  conveyance  were  simple  and  brief,  but  from  about  the  begin- 
ning of  the  seventeenth  century  until  comparatively  recent  years 
the  common  mode  of  conveying  land  in  England  was  by  the 
"lease  and  release,"  which  involved  the  making  of  two  long  in- 
struments. From  1833  until  the  present  time  many  acts  of  par- 
liament have  tended  to  simplify  the  forms  of  conveyances  until 

"  Buckner  v.  Street,  15  Fed.  365,  5  ■'*  Miller  v.   Bayless,   194   Mo.  630, 

McCrary    (U.   S.)    59.  92  S.  W.  482. 

•'^  Gee  V.  Moore,  14  Cal.  472 ;  Hoi-  ^■''  AUeemong  v.  Gray,  92  Va.  216,  23 

brook  V.   Debo,  99  111.  372 ;   Kimball  S.  E.  298. 
V.  Blaisdell,  5  N.  H.  533,  22  Am."  Dec. 
476. 


1 


327  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    304 

now  very  few  words  will  incorporate,  by  virtue  of  statute,  many 
of  the  old  clauses  which  were  previously  inserted  at  full  length. 

In  this  country  statutes  have  been  enacted  in  many  states  pro- 
viding short  forms  of  deeds.  While  these  forms  are  used  in 
some  states,  they  are  not  followed  in  others.  When  these  forms 
are  attempted  to  be  used,  they  are  seldom  as  short  as  the  statutory 
form,  but  have  the  formal  beginning  and  conclusion  of  an  in- 
denture or  deed  poll,  and  sometimes  contain  many  parts  of  the 
older  forms.  One  important  result  of  such  statutes  is  to  import 
into  the  deed,  by  the  use  of  certain  words  named  in  the  statute, 
the  covenants  specified  in  it  with  the  same  effects  on  the  rights 
and  liabilities  of  the  parties  as  if  the  covenants  had  been  fully 
expressed.  The  words  necessary  to  accomplish  this  result  vary  in 
the  different  states,  and  the  covenants  thus  implied  by  the  use  of 
certain  words  are  not  always  general  in  their  nature,  but  are  often 
restricted  or  special.  In  none  of  the  states  prescribing  short 
forms  of  deeds  is  it  necessary,  or  customary  to  use  the  form  pre- 
scribed, and  longer  forms  are  still  in  general  use.  In  some  states 
the  use  of  the  words  "convey  and  warrant"  has  the  effect  to  im- 
jx)rt  covenants  into  the  deed,  while  in  other  states  the  use  of  the 
words  "grant,  bargain  and  sell"  will  imply  covenants.  In  still 
other  states  both  sets  of  words  are  to  be  found,  one  set  implying 
certain  covenants,  and  the  other  set  certain  other  covenants.  The 
word  "grant"  in  several  of  the  states,  where  used,  has  the  effect 
to  import  limited  or  special,  rather  than  general  covenants  into  a 
deed.  When  the  statutor}"-  words  are  used,  the  effect  is  to  import 
the  covenants  as  effectively  into  the  deed  as  if  they  were  expressed 
at  length.'^"  But  in  order  that  this  may  be  the  effect,  the  statutory 
words  must  be  employed ;  as,  for  example,  where  the  statute  gives 
this  effect  to  the  words  "grant,  bargain  and  sell"  the  same  effect 
will  not  be  given  to  one  of  the  words  merely,  "grant. "^"  It  has 
been  held  that  if  the  grantor,  instead  of  using  the  statutory  words, 
inserts  an  express  covenant,  this  has  the  effect  of  restricting  the 
full  force  which  would  otherwise  be  given  to  the  statutory 
words.^^ 

5°Lehndorf    v.    Cope,    122    111.    317.  "Wheeler  v.  Wavne,   132  111.  599. 

13  N.  E.  505 ;  Beasley  v.  Phillips,  20  24  N.  E.  625. 

Ind.   App.    185,    50    N.    E.    488;    Van  ss  Douglas  v.  Lewis.   131   U.   S.  75. 

Wagner   v.    Van    Nostrand,    19   Iowa  9  Sup.  Ct.  634,  33  L.  ed.  53 ;  Leddv  v. 

422:  Foote  v.  Clark,  102  Mo.  394.  14  Enos,  6   Wash   .247,  33   Pac.   508,   34 

S.  W.  981,  11  L.  R.  A.  861.  Pac.  665. 


^    305  TITl-ES    AND    ABSTRACTS  328 

The  abstract  should  always  contain  the  operative  words  of  the 
deed,  whether  they  are  the  statutory  words  or  the  old  forms  of 
expression. 

v^  305.  Common-law  deeds. — Our  ancestors  brought  with 
them,  upon  the  hrst  settlement  of  this  country,  the  modes  of  con- 
veying real  estate  then  in  use  in  England.  Several  different 
kinds  of  deeds  were  then  used,  each  having  its  appropriate  use 
and  effect.  While  many  of  the  old  rules  relating  to  these  forms 
of  deeds  are  obselete,  it  is  still  necessary  at  times  to  recur  to 
them  in  order  to  appreciate  the  effect  of  modern  conveyances  or 
to  understand  modern  statutes  and  decisions.  These  so-called 
common-law  deeds  were  classified  into:  (1)  Deeds  creating 
estates,  called  "original  deeds,"  and  (2)  deeds  modifying  estates 
already  created,  called  "derivative  deeds."  To  the  first  class  be- 
longed such  deeds  as  feoffment,  gift,  grant,  lease,  exchange,  and 
partition.  The  second  class  included  such  deeds  as  release,  sur- 
render, confirmation,  assignment,  and  defeasance.  Besides  the 
above  there  were  certain  deeds  w'hich  derived  their  force  and  ef- 
fect as  legal  conveyances  from  the  Statute  of  Uses.  These  latter 
were  deeds  of  bargain  and  sale,  covenant  to  stand  seised  to  uses, 
and  lease  and  release.'''^ 

These  common-law  deeds,  with  some  modifications  and  occa- 
sionally with  new  names,  are  still  retained  to  some  extent  in  this 
country,  although  the  deeds  of  feoffment  and  gift  are  not  used 
in  some  states.  Our  modern  deeds  are  modifications  of  the  old 
common-law  deeds,  and  may  be  divided  into  four  species,  namely  : 
(1)  The  quitclaim  deed,  (2)  bargain  and  sale  deed  without  any 
covenant  for  title,  (3)  bargain  and  sale  deed  with  special 
covenants  for  title,  and  the  w'arranty  deed.  All  the  above 
forms  of  deeds,  except  the  cjuitclaim  deed,  are  deeds  of  bargain 
and  sale,  and  are  adequate  to  transfer  title  to  most  any  estate  in 
real  property. 

§  306.  Deed  of  release. — At  common  law  a  deed  of  re- 
lease was  a  form  (jf  transfer  used  only  where  some  right  to  real 
estate  existed  in  one  person,  the  actual  possession  of  which  was  in 
another.®"  It  belonged  to  the  class  of  derivative  or  secondary 
conveyances,  and  served  to  pass  any  interest  in  the  land  which  the 

50  2  Bl.  Comm.  338.  '  '''O  Miller  v.  Emans,  19  N.  Y.  384. 


329  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    307 

releasor  had/'^  One  tenant  in  common  could  not  release  to  his 
co-tenant,  because  they  had  distinct  freeholds.  When  a  man  had 
the  right  of  possession  in  himself,  he  was  compelled  to  convey  by 
feoffment.  He  could  give  a  release  only  when  out  of  possession, 
and  it  could  then  only  be  made  to  one  in  possession.*^"  But  by 
long  established  practice  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  re- 
leasee has  an  existing  estate  in  possession  or  not.*^^ 

This  form  of  conveyance  at  common  law  resembled  our  modern 
quitclaim  deed,  except  that  in  the  latter  possession  in  the  grantee 
is  not  necessary.  In  some  states  the  only  difference  between  the 
two  is  that  a  quitclaim  deed  is  treated  as  an  original  convey- 
ance.^* A  deed  of  release  ordinarily  gives  up  a  future  interest 
to  a  present  holder,  and  so  enlarges  his  estate;  or  it  removes 
from  an  owner's  title  a  mortgage,  easement,  dower  right,  or  other 
outstanding  incumbrance.''^ 

The  ordinary  operative  words  of  a  deed  of  release  at  common 
law  are,  "remise,  release,  and  forever  quitclaim" — the  same  as 
those  of  a  quitclaim  deed  of  to-day.  The  latter  instrument  is  the 
outgrowth  of  the  common-law  release,  and  is  now  quite  generally 
used  to  fill  its  ofifice.^*^  By  statute  in  many  states,  and  by  usage  in 
others,  a  deed  of  release,  or  a  quitclaim  deed,  operates  to  pass  all 
the  estate  the  releasor  could  convey  by  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale, 
or  by  any  other  form  of  deed. 

§  307.  Deeds  of  confirmation. — A  deed  of  confirmation  at 
common  law  was  of  the  class  of  derivative  or  secondary  deeds, 
and  was  used  to  validate  and  make  indefeasible  a  prior  voidable 
transfer.  This  form  of  deed  is  of  a  nature  similar  to  a  release, 
and  is  the  proper  form  to  make  sure  a  voidable  estate."  A  deed 
of  confirmation  does  not  have  the  effect  to  validate  a  conveyance 
that  was  originally  void,**^  although  such  an  instrument  might 
now,  in  a  proper  case,  be  made  operative  as  a  deed  of  bargain 
and  sale,  or  some  other  form  of  conveyance.*'''^ 

"Jackson  v.  Root,   18  Johns.    (N.  house,   1  Cow.   (N.  Y.)    122,   13  Am. 

Y.)  60.  Dec.  514. 

62  Baker  v.  Woodward,   12  Ore.  3,  gg  u^i^ed    States   v.    California   &c. 

6  Pac.  173.  Land  Co.,  148  U.  S.  31,  13  Sup.  Ct. 

c^Hoyt  V.   Ketcham,   54   Conn.   60,  458,  Zl  L.  ed.  354;  Lewis  v.  Shearer, 

5  Atl.  606.  189  111.  184,  59  N.  E.  580. 

«*  Rogers  v.  Hillhouse,  3  Conn.  398 ;  c-  Turk  v.  Skiles,  45  W.  Va.  82,  30 

Kerr  v.  Freeman.  7>Z  Miss.  292 ;  Hall  S.  E.  234. 

V.  Ashby,  9  Ohio  96,  34  Am.  Dec.  424.  cs  Branham  v.  San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585. 

c^Doe  V.  Reed,  5  111.   117,  38  Am.  en  Pauntleroy's    Heirs    v.    Dunn,    3 

Dec.    124;   Bryan   v.  Uland,    101    Ind.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  594. 
477,   1   N.   E.   52;    Jackson   v.    Stack- 


§    308  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  330 

A  title  defeasible  because  coming  through  the  deed  of  an  infant 
or  insane  person  may  be  made  good  by  the  confirmatory  deed  of 
the  former  after  he  reaches  his  majority,  or  by  that  of  the  latter 
after  he  regains  his  sanity.^"  The  operative  words  used  in  a  deed 
of  confirmation  are  "given,  granted,  ratified,  approved,  and  con- 
firmed," although  any  other  words  sufficiently  showing  the  inten- 
tion to  confirm  may  be  employed/^  The  office  of  confirmation 
deeds  is  largely  filled  in  modern  transactions  by  the  quitclaim 
deed.  It  frequently  occurs,  however,  that  the  recitals  in  a  deed 
show  that  it  was  given  to  ratify  or  confirm  some  previous  trans- 
action, or  to  correct  some  error  or  irregularity  in  a  former  deed, 
in  which  case  the  recitals  become  material  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  a  correction  of  the  erro^  mentioned.  In  such  case  con- 
firmatory recitals  should  be  briefly  noted  in  the  abstract,  as : 

This  deed  given,  as  stated  therein,  to  correct  an  error  in  a 
former  deed  between  the  same  parties,  dated  May  10,  1905, 
wherein  the  grantee's  name  was  erroneously  given  as  John  Smyth 
instead  of  John  Smith. 

§  308.  Deeds  of  surrender. — A  surrender  is  that  form  of 
secondary  conveyance  whereby  an  estate  for  life  or  years  is 
yielded  up  to  one  who  has  the  immediate  estate  in  reversion  or 
remainder,  and  by  which  the  lesser  estate  becomes  merged  in  the 
greater  by  mutual  agreement."  It  is  the  converse  of  a  release, 
as  it  operates  by  the  falling  of  a  lesser  estate  into  the  greater, 
while  a  release  operates  by  the  greater  estate  descending  upon 
the  less. 

The  technical  and  proper  words  for  this  conveyance  are,  "sur- 
render and  yield  up;"  but  any  form  of  words  by  which  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  is  sufficiently  made  clear  will  operate  as  a  sur- 
render. The  surrender  may  be  express  or  implied.  It  is  implied 
when  an  estate  incompatible  with  the  existing  estate  is  accepted, 
or  tile  lessee  takes  a  new  lease  of  the  same  lands. ^^  The  implied 
surrender  is  usually  referred  to  as  a  surrender  "by  operation  of 
law."    The  words  commonly  used  in  an  express  surrender  are, 

70  McGreal    v.    Taylor,    167    U.    S.  " ^  2  Bl.  Comm.  325. 

688,   17  Sup.  Ct.  961.  42  L.  ed.  320;  "  Havs   v.   Goldman,   71    Ark.  251, 

Luhrs  V.  Hancock,  181  U.  S.  567,  21  72  S.  W.  563 ;  Fisher  v.  Edington,  80 

Sup.  Ct.  726,  45  L.  ed.  1005;  Clay  v.  Tenn.  189. 

Hammond,  199  111.  370,  65  N.  E.  352.  ^^  Qtis    v.    McMillan,    70    Ala.    46; 

93  Am.   St.   146 ;    Blinn   v.   SchwaTtz.  Flagg  v.  Dow,  99  Mass.  18. 
177  N.  Y.  252,  69  N.  E.  542. 


331  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    308 

"surrender,  grant,  and  yield  up,"  but  no  particular  words  are 
necessary,  it  being  sufficient  Tf  the  intention  of  the  parties  clearly 
appear/*  An  express  surrender,  to  be  vahd,  must  be  by  one  in 
possession,  and  the  interest  surrendered  must  bear  such  a  relation, 
both  in  quantum  and  position,  to  the  estate  of  the  surrenderee, 
in  order  that  it  may  merge  therein.  As  in  release  and  confirma- 
tion the  quitclaim  has  largely  taken  the  place  of  surrender  for 
most  purposes,  but  the  instrument  is  still  used  for  the  relinquish- 
ment of  dower  rights  and  leasehold  interests.  The  operative 
part  of  a  deed  of  surrender  is  usually  preceded  by  matter  of  in- 
ducement or  preamble  stating  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
deed  is  made.  A  brief  synopsis  of  this,  and  the  surrender  clause, 
should  appear  in  the  abstract.  An  example  of  the  surrender  of  a 
life  estate  is  as  follows  : 


William  Smith 

to 

John  Smith,  only  son  and  heir 
apparent  of  said  William 
Smith. 


Deed  of  Surrender. 
Dated  June  1,  1910. 
Recorded  June  20,  1910. 
Vol.  25,  page  75. 
Consideration  $1,000.00. 


Recites  that  "whereas,  by  virtue  of  a  deed  dated  the  20th  day 
of  March,  1900,  the  land  hereinafter  described  was  conveyed  to 
the  grantor  herein  during  his  natural  lifetime;  and  whereas  the 
grantor  herein  has  agreed  with  the  grantee  herein  to  sell  to  him 
the  life  estate  of  the  grantor  in  said  land  for  the  price  of  one 
thousand  dollars:  Now  in  consideration  of  one  thousand  dollars 
paid  to  the  grantor  by  the  grantee,  the  receipt  whereof  is  hereby 
acknowledged,  the  grantor  hereby  surrenders,  grants,  and  yields 
up  unto  the  grantee  all  that  parcel  of  land  [describing  same]  and 
the  estate  for  life  or  life  interest  of  said  grantor  therein,  to  the 
intent  that  the  same  may  merge  and  be  extinguished  in  the  rever- 
sion and  the  inheritance  of  the  said  premises,  and  that  the  said 
grantee  thereafter  may  be  seised  of  or  entitled  to  the  fee  simple 
and  inheritance  in  possession  thereof.  Acknowledged  June  1, 
1910."  As  deeds  of  this  character  are  usually  long  and  technical, 
condensation  and  abbreviation  should  be  practiced  and  every- 
thing eliminated  except  the  salient  features. 

7*  Harris  v.  Hiscock,  91  N.  Y.  340. 


§  309  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  332 

§  309.  Deeds  of  assignment. — Another  form  of  derivative 
or  secondary  conveyances  at  common  law  was  the  deed  of  assign- 
ment. It  was  originally  used  in  the  transfer  of  estates  for  years, 
hut  it  is  now  more  particularly  used  to  transfer  some  particular 
estate  or  interest  in  land,'"  such  as  an  estate  for  life,  or  for  years, 
not  back  to  the  reversioner  or  remainderman,  but  to  an  outside 
party." 

It  is  also  used  to  transfer  a  mortgage,  a  judgment  lien,  a  rent, 
an  easement,  or  any  other  outstanding  claim  or  encumbrance  on 
realty.  At  common  law  it  was  understood  to  mean  a  parting  with 
the  whole  property,  and  could  be  made  orally;  but  is  required  by 
the  statute  of  frauds  to  be  in  writing,  except  when  affecting  per- 
sonalty interests  such  as  a  mortgage  lien  that  may  pass  by  deliv- 
ery of  the  instrument. 

The  words  commonly  used  in  an  assignment  are  "assign,  trans- 
fer, and  set  over,"  although  other  words  clearly  showing  the  in- 
tention of  the  parties  would  be  sufficient.  An  assignment  of  a 
deed,  indorsed  thereon,  does  not  convey  any  interest  in  the  lands 
therein  described.  In  equity  it  might  entitle  the  assignee  to  a 
decree  for  specific  performance,  but  it  can  not  operate  as  a  trans- 
fer of  the  legal  title. "^ 

§  310.  Deeds  of  defeasance. — A  defeasance  is  an  instru- 
ment which  avoids  or  defeats  the  force  and  operation  of  some 
other  deed,  and  that  which  in  the  same  deed  would  be  called  a 
"condition"  of  it.  in  another  deed  is  a  defeasance;  but  it  must 
contain  proper  words  to  defeat  or  put  an  end  to  the  deed  of 
which  it  is  intended  to  be  a  defeasance,  as  that  it  shall  be  void  or 
of  no  force  or  effect.^*  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  dates  of  the 
defeasance  and  the  original  deed  should  correspond.  It  is  to  be 
executed  at  the  same  time,  that  it  may  be  a  part  of  the  same 
transaction."  To  be  valid,  a  defeasance  must  be  made  between 
the  same  persons  who  were  parties  to  the  original  deed,  and  must 
be  signed  and  executed  by  the  person  whose  estate  is  to  be  de- 
feated.^"    It  is  immaterial  whether  the  contract  which  constitutes 

'•'  Ball  V.  Chadwick.  46  111.  28.  84  Tex.  107,  19  S.  W.  364,  31  Am.  St. 

T"2  Bl.  Comm.  pp.  *326,  *327.  21. 

"  Dupont    V.    Wertheman.    10    Cal.  ^s  Lippincott  v.  Tilton,  14  N.  J.  L. 

354;   Porter  v.   Read,   19  Maine  363;  364. 

Reaume  v.  Chambers,     22     Mo.     36;  "Harrison  v.  Trustees  of  Philip's 

Bentlcy  v.   Deforest,  2  Ohio  221,    15  Academy,  12  Mass.  456. 

Am.  Dec.  546;  Contra,  Lemon  v.  Gra-  ^"Miller  v.  Quick,  158  Mo.  495,  59 

ham.   131    Pa.   St.  447,   19  Atl.  48,  6  S.  W.  955. 
L.   R.   A.  663 ;   Harlowe  v.   Hudgins, 


333  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    311 

the  defeasance  be  incorporated  in  the  same  instrument  or  in  a 
separate  instrument  contemporaneously  executed  ;^^  but  the  de- 
feasance and  the  conveyance  are  now  generally  combined  into 
one  document,  and  take  the  form  of  the  modern  mortgage. 

§  311,     Conveyances  to  take  effect  in  the  future. — By  the 

common  law,  an  estate  of  freehold  could  not  be  conveyed  to  com- 
mence in  futuro,  because  it  could  not  be  created  without  livery 
of  seisin.  This  reason  does  not  apply  to  conveyances  operating 
by  force  of  the  statute  of  uses.®"  This  was  also  due  to  the  tech- 
nical doctrine  that  there  must  always  be  some  one  seised  of  the 
freehold.  By  statute,  however,  in  many  states,  freeholds  may 
now  be  created  to  commence  in  futuro,  with  or  without  a  preced- 
ing estate.  A  deed,  in  whatever  terms,  reserving  to  the  grantor 
the  enjoyment  of  the  property  during  his  life,  is  generally  con- 
sidered as  a  present  conveyance  of  the  fee  to  the  grantee,  subject 
to  the  reserv'ation,  and  not  as  testamentary  in  character.'^^  Even 
a  declaration  that  the  deed  shall  not  go  into  effect  until  the  death 
of  the  grantor  does  not  give  it  a  testamentary  character.^* 

A  deed  must  take  effect  upon  its  execution  if  at  all.  It  must 
pass  a  present  interest  to  the  grantee,  though  his  right  to  enter 
into  possession  may  be  deferred  to  a  future  time.  If  the  inten- 
tion is  manifest  that  the  deed  should  not  take  immediate  effect, 
but  shall  be  operative  only  upon  the  grantor's  death,  it  will  never 
take  effect  at  all  unless  it  is  executed  with  such  formalities  that 
it  may  be  given  effect  as  a  testamentary  disposition.^^  But  a  deed 
may  be  delivered  to  take  effect  upon  the  grantor's  death.  If  a 
grantor  delivers  a  deed  to  a  third  person  absolutely  as  his  deed, 
without  reservation  and  without  intending  to  reserve  any  control 
over  the  instrument,  though  this  is  not  to  be  delivered  to  the 
grantee  until  the  death  of  the  grantor,  the  deed  when  delivered 
upon  the  grantor's  death  is  valid,  and  takes  effect  from  the  first 
delivery.®'^ 

*i  Dubuque  Nat.  Bank  v.  Weed,  57  Wellborn  v.  Weaver,   17  Ga.  267,  63 

Fed.  513.  Am.  Dec.  235:  Blackman  v.  Preston, 

*^2  Chancellor  v.  Windham.   1   Rich.  123  111.  381,  15  N.  E.  42. 

L.  (S.  Car.)   161,  42  Am.  Dec.  411.  '^ '  McCalla    v.    Bane.    45    Fed.    828; 

*•■' Knowlson    v.    Fleming,    165    Pa.  Burv  v.  Young.  98  Cal.  446,  33  Pac. 

St.  10.  30  Atl.  519.  338,    35    Am.    St.    186;    Loveland    v. 

*<*  Bunch  V.   Nicks,   50  Ark.   367,   7  Loveland,   136  111.  75,  26  N.   E.  381; 

S.  W.  563;  Shackelton  v.   Scbree,  86  Maxwell    v.    Harper,    51    Wash.    351, 

111-  616.  98  Pac.  756. 

-^^McCalla    v.    Bane,   45    Fed.   828; 


§    312  TITLES    AND    ARSTRACTS  334 

In  States  in  which  tlie  Statute  of  Uses  is  not  in  force,  it  has  been 
decided  that,  since  Hvery  of  seisin  is  obsolete,  the  common-law 
rules  based  upon  abeyance  of  the  seisin  do  not  control,  and  that, 
aside  from  any  express  statutory  authorization,  future  estates 
can  be  created  by  a  conveyance  inter  vivos,  unsupported  by  any 
precedent  estate. ^^  "The  mere  technicalities  of  ancient  law  are 
dispensed  with  upon  compliance  with  statutory  requirements. 
The  acknowledgment  and  recording  are  accepted  in  place  of  livery 
of  seisin,  and  it  is  competent  to  fix  such  time  in  the  future  as 
the  parties  may  agree  upon  as  the  time  when  the  estate  of  the 
grantee  shall  commence.  No  more  necessity  for  limiting  one 
estate  upon  another,  or  for  having  an  estate,  of  some  sort,  pass 
immediately  to  the  grantee  in  opposition  to  the  expressed  intention 
of  the  parties.  The  feoffment  is  to  be  regarded  as  taking  place, 
and  the  livery  of  seisin  as  occupying,  at  the  time  fixed  in  the  in- 
strument, and  the  acknowledgment  and  recording  are  to  be  con- 
sidered as  giving  the  necessary  publicity  which  was  sought  in  the 
ancient  ceremony. "^^ 

Conveyances  to  take  effect  in  the  future  are  usually  in  the  form 
of  a  deed  of  bargain  and  sale,  with  a  provision  postponing  the 
grantee's  enjoyment  and  occupancy  until  the  grantor's  death  or  to 
some  other  specified  time.*°  In  abstracting  a  deed  of  this  char- 
acter the  proviso  limiting  the  enjoyment  and  occupancy  of  the 
estate  should  be  shown.  Where  the  character  of  the  grantee's 
estate  is  set  out  in  the  habendum,  this  should  be  copied  literally. 
The  words  of  grant,  and  covenants,  if  any,  should  also  appear  in 
the  abstract.  The  presentation  in  other  respects  will  not  differ 
from  the  ordinary  forms  of  abridgments  already  shown. 

§  312.  Deeds  conveying  base,  qualified,  and  conditional 
estates  or  interests. — Wliere  the  deed  to  be  abstracted  Is  an 
absolute  conveyance  of  the  entire  interest  of  the  grantor  the  na- 
ture and  legal  import  of  the  instrument  may  be  indicated  by  the 
use  of  the  words  "warranty  deed."  or  "quitclaim  deed,"  as  the 
case  may  l)e ;  the  former  Ijeing  used  when  the  deed  contains  cove- 
nants running  with  the  land,  and  the  latter  when  the  deed  pur- 
ports to  convey  only  the  present  interest  or  estate  of  the  grantor. 
But  where  the  instrument  does  not  purport  to  be  an  absolute  con- 

"  Bunch  V.  Nicks.  50  Ark.  367,  7  S.  ss  Abbott  v.  Holway,  72  Maine  29«. 
W.  563 ;  Gorham  v.  Daniels,  23  Vt.  »»  Abbott  v.  Holway,  12  Maine  298. 
600. 


I 


335  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    312 

veyance  of  the  entire  interest  or  estate  of  the  grantor,  the  instru- 
ment should  be  referred  to  simply  as  a  "deed,"  and  all  the  ma- 
terial provisions  and  operative  words  set  out  in  full,  so  that 
counsel  may  determine  their  legal  import  and  effect. 

Conveyances  of  this  kind  embrace  such  estates  or  interests  as 
estates  for  life  or  years,  conditional  or  qualified  estates,  equitable 
estates,  estates  in  expectancy,  easements  and  the  like.  The  valid- 
ity and  effect  of  such  conveyances  is  not  always  determined  by  the 
application  of  general  principles,  as  in  case  of  warranty  and  quit- 
claim deeds,  but  by  the  application  of  special  provisions  of  law 
to  the  particular  provisions  of  the  conveyance.  Hence,  greater 
particularity  of  statement  is  required  in  abstracting  a  deed  of  this 
character  than  is  required  of  any  other  form  of  conveyance.  The 
nature  and  extent  of  the  estate  granted  is  frequently  determined 
from  the  operative  words  and  from  the  words  of  purchase  and 
limitation,  while  the  language  of  the  habendum  is  often  employed 
to  explain  or  define  the  grant  made  in  the  premises.  Conditions 
and  restrictions  require  special  attention,  and  where  covenants  ap- 
pear it  is  best  to  note  them  also.  The  habendum  may  explain, 
enlarge,  or  qualify,  but  can  not  contradict  or  defeat  the 
estate  granted  by  the  premises  ;°*'  but  so  far  as  the  habendum 
is  inconsistent  with  the  declaration  in  the  premises  it  must 
be  rejected, ^^  The  premises  of  a  deed  are  often  expressed 
in  general  terms  which  admit  of  explanations  which  are 
usually  found  in  the  habendum.  The  premises  frequently  do  not 
describe,  or  profess  to  describe,  the  quantum  or  extent  of  the 
estate  granted  or  intended  to  be  granted. ^^  If  no  words  of  in- 
heritance are  used  in  the  premises,  the  grantee  by  the  premises 
takes  by  implication  only  a  life  estate  at  most.  The  habendum 
may  then  by  express  limitation  define  the  estate  granted  as  an 
estate  for  life  in  fee,  or  in  fee  tail,  and  the  estate  so  expressly 
defined  necessarily  excludes  the  uncertain  implication  from  the 
premises."^  If  the  habendum  clause  is  repugnant  to  the  estate 
already  vested  by  the  deed  it  is  void.^*    Effect  will  be  given  to  both 

90  Rines  v.   Mansfield,  96  Mo.  394,  v.  Billings,  44  Maine  416,  69  Am.  Dec. 

9  S.  W.  798 ;  Tyler  v.  Moore,  42  Pa.  107. 

St.   374;    Thompson    v.    Carl,    51    Vt.         -'4  Ratcliff  v.   Marrs.  87  Ky.  26.   10 

408.  Ky.  L.  134,  7  S.  W.  395,  8  S.  W.  876; 

«i  Winter  v.  Gorsuch,  51    Md.   180.  Smith  v.  Smith,  71   Mich.  633,  40  N. 

^2  Doren    v.    Gillum,    136   Ind.    134,  W.  21  ;  Havens  v.  Seashore  Land  Co. 

35,  N.  E.  1101.  47  N.  J.  Eq.  365,  20  Atl.  497. 

93  Riggin  V.  Love,  72  111.  553 ;  Berry 


§    313  TITLK?.    AND    ABSTUACTS  336 

the  granting  clause  and  the  habendum,  if  possible  to  do  so  by  a 
fair  construction,  where  the  interest  intended  to  be  conveyed  is 
defined  in  both  clauses.  If  the  habendum  is  to  the  grantee  for  the 
life  of  another,  after  a  grant  to  him  and  his  heirs,  there  is  no 
repugnancy/''  The  covenant  of  warranty  applies  to  the  estate 
conveyed,  and  can  not  enlarge  the  estate."" 

§  313.  Conveyances  with  restrictive  conditions  and  cove- 
nants.— The  owner  of  land,  desiring  to  protect  and  improve 
the  neighborhood  for  any  special  purpose,  may  impose  such  re- 
strictions as  he  sees  fit  in  making  sales  of  his  land,  provided  such 
restrictions  are  not  against  public  policy."'^  He  may  determine  for 
himself  what  kinds  of  business  are  undesirable  in  the  vicinity  of 
residences,  and  covenants  restraining  them  can  be  enforced  with- 
out any  proof  whatever  that  they  are  injurious  or  offensive."® 
Restrictions  in  the  use  of  land  conveyed  in  fee  are  not  favored, 
but  the  courts  will  enforce  them  where  the  intention  of  the  parties 
in  their  creation  was  clear.  Such  restrictions  are  to  be  fairly  and 
reasonably  interpreted  accordingly  to  their  apparent  purpose.  On 
the  one  hand  they  are  not  to  be  construed  narrowly,  and  on  the 
other  hand  they  are  not  to  be  unduly  enlarged. "°  A  restriction 
which  amounts  to  a  prohibition  of  the  use  of  the  land  granted  is 
void.^  Where  a  restriction  is  confined  within  reasonable  bounds, 
and  the  party  in  whose  favor  it  is  made  has  an  interest  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  restriction,  or  others  in  privity  with  him 
have  such  an  interest,  it  will  be  sustained."  A  covenant  not  to 
engage  in  a  particular  business  upon  the  land  conveyed  or  retained 
is  valid  if  limited  to  a  reasonable  time.^  It  is  competent  for  the 
grantee  to  covenant  to  reconvey  the  land  for  a  specified  sum  with- 
in a  period  named.*  A  provision  that  the  grantee  shall  not  con- 
vey without  the  consent  of  the  grantor  is  repugnant  to  the  grant 
and  void.^    Restrictions  as  to  the  use  of  the  land  or  the  mode  of 

»5  Rowland  v.  Rowland,  93  N.  Car.  "«  Coudert   v.    Sayrc,  46  N.  J.   Eq. 

214.  386,  19  Atl.  190. 

•"■'Ballard  v.  Child.  46  Maine   152;  ""Smith  v.  Bradley,  154  Mass.  227, 

White  V.   Brocaw,    14   Ohio    St.   339;  28  N.  E.  14. 

Hull  V.  Hull.  35  W.  Va.   155,   13   S.  i  Craig  v.  Wells,  11  N.  Y.  315. 

E.  49,  29  Am.  St.  800.  2  Qrigg  v.  Landis,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  494. 

»7Webb   V.    Robbins.    77   Ala.    176;  ^  Mollvneaux     v.     Wittenberg,     39 

Peabody  Heights  Co.  v.  Willson,  82  Nebr.  547.  58  N.  W.  205. 

Md.  186,  32  Atl.  386,  1077,  36  L.  R.  A.  4  Randall  v.  Sanders,  87  N.  Y.  578. 

393;  Sanborn  v.  Rice,  129  Mass. '387:  s  Murray  v.  Green,  64  Cal.  363,  28 

Rowland  v.  Miller,  139  N.  Y.  93,  34  Pac.  118. 
N.    E.    765,   22   L.   R.   A.    182;    In   re 
Thompson's  Appeal,  101  Pa.  St.  225. 


i 


337  CLASSIFICATION    OF   PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    31-1 

its  enjoyment,  though  expressed  to  be  "conditions,"  will  not  be 
construed  to  be  technical  conditions  unless  it  appears  that  the 
parties  so  intended  or  understood  them  to  be  "conditions,"  a 
breach  of  which  would  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate.*^ 

No  particular  form  of  words  is  considered  absolutely  essential 
in  creating  a  condition  in  a  grant  or  deed ;  but  it  is  essential  that 
the  intention  to  create  it  shall  be  clearly  shown  by  some  words. 
It  is  well  recognized  that  certain  terms  are  more  apt  to  create  a 
condition  than  are  others.  The  most  appropriate  words  used  for 
this  purpose  are  such  phrases  as  "on  condition,"  "provided  al- 
ways," or  similar  expressions  which  indicate  that  in  a  certain 
event  prescribed  the  estate  becomes  defeasible  by  entry  of  the 
grantor  or  his  heirs,  but  that  until  entry  the  estate  is  to  continue. 
Whatever  the  words  used,  they  should  be  literally  copied  in  the 
abstract. 

§  314.  Conveyances  of  land  in  the  adverse  possession  of 
another. — At  common  law  the  conveyance  of  land  in  the  ad- 
verse possession  of  another  was  void.  When  livery  of  seisin  was 
essential  to  a  conveyance  of  land,  it  was  of  course  impossible  to 
make  liver}^  when  the  land  was  in  the  possession  of  another.^  An- 
other reason  for  the  rule  is  found  in  the  policy  of  the  law  to  pre- 
vent the  sale  of  pretended  titles  whereby  litigation  is  encouraged. 
If  the  owner  is  not  disposed  to  attempt  the  enforcement  of  a 
doubtful  claim,  public  policy  requires  that  he  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  transfer  it  to  another,  and  thus  encourage  strife  and 
litigation.^  The  common-law  rule  has  been  affirmed  by  statute 
and  judicial  decisions  in  a  few  states.^  It  is  a  transfer  of  land  in 
adverse  possession  against  which  such  statutes  animadvert,  but 
the  deed  made  between  the  parties  is  good  as  between  them  and 
to  all  the  world.  It  is  only  void  as  to  the  party  in  possession  and 
his  privies.^"  Even  in  those  states  in  which  the  doctrine  is  re- 
tained, inasmuch  as  the  reasons  for  it  have  in  a  great  measure 
ceased  to  exist,  the  tendency  of  the  later  decisions  is  to  modify 

6  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Priest,  »  Mahan  v.  Smith,  151  Ala.  482,  44 

131  Ind.  413,  31  N.  E.  11 ;  Ayling  v.  So.  375 ;  Paton  v.  Robinson.  81  Conn. 

Kramer,  133  Mass.  12;  Fuller  v.  Arms,  547,  71  Atl.  730;  Cyrus  v.  Holbrook. 

45  Vt.  400.  2>2  Ky.  L.  466.  106  S.  W.  300 ;  Becker 

"Dexter  v.  Nelson.  6  Ala.  68;  Mc-  v.   Church,   115  N.   Y.  562,  22  N.  E. 

Mahan    v.    Bowe,   114   Mass.   140,   19  748. 

Am.  Rep.  321.  lo  Pamum   v.    Peterson.    Ill    Mass. 

s  Russell  V.  Doyle,  84  Ky.  386,  8  Ky.  148 ;   Huston   v.   Scott,  20  Okla.    142, 

L.  366,  1  S.  W.  604.  94  Pac.  512  35  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  721n. 

22 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


^5    315  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  338 

it  SO  as  to  make  it  reasonable  and  just."  It  is  held  that  such  stat- 
utes do  not  apply  where  real  proi)erty  thus  held  adversely  was 
purchased  at  a  judicial  sale.^^ 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  title  of  the  disseisor  l^e  valid  to 
constitute  an  adverse  possession  under  the  rule.  His  title  may 
be  bad,  or  his  original  entry  may  have  been  by  permission  of  the 
true  owner.^^  But  to  render  a  deed  void  on  account  of  adverse 
possession,  the  adverse  claimant  must  have  actual  exclusive  pos- 
session under  claim  of  a  specific  title,  and  not  under  a  general 
assertion  of  ownership;^*  he  must  have  actual  possession  and 
claim  adversely. ^^  An  entry  by  the  disseisee,  and  delivery  of  a 
deed  upon  the  land,  purges  the  disseisin,  and  makes  the  deed 
effectual  to  pass  all  the  title  originally  acquired  and  held  by  the 
grantor  at  the  time  of  his  conveyance.^" 

In  a  majority  of  the  states,  however,  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  a  person  claiming  title  to  real  property  in  the  adverse  posses- 
sion of  another  may  transfer  it  with  the  same  effect  as  if  he  were 
in  actual  possession.^'  The  effect  of  the  statutes  removing  the 
disability  of  the  owner  of  land  out  of  possession  is  simply  to  en- 
able him  to  invest  the  grantee  with  all  the  rights  of  the  owner 
precisely  as  he  held  them.^**  Whatever  titles  are  deducible  from 
the  records  must  be  shown  in  the  abstract,  and  their  validity  and 
effect  determined  by  applying  the  law  of  the  jurisdiction  to  the 
admitted  or  known  facts. 

^315.  Fraudulent  conveyances.  —  Fraudulent  convey- 
ances may  be  either  fraudulent  in  law  or  fraudulent  in  fact.  They 
are  fraudulent  in  law  when  they  have  been  executed  under  such 
circumstances  that  the  law  itself  conclusively  infers  a  fraudulent 
intent  from  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  circumstances,  without  any 
inquiry  into  the  actual  intent  of  the  parties  to  the  transaction. 
They  are  fraudulent  in  fact  where  the  circumstances  are  not  such 

^1  Webb  V.  Thompson,  23  Ind.  428;  ^''' Fanium    v.    Peterson,    111    Mass. 

McMalian  v.  Bovve,  114  Mass.  140,  19  148;    Betsey    v.    Torrance,    34    Miss. 

Am.  Rep.  321.  132. 

12  Vary  V.  Sensabaugh,  156  Ala.  459,  '"Moore   v.    Sharpe,    91    Ark.    407, 

47  So.   196;   Martin  v.  Turner,    (Ky.  121   S.  W.  341,  23  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.) 

App.),  115  S.  W.  833.  937n;   King  v.   Sears,  91   Ga.  577,  18 

'•■*  Barry  V.  Adams,  3  Allen  (Mass.)  S.    K.    830;    Torrence   v.    Shedd,    112 

493;   Pearce  v.  Moore,  114  N.  Y.  256,  111.  466;  Hovey  v.  Hobson,  51  Maine 

21  N.  K.  419.  62 ;  Crane  v.  Reeder.  21   Midi.  24,  4 

1*  Dawley  v.  Brown,  79  N.  Y.  390.  Am.  Rep.  430 ;  Cassedy  v.  Jackson,  45 

15  Sherwood    v.    Waller,    20    Conn.  Miss.  397. 

262.  1^  Shortall  v.  Hinckley,  31   111.  219. 


J 


1 


339  CLASSIFICATION    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    316 

as  that  the  law  conchisively  infers  a  fraudulent  intent  from  them, 
but  where  the  parties  have  actually  intended  to  delay,  hinder,  or 
defraud  creditors  or  subsequent  purchasers." 

As  a  general  rule,  fraud  seldom  appears  on  the  face  of  a  deed, 
so  as  to  charge  a  subsequent  purchaser  with  notice.  It  sometimes 
happens,  however,  that  the  provisions  of  a  conversance  purporting 
to  be  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  particular  persons  is  framed  so 
palpably  in  the  interest  of  the  grantor  that  a  court  of  equity  will 
not  hesitate  to  pronounce  it  void,  as  having  been  executed  for  the 
purpose  of  delaying  creditors.  Thus  where  property  of  the  value 
of  $7,000  was  conveyed  in  trust  to  secure  a  debt  of  $150,  and  sev- 
eral other  small  debts  not  yet  due,  the  deed  permitting  the  grantor, 
in  the  meanwhile,  to  remain  in  possession  of  the  premises,  the 
deed  was  held  void  on  its  face,  and  a  remote  purchaser  thereun- 
der charged  with  notice  of  the  fraud."°  Whether  or  not  a  con- 
veyance is  fraudulent  is  generally  a  question  of  consideration  and 
intent  to  delay,  hinder,  or  defraud  creditors. ^^  Where,  however, 
a  conveyance  is  gratuitous  or  without  consideration,  an  actual  in- 
tent to  defraud  is  not  necessary;'-  but  it  is  always  a  question  of 
fact  whether  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case  a  conveyance 
was  fraudulent.-^  If  the  grantee  participate  in  the  fraud,  the 
conveyance  is  fraudulent  though  based  upon  a  valuable  consider- 
ation.^* But  where  the  grantor  alone  is  guilty  of  an  intent  to 
defraud,  a  bona  fide  grantee,  for  valuable  consideration,  and  with- 
out notice  of  the  fraud,  obtains  a  valid  title.^^ 

§  316.  Conveyances  subject  to  incumbrance. — It  not  in- 
frequently happens  that  a  conveyance  is  made  subject  to  an  in- 
cumbrance, usually  a  mortgage.  The  clause  in  a  deed  referring  to 
the  existence  of  a  prior  mortgage  is  of  much  importance  in  other 
ways  than  in  determining  whether  the  grantee  engages  to  pay  the 
mortgage,  or  merely  buys  subject  to  it.  In  the  first  place  it  may 
qualify  the  grantor's  liability  upon  the  covenants  of  the  deed 

13  Land  v.  Jeffries,  5  Rand.    (Va.)  29  N.  W.  679;  Todd  v.  Nelson,  109 

211.  599.  N.  Y.  316,  16  N.  E.  360. 

-Mohnson  v.  Thweatt,  18  Ala.  741.  24  Huffman  v.  Leslie,  23  Ky.  L.  1981, 

21  Chandler  v.  Von  Roeder,  24  How.  66  S.  W.  822. 

(U    S.)  224,  16  L.  ed.  633;  Todd  v.  ^s  Hughes  v.  Noyes,  171  111.  575,  49 

Nelson,  109  N.  Y.  316,  16  N.  E.  360.  N.  E.  703 ;   Parmenter  v.  Lomax,  68 

,o  l^?.^*^"  ^-   S*^^^^'    109  Ala.  563,  Kans.  61,  74  Pac.  634;  Russell  v.  Cole. 

^%f  o.  972,  55  Am.  St.  947.  167  Mass.  6,  44  N.  E.   1057,  57  Am. 

23  Adams  v.  Kellogg,  63  Mich.  105,  St.  432;  Delavan  v.  Wright,  110  Mich. 

143,  67  N.  W.  1110. 


>;    316  TITLES    AND    ADSTRACTS  340 

against  incumbrances  by  showing  the  existence  of  the  mortgage, 
and  that,  as  between  him  and  his  grantee,  the  latter  is  to  pay  it."" 
It  may  prevent,  by  a  statement  as  to  what  the  incuml)rance  upon 
the  property  is,  any  liability  on  the  part  of  the  grantor  to  the 
penalties  imposed  by  statute  upon  one  who  sells  incumbered  prop- 
erty without  disclosing  the  incumbrance.  It  may  preclude  the 
grantee  from  impeaching  the  validity  of  the  mortgage  existing 
upon  the  property  conveyed.'^  It  may  subject  the  land  to  the 
burden  of  the  mortgage  without  imposing  upon  the  grantee  any 
personal  liability  to  pay  it."^  It  may  have  an  important  bearing 
upon  the  liability  of  the  grantor  in  case  an  extension  of  the  mort- 
gage is  afterwards  made  without  his  consent."^.  It  may  render 
the  grantee  directly  liable  for  the  mortgage  debt  to  the  mortgagee, 
or  it  may  make  him  liable  merely  to  his  grantor.^"  Moreover, 
under  this  clause  arise  questions  of  notice  affecting  others  who 
may  claim  under  the  deed.^^ 

The  mode,  therefore,  in  which  this  clause  is  expressed  is  of  ex- 
treme importance,  both  in  the  abstracting  of  the  instrument  and 
in  the  interpretation  of  its  effect.  The  abstract  should  contain  a 
verbatim  copy  of  the  clause,  together  with  any  covenant  which 
it  may  cjualify.  When  land  is  conveyed  "subject  to"  a  mortgage, 
and  the  amount  of  it  is  deducted  from  the  consideration,  with 
the  intention  that  it  shall  be  paid  by  the  grantee,  it  is  important 
that  the  mortgage  be  excepted  from  the  covenants  of  the  deed; 
otherwise  the  grantor  may  be  held  to  have  covenanted  against  the 
incumbrance,  and  to  have  made  himself  liable  for  its  payment.^" 
The  fact  that  the  incumbrance  is  mentioned  in  the  deed  to  which 
reference  is  made  does  not  avail  to  qualify  the  covenants  of  a 
deed.^^  Oral  evidence  that  the  parties  intended  or  agreed  that  the 
incumbrance  should  be  excepted  from  the  covenants  is  not  admis- 
sible, because  its  effect  would  be  to  vary  or  control  the  deed.^* 

The  mention  of  an  existing  mortgage  for  a  certain  amount 

2"  Lippitt  V.  Thames  Loan  &c.  Co.,  ^^  Garnscy  v.  Rogers,  47  N.  Y.  233, 

88  Conn.  185,  90  Atl.  369;  Collins  v.  7  Am.  Rep.  440. 

Rowe,  1  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  97.  ^i  Campbell  v.  Vedder,  3  Keys  (N. 

27McMurphy  v.  Adams,  67  N.  H.  Y.)    174,   1  Abb.  App.  Dec.   (N.  Y.) 

440.  39  Atl.   333;   Ritter  v.   Phillips,  295. 

53  N.  Y.  586.  32  King  v.  Kilbride,  58  Conn.   109, 

28  McConihe    v.    Fales,    107    N.    Y.  19  Atl.  519. 

404.  14  N.  E.  285.  •"•^  Harlow    v.     Thomas,     15     Pick. 

2»Calvo  V.  Davies.  8  Hun   (N.  Y.)  (Mass.)  66. 

222,  aff'd  73  N.  Y.  211,  29  Am.  Rep.  34  Spurr     v.      Andrew,     6     Allen 

130.  (Mass.)  420. 


341  CLASSIFICATION    OF   PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    316 

is  only  by  way  of  description  and  identification  of  the  mortgage, 
which,  to  the  extent  of  all  sums  due  thereon  for  principal  or  in- 
terest, is  a  single  incumbrance.  A  covenant  that  the  premises  "are 
free  from  all  incumbrances  except  the  aforesaid"  is  not  a  covenant 
that  there  was  no  interest  due  upon  the  mortgage  at  the  time  of 
the  conveyance.^^  A  recital  in  a  deed  that  it  is  made  subject  to  a 
mortgage  may  give  notice  of  the  mortgage,  but  such  recital  must 
be  sufficient  to  make  it  the  duty  of  the  purchaser  to  inquire  and 
to  lead  to  the  discovery  of  the  mortgage.  In  case  the  m.ortgage 
is  not  recorded,  the  recital  must  be  sufficiently  definite  to  put  the 
purchaser  in  a  way  of  discovering  the  unrecorded  mortgage. ^'^ 
One  who  purchases  land  by  a  deed  which  expressly  re- 
cites that  the  premises  are  subject  to  a  mortgage  has  notice 
of  the  mortgage  from  the  recital,  and  can  not  claim  against 
it,  although  it  be  not  recorded. ^^  A  condition  for  the  payment 
of  money  to  third  persons  by  the  grantee  w-ithin  a  fixed  time  will 
be  construed  to  be  merely  a  charge  upon  the  land,  unless  a  differ- 
ent intent  is  apparent,  or  the  language  of  the  condition  is  so  clear 
as  to  leave  no  room  for  construction  or  doubt. ^^  A  conveyance 
"subject  to  the  purchase-money,"  and  to  an  agreement  concerning 
the  same,  creates  an  equitable  lien  upon  the  land  conveyed. ^'~^  A 
provision  in  a  deed  that  the  grantee  shall  assume  and  pay  a  mort- 
gage upon  the  land  conveyed  does  not  constitute  a  condition  upon 
the  breach  of  which  the  title  revests  in  the  grantor. *°  But  the 
payment  of  a  mortgage  upon  the  land  may  be  made  an  express 
condition,  and  when  so  intended  it  will  be  enforced  by  forfeiture.*^ 
In  like  manner,  and  for  stronger  reasons,  one  who  has  purchased 
land  subject  to  a  mortgage,  which  he  agrees  to  pay,  takes  a  title 
subject  to  the  mortgage,  although  it  be  not  recorded,  or  be  re- 
corded in  such  a  way  that  it  is  not  notice.*^  When  a  mortgage  is 
expressly  excepted  from  a  covenant  of  warranty  in  a  deed,  this 
exception  charges  the  purchaser  with  notice  of  the  mortgage, 
although  the  mortgage  be  not  recorded.*^ 

35Ayer   v.    Philadelphia   &c.    Brick  3"  Hiestes  v.  Green.  48  Pa.   St.  96, 

Co.,  157  Mass.  57,  31  N.  E.  717,  159  86  Am.  Dec.  569. 

Mass.  84,  34  N.  E.  177.  40  Martin  v.   Splivalo,  69   Cal.  611, 

3«  McCrea  v.  Newman,  46  N.  J.  Eq.  11  Pac.  484. 

473,  19  Atl.  198.  4i  pisk  v.   Chandler,   30   Maine   79, 

"Hull   V.    Sullivan,   63     Ga.     126;  50  Am.  Dec.  612. 

Garrett  V.  Puckett,  15  Ind.  485;  Wes-  i^  Rosj    ^     Worthington,    11     (Gil. 

tervelt  v.  Wyckoff,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  188.  323)   Minn.  438,  88  Am.  Dec.  95. 

3svv^jer  V.   Simmons,  55  Wis.  637,  «  Morrison   v.   Morrison,   38   Iowa 

13  N.  W.  873.  73. 


^    317  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  342 

The  principle  of  equity  is  well  established  that  a  grantee  of 
land  is  chargeable  with  notice,  by  implication,  of  every  fact  affect- 
ing the  title  which  would  be  discovered  by  an  examination  of  the 
deeds,  or  other  muniments  of  title  of  his  grantor,  and  of  every 
fact  as  to  which  the  grantee,  with  reasonable  prudence  or  dili- 
gence, ought  to  become  acquainted.  If  there  is  sufficient  con- 
tained in  any  deed  or  record,  which  a  prudent  purchaser  ought 
to  examine,  to  induce  an  inquiry  in  the  mind  of  an  intelligent 
person,  he  is  chargeable  with  knowledge  or  notice  of  the  facts  so 
contained/*  So  the  recital  of  an  incumbrance  to  which  a  con- 
veyance is  subject  must  be  sufficient  to  put  the  purchaser  upon 
inquiry,  and  to  lead  to  the  discovery  of  the  mortgage  referred  to. 

§  317.  Dedicatory  deeds. — We  have  seen  that  a  v^riting 
is  not  requisite  to  the  validity  of  a  dedication.  All  that  is  required 
is  the  assent  and  intent  of  the  owner  of  the  property  to  appro- 
priate it  to  a  public  use,  and  any  act  or  acts  clearly  manifesting  an 
intent  to  dedicate  is  sufficient.  There  are  dedications,  however, 
where  the  intent  is  expressly  manifested,  as  much  so  as  in  ordi- 
nary deeds,  and  the  intent  of  the  dedication  will  be  measured  by 
the  writing.*^  Deeds  of  streets  to  "the  present  and  future  owners 
of  town  lots,"  or  to  the  "inhabitants"  of  a  certain  town,  and  the 
like,  have  been  held  to  operate  as  a  dedication  to  the  public.*'^  So, 
deeds  by  owners  to  individuals  expressly  dedicating  streets  and 
the  like  have  often  been  held,  as  between  the  parties,  to  give  the 
grantee  the  right  to  have  the  dedicated  streets  used  as  such/^  and, 
indeed,  to  constitute  an  irrevocable  dedication  to  the  public  when 
duly  accepted.*^  It  is  only  in  the  latter  instance  that  the  intent 
to  dedicate  must  be  unmistakable  in  purpose  and  decisive  in  char- 
acter, and  the  recital  thereof  should  be  shown  by  a  literal  trans- 
cription. 

We  have  said  that  where  streets  and  highways  are  marked  on 
a  plat  and  lots  are  lx)ught  and  sold  with  reference  to  the  plat  or 
map,  all  who  buy  with  reference  to  the  general  plan  or  scheme  dis- 
closed by  the  plat  or  map  acquire  a  right  in  all  the  public  ways 

■»*Corbitt   V.    Clennv,   52   Ala.   480;  ^^  Booraem      v.      North      Hudson 

Stidham  v.  Matthews'  29  Ark.  650.  Countv   R.   Co.,  40  N.  J.   Eq.  557,  5 

45  Getchell  v.  Benedict,  57  Iowa  121,  Atl.  106. 

10  N   W   321.  ^8  Barney  v.  Lincoln  Park,  203  111. 

♦«  Mayo    V.    Wood.    50    Cal.    171 ;  397,  67  N.  E.  801. 
Browne    v.    Bowdoinham,    71    Maine 
144 ;  Corbin  v.  Dale,  57  Mo.  297. 


343  CLASSIFICATION    OF   PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    318 

designated  thereon  and  may  enforce  the  dedication/"  These  plats 
and  maps  are  important  to  be  considered  in  examining  titles.  It 
is  often  necessary  to  consult  the  original  plats,  and  it  is  well  to 
become  familiar  with  the  system  of  indexing  and  recording  them, 
as  well  as  the  chief  statutory  recpirements  for  platting  and  sub- 
dividing land.^° 

§  318.  Deeds  creating  resulting  trusts. — It  is  a  principle 
of  law  that  where  one  buys  real  estate  and  pays  the  purchase 
money  with  his  own  funds,  and  has  the  title  placed  in  the  name  of 
another  person,  or  where  a  person  standing  in  a  fiduciary  relation 
uses  fiduciary  funds  to  purchase  the  property,  and  takes  the  title 
thereto  in  his  own  name,  a  trust  results  in  favor  of  the  one  whose 
funds  were  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  purchase-price.  Such  a 
trust  is  raised  only  from  fraud  in  obtaining  title,  or  from  payment 
of  the  purchase-money  when  the  title  is  acquired. ^^  Such  a  trust 
does  not  arise  out  of  any  contract  between  the  parties,  but  is  an 
implication  of  law  from  the  existence  of  facts  necessary  to  justify 
the  implication."  They  are  founded  on  the  presumed  intention 
of  the  parties. ^^ 

In  an  early  day  it  was  necessary  that  the  deed  set  out  the  con- 
sideration, and  that  it  was  paid  by  the  grantee.  If  the  deed  con- 
tained no  such  recital  it  was  presumed  that  the  grantee  held  the 
title  in  trust  for  the  grantor,  or  other  person  who  paid  the  con- 
sideration money.  But  the  presumption  now  is  that  the  person  to 
whom  the  deed  is  made  paid  his  own  money  for  it.  The  grantor 
is  estopped,  by  a  recital  of  a  consideration  paid,  to  claim  a  result- 
ing trust  in  his  favor. ^*  It  may  be  presumed,  however,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statutory  declaration  to  the  contrary,  that  where  the 
purchase-money  is  paid  by  one  and  the  title  taken  in  the  name  of 
another,  the  two  being  strangers  to  each  other,  a  resulting  trust 
arises,  and  the  grantee  named  will  be  held  to  be  a  trustee  for  the 
person  who  parted  with  the  consideration  for  which  the  deed  was 
made.^^     But  the  mere  fact  that  there  was  no  consideration  will 

49Bartlett    v.     Bangor,    67    Maine  ^3  Cook  v.  Patrick.  135  111.  499,  26 

460;   In  re  Pearl  Street,   111   Pa.  St.  N.  E.  658,  11  L.  R.  A.  573. 

565,  5  Atl.  430.  •"'*  Bassett  v.  Bassett,  55  Maine  125; 

50  See  Chap.  IX.  Wilkinson  v.  Scott,  17  Mass.  249. 

-"^i  In  re  Bickel's  Appeal,  86  Pa.  St.  -"'^  Union    College    v.    Wheeler,    59 

204.  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  585,  5  Lans.  160;  Mc- 

52Monson  v.  Hutchin,  194  111.  431.  Govern  v.  Knox,  21  Ohio  St.  551,  8 

62  N.  E.  788.  Am.  Rep.  80. 


§318  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  344 

not  in  itself  raise  a  resulting  trust. ■"'"  A  voluntary  conveyance  to 
a  wife  or  child,  or  to  one  to  whom  the  grantor  is  under  legal  or 
moral  obligation  to  support,  will  be  presumed,  as  a  rule,  to  carry 
the  beneficial  interest  also,  and  no  resulting  trust  arises. ^^  An 
actual  consideration  will  prevent  a  trust  resulting;^*  and  the  con- 
sideration need  not  be  expressed  in  the  deed.°°  But  the  recital  of 
a  valuable  consideration  in  a  deed,  even  if  the  consideration  is  not 
paid,  will  prevent  a  resulting  trust. ''° 

•'■''' McClenahan    v.     Stevenson,     118         '"'' Hogan   v.   Jaques,    19  N.   J.   Eq. 
Iowa  106,  91  N.  W.  925.  123,  97  Am.  Dec.  644. 

^"^  Ripley  v.  Seligman,  88  Mich.  177,         -''^  Bank   of    U.    S.    v.    Housman,   6 
50   N.   W.    143;   Gaylord  v.   Gaylord,     Paige  (N.  Y.)  526. 
150  N.  Car.  222,  63  S.  E.  1028.  '^o  Verzier  v.  Convard,  75  Conn.  1, 

52  Atl.  255. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

SPECIAL  CLASSES  OF   PRIVATE  CONVEYANCES 


SEC.  SEC. 

320.  Conveyances    for    the    sole    and  331.  Conveyances      by      public      and 
separate  use  of  married  women.  quasi  corporations. 

321.  Deed  to  husband  and  wife.  332.  Conveyance  by  private  corpora- 

322.  Conveyances  for  married  women.  tions. 

323.  Conveyance  between  husband  and  333.  Conveyances  by  charitable  or  re- 
wife,  ligious  corporations. 

324.  Acknowledgment      by      married  334.  Conveyance  of  an  expectancy, 
woman.  335.  Conveyance  by  attorney  in   fact. 

325.  Release  of  dower.  336.  Power  of  attorney  to  convey. 

326.  Conveyances   creating  estates   in  337.  Ratification    and    revocation    of 
common  and  in  joint  tenancy.  powers  of  attorney. 

327.  Voluntary  partition  deeds.  338.  Conveyances  in  trust. 

328.  Conveyances  to  and  by  partner-  339.  Declaration  of  trust  in  deeds, 
ships.  340.  Revocation  of  trust. 

329.  Conveyances  to  private  corpora-  341.  Death,    resignation,    or    removal 
tions.  of  trustee. 

330.  Acknowledgment     of     corporate 
deeds. 

§  320.  Conveyances  for  the  sole  and  separate  use  of  mar- 
ried women. — Conveyances  attempting  to  secure  to  a  mar- 
ried woman,  or  to  her  and  her  children,  the  use  and  title  to  lands 
freed  from  the  dominion  and  control  of  the  husband  and  father 
are  not  uncommon.  By  statute  in  nearly  all  of  the  states  a  con- 
veyance can  be  made  to  a  married  woman  over  which  her  husband 
will  have  no  control ;  and  the  conveyance  may,  in  some  instances, 
be  made  to  her  directly,  and  in  others  by  the  aid  of  a  trustee  for 
her  sole  and  separate  use.^  But  if  such  a  deed  does  not  describe 
her  as  a  married  woman,  and  does  not  purport  to  be  for  her  sole 
and  separate  use,  the  presumption  is  that  it  is  a  deed  to  the  hus- 
band and  wife  in  common.  The  separate  estate  of  a  married 
woman,  being  dependent  upon  the  equitable  doctrine  of  trusts — 
with  the  legal  and  equitable  title  separated — when  a  transfer  is 
thus  made  directly  to  a  married  woman  for  her  sole  and  separate 
use,  her  husband,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  trust,  is  regarded 
in  equity  as  taking  the  legal  estate  in  trust  for  his  wife  for  her 

iLippincott   v.    Mitchell,   94   U.    S.     767,  24  L.  ed.  315;  Meyer  v.  Kinzer, 

12  Cal.  247,  73  Am.  Dec.  538. 

345 


^321  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  346 

separate  use.^  In  order  to  create  this  eqiiital)Ie  separate  estate, 
the  intention  of  the  grantor  to  give  the  married  woman  the  com- 
plete use  of  the  property  free  from  her  husband's  control  must 
clearly  appear  from  the  words  used  in  the  deed.'^  And  while  the 
expression  "sole  and  separate  use"'  has  been  most  frequently  em- 
ployed for  this  purpose,  no  special  or  technical  form  of  words 
is  necessary,  if  the  intention  to  exclude  the  husband's  marital 
rights  is  indicated.  Words  which  might  be  necessary,  however, 
to  show  such  an  intention  when  the  grantor  is  a  stranger  are  not 
always  regarded  as  necessary  in  a  conveyance  by  the  husband  to 
a  trustee  for  the  wife  or  in  his  conveyance  directly  to  her.*  A 
conveyance  by  the  husband  directly  to  the  wife,  without  reserva- 
tion, is  necessarily  a  clear,  unequivocal  manifestation  and  declara- 
tion of  the  intention  to  relinquish  his  own  rights,  and  to  clothe 
the  wife  with  them.^ 

In  abstracting  a  deed  of  this  character  the  granting  clause  and 
habendum  should  be  shown  quite  fully.  Where  the  deed  contains 
any  restrictions  upon  her  power  of  disposition,  either  as  to  the 
mode  of  conveyance,  or  the  purpose  for  which  she  may  convey, 
such  restrictions  must  be  shown,  as  she  can  convey  it  only  in  the 
manner  and  for  the  purpose  specified. 

§  321.  Deed  to  husband  and  wife. — A  conveyance  to  two 
persons  who  are  husband  and  wife  at  the  time  the  property  vests 
in  them,  creates  an  estate  by  entireties.  By  reason  of  their  legal 
unity  by  marriage,  they  together  take  the  whole  estate  as  one  per- 
son. Neither  has  a  separate  estate  or  interest  in  the  land,  but 
each  has  the  whole  estate.  Upon  the  death  of  one  the  entire  estate 
and  interest  vests  in  the  other,  not  by  survivorship,  but  by  virtue 
of  a  title  that  vested  under  the  original  limitation.^  By  reason 
of  the  unity  of  husband  and  wife,  a  conveyance  or  devise  to  them 
and  to  another  vests  one  moiety  of  the  land  in  such  other,  and 
only  one  moiety  in  the  husband  and  wife  together."  A  tenancy 
by  entireties  arises  upon  the  vesting  of  any  kind  of- estate  in  hus- 

2 Jones  V.  Clifton,  101  U.  S.  225,  25  "Hamilton    v.    Hubbard,    134    Cal. 

L.  ed.  908;  Wood  v.  Wood,  83  N.  Y.  603,  65  Pac.  321,  66  Pac.  860;  Barnum 

575;  Dczendorf  v.  Humphreys,  95  Va.  v.  Le  Master,  110  Tenn.  638,  75  S.  W. 

473,  28  S.  E.  880.  1045. 

•■'  Richardson   v.   De   Giverville,    107  ■'"'  McMillan  v.  Peacock,  57  Ala.  127. 

Mo.  422.    17   S.   W.   974,  28   Am.   St.  « Thornton    v.    Thornton,    3    Rand. 

426;  Holliday  v.  Hively,   198  Pa,  St.  (Va.)    179. 

335,  47  Atl.  988;  Hackett  v.  Moxley,  ^  Johnson   v.   Hart,   6  Watts   &   S. 

68  Vt.  210,  34  Atl.  949.  (Pa.)  319,  40  Am.  Dec.  565. 


347  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    321 

band  and  ^vife,  whether  it  be  in  fee,  in  tail,  for  hfe,  or  for  years; 
whether  it  be  in  possession,  reversion,  or  remainder.  Such  estate 
may  be  created  by  devise  as  well  as  by  deed,  and  the  tide  taken 
is  always  by  purchase  and  not  by  descent.^  And  such  an  estate 
can  be  created  only  where  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife 
exists.^  Upon  the  death  of  either  during  coverture  the  survivor 
does  not  take  by  right  of  survivorship,  as  in  the  case  of  a  joint 
tenancy,  but  continues  to  hold  the  whole  by  virtue  of  the  original 
title.  Of  course  there  can  be  neither  curtesy  or  dower  in  an 
estate  held  by  the  entirety.^"  as  the  estate  vests  absolutely  in  the 
one  upon  the  death  of  the  other.  For  the  same  reason  the  home- 
stead right  which  attaches  to  the  land  during  the  life  of  the  hus- 
band does  not  survive  to  his  wife;  the  whole  estate  vests  in  her 
absolutely."  Upon  the  death  of  both  husband  and  wife  the  estate 
goes  to  the  heirs  of  the  one  dying  last;  the  heirs  of  the  first  one 
to  die  takins:  nothing:.^"  In  some  states  such  estates  have  never 
been  recognized,  even  in  the  absence  of  legislation  on  the  sub- 
ject.^^  No  estate  by  the  entirety  is  created  by  a  deed  in  partition 
which,  by  direction  of  the  coparcener,  is  made  to  himself  and 
Avife,  or  no  title  passes  by  a  partition  deed.^*  In  some  states  it  is 
held  that  the  statutes  enabling  married  women  to  hold  property  as 
if  they  were  sole  has  had  the  effect  to  abrogate  estates  by  en- 
tireties.^^ Such  statutes  do  not  affect  estates  by  the  entireties 
already  existing,  but  prevent  the  creation  of  such  estates  after- 
ward.^°  Neither  spouse  can  sever  this  title  so  as  to  defeat  or 
I)rejudice  the  right  of  survivorship  in  the  other.  Neither  can 
alone  make  a  valid  conveyance  to  a  third  person.     The  husband 

s  Jones   V.    Chandler.   40    Ind.   588;  100  N.  W.  662;  Kerner  v.  McDonald. 

French  v.  Mehan,  56  Pa.  St.  286.  60  Nebr.  663,  84  N.  W.  92,  83  Am.  St. 

^  Thornburg    v.    Wiggin,    135    Ind.  550;     Farmers'     &     Merchants'     Nat. 

178.  34  N.  E.  999,  22  L.  R.  A.  42,  41  Bank  v.  Wallace,  45  Ohio  St.  152,  12 

Am.  St.  422.  N.  E.  439. 

^^  Ames     V.     Norman,     4     Sneed.  i*  Harrison    v.    Ray,    108    N.    Car. 

(Tcnn.)  683,  70  Am.  Dec.  269.  215,  12  S.  E.  993,  11  L.  R.  A.  722,  23 

I'- Chambers  v.  Chambers,  92  Tenn.  Am.    St.   57;   Taylor   v.   Birmingham, 

707.  23  S.  W.  67.  29  Pa.  St.  306;  Yancey  v.  Radford,  86 

i--i  Baker  v.  Stewart,  40  Kans.  442,  Va.  638,  10  S.  E.  972. 

19  Pac.  904,  2  L.  R.  A.  434,  10  Am.  is  Donegan    v.    Donegan,    103    Ala. 

St.   213;   Jacobs   v.   Miller,   50   Midi.  488,  15  So.  823,  49  Am.  St.  53;  Mittel 

119,  15  N.  W.  42;  Bains  v.  Bullock,  v.  Karl,  133  111.  25,  24  N.  E.  553,  8  L. 

129  Mo.  117,  31  S.  W.  342;  Bertles  v.  R.   A.   655;    Hoffman   v.    Stigers,   28 

Nunan,  92  N.  Y.  152,  12  Abb.  N.  Cas.  Iowa  302 ;   Clark  v.  Clark,  56  N.  H. 

283,  44  Am.  Rep.  361 ;  Long  v.  Barnes,  105. 

87  N.  Car.  329.  ig  Almond  v.  Bonnell,  76  111.  536 ; 

i-nVhittlesey    v.    Fuller,    11    Conn.  Stilphen  v.  Stilphen,  65  N.  H.  126,  23 

337;  Semper  v.  Coates,  93  Minn.  76,  Atl.  79. 


§    522  TITLES    AND    AHSTKACTS  348 

may,  however,  convey  his  title  in  such  an  estate  to  his  wife 
through  a  third  person-/"  and  where  a  husband  may  convey  di- 
rectly to  his  wife,  his  deed  of  land  held  by  entirety  to  his  wife  is 
valid. ^*  A  husband  and  wife  by  their  joint  conveyance  may  de- 
stroy this  estate,  or  they  may  mortgage  the  estate  to  secure  the 
purchase-money  of  the  land,^^  or  to  secure  a  loan  to  the  husband.-*^ 
Where  the  granting  clause  in  a  deed  to  a  husband  and  wife  is 
silent  as  to  the  estate  conveyed,  but  the  deed  recites  the  payment 
of  the  consideration  by  the  wife  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
her  lands,  and  the  habendum  clause  recites,  "to  have  and  to  hold 
to  the  said  husband  and  wife  to  them,  her  heirs  and  assigns  for- 
ever," vests  in  them  the  use  and  joint  occupancy  of  the  land  for 
life  with  the  right  to  join  in  a  sale  thereof,  but  on  the  death  of 
the  wife  without  a  sale,  the  land  passes  to  her  heirs. *^  It  will  thus 
be  seen  that  the  granting  clause  and  the  habendum  may  determine 
the  nature  of  the  estate  conveyed,  and  for  this  reason  they  should 
be  set  out  with  great  particularity  where  the  deed  purports  to 
convey  to  husband  and  wife. 

§  322.  Conveyances  by  married  women. — By  the  common 
law  a  married  woman  could  not  convey  her  land  either  by  her 
separate  deed  or  by  joining  in  a  conveyance  with  her  husband. 
This  disability  was  an  incident  to  her  coverture.  But  the  course 
of  modern  legislation  has  constantly  tended  toward  giving  her 
full  control  over  her  property  without  the  assent  or  concurrence 
of  her  husband.  This  change  has  been  gradual,  extending  over 
a  series  of  years,  and  lacking  uniformity  among  the  states.  In 
some  states  the  husband's  common-law  rights  in  his  wife's  prop- 
erty has  been  substantially  abolished,  thus  giving  the  wife  full 
control  over  her  property  without  the  assent  or  concurrence  of  her 
husband.  In  others  the  common-law  rule  has  only  been  modified 
by  giving  her  the  power  to  convey  her  land  only  with  the  assent 
and  concurrence  of  her  husband  manifested  by  his  joining  with 
her  in  the  conveyance.  In  spite  of  the  influence  of  legislation  in 
this  country  common-law  doctrines,  as  to  husband  and  wife,  are 
not  yet  entirely  obsolete,  and  in  some  states  the  husband's  com- 

"  Donahue  v.  Hubbard.   154  Mass.  i^  McCoy  v.  Barns,  136  Ind.  378,  36 

537,  28  N.  E.  909,  14  L.  R.  A.  123,  26  N.  E.  134. 

Am.   St.  271  ;    Meeker  v.   Wright,  76  20  Peoples   Bldg.  &   Loan   Assn.   v. 

N.  Y.  262,  7  Abb.  N.  Cas.  297.     .  Billing,  104  Mich.  186,  62  N.  W.  373. 

isEnyeart  v.   Kepler,    118   Ind.   34,  -'i  Hudson's     Heirs     v.      Hudson's 

20  N.  E.  539,  10  Am.  St.  94.  Admr.  (Ky.  App.),  121  S.  W.  973. 


349  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    322 

mon-law  marital  rights  are  still  recognized  in  respect  to  such  of 
the  wife's  real  property  as  is  not  her  "separate  estate."" 

All  the  legislation  on  this  subject  is  in  derogation  of  the  com- 
mon law,  inasmuch  as  it  confers  a  capacity  to  contract  and  convey 
upon  persons  who  formerly  had  no  capacity  at  all;  and  therefore 
all  the  requirements  of  the  enabling  statutes,  whether  in  regard 
to  the  execution  or  acknowledgment  of  the  deed,  must  be  strictly 
complied  with.-^  It  is  only  the  precise  mode  prescribed  by  the 
statute  that  a  married  woman  can  make  a  valid  conveyance  of  her 
lands,  and  the  same  mode  may  not  apply  alike  to  all  the  deeds  in 
a  chain  of  title.  In  the  examination  of  a  title  based  on  the  deed 
of  a  married  woman  counsel  must  see  to  it  that  the  particular 
statute  governing  capacity  and  mode  of  conveyance  in  force  at 
the  time  the  deed  was  executed,  has  been  strictly  followed.  In 
view  of  the  many  radical  changes  in  the  law  respecting  convey- 
ances by  married  women,  and  the  further  fact  that  a  rigid  and 
literal  compliance  with  the  law  is  essential  to  vest  title,  greater 
vigilance  and  closer  scrutiny  on  the  part  of  counsel  is  required 
than  in  any  other  class  of  conveyances.  Different  formalities  in 
regard  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  were  requisite  at  differ- 
ent periods,  and  counsel  must  be  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  law 
applicable  to  the  particular  deed  or  deeds  at  the  time  of  execution. 

The  relation  which  a  married  woman  sustains  to  real  property 
is  an  important  factor  in  determining  her  capacity  to  sever  that 
relation,  and  the  mode  of  severance  in  case  she  has  capacity.  She 
may  appear  as  having  an  interest  in  community  property ;  as  hav- 
ing an  interest  in  the  homestead ;  as  having  an  interest  in  an  estate 
by  entireties ;  as  having  a  dower  or  statutory  interest ;  as  having 
an  equitable  or  statutory  separate  estate ;  or  as  having  a  general 
estate.  The  statutes  should  always  be  consulted  regarding  ca- 
pacity and  mode  of  disposition  in  the  particular  relation  the  mar- 
ried woman  sustains  to  the  property  in  question. 

A  provision  requiring  the  joinder  of  the  husband  in  a  deed  by 
the  wife  of  her  real  estate  is  generally  met  by  his  expressing  his 
assent  thereto  under  his  hand  and  seal  without  joining  in  the 
granting  clause  of  the  deed.^*  There  are  statutes  in  some  states 
providing  for  the  execution,  in  certain  cases,  of  a  separate  deed 

-2  Brasfield   v.   Brasfield,   96   Tenn.  23  Qoo^j   y.   Zercher,    12   Ohio   364; 

580,  36  S.  W.  384 ;  Dietrich  v.  Hutch-  Glidden  v.  Strupler,  52  Pa.  St.  400. 

inson.  72>  Vt.  134,  50  Atl.  810,  87  Am.  -^  Schley   v.    Pullman    Car    Co.,   25 

St.  698.  Fed.  890. 


§    323  TITLES    AND    AUSTKACTS  350 

by  a  married  woman,  as  in  case  her  husband  is  insane,  or  has 
deserted  her,  or  is  Hving  separate  from  her ;  but  where  the  stat- 
ute enabhng  a  married  woman  to  convey  her  property  by  deed 
provides  for  the  joinder  of  her  husl)and  in  her  deed  of  convey- 
ance, her  separate  deed  is  void  though  her  husband  be  insane,  or 
has  deserted  her,  or  is  Hving  separate  from  her,  unless  special  ex- 
ceptions be  made  for  these  cases."'"'  Where  a  married  woman  has 
capacity  to  convey  her  separate  estate  she  may  do  so  without 
specially  referring  to  the  instrument  giving  her  the  estate, "°  nor 
need  the  trustee  join  to  render  the  conveyance  valid  generally  in 
equity.^^ 

A  married  woman  is  not,  as  a  general  rule,  liable  on  her  cov- 
enants in  a  deed  made  jointly  by  herself  and  husband,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute  imposing  such  liability. ^^  This  rule  has  been 
affirmed  by  statute  in  some  states,  while  in  others,  under  statutes 
giving  her  the  power  to  contract  with  reference  to  her  separate 
estate  as  if  she  were  sole,  she  has  been  held  liable  upon  her 
covenants  for  title,  and  in  still  other  states  there  are  statutes  which 
provide  in  terms  that  she  shall  be  so  liable.  In  several  states  it 
has  been  held  that  a  married  woman  can  not  set  up  a  subsequently- 
acquired  title  against  her  grantee,  even  though  she  can  not  be  held 
liable  on  her  covenants.^'' 

Upon  the  principle  that  a  grantor  shall  not,  in  equity,  be  per- 
mitted to  repudiate  his  own  deed,  a  married  woman  is  as  effec- 
tually estopped  by  her  deed  without  covenants  as  if  the  deed  con- 
tained them.^°  She  is  estopped  from  setting  up  her  own  title 
existing  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance;  otherwise,  the  statutes 
permitting  her  to  convey  would  be  rendered  nugatory.^^ 

§  323.  Conveyance  between  husband  and  wife. — A  con- 
veyance by  the  husband  to  the  wife  or  by  the  wife  to  the  hus- 
band is  void  at  common  law  and  passes  no  title,  because  the  legal 
existence  of  the  wife  is  merged  in  the  husband.^'     The  statutes 

2=  Richards    v.    McClelland,   29   Pa.  29  Knight  v.  Thayer,  125  Mass.  25. 

St.  385.  But  see  Farley  v.  Eller,  29  Ind.  322. 

2«  Porchcr  v.  Daniel,   12  Rich.   Eq.  "-o  Graham  v.  Meek.  1  Ore.  325. 

(S.  Car.)   349.  •''i  King   v.    Rea,   56   Ind.    1;    Wad- 

27Rvland  V.  Banks,   151   Mo.   1,  51  Icigh  v.  Glines,  6  N.  H.   17,  23  Am. 

S.  W.  720.  Dec.  705:   Summerfield  v.  White,  54 

28  Menard   v.    Campbell,    180   Mich.  W.  Va.  311,  46  S.  E.  154. 

583.  147  N.  W.  556,  Ann.  Cas.  1916A,  •'2  Smith  v.  Seiberling,  35  Fed.  677 ; 

802n.  Kelley  v.  Dearman,  65  W.  Va.  49,  63 

S.  E.  693. 


351  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    323 

and  constitutional  provisions  empowering  a  married  woman  to 
convey  as  if  she  were  unmarried  are  held  to  remove  her  disability 
and  empower  her  to  convey  directly  to  her  husband,  and  the  hus- 
band to  convey  directly  to  her.^^  If  the  wife  is  under  disability 
to  convey  her  lands  except  by  a  deed  in  which  her  husband  joins, 
she  can  not  convey  to  him  directly,  but  only  through  a  third  per- 
son, though  in  the  same  state  the  husband  may  convey  directly 
to  his  wife.^*  The  common-law  disability  of  husband  and  wife 
to  convey  to  each  other  directly  is  obviated  by  the  intervention 
of  a  third  person  through  whom  the  conveyance  is  made.  The 
disability  of  husband  and  wife  to  convey  the  one  to  the  other,  has, 
however,  been  expressly  removed  by  statute  in  some  states.  But 
even  in  the  absence  of  such  a  statute,  such  a  deed  will  be  upheld  in 
equity,  especially  in  case  of  a  voluntary  settlement  upon  the  wife, 
when  the  rights  of  creditors  or  other  third  parties  are  not  in  any 
way  interfered  with.^^  When  the  fact  that  such  conveyance  is 
intended  as  a  settlement  is  declared  in  the  deed,  or  otherwise 
clearly  established,  it  will  be  sustained  against  the  claims  of 
creditors,  if  it  does  not  deprive  them  of  any  existing  rights.^" 

A  conveyance  directly  by  the  husband  to  the  wife  creates  in  her 
a  separate  estate  vesting  in  her  the  entire  interest,  without  the 
use  of  technical  words  necessary  to  create  a  separate  estate  in 
conveyances  to  her  from  persons  other  than  the  husband. ^^  A 
deed  from  the  wife  to  the  husband  may  be  valid  in  equity  where 
a  consideration  has  been  paid,  or  the  husband  is  entitled  to  equita- 
ble relief  for  improvements  made  by  him  upon  his  wife's  land.'^ 

Where  marriage  would  affect  the  grantor's  title  the  facts  must 
be  ascertained  by  inquiries  dehors  the  record,  and  should  be  em- 
bodied in  an  affidavit  to  be  used  in  verifying  the  abstract.  Con- 
ve3'ances  of  the  character  under  discussion  must  be  closely  scruti- 
nized by  the  abstracter  as  well  as  by  counsel  in  his  examination 
of  the  title  upon  which  they  depend.  Local  statutes  must  be  con- 
sulted in  each  instance  to  ascertain  the  legal  effect  of  the  trans- 

■^3  Wells  V.  Caywoocl,  3  Colo.  487;  sc  Moore  v.  Page,  111  U.  S.  117,  4 

Robertson  v.  Robertson.  25  Iowa  350 ;  S.  Ct.  388,  28  L.  ed.  2,7Z. 

Allen  V.  Hooper,  50  Maine  371 ;  Ran-  3^  Small  v.   Field,   102  Mo.   104.   14 

som  V.  Ransom,  30  Mich.  328.  S.  W.  815;  Pitts  v.  Sheriff.  108  Mo. 

3*  Rico    V.    Branden.stein,    98    Cal.  110,  18  S.  W.  1071. 

465,  2>Z  Pac.  480,  20  L.  R.  A.  702,  35  ss  Brooks    v.    Kearns,    86    111.    547; 

Am.  St.  192.  Winans  v.  Peebles,  32  N.  Y.  423. 

35  Jones  V.  Clifton,   101   U.  S.  225, 
25  L.  ed.  908. 


§    324  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  352 

action,  and  a  consideration  should  be  made  of  such  matters  as, 
for  example,  which  is  grantor,  the  husband  or  the  wife?  What 
is  the  nature  of  the  estate  or  interest  sought  to  be  disposed  of  ?  Is 
it  separate  projierty  or  is  it  some  interest  or  estate  growing  out  of 
the  marriage  relation,  like  curtesy  or  dower?  Is  it  a  homestead 
right  ?  Or,  is  a  joint  conveyance  of  husband  and  wife  ordinarily, 
in  the  particular  jurisdiction,  required? 

§  324.  Acknowledgment  by  married  women, — In  treating 
the  subject  of  acknowledgments  in  a  former  chapter  we  made 
brief  mention  of  acknowledgments  by  married  women.  The 
subject  is  deemed  of  such  importance  as  to  warrant  further  treat- 
ment here.  In  the  first  place  it  is  important  as  fixing  the  date  of 
execution,  which  is  a  factor  in  determining  the  validity  of  such 
a  deed.  Again,  the  acknowledgment  properly  made  is  necessary, 
not  only  as  an  authentication  of  the  deed  for  record,  but  as  a  part 
of  the  execution  of  the  deed  itself,  without  which  it  would  be  in- 
efifectual  to  convey  title.  Hence  the  certificate  of  acknowledg- 
ment of  a  deed  executed  by  a  married  woman  requires  the  closest 
scrutiny  on  the  part  of  both  abstracter  and  counsel.  What  would 
be  considered  a  sufficient  acknowledgment  of  her  deed  to-day 
would  most  likely  fall  short  of  the  requirement  at  the  date  of  the 
attempted  acknowledgment.  Statutes  requiring  acknowledgments 
of  married  women  to  be  taken  upon  a  separate  examination  and 
explanation  of  the  deed  have  been  enacted  for  their  protection 
against  the  undue  influence  of  their  husbands.  In  a  conveyance  of 
land  by  a  married  woman  her  acknowledgment,  under  such  stat- 
utes, is  an  essential  part  of  the  execution;  and  unless  her  deed  is 
acknowledged  substantially  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  statute,  it 
is  absolutely  void.^''  In  the  appendix  of  this  work  will  be 
found  a  digest  of  the  present  statutes  relating  to  the  execution 
and  acknowledgment  of  instruments  of  conveyance,  but  if  it 
becomes  important  to  know  if  the  acknowledgment  of  a  married 
woman  was  made  in  compliance  with  a  statute  in  force  at  a  par- 
ticular date  in  the  past,  the  statute  in  force  at  such  time  must  be 
consulted.  The  provision  of  law,  that  a  married  woman  in  mak- 
ing a  conveyance  of  her  land  should  acknowledge  the  deed  upon 
a  private  examination  apart  from  her  husband,  was  designed  as 

39Shryock  v.  Cannon.  39  Ark.  434;     Todd,  41   Md.  633,  20  Am.  Rep.  76;. 
Muir  V.  Gallowav,  61  Cal.  498;' Cole-     Allen  v.  Lenoir,  53  Miss.  321. 
man  v.  Billings,  89  111.  183;  Grove  v. 


1 


353  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    324 

a  substitute  for  the  proceeding  at  common  law  by  fine  and  re- 
covery, whereby  the  rights  of  the  wife,  on  the  one  hand,  should 
be  guarded,  and  on  the  other  a  sure,  indefeasible  transfer  of  her 
right  secured.*'^ 

Her  examination  must  be  personal ;  nor  can  she  make  the  ac- 
knowledgment through  an  attorney.*^  The  certificate  must  de- 
clare her  identity  in  the  same  manner  as  if  she  were  sole."*" 
She  need  not  acknowledge  at  the  same  time  or  place,  or 
before  the  same  officer  taking  her  husband's  acknowledgment. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  that  their  acknowledgments  be  certified  by  a 
single  certificate,*^  It  must  clearly  appear  from  the  certificate 
that  the  married  w^oman  was  examined  separately  and  apart  from 
her  husband,  and  an  examination  "separate  and  apart"  from  her 
husband  means  that  it  took  place  out  of  his  presence.  But  if  the 
examination  is  "apart"  it  is  "separate,"  the  words  having  sub- 
stantially the  same  meaning,  and,  therefore,  a  certificate  is  not 
rendered  invalid  by  the  omission  of  one  of  these  words.*"*  Com- 
pliance with  the  requirement  of  a  separate  examination  from  the 
husband  must  be  substantially  shown  by  the  certificate.*^  A  cer- 
tificate of  separate  examination  which  fails  to  show  that  the  deed 
was  "fully  explained"  or  "contents  made  known,"  as  provided 
by  statute,  is  fatally  defective.**'  The  words  "willingly  executed 
the  same,"  or  words  of  equivalent  import,  are  essential  to  the 
validity  of  a  certificate  when  required  by  statute.*^  The  omission 
of  the  words  "freely"  and  "voluntarily"  is  immaterial  when  the 
certificate  shows  that  she  acknowledged  that  she  executed  the 
deed  "without  any  fear,  threats,  or  compulsion."*^  The  words 
"for  the  purposes  therein  expressed"are  material  when  prescribed 
by  statute.*^  The  requirement  may,  however,  be  satisfied  by  the 
use  of  equivalent  words. ^°  Under  a  statute  providing,  as  a  part 
of  the  certificate,  that  she  "does  not  wish  to  retract"  her  execu- 
tion of  the  conveyance,  the  omission  of  this  statement  makes  the 

40  Kerr  v.  Russell,  69  111.  666,  18  Hockman  v.  McClannahan,  87  Va.  33, 
Am.  Rep.  634.  12  S.  E.  230. 

41  Wambole  v.  Foote,  2  Dak.  1,  2  N.  ^o  Roney  v.  Moss,  76  Ala.  491 ; 
W.  239.  Hutchinson    v.    Ainsworth,    63    Cal. 

42  Lindley  v.  Smith,  46  111.  523.  286. 

43Lineberger    v.    Tidwell,    104    N.  ^t  Laughlin  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Fream, 

Car.  506,  10  S.  E.  758.  14  W.  Va.  322. 

"  Belo  V.  Mayes,  79  Mo.  67.  4s  Allen  v.  Lenoir,  53  Miss.  321. 

45  Tiffin   V.    Siiawhan,   43   Ohio   St.  •*"  Shryock  v.  Cannon,  39  Ark.  434. 

178.  1  N.  E.  581;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  -'O  Davis      v.      Bogle,      11      Heisk. 

Paul,  75  Va.  594,  40  Am.   Rep.  740;  (Tenn.)  315. 

23 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


v^    325  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  .  354 

certificate  fatally  defective,  unless  words  of  equivalent  import  are 
used.^^ 

§  325.  Release  of  dower. — It  is  generally  considered  that 
the  right  of  dower,  inchoate  or  consummate,  is  an  incumbrance, 
and  care  should  be  exercised  to  see  that  it  is  effectively  released. 
This  is  usually  accomplished  only  by  a  writing  under  seal,  duly 
acknowledged.'^^  Dower  may  also  be  released  by  the  wife's  quit- 
claim deed  executed  subsequent  to  the  separate  deed  of  her  hus- 
band."'^ But  her  sole  and  separate  deed,  made  after  a  deed  by  her 
husband,  will  not  generally  release  her  right,  unless  such  a  deed 
is  expressly  authorized  by  statute.''*  Generally  where  a  wife 
joins  her  husband  in  a  deed  by  signing  it,  it  will  operate  as  a  valid 
relinquishment  of  her  dower,  although  the  body  of  the  deed  does 
not  describe  her  as  grantor,  or  name  her  or  her  dower.^^  When 
the  wife's  name  nowhere  appears  in  the  body  of  the  instrument, 
her  signature  and  acknowledgment  of  the  deed  are  sufficient  to 
bar  her  dower  right. ^° 

A  husband's  conveyance,  not  joined  in  by  the  wife,  is  valid,  but 
it  has  no  effect  on  the  wife's  contingent  right  of  dower.^^  This  is 
generally  true  also  of  the  statutory  substitute  for  dower  in  those 
states  where  dower  has  been  abolished  or  substantially  modified. 
But  where  the  husband  alone  makes  a  dedication  by  deed,  the  wife 
is  not  dowable  in  the  land. '^  In  a  few  states,  though  provision  is 
made  for  a  wife  if  she  survive  her  husband,  he  may  transfer  his 
land  during  his  life  without  her  concurrence  and  it  is  relieved 
from  all  claims  by  her,  provided  the  transaction  is  not  merely  col- 
orable and  a  fraud  on  her.'^"  In  other  states  a  non-resident  wife 
need  not  join  in  the  husband's  conveyance,  as  she  is  entitled  to 
dower  only  in  the  lands  of  which  he  died  seised.*'"  In  still  other 
states,  while  a  resident  married  man  whose  wife  is  not,  and  never 

••1  In  re  Bateman,  11  R.  I.  585.  503.  47  S.  E.  19,  65  L.  R.  A.  682,  101 

22  Jarrcll  v.  French,  43  W.  Va.  456,  Am.  St.  877. 

27  S.  E.  263.  58  Duncan  v.  Terre  Haute,  85   Ind. 

r.3  Fowler    v.    Chadima.    134    Iowa  104. 

210.  Ill   N.  W.  808,  120  Am.  St.  433,  ■-«  Phillips  v.  Phillips,  30  Colo.  516. 

13  Ann.  Cas.  141.  71   Pac.  363:   Flowers  v.  Flowers,  89 

''*  So      authorized      in      Alahama,  Ga.  632,  15  S.  E.  834,  18  L.  R.  A.  75 ; 

Maine,   Massachusetts  and   Micliigan.  Thayer  v.  Thayer,  14  Vt.  107,  39  Am. 

5=  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor-  Dec.  211. 

rison,  195  111.  271,  63  N.  E.  96.  '>»  Ligare  v.  Semple,  32  Mich.  438; 

S6  Peter  v.  Byrne.   175  Mo.  233,  75  .Atkins  v.  Atkins,  18  Nebr.  474.  25  N. 

S.  W.  433,  97  Am.  St.  576.  W.  724 ;   Bennett  v.  Harms,  51  Wis 


"  Rodman  v.  Robinson,  134  N.  Car.    251,  8  N.  W.  222. 


1 


355  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    325 

has  been,  a  resident  of  the  state,  may  convey  his  land  without  her 
concurrence,  it  is  important  for  her  to  join  in  his  conveyance  if 
she  has  been  at  any  time  a  resident  of  the  state.*^^ 

While  the  wife's  inchoate  right  of  dower  or  statutory  interest 
in  her  husband's  land  is  an  interest  v/hich  may  be  released,  it  is 
held  not  subject  to  grant  or  assignment,  nor  is  it  in  any  sense  an 
interest  in  real  estate.  It  is  only  a  right  incident  to  the  estate  of 
her  husband  in  land.*'-  It  is  a  right  which  may  be  released,  relin- 
quished, or  barred,  but  until  it  becomes  consummate  by  the  death 
of  the  husband,  it  can  not  be  bargained,  sold,  or  conveyed  in  the 
ordinary  sense.  While,  therefore,  dower  is  not  property,  strictly 
speaking,  it  has  nevertheless  generally  been  considered  such  an 
interest  as  to  require,  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  some  instrument 
in  writing  for  its  release.*'^  And,  generally  speaking,  if  the  writ- 
ing is  anything  short  of  a  deed  properly  executed  it  will  not  bar 
her  right. 

Where  the  statute  requires  her  acknowledgment,  or  her  separ- 
ate examination,  these  requirements  must  be  complied  with.*'*  It 
is  sometimes  held  that  the  deed  should  expressly  state  that  she 
executes  it  for  the  purpose  of  releasing  dower.*'^  Where  the  re- 
lease is  by  separate  instrument  the  abstract  should  contain  its  im- 
portant recitals,  thus : 


Ida  C.  Grove 

to 

Samuel   Soloman. 


Release  of  Dower. 
Dated  Aug.  1,  1902. 
Recorded  Aug.  20,   1902. 
Vol.  25,  page  200. 
Consideration,  $1,000. 


Releases  unto  second  party  all  her  right,  title,  claim  or  demand 
of  or  to  dower  which  she  has  or  could  claim  in  and  to  certain  real 
estate  described  in  a  conveyance  by  "my  husband."  William 
Grove,  to  said  second  party,  and  recorded  in  Vol.  5,  page  25  of 
the  deed  records  of  Preble  County,  Ohio.  Acknowledged  Aug. 
1,  1902. 

«i  Kennedy    v.    Haskell,    67    Kans.  Am.    Dec.    351 ;    Davis    v.    Davis    61 

612,  IZ  Pac.  913.  Maine  395. 

62Haggerty    v.    Wagner,    148    Ind.  •'*  Maynard  v.  Davis,  127  Mich.  571, 

625,  48  N.  E.  366,  39  L.  R.  A.  384;  86  N.  W.  1051;  Hand  v.  Weidner,  151 

Hoy  V.  Varner,  100  Va.  600,  42  S.  E.  Pa.  St.  362,  25  Atl.  38. 

690.  c^Lothrop  v.  Foster,  51  Maine  367; 

•53  Carnall  v.  Wilson,  21  Ark.  62,  76  Carter  v.  Goodin,  3  Ohio  St.  75. 


§  326  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  356 

For  convenience  of  council,  this  synopsis  should  immediately 
follow  that  of  the  husband's  deed  in  the  abstract. 

Where  the  release  of  dower  is  in  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
wife  this  should  be  noted  in  the  abstract  in  connection  with  the 
fact  of  acknowledgment. 

§  326.  Conveyances  creating  estates  in  common  and  in 
joint  tenancy. — By  the  common  law,  an  estate  acquired  in  any 
way  except  by  inheritance,  by  two  or  more  persons  not  husband 
and  wife,  created  a  join  tenancy  in  them,  the  principal  incident 
of  which  is  the  right  of  survivorship,  by  which  the  entire  tenancy, 
on  the  decease  of  one  tenant,  remains  to  the  survivors,  and  ul- 
timately to  the  last  surivor.*^"  Until  the  policy  of  the  law  was 
changed  by  statute,  it  was  essential  to  the  creation  of  an  estate  in 
common  that  there  should  be  something  to  show  an  intent  that 
the  grantees  or  devisees  should  hold  by  several  and  distinct  titles, 
or  that,  instead  of  survivorship  to  one,  there  should  be  an  inheri- 
tance from  both  or  all."^ 

In  recent  times  the  doctrine  of  survivorship,  except  in  a  few 
cases,  that  of  a  grant  or  devise  to  trustees  being  the  principal,  is 
generally  declared  to  be  contrary  to  public  policy.  Title  by  joint 
tenancy  has  been  destroyed  by  legislation  except  in  a  few  in- 
stances, and  now,  with  these  exceptions,  the  law  itself  never  cre- 
ates a  joint  tenancy.  It  never  comes  through  the  steps  of  descent 
or  distribution,'"'^  But  where  an  estate  in  joint  tenancy  exists, 
upon  the  death  of  one  joint  tenant,  the  joint  estate  remains  un- 
impaired with  the  survivors,  and  ultimately  with  the  last  survivor, 
instead  of  passing  to  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  tenant. 

It  is  provided  by  statute  in  some  states  that  heirs  shall  take  as 
parceners,  thereby  creating  a  tenancy  in  coparcenary,  which  lacks 
the  chief  characteristic  of  a  joint  tenancy,  the  right  of  survivor- 
ship. The  coparceners  are  not  seised,  as  are  joint  tenants,  of  the 
entirety  of  the  estate,  but  only  of  undivided  shares  which  descend 
to  the  heirs  of  the  intestate  tenant.*^''  In  nearly  all  the  states  the 
common  law  concerning  estates  in  joint  tenancy  continued  until 
the  rule  was  changed  by  statute.     In  a  few  states,  however,  the 

68  Simons  v.  McLain,  51  Kans.  153,  ^-^  Stetson  v.  Eastman,  84  Maine 
32  Pac.  919.  366,  24  Atl.  868. 

''^  Webster  v.  Vandeventer,  6  Grav        (^'•>  1  Preston  Estates  138. 
(Mass.)   428;   Gilbert  v.  Richards,  7 
Vt.  203. 


I 


357  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    326 

judiciary,  regarding  the  policy  of  the  law  as  opposed  to  the  no- 
tion of  survivorship,  declared  that  estates  in  joint  tenancy  did 
not  exist.'"  In  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Delaware,  Idaho,  Illinois,  In- 
diana. Iowa,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Maryland,  Michigan,  Minne- 
sota, Missouri,  Mississippi,  Montana,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire, 
New  Jersey,  New  Mexico,  New  York,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma, 
Rhode  Island,  South  Dakota,  Vermont  and  Wisconsin,  joint 
tenancies  are  by  statute  turned  into  tenancies  in  common,  unless 
the  instrument  creating  the  estate  expressly  states  that  it  is  to  be 
held  in  joint  tenancy;  or  unless  it  manifestly  appears  from  the 
tenor  of  the  instrument  that  it  was  intended  to  create  a  joint 
tenancy.  In  Alabama,  Arizona,  Colorado,  Florida,  Illinois,  Kan- 
sas, Kentucky,  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  Texas,  Virginia,  Washington,  and  West  Virginia,  sur- 
vivorship is  destroyed  by  a  declaration  in  the  statute  that  a  joint 
tenancy  is  severed  by  the  death  of  one  of  the  joint  tenants,  where- 
upon the  estate  descends  or  vests  and  is  subject  to  debts,  curtesy, 
dower,  or  distribution,  as  if  it  were  held  in  common.'^  In  Georgia 
and  Oregon  the  statutes  abolish  joint  tenancy  in  general  terms. 

In  many  of  these  states,  the  statutes  converting  joint  tenancies 
into  tenancies  in  common,  do  not  apply  in  case  of  conveyances  to 
trustees,  who  continue  to  hold  the  legal  estate  in  joint  tenancy; 
nor  do  they  apply  in  case  of  estates  held  by  executors.  In  several 
states  the  statutes  do  not  apply  to  conveyances  in  mortgage,  or  to 
conveyances  to  husband  and  wife,  or  in  case  of  property  held  in 
partnership,  or  in  case  of  property  acquired  as  community  prop- 
erty. Though  all  the  joint  tenants  are  for  some  purposes  re- 
garded as  composing  a  single  owner,  each  nevertheless  has  such 
a  share  that  will  entitle  him  to  convey  it.  But  his  conveyance  of 
his  entire  interest  to  a  stranger  severs  the  joint  tenancy  and  it 
thereafter  becomes  a  tenancy  in  common,  so  far  as  his  grantee  is 
concerned.  In  thus  conveying  to  a  stranger  a  joint  tenant  con- 
veys in  the  ordinary  manner  and  with  the  usual  words  of  limita- 
tion of  a  fee  where  necessary,  but  in  conveying  to  a  co-tenant  he 
conveys  by  release,  in  which  case  words  of  inheritance  are  not 
required  to  pass  a  fee  even  where  they  are  required  in  ordinary 

,'°  Whittlesey    v.    Fuller,    11    Conn.  Simons  v.  McLain,  51   Kans.   153,  32 

337 ;  Sergeant  v.  Steinberger,  2  Ohio  Pac.  919 ;  Rowland  v.  Rowland.  93  N. 

305.  15  Am.  Dec.  553.  Car.  214;  Jones  v.  Cable.  114  Pa.  St. 

/I  Parsons    v.    Boyd,    20   Ala.    112;  586,  7  Atl.  791;  Varn  v.  Varn,  32  S. 

Mette  V.  Feltgen  (111.),  27  N.  E.  911 ;  Car.  11,  10  S.  E.  829. 


§    327  TITLES    AND    AHSTRVCTS  358 

conveyances/"  Where  the  tenancy  is  in  common,  one  such  tenant 
may  convey  his  own  undivided  interest,  and  his  grantee  will  be- 
come a  tenant  in  common  with  the  remaining  tenants." 

Joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common  should  covenant  sever- 
ally.'* and  the  covenants  of  each  should  be  extended  no  further 
than  the  undivided  share  of  each,  as  each  is  bound  by  it  only  to 
the  extent  of  his  interest/^ 

§  327.  Voluntary  partition  deeds. — The  usual  mode  of 
effecting  a  vc^luntary  partition  of  land  held  in  common  is  for  each 
co-tenant  to  take  a  conveyance  from  all  the  other  part  owners  of 
the  part  of  the  land  which  all  had  agreed  he  should  receive  as  his 
share  of  the  common  or  joint  property.  All  the  deeds  are  con- 
strued together  as  one  instrument.  A  partition  may  also  be  ef- 
fected by  a  conveyance  by  all  the  co-tenants  to  a  third  person,  fol- 
lowed by  conveyances  by  the  latter  to  the  several  co-tenants  of  the 
specific  parts  which  they  have  agreed  among  themselves  to  accept 
as  their  shares. 

After  partition  of  land  has  been  made  among  tenants  in  com- 
mon, each  owns  in  severalty  an  interest  equal  to  that  which  he 
before  held  in  common.  The  partition  does  not  transfer  the  title 
of  the  parties  so  much  as  it  assigns  or  apportions  to  each  his  share 
in  severalty  in  the  land.^"  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  such  par- 
tition, or  agreement  for  partition,  need  not  be  evidenced  by  deed, 
or  even  by  a  writing."  But  the  better  opinion  in  reason  and  in 
law  seems  to  be  that  the  change  in  ownership  involved  in  partition 
is  within  the  statute  of  frauds  and  required  to  be  in  writing.^^ 

In  many  states,  however,  a  partition  by  mutual  agreement  may 
be  by  parol,  followed  by  possession  by  the  several  tenants  respec- 
tively of  the  portions  assigned  to  them.^'* 

The  rule  generally  prevailing  is  that  there  is  no  implied  war- 
ranty of  title  in  voluntary  partition  deeds,**"  though  an  express 

72  Co.  Litt.  273b.  7s  Berry  v.  Seawall,  65  Fed.  742,  13 

"3  Fleming    v.    Katahdin    Pulp    &c.  C    C.    A.    101 ;    Woodhull    v.    Long- 
Co.,  93  Maine  110,  44  Atl.  378;  Ban-  street,  18  N.  J.  L.  405. 
zer  V.  Banzer,  156  N.  Y.  429,  51  N.  E.  "  Byers  v.   Byers,   183  Pa.  509,  38 
291.  Atl.  1027,  39  L.  R.  A.  537,  63  Am.  St. 

'^*  Coe  V.  Harahan,  8  Gray  (Mass.)  765. 

198.  **<>  Dawson    v.    Lawrence,    13    Ohio 

7''' Coster    V.    Monroe    Mfg.    Co.,    1  543,  42  Am.   Dec.   210;    Beardsley  v. 

Gr.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  467.  Knight,  10  Vt.  185,  33  Am.  Dec.  193; 

7fi  Moore  v.  Kerr,  46  Ind.  468.  Roundtree  v.  Denson,  59  Wis.  522,  18 

77  Mellon  V.  Reed,  114  Pa.  St.  647,  N.  W.  518. 
8  Atl.  227. 


/ 


359  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    328 

warranty  in  such  deeds  is  binding  equally  with  a  covenant  of 
warranty  in  other  conveyances.^^ 

Where  the  parties  to  a  partition  deed  derive  their  title  by 
descent,  the  instrument  should  recite  the  facts  upon  which  heir- 
ship is  based.  This  recital  should  be  included  in  the  abstract,  to- 
gether with  all  other  material  matters  and  a  minute  description 
of  the  method  of  division.  The  synopsis  may  be  in  form  similar 
to  the  following: 


James  Frable, 

to  and  with 

John  Frable. 


Partition  deed. 
Dated  May  1,  1914. 
'  Recorded  May  20,  1914. 

Vol.  25,  page  150. 


Recites  that  said  parties  are  now  seised  by  right  of  inheritance 
as  the  heirs  and  only  heirs  of  Lee  Frable,  deceased,  of  the  N. 
E.  14  and  the  S.  E.  34  of  the  N.  W.>4  of  Sec.  6,  Tp.  25  N.  R.  8  E., 
in  Grant  county,  state  of  Ind.,  and  have  agreed  to  make  partition 
thereof  between  them  by  James  Frable  taking  the  said  N.  E.  34 
and  the  said  John  Frable  taking  the  said  S.  E.  34  of  said  N.  W.  ^4 
of  said  Sec.  Tp.  &  R.,  so  that  their  respective  portions  may  hence- 
forth be  held  in  severalty.  And  the  said  James  Frable  gives, 
grants,  sets  over,  releases  and  confirms  to  said  John  Frable  the 
S.  E.  34  of  said  described  %  Sec.  to  have  and  to  hold  in  severalty, 
as  his  full  share.  And  John  Frable  gives,  grants,  etc.,  to  James 
Frable,  the  S.  E.  ^4  o^  said  described  ^  Sec.  to  have,  etc.  Each 
of  said  parties  warrants  to  the  other,  his  heirs  and  assigns  the 
quiet  and  peaceful  enjoyment  of  the  parcel  allotted  as  their  re- 
spective shares  against  all  lawful  claimants  or  claims  from  and 
under  them  respectively  and  their  respective  heirs,  assigns  and 
personal  representatives.  Signed  and  acknowledged  by  both 
parties  May  1,  1914. 

§  328.  Conveyances  to  and  by  partnerships. — Real  estate 
held  by  persons  constituting  a  firm  is  held  by  them  as  tenants  in 
common,  though  such  title  may  be  subject  to  partnership  equi- 
ties.^^     Real  estate  becomes  partnership  assets  when  the  title  to 

^^  Gittings  V.  Worthington,  67  Md.  355 ;  Murray  Ferris  &  Co.  v.   Black- 

139,  9  Atl.  228.  ledge,  71  N.  Car.  492 ;  Morse  v.  Car- 

**2  Blanchard  v.  Floyd,  93  Ala.  53,  9  penter,  19  Vt.  613. 
So.  418;  McCauley  v.  Fulton,  44  Cal. 


§    328  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  360 

it,  though  nominally  in  two  or  more  persons,  is  equitably  merged 
in  the  joint  ownership  of  a  firm/'^ 

A  conveyance  to  two  persons,  their  heirs  and  assigns,  prima 
facie  vests  the  title  in  them  as  tenants  in  common,  though  they 
may  be  partners;  and  on  the  death  of  one  of  them  his  interest 
descends  to  his  heirs,  and  is  not  subject  to  sale  and  conveyance  by 
the  surviving  partner.^*  Some  courts  have  taken  the  distinction 
that  a  deed  to  a  partnership  by  the  partnership  name  a4one  does 
not  pass  the  legal  title  to  the  land,  but  only  an  equitable  title.^^ 
But  by  implication  the  deed  vests  in  the  members  of  the  firm  the 
power  to- convey.^*^  But  one  partner  or  member  of  a  firm  has  no 
implied  authority  to  execute  a  deed  binding  upon  the  other  mem- 
bers.®^ A  joint  deed  by  individual  partners  in  whom  the  legal  title 
is  vested  is  not  always  necessary  to  convey  the  firm  title.  One 
partner  executing  a  deed  in  behalf  of  the  firm  binds  his  co-part- 
ners, if  there  be  either  a  previous  parol  authority  or  a  subsequent 
parol  adoption  of  his  act.^^  A  partner  holding  the  legal  title  to 
land  for  the  firm  has  the  same  power  over  it  as  over  firm  per- 
sonalty, and  his  conveyance  for  firm  purposes  passes  the  title  free 
of  the  firm's  equities.^'' 

A  deed  to  a  partnership  should  not  generally  be  made  in  the 
firm  name,  but  to  the  individual  partners  jointly  as  tenants  in 
common.    If  a  deed  be  made  to  a  partnership  designated  as  "A. 

B.  &  Co.,"  the  title  will  pass  to  A.  B.  alone."**  But  the  legal  title 
to  land  bought  by  a  firm,  may  l3e  conveyed  in  trust  to  one  of  the 
members. °^  The  widow  of  a  deceased  partner  has  her  dower  only 
after  the  debts  of  the  firm  have  been  paid,  and  each  surviving 
partner  has  received  his  full  interest  on  winding  up  the  affairs  of 
the  firm.  When  such  debts  and  partner's  interests  are  adjusted, 
the  surplus  real  estate,  if  any,  will  descend  as  real  estate,  and  not 
as  personal  estate. 

''3  Sikes  V.  Work,  6  Gray   (Mass.)         ^^  McGahan  v.   National  Bank,   156 

433.  U.  S.  218,  15  Sup.  Ct.  347,  39  L.  cd. 

«*  Southern  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  ?Ic-n-  403. 
shaw,  89  Ala.  448,  7  So.  760.  ««  McGahan  v.  National  Bank,   156 

^•■Perciful   v.    Piatt,    36   Ark.   456;  U.  S.  218,  15  Sup.  Ct.  347,  39  L.  ed. 

Townshend  v.  Goodfellow,  40  Minn.  403. 

312,  41  N.  W.  1056,  3  L.  R.  A.  739,  12         -'o  Beaman    v.    Whitney.    20    Maine 

Am.  St.  736.  413 ;  Arthur  v.  Weston.  22  Mo-.  378. 

«"  Dunlap  V.  Green,  60  Fed.  242,  8         '■'^  Allison  v.  Perry,  130  111.  9,  22  N. 

C.  C.  A.  600.  .  E.  492. 
''■  Skinner  v.  Davton.  19  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  513,  10  Am.  Dec.  286. 


361  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    329 

A  deed  by  a  partnership  should  be  signed  by  the  individual 
members  of  the  firm.  One  partner  has  no  right  to  execute  a  con- 
veyance in  the  name  of  the  partnership  unless  the  other  partners 
are  standing  by  and  give  their  consent  to  confer  power  upon  him 
to  convey  by  an  instrument  under  seal.  In  such  case  the  matter 
is  left  open  for  proof.^" 

As  a  general  rule  the  same  formalities  are  required  in  the  con- 
veyance of  partnership  real  estate  as  that  of  individuals.^^  The 
certificate  of  acknowledgment  of  a  deed  by  a  firm,  in  the  firm 
name,  should  show  by  which  member  of  the  firm  the  signature 
was  made  and  acknowledged.  An  acknowledgment  purporting  to 
have  been  made  by  the  firm  in  the  firm  name  is  not  sufficient  to 
entitle  the  instrument  to  be  recorded.''''*  But  the  certificate  need 
not  state  that  the  signing  partner  was  authorized  by  the  others 
to  sign  his  name  to  the  instrument. °^ 

§  329.  Conveyances  to  private  corporations.  —  Private 
business  corporations  in  nearly  every  state  may  acquire,  hold,  and 
convey  so  much  realestate  as  may  be  necessary  or  proper  for  the 
transaction  of  their  business.  The  statutes  of  the  several  states 
are  not  precisely  alike  in  their  terms,  some  designating  the  real 
estate  which  corporations  may  hold  as  "necessary,"  others  as 
"proper,"  or  "necessary  and  convenient,"  or  "required"  for  the 
purposes  of  the  incorporation.  A  deed  to  a  corporation  which  is 
forbidden  by  its  charter  to  purchase  and  hold  real  estate  is  void.^*' 
It  is  held,  however,  that  such  conveyance  is  only  voidable,  and  the 
state  alone  can  object.^" 

A  corporation  de  facto  may  take  a  conveyance  of  land,  and  its 
corporate  existence  and  right  to  hold  the  land  can  be  questioned 
only  by  the  state  in  direct  proceedings  to  inquire  into  its  right  to 
exercise  corporate  functions. ^^  The  corporation  must  have  a  legal 
existence  and  be  capable  of  taking  title.  A  qualification  of  this 
rule  is  to  be  noted  as  regards  corporations  which  have  a  de  facto 
existence.     But  a  conveyance    to    an    unincorporated    company 

^2  McGahan  v.  Bank,  156  U.  S.  218,  »«  St.  Peter's  Roman  Catholic  Con- 

15  S.  Ct.  347,  39  L.  ed.  403.  gregation  v.  Germain,   104  111.  440. 

93  Butts  V.  Cooper,  152  Ala.  375,  44  ^'  Puget     Sound      Nat.     Bank     v. 

So.  616.  Fisher,  52  Wash.  246,  100  Pac.  724,  17 

■'*  Sloan  V.  Owens  &c.  Co.,  70  Mo.  Ann.  Cas.  526. 

206.  98  Doyle  v.  San  Diego  Land  Co.,  46 

°"'  National    Bank    v.     Scriven,    63  Fed.  709. 
Hun  375,  18  N.  Y.  S.  277,  44  N.  Y. 
St.  331. 


§    330  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  362 

which  is  shortly  afterwards  duly  organized  as  a  corporation  and 
goes  into  possession  under  the  deed,  passes  a  title  to  such  corpor- 
ation as  against  one  not  holding  a  superior  title."^ 

A  corporation,  when  made  a  grantee,  should  be  descril^ed  by  its 
official  name.  A  grant  to  a  corporation  is  good,  however,  if  it 
clearly  appears  from  the  deed  itself  what  corporation  was  intend- 
ed, though  an  omission  or  mistake  may  have  been  made  in  the 
corporate  name.  The  corporation  must  have  a  legal  existence  and 
be  capable  of  taking  a  conveyance.^  A  deed  to  the  trustees  or 
officers  by  name  of  an  unincorporated  association  is  good,  for  in 
such  case  the  title  vests  in  such  trustees  or  officers  as  individuals. 
The  words  naming  the  association  are  regarded  merely  as  words 
descriptive  of  the  persons.^  The  misnomer  of  a  corporation  in- 
tended to  be  the  grantee  does  not  invalidate  the  deed  when  the 
true  name  of  the  corporation  appears  in  the  covenant  of  warranty 
or  other  part  of  the  deed,^  or  when  it  appears  in  any  way  from 
the  deed  itself  what  corporation  was  intended. 

If  there  are  tw^o  corporations  of  the  same  name,  ana  a  con- 
veyance is  made  to  one  of  them,  the  grantee  may  be  identified  by 
evidence  aliunde,  as,  for  instance,  by  evidence  as  to  which  corpor- 
ation paid  the  purchase  money  and  received  delivery  of  the  deed.* 
Where  the  corporation  was  organized  under  a  special  act  of  the 
legislature,  a  conveyance  to  it  should  be  supplemented  by  the  act 
or  some  portion  of  it;  but  this  need  not  be  done  where  the  cor- 
poration was  organized  under  a  general  law,  as  a  reference  to 
the  local  statutes  will  generally  supply  the  desired  information. 

The  manner  in  which  the  corporate  seal  is  recorded  should  be 
noted  in  the  abstract.  Thus  if  the  seal  is  recorded,  "Corporate 
Seal,"  these  words  will  suffice  for  the  abstract,  a  fac  simile  of  the 
seal  as  it  appears  on  the  deed  not  being  necessary  unless  the 
statute  requires  it. 

§  330.  Acknowledgment  of  corporate  deeds. — We  have 
heretofore  alluded  to  acknowledgments  of  deeds  by  corporations, 
but  a  further  consideration  of  this  important  act  is  deemed  proper 
in  this  place.  The  statutes  of  some  states  require  the  officers  of 
a  corporation  executing  a  conveyance  to  make  oath  that  they  are 

''o  Clifton     Heights     Land     Co.     v.  Parker,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  307,  12  Atl.  142. 

Randell,  82  Iowa  89,  47  N.  W.  905:  ■*  Asheville    Division    v.    Aston.    92 

1  Douthitt  V.  Stinson.  63  Mo.  268.  N.    Car.   578,    16  Am.   &   Eng.   Corp. 

^  Brown  v.  Combs,  29  X.  J.  L.  36.  Cas.  94. 
3  Centenary     M.     E.     Church ,    v. 


■ 


363  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    330 

the  officers  named  in  the  instrument  and  that  they  executed  it  on 
behalf  of  the  corporation,  and  by  authority  of  its  directors;  but 
the  failure  to  do  this  will  not  render  the  instrument  invalid  as 
between  the  parties  or  as  against  a  trustee  in  bankruptcy.^  The 
acknowledgment  should  be  by  the  person  or  officer  who  was  prop- 
erly authorized  to,  and  who  did,  execute  the  instrument.*^  It  is 
also  the  rule  that  an  acknowledgment  can  not  be  taken  by  an  in- 
terested party;  and  it  is  generally  provided  by  a  statute  that  a 
person  who  is  an  officer  and  a  stockholder  in  a  corporation  or  in 
a  bank,  can  not  act  as  a  notary  public  in  matters  in  which  his  cor- 
poration is  interested.^  In  the  absence  of  statutory  provision  re- 
lating to  the  acknowledgment  of  deeds  by  a  corporation,  the  offi- 
cer affixing  the  corporate  seal  has  been  held  to  be  the  party  execut- 
ing the  deed.®  But  where  a  corporate  deed  was  executed  by  the 
president  and  countersigned  by  the  secretary,  it  was  held  that  the 
secretary  was  not  the  officer  who  executed  the  instrument,  but  was 
merely  the  attesting  witness  who  proved  its  execution  before  the 
proper  officer." 

The  statutes  in  many  jurisdictions  require  a  peculiar  form  of 
certificate  in  the  case  of  the  execution  and  acknowledgment  of 
deeds  by  corporations ;  and  it  must  affirmatively  appear  from  the 
certificate  itself  that  the  requirements  of  such  statutes  have  been 
substantially  complied  with.^°  The  statutes  in  many  jurisdictions 
require  not  only  an  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of  the  corpora- 
tion by  the  proper  officer,  but  also  an  oath  or  form  as  to  the 
authority  and  identity  of  such  officer.  More  particularly  such  re- 
quirements are  that  the  officer  or  agent  of  the  coriX)ration  must 
be  first  sworn  or  affirmed  by  the  magistrate  taking  the  acknowl- 
edgment, and  he  must  under  oath  say:  (a)  That  he  is  the  officer 
or  agent  of  the  corporation  described  In  the  particular  writing, 
giving  the  date  or  other  sufficient  description  for  the  purpose  of 
identification;  (b)  that  he  is  duly  authorized  by  the  corporation 
to  execute  and  acknowledge  the  deeds  and  writings  of  such  cor- 
poration; (c)  that  the  seal  affixed  to  said  writing  is  the  corporate 

5  Murray  v.  Beal,  23  Utah  548,  65  «  Kelly  v.  Calhoun,  95  U.  S.  710,  24 

Pac.  726.  L.  ed.  544. 

"Lovett  V.   Steam  Saw  Mill  Assn..  ^  Johnson  v.  Bush,  3  Barb.  Ch.  (N. 

6  Paige  (N.  Y.)  54.  Y.)  207. 

7  Smith  V.  Clark.  100  Iowa  605,  69  lo  Jocoway  v.  Gault,  20  Ark.  190,  7i 

N.    W.    1011;    Wilson    v.    Griess,    64  Am.   Dec.  494;   Bryan  v.   Ramirez,  8 

Nebr.  792,  90  N.  W.  866.  Cal.  461,  68  Am.  Dec.  340. 


§    331  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  364 

seal  of  the  ci^rporation  ;  (^d)  that  the  deed  or  writing  was  signed, 
and  sealed  Ijv  him  on  behalf  of  said  corporation  and  by  its  au- 
thority duly  given.  After  such  deposition  is  given,  the  officer  or 
agent  must  acknowledge  the  deed  to  be  the  act  and  deed  of  the 
corporation.  All  these  facts  must  appear  in  the  certificate  of  the 
certifying  officer,  before  the  instrument  can  be  legally  admitted 
to  record.  Under  these  requirements  a  failure  to  show  that  the 
acknowledging  party  was  duly  sworn  and  that  he  deposed  to  the 
facts  contained  in  the  certificate,  was  held  to  be  fatal. ^^  In  many 
and  perhaps  most  jurisdictions  a  simple  acknowledgment  in  the 
ordinary  form  of  that  made  by  individuals  will  be  sufficient.  It 
has  been  held  that  the  authority  to  execute  the  instrument  is  suffi- 
cient authority  to  acknowledge  the  execution. ^- 

§  331.  Conveyances  by  public  and  quasi-public  corpora- 
tions.— The  power  of  a  corporation  to  alienate  its  property 
depends  very  much  upon  its  character,  whether  it  is  public,  quasi- 
public,  or  strictly  private.  Thus,  public  municipal  corporations 
can  not  alienate  property  of  a  public  nature,  such,  for  instance, 
as  a  public  square  or  street,  in  violation  of  the  trusts,  express  or 
implied,  upon  which  it  is  held,  except  under  legislative  authority. 
They  may,  however,  dispose  of  their  lands  which  are  of  a  private 
nature,  unless  restrained  by  charter  or  by  statute.  Neither  is  a 
quasi-public  corporation  allowed  to  divest  itself  of  its  lands  nec- 
essary for  the  exercise  of  its  franchise,  without  legislative  per- 
mission.^^ 

It  is  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  authority,  a  municipal 
corporation  has  no  power  to  execute  a  deed  with  covenants  of 
warranty,  such  power  not  being  essential  to  the  purposes  and  ob- 
jects of  the  corporation.^*  In  the  case  of  a  grant  of  land  by  a 
state  or  other  government,  an  agent  authorized  to  make  the  con- 
veyance may  properly  execute  the  deed  by  signing  his  name,  in- 
stead of  the  name  of  the  state;  for  the  state  may  grant  without 
any  deed,  and  in  fact  the  title  passes  by  the  resolve  rather  than  by 
the  deed.^^  A  conveyance  in  this  form  may  also  be  supported  on 
the  ground  of  the  practice  of  a  state  continued  for  many  years  in 

"Abney  v.  Ohio  Lumber  &c.  Co.,  R.    Co..    118   U.    S.   290,   6   Sup.    Ct. 

45  W.  Va.  446.  32  S.  E.  256.  1094.  .30  L.  ed.  83. 

12  Wright  V.  Lee,  2  S.  Dak.  596.  51  i*  Harrison  v.  Palo  Alto  Co.,  104 
N.  W.  706.  Iowa  383,  73  N.  W.  872. 

13  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  is  Thompson  v.  Carr,  5  N.  H.  510. 


365  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    332 

conveying  lands  in  this  manner.'"  Also  a  deed  which  purports  to 
be  the  deed  of  a  county  or  town  may  be  executed  by  the  proper 
officer  or  agent  by  signing  his  own  name/"  Where  trustees 
of  a  town  are  made  a  body  corporate  and  are  authorized  to  sell 
land,  they  may  execute  the  conveyance  in  their  own  name  and  not 
in  the  name  of  the  town/^ 

A  conveyance  of  land  by  a  municipal  corporation  should  be  in 
its  corporate  name  and  under  its  corporate  seal.  Such  a  con- 
veyance, when  regular  upon  its  face,  made  by  a  corporation  hav- 
ing power  to  dispose  of  its  real  estate,  is  presumed  to  have  been 
executed  in  pursuance  of  that  power.  It  is  not  essential  to  recite 
the  authority  in  the  deed,  and  a  purchaser  claiming  under  such 
conveyance  need  not  produce  the  special  ordinance  authorizing 
its  execution.  The  seal  of  the  corporation  affixed  to  the  deed  is 
prima  facie  evidence  that  it  was  so  affixed  by  the  authority  of  the 
corporation.  The  execution  of  a  power  conferred  by  a  municipal 
corporation  upon  a  public  officer  to  convey  land  must  be  in  strict 
pursuance  of  the  power,  or  no  title  is  conveyed. ^^  The  officers  of 
such  corporation  are  not  in  the  position  of  trustees  acting  under 
special  powers,  and  required  in  their  deeds  to  recite  the  power  and 
show  that  the  contingency  has  arisen  which  authorizes  a  sale.'" 
While  a  person  claiming  under  such  conveyance  need  not  produce 
the  special  ordinance  authorizing  its  execution,  it  is  necessary  that 
such  authority  should  appear  in  the  abstract  in  connection  with  the 
conveyance  authorized  by  it.-^  Examples  of  municipal  ordinances 
and  resolutions  affecting  title  to  real  estate  will  appear  in  a  sub- 
sequent chapter  of  this  work.-- 

§  332.  Conveyance  by  private  corporations. — Every  pri- 
vate corporation  having  no  public  functions  has  the  absolute 
right  to  dispose  of  its  property  in  the  same  manner  that  an  in- 
dividual has.  It  may  convey  its  real  property  acting  by  a  ma- 
jority of  its  stockholders;  and  this  right  is  not  limited  as  to  ob- 
jects, circumstances,  or  ciuantity,  unless  restrained  by  statute  or  by 
public  policy.-^     The  technical  mode  of  executing  the  deed  of  a 

i«  Cofran  v.  Cockran.  5  N.  H.  458.         -i  Ward  v.  Necedah  Lumber  Co.,  70 

^'  Decker  v.  Freeman.  3  Maine  3.38.  Wis.  445.  35  N.  W.  929. 

"De  Zeng  v.  Beekoian,  2  Hill  (N.         --  See  ch.  21. 
Y.)  489.  2.';  Treadwell  v.  Salisbury  Mfg.  Co., 

1"  Still   V.    Lansingbursih,    16    Barb.  7    Grav    (Mass.)    393,    66    Am.    Dec. 

(N.  Y.)  107.  490.     ' 

-0  Henry   v    .\tkison,    50   Mo.   266; 
Haseltine  v.  Donahue,  42  Wis.  576. 


§    332  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  366 

corporation  is  for  the  proper  officer  to  sign  the  corporate  name, 
adding  his  own  signature  and  official  title  as  the  agent  by  whom 
the  act  is  done,  and  affixing  the  corporate  seal.  Of  course  the 
testimonium  clause  should  recite  the  mode  of  execution,  and  espe- 
cially the  name  of  the  officer  authorized  to  sign  the  corporate 
name  and.  affix  its  seal.  It  is  essential  that  the  deed  on  its  face 
should  purport  to  be  executed  by  the  corporation,  and  that  its  seal 
should  in  fact  be  affixed  by  a  duly  authorized  officer  or  agent. 
But  an  execution  of  a  deed  by  affixing  the  corporate  seal  is  good 
though  the  officer  signs  his  own  name  instead  of  the  name  of  the 
corporation,  especially  if  the  tesimonium  clause  duly  recites  a 
signing  and  sealing  by  the  corporation  by  the  agency  of  such 
officer."*  When,  however,  the  deed  on  its  face  purports  to  be  the 
deed  of  the  officer  or  agent  who  executed  it,  instead  of  the  corpor- 
ation, it  is  inoperative  to  pass  any  title  to  the  land  of  the  corpora- 
tion.^' 

Abstracters  and  counsel  should  pay  particular  attention  to  con- 
veyances of  corporate  property,  and  all  statutory  and  charter  pro- 
visions as  to  the  authority  of  officers  to  convey,  and  as  to  the 
mode  of  conveyance  should  be  inquired  into  in  order  to  see  that 
they  have  been  liberally  and  rigidly  followed.  In  abstracting  a 
deed  by  a  corporation  all  the  important  recitals  should  be  stated, 
and  testimonium  clause,  together  with  the  signatures  of  the  offi- 
cers should  be  literally  transcribed.  The  following  example  is 
submitted : 


Globe  Investment  Co.,  a  private  ' 
corporation,    existing   under 
and  by  virtue  of  the  laws  of 
South  Dakota, 

to 

John  J.  Peers. 


Warranty  Deed. 
Dated  Jan.  1,  1890. 
}■  Recorded  Jan.  20.  1890. 
Book  6,  Deeds,  page  473. 
Consideration,  $6,000. 


Conveys  N.  W.  34  of  S.  E.  %  of  Sec.  32,  Tp.  128  N,  Range 
7  West  5th  P.  M.  "In  witness  whereof,  said  corporation  has 
caused  its  corporate  seal  to  be  hereto  affixed,  and  these  presents 
to  be  signed,  executed,  acknowledged  and  delivered,  in  its  name 

-*  Haven      v.      Adam,      4      Allen         -"•  Commonwealth   v.    Reading   Sav. 
(Mass.)  80.  Bank,  137  Mass.  431. 


367  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    333 

and  behalf,  by  its  president  and  attested  by  its  secretary,  this  1st 
day  of  Jan.,  1890. 

[Seal]  (Signed)  "Roland  Phillips,  President. 

(Attest)         George  Turton,  Secretary." 

Acknowledged  by  said  president  and  secretary  as  the  free  and 
voluntary  act  of  said  Globe  Investment  Company  on  the  1st  day 
of  Jan.,  1890. 

The  mode  of  execution  is  usually  prescribed  by  statute,  but 
where  the  charter  or  by-laws  prescribe  a  mode  it  should  be  ap- 
pended to  the  above  synopsis. 

§  333.  Conveyances  by  charitable  or  religious  corpora- 
tions.— A  charitable  or  religious  corporation  may  be  under 
an  obligation  to  discharge  its  corporate  duties,  and  may  be  com- 
pelled to  appropriate  its  property  to  the  specific  uses  for  which  it 
was  allowed  by  its  charter  or  by  statute  to  acquire  it.  Particular 
modes  are  often  prescribed  by  special  or  general  laws  for  dis- 
posing of  the  property  of  such  corporations. 

The  property  of  an  incorporated  religious  society  belongs  to 
the  corporation,  and  not  to  the  church  at  large.""  The  legal  title 
to  the  property  held  by  such  corporations  is  often  vested  in  trus- 
tees, and  conveyances  by  such  corporations  are  generally  made  by 
the  trustees.  When  the  method  of  conveyance  is  prescribed  by 
statute — and  there  are  often  requirements  not  found  in  other 
cases — that  method  must  be  strictly  followed."''  Hence,  great  care 
should  be  exercised  by  both  abstracter  and  counsel  where  a  con- 
veyance of  the  character  under  discussion  appears  in  the  chain  of 
title.  Many  incidents  which  would  be  unimportant  in  other  deeds 
must  not  be  overlooked  here.  Numerous  cases  will  be  found  in 
the  reports  where  such  societies  have  mortgaged  their  property 
to  raise  funds  for  improvements,  and  afterwards  have  taken  ad- 
vantage of  some  technicality  to  escape  payment  of  the  debt."® 

§  334.  Conveyance  of  an  expectancy. — The  conveyance  of 
a  mere  possibility  or  expectancy  of  an  heir  in  the  estate  of  an- 
other, although  for  a  valuable  consideration,  is  void,  and  can  not 

26  Trustees   of   Presbytery  of   New  -"  Lombard  v.  Chicago  Sinai  Cong., 

York    V.    Westminster     Presbyterian  64  111.  477. 

Church,  67   Misc.  317,   122   N.  Y.   S.  ^s  Scott    v.    Trustees    First    M.    E. 

309.  Ch,  SO  Mich.  528,  15  N.  W.  891. 


§    335  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  368 

be  enforced  in  equity  l)y  the  grantee.-"  This  is  upon  the  principle 
that  a  contract  of  bargain  and  sale  is  invalid  unless  there  is  a 
thing  or  subject-matter  to  be  contracted  for.  This  is  absolutely 
essential  to  the  validity  of  the  contract.  Some  courts  have  held, 
however,  that  a  mere  possibility  or  expectancy  is  assignable  in 
equity,  for  a  valuable  consideration,  and  equity  will  enforce  the 
contract  when  the  possibility  or  expectancy  has  changed  into  a 
vested  interest  or  possession."''"  While  such  deed  is  inoperative 
as  a  conveyance,  it  may  operate  as  an  estoppel  springing  from  the 
covenants  in  the  deed.^^  In  a  comparatively  recent  case  it  was 
held  that  the  contract  of  an  expectant  or  presumptive  heir  by 
which  he  "releases,  remises,  and  forever  quitclaims  his  undivided 
portion  that  he  may  be  entitled  to"  of  certain  described  real  estate 
of  his  mother  will  be  enforced  in  equity.^"  In  considering  a  sim- 
ilar conveyance  the  supreme  court  of  Indiana  held  that  such  a  con- 
veyance will  not  be  enforced  unless  made  with  the  knowledge  and 
consent  of  the  person  from  whom  the  inheritance  is  to  come.'''* 
In  case  a  child,  in  consideration  of  money  or  property  advanced 
to  him  by  his  parent,  execute  a  writing  releasing  his  right  as  pros- 
pective heir  and  distributee  of  the  estate  of  such  parent,  he  is 
thereby  estopped  from  asserting  any  claim  to  the  estate  against 
the  other  heirs  and  distributees.''* 

An  expectant  estate  may  be  conveyed,  but  a  conveyance  of  it 
is  always  viewed  with  suspicion.  It  is  never  presumed,  and,  to 
render  it  valid,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  conveyance  was  in  good 
faith,  that  there  w-as  no  fraud  practiced  upon  either  the  heir  or 
the  ancestor,  and  that  a  full  value  was  paid.^^ 

§  335.  Conveyance  by  attorney  in  fact. — A  deed  can  not 
be  executed  by  a  third  person  for  the  grantor  in  his  absence  unless 
authorized  by  a  power  under  seal.^"  A  recital  of  the  attorney's  au- 

29McCall's  Admr.  v.  Hampton,  98  ^'^  McClure  v.  Rahen,  125  Ind.  139, 

Ky.  166,  32  S.  W.  406,  17  Ky.  L.  713,  25  N.  E.  179,  9  L.  R.  A.  477. 

33  L.  R.  A.  266,  56  Am.  St.  335.  s*  Squires    v.    Squires,    65    W.    Va. 

30  East  Lewisburg  Lumber  &  Mfg.  611,  64  S.  E.  911,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
Co.  V.  Marsh,  91  Pa.  St.  96.  284n. 

31  Habig  V.  Dodge,  127  Ind.  31,  25  3,-;  Layton  v.  Herr,  45  Ind.  App.  203, 
N.  E.  182;  Johnson  v.  Johnson.   170  90  N.  E.  645. 

Mo.  34,  70  S.  \^^  241,  59  L.  R.  A.  so  Young  v.  Sheldon,  139  Ala.  444, 
748;  Steele  v.  Friarson,  85  Tenn.  430,  36  So.  27,  101  Am.  St.  44;  Videau  v. 
3  S.  W.  649.  Griffin,  21    Cal.  389;   Rowe  v.  Ware. 

32Clendening  v.  Wvat,  54  Kans.  30  Ga.  278;  Heath  v.  Nutter,  50 
523,  38  Pac.  792,  33  L.  R.  A.  278.  Maine   378 ;    Cadell   v.   Allen,   99   N. 

Cas.  542,  6  S.  K.  399. 


369  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    335 

thority  in  the  deed  Is  proper  and  desirable,  but  it  has  of  itself  no 
effect  as  showing  authority,^^  though  such  recital,  coupled  with  a 
long  delay  of  the  principal  to  assert  an  adverse  claim,  affords 
presumption  of  the  existence  of  the  power.^®  A  prima  facie  show- 
ing of  the  attorney's  authority  to  make  the  conveyance  is  made  by 
the  recital  in  his  deed  and  letters,  that  he  was  attorney  in  fact  for 
his  principal,  supported  by  the  testimony  of  one  who  saw  the  lost 
power  of  attorney. ^^ 

If  the  deed  is  not  made  in  the  name  of  the  principal,  it  is  not 
his  deed,  but  the  deed  of  the  agent  alone.  It  is  not  sufficient,  as 
is  the  case  with  unsealed  contracts,  that  the  fact  of  agency  can  be 
gathered  from  the  whole  instrument.  The  attorney  may  execute 
the  deed  by  signing  the  name  of  the  principal  alone,  without  sign- 
ing his  own.*°  The  recitals  in  the  body  of  the  deed  should  show 
that  it  is  the  act  of  the  principal,  and  the  deed  should  be  signed  as 
well  with  the  name  of  the  principal  as  with  that  of  the  attorney, 
thus,  "John  Jones,  by  his  attorney  in  fact,  William  Smith."  The 
deed  should  purport  throughout  to  be  the  deed  of  the  principal, 
and  the  principal's  name  should  be  signed,  together  with  his  own 
name  as  attorney.  This  is  the  common-law  form  of  executing  a 
deed  under  a  power  of  attorney,  and  this  form  is  proper  though 
a  statute  provides  that  a  person  executing  a  deed  as  attorney  for 
another  shall  describe  himself  in  and  sign  the  deed  as  attorney.^^ 

A  deed  executed  by  an  attorney  under  a  power  should  be  ac- 
knowledged by  the  attorney  as  the  deed  of  his  principal,  and  the 
certificate  should  recite  that  the  attorney  appeared  and  acknowl- 
edged the  instrument  to  be  the  deed  of  his  principal.  If  the 
acknowledgment  of  such  a  deed  is  insufficiently  executed,  no  title 
passes.*^  It  seems  that  a  grantor,  executing  a  deed  in  his  own 
prc-per  person,  may  acknowledge  it  through  an  attorney  in  fact.'*^ 

Counsel  should  be  careful  to  see  that  the  deed  was  executed  by 
a  person, having  power  and  authority  to  make  the  conveyance. 
The  nature  and  extent  of  such  power  should  be  ascertained,  and 
the  required  formalities  of  execution  and  acknowledgment  should 

^"  Waggener  v.  Waggener,  3  T.  B.  ^o  Devinney   v.   Reynolds,    1    Watts 

Mon.   (Ky.)   542.  &  S.   (Pa.)  328. 

2^  Folts    V.    Ferguson     (Tex.     Civ.  *i  Posncr  v.  Bayless,  59  Md.  56. 

App.),  24  S.  W.  657.  42McKinney  v.  Rodgers  (Tex.  Civ. 

■''"Mulford    V.    Rowland,    45    Colo.  App.),  29  S.  W.  407. 

172,  100  Pac.  603.  ^■^  Elliott    v.    Osborn,     1     Harr.     & 

McH.  (Md.)   146. 
24 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    336  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  370 

lie  looked  into.  The  delegated  authority  to  make  the  deed  should 
be  shown  in  the  abstract,  together  with  the  fact  that  it  was  ac- 
knowledged by  the  attorney  as  the  act  of  his  principal.  The 
testimonium  clause  should  be  copied  verbatim.  The  synopsis  of 
a  deed  executed  by  one  person  as  attorney  in  fact  for  another 
under  a  power  previously  executed  may  be  in  form  thus : 


Warranty  Deed. 
Dated  Oct.  5,  1903. 
Recorded  Oct.  7,  1903. 
iQ  I  Deed  Record  45,  page  175. 


John  Harrell,  by  Edgar  Phil 
lips,  his  attorney  in  fact, 


Elias  Johnson.  Recites  that,   [same    recitals 

as  ill  deeds  by  grantor  in  per- 
son] "In  witness  whereof,  Edgar  Phillips,  attorney,  by  virtue  of 
a  power  of  attorney,  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  the  above 
named  John  Harrell,  dated  January  1st,  1903,  and  to  be  recorded 
herewith,  has  hereunto  subscribed  the  name  and  set  the  seal  of 
said  John  Harrell,  party  of  the  first  part,  this  5th  day  of  October, 
1903." 

Acknowledged  June  10,  1917,  by  Edgar  Phillips  as  the  act  and 
deed  of  John  Harrell. 

§  336.  Power  of  attorney  to  convey. — It  is  provided  by 
statute  in  nearly  all  the  states,  though  in  somewhat  varying  terms, 
that  a  power  of  attorney  to  convey  real  estate  must  be  executed, 
acknowledged,  and  recorded  in  the  same  manner  that  conveyances 
are.**  A  power  of  attorney  for  the  execution  of  a  deed  should  be 
as  certain  as  the  deed  itself.*^  The  same  formalities,  moreover,  of 
signing,  sealing,  and  acknowledging,  should  be  observed  in  its 
execution.**'  If  two  subscribing  witnesses  are  required  for  the 
execution  of  the  deed,  two  witnesses  should  be  required  for  the 
execution  of  the  power.*'^  Where  the  deed  of  a  married  woman 
is  invalid  unless  her  husband  joins  with  her  in  the  execution  of 
it,  the  husband  should  join  in  the  execution  of  a  power  of  attor- 
ney given  by  his  wife  for  the  conveyance  of  her  land.*^     If  it  is 

■>'  See  digest  of  statutes  of  various         *«  Cadell  v.  Allen,  99  N.  Car.  542, 

states  in  appendix.  6  S.  E.  399. 

«Gage    V.    Gage.    30    N.    H.    420;         ^7  Stone  v.  Ashley.  13  N.  H.  38. 
Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31,  28         ^sReinlen  v.  Martin,  53  Cal.  321. 
Am.  Dec.  381. 


371  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    336 

required  that  a  married  woman  in  acknowledging  a  deed  shall  be 
examined  apart  from  her  husband,  the  same  fonnality  is  re- 
quisite in  her  acknowledgment  of  a  power  of  attorney  for  the 
conveyance  of  her  land/^  The  lands  to  be  conveyed  under  the 
power  must  be  sufficiently  identified.^" 

One  who  is  capable  of  making  a  deed  may  execute  it  by  an  at- 
torney constituted  such  by  a  writing  under  his  hand  and  seal.  Of 
course  the  same  disabilities  that  prevent  the  owner's  making  a 
conveyance  prevent  his  appointing  an  attorney  to  make  it.  The 
power  of  attorney  of  a  married  woman  whose  common-law  disa- 
bilities have  been  removed  may  be  made  in  the  same  manner  and 
with  the  same  legal  effect  as  the  power  of  a  feme  sole.°^ 

In  construing  a  power  of  attorney  the  intention  of  the  parties 
is  to  be  regarded.  Though  the  power  to  sell  is  not  expressly 
given,  it  may  be  implied  from  the  terms  of  the  instrument.^^  The 
authority  of  the  attorney  must  be  ascertained  from  the  language 
of  the  instrument  which  confers  the  authority,^^  though  the  prac- 
tical interpretation  put  upon  it  by  the  parties  themselves  by  their 
acts  may  serve  to  show  the  extent  of  the  authority  they  intended 
to  confer.^*  The  attorney's  authority,  as  expressed  in  the  terms 
of  the  power,  can  not  be  extended  further  than  is  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  the  authority  expressly  conferred  into  full 
effect.  In  construing  the  power  reference  may  be  had  to  the 
purpose  of  the  appointment,  and  the  powers  specifically  declared 
may  properly  be  enlarged  or  limited  by  a  due  consideration  of  the 
object  intended  to  be  accomplished.^^  An  unrestricted  power  to 
sell  gives  the  attorney  the  right  to  sell  in  bulk  or  in  parcels. 

Whether  an  attorney  can  bind  his  principal  by  covenants,  with- 
out express  or  implied  authority  to  convey  with  covenants,  is  a 
question  upon  which  the  cases  can  hardly  be  reconciled.  The 
cases  which  hold  that  such  express  authority  is  necessary  are 
perhaps  the  most  numerous."*'  But  there  are  well  considered  cases 
holding  that  a  power  which  authorizes  an  attorney  to  convey,  in 
as  full  and  ample  a  manner  as  the  principal  himself  could,  au- 

!n  Butterfield  v.  Beall.  3  Ind.  203.  54  Marr  v.  Given,  23  Maine  55,  39 

■'"  Bradley  v.  Whitesides,  55  Alinn.  Am.  Dec.  600. 

455   57  N.  W.  148.  sr,  Martin     v.     Harris     (Tex.     Civ. 

■'1  Knapp  V.  Smith,  27  N.  Y.  277.  App.),  26  S.  W-  91. 

'-s  Marr  v    Given,  23  Maine  55,  39  se  Heath  v.   Nutter,  50  Maine  378 ; 

r,V,   ^-  ^"-  Howe    v.    Harrington,    18    N.    J.    Eq. 

■'SBkim  V.  Robertson,  24  Cal.  127.  495;  Nixon  v.  Hyserott,  5  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  58. 


§    336  TITLES    AND    AP.STRACTS  372 

thorizes  him  to  make  a  deed  with  full  covenants  of  warranty.^' 
Ordinarily  a  party  who  relies  on  a  grant  of  land  under  a  power 
of  attorney,  must  show  the  authority  of  the  attorney. ■''^ 

Powers  of  attorney  authorizing  the  execution  of  deeds  for  the 
conveyance  of  real  estate  must  be  recorded  in  the  office  of  the 
recorder  of  the  county  in  which  the  lands  are  situated,  previous 
to  the  sale  or  execution  of  the  deed  by  virtue  of  the  power.  A 
synopsis  of  such  power  should  immediately  follow  the  abstract 
of  the  deed  purporting  to  be  made  by  virtue  of  the  power.  All 
matters  reciting  the  scope  of  the  attorney's  power  should  be  noted, 
together  with  any  reservation  of  the  right  of  revocation  or  sub- 
stitution that  may  be  contained  in  the  power.  The  recital  of  the 
power  should  be  transcribed  literally.  The  following  example 
of  such  synopsis  is  given: 

James  Terrell,  /]  Power  of  Attorney. 

Dated  June  10,  1903 


to 
Lewis  Williams. 


'  Recorded  June  11,  1903. 
Deed  Record  45,  page  160. 


Know  all  men  by  these  presents,  that  I,  the  undersigned,  James 
Terrell,  have  this  day  made,  constituted,  and  appointed,  and  do 
by  these  presents  make,  constitute  and  appoint  Lewis  Williams 
my  true  and  lawful  attorney,  for  me  and  in  my  name  to  sell  and 
dispose  of  absolutely,  in  fee  simple,  the  following  described  real 
estate  (here  describe  land)  for  such  price  or  sum  of  money,  and 
to  such  person  or  persons  as  he  shall  think  fit  and  convenient ;  and 
also  for  me  and  in  my  name,  as  my  act  and  deed,  to  sign,  execute, 
and  acknowledge,  and  deliver  such  deed  or  deeds  of  conveyance, 
for  the  absolute  sale  and  disposal  thereof,  with  such  clause  or 
clauses,  covenant  or  covenants,  conditions  and  restrictions,  to  be 
therein  contained,  as  my  said  attorney  shall  think  lit  and  exped- 
ient. 

Full  power  to  revoke  and  substitute. 

Acknowledged  June  10.  1903. 

Where  an  unexecuted  pow-er  of  attorney  appears  of  record  it 
need  not  be  abstracted,  a  mere  reference  thereto  in  the  proper  con- 
nection being  sufificient. 

Dec. 


"Le   Roy   v.    Beard,   8   How.    (U. 

Farnsworth,  15  Vt.  155,  40  Am. 

S.)    451,    12    L.    ed.    1151;    Peters    v. 

671. 

ssHager  v.  Spect,  52  Cal.  579. 

373  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    337 

§  337.  Ratification  and  revocation  of  powers  of  attorney. 
— While  many  authorities  hold  that  a  deed  executed  by  an  attor- 
ney having  no  previous  authority  may  be  ratified  by  parol, ^^  others 
hold  to  the  rule  that  such  unauthorized  act,  of  an  attorney  in  fact, 
can  be  confirmed  only  by  an  instrument  under  seal/'"  But  even 
this  rule  does  not  prevent  a  ratification  by  acts  which  operate  as 
an  estoppel  in  pais/^  A  power  of  attorney  is  revocable  at  any 
time,  though  it  is  expressly  declared  irrevocable,  unless  the  attor- 
ney has  an  interest  in  the  property  on  which  the  power  is  to  be 
exercised."^ 

The  death  of  the  principal  terminates  a  power  to  convey,  and 
a  deed  made  by  the  attorney  after  such  death  is  void  even  if  he 
was  ignorant  of  the  fact  of  the  death ;*'^  though,  if  the  power  be 
coupled  with  an  interest,  it  survives  and  may  be  executed  after  the 
death  of  the  donor.  The  marriage  of  the  donor  of  a  power  of 
attorney  operates  as  a  revocation  of  the  same,  so  far  as  concerns 
the  rights  which  the  wife  of  the  donor  may  acquire  in  the  prop- 
erty by  marriage,  such  as  the  rights  of  dower  and  homestead/* 
The  insanity  of  the  principal  after  the  execution  of  a  power  of 
attorney  operates  as  a  revocation,  or  suspension  for  the  time  be- 
ing, of  the  authority  of  the  agent  to  act  under  it/^  A  conveyance 
by  the  principal  before  the  attorney  has  acted  upon  the  authority 
given  him,  operates  to  revoke  the  power/*^ 

A  provision  in  the  instrument  creating  the  power,  to  the  effect 
that  the  principal  may  not  revoke  the  power  at  will,  serves  to 
prevent  such  revocation  on  the  part  of  the  principal.  It  would 
seem  that  the  recording  of  the  power  of  attorney  prevents  its  rev- 
ocation except  by  a  revocation  duly  recorded.**'  The  recording  of 
the  revocation  is  constructive  notice  of  the  fact.  Where  there 
appears  of  record  a  revocation  of  a  power  which  has  not  been 
executed,  the  abstract  need  not  contain  any  reference  either  to 

•"'0  Mclntyre     v.      Park,      11      Gray  62  Hunt   v.    Rousmanier,   8   Wheat. 

(Mass.)    102,  71  Am.  Dec.  690;   Mc-  (U.  S.)    174.  5  L.  ed.  589;  Brown  v. 

Donald  v.  Eggleston,  26  Vt.   154,  60  Pforr,  38  Cal.  550. 

Am.  Dec.  303.  g3  Davis  v.  Windsor  Sav.  Bank,  46 

«o  Spofford  V.  Hobbs.  29  Maine  148,  Vt.  728. 

48  Am.  Dec.  521 ;  Despatch  Line  Co.  64  Henderson  v.  Ford,  46  Tex.  627. 

V.  Bellamy  Mfg.   Co.,   12  N.   H.  205,  6,^  Davis  v.  Lane,  10  N.  H.  156. 

37  Am.  Dec.  203.  r.r,  Walker  v.  Denison.  86  111.  142. 

ciBorel    V.    Rollins,    30    Cal.    408;  or  Weile  v.  United  States,  7  Ct.  of 

Alexander  v.  Jones,  64  Iowa  207,  19  CI.  (U.  S.)  535. 
N.  W.  913. 


^    338  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  374 

the  power  itself  or  to  the  instrument  revoking  it.  But  in  case  it 
is  desired  to  show  the  transaction,  a  brief  reference  to  the  power 
followed  immediately  by  the  revocation  will  suffice.  It  may  be 
presented  as  follows : 

Revocation  of  Power  of  Attor- 
ney. 
►  Dated,  Sept.  12,  1903. 
Recorded  Sept.  12,  1903. 
Deed  Record  45,  page  285. 


James  Terrell 

to 
Lewis  Williams. 


Stating  particulars  of  power  of  attorney  shown  as  No.  12  of 
this  abstract,  and  revokes  and  makes  void  all  and  singular  the 
powers  and  authorities  thereby  given  to  said  Lewis  Williams. 
Acknowledged  Sept.  12,  1903.  Where  the  rule  prevails  that  the 
death  of  the  principal,  whether  known  or  unknown  to  the  attor- 
ney, terminates  the  power,  it  is  important  to  know  if  the  principal 
was  alive  at  the  time  a  conveyance  was  made  under  the  power. 
If  the  abstracter  has  any  knowledge  of  the  facts,  his  notation 
thereof  in  the  abstract  would  be  proper. 

§  338.  Conveyances  in  trust. — There  is  a  well-settled  dis- 
tinction between  a  deed  of  trust  proper  and  a  deed  of  trust  in 
the  nature  of  a  mortgage;  the  one  being  for  the  trust  purposes 
unconditional  and  indefeasible,  while  the  other  is  conditioned  and 
defeasible,  in  the  same  way  that  a  mortgage  is."^  Our  treatment 
here  will  be  confined  to  conveyances  made  in  trust  for  the  benefit 
of  a  person  or  persons  named  therein  as  beneficiaries,  and  not 
such  as  are  made  to  secure  the  payment  of  a  debt  or  the  per- 
formance of  an  obligation.  Conveyances  of  the  character  under 
discussion  are  not  as  frequent  as  formerly.  Where  they  are  still 
employed  the  statutes  sometimes  provide  that  the  cestui  que  trust 
takes  both  the  legal  title  and  the  beneficial  interest. "° 

These  are  what  are  termed  "passive"  or  "simple"  trusts,  and 
impose  no  duty  upon  the  trustee  except  to  make  a  conveyance 
of  the  property  when  requested  by  the  cestui  que  trust.  Where, 
however,  the  deed  imposes  some  active  duty  on  the  part  of  the 
trustee,  such  as  to  care  for  the  land,  to  pay  taxes,  to  collect  rents, 

••'8  Fox  V.  Fraser.  92  Ind.  265 ;  Iloff-        "^  Roth  v.  Michalis,  125  Md.  325,  17 
man   Burnestoii   &  Co.  v.   Mackall,  5     N.  E.  809.    , 
Ohio  St.  124,  64  Am.  Dec.  637. 


375  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    338 

to  make  sale,  and  the  like,  he  will  take  the  fee,  without  words 
of  limitation  or  inheritance,  when  necessary  to  carry  out  the 
trust.  ^°  Thus,  a  deed  to  trustees  and  their  successors  in  trust  to 
sell  and  convey  in  fee  simple  absolute,  without  the  word  "heirs" 
in  either  the  habendum  or  granting  clause,  conveys  to  the  trustees 
an  estate  in  fee  simple.  The  trust  required  an  estate  in  fee  sim- 
ple for  its  execution,  and  consequently  a  legal  estate  commensur- 
ate with  this  requirement;  and  therefore  the  trustees  took  such 
an  estate  without  the  use  of  the  usual  words  of  limitation."  A 
trustee,  however,  takes  no  greater  estate  than  the  purposes  of  the 
trust  require,"  even  though  the  grant  to  him  is  in  fee."  In  most 
cases,  the  object  or  purpose  for  which  the  trust  was  created  being 
executed,  the  trustee's  estate,  if  greater  than  was  required,  term- 
inates, and  the  legal  title  becomes  vested  in  the  beneficiary.^* 

Inasmuch  as  conveyances  in  trust  are  allowed  only  to  a  limited 
extent  in  this  country,  every  part  of  the  instrument  necessary  to 
bring  it  within  the  permitted  class  should  be  shown  in  the  abstract. 
The  habendum  clause  is  most  frequently  employed  to  define  the 
trusts  imposed  on  the  person  taking  the  legal  estate  under  the 
deed,  and  its  recitals  should  be  shown.  Also  any  power  of  ap- 
pointment, reservation,  or  any  special  matter  of  inducement  con- 
tained in  any  part  of  the  deed  must  be  noted. 

No  technical  terms  or  expressions  are  necessary  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  trust,  any  words  being  suflficient  for  the  purpose  if  the 
intention  to  create  a  trust  clearly  appears. ^^  It  is  usually  created 
in  the  habendum  bylanguage  similar  to  the  following:    "To  have 

and  to  hold  unto  the  said  ,  as  trustee,  his  successors  and 

assigns  forever,  upon  the  trusts,  and  to  and  for  the  uses,  interests 
and  purposes,  hereinafter  .limited,  described  and  declared." 

Persons  dealing  with  a  trustee  must  take  notice  of  the  scope  of 
his  authority ;  and  even  a  third  person  taking  a  title  which  comes 
through  a.trustee,  and  having  notice  of  facts  which  should  put  him 

70  Lord  V.  Comstock,  240  111.  492,  88  "  Young  v.  Bradley,  101  U.  S.  782, 

N.  E.   1012;   Packard  v.   Old  Colony  25  L.  ed.  1044;  Brillhart  v.  Mish,  99 

R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  92,  46  N.  E.  433.  Md.  447,  58  Atl.  28. 

Ti  Neilson  v.  Lagow.  12  How.    (U.  ^^  Brown  v.  Reeder,  108  Md.  653.  71 

S.)  98,  13  L.  ed.  909;  Ewing  v.  Shan-  Atl.    417;    Temple    v.    Ferguson,    110 

nahan,  113  Alo.  188,  20  S.  W.  1065.  Tenn.  84,  72  S.  W.  455,  100  Am.  St. 

-2  Allen  V.  Hughes,  106  Ga.  775,  32  791. 

S.   E.   927;   Olcott  v.   Tope,   115   111.  7.-.  Estate  of  Smith,  144  Pa.  St.  428, 

App.  121.  22  Atl.  916,  27  Am.  St.  641. 


§  339  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  376 

upon  inquiry  whether  the  trustee  was  acting  within  the  scope  of 
his  authority,  is  not  protected/'* 

§  339.  Declaration  of  trust  in  deeds. — A  trust  in  real 
property  can  be  created  only  by  a  writing  in  which  the  objects  and 
nature  of  the  trust  is  clearly  indicated,  the  parties  designated,  their 
relation  to  each  other  defined,  the  proportions  in  which  they  are 
to  take  specified,  and  in  general,  all  the  material  elements  of  the 
settlement  set  forth."  But  no  particular  form  of  such  writing  is 
required.  The  deed  may  be  al)solute  in  form,  and  the  trust  de- 
clared in  a  note  at  the  end  of  the  deed,'^  or  in  a  separate  instru- 
ment, such  as  a  memorandum  or  affidavit, ^^  or  even  a  letter, 
though  addressed  to  some  third  party,  if  properly  signed  and 
adequately  expressing  what  the  trust  is.**°  Where  a  trust  is  created 
by  deed  the  declaration  is  usually  found  in  the  habendum,  but 
it  is  sufficient  if  from  the  whole  instrument  an  intention  appears 
to  create  a  trust.^^  The  trust  may  be  manifested  or  proved  by 
any  writing  signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged,  or  by  the  party 
who  is  entitled  to  declare  the  trust,  provided  the  fiduciary  relations 
are  set  forth  in  the  writing  with  sufficient  certainty.*^ 

The  declarations  of  trust  in  a  deed  should  be  transcribed  liter- 
ally, and  require  the  closest  attention  of  .counsel.  These  declara- 
tions advise  the  purchaser  that  he  is  dealing  with  a  person  who 
has  not  the  beneficial  ownership,  and  who  can  convey  no  title 
except  by  a  deed  made  in  strict  conformity  with  the  terms  of  the 
trust.  The  terms  of  the  trust  may  not  authorize  the  trustee  to 
sell  at  all,  or  not  to  sell  except  upon  conditions  which  have  been 
complied  with.  With  respect  to  the  authority  of  the  trustee  to 
sell,  the  only  guide  is  the  declaration  of  the  trust.  With  respect 
to  the  matter  of  compliance  with  conditions,  the  purchaser  is 
obliged  to  resort  to  facts  outside  the  record. 

In  abstracting  a  deed  of  trust  the  declaration  creating  the  trust, 
or  so  much  thereof  as  will  show  the  full  intention  of  the  parties 

■'sKirsch  v.  Tozicr,  143  N.  Y.  390,  so  Larrabee    v.    Hascall,    88    Maine 

38  N.  E.  375,  42  Am.  St.  729.  511,    34    Atl.    408,    51    Am.    St.    446; 

"7  Finley  v.  Isett,  154  U.  S.  561,  14  Tusch  v.  German  Sav.  Bank,  20  Mi.sc. 

S.  Ct.   1164,   19  L.  ed.  273;   Emerson  571,  46  N.  Y.  S.  422;  Roberts'  Appeal, 

V.  Galloupe,  158  Mass.  146,  32  N.  E.  92  Pa.  St.  407. 

1118;  Hutchins  v.  Van  Vechten,  140  ^ijaft    v.    Taft,    130    Mass.    461; 

N.  Y.   115,  35   N.  E.  446;   Martin  v.  Toms  v.  Williams,  41  Mich.  552,  2  N. 

Baird,  175  Pa.  St.  540,  34  Atl.  809-.  W.    814;    In    re    Smith's    Estate,    144 

78  Preston  v.   Preston,  202   Pa.   St.  Pa.  428,  22  Atl.  916,  27  Am.  St.  641. 
515,  52  Atl.  192.  82  Kintner  v.  Jones,  122  Ind.  148,  23 

79  Pinney  v.  Fellows,  15  Vt.  525.  N.  E.  701. 


Z77  CLASSES    OF    PRIVATE    CONVEYANCES  §    340 

as  indicated  in  the  deed,  must  appear.    An  example  of  such  synop- 
sis is  appended : 


Joseph  Wolf,  Trustee, 

to 
Whom  it  may  concern. 


Declaration  of  Trust. 
Dated  Oct.  1,  1917. 
Recorded  Oct.  2,  1917. 
Record  75,  page  200. 


Recites  that  the  purchase 
money  for  the  within  described  real  estate  was  provided  and  paid 
by  Julia  Eklund,  and  that  she  is  the  actual  purchaser  and  the 
conveyance  was  made  to  said  Joseph  Wolf,  as  a  trustee  for  the 
purchaser:  "Now  know  all  men  by  these  presents  that  I,  the 
said  Joseph  Wolf,  do  hereby  declare  that  I  stand  seised  of  said 
land  and  premises  within  described  in  trust  for  the  said  Julia 
Eklund,  her  heirs  and  assigns,  and  hereby  agree  to  convey  the 
same  at  her  request  and  at  her  cost  to  her  or  to  such  person  or 
persons  at  such  time  or  times  and  in  such  manner,  as  she,  the 
said  Julia  Eklund,  shall  direct  or  appoint." 

§  340.     Revocation  of  trust. — A  trust  can  not  be  revoked 

by  the  donor  after  its  acceptance  actual  or  presumed,  unless  the 
declaration  reserves  a  power  of  revocation,  and  in  that  case  the 
power  to  revoke  must  be  strictly  pursued.®^  And  the  absence  of 
a  power  of  revocation  from  a  voluntary  deed  of  trust  is  not 
prima  facie  evidence  of  a  mistake,  where  such  power  was  not  in- 
consistent with  the  purposes  of  the  trust  and  was  neither  intended 
nor  desired  by  the  grantor  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the 
trust.^*  But  a  completed  trust,  without  reservation  of  power  of 
revocation,  can  be  revoked  by  the  consent  of  all  the  beneficiaries.*^ 
In  some  states  it  is  held  that  when  the  settler  reserves  for  his 
own  benefit  an  absolute  power  to  revoke  the  trust,  he  is  still 
deemed  the  absolute  owner  of  the  property  conveyed,  so  far  as 
the  rights  of  creditors  and  purchasers  are  concerned. *°'  A  power 
of  revocation  in  a  trust  deed  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  creation 
of  a  valid  trust.*^  Except  where  the  rights  of  creditors  are  in- 
volved, such  a  power  is  valid  and  consistent  with  the  idea  of  a 

83  Spence  v.  Widney  (Cal.),  46  Pac.  ^g  Von  Hesse  v.  MacKave.  136  N.  Y. 
463.  114,  32  N.  E.  615. 

84  Wallace  v.  Industrial  Trust  Co.,  "  Seaman  v.  Harmon,  192  Mass.  5. 
29  R.  I.  550.  li  Atl.  25.  78  N.  E.  301. 

85  Ewing    V.    Shannahan,    113    Mo. 
188,  20  S.  W.  1065. 


§    341  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  378 

trust/^  Where  no  particular  form  for  such  revocation  is  required, 
any  lang^uage  clearly  expressing  an  intention  to  revoke  is  suffi- 
cient. If  the  power  to  revoke  is  not  exercised  during  the  life  of 
the  settler  the  trust  continues  until  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
created  is  accomplished.  Where  a  deed  of  trust  contains  a  power 
of  revocation,  and  the  trust  remains  unexecuted,  the  reservation 
should  be  set  out  in  full  in  the  abstract. 

§  341.  Death,  resignation,  or  removal  of  trustee. — Upon 
the  death  of  a  trustee  holding  the  legal  title  to  land,  such  title 
vests  in  his  heirs  subject  to  the  trust.**'"*  and  his  executors  become 
clothed  with  his  duties  and  responsibilities  as  such  trustee.''"  When 
a  trust  exists  and  all  the  trustees  are  dead,  the  court  will  appoint 
other  trustees  and  direct  the  execution  of  the  trust.'''-  But  in  the 
absence  of  a  provision  to  the  contrary  persons  holding  under  a 
conveyance  as  trustees  hold  as  joint  tenants,  and  upon  the  death 
of  one  the  trust  obligations  devolve  upon  the  survivor,  and  do 
not  pass  to  the  heir  or  personal  representative  of  the  deceased 
trustee.^"  Persons  creating  a  trust  may  provide  for  the  selection 
of  trustees  and  their  successors."^  But  where  an  instrument  creat- 
ing a  trust  provides  that  if  the  appointed  trustee  is  unwilling  to 
act,  the  cestui  que  trust  shall  appoint  another  trustee  "under 
their  hand  and  seal,"  an  appointment  made  without  some  sort  of 
a  seal  confers  no  authority. '■'* 

A  trustee,  by  his  resignation,  can  not  divest  himself  of  the  legal 
title  to  property  vested  in  him  by  the  instrument  creating  the 
trust."'^'  Where  lands  are  conveyed  in  trust,  and  the  trustee  enters 
into  possession  of  the  property  under  the  deed,  he  is  bound  to 
observe  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  instrument  under  which 
he  receives  a  conveyance  of  property;  and  if  he  fails  to  discharge 
his  duty  as  trustee,  and  attempts  to  divert  the  property  to  a  use 
not  contemplated  by  the  deed,  or  appropriates  it  to  his  own  use, 
a  court  of  equity  will  remove  him  and  appoint  another  trustee  U) 
take  his  place. °" 

ssSchreyer  v.   Schreyer,  91   N.   Y.  Coal  Co.,  231  111.  238,  83  N.  E.  166. 

S.  1065.  121  Am.  St.  307. 

^9  Lawrence    v.    Lawrence,    181    111.  »3  gtahl  v.   Mitchell,  41   Minn.  325, 

248,  54  N.  E.  918.  43  N.  W.  385. 

'•0  Anderson    v.    Northrop.    30    Fla.  "^  sharpely  v.   Plant,  79  Miss.   175, 

612,  12  So.  318.                               .  28  So.  799,  89  Am.  St.  588. 

"1  Spence  v.  Widney  (Cal.),  46  Pac.  '■'^  Simpson  v.  Erisner,  155  Mo.  157, 

463.  55  S.  W,  1029. 

02Reichert    v.    Alissouri    &    Illinois  oc  Quilfoil   v.    Arthur.    158    Til.   600, 

41  N.  E.  1009. 


CHAPTER  XV 

OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES 

SEC.  SEC. 

345.  Official  conveyances  generally.  355.  Trustee's    conveyance    of    legal 

346.  Recitals  in  official  deeds.  title. 

347.  Sheriff's  deed  on  execution  sale.  356.  Testamentary  trust  distinguished 

348.  Description  of  premises  sold  on  from  power,  charge,  and  estates 
execution.                                                          on  condition  subsequent. 

349.  Acknowledgment      of      sheriff's  357.  Trustees'  deeds. 

deed.  358.  Mortgagee's    deed    under    power 

350.  Construction    and    operation    of  of  sale, 
sheriff's  deeds.  359.  Executor's  deed. 

351.  Statutory  sheriff's  deeds.  360.  Administrator's  deed. 

352.  Sheriff's  deed  in  execution  of  de-  361.  Administrator  with  the  will  an- 
cree.  nexed. 

353.  Deeds   by   masters,    commission-  362.  Guardian's  deed. 

ers  and  referees.  363.  Fiduciaries    purchasing    at    their 

354.  Powers  and  duties  of  trustees  to  own  sales. 

make  conveyances.  364.  Caveat  emptor  as  applied  to  ju- 

dicial and  ministerial  sales. 

§  345.  Official  conveyances  generally. — Under  the  title  of 
official  conveyances  we  propose  to  group  such  transfers  of  real 
property  as  are  effected  by  judicial  sales;  sales  under  execution; 
sales  by  executors,  administrators  or  other  personal  representa- 
tives under  judicial  license ;  sales  by  executors  and  administra- 
tors under  power  conferred  by  will;  sales  by  trustees  and  mort- 
gagees ;  sales  by  tax  collectors,  and  generally  any  sale  in  which 
the  grantor  acts  not  in  his  own  right,  but  in  an  official,  fiduciary 
or  ministerial  character.  Such  conveyances  are  made  without  the 
co-operation  of  the  owner,  and  often  against  his  will.  Statutes 
very  generally  provide  that  under  certain  circumstances  the  in- 
terest of  one  incapable  of  conveying,  or  of  one  capable  of  con- 
veying but  unwilling  to  do  so,  may  be  transferred  to  another  by  a 
judicial  or  other  proceeding.  A  judicial  sale  is  had  in  cases  in 
which  there  is  a  proceeding  in  rem  affecting  definite  property; 
while  a  sale  under  execution  is  based  on  a  general  judgment  for 
so  much  money.  A  conveyance  made  under  an  order  or  decree  of 
court  is  executed  by  an  agent  or  officer  of  the  court  legally  ap- 
pointed and  commissioned  for  that  purpose;  while  a  conveyance 
based  on  an  execution  to  make  funds  to  satisfy  a  judgment  for 

379 


§    346  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  380 

money  is  made  by  a  ministerial  officer  of  the  law.^  In  either  case 
the  officer  executing  the  conveyance  acts  only  in  pursuance  of  a 
naked  power  conferred  upon  him  by  statute  or  order  of  court, 
passing  only  such  a  title  as  the  judgment  debtor,  deceased  person, 
etc.  had,  without  covenants  for  title.  In  this  class  of  conveyances 
the  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  applies,  in  the  sense  that  the  pur- 
chaser will  be  deemed  to  have  entered  into  the  contract  with  the 
understanding  that  he  is  to  take  the  title,  such  as  it  is,  without 
an  express  contract  to  that  efifect.  A  judicial  sale  is  a  sale  of  the 
interest  of  the  defendant  in  the  action,  and  nothing  more.^  No 
warranty  is  given  or  implied.^  A  person  executing  a  conveyance 
in  a  representative  capacity,  such  as  administrator,  guardian,  or 
trustee,  can  not  bind  the  estate  he  represents  by  covenants  for 
title,  nor  is  the  estate  bound  by  covenants  implied  from  the  use 
of  the  words  "grant,  bargain,  and  sell."*  The  mode  of  acquiring 
title  to  real  property  by  official  conveyances  is  regulated  by  the 
law  of  the  state  where  the  land  is  situated,  and  the  validity  of 
such  conveyances  depends  upon  the  substantial  conformity  of  the 
proceedings  to  that  law.^ 

In  abstracting  deeds  of  the  character  under  discussion  every 
material  part  should  be  set  forth  with  such  fullness  that  no  rea- 
sonable inquiry  shall  remain  unanswered.  It  is  important  that 
every  recital  be  stated,  because  they  are  always  notice  to  the  pur- 
chaser of  the  facts  recited,  and  of  everything  to  which,  if  fol- 
lowed up  by  reasonable  inquiry,  they  naturally  lead.  The  recitals 
should  show  whether  or  not  the  officer  had  authority  to  make  the 
conveyance. 

§  346.  Recitals  in  official  deeds. — Official  deeds  usually 
contain  one  or  more  formal  recitals  setting  forth  the  authority 
under  which  the  officer  acts,  and  briefly  giving  a  narrative  of  the 
proceedings  leading  up  to  the  conveyance.  Such  deeds  are  often 
required  by  statute  to  contain  recitals  of  certain  facts,  and  it  being 
thus  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  make  such  recitals,  they  are,  when 
made,  taken  as  prima  facie  true."     But  such  recitals  have  been 

1  Norton  v.  Reardon,  67  Kans.  302,  *  Foote  v.  Clark,  102  Mo.  394,  14  S. 
n  Pac.  861,  100  Am.  St.  459.  W.  981,  11  L.  R.  A.  861. 

2  O'Neal    V.    Wilson,   21    Ala.    288;  ^  Buell  v.  Cross,  4  Ohio  327. 
AIcLouth  V.  Rathbone,  19  Ohio  21.  e  Williamson    v.    Mayer,    117    Ala. 

3  Brackcnridge    v.    Dawson,    7    Ind.  253,   23    So.   3;    Bray   v.   Adams,    114 
383;  King  v.  Gunnison,  4  Pa.  St.  171.  Mo.   486.    21    S.    W.   853;    Miller 

Miller,  89  N.  Car.  402. 


I 


381  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    347 

held  not  sufficient  to  dispense  with  proof  of  the  facts  recited,  as 
against  third  persons/ 

Recitals  in  an  executor's  deed  are  not  competent  to  establish 
the  testator's  will,  the  probate  thereof,  and  the  proceedings  end- 
ing in  the  execution  of  the  deed,  as  against  persons  not  in  privity 
with  the  grantor.®  A  deed  by  an  executor,  administrator,  guard- 
ian, or  other  person  acting  in  like  capacity,  should  contain  recitals 
of  the  power  under  which  the  grantor  acts  in  making  the  convey-, 
ance.  If  a  person  in  such  representative  capacity  executes  a  deed 
without  such  recitals,  and  signs  it  with  addition  merely  of  the 
words  indicating  the  capacity  in  which  he  intends  to  act,  as,  for 
instance,  "administrator,"  etc.,  the  deed  is  strictly  his  own  per- 
sonal deed.^ 

Also  a  sheriff's  deed  should  contain  recitals  sufficient  to  show 
the  authority  under  which  he  acted  in  making  the  sale.  They 
should  show  the  authority  to  sell,  and  a  sale  made  substantially 
according  to  law.^'^  All  the  facts  which  constitute  the  foundation 
of  title,  and  without  which  the  sale  would  be  void,  must  be  re- 
cited." But  recitals  other  than  those  which  show  the  sheriff's 
authority,  and  his  acts  in  executing  it,  are  not  necessary,  and  may 
be  omitted  even  when  required  by  statute.^"  The  deed  need  not 
recite  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  the  names  of  the  parties, 
if  the  execution  is  valid. ^"  A  misrecital  of  facts  authorizing  a 
sale  by  the  sheriff  does  not  avoid  his  deed,  if  the  necessary  facts 
actually  exist. ^* 

In  the  case  of  a  sale  by  a  tax  collector  the  deed  must  show  by 
its  recitals  that  the  statute  has  been  strictly  complied  with.^^  The 
abstract  should  show  every  recital  which  the  statute  requires  if 
they  are  contained  in  the  deed,  even  though  they  are  regarded  as 
matters  of  inducement. 

§  347.  Sheriff's  deed  on  execution  sale. — A  certificate  of 
sale  on  execution  is  usually  issued  to  the  purchaser,  and  this  may 

7  Lawless  v.  Stamp,  108  Iowa  601,  Am.  Dec.  442;  Perkins  v.  Dibble,  10 
79  N.  W.  365.  Ohio  433,  36  Am.  Dec.  97. 

8  Miller  v.  Miller,  63  Iowa  387,  19  is  Perkins  v.  Dibble,  10  Ohio  433, 
N.  W.  251.  36  Am.  Dec.  97. 

"Bobb  V.  Barnum,  59  Mo.  394  i-*  Martin  v.  Wilbourne.  2  Hill   (S. 

10  Martin  v.  Bonsack,  61  Mo.  556.  Car.)  395,  27  Am.  Dec.  393. 

11  Armstrong  v.  McCoy,  8  Ohio  i^  Brooks  v.  Rooney,  11  Ga.  423,  56 
128.  31  Am.  Dec.  435.  Am.  Dec.  430. 

12  Bettison  v.  Budd,  17  Ark.  546,  65 


§    347  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  •  382 

be  assigned  to  another,  entitling  the  assignee  to  the  deed  from  the 
sheriff/"'  But  a  deed  to  a  person  other  than  the  one  to  whom  the 
certificate  was  issued,  or  an  assignee  thereof,  is  void.^'  A  sher- 
iff's certificate  of  purchase  does  not  operate  to  pass  any  title  to 
the  purchaser  in  the  absence  of  the  execution  of  a  deed  by  him 
after  the  expiration  of  the  period  allowed  for  redemption.^* 

The  legal  title  remains  in  the  judgment  debtor  until  the  execu- 
tion and  delivery  of  the  sheriff's  deed.^^  But  where  one  entitled 
to  receive  the  deed  dies,  the  subsequent  execution  of  it  to  him,  al- 
though void,  does  not  affect  the  title  of  those  claiming  under 
him.2° 

Where  the  deed  was  made  to  a  person  other  than  the  pur- 
chaser at  the  sale,  the  certificate  of  purchase  together  with  the 
assignment  thereof  to  the  grantee  should  be  shown  in  the  abstract, 
or  its  absence  noted. 

It  is  generally  provided  by  statute  that  the  sheriff  selling  land 
under  a  writ  of  execution,  shall  make  to  the  purchaser  as  good 
and  sufficient  deed  of  conveyance  of  the  land  sold  as  the  execution 
defendant  could  have  made  at,  or  any  time  after  he  became  liable 
on  the  judgment;  that  the  deed  shall  be  sufficient  evidence  of  the 
legality  of  such  sale,  and  the  proceedings  therein,  until  the  con- 
trary is  proved,  and  shall  vest  in  the  purchaser  as  good  and  as 
perfect  an  estate  in  the  property  as  was  vested  in  the  judgment  de- 
fendant at  the  time  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment;  that  such 
deed  shall  recite  the  execution,  the  names  of  the  parties,  and  the 
amount  and  date  of  the  rendition  of  the  judgment ;  and  that  the 
deed  shall  be  executed,  acknowledged  and  recorded  as  is  provided 
by  law  to  perfect  the  conveyance  of  real  estate  in  other  cases.  In 
order  that  the  sale  may  be  effective  to  divest  the  title  of  the  judg- 
ment debtor,  and  to  vest  it  in  the  purchaser,  it  must  have  been 
made  under  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction 
of  the  subject-matter  and  the  parties.  The  form  prescribed  by 
statute  should  be  followed  in  deeds  of  this  character,  but  in  the 
absence  of  a  statutory  form  any  language  showing  an  intention 
to  pass  title  to  the  purchaser  will  suffice.    The  deed  should  always 

i«  Oliver  v.  Dougherty,  8  Ariz.  65,  i"  Paxton   v.   Heron,  41    Colo.   147, 

68  Pac.  553 ;  Conger  v.  Babcock,  87  92  Pac.  15,  124  Am.  St.  123. 

Ind.  497.  ^"Diamond    v.    Turner,    11    Wash. 

IT  Carpenter  v.  Sherfy,  71   111.  427.  189,  39  Pac.  379. 

18  Hill  V.  Swihart,  148  Ind.  319,  47 
N.  E.  705. 


383  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    348 

contain  apt  and  proper  words  of  grant,  release  or  conveyance. ^^ 
The  recitals  prescribed  by  statute  to  be  inserted  in  sheriff's  deeds 
have  been  held  to  be  no  part  of  the  deed,  and  an  omission  to 
recite  or  a  misrecital  of  the  judgment  or  execution  under  which 
the  sale  was  made,  does  not  invalidate  the  deed.""  In  case  the 
deed  does  not  show  on  its  face  the  essential  requirements  of  a 
valid  sale,  these  may  be  shown  by  the  return  on  the  execution,"^ 
but  some  courts  have  held  that  where  there  is  a  material  variance 
between  the  sheriff's  return  and  the  deed  executed  by  him,  the 
deed  is  invalid."* 

§  348.  Description  of  premises  sold  on  execution. — Like 
all  other  deeds  purporting  to  convey  land,  a  sheriff's  deed  which 
does  not  describe  or  designate  the  lands,  is  invalid  for  uncer- 
tainty."'" The  land  sold  is  required  to  be  described  with  sufficient 
certainty  to  enable  a  person  of  common  understanding  to  identify 
it."°  If  by  reason  of  a  failure  to  give  a  proper  description  of  the 
land,  a  sale  is  invalid,  the  purchaser,  it  is  held,  is  subrogated  to 
the  lien  of  the  judgment."^  Equity  will  correct  a  mistake  in  a 
sheriff's  deed,  where  a  part  of  the  premises  are  omitted  from  the 
description,  when  a  case  of  mistake  is  established  by  competent 
evidence."'*  If  the  purchaser  at  a  sale  on  execution  receives  a  deed 
which  is  invalid  for  want  of  proper  description  of  the  property, 
he  is  entitled  to  another  correct  in  form."^  Where  the  description 
is  accurate  but  general,  the  land  conveyed  may  be  clearly  located 
and  identified  by  extrinsic  evidence.^"  So  the  description  w'ill  be 
sufficient  if,  with  the  aid  of  extrinsic  evidence,  the  land  can  be 
located  and  identified.^^  A  defective  description  in  a  sheriff's 
deed  may  be  remedied  by  a  new  deed  ordered  from  the  court  issu- 
ing the  process,  and  a  new^  deed  may  be  executed  to  take  the  place 
of  one  that  has  been  lost  before  registration.^" 

21  Johnson  v.  Bantock,  38  111.  111.  26  fjerrick  v.  Ammerman,  32  Minn. 

22  Wilson  V.  Campliell,  33  Ala.  249,     544,  21  N.  W.  836. 

70  Am.    Dec.  586;    Clark  v.    Sawyer,         27  jones  v.  Smith,  55  Tex.  383. 

48    Cal.    133;    Hill    v.    Reynolds,    93         28Zingsem   v.    Kidd,   29   N.   J.    Eq. 

Maine   25,   44   Atl.    135,    74    Am.    St.  516. 

329.  20  Thornton  v.  Mi.skimmon,  48  Mo. 

23Stinson   v.   Ross,   51    Maine   556,  219. 
81  Am.  Dec.  591.  3°  Smith  v.   Crosby,  86  Tex.  15,  23 

2*  Landreaux  v.  Foley,  13  La.  Ann.  S.  W.  10,  40  Am.  St.  818. 
114;  Pfeiffer  v.  Lindsay,  66  Tex.  123,         ^i  j^j^fjej-son    v.    Casey-Swasev    Co. 

1  S.  W.  264.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  120  S.  W.  918. 

25  Driver    v.    Spence,    1    Ala.    540;         32  McMillan     v.     Edwards,     75     N. 

Swift  V.  Lee,  65  111.  336;  Stewart  v.  Car.  81. 
Perkins,  110  Mo.  660,  19  S.  W.  989. 


§    349  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  384 

§  349.  Acknowledgment  of  sheriff's  deed. — Sheriffs'  deeds 
are  usually  required  to  be  acknowledged  before  the  clerk  of  the 
court  of  the  county  where  the  land  is  situated,  and  the  certificate 
of  acknowledgment  to  be  indorsed  thereon  by  the  clerk."'''^  In 
some  jurisdictions  an  acknowledgment  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  statute  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  sheriff's  deedf*  while 
in  others  its  validity  does  not  depend  upon  its  being  acknowledged 
at  all,  and  hence,  any  defect  in  the  certificate  can  have  no  effect 
on  the  validity  of  the  deed.^^  The  language  of  the  deed  itself 
may  be  referred  to,  to  aid  a  defective  certificate  of  acknowledg- 
ment."'' The  acknowledgment  of  a  sheriff's  deed  before  a  proper 
officer  raises  a  presumption  of  delivery.^^ 

§  350.     Construction  and   operation  of  sheriff's  deeds. — 

The  sherift"s  deed  clothes  the  purchaser  with  such  title  as  the 
judgment  defendant  had,  and,  where  the  proceedings  were  regu- 
lar, relates  back  to  the  date  of  the  acquisition  of  the  lien."^  He 
takes  title  subject  to  the  equities  and  rights  of  third  parties  ac- 
quired prior  to  the  judgment  under  which  the  property  was  sold,"" 
and  to  the  judgment  defendant's  right  to  be  relieved  from  the 
effect  of  any  fraud  practiced  in  making  the  sale.*"  A  mere  irreg- 
ularity in  the  issuance  of  the  execution  is  not  usually  fatal, *^  but 
an  irregularity  in  a  transcript  upon  which  the  execution  is  issued 
has  a  more  serious  effect.*"  The  title  of  the  purchaser  does  not 
depend  on  the  return  of  the  writ,*^  and  the  rights  acquired  at  the 
sale  are  not  affected  by  the  subsequent  loss  of  the  writ.'**  The 
general  rule  is  that  a  sheriff's  deed  is  of  itself  prima  facie  evi- 
dence that  the  grantee  therein  took  the  same  title  that  the  execu- 
tion defendant  had  at  the  time  the  judgment  w-as  rendered,*'^  and 

33  Fail  V.  Goodti'tle,  1  111.  201 ;  Ca-  Grand    Pac.    Gold   Min.    Co.,    10   Gal. 

vender  v.   Smith,  5  Iowa  157;  Ham-  App.  415,  102  Pac.  548. 

mond  V.  Gordon,  93  Mo.  223,  6  S.  W.  ^'j  National      Broadway      Bank      v. 

93;  Terrell  v.  Martin,  64  Tex.  121.  Denny,  133  Ga.  227,  65  S.  E.  412. 

3*  Adams  v.  Buchanan,  49  Mo.  64;  ^o  Bowling  v.  Bowling  (Ky.  App.), 

Boal  V.  King.  6  Ohio  11;   In  re  De-  118  S.  W.  923. 

Haven's  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  Z73.  «  McKeithen  v.  Blue,   149  N.  Car. 

35  Stephenson  v.  Thompson,  13  111.  95,  62  S.  E.  769,  128  Am.  St.  654. 

186;  Ogden  v.  Walters,  12  Kans.  282;  ^-  Schmitt  v.  Weber,  239  111.  377,  88 

In  re  Smith,  4  Nev.  254,  97  Am.  Dec.  N.  E.  268. 

531.  43\Veldon  v.  Roger.s,   157  Cal.  410, 

3«  Owen  v.  Baker.  101   Mo.  407,  14  108  Pac.  266. 

S.  W^  175,  20  Am.  St.  618.  44  Miller  v.  Goodin  (Ky.  App.),  124 

37  Robisson   v.    Miller,    158    Pa.  -St.  S.  W.  818. 

177.  27  Atl.  887.  45  Alontgomery  v.  Robinson,  49  Cal. 

3s  San   Domingo   Gold   Min.   Co.  v.  258;  Hadden  v.  Johnson,  7  Ind.  394; 


385  OFFICIAL   CONVEYANCES  §    351 

is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  judgment  itself.*® 
Where  a  deed  executed  by  the  sheriff  to  a  purchaser  at  a  sale  on 
execution  contains  all  the  recitals  required  by  the  statute,  and  was 
duly  made  and  executed,  acknowledged  and  recorded,  as  required 
by  law,  such  deed  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  legality  and 
regularity  of  the  sale.*''  As  a  general  proposition,  any  error  in 
the  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  execution  of  the  deed  will  not 
affect  the  title  of  the  purchaser,  where  he  is  not  culpable.  His 
title  can  not  be  attacked  collaterally.*^ 

§  351.  Statutory  sheriff's  deeds. — In  many  states  a  form 
for  sheriff's  deeds  is  prescribed  by  statute.  These  statutes  are 
generally,  but  not  universally,  declared  to  be  directory  merely. *** 
But  these  statutes  declare  the  legal  effect  of  the  form  prescribed, 
and,  where  used  in  a  deed,  make  it  sufficient  evidence  of  the 
legality  of  the  sale,  and  the  proceedings  therein,  until  the  con- 
trary is  proved.  By  adherence  to  the  prescribed  form  there  is 
little  danger  of  misrecitals,  and  small  ground  for  collateral 
impeachment.  By  their  use  the  purchaser  becomes  vested  with  as 
good  and  perfect  an  estate  in  the  premises  as  was  vested  in  the 
execution  defendant  at,  or  after,  the  time  when  the  property  be- 
came liable  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judgment.  These  statutory 
forms  are  usually  limited  to  a  recital  of  the  judgment,  execution, 
sale,  and  the  authority  of  the  officer  making  the  sale.  The  grant- 
ing clause  of  such  deeds  is  usually  confined  to  the  most  apt  and 
simple  words  of  grant  or  transfer.  In  fact,  little  else  is  usually 
contained  in  such  forms  than  what  is  required  in  a  synopsis 
thereof  in  an  abstract.    An  example  of  such  synopsis  is  appended : 


John  Williams,  Sheriff  of 
Grant  County,  Ind., 


Sherift''s  Deed. 
Dated  July  12,  1893. 
Recorded  July  15,  1893. 
Deed  record  No.  75,  page  36. 


to 
Samuel  BHnn. 
Recites  that  whereas,  on  the  12th  day  of  January,  1893,  Ephriam 


Owen  V.  Baker.   101   AIo.  407,   14   S.  "s.  Moore  v.  Neil,  39  111.  256,  89  Am. 

W.  175,  20  Am.  St.  618.  Dec,  303;   Bray  v.  Adams,   114  Mo. 

"f-Everson  v.   State,  66  Nebr.    154,  486.  21  S.  W.  853;  Wilkins  v.  Huse, 

92  N.  W.  137.  9  Ohio  154. 

^nVebster  v.  Daniel,  47  Ark.   131.  ^9  Wright    v.    Young,    6    Ore.    87; 

14  S.  W.  550;  Kimmel  v.  Meier,  106  Bludworth    v.    Poole,    21    Tex.    Civ. 

111.  App.  251.  App.  551,  53  S.  W.  717. 

25 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    352  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  386 

Creviston  recovered  a  judgment  against  William  Gaines,  defend- 
ant therein,  for  $500.00,  and  costs  of  suit,  upon  which  an  execu- 
tion was  issued  on  the  10th  day  of  April,  1893,  directed  to  the 
sheriff  of  the  county  and  state  aforesaid  to  execute,  and  which 
execution  was,  on  the  12th  day  of  April,  1893,  levied  on  the 
premises  hereinafter  described;  and  having  advertised  the  time 
and  place  of  sale  of  same  according  to  law,  said  premises  were 
struck  off  and  sold  to  Samuel  Blinn  for  the  sum  above  mentioned, 
that  being  the  highest  and  best  bid  received.     Therefore,  said 

sheriff,  in  consideration  of  the  premises,  and  the  sum  of  $ , 

"do  hereby  grant  and  convey"  unto  said  Samuel  Blinn,  the  fol- 
lowing described  real  estate  [describing  same].  Acknowledged 
July  12,  1893. 

§  352.  Sheriff's  deed  in  execution  of  decree. — As  a  court 
of  equity  has,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  no  power  to  create  or 
transfer  title,  a  decree  for  that  purpose  must  direct  the  making 
of  a  conveyance,  and  the  title  passes  by  virtue  of  the  conveyance 
and  not  by  virtue  of  the  decree  alone.  The  conveyance  made 
under  the  decree  is  ordinarily  by  a  master  commissioner  or  ref- 
eree appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose,  but  not  infrequently 
the  conveyance  is  made  by  the  sheriff  either  through  special  ap- 
pointment or  by  virtue  of  his  office.  But  a  sale  made  by  a  sheriff 
under  a  decree  is  a  judicial  sale,  or  a  sale  made  by  the  court 
through  the  sheriff  acting  as  a  ministerial  officer  only.  In  those 
states  where  the  older  mode  of  selling  under  a  decree  of  a  court 
of  equity  has  been  superseded  by  the  "special  execution"  or 
"mortgage  execution,"  the  deed  w-hich  vests  the  title  in  the  buyer 
under  judgment  or  decree  is  also  a  "sheriff's  deed,"  made  by  the 
officer  who  conducted  the  sale.  A  deed  by  a  sheriff  under  a  de- 
cree differs  but  little  from  a  deed  made  by  that  officer  under  ex- 
ecution. In  the  former  case  his  conveyance  must  always  be  re- 
ported to  the  court  for  confirmation.  Whether  the  deed  made  to 
the  purchaser  at  a  decretal  sale  be  called  a  sheriff's  or  commis- 
sioner's deed,  it  has  the  same  effect — that  of  vesting  in  the  pur- 
chaser the  title  of  all  the  parties  to  the  cause,  plaintiff's  as  well  as 
defendants,  such  as  they  had  at  the  sale  or  before  it,  since  the 
commencement  of  the  suit.^°  The  sheriff  is  usually  appointed  to 
make  the  sale  and  conveyance  where  there  is  no  master."^ ^     And 

50  Young  V.  Brand,  15  Nebf.  601,  19  •"'i  Childs  v.  Alexander,  22  S.  Car. 
N.  W.  494.  169. 


387  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    353 

where  the  sheriff  is  appointed  the  sale  may  be  made  by  his  dep- 
uty/' 

§  353.  Deeds  by  masters,  commissioners  and  referees. — 
Deeds  under  decretal  sales  are  executed  by  a  person  who  receives 
his  appointment  from  the  court  rendering  the  decree."'^  and  the 
defendant  whose  property  is  sold  need  not  join  in  the  convey- 
ance.^* Aside  from  the  sheriff  or  clerk,  who  are  sometimes  ap- 
pointed to  make  the  deed,  they  are  usually  made  by  masters,  com- 
missioners, or  referees.  The  deed  made  by  such  officer  should 
contain  recitals  sufficient  to  show  the  authority  under  which  he 
acted  in  making  the  sale,  and  where  confirmation  is  required  a 
deed  made  without  it  is  a  nullity  and  passes  no  title.^^ 

The  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  order  of  sale  need  not  be  set 
forth  at  length;  but  where  the  conveyance  is  offered  in  evidence 
in  support  of  title,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  enough  of  the  rec- 
ord of  the  proceedings  to  show  that  the  parties  holding  title 
affected  by  the  deed,  and  also  the  land  itself,  were  before  the 
court,  and  that  it  was  sold  under  a  decree  by  the  person  author- 
ized to  make  the  sale,  and  that  the  sale  was  confirmed  by  the  court 
rendering  the  decree  and  order. ^*^  The  deed  passes  to  the  pur- 
chaser all  the  title  had  by  the  parties  to  the  suit,  and  all  the  title 
of  those  who  have  derived  their  interest  from  any  of  such  parties 
during  the  pendency  of  the  suit.^^ 

In  abstracting  a  deed  of  the  character  under  discussion,  all  that 
is  necessary  is  a  condensed  statement  of  the  proceedings  author- 
izing the  officer's  act,  his  compliance  with  the  decree  and  order  of 
sale,  and  the  confirmation.  The  synopsis  of  the  deed  should  come 
directly  after  the  statement  of  the  court  proceedings  leading  up  to 
the  sale  and  the  officer's  certificate  of  sale.  The  following  ex- 
ample of  synopsis  is  submitted : 

George    Anderson, 

Commissioner, 

to 

Henry  Hall. 

Recites  that  said  George  Anderson  was  duly  appointed  commis- 

52  Craig  V.  Fox,  16  Ohio  563.  Johnson  v.  Hines.  61  Md.  122 ;  Valle 

53  Peake  v.  Young,  40  S.  Car.  41,  v.  Fleming,  19  Mo.  454,  61  Am.  Dec. 
18  S.  E.  237.  566. 

54  Miller  V.  Sherry,  2  Wall.  (U.  S.)  '"^  Ronk  v.  Higginbotham,  54  W. 
237.  17  L.  ed.  827.  Va.  137,  46  S.  E.  128. 

ssRawHngs  v.   Bailey.   15   111.    178;         s- Harrj-man  v.  Starr,  56  Md.  63. 


J 


Commissioner's 

d 

e  e  d 

under 

foreclosure. 

Dated,  etc. 

5|J                 5k                =1'                 5^ 

* 

* 

*      * 

*                 *                *                 * 

* 

* 

*      * 

§    354  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  388 

sioner  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  Marion  County,  Indiana,  in  a  suit 
in  said  court  pending  wherein was  plaintiff,  and de- 
fendant, and  was  authorized  by  said  court  to  sell  and  make  con- 
veyance of  the  real  estate  hereinafter  described.     That  on  the 

day  of ,  19 — ,  said  court  entered  a  decree  in  said  cause 

ordering  and  directing  a  sale  of  said  premises  to  satisfy  and  pay 
the  mortgage  thereon  as  described  in  the  petition  in  said  action. 
That  in  pursuance  of  said  decree,  and,  by  virtue  of  the  authority 
conferred  on  him  by  said  court,  the  said  commissioner  did,  on  the 

day  of ,  19 — ,  offer  said  premises  for  sale  to  the  highest 

bidder,  whereupon  said  Henry  Hall,  bid  therefor  the  sum  of 

$ ,  and  that  being  the  highest  and  best  bid  received,  the  same 

was  struck  off  and  sold  to  said  Henry  Hall  on  the day  of 

,  19 — .     And  whereas  said  Henry  Hall  thereupon  paid  said 

commissioner  the  sum  bid  therefor,  whereupon  said  commissioner 
made  and  issued  to  him  the  usual  certificate  in  duplicate  in  due 
form  of  law,  and  caused  a  copy  thereof  to  be  filed  in  the  re- 
corder's office  of  said  county.  And,  whereas,  more  than  twelve 
months  having  elapsed,  and  no  redemption  having  been  made  of 
the  premises,  the  said  commissioner  granted,  bargained  and  sold 
to  said  Henry  Hall,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  forever  the  following 
described  real  estate  [description  same' as  in  mortgage  and  peti- 
tion in  said  suit].    Acknowledged,  etc. 

§  354.  Powers  and  duties  of  trustees  to  make  convey- 
ances.— A  trustee  is  one  in  whom  an  interest,  power  or  legal 
estate  is  vested  under  an  express  or  implied  agreement  to  admin- 
ister or  exercise  it  for  the  benefit  or  to  the  use  of  another.'^^  The 
powers  of  a  trustee  are  either  general  or  special.  The  general 
powers  of  a  trustee  are  those  such  as  are  deemed  by  law  incident 
to  the  office  of  trustee.  Special  powers  are  those  conferred  by 
the  settler  himself  by  the  express  provisions  of  the  instrument 
whereby  he  creates  such  trust.  A  trustee  is  bound  by  the  direc- 
tions contained  in  the  trust  instrument.  His  powers  do  not  de- 
pend on  a  rule  of  law  but  on  the  interpretation  of  the  trust  instru- 
ment with  the  settler's  intention.'^"  The  power  so  conferred  is 
strictly  construed.  Consequently  a  power  to  sell  does  not  include 
a  power  to  mortgage.""     Generally  speaking,  a  trustee  has  such 

58  Ogden  City  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,     Northern  Trust  Co.,  250  111.  86,  95  N. 
31  Ore.  150.  49  Pac.  975.  E.  59.  45  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  411n. 

59  Merchants'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.        ^'^  Hamilton  v.  Hamilton,  149  Iowa 

321.  128  N.  W.  380. 


389  OFFICIAL   CONVEYANCES  §    355 

powers  over  the  subject-matter  of  a  trust  as  will  enable  him  to 
carry  out  the  legal  purposes  and  intent  of  the  settler  as  indicated 
by  the  directions,  nature  and  purpose  of  the  settlement.'^ ^  At  law 
the  trustee  is  regarded  as  the  legal  owner  of  the  estate,"  and  upon 
his  death  the  estate  descends  to  his  heirs  burdened  with  the  same 
duties  and  responsibilities  as  when  held  by  the  ancestor.*'^  But 
where  the  trust  estate  is  held  by  two  or  more  persons  jointly,  and 
one  of  them  dies,  the  title  remains  in  the  survivor  or  survivors  to 
the  exclusion  of  any  interest  by  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  trustee.^* 
By  statute  in  some  states,  however,  the  title  vests  in  the  courts  of 
equity  until  a  successor  is  appointed. '^'^  A  power  to  sell  land  given 
to  two  persons  jointly  can  be  exercised  only  by  both  joining  in 
the  conveyance,  but  if  such  power  is  coupled  with  an  interest,  a 
separate  sale  will  pass  only  the  interest  of  the  party  selling.''*' 
Upon  the  appointment  of  a  successor  to  a  retiring  trustee  it  is  not 
necessary  for  the  latter  to  make  a  conveyance  of  his  title  to  the 
new  trustee  to  enable  the  latter  to  execute  the  trust. *'^ 

§  355.  Trustee's  conveyance  of  legal  title. — The  holder  of 
the  legal  title  should  make  the  deed  under  a  power  of  sale  in  a 
deed  of  trust.  If  such  title  be  in  a  trustee  the  grantee  becomes 
vested  with  the  same  title  and  estate  as  the  trustee  had.  The 
trustee  is  not  required  to  enter  into  any  personal  covenants  him- 
self against  general  incumbrances,*'®  though  he  usually  covenants 
against  such  as  are  done  or  suffered  by  himself.  The  purchaser 
is  bound  to  know  that  there  can  be  no  personal  w^arranty  of  title. 
He  is  also  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  title  as  it  stands  in  the 
trustee  with  all  its  defects  as  it  appears  of  record.*^''  It  would 
seem,  however,  that  if  the  conveyance  to  the  trustee  contains 
covenants  for  title,  the  benefit  of  them  will  pass  to  the  purchaser 
at  the  trustee's  sale,  and  he  may  maintain  an  action  thereon 
against  the  grantor.'^''    And  where  the  trustee,  selling  at  public 

«i  Murphy  V.  Delano,  95  Maine  229,  6"  Smith  v.  Glover,  50  Minn.  58,  52 

49  Atl.  1053,  55  L.  R.  A.  727.  N.  W.  210,  912. 

"2  Martin    v.    Poague,    4    B.    Mon.  «7  Reichert    v.    Missouri    &c.    Coal 

(Ky.)  524.  Co.,   231   111.  238,  83   N.   E.   166,   121 

^'s  Lawrence   v.    Lawrence,    181    111.  Am.  St.  307. 

248.  54  N.  E.  918.  es  pirst  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pearson,  119 

"4  Reichert    v.    Missouri    &c.    Coal  N.  Car.  494,  26  S.  E  46 

Co.,  231   111.  238,  83   N.   E.   166,   121  «9  Barnard  v.  Duncan,  38  Mo.  170, 

Am.  St.  307.  90  Am.  Dec.  416. 

G^Lecroix  v.  Malone,  157  Ala.  434,  -o  Taylor    v.    Lane,    18    Tex.    Civ. 

47   So.  725;    Dwenger  v.    Geary,    113  App.  545,  45  S.  W.  317. 
Ind.    106,    14    N.    E.    903;    Royce    v. 
Adams,  123  N.  Y.  402,  25  N.  E.  386. 


§    356  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  390 

auction  announces  that  the  land  is  sold  free  and  clear  of  all  in- 
cumbrances, and  it  afterward  appears  that  incumbrances  exist, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  purchaser  will  be  relieved.'* 

It  has  long  been  the  established  rule  that,  where  a  power  is  ex- 
ecuted, the  person  taking  under  it  takes  under  him  who  created 
the  power,  and  not  under  him  who  executes  it.  The  doctrine  that 
a  purchaser  from  a  trustee  with  notice  of  the  trust  shall  be 
charged  with  the  same  trust,  has  no  application  to  sales  of  trust 
estates  at  public  auction  under  the  terms  of  the  power  contained 
in  the  trust  deed.'"  A  purchaser  of  trust  property  is  not  bound 
to  see  to  the  proper  application  of  the  proceeds  of  sale  where  it 
appears  that  the  donor  of  the  power  confided  the  application  of 
the  purchase-money  to  the  judgment  and  discretion  of  the  trus- 
tee.^^  Nor  is  a  bona  fide  purchaser  who  pays  the  purchase-money 
to  the  trustee  bound  to  see  that  it  is  properly  applied  to  trust  the 
purpose.'* 

One  who  purchases  from  a  trustee  who  had  authority  to  sell 
acquires  a  title  to  the  property  sold,  and  the  title  thus  acquired  is 
not  affected  by  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  purchaser,  in  know- 
ingly aiding  the  trustee  in  misapplying  the  proceeds  of  the  sale, 
unless  such  misappropriation  be  the  result  of  an  arrangement  be- 
tween the  purchaser  and  the  trustee  prior  to  the  sale,  or  the  pur- 
chaser knew  that  the  trustee  was  selling  for  the  purpose  of  mis- 
appropriating the  proceeds."''  The  trust  may  be  of  such  a  char- 
acter as  to  oblige  the  purchaser  to  become  responsible  that  the 
trustee  properly  applies  the  purchase-money  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  the  trust.  It  is  a  question  of  the  intention  of  the 
creator  of  the  trust,  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument; 
and  if  any  doubt  arises,  a  verbal  copy  of  the  material  parts  of  the 
instrument  should  be  set  out  in  the  abstract.  An  intention  to 
make  the  purchaser  responsible  is  deemed  to  exist  where  the  terms 
of  the  trust  imperatively  requires  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  to  be 
paid  to  a  person  in  being,  and  competent  to  bind  himself  by  his 
receipt. 

§  356.  Testamentary  trust,  distinguished  from  power, 
charge,  and  estates  on  condition  subsequent. — In  the  nature 

■1  Schaeflfer  v.  Bond,  70  Md.  480.  ^4  Claiborne    v.     Holland,    88    Va. 

72  Wood  V.  Augustine,  61  Mo.  "46.  1046,  14  S.  E.  915. 

73  Franklin  Savings  Bank  v.  Tay-  ^s  fapigy  y.  Tapley,  115  Ga.  109,  41 
lor,  131  111.  376,  23  N.  E.  3')/.  S.  E.  235. 


391  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    357 

of  things,  there  is  a  wide  distinction  between  a  power  and  a  trust 
created  by  will.  In  the  former,  the  party  may  or  may  not  act  in 
his  discretion;  in  the  latter,  the  trust  will  be  executed,  notwith- 
standing his  omission  to  act.'"  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  says :  "One  of  the  tests  as  to  a  trust  or  a  power  is  that  a 
naked  power  to  sell  may  be  exercised  or  not  by  the  executors,  and 
is  discretionary,  while  an  imperative  direction  to  sell  and  dispose 
of  the  proceeds  is  a  power  coupled  with  a  trust."" 

A  charge  on  real  estate  is  distinguished  from  a  trust  thereof, 
in  that  in  case  of  the  former  the  real  estate  is  devised  generally 
for  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  devisee,  subject,  however,  to 
the  payment  by  him  of  a  sum  of  money  or  the  performance  of  a 
duty,  while  in  the  case  of  a  trust  the  devise  is  limited  to  some 
particular  purpose,  with  no  beneficial  interest  in  the  devise.^* 

An  estate  in  trust  created  by  will  is  distinguished  from  an 
estate  on  condition  subsequent  in  that  in  the  former  the  proper 
person  to  secure  the  performance  of  the  trust  are  not  the  heirs 
of  the  testator,  but  the  beneficiaries  of  the  trust  property;  while 
in  the  latter  estate  the  breach  of  the  condition  gives  the  testator 
and  his  heirs,  or  perhaps  his  devisees,  a  right  of  entry  on  the  land, 
which  is  the  legal  right,  enforcible  only  in  an  action  at  law.'^ 

§  357.  Trustees'  deeds. — Where  an  instrument  creating  a 
trust  confers  on  the  trustee  power  to  convey  the  property,  and  he 
afterwards  carries  out  or  executes  such  power,  the  deed  by  which 
he  does  so  ought  regularly  to  indicate  not  only  the  capacity  in 
which  he  executes  it,  but  also  should  show  by  recital  the  facts 
which  warrant  its  execution.  Such  recitals  may  prove  to  be  of 
value  to  the  grantee,  for  should  his  title  be  attacked  on  the  ground 
that  the  conveyance  was  not  authorized  by  the  existing  circum- 
stances, a  recital  of  those  circumstances  showing  that  it  was 
proper  for  the  trustee  to  make  the  conveyance,  will  be,  in  many 
jurisdictions,  regarded  as  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  proper 
circumstances  did  exist. ^°  It  is  also  sometimes  provided  in  deeds 
of  trust  that  the  recitals  contained  in  the  trustee's  deed  of  sale 
under  the  power  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts  stated 

76  Chew   V.    Hyman,    7    Fed.    7,    10  "Stanley  v.  Colt,  5  Wall.   (U.  S.) 

Biss.  (U.  S.)  240.  119.  18  L.  ed.  502. 

"■^  Taylor  v.   Benham,  5  How.    (U.  *°  Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Deering, 

S.)  233,  12  L.  ed.  130.  66  Cal.  281,  5  Pac.  353;  Tartt  v.  Clay- 

78  Lang  V.  Everling,  3  Misc.  530,  23  ton,    109   111.   579 ;    Beal   v.    Blair,    33 

N.  Y   S-  329.  52  N.  Y.  St.  489.  Iowa  318. 


§    357  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  392 

in  it.*"^  In  an  action  at  law,  however,  the  trustee's  deed  made 
under  a  power  in  a  trust  deed  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  sale 
under  the  power,  and  can  not  be  contradicted,  and  showai  to  have 
been  executed  in  violation  of  law,  and  therefore  fraudulent  and 
void.*^  The  recital  in  a  trustee's  deed  is  conclusive,  where  the 
deed  of  trust  empowers  the  trustee  to  make  it,  and  in  the  absence 
of  fraud  of  which  the  purchaser  at  the  trustee's  sale  had  notice. 

In  jurisdictions  w^here  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  the  payment  of 
a  debt  does  not  vest  the  legal  title  in  the  trustee,  it  is  generally 
held  that  the  instrument  of  conveyance  under  the  power  should 
be  executed  in  the  name  of  the  grantor  by  the  trustee  as  attorney 
in  fact.**^ 

Where  two  or  more  persons  are  appointed  to  execute  a  power 
of  sale  and  no  authority  is  given  to  a  less  number  than  the  whole 
to  act,  all  must  join  in  the  conveyance.^*  It  must  be  executed  by 
all  who  accept  the  trust."  But  upon  the  death  of  one  of  two  or 
more  trustees  to  whom  property  has  been  deeded,  the  survivor  or 
survivors  may  execute  a  valid  conveyance.**^  A  trustee,  whether 
vested  with  the  legal  title  or  having  only  a  naked  power  to  sell, 
should  execute  the  conveyance  in  his  own  name.  The  power  is 
one  of  personal  trust  and  confidence,  and  can  not  be  delegated. 

Where  a  trust  deed  forms  a  link  in  the  chain  of  title,  the  decla- 
ration of  trust  should  be  copied  verbatim  in  the  synopsis  of  that 
instrument  and  a  reference  thereto  made  in  abstracting  the  trus- 
tee's deed.  Should  the  trust  deed  be  omitted  from  the  abstract 
the  conditions  of  the  trust  as  recited  in  the  trustee's  deed  may  be 
noted  as  in  the  following  example  : 


Andrew  Baker,  trustee, 

to 

William  Zeigler. 


Trustee's  deed. 
Dated,  etc. 

Recites  that  whereas,   John 


Davis,  by  his  last  w\\\  and  testament  bearing  date  the day  of 

,    19 — ,   devised   the   lands   hereinafter   described   to   said 

81  Swain  V.  Mi«-.chell,  27  Tex.  Civ.  ^^  Shaw  v.  Canfield,  86  Mich.  1,  48 

App.  62,  66  S.  W.  61.  N.  W.  873. 

^2  Savings  &  Loan  Soc.  v.  Deering,  ^5  Pennsjlvania     Co.     for     Ins.     v. 

66   Cal.   281,   5    Pac.   353 ;    Ensley  v.  Bauerle.  143  III.  459.  33  N.  E.  166. 

Page,  13  Colo.  App.  452,  59  Pac.-225.  »<••  McCallister  v.  Ross,  155  Mo.  87, 

**3  Moseley  v.  Rambo,   106  Ga.  597,  55  S.  W.  1027. 
32  S.  E.  638:  Dendy  v.  Waite,  36  S. 
Car.  569,  15  S.  E.  712. 


393  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    358 

Andrew  Baker,  in  trust  to  hold  the  same  during  the  minority  o£ 
his  son,  George  Davis,  and  on  his  attaining  his  majority,  or  on 
his  death,  if  it  should  sooner  occur,  to  sell  and  convert  the  same 
into  money  for  the  purposes  in  said  will  specified,  with  power  in 
such  case  to  sell  in  such  manner  as  he  should  deem  proper.    And 

whereas,  the  said  George  Davis  died  on ,  before  attaining 

his  majority,  now  this  indenture  witnesseth :  That  the  said  An- 
drew Baker,  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  authority  to  him  given 
in  and  by  said  last  will  and  testament,  and  in  consideration  of 

the  sum  of  ^5 ,  does  grant,  sell  and  convey  to  William  Zeigler, 

his  heirs  and  assigns,  the  following  described  real  estate,  to  wit : 

[description].      Acknowledgment    dated    the  —  day    of  , 

19—. 

When  the  trustee's  deed  is  delivered  to  the  purchaser,  whether 
he  be  the  mortgagee,  his  assignee,  or  an  outside  party,  the  title 
passes  to  him  at  once,  and  all  right  of  foreclosure  or  redemption 
is  barred." 

§  358.  Mortgagee's  deed  under  power  of  sale. — Deeds  of 
trust  are  in  legal  effect  mortgages,  and  where  they  are  regarded 
as  conveyances  of  the  legal  estate  the  trustee  takes  such  estate, 
but  in  jurisdictions  where  mortgages  are  regarded  as  a  mere  lien, 
and  not  a  conveyance  of  the  legal  estate,  the  deed  of  trust  is 
sometimes  held  to  have  only  the  same  effect  as  a  mortgage.^®  The 
power  of  sale  in  a  deed  of  trust  is  sometimes  expressly  given  to 
the  mortgagee  or  his  assignee,  in  which  case  he,  or  his  assignee, 
by  a  valid  execution  of  the  power,  may  transfer  the  legal  title  to 
another.  So  long  as  the  mortgagee  retains  the  mortgage  the 
power  must  be  exercised  by  him;  and  when  it  has  been  wholly 
assigned  the  assignee  must  exercise  it.®^ 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  power  of  sale  may  be  exercised  by  any 
person  entitled  to  the  mortgage  debt.^"  When  the  mortgage  itself 
expressly  confers  a  power  of  sale  upon  the  mortgagee  or  his  legal 
representatives,  the  executor  or  administrator  of  such  mortgagee, 
upon  the  death  of  the  latter,  may  exercise  the  power. '^^     The 

"  Koch  V.  Briggs,   14  Cal.  256,  73  Kreig,  21  Nev.  404,  32  Pac.  641 ;  Mc- 

Am.  Dec.  651.  Lane  v.  Paschal,  47  Tex.  365. 

88  Newman    v.    Samuels,    17    Iowa  so  Woodruff  v.  Adair,  131  Ala.  530, 

528;   Lenox  v.  Reed,   12   Kans.  223;  32  So.  515. 

Webb   V.    Hoselton,   4   Nebr.   308,    19  »«  Harton  v.  Little,  176  Ala.  267,  57 

Am.    Rep.   638;    First    Nat.    Bank   v.  So.  851. 

"^  Stevens    v.    Shannahan,    160    111. 


§    359  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  394 

power  of  sale  given  to  the  mortgagee  is  a  power  coupled  with  an 
interest,  and  is  therefore  irrevocable."' 

The  deed  of  the  mortgagee  made  in  the  exercise  of  a  power 
expressly  given  in  a  power  of  sale  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust 
differs  in  no  material  respect  from  a  trustee's  deed.  It  should 
recite  the  power  by  virtue  of  which  the  sale  is  made,  though  per- 
haps such  a  recital  is  not  necessary  as  a  matter  of  law.  But  the 
deed  should  contain  all  the  recitals  required  by  the  statute.  Re- 
citals in  a  deed  made  by  a  mortgagee  under  a  power  of  sale,  of 
the  giving  of  due  notice  of  the  sale,  in  conformity  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  and  in  pursuance  of  the  provisions  of 
such  mortgage,  giving  the  particulars  of  the  notice,  are  prima 
facie  evidence  of  such  notice."^  The  mortgagee's  recitals  in  such 
deed  bind  not  only  the  mortgagee  but  as  well  the  mortgagor, 
equally  as  if  the  deed  were  executed  by  him  in  person,  for  the 
mortgagee  is  his  attorney  in  fact."*  If  the  deed  be  made  by  an 
attorney  of  the  mortgagee,  his  authority  should  be  evidenced  by 
a  writing  under  seal,  although  the  power  of  sale  expressly  author- 
izes the  mortgagee,  his  legal  representatives  or  attorney,  to  con- 
vey."^ The  mortgagee  can  not  sell  a  greater  interest  than  his 
mortgage  gives  him  authority  to  sell.  He  can  sell  only  what  was 
conveyed  to  him."" 

What  we  said  about  showing  in  the  abstract  such  recitals  as 
will  disclose  a  compliance  with  the  conditions  of  a  trust  and  the 
due  execution  of  a  power  by  a  trustee,  applies  as  well  to  deeds 
made  by  mortgagees  under  power  of  sale. 

§  359.  Executor's  deed. — If  a  testator  directs  by  will  that 
his  real  estate  be  sold  without  declaring  by  whom  the  sale  shall 
be  made,  the  power  to  sell,  if  no  contrary  intention  appear  from 
the  will,  shall  vest  in  the  executor."^  Where  a  will,  by  its  terms, 
so  disposes  of  the  proceeds  to  be  derived  from  a  sale  of  the  real 
estate  as  to  blend  and  mix  them  with  the  personal  estate,  the 
executor  has,  by  implication,  power  to  sell  such  real  estate."^  And 

330,    43    N.    E.    350;    Sulphur    Mines  "« Dearnalcy    v.    Chase,    136    Mass. 

Co.  V.  Thompson,  93  Va.  293,  25  S.  288. 

E.  232.  97  Munson  v.  Cole,  98  Ind.  502. 

•'^  Bradley    v.     Chester    Valley    R.  °®  Lippincott  v.  Lippincott,  19  N.  J. 

Co..  36  Pa.  St.  141.  Eq.  121  ;  Mott  v.  Ackerman.  92  N.  Y. 

93Tartt  V.  Clayton,  109  111.  579.  539;   Council  v.   Averett,  95   N.   Car. 

"*  Simson  v.  Eckstein,  22  Cal.  580.  131. 

»5  Watson  V.  Sherman,  84  111.  263. 


395  OFFICIAL   CONVEYANCES  §    359 

a  direction  in  the  will  to  convert  the  whole  estate  into  money  with- 
out specifying  who  shall  do  it,  or  how  it  shall  be  done,  confers 
upon  the  executor,  by  implication,  the  power  to  sell  the  real 
estate. *"*  But  the  making  of  certain  items  charges  upon  lands 
which  have  been  devised,  or  directing  that  the  lands  be  sold 
for  the  payment  of  debts,  does  not  authorize  an  executor  to  sell 
such  lands  without  an  order  of  court/ 

Any  expression  in  the  will  showing  an  intention  to  confer  upon 
the  designated  person  the  power  to  dispose  of  the  testator's  prop- 
erty by  deed  will  be  sufficient.  A  devise  and  direction  to  divide 
and  pay  over  the  shares  to  legatees,  where  a  division  is  imprac- 
ticable, implies  a  power  to  sell.  A  mere  direction  to  divide  is  not 
enough.  There  must  be  some  further  active  duty  to  perform.^ 
But  when  the  will  confers  upon  the  executor  the  power  to  sell 
and  convey  the  lands  of  his  testator,  he  may  sell  and  make  con- 
veyance thereof  without  first  procuring  from  the  court  an  order 
for  such  sale.^  The  power  of  sale  may  be  given  to  an  executor 
appointed  by  a  will  which  makes  no  direct  disposition  of  prop- 
erty.* An  executor's  power  and  right  to  act  is  derived  from  his 
testamentary  appointment;  his  powers,  under'the  law,  are  as  great 
as  those  of  an  administrator,  and  by  the  terms  of  the  will  may 
be  made  greater.^  He  does  not  take  title  to  real  estate,  or  ac- 
quire any  power  or  right  of  possession  therein,  unless  conferred 
by  statute  or  testamentary  provision.*^  His  duties  and  powers  are 
to  be  ascertained  from  an  inspection  of  the  will,  and  the  statutes, 
if  any,  which  are  applicable.^ 

In  construing  wills  the  courts  have  made  a  distinction  between 
a  devise  to  the  executor  of  real  estate,  with  directions  to  sell  the 
same  and  make  distribution  of  the  proceeds,  and  a  devise  which 
directs  that  real  estate  be  sold  and  the  proceeds  distributed  but 
without  passing  the  legal  tide  to  the  executor.  In  the  one  case  it 
is  held  that  the  executor  is  the  custodian  of  the  title  until  divested 
by  the  sale,  while  in  the  other  the  title  is  held  to  be  in  the  bene- 

93  Putnam  v.  Story.  132  Mass.  205;  *  Barber    v.    Barber,    17    Hun    (N. 

Collier  V.  Grimesey,  36  Ohio  St.  17.  Y.)   72. 

1  Duncan  v.  Gainey,  108  Ind.  579,  9  ^  Scott  v.  West,  63  Wis.  529,  24  N. 
N.  E.  470.  W.  161,  25  N.  W.  18. 

2  Harris  v.  Ingalls,  74  N.  H.  339,  68  "  Austin  v.  Chambers,  33  Okla.  40, 
Atl.  34.  124  Pac.  310. 

3  Bailey  v.  Rinker,  146  Ind.  129,  45  ^  Murphy  v.  Delano,  95  Maine  229, 
N.  E.  38.  49  Atl.  1053,  55  L.  R.  A.  727. 


§    360  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  396 

ficiary  or  the  heirs  until  the  sale  is  made.''  An  executor  selling  his 
testator's  property  under  a  power  in  the  will  should  recite  the 
power  and  execute  the  deed  in  his  own  name.''  W'here  an  execu- 
tor undertakes  to  pass  title  by  statutory  modes  it  must  appear  that 
those  modes  have  been  followed,  or  the  deed  will  be  a  nullity. 
But  where  the  will  gives  the  executor  full  power  to  convey  with- 
out applying  to  the  probate  court  for  an  order,  a  recital  of  the 
probate  of  the  will  and  lawful  proceedings  ending  in  the  execu- 
tion of  the  deed  is  all  that  is  necessary.  Deeds  of  executors,  as 
well  as  others  acting  in  a  fiduciary  capacity,  usually  contain  one 
or  more  formal  recitals  setting  forth  the  authority  under  which 
the  grantor  acts  and  briefly  giving  a  history  of  the  proceedings 
culminating  in  a  conveyance.  Such  deeds  are  often  required  by 
statute  to  contain  recitals  of  certain  facts,  and  it  being  thus  the 
duty  of  the  grantor  to  make  such  recitals,  they  are,  when  made, 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  facts  stated. 

§  360.  Administrator's  deed. — An  administrator  takes  no 
title  to  or  interest  in  the  real  estate  o-f  his  decedent,  but  only  a 
naked  power  to  sell,  and  this  power  is  conditioned  upon  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  personal  estate  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  dece- 
dent.^" The  title  to  the  real  estate,  at  the  death  of  the  ancestor 
intestate,  vests  at  the  instant  of  his  death  in  his  heirs,  and  they 
take  and  retain  such  title  with  all  the  rights  and  incidents  belong- 
ing thereto,  until  the  administrator  of  the  ances.tor's  estate  ef- 
fectively asserts  his  right  thereto  for  the  purposes  provided  in  the 
statute. ^^  An  administrator  can  not  sell  real  estate  oi  his  de- 
cedent without  an  order  of  court  previously  obtained  therefor. 
The  power  conferred  upon  an  administrator  is  purely  statutory 
and  can  legally  be  exercised  only  under  an  order  of  court. ^"-  The 
order  of  sale  should  comply  with  the  statute,  and  should  as  a  rule 
follow  the  petition,  and  should  so  describe  the  land  to  be  sold  that 
it  can  be  identified,  and  should  specifically  show  what  part  is  to 
be  sold.^^    The  order  must  precede  the  sale,  and  should  specify 

8  Smith  V.  Hunter,  241  III.  514.  89  Am.  Dec.  237;  Shaw  v.  Hoadley,  8 
N.  E.  686,  132  Am,  St.  231;  Brumfield  Blackf.  (Ind.)  165;  Overturf  v.  Du- 
V.  Drook.  101  Ind.  190.  gan.  29  Ohio  St.  230. 

9  Wolfe  V.  Hines,  93  Ga.  329,  20  S.  12  Tippecanoe  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
E.  322.  Carr,  40  Ind.  App.  125,  78  N.  E.  1043. 

10  Moore  v.  Moore,  155  Ind.  261.  57  ^^  Gelstrop  v.  Moore,  26  Miss.  206, 
N.  E.  242.  59  Am.  Dec.  254. 

"  Beckett  v.  Selover,  7  Cal.  215,  68 


397  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    360 

how  and  upon  what  terms  the  sale  shall  be  made ;  and  the  admin- 
istrator in  making  the  sale,  should  follow  the  order  and  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  authorizing  the  sale.'*  Until  the  sale  has 
been  reported  to  the  proper  court  and  confirmed,  it  is  incomplete 
and  no  title,  eitherlegal  or  equitable,  passes  to  the  purchaser/^ 

Four  things  are  necessary  to  vest  the  estate  in  the  purchaser : 
(1 )  A  sale  by  the  administrator;  (2)  a  confirmation  of  the  sale 
by  the  proper  court;  (3j  an  order  for  the  making  of  the  convey- 
ance, and  (4)  the  execution  of  such  conveyance.  Such  convey- 
ance, when  executed  and  delivered,  relates  back  to  the  time  when 
the  sale  was  confirmed  and  the  deed  ordered,  and  vests  the  same 
rights  in  the  purchaser  as  if  the  deed  had  been  executed  and  de- 
livered, and,  perhaps,  even  to  the  time  of  the  sale.'*' 

The  statutes  usually  prescribe  the  form  of  the  deed  to  be  used, 
and  often  provide  that  it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  set  out  in  the 
instrument  of  conveyance  all  the  proceedings  preliminary  to  the 
deed.  The  recitals  in  such  deeds  are  said  to  be  not  of  the  essence, 
but  only  of  the  form  of  the  deed,  and  while  the  purchaser  is  en- 
titled to  have  in  the  deed  all  the  recitals  required  by  the  statute, 
yet  their  omission  does  not  vitiate  the  deed.''  But  the  recitals  in 
an  administrator's  deed  of  the  acts  required  by  statute  in  making 
a  sale  are  prima  facie  evidence  of  their  performance.  The  ad- 
ministrator is  an  officer  of  the  law,  acting  under  the  obligations 
of  his  oath  of  office,  and  it  is  presumed  that  he  does  his  duty,  and 
fulfills  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  until  the  contrary  is 
proved.'-  This  is  particularly  the  case  after  a  lapse  of  time  which 
makes  the  instrument  an  ancient  deed."*  The  deed  should  con- 
tain recitals  of  the  power  under  which  the  administrator  acts  in 
making  the  conveyance.  If  he  executes  the  deed  without  such 
recitals,  and  signs  it  with  the  addition  merely  of  the  words  indi- 
cating the  capacity  in  which  he  intends  to  act,  as,  for  instance, 
"administrator,"  etc.,  the  deed  is  strictly  his  own  personal  deed."** 

Where  an  administrator's  deed  appears  in  the  chain  of  title  the 

"Stuart  V.  Allen.    16  Cal.  473,   76  i' Allison  v.  Kurtz.  2  WaUs   (Pa.) 

Am.    Dec.    551  :    Clark   v.    Hillis,    134  185 :   Tones  v.  Taylor,  7  Tex.  240,  56 

Ind.  421,  34  N.  E.  13.  Am.  Dec.  48n. 

i-"^  Smith  V.  Wert,  64  Ala.  34;  Apel  i'^  Doe  v.  Henderson,  4  Ga.  148,  48 

V.  Kelsey,  47  Ark.  413,  2  S.  W.  102 ;  Am.  Dec.  216. 

Henry  v.  McKerlie,  78  Mo.  416  i'-'  Stevenson  v.  McRearv,  12  Sm.  & 

i«Landes   v.    Brant,    10   How.    (U.  M.  (Miss.)  9,  51  Am.  Dec.  102. 

S.)    348,    13    L.    ed.   449;    Bellows   v.  20  Bobb  v.  Barnum,  59  Mo.  394. 
McGinnis,  17  Ind.  64. 


§    361  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  398 

abstract  should  show  the  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  sale,  the 
sale,  the  report  thereof  to  the  proper  court,  the  court's  approval 
of  the  sale  and  its  order  for  conveyance,  and  all  other  material 
matters  tending  to  show  a  compliance  with  the  court's  orders  and 
the  statutory  requirements.  An  example  of  such  synopsis  is  as 
follows : 


Elias  S.  Yohn,  administrator  of 

the  estate  of  James  C. 

Yohn,  deceased, 


to 
William  Tron. 


Administrator's  deed. 
Dated  Sept.  16,  1893. 
Recorded  Sept.  16.  1893. 
Record  229,  page  180. 


Sets  forth  that  the  Probate 
Court  of  Marion  County,  Indi- 
ana, on  September  11,  1893,  in  a  certain  cause  brought  by  petition 
filed  by  said  Elias  S.  Yohn,  as  administrator  of  the  estate  of 
James  C.  Yohn,  then  deceased,  against  Mary  E.  Yohn  et  al.  did 
by  order  duly  entered,  empower  and  direct  said  Elias  S.  Yohn, 
as  such  administrator,  to  sell  at  public  auction  the  real  estate  be- 
longing to  the  estate  of  James  C.  Yohn,  deceased,  to  pay  debts  of 
said  estate.  All  of  said  defendants  answered,  consenting  to  said 
such  sale.  The  realty  was  appraised  according  to  law  and  for 
the  sum  of  $5,000.00.  Sale  ordered  by  court  at  public  auction  for 
not  less  than  two-thirds  of  said  appraised  values,  after  notice 
given.  Proof  of  notice  filed.  Report  of  sale  filed  September  16, 
1893,  showing  public  sale  to  said  William  Tron,  for  the  sum  of 
$5,000.00  cash.  Sale  confirmed  and  administrator  directed  to 
make  deed  to  purchaser  conveying  title  in  fee  simple.  Order 
book  102,  pages  400-405.  Said  administrator,  in  consideration  of 
the  premises  and  $5,000.00,  grants,  bargains  and  sells  to  William 
Tron  lot  numbered  182  in  Stout's  Vermont  Street  Addition  to  the 
city  of  Indianapolis,  Indiana,  being  the  same  real  estate  described 
in  said-  petition  above  referred  to.  Acknowledged  September 
16,  1893. 

§  361.  Administrator  with  the  will  annexed. — A\'henever 
a  person  dies  testate  there  must  be  an  executor  or  an  adminis- 
trator with  the  will  annexed.  No  administrator  can  be  appointed 
when  there  is  a  will.  If  there  is  an  executor  named  in  the  will, 
he  must  be  appointed,  if  he  be  qualified  and  willing  to  serve; 
otherwise,  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  must  be  ap- 
pointed.   The  only  difference  l:>etween  an  executor  and  an  admin- 


399  OFFICIAL    CONVEYANCES  §    362 

istrator  with  the  will  annexed  consists  in  their  mode  of  appoint- 
ment. The  one  is  designated  by  the  testator,  and  qualified  by  the 
court ;  the  other  is  both  appointed  and  qualified  by  the  court. 
There  can  not  be  in  the  same  estate  both  an  executor,  or  an  ad- 
ministrator with  the  will  annexed,  and  an  administrator.  The 
executor  is  succeeded  by  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed, 
and  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  is  succeeded  by  the 
administrator  de  bonis  non  with  the  w^ill  annexed.  They  all  act 
under  and  in  pursuance  of  the  will.^^  An  administrator  with  the 
will  annexed  has  no  power  over  his  decedent's  real  estate  except 
what  may  be  given  him  by  statute  or  by  the  will.  Where  the  will 
makes  no  provision  for  the  sale  of  the  real  estate  the  adminis- 
trator with  the  will  annexed  has  only  a  naked  power  to  make  sale 
of  the  real  estate  in  case  it  becomes  necessary  to  pay  debts.  But 
in  case  the  testator  directs  by  will  that  his  real  estate  be  sold  with- 
out declaring  by  whom  the  sale  shall  be  made,  the  power  to  sell, 
if  no  contrary  intention  appears  from  the  will,  shall  vest  in  the 
administrator  with  the  will  annexed.  The  scope  of  the  powers  of 
an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed,  in  the  absence  of  statu- 
tory or  testamentary  provisions  extending  or  limiting  them,  is 
similar  to  those  of  an  administrator. 

§  362.  Guardian's  deed. — A  guardian  is  defined  to  be  a 
person  who  is,  in  some  legal  w^ay,  appointed  to  the  care  and  man- 
agement of  the  person  or  estate,  or  of  both,  of  a  person  under 
legal  disability,  such  as  minors,  lunatics,  idiots,  or  habitual  drunk- 
ards. Guardians  are  ordinarily  created  by  statute,  but  in  most 
states  testamentary  guardians  are  recognized  to  the  extent  of 
giving  them  the  preference  of  a  statutory  appointment.  Statutes 
usually  prescribe  the  powers  and  duties  of  a  guardian  with  refer- 
ence to  the  estate  of  his  w^ard. 

The  guardian  may  be  authorized  to  sell  the  real  estate  of  his 
ward  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  better  investment  of  the  pro- 
ceeds. Courts  have  no  inherent  original  jurisdiction  to  order  or 
direct  the  sale  of  the  real  estate  of  a  person  under  legal  disability. 
Where  such  jurisdiction  exists,  it  will  be  found  to  rest  altogether 
upon  statutory  enactments.  The  guardian's  authority  to  sell  de- 
pends upon  the  grant  expressly  from  the  court  under  whose  juris- 
diction he  acts,  and  such  authority,  when  granted  by  the  court, 

21  Davis  V.  Hoover,  112  Ind.  423,  14     N.  E.  468. 


§    363  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  400 

can  only  be  granted  in  strict  conformity  to  the  statute  regulating 
the  guardianship  upon  such  matters."  From  this  it  can  be  seen 
that  there  is  no  inherent  power  in  the  guardian  to  sell  the  ward's 
land.  Before  he  can  sell  he  must  have  the  power  to  do  so  con- 
ferred by  a  court  of  proper  jurisdiction  acting  under  authority  of 
the  statute.  A  sale  of  an  infant's  real  estate,  made  by  a  guardian 
without  the  sanction  and  order  of  the  court,  properly  obtained, 
would  be  void.""' 

The  purchaser  of  land  at  a  guardian's  sale  takes  only  the  title 
which  is  in  the  ward  at  the  time  of  the  sale.  There  is  no  warranty 
in  such  sale,  and  the  guardian  has  no  power  to  bind  his  w^ard  by 
covenants  in  the  deed ;  he  only  has  power  to  sell  and  convey  under 
the  order  of  the  court.  The  deed  of  conveyance  is,  in  effect,  only 
a  quitclaim,  and  passes  the  interest  of  the  ward  in  the  land  sold. 
The  title  does  not  pass  to  the  purchaser  until  after  the  sale  has 
been  reported  and  confirmed  by  the  court."*  After  the  sale  has 
been  duly  reported  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  enter  an  order 
confirming  same,  and  directing  the  guai'dian  to  execute  and  de- 
liver to  the  purchaser  a  deed  for  the  premises.  The  deed  should 
be  in  the  form  required  by  statute,  but  it  is  held  that  if  it  does 
not  clearly  identify  by  reference  the  book  and  page  of  the  record 
where  the  order  is  entered,  it  will  nevertheless  be  valid."^  To 
perfect  the  title  not  only  must  the  sale  be  reported  and  confirmed, 
but  a  deed  executed  in  accordance  with  the  court's  direction  and 
in  conformity  with  the  statutory  requirements.  No  title  will  pass 
until  these  things  have  been  done.^° 

The  abstract  should  show  the  appointment  of  the  guardian,  the 
authority  obtained  by  him  from  the  court  to  make  the  sale,  the 
sale,  the  report  thereof,  its  confirmation  and  order  for  convey- 
ance, and  the  guardian's  deed  in  full  compliance  with  law  and  the 
court's  directions. 

§  363.  Fiduciaries  purchasing  at  their  own  sales. — Per- 
sons holding  property  in  a  fiduciary  character  are  not  competent 
to  purchase  it,  either  directly  or  indirectly.    This  rule  applies  to 

22  Morris  v.  Goodwin,  1  Ind.  App.  Menage  v.  Jones,  40  Minn.  254,  41  N. 
481.  27  N.  E.  985.  W.  972. 

23  Morrison  v.  Kinstra,  55  Miss.  71;  2g  Qq^  y.  Jackson,  51  Ala.  514; 
Doty  V.  Hubbard,  55  Vt.  278.  Ordway  v.  Smith,  53  Iowa  589,  5  N. 

2*  Maxwell  v.  Campbell,  45  -Ind.  W.  757 ;  In  re  Dickerson,  HI  N.  Car. 
360.  108,  15  S.  E.  1025. 

25  Hammann  v.  Mink,  99  Ind.  279; 


401  OFFICIAL   CONVEYANCES  §    364 

sales  made  by  executors  and  administrators,"^  but  such  sales  have 
been  held  voidable  only  at  the  instance  of  any  one  interested  in 
the  estate  who  moves  within  a  reasonable  time  to  set  aside  the 
sale."**  Also  where  a  commissioner  appointed  to  sell  land  owned 
by  an  estate,  directly  or  indirectly,  becomes  the  purchaser  at  his 
own  sale,  the  sale  is  void.~^  Persons  holding  real  estate  in  trust 
are  not  competent  to  purchase  it,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  The 
cestui  que  trust  can  insist  upon  a  reconveyance  from  the  purchas- 
ing trustee,  or  from  a  third  person  who  purchased  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  trustee's  sale  for  his  own  benefit. ^"^  However,  the 
trustee  may  purchase  from  his  cestui  que  trust,  or  with  his  full 
knowledge  and  consent.  The  extent  of  the  estate  taken  by  the 
trustee  is  to  be  determined  by  the  terms  of  the  instrument  creat- 
ing the  trust. ^^  The  same  principle  which  prevents  an  adminis- 
trator, executor  or  other  trustee  from  purchasing  the  property 
which  he  holds  in  trust  applies  to  a  sale  by  a  guardian.^-  It  is  a 
well-settled  rule  of  law  that  a  purchase  by  one  who  represents 
another  of  particular  property  owned  by  such  other,  of  which  he 
has  the  sale,  carries  fraud  on  the  face  of  it.^" 

§  364.  Caveat  emptor  as  applied  to  judicial  and  ministerial 
sales. — The  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  (let  the  buyer  beware) 
applies  to  all  judicial  and  execution  sales.^*  In  all  such  sales  the 
presumption  is  th?.t  the  purchaser  will  examine  the  title  with  the 
same  care  that  a  person  does  who  receives  a  conveyance  by  a 
simple  quitclaim  deed.  When  the  purchaser  knows  there  are  no 
covenants  to  resort  to  in  case  he  acquires  no  title,  prudence  will 
dictate  a  careful  examination  before  parting  with  his  money.  It 
is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  invest  the  officer  making  the  sale  with 
a  mere  naked  power  to  sell  such  title  as  the  debtor  had,  without 
warranty,  or  any  terms  except  those  imposed  by  law.^^     At  a 

27  Nelson    v.    Hayner,   66    111.    487 ;  so  Morse  v.  Hill,  136  Mass.  60. 
Stobaugh  V.  Irons,  243  111.  55,  90  N.  si  Hawkins  v.  Chapman,  36  Md.  83 ; 
E.  272;   Morgan  v.  Wattles,  69  Ind.  Paddock  v.  Wallace,  117  Mass.  99. 
260.  32Qaylord    v.    Goodell,    173    Mass. 

28  Crawford    County   Bank  v.   Bol-  140,  53  N.  E.  275. 

ton,    87    Ark.    142,    112    S.    W.    398;         s^  Michoud  v.  Girod,  45  U.  S.  502, 

Moore  v.  Carey,  116  Ga.  28,  42  S.  E.  11    L.   ed.    1076;    Kazebeer   v.    Nune- 

258;  Comegys  v.  Emerick,  134  Ind.  maker,  82  Nebr.  732,  118  N.  W.  646. 
148.  33   N.   E.  889,   39  Am.    St.  245;         3*  Tonopah    Banking   Corp.  v.    Mc- 

McGary  v.  McGary   (Ky.  App.),  105  Kane  Min.  Co.,  31  Nev.  295,  103  Pac. 

S,  W.  891.  230. 

29  Penn   v.   Rhoades,    124   Ky.   798,        ss  Bishop  v.  O'Conner,  69  111.  431. 
100  S.  W.  288. 

26 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    364  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  402 

judicial  sale  the  purchaser  buys  at  his  peril,  as  in  ordinary  sales 
under  execution,  the  only  difference  being  that  in  sales  by  the 
chancellor  through  his  commissioner  the  purchaser  may  have  re- 
lief for  defective  title  before  the  sale  is  confirmed,  but  not  after.^" 
But  it  would  seem  that  the  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  does  not 
apply  to  cases  in  which  the  court  ordering  the  sale  had  no  juris- 
diction, and  that  in  such  cases  the  purchaser  may  have  restitution 
of  the  purchase-money  even  after  confirmation  of  the  sale." 

It  has  been  said  that  the  maxim  caveat  emptor  applies  in  all  its 
strictness  to  sales  by  executors  and  administrators.^**  The  doc- 
trine embodied  in  the  maxim,  caveat  emptor,  applies  in  sales 
under  deeds  of  trust  and  other  instruments  containing  a  power 
of  sale,  and  the  purchaser  at  such  sale  must  see  that  the  trustee 
has  complied  strictly  with  the  directions  in  the  instrument  con- 
ferring the  power."'"*  The  rule  has  been  generally  applied  to  sales 
by  executors  and  administrators  under  judicial  authority,  whether 
in  respect  to  inherent  defects  in  the  title  or  to  those  which  result 
from  errors  and  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  whence  the 
authority  to  sell  is  derived.  The  sale  is  of  the  title  such  as  it  is, 
good  or  bad,  and  the  purchaser  is  conclusively  presumed  to  have 
purchased  with  that  understanding.''**  The  rule  of  caveat  emptor 
also  applies  to  sales  by  guardians."  In  fact,  the  doctrine  of 
caveat  emptor  applies  to  any  sale  in  which  the  grantor  acts  not  in 
his  own  right,  but  in  a  fiduciary  or  ministerial  character,  and 
from  whom  the  grantee  has  no  right  to  require  general  covenants 
for  title. 

3"  Humphrey  v.  Wade,  84  Ky.  391,  nenberg  Co.,  117  Ga.  567,  44  S.  E.  97; 

8  Ky.  L.  384,  1  S.  W.  648.  Hosmer    v.    Campbell,    98    111.    572 ; 

•"  Boggs  V.  Fowler,  16  Cal.  559,  76  Scott  v.  Austin,  36  Minn.  460,  32  N. 

Am.  Dec.  561.  W.  89,  864. 

3«Altgelt  V.  Mernitz,  Z7  Tex.  Civ.         « Boiling    v.    Jones,    67    Ala.    508; 

App.  397,  83  S.  W.  891 ;   Matson  v.  Jones  v.  Warnock,  67  Ga.  484 ;  Tilley 

Johnson,  48  Wash.  256,  93  Pac.  324,  v.  Bridges,  105  111.  336;  Riley  v.  Kep- 

125  Am.  St.  924.  ler.  94  Ind.  308. 

39  Sheridan    v.    Schimpf,    120    Ala.         ^i  Manternach  v.  Studt,  240  111.  464, 

475,  24  So.  940 ;   Mashburn  v.   Dan-  88  N.  E.  1000,  130  Am.  St.  282. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ASSIGNMENTS  AND  BANKRUPTCY 

SEC.  SEC. 

370.  Assignments  generally.  378.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure  prior 

371.  Voluntary    assignments    for    the  to  adjudication. 

benefit  of  creditors.  379.  Voluntary  and  involuntary  bank- 

372.  Validity  of  assignments.  ruptcy. 

i7i.  Formal     requisites     of  assign-     380.  The  petition,  process,  etc. 

ments.  381.  Effect  of   adjudication   in  bank- 

374.  Assignee's  title.  ruptcy. 

375.  Construction,  operation,  and  ef-     382.  Procedure  after  adjudication, 
feet  of  assignments.  383.  Abstracting  bankruptcy  proceed- 

376.  What  laws  govern.  ings. 

377.  Bankruptcy  and  insolvent  laws.        384.  Deed  of  trustee  in  bankruptcy. 

385.  Discharge  in  bankruptcy. 

§  370.  Assignments  generally. — "The  word  'assignment' 
has  several  meanings.  In  a  broad  sense  it  is  used  to  signify  the 
act  by  which  one  person  transfers  to  another,  or  causes  to  vest  in 
such  other,  the  entire  right,  interest,  or  property  which  he  has  in 
any  realty  or  personalty,  in  possession  or  in  action,  or  some  share, 
interest,  or  subsidiary  estate  therein.  It  is  more  particularly  ap- 
plied to  a  written  transfer,  as  distinguished  from  a  transfer  by 
mere  delivery."^  When  applied  to  real  property  it  signifies  a 
transfer  of  some  particular  estate  or  interest  in  land."  The  term 
is  commonly  applied  to  the  transfer  of  a  chattel  interest  in  land, 
such  as  an  estate  for  life  or  for  years. ^  But  in  this  connection 
the  term  will  be  employed  to  designate  that  class  of  conveyances 
wherein  the  assignor  or  grantor  transfers  his  real  estate,  either 
voluntarily  or  under  legal  compulsion,  to  an  assignee  or  assignees, 
in  trust,  to  apply  the  same  or  the  proceeds  thereof  to  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debts. 

A  transfer  of  the  title  to  and  the  possession  and  control  of  the 
property  of  the  debtor  to  an  assignee  in  trust  to  convert  it  into 
money  and  distribute  it  among  the  creditors  of  the  assignor  is 
usually  essential  to  constitute  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of 

1  Johnson  v.  Brewer,   134  Ga.  828,         2  Ball  v.  Chadwick.  46  111.  28. 
68  S.   E.  590,  31   L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)         ^2  Blk.  Comm.  327. 
332n. 

403 


§    371  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  404 

creditors.*  and  a  conveyance  of  his  property  by  a  debtor  directly 
to  his  creditors  for  their  benefit  does  not  constitute  a  general  as- 
signment because  it  raises  no  trust.^  No  instrument  is  held  to 
constitute  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  unless  it 
clearly  appears  either  that  the  grantor  intended  it  should  so  oper- 
ate or  that  such  was  the  necessary  legal  effect.  A  mere  trust  in 
which  the  creditors  have  no  vested  interest  does  not  constitute  an 
assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors." 

§  371.  Voluntary  assignments  for  the  benefit  of  creditors. 
— It  is  generally  conceded  that  an  owner  of  property  has  the  right 
to  transfer  the  same  for  a  good  and  valuable  consideration;  and 
the  general  disposition  of  all  friendly  governments  is  to  give 
effect  to  such  transfers  when  not  opposed  to  some  great  consid- 
erations of  public  policy,  or  which  are  manifestly  injurious  to 
their  own  citizens.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  several  states  of 
the  union,  which,  though  foreign  in  some  respects,  are  closely 
united  in  many  others.'  In  most  states  the  distinction  between 
involuntary  assignments,  such  as  work  by  operation  of  law,  and 
voluntary  conveyances,  is  recognized.  The  reason  for  the  distinc- 
tion is  that  a  voluntary  transfer,  if  valid  where  made,  ought  gen- 
erally to  be  valid  everywhere,  being  the  exercise  of  the  personal 
right  of  the  owner  to  dispose  of  his  own,  while  an  assignment  by 
operation  of  law  has  no  legal  operation  outside  the  state  in  which 
the  law  was  enacted.^ 

In  determining  whether  an  assignment  is  voluntarily  or  invol- 
untarily made  it  is  important  to  remember  that  one  who  volun- 
tarily takes  advantage  of  a  bankrupt  act,  that  is  to  say,  a  statute 
which  provides  that  the  assignor  may  be  discharged  from  his 
debts  as  a  part  of  the  proceedings  under  such  assignment  upon 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  act,  is  deemed  to  have  done 
so  in  invitum  and  the  assignment  is  governed  by  the  principles 
applicable  to  involuntary  assignments."  A  voluntary  assignment 
may  result  from  acts  done  or  suffered  to  be  done  in  respect  to  his 
property  by  a  debtor  in  failing  circumstances,  although  he  did  not 

4  Griffin  v.  Button.  165  Fed.  626.  ^  jgwell  v.   Knight,    123  U.   S.  426, 

^  Missouri-American    Elec.    Co.    v.  31  L.  ed.  190,  8  Sup.  Ct.  193. 

Hamilton-Brown  Shoe  Co.,   165  Fed.  ^  Cole   v.    Cunningham,    133    U.    S. 

283.                                                     -  107.  10  Sup.  Ct.  269.  33  L.  ed.  538. 

"  Ives  V.  Sanguinetti,  10  Ariz.  83,  85  "  Townsend  v.  Coxe,  151  111.  62,  37 

Pac.  480.  N.  E.  689. 


405  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    2i72 

intend  such  acts  to  operate  as  an  assignment.'"  Under  some 
statutes,  however,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  an  actual 
intention  on  the  part  of  the  debtor  to  make  the  assignment.''  In 
some  states  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  every  assignment  in  con- 
templation of  insolvency,  and  with  the  design  to  prefer  one  cred- 
itor to  the  exclusion  of  others,  shall  operate  as  an  assignment  of 
all  the  property  of  the  debtor  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors.^^ 
Whether  a  given  transfer  of  property  constitutes  an  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors  must  be  determined  by  construction.'^ 
The  appropriation  of  the  property  by  the  debtor  for  his  creditors 
must  be  absolute,  and  not  a  mere  surrender  of  possession  and 
control  thereof,  nor  the  creation  of  a  lien  or  revocable  power. 
He  must  completely  divest  himself  of  title  to  and  surrender  his 
control  of  the  property  to  his  assignee,  who  thereupon  becomes 
his  representative  in  respect  to  the  property  assigned.  A  direct 
assignment  to  creditors  without  the  intervention  of  a  trustee  has 
been  held  not  a  voluntary  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  credit- 

14 

ors. 

§  372.  Validity  of  assignments. — An  assignment  for  the 
benefit  of  creditors  is  allowed  by  law  as  a  means  for  a  distribu- 
tion of  the  property  of  an  insolvent  debtor  among  his  creditors.'^ 
Where  all  of  the  assignor's  property  not  exempt  from  attachment 
and  execution  is  conveyed  to  be  divided  pro  rata  among  all  credit- 
ors who  should  assent  thereto,  and  reasonable  time  for  such  as- 
sent is  given,  it  is,  if  bona  fide,  a  valid  assignment  of  the  property 
described  as  conveyed  therein.'^  If  an  assignment  is  made  in 
good  faith  and  provides  that  the  proceeds  be  divided  ratably 
among  all  creditors  it  will  not  be  illegal,'"  nor  is  the  mere  en- 
deavor by  creditors,  and  the  common-law  assignee  to  uphold  the 

10  Lehman-Durr  Co.  v.  Griel  Bros.  ^^Pa^cett  v.  Mitchell,  133  Ky.  361, 
Co.,  119  Ala.  262,  24  So.  49;   Penzel     117  S.  W.  956. 

Co.  V.  Jett,  54  Ark.  428.  16  S.  W.  120;  i3  Johnson  v.  Brewer,  134  Ga.  828, 

Sabichi  V.  Chase,  108  Cal.  81,  41  Pac.  68   S.   E.  590,  31    L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.) 

29;  Burchinell  v.  Koon,  25  Colo.  59,  332n. 

52  Pac.  1100;  Bates  v.  Coe.  10  Conn.  i^Wood    v.    Kerkeslager,    227    Pa. 

280;  Johnson  v.  Adams,  92  Ga.  551,  536,  76  Atl.  425. 

17  S.   E.  898 ;   Wright  v.   Hutchison,  i^  In  re  Rutaced  Co.,  137  App.  Div. 

156  111.  575,  41  N.  E.  172 ;  Ouerbacker  716.  122  N.  Y.  S.  454. 

V.  Claflin,  96  Ky.  235,  16  Ky.  L.  436;  i''  Thompson    v.    Shaw,    104    Maine 

28  S.  W.  506.                                     •  85.  71  Atl.  370. 

11  Roberts  v.  Press,  97  Iowa  475.  i"  Roth  Grocery  Co.  v.  Hotel  Mon- 
66  N.  W.  756;  Crow  v.  Beardsley,  68  ticello  Co.,  148  Mo.  App.  513,  128  S. 
Mo.  435.  W.  542. 


§  373 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


406 


assignment  as  against  a  bankruptcy  petition,  necessarily  unlawful, 
if  involving  no  collusion  with  the  bankrupt,  and  no  use  of  funds 
belonging  to  the  estate.^**  An  assignment  may  operate  as  a  com- 
mon-law assignment,  and  yet  not  be  valid  as  a  statutory  assign- 
ment.^" But  where  the  assignment  purports  to  be  made  under  the 
statute,  its  validity  depends  upon  a  compliance  with  the  statutory 
requirements.***  In  the  absence  of  statutory  formalities  the  rules 
relating  to  the  formal  requisites  of  other  conveyances  must  be 
applied.*^ 

As  a  general  rule  an  assignment  which  is  void  in  part  is  entirely 
void,  and  where  it  is  fraudulent  in  fact  it  is  void  in  toto.""  But 
it  has  been  held  that  a  fraudulent  intent  on  the  part  of  the  debtor 
alone  is  not  sujfficient  to  avoid  an  assignment  when  no  prefer- 
ences are  made,  and  neither  the  creditors  nor  the  assignee  partici- 
pated in  the  fraud. -^  A  conveyance  by  a  grantor  of  all  his  prop- 
erty to  a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  is  not  invalidated  by 
a  failure  of  the  grantor  to  deliver  all  his  property  to  such  trus- 
tee.'* 

^  373.  Formal  requisites  of  assignments. — A  deed  of  as- 
signment to  be  valid  must  be  executed  in  substantial  accordance 
with  the  assignment  laws,^^  and  the  phraseology  of  the  law  must 
be  looked  to  as  to  the  form  and  contents  of  the  instrument,  as 
well  as  the  manner  of  its  execution.  But,  as  we  stated  in  the 
preceding  section,  the  rules  relating  to  other  conveyances  will  be 
applicable  where  the  statute  does  not  prescrilje  a  form.  A  statu- 
tory provision  requiring  the  deed  to  be  verified  by  the  assignor's 
affidavit  is  mandatory,  and  a  failure  to  comply  with  it  renders  the 
assignment  void.""  In  the  several  states  statutes  have  been  en- 
acted for  the  express  purpose  of  regulating  voluntary  assignments 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors.    These  statutes  vary  somewhat,  both 


1^  In  re  Lewis  F.  Perry  &  Whitney 
Co.,  172  Fed.  745. 

^'■'  Johnson  v.  Robinson,  68  Tex. 
399,  4  S.  W.  625 ;  Hall  v.  Denison,  17 
Vt.  310. 

^0  Milligan  v.  O'Conor,  19  111.  App. 
487. 

21  Shackelford  v.  Planters'  &c. 
Bank.  22  Ala.  238;  Forbes  v.  Scan- 
nell,  13  Cal.  242. 

"  W.  P.  Noble  Mercantile  Co.-  v. 
Mt.  Pleasant  Co-op.  Inst.,  12  Utah 
213,  42  Pac.  869. 


23  Billings  V.  Parsons,  17  Utah  22, 
53  Pac.  730. 

2-1  Hurst  V.  Leckie.  97  Va.  550,  34 
S.  E.  464,  75  Am.  St.  798. 

-■'  Box  V.  Goodbar,  54  Ark.  6,  14  S. 
\V.  925. 

2"Jaffray  v.  McGehee,  107  U.  S. 
361,  2  Sup.  Ct.  367.  27  L.  ed.  495; 
Williams  v.  Crocker,  36  Fla.  61,  18 
So.  52;  Coggins  v.  Stephens,  73  Ga. 
41  ;  Mather  v.  McMillian,  60  Wis.  546, 
19  N.  W.  440. 


407  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    374 

in  their  scope  and  detail ;  being  in  some  states  confined  to  the  mere 
prohibition  of  preferences  by  the  debtor;  in  others,  extending  to 
the  prohibition  of  all  general  assignments  in  trust;  in  others,  com- 
pelling the  conveyance  of  all  the  debtor's  property  under  the  obli- 
gation of  an  oath;  and  in  still  others,  providing  more  effectually 
for  the  security  of  creditors  as  against  assignees  by  requiring 
them  to  give  bond.  A  simple  form  of  a  deed  of  assignment  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors  would  contain:  (1)  The  commencement 
clause,  (2)  the  recitals,  (3)  the  consideration,  (4)  the  transfer, 
(5)  the  description  of  the  property,  (6)  the  habendum,  (7)  the 
declaration  of  trust,  or  directions  to  the  assignee,  (8)  the  reser- 
vation to  the  assignor,  (9)  the  power  of  attorney  to  the  assignee, 
(10)  covenants,  (11)  the  concluding  clause.  Statutes  also  pre- 
scribe a  form  of  attestation  and  acknowledgment  for  such  in- 
struments. Any  deviation  from  the  form  and  manner  of  execu- 
tion, attestation,  or  acknowledgment  prescribed  by  statute  should 
be  noted  in  the  abstract.  Also  the  synopsis  of  the  instrument 
should  contain  a  compliance  with  the  statute  with  respect  to  ac- 
ceptance of  the  trust  by  the  assignee,  the  filing  of  his  bond,  the 
notice  to  creditors,  etc.,  together  with  the  operative  parts  of  the 
instrument  of  transfer,  including  the  trust.  Where  an  inventory 
or  schedule  of  the  assignor's  property  is  required,  such  portion 
thereof  as  cover  the  real  estate  transferred  should  also  be  shown. 

§  374.  Assignee's  title. — An  assignee  stands  in  the  place 
of  the  insolvent  debtor,  and,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  takes  the  lat- 
ter's  estate  subject  to  all  equities,  liens  and  incumbrances,  whether 
created  by  operation  of  law  or  by  the  act  of  the  assignor  which 
had  a  valid  existence  against  the  property  in  the  hands  of  the 
assignor."  The  assignee  acquires  no  better  title  to  the  property 
than  the  assignor  himself  had,"-  and  can  convey  no  better  title.-" 
He  has  such  title  as  will  enable  him  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  given 
to  his  assignor,^"  or  set  aside  a  fraudulent  conveyance  of  his  as- 
signor.^^ 

§  375.  Construction,  operation,  and  effect  of  assignments. 
— Such  a  construction  will  be  given  to  an  assignment  as  will  carry 

27LaiishHn  v.  Reed,  89  Maine  226,  29  Lockwood    v.    Noble,    113    Mich. 

36  Atl.  131.  418,  71  N.  W.  856. 

28  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  68  s"  Thompson  v.  Browne,  10  S.  Dak. 

N.  H.  20,  40  Atl.  396.  73  Am.  St.  552 :  344.  7Z  N.  W.  194. 

Grube  v.  Lilienthal,  51  S.  Car.  442,  29  --^  Applegarth    v.    Wagner,    86    Md. 

S.  E.  230.  468.  38  Atl.  940. 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


408 


into  effect  the  intention  of  the  parties.^"  The  rules  of  construc- 
tion appHcable  to  other  conveyances  will  generally  be  applied  to 
deeds  of  assignment. '^^  Where  it  is  ambiguous  in  its  terms  and 
admits  of  two  constructions,  that  interpretation  will  be  given 
which  will  render  it  legal  and  operative  rather  than  that  which 
will  render  it  void.^* 

Some  of  the  earlier  cases  hold  that  an  assignee  is  a  bona  fide 
purchaser  for  value  ;^^  but  the  later  authorities  generally  take  a 
contrary  view.^"  There  must  be  some  consideration  passing  at 
the  time  of  the  assignment,  some  new  responsibility  incurred,  or 
some  right  given  up,  to  invest  the  assignee  with  the  character  of 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value. ^^  Although  the  legal  title  passes 
to  the  assignee,  he  is  not  an  assignee  for  value,  but  is  regarded  as 
the  agent  of  the  assignor  to  distribute  the  proceeds  of  the  prop- 
erty among  the  latter's  creditors.^**  The  agency  of  the  assignee 
is,  however,  limited  to  the  purposes  declared  in  the  instrument  of 
assignment.^'*  From  another  point  of  view  the  assignee  holds  the 
property  assigned  as  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors.^" 

The  assignor  can  not  amend  an  assignment  which  he  has  prop- 
erly executed  and  which  has  been  accepted  by  the  assignee." 
Nor  will  a  valid  prior  assignment  be  affected  by  a  subsequent  as- 
signment.^" Likewise  a  duly  executed  and  accepted  assignment 
is  irrevocable,*^  except  as  against  subsequent  creditors.** 

No  more  property  will  pass  to  the  assignee  than  is  specified  in 
the  instrument ;  but  if  there  be  nothing  in  the  instrument  or  sched- 
ule annexed  to  it,  to  limit  or  qualify  its  operation,  a  general  as- 
signment by  a  debtor,  of  all  his  estate  and  effects,  will  pass  every- 


32  Coverdale  v.  Wilder,  17  Pick 
(Mass.)  178. 

33  Bank  of  Mobile  v.  Dunn,  67  Ala. 
381 ;  Hall  v.  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank,  53 
Md.  120 ;  Crook  v.  Rindskopf,  105  N. 
Y.  476.  12  N.  E.  174. 

34Grover  v.  Wakeman,  11  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  187. 

3''  Gates  V.  Labeaume,  19  Mo.  17. 

.30  Fechheimer  v.  Hollander,  21  D. 
C.  76;  Mayer  v.  Wilkins,  2,7  Fla.  244, 
19  So.  632;  Todd  v.  Johnson,  99  Kv. 
548.  18  Ky.  L.  354.  36  S.  W.  987,  iZ 
L.  R.  A.  399 ;  Peet  v.  Spencer,  90  Mo. 
384,  2  S.  W.  434. 

s^Frow  V.  Dovvnman,  11  Ala.  880. 


3s  In  re  Farrell,  176  Fed.  505. 

39  In  re  Lewis  F.  Perry  &  Whitney 
Co.,  172  Fed.  745. 

*o  Burnes  v.  Daviess  County  Bank 
&  Trust  Co.,  135  Ky.  355.  122  S.  W. 
182,  25  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  525n,  135 
Am.  St.  467. 

*i  Ingram  v.  Kirkpatrick.  41  N. 
Car.  463,  51  Am.  Dec.  428. 

4--2  Drake  v.  Ellman,  80  Ky.  434,  4 
Kv.  L.  269. 

•»3  Daner  v.  Brewer.  69  Ala.  191 ; 
Mackellar  v.  Pillsbury,  48  Minn.  396, 
51  N.  W.  222. 

^' Small  V.  Sproat,  3  Mete.  (Mass.) 
303. 


409  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    376 

thing  owned  by  the  debtor  which  is  in  its  nature  assignable  at  the 
time  of  the  assignment, ^^  except  such  property  as  may  be  spe- 
cially exempted  by  law,  or  excepted  by  the  terms  of  the  deed, 
where  such  exception  is  allowed.  But  property  acquired  by  the 
debtor  after  the  assignment  does  not  pass." 

§  376.  What  laws  govern. — A  deed  of  assignment  for  the 
benefit  of  creditors  is  ineffectual  to  transfer  title  to  real  estate  of 
the  insolvent  situated  in  other  states.^'  But  where  an  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors  is  made  in  a  state  other  than  that 
wherein  the  land  is  situated  by  a  resident  of  such  other  state,  and 
the  assignment  is  not  repugnant  to  the  laws  of  the  state  where 
the  land  is  situated,  or  the  laws  of  the  state  where  made,  it  will 
pass  title  to  such  land  if  the  deed  of  assignment  is  executed  as 
deeds  of  conveyance  are  required  to  be  executed  by  the  laws  of 
the  state  where  the  land  is  situated.*^  A  voluntary  assignment, 
valid  in  the  state  where  made,  which  includes  real  estate  situated 
in  another  state,  if  sufficient  in  form  to  operate  as  a  conveyance  of 
land  in  the  latter  state  will  be  upheld  by  its  courts,  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  comity,  against  nonresident  attaching  creditors,  even 
though  the  effect  of  the  assignment  is  contrary  to  the  policy  and 
laws  of  the  state  where  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced;  but  this  rule 
can  not  be  invoked  as  against  resident  creditors. ^° 

§  377.  Bankruptcy  and  insolvent  laws. — Bankruptcy  and 
insolvent  laws  are  of  comparatively  recent  origin.  There  is  no 
practical  difference  between  a  bankrupt  law  and  an  insolvent  law, 
except  that  the  former  affords  relief  upon  the  application  of  the 
creditor,  and  the  latter  upon  the  application  of  the  debtor.  Our 
present  federal  bankrupt  law  is  both  a  bankrupt  law  and  an  insol- 
vent law,  for  it  affords  relief  upon  the  application  of  either  the 

45  Pollak  Co.  V.  Muscogee  Mfg.  119  N.  W.  635;  Weider  v.  Maddox, 
Co.,  108  Ala.  467,  18  So.  611,  54  Am.  66  Tex.  372,  1  S.  W.  168,  59  Am. 
St.  165 ;  Freydendall  v.  Baldwin,  103     Rep.  617. 

111.  325.  48  Thompson   v.   Ellenz.    58    Minn. 

46  Lorenz  v.  Orladv,  87  Pa.  St.  226.  301,  59  N.  W.  1023. 

47  Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Dodd,  173  4o  Heyer  v.  Alexander,  108  III.  385  ; 
U.  S.  624,  19  Sup.  Ct.  545,  43  L.  ed.  Chafee  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  71 
835;  Townsend  v.  Coxe,  151  111.  62,  Maine  514,  36  Am.  Rep.  345;  Eddy  v. 
Zl  N.  E.  689 ;  Franzen  v.  Hutchinson,  Winchester,  60  N.  H.  63 ;  Pemberton 
94  Iowa  95,  62  N.  W.  698 ;  Barth  v.  v.  Klein,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  98,  10  Atl.  837 ; 
Backus,  140  N.  Y.  230,  35  N.  E.  425,  Williams  v.  Kemper,  &c.  Co.,  4  Okla. 
23    L.    R.    A.    47,    Zl    Am.    St.    545;  145,  43  Pac.  1148. 

Adams  v.  Hartzell,   18  N.  Dak.  221, 


177 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


410 


debtor  or  creditor  under  the  heads  of  voluntary  and  involuntary 
bankruptcy.^"  Hence  a  bankrupt  law  may  contain  those  regula- 
tions which  are  generally  found  in  insolvent  laws,  and  an  insol- 
vent law  may  contain  those  which  are  found  in  a  bankruptcy 
law.'' 

A  number  of  states  have  from  time  to  time  enacted  what  have 
been  termed  "insolvent  laws,"  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  exon- 
erate the  person  or  property  of  a  debtor  and  to  relieve  him  from 
the  pressure  of  creditors.^"  These  insolvency  laws  practically 
cover  the  same  scope  within  their  own  territorial  limits  as  the 
federal  bankruptcy  laws.  But  the  prevailing  rule  is  that  a  con- 
veyance under  a  state  insolvent  law  operates  only  upon  property 
within  the  territory  of  that  state,  and  that  with  respect  to  prop- 
erty in  other  states  it  is  given  only  such  effect  as  the  laws  of  such 
states  permit,  and  that,  in  general,  it  must  give  way  to  claims  of 
creditors  pursuing  their  remedies  there.  It  passes  no  title  to  real 
estate  situated  in  another  state. ^^  Where  the  operation  of  state 
insolvent  laws  conflict  with  the  operation  of  the  federal  bank- 
ruptcy law  the  former  will  be  superseded  by  the  latter.'^*  State 
insolvency  laws  remain  operative,  however,  upon  any  subject- 
matter  expressly  or  impliedly  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the 
national  act.''  It  is  only,  however,  to  the  extent  that  congress 
has  legislated  upon  the  subject  that  the  statutes  of  the  several 
states  are  suspended  by  its  legislation.  The  state  laws  will  re- 
main operative  in  all  cases  which  are  not  within  the  provisions  of 
the  bankruptcy  law.  A  bankrupt  or  insolvent  law,  viewed  as 
operating  on  the  rights  of  creditors,  is  a  system  of  remedy.  It 
is  the  policy  and  purpose  of  the  national  bankruptcy  acts  to  secure 
an  equal  and  a  speedy  distribution  of  the  property  of  the  bank- 
rupt among  his  creditors.  A  further  object  is  to  relieve  the 
honest  debtor  from  legal  proceedings  for  his  debts,  and  to  enable 
him  to  have  a  fresh  start  in  business  life;  but  the  distribution  of 


50  Martin   v.   Berry,   11   Cal.  222. 

51  Hanover  Nat.  Bank  v.  Moyses, 
186  U.  S.  181,  22  Sup.  Ct.  857,  46  L. 
ed.  1113,  8  A.  B.  R.  1. 

•''-  Cook  V.  Rogers,  31  Mich.  391 ; 
Haijek  v.  Luck,  96  Tex.  517,  74  S.  W. 
305. 

53  Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Dodd  &c. 
Co.,  173  U.  S.  624,  19  Sup.  Ct.  545,  43 
L.  ed.  835. 


■'*Harbaugh  v.  Costello,  184  111. 
110.  56  N.  E.  363,  75  Am.  St.  147; 
Old  Town  Bank  v.  McCormick,  96 
Md.  341,  53  Atl.  934.  60  L.  R.  A.  577, 
94  Am.  St.  577;  Parmentcr  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  Hamilton,  172  Mass.  178,  51  N.  E. 
529.  70  Am.  St.  258. 

55  R.  H.  Herron  Co.,  v.  Superior 
Court.  136  Cal.  279,  68  Pac.  814,  89 
Am.  St.  124. 


411  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    378 

the  property  is  the  principal  object  to  be  attained — the  discharge 
of  the  debtor  being  incidental  and  subordinate."®  The  federal 
bankruptcy  law  now  in  force  was  enacted  on  July  1,  1898,  and 
amended  in  various  respects  on  February  5,  1903;  June  15,  1906, 
and  June  25,  1910. 

§  378.  Jurisdiction  and  procedure  prior  to  adjudication. — 
By  the  bankruptcy  act  of  1898,  the  district  courts  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  Territories,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  and  the  United  States  court  of  the  Indian  Territory 
and  of  Alaska  are  made  courts  of  bankruptcy,  and  are  invested, 
within  their  respective  territorial  Hmits,  with  such  jurisdiction  at 
law  and  in  equity  as  will  enable  them  to  exercise  original  juris- 
diction in  bankruptcy  proceedings."  The  jurisdiction  of  these 
courts  covers  the  entire  subject  of  bankruptcy  proceedings.  Their 
jurisdiction  is  absolute  and  exclusive  to  adjudicate  the  question  of 
bankruptcy,  to  adjust  all  matters  and  determine  all  questions  aris- 
ing in  bankruptcy  proceedings  touching  the  persons  and  property 
of  bankrupts,  their  relation  to  their  creditors,  and  the  rights  of 
creditors  in  and  to  the  bankrupt's  estate,  from  the  commencement 
of  the  proceedings  to  their  close. ''^ 

Under  the  terms  of  our  federal  bankruptcy  law  bankruptcy 
courts  are  invested  with  the  designated  jurisdiction  "within  their 
respective  territorial  limits  as  now  established,  or  as  they  may  be 
hereafter  changed."  The  criterion  of  jurisdiction  is  the  existence 
of  either  place  of  business,  residence,  or  domicile  of  the  bankrupt, 
and  if  he  does  not  have  either  his  principal  place  of  business,  his 
residence,  or  his  domicile  within  the  district,  the  court  has  no 
power  to  obtain  jurisdiction  over  him  by  any  service  of  process 
otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  the  rule.'^''  In  other  words, 
bankruptcy  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  adjudge  as  bankrupt  a 
person  who  has,  for  the  greater  portion  of  the  preceding  six 
months,  had  his  principal  place  of  business,  or  his  residence,  or 
his  domicile  within  their  respective  territorial  jurisdictions.*^*' 
Jurisdiction  of  particular  proceedings  ordinarily  attaches  upon 

5"  In  re  Swofford  Bros.  Dry  Cioods     Murchison,  213  Fed.  147.  31  A.  B.  R. 
Co.,  180.  Fed.  549,  25  A.  B.  R.  282.  740. 

"Bankr.  Act.   (1898),  §  2.  ^Mn  re  Lemen,  208  Fed.  80,  30  A. 

•'S  In    re    Standard    Fuller's    Earth     B.  R.  638. 
Co.,  186  Fed.  578;  Bank  of  Dillon  v.         "'°  In  re  Pennsylvania  Consol.  Coal 

Co.,  163  Fed.  579. 


379 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


412 


the  filing  of  the  petition;"  and  upon  the  fiHng  of  the  petition,  all 
property  held  by  or  for  the  bankrupt  is  brought  within  the  cus- 
tody of  the  court  of  bankruptcy.''" 

A  proceeding  in  bankruptcy  is  a  proceeding  in  rem,*^'  equitable 
in  its  nature,"*  and  the  filing  of  the  petition  operates  as  an  injunc- 
tion restraining  all  persons  from  intermeddling  with  the  bank- 
rupt's property.''^  Proceedings  in  bankruptcy  are  governed  by  the 
rules  and  practice  in  equity  where  the  acts  of  congress  and  general 
orders  are  silent. "^^ 

§  379.  Voluntary  and  involuntary  bankruptcy. — Our  fed- 
eral bankrupt  law  affords  relief  upon  the  application  of  either  the 
debtor  or  creditor  under  the  heads  of  voluntary  and  involuntary 
bankruptcy.  The  right  to  file  a  voluntary  petition  in  bankruptcy 
is  accorded  to  all  persons  within  the  bankruptcy  law,  and  can  not 
be  limited  or  affected  by  any  pending  proceeding  in  state  courts."^ 
An  involuntary  petition  may  be  filed  only  by  creditors  who  have 
provable,  existing,  unsecured  claims,  and  who  are  not  estopped, 
or  by  an  assignee  in  good  faith  for  a  valid  consideration,  of  one 
who  is  not  himself  estopped  to  petition.*'^  Any  person,  except  cor- 
porations, owing  debts  provable  under  the  act,  is  entitled  to  the 
benefits  of  the  law  as  a  voluntary  bankrupt.  But  it  would  seem 
that  where  a  corporation  in  failing  circumstances  has  signified  its 
willingness  to  be  adjudged  a  bankrupt,  and  has  induced  its  credit- 
ors to  file  an  involuntary  petition,  such  petition  is  in  effect  a  vol- 
untary one  and  an  invasion  of  the  act.*^''  An  involuntary  petition 
in  bankruptcy  may  be  instituted  against  any  natural  person,  ex- 
cept a  wage-earner  or  a  person  engaged  chiefly  in  farming  or  the 
tillage  of  the  soil,  any  unincorporated  company,  and  any  corpora- 
tion engaged  principally  in  manufacturing,  trading,  printing,  pub- 
lishing, or  mercantile  pursuits,  owing  debts  to  the  amount  of  one 
thousand  dollars  or  over,  and  upon  default  or  an  impartial  trial 
may  be  adjudged  an  involuntary  bankrupt.    The  effect  of  an  ad- 


"i  Staunton  v.  Wooden,  179  Fed.  61. 

e2  Thomas  v.  Woods,  173  Fed.  585, 
26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1180n,  19  Ann. 
Cas.  1080. 

^3  Johnson  v.  United  States,  163 
Fed.  30,  18  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   1194n. 

"*  Missouri-American  Elec.  Co.  •  v. 
Hamilton-Brown  Shoe  Co.,  165  Fed. 
283. 


"■'^  Dittemore  v.  Cable  Mill  Co.,  16 
Idaho  298,  101  Pac.  593,  133  Am.  St. 
98n. 

66  In  re  Irwin,  177  Fed.  284. 

C7  1n  re  Kepecs,   123  N.  Y.  S.  872. 

68  In  re  Lewis  F.  Perry  &  Whit- 
ney Co.,  172  Fed.  745. 

69  In  re  Bates  Mach.  Co.,  91  Fed. 
625. 


413  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    380 

judication  in  bankruptcy  on  the  property  of  the  bankrupt  is  the 
same  whether  the  proceedings  were  voluntary  or  invoKmtary. 

§  380.  The  petition,  process,  etc. — A  petition  in  bank- 
ruptcy must  prima  facie  show  that  the  alleged  bankrupt  is  within 
a  class  subject  to  adjudication/"  and  must  sufficiently  set  out  the 
particular  act  of  bankruptcy  sought  to  be  availed  of.'^  All  facts 
essential  to  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  should  be  alleged  with 
definiteness  and  certainty."  It  must  sufficiently  state  the  claims 
of  the  petitioning  creditors/^  and  must  definitely  allege  some  act 
of  bankruptcy  specified  in  the  bankruptcy  law/*  as  general  aver- 
ments in  respect  to  such  acts  are  insufficient."  The  nature  of  the 
claims  of  petitioning  creditors  should  be  clearly  stated. ^'^  The 
petition  and  schedule  in  voluntary  cases  must  be  drawn  and  veri- 
fied in  triplicate ;  while  in  involuntary  cases  they  must  be  drawn 
and  verified  in  duplicate.  The  petition  must  be  filed  with  the 
clerk  of  the  bankruptcy  court,  and  jurisdiction  begins  from  the 
moment  of  such  filing.^^  The  condition  at  the  time  of  the  filing 
of  the  petition  measures  the  extent  of  the  estate,  and  the  rights 
of  all  creditors  of  the  bankrupt  and  all  parties  interested  in  the 
property.  No  process  is  required  in  voluntary  cases,  but  on  the 
filing  of  an  involuntary  petition  the  clerk  must  at  once  issue  a 
subpoena  which  must  be  served  in  the  same  manner  that  service 
of  similar  process  is  had  in  suits  of  equity  in  the  United  States 
courts.  And  where  personal  service  may  not  be  made,  notice 
must  be  given  by  publication. 

§  381.  Effect  of  adjudication  in  bankruptcy. — Without 
further  proceedings,  the  adjudication  in  bankruptcy  is  a  seizure 
by  the  court  and  a  transfer  to  it  of  the  possession  of  all  the  prop- 
erty of  the  bankrupt  in  which  his  creditors  are  entitled  to  share.'® 
Bankruptcy,  like  death,  divests  the  owner  of  title  to  his  property 
and  places  it  in  custodia  legis.^^  Immediately  upon  and  by  virtue 
of  the  adjudication,  all  the  property  of  the  bankrupt  wherever 
situated  passes  into  the  custody  of  the  court,  and  upon  the  ap- 

"•^  In  re  De  Lancey  Stables  Co.,  170  ''^  In   re  Mason-Seaman  Transpor- 

Fed.  860.  tation  Co.,  235  Fed.  974. 

7^     Exporation    Mercantile    Co.    v.  '''^  In  re  White,  135  Fed.  199. 

Pacific  &c.  Steel  Co.,  177  Fed.  825.  "  shute  v.  Patterson,  147  Fed.  509. 

72  Clark  V.  Henne,  127  Fed.  288,  62  ^s  Wright  Dalton-Bell-Anchor  Store 

C.  C.  A.  172.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  142  Mo. 

"  Conway  v.  German,  166  Fed.  67.  App.  50,  125  S.  W.  517. 

7^  In  re  Tupper,   163  Fed.  766.  '^  In  re  Frazin,  174  Fed.  713. 


382 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


414 


pointment  of  a  trustee  it  becomes  vested  in  him/"  The  trustee 
takes  the  property  of  the  bankrupt  subject  to  the  rights,  Hens,  and 
equities  existing  against  it  in  the  hands  of  the  bankrupt.*^  The 
court  has  jurisdiction  to  determine  all  liens  and  interests  affecting 
the  title  to  the  property.®^  The  adjudication  acts  both  in  per- 
sonam and  in  rem.^^  As  to  all  parties  named  in  the  schedule  as 
creditors,  and  all  persons  in  any  way  interested  in  the  res,  the 
adjudication  is  conclusive  to  the  extent  of  the  matters  necessarily 
determined  in  making  the  adjudication/* 

§  382.  Procedure  after  adjudication. — After  filing  of  the 
petition  and  schedule  of  assets  and  liabilities,  and  the  adjudication 
made,  the  court  usually  appoints  a  receiver  whose  duty  it  is  to 
preserve  the  estate.  The  receiver  is  not  invested  with  the  title  to 
the  property  of  the  bankrupt,^'  but  is  a  mere  custodian  of  such 
property  is  an  asset  of  the  estate/"  But  the  appointment  of  a 
receiver  is  authorized  only  in  cases  where  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  preservation  of  the  estate/^ 

Section  44  of  the  federal  bankruptcy  law  provides  that  "the 
creditors  of  a  bankrupt  estate  shall,  at  their  first  meeting  after 
the  adjudication  or  after  a  vacancy  has  occurred  in  the  office  of 
trustee,  or  after  an  estate  has  been  reopened,  or  after  a  composi- 
tion has  been  set  aside  or  a  discharge  revoked,  or  if  there  is  a 
vacancy  in  the  office  of  the  trustee,  appoint  one  trustee  or  three 
trustees  of  such  estate.  If  the  creditors  do  not  appoint  a  trustee 
or  trustees  as  herein  provided,  the  court  shall  do  so."  Upon  his 
appointment  the  trustee  becomes  vested  with  the  title  of  the  bank- 
rupt to  all  property  for  the  purpose  of  administration  and  distri- 
bution of  the  estate  among  the  bankrupt's  creditors.^® 

The  court  may  order  the  trustee  to  sell  the  bankrupt's  property 
to  make  funds  with  which  to  pay  creditors.  The  sale  may  be 
ordered  made  subject  to  existing  liens  thereon,  or,  in  a  proper 
case,  discharged  of  such  liens,  but  in  the  latter  event  the  lien  is 
transferred  to  the  proceeds.    The  sale  should  be  held  in  the  man- 


so  In  re  Peacock,  178  Fed.  851. 

81  Smith  V.  Godwin,  145  N.  Car. 
242.  58  S.  E.  1089. 

82  Thomas  v.  Woods,  173  Fed.  585, 
26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1180n,  19  Ann. 
Cas.  1080. 

83  Carter  v.  Hobbs,  92  Fed.  594. 


8*  In  re  Ulfelder  Clothing  Co.,  98 
Fed.  409. 

8^  In  re  Rubel,  166  Fed  131. 

86  In  re  Ghazal,  163  Fed.  602. 

87  T.  S.  Faulk  &  Co.,  v.  Steiner,  165 
Fed.  861. 

88Bracklee    Co.    v.    O'Connor,    67 
Misc.  599,  122  N.  Y.  S.  710. 


415  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  |    383 

ner  authorized  by  the  court.  The  sale  is  governed  by  the  rules 
applicable  to  judicial  sales  generally,  under  which  the  order  of 
confirmation  exhausts  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  over  the  prop- 
erty, and  the  validity  of  the  title  passed  depends  upon  the  validity 
of  the  order  of  confirmation.^^  Recitals  in  the  trustee's  deed  do 
not  prove  facts  set  forth  therein,  but  the  conveyance  must  be  sup- 
ported by  enough  of  the  record  of  the  proceedings  in  bankruptcy 
to  vouch  authority  for  its  execution  from  a  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  person  and  the  subject-matter. 

§  383.  Abstracting  bankruptcy  proceedings. — Proceed- 
ings in  bankruptcy  cases  will  be  found  in  the  rolls  of  the  courts 
where  the  proceedings  were  held,  and  where  they  affect  the  title 
of  the  real  estate  being  examined  these  records  must  be  resorted 
to  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  proceedings  were  conducted 
in  conformity  with  the  law.  It  is  not  necessary  to  set  out  in  the 
abstract  more  than  a  brief  synopsis  showing  the  apparent  regu- 
larity of  the  steps  taken  in  the  course  of  the  procedure.  The 
court's  confirmation  of  a  sale  by  the  trustee  or  assignee  binds  all 
the  parties  and  their  privies  and  forever  precludes  any  attack 
upon  the  sale  except  for  fraud,  or  some  other  circumstance  for 
which  equity  would  give  relief  if  the  sale  had  been  made  by  the 
parties  instead  of  by  the  court.  In  this  respect  a  sale  by  a  trustee 
or  assignee  in  bankruptcy  stands  in  the  situation  as  other  sales 
under  a  decree  in  chancery.  The  following  synopsis  of  a  pro- 
ceeding in  bankruptcy  is  submitted  as  an  example : 

In   the   District   Court   of   the 

United  States  for  the  

district  of . 

Case  No. 


In  the  matter  of  John  Doe  in 
bankruptcy. 


'  Petition  filed  Sept.  1,  1916. 


Schedule  of  assets  and  liabili- 
ties mentions  the  real  estate  de- 
scribed in  the  caption  of  the  abstract  [if  real  estate  not  mentioned 
that  fact  should  be  stated].  Adjudication  entered  on  September 
20,   1916.     Richard  Roe  appointed  trustee  November  1,   1916. 

89  West   Lumber    Co.   v.   Lyon,    53     Tex.  Civ.  App.  648,  116  S.  W.  652. 


§    384  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  416 

Petition  l^y  trustee  to  sell  property  at  public  auction  filed  Novem- 
ber 10.  1916. 

November  12,  1916,  sale  ordered  as  prayed  for  in  petition  after 
notice  by  publication  for  three  weeks,  and  ten  days'  notice  by  mail 
to  creditors. 

Trustee's  report  of  sale,  with  proof  of  publication  and  notice 
of  sale  attached,  filed  January  1,  1917,  showing  sale  of  [here  de- 
scribe property  sold  if  included  in  real  estate  described  in  caption 
of  abstract]  to  John  Jones  for  $5,000. 

Report  of  sale  approved  and  sale  confirmed  January  10,  1917. 

§  384.  Deed  of  trustee  in  bankruptcy. — The  deed  of  a 
trustee  in  bankruptcy  should  recite  enough  of  the  record  of  the 
court  of  bankruptcy,  upon  which  it  is  founded,  to  vouch  the 
authority  for  its  execution  from  a  court  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  person  whose  property  is  conveyed  by  its  order,  and  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  involved.  Such  deeds  are  often 
long  and  tedious,  and  the  abstracter  should  confine  his  synopsis  to 
those  particulars  only  which  in  any  way  affect  the  title  to  the 
property  in  question.  The  following  example  is  deemed  sufficient 
for  the  purpose : 

John  F.  Wise,  trustee  in  bank-  ^ 
ruptcy  of  the  estate  of  Will- 
iam Hanson,  bankrupt. 


to 
Emmett  Gardner. 


Trustee's  deed. 
Dated  Aug.  1,  1916. 
Recorded  Aug.  5,  1916. 
Deed  record  75,  page  12. 


Sets   forth  that   whereas,   a 
petition  in  involuntary  bankruptcy  was  filed  in  the  District  Court 

of  the  United  States  for  the  district  of on  the  10th 

day  of  January,  1916,  against  said  William  Hanson,  and  whereas, 
said  William  Hanson  was  duly  adjudged  a  Ijankrupt  on  said  peti- 
tion on  the  12th  day  of  January,  1916,  and  the  said  John  F.  Wise 
thereafter  was  duly  appointed  trustee  of  the  estate  of  said  bank- 
rupt on  the  15th  day  of  January,  1916.  and  thereafter  duly  quali- 
fied as  such  trustee,  and  whereas,  said  John  Wise,  as  trustee  in 
bankruptcy  of  the  estate  of  said  William  Hanson,  bankrupt,  was 
duly  authorized  after  notice  to  the  creditors  and  lienholders.  by 
an  order  of  George  R.  Scott,  referee  in  bankruptcy,  dated  Janu- 
ary 25,  1916,  to  sell  and  convey  the  property  hereinafter  men- 
tioned at  public  auction,  free  and  clear  of  liens  except  taxes,  and 


417  ASSIGNMENTS    AND    BANKRUPTCY  §    385 

the  said  sale  having  been  duly  held  at  on  the  1st  day  of 

April,  1916,  and  the  said  sale  having  thereafter  been  confirmed 
by  an  order  of  said  referee,  dated  April  5,  1916.  Therefor  said 
trustee,  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  authority  vested  in  him,  as 
aforesaid,  and  in  consideration  of  the  sum  of  $5,000.00  paid  by 
said  Emmett  Gardner,  granted,  bargained  and  sold  to  said  Em- 
mett  Gardner,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  the  following  described  real 
estate,  to  wit :  (here  describe  real  estate.)  Acknowledged  August 
1,  1916.  The  title  acquired  by  the  grantee  under  a  trustee's  deed 
is  the  same  as  that  held  by  the  bankrupt  at  the  time  of  the  adjudi- 
cation. 

§  385.  Discharge  in  bankruptcy. — We  have  seen  that  the 
effect  of  an  adjudication  in  bankruptcy  is  to  vest  in  the  trustee  the 
title  to  the  bankrupt's  property.^"  It  terminates  the  right  of  the 
bankrupt  to  dispose  of  his  property.^^  But  the  trustee  takes  such 
title  only  for  the  purpose  of  administration,  and  the  bankrupt  re- 
tains an  interest  in  the  property  which  becomes  absolute  where  it 
is  not  needed  to  pay  his  debts,  or  when,  for  any  reason,  the  trus- 
tee is  discharged  without  having  used  it  for  that  purpose,  and  this 
interest  the  bankrupt  may  convey  to  another.^' 

Property  transferred  by  the  bankrupt  within  four  months  prior 
to  the  filing  of  the  petition,  with  the  intent  to  hinder,  delay  or 
defraud  creditors,  passes  to  the  trustee,  except  as  against  pur- 
chasers in  good  faith  for  a  present  consideration.^^  Property  not 
owned  by  the  bankrupt  but  acquired  before  the  adjudication,^* 
and  surely  property  acquired  after  adjudication  and  before  dis- 
charge,''^ does  not  vest  in  the  trustee,  but  becomes  the  bankrupt's, 
free  from  the  claims  of  creditors,  save  those  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  proceedings  or  those  who,  for  statutory  reasons,  are 
not  affected  by  the  discharge.^''' 

As  the  power  of  a  bankrupt  to  make  conveyances  of  his  prop- 
erty during  the  time  intervening  between  the  filing  of  the  petition 
and  the  discharge  is  limited  as  explained  above,  it  is  important 
that  the  abstract  should  show  his  discharge  where  he  appears  as 
grantor  or  grantee  in  any  instrument  in  the  chain  of  title.     The 

«o  In  re  Thomas,  199  Fed.  214.  os  Shelton    v.    Price,    174   Fed.   891. 

•'1  In  re  Dillard,  2  Hughes  (U.  S.)  «*  In  re  Harris,  2  Am.  B.  R.  359. 

190,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3912.  95  In  re  Stoner,  105  Fed.  752. 

••2  Robertson  v.    Howard,  82   Kans.  oe  !„  re  West,  128  Fed.  205. 
588,  109  Pac.  696. 

27 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§  385 


TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS 


418 


discharge  restores  his  power  to  take  and  convey  real  property  as 
freely  as  he  could  before  the  proceedings  in  bankruptcy  were  in- 
stituted against  him,  and  such  property  will  not  be  subjected  to 
the  claims  of  creditors  scheduled  in  the  proceedings,  or  the  claims 
of  creditors  who  had  notice  or  actual  knowledge  of  the  proceed- 
ings. 

The  discharge  in  bankruptcy  may  be  shown  in  the  abstract  by 
a  simple  notation  of  the  fact,  as: 

In  the   District   Court   of   the 


In  the  matter  of  John  Doe 
in  bankruptcy. 


United  States  for  the 

district  of . 

►  Case  No. . 

Voluntary  petition. 


to  said  bankrupt  on  the 


Discharge  entered  and  issued 
day  of ,  19—. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

CONTRACTS  TO  SELL  AND  CONVEY  REAL  ESTATE 
SEC.  SEC. 

390.  Land    contracts    and    bonds    for     395.  Construction  of  the  contract, 
deed.  396.  Abstracting  the  contract. 

391.  Relation   of   vendor   and   vendee     397.  Assignment  of  contract. 

under  contract  or  bond  for  deed.     398.  Agreement    as    to    title    and    its 

392.  Title  or  interest  of  vendor  and  performance. 

vendee.  399.  Forfeiture  of  contract  of  sale. 

393.  Formal  requisites.  400.  Title  bond. 

394.  Record  of  contract  of  sale.  401.  Agreement  to  devise  real  estate. 

§  390.  Land  contracts  and  bonds  for  deed. — It  is  not  an 
uncommon  thing  for  the  vendor  and  purchaser  of  real  estate  to 
reduce  their  agreement  to  writing  and  have  it  recorded.  The 
agreement  is  sometimes  put  in  the  form  of  a  bond  for  a  deed,  but 
it  generally  takes  the  form  of  a  simple  executory  contract  where- 
by the  vendor  agrees,  for  a  consideration  paid,  or  to  be  paid,  to 
convey  to  the  vendee  the  real  estate  described  therein.  When  a 
deed  of  conveyance  is  delivered  and  accepted  as  performance  of 
such  contract,  the  contract  becomes  merged  in  the  deed,  and  the 
rights  of  the  parties  rest  thereafter  solely  on  the  deed.^ 

Where  a  merger  has  thus  taken  place  only  a  mere  mention  of 
the  contract  and  its  execution  need  be  made  in  the  abstract ;  but  if 
the  contract  remains  unexecuted  its  provisions  must  be  set  out  in 
detail.  Although  the  terms  of  the  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  the 
contract  may  vary  from  those  contained  in  the  contract,  still  the 
deed  must  be  looked  to  alone  to  determine  the  rights  of  the 
parties.  There  may  be  cases,  however,  where  a  stipulation  in  a 
contract,  instead  of  becoming  merged  in  the  deed,  survives  it  and 
confers  an  independent  cause  of  action.  Thus  where,  in  a  con- 
tract for  the  purchase  of  land,  there  was  a  provision  that  if  the 
purchaser  did  not  build  a  factory  on  the  land  he  should  reconvey 
to  the  vendor.  The  purchaser  took  possession,  made  payment, 
and  obtained  a  deed,  but  failed  to  construct  the  factor}^  in  accord- 
ance with  the  temis  of  the  contract.     It  was  held  that  the  pro- 

1  Slocum   v.    Bracy,    55    Minn.   249,     56  N.  W.  826,  43  Am.  St.  499. 

419 


§    391  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  420 

vision  relating  to  the  construction  of  the  contract  was  not  merged 
in  the  deed."  Also  where,  by  mutual  mistake  of  the  parties,  the 
deed  fails  to  embody  the  clearly  expressed  terms  of  the  contract, 
and  the  deed  does  not  effect  what  both  parties  intended  by  their 
contract,  a  court  of  equity  will  reform  the  deed  in  accordance 
with  their  manifest  intention.^  So  where  the  deed  does  not  show 
a  substantial  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  contract,  or  where 
there  are  any  unusual  stipulations  therein,  a  full  synopsis  of  the 
instrument  should  be  given. 

§  391.  Relation  of  vendor  and  vendee  under  contract  or 
bond  for  deed. — The  relation  of  vendor  and  vendee  under  a 
contract  or  bond  for  a  deed  bears  a  strong  similitude  to  that  of 
equitable  mortgagee  and  mortgagor,  the  vendee  holding  an  equity 
which  is  subject  to  foreclosure  by  the  vendor.*  When  the  legal 
title  remains  in  the  vendor,  the  vendee  has  merely  an  equity  of 
redemption.  The  vendor's  title,  by  the  terms  of  the  contract,  is 
his  security;  and  he  can  not  in  any  way  be  divested  of  his  title, 
except  the  vendee  fulfills  his  contract,  and  by  that  act  becomes 
entitled  to  a  conveyance.  The  position  of  the  vendor  being  re- 
garded substantially  as  that  of  a  mortgagee,  the  possession  of  the 
vendee  is  not  adverse  to  the  vendor.'^ 

§  392.  Title  or  interest  of  vendor  and  vendee. — The  legal 
effect  of  a  title  bond  or  agreement  for  a  deed  is  sometimes  said  to 
be  like  a  deed  by  the  vendor  and  a  mortgage  back  by  the  vendee." 
There  can  be  no  sensible  distinction  between  the  case  of  a  legal 
title  conveyed  to  secure  the  payment  of  a  debt,  and  a  legal  title  re- 
tained to  secure  payment. '^  The  vendor  holds  the  legal  title,  and 
all  persons  must  necessarily  take  notice  of  it ;  and  although  the 
vendee  enter  into  possession,  this  will,  of  course,  convey  only  his 
equitable  title. ^  The  equitable  estate  of  the  vendee  may  be  alien- 
ated or  devised  as  real  estate,  and  upon  his  death  it  will  descend 
to  his  heirs ;  while  on  the  other  hand,  although  the  vendor  holds 
the  legal  title,  upon  his  death  the  securities  he  has  taken  for  the 

-  Doty  V.  Sandusky  Cement  Co.  46  •'^  Burnett  v.  Caldwell,  9  Wall,    (U. 

Ind.  App.  400.  91  N.  E.  569.  S.)  290.  19  L.  ed.  712. 

3  Elliott  V.  Sackett,  108  U.   S.   132,  «  Hardin   v.    Boyd,    113    U.    S.   756. 
2  S.  Ct.  375,  21  L.  ed.  678.  5  Sup.  Ct.  771,  28  L.  ed.  1141;  Wells 

4  Hardin  v.  Boyd.  113  U.  S.  756,  5  v.  Francis,  7  Colo.  396,  4  Pac.  49. 

S.  Ct.  771.  28  L.  ed.  1141;  Moses  v.  7  Lowery  v.  Peterson,  75  Ala.  109. 
Johnson,  88  Ala.  517,  7  So.  146,  16  » New  York  &c.  Gas  Coal  Co.  v. 
Am.  St.  58.  Plumer,  96  Pa.  St.  99. 


421  CONTRACTS    OF    SALE  §    393 

purchase-money  go  to  his  personal  representatives."  The  holder 
of  the  contract  can  not  impair  the  security.  The  legal  title  of  the 
vendor  in  such  case  is  not  affected  by  any  liens  created  by  the  per- 
son who  holds  the  contract  of  purchase.^**  The  vendee  can  not 
possibly  do  anything  to  impair  the  lien  of  the  vendor,  any  more 
than  a  mortgagor  can,  after  the  execution  of  his  mortgage,  do 
anything  with  his  title  to  impair  that  security.  The  right  of 
dower  of  the  widow  of  the  vendee  is  subordinate  to  the  vendor's 
Ijen.^^  No  homestead  right  in  the  property  can  be  acquired  by 
the  purchaser  as  against  the  lien.^^  If  the  vendee  sells  the  prop- 
erty to  another,  his  lien  upon  the  land  for  the  purchase-money  is 
subordinate  to  the  lien  of  the  original  vendor.^* 

§  393.  Formal  requisites. — By  the  provisions  of  the  Eng- 
lish Statute  of  Frauds  which  has  been  re-enacted  in  practically  all 
of  the  states  of  this  country,  no  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  or 
any  interest  in,  out  of,  or  concerning  land,  can  be  enforced,  unless 
some  note  or  memorandum  thereof  be  made  in  writing,  and 
signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged.  The  writing  should  contain 
within  itself,  without  resort  to  parol  testimony,  the  whole  agree- 
ment, including  the  names  of  the  vendor  and  vendee,  the  price  to 
be  paid,  all  stipulations  intended  to  bind  the  parties,  and  such  a 
description  of  the  land  as  will  enable  any  one  acquainted  with  it 
to  learn,  upon  reading  the  contract,  what  property  was  intended 
to  be  sold,  the  time  when  the  purchase-money  must  be  paid,  and 
the  date  when  the  conveyance  is  to  be  made.  The  contract  is 
sometimes  made  in  the  form  of  a  sealed  obligation  under  penalty 
on  the  part  of  the  vendor  to  convey  a  good  title,  in  which  case 
the  instrument  is  known  as  a  title  bond."  A  valid  and  binding 
contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  may  be  made  through  corre- 
spondence;^^ but  in  such  case  the  name  of  the  vendee  or  vendor 
can  not  be  supplied  by  parol  evidence.^^  The  contract  may  be  in 
several  parts  or  papers;  but  if  a  formal  contract  be  contemplated 
the  agreement  must  be  found  therein."     A  written  instrument 

9  Lewis  V.  Hawkins  23  Wall,  (U.  ^^  Beattie  v.  Dickinson,  39  Ark.  205. 
S.)  119,  23  L.  ed.  113.  i*  Vardeman  v.  Lawson,  17  Tex.  10. 

10  Williams  v.  Cunningham,  52  Ark.  '^^'  Curtis  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  In- 
439,  12  S.  W.  1072;  Thorpe  v.  Dur-  terior  Land  Co.,  137  Wis.  341,  118  N. 
bon,  45   Iowa   192 ;   Tuck  v.   Calvert,     W.  853,  129  Am.  St.  1068. 

33  Md.  209.  10  Stengel  v.  Sergeant,  74  N.  J.  Eq. 

iiZeischang  v.  Helmke   (Tex.  Civ.     20,  68  Atl.  1106. 
App.)  84  S.  W.  436.  i"  Scott  v.  Fowler,  227  111.  104,  81 

12  Berry  v.    Boggers,  62   Tex.  239.     N.  E.  34. 


§    393  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  422 

naming  the  grantor  and  grantee  in  which  one  agrees  to  sell  real 
estate  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  owner  thereof,  and  which 
the  vendee  in  signing  refers  to  as  a  contract  of  sale  \vill  be  treated 
as  such,  and  not  a  contract  of  agency.^^ 

The  writing  must  be  signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged,  and  is 
valid  though  not  signed  by  the  party  insisting  on  its  performance. 
The  signature  of  the  vendor  alone  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds,  and  the  bringing  of  an  action  for  specific  perform- 
ance by  the  vendee  in  such  a  contract  renders  it  mutual  and  en- 
forcible  between  the  parties. ^^  But  an  instrument  signed  by  the 
vendor  only,  agreeing  to  sell  to  certain  named  persons  for  a  desig- 
nated price,  but  which  expresses  no  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
persons  to  buy  nor  any  consideration  for  the  agreement  to  sell 
is  nudum  pactum.*'^ 

Where  an  executory  contract  consists  of  mutual  promises,  both 
parties  must  be  bound,  or  it  will  be  void  for  want  of  mutuality. 
There  can  be  no  valid  contract  for  the  sale  and  conveyance  of 
land  unless  the  parties  have  mutually  consented  to  the  same  con- 
ditions, until  there  is  a  clearly-defined  offer  on  the  one  hand,  and 
an  acceptance  on  the  other  of  the  very  terms  offered."^  The  con- 
tract may  be  signed  by  an  agent  of  the  party  to  be  bound,  but  the 
authority  of  the  agent  to  sign  need  not  be  in  writing.-"  A  mem- 
orandum of  sale  if  signed  suffices,-^  but  its  acceptance  may  be 
oraP*  unless  it  is  sought  to  enforce  it  against  the  vendee. ~'' 

Execution  of  the  contract  by  part  payment,  or  entry  and  pos- 
session, or  both,  will  take  the  contract  out  of  the  statute  of 
frauds. ^°  The  contract  must  be  definite  and  certain  as  to  the  time 
of  performance  and  the  amount  paid,"^  and  must  definitely  bind 
some  person  to  sell.^^  The  contract  must  contain,  either  in  terms 
or  by  reference,  such  a  description  of  the  property  as  to 
identify  it.^^ 

18  Cartwright   v.    Ruffin,     43     Colo.  -*  Boehly  v.  Mansing,  52  Misc.  382, 

Zn,  96  Pac.  261.  102  N.  Y.  S.  171. 

i»  Perry  v.  Paschal,  103  Ga.  134,  29  ^r,  Kingsbury  v.  Cornelison,  122  111., 

S.  E.  703.  .\pp.  495. 

20  Smith  V.  Bateman,  25  Colo.  241,  ^n  (^j^y    Loan    &    Banking     Co.     v. 

53  Pac.  457.  Poole,  149  Ala.  164,  43  So.  13. 

2iHeiland   v.   Ertel,   4   Kans.   App.  27  Watson  v.  Watson,  225   111.  412, 

516.  44  Pac.  1005.  80  N.  E.  332. 

--  Whiteworth    v.    Pool,    29   Ky.    L.  ^s  Kingsbury  v.  Cornelison,   122  111. 

1104,  96  S.  W.  880.  App.  495. 

-'•■^  Boehly  v.  Mansing,  52  Misc.  382,  2S)  Lange   v.   Waters,    156   Cal.    142. 

102  N.  Y.  S.  171.  103  Pac.  889,  19  Am.  Cas.  1207;  Ames 


423  CONTRACTS    OF    SALE  §    394 

§  394.  Record  of  contract  of  sale. — The  registration  of  a 
contract  for  the  sale  of  land  is  notice,  if  the  registry  act  author- 
izes it,  but  not  otherwise. ^°  Of  course  the  law  may  authorize  the 
recording  of  such  a  contract  in  general  terms  without  specifically 
naming  it."  Thus  where  the  statute  provided  that  "all  the  writ- 
ings obligatory  or  contracts  for  conveyances  of  lands  or  of  any 
interest  or  estate  of,  in  or  relating  to  lands"  may  be  recorded  if 
duly  executed  and  acknowledged,  it  was  held  that  a  contract  by 
which  one  of  the  parties  agreed  to  sell  and  the  other  to  buy  real 
estate,  may  be  recorded.^^  Also  under  a  statute  providing  that  an 
instrument  in  writing  "affecting  the  title"  to  real  property  may  be 
recorded  it  was  held  that  a  contract  for  the  conveyance  of  real 
estate  may  be  recorded  and  its  record  was  notice  to  all  persons.^^ 
When  the  vendor  retains  the  legal  title,  the  interest  of  the  pur- 
chaser is  insecure,  unless  the  contract  of  purchase  is  recorded;  for 
the  land  is  subject  to  sale  by  the  vendor,  and  subject  to  levy  upon 
execution  by  his  creditors." 

§  395.  Construction  of  the  contract. — Time  is  not  to  be 
deemed  of  the  essence  of  a  contract  to  convey  real  estate  unless 
made  so  by  its  terms,  or  by  implication  from  the  nature  of  the 
subject-matter,  the  object  of  the  contract,  or  the  situation  of  the 
parties.^"  In  a  contract  to  sell  and  buy  land  where  the  stipulations 
are  that  the  vendee  shall  pay  the  money  and  the  vendor  shall  exe- 
cute a  deed,  and  there  is  no  provision  that  either  is  to  be  done 
first,  the  covenants  are  mutual  and  dependent.  The  vendee  is  not 
bound  to  pay  without  receiving  his  deed,  nor  the  vendor  to  part 
with  his  land  without  receiving  the  purchase-money.  The  per- 
formance must  be  simultaneous.^''  The  validity  of  a  contract  for 
the  sale  and  purchase  of  real  estate  is  to  be  determined  by  the  law 
of  the  place  where  the  property  is  situated,  and  not  by  the  law 
of  the  place  where  the  contract  is  made.^'     In  every  contract  for 

V.  Ames.  46  Ind.  Ann.  597,  91  N.  E.  Evans  v.  Ashe,  50  Tex.  Civ.  App.  54, 

509  108  S.  W.  389.  1190. 

30  Mesick  v.  Sunderland,  6  Cal.  297.  ^s  Martindale  v.  Waas,  8  Fed.  854. 

31  Memphis  Land  &  Timber  Co.  v.  3  McCrary  (U.  S.)  108;  Cramer  v. 
Ford,  58  Fed.  452,  7  C.  C.  A.  304.  Mooney,  59  N.  J.  Eq.  164.  44  Atl.  625. 

32  South  Baltimore  Harbor  &  Imp.  3g  Cole  v.  Killam,  187  Mass.  213,  11 
Co.  V.  Smith.  85  Md.  537,  Zl  Atl.  27.  N.  E.  947. 

33  Kent  V.  Williams,  146  Cal.  3,  79  3-  Morris  v.  Linton,  61  Nebr.  537. 
Pac   527  85  N.  W.  565;  Baum  v.  Birchall,  150 

34  Bell   V.    McDuffie,   71     Ga.    264;  Pa.  St.  164,  24  Atl.  620,  30  Am.  St. 

797. 


§    396  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  424 

the  sale  of  real  estate  there  is  an  implied  condition  that  the  vendor 
will  produce  a  fair  marketable  title  to  which  no  reasonable  objec- 
tion can  be  made."*  Where  the  agreement  contains  no  restrictive 
expressions  it  is  an  agreement  to  sell  the  whole  of  the  vendor's 
estate  or  interest  therein. ^^  If  the  vendee  contract  for  a  title  de- 
ducible  of  record,  he  can  not  be  compelled  to  accept  a  title  resting 
altogether  upon  matters  in  pais.^° 

§  396.  Abstracting  the  contract. — In  making  a  synopsis  of 
a  contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  such  matters  as  the  names  of 
the  parties,  the  description  of  the  property,  the  quantity  of  the 
estate  sold,  the  terms  or  conditions  of  the  sale,  and  the  time  when 
the  contract  shall  be  executed  should  be  clearly  shown.  The  con- 
tract must  be  mutual ;  and  the  fact  that  it  is  signed  by  the  vendor 
only  does  not  affect  its  mutuality.  Where  there  is  a  want  of 
mutuality  in  the  covenants  or  stipulations  this  fact  should  be 
noted.  An  example  of  a  synopsis  of  a  contract  of  the  character 
under  discussion  is  appended : 


Charles  Hewett 
to 

\\'illiam  JMoore. 


Contract  for  sale  of  real  estate. 
Dated  June  10.  1912. 
Recorded  June  15,  1912. 
Book  145,  page  280. 


Said  Charles  Hewett  on  payment  of  $1,000.00  agrees  to  sell 
and  convey  to  said  William  Moore,  by  good  and  sufficient  war- 
ranty deed,  the  following  described  real  estate  to  wit:  [here  de- 
scribe property]  free  and  clear  of  all  incumbrances  made,  done 
or  suffered  by  the  said  Charles  Hewett. 

Said  W'illiam  Moore  in  consideration  of  the  above  promise  on 
the  part  of  said  Charles  Hewett,  agrees  to  buy  said  real  estate 
and  pay  therefor  to  said  Charles  Hewett  the  sum  of  $1,000.00 
in  the  manner  as  follows  :  [here  state  terms  of  payment] 

Time  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract.  Mutually  agreed  that 
said  William  Moore  is  to  have  possession  of  said  premises  until 
forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  purchase-money  in  the  manner 
above  provided. 

3«Flinn  v.  Barber.  64  Ala.  193;  4o  Pagg  y.  Greely,  75  111.  400 ;  Noyes 
Easton  v.  Montgomery,  90  Cal.  307,  v.  Johnson,  139  Mass.  436,  31  N.  E. 
27  Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123.  767. 

3"  Bower  v.  Cooper,  2  Hare  (Eng.) 
408. 


425  CONTRACTS    OF    SALE  §    397 

Said  William  Moore  agrees  to  pay  all  taxes  and  assessments 
against  the  property.  Failure  to  pay  principal  and  interest  when 
due  as  aforesaid,  or  failure  to  pay  taxes  operates  as  forfeiture  of 
contract  and  all  rights  thereunder  on  the  part  of  said  William 
Moore,  and  amount  paid  by  him  forfeited  as  rental  for  the  prop- 
erty.    Signed  and  acknowledged  by  both  parties  June  10,  1912. 

§  397.  Assignment  of  contract. — A  condition  in  a  contract 
for  the  sale  of  real  estate  to  the  effect  that  no  assignment  of  the 
agreement  will  be  valid  without  the  consent  and  signature  of  the 
vendor  has  been  upheld.*^  But  under  some  statutes,  a  stipulation 
of  nonassignability  in  a  contract  of  this  character  will  not  pre- 
vent its  transfer  to  an  assignee  subject,  of  course,  to  all  defenses 
which  would  have  been  available  in  the  hands  ot  the  assignor.*^ 
And  an  assignment  may  be  valid  as  between  the  immediate  parties 
thereto  even  though  not  binding  upon  the  vendor.*^  The  assignee 
of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  in  which  there  is  neither 
fraud  nor  warranty,  like  the  assignor  under  whom  he  claims,  pur- 
chases at  his  peril."  In  the  absence  of  a  stipulation  to  the  con- 
trary a  vendee  may  assign  his  written  contract  of  purchase,  and 
his  assignee  succeeds  to  all  his  rights  thereunder;*^  and  such  as- 
signee may  enforce  specific  performance  of  the  contract,  as 
against  the  vendor,  upon  complying  with  the  terms  of  such  con- 
tract.*''' But  the  mere  assignment  by  the  vendee,  although  fol- 
lowed by  possession,  does  not  by  implication  impose  upon  the 
assignee  liability  to  pay  the  price  agreed  to  in  the  contract, 
although  by  its  terms  its  obligations  are  extended  to  the  assignees 
of  the  parties.*'  An  assignment  of  a  contract  of  purchase  as 
security  is  a  mortgage,  and  when  the  assignee  has  completed  the 
payments,  and  taken  a  conveyance  to  himself,  the  relation  of  the 
parties  remains  the  same.*^ 

§  398.     Agreement  as  to   title  and   its  performance. — In 

■*i  Lockerby  v.  Anion,  64  Wash.  24,  S.  E.  703 ;  Hooper  v.  Van  Husen,  105 

116   Pac.  463,   35   L.   R.   A.    (N.   S.)  Mich.  592,  63  N.  W.  522. 

1064n.  Ann.  Cas.  1913  A,  228n.  ^c.  Craver  v.  Spencer,  40  Fla.  135,  23 

^-  Thomassen  v.  De  Goey,  133  Iowa  So.  880. 

278,  110  N.  W.  581,  119  Am.  St.  605.  47  Lisenbv  v.  Newton,  120  Cal.  571, 

«  Sproull  V.  Miles,  82  Ark.  455,  102  52  Pac.  813  ,  65  Am.  St.  203. 

S.  W.  204.  48  Hays  v.  Hall,  4  Part.  (Ala.)  374, 

44  Carrier  v.  Eastis,  112  Ala.  474,  30  Am.  Dec.  530;  Smith  v.  Cremer, 
20  So.  595.  71  111.  185 ;  Gamble  v.  Ross,  88  Mich. 

45  Perry  v.  Paschal,  103  Ga.  134,  29  315,  50  N.  W.  379. 


§    398  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  426 

every  contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  there  is  an  agree- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  vendor  to  convey  to  the  vendee  a 
good  marketable  title,  free  from  all  defects  or  incumbrances, 
and  if  such  agreement  is  not  expressed  it  will  be  implied/" 
But  the  implication  that  the  vendee  was  to  receive  such  title 
may  be  rebutted  by  showing  that  he  had  notice  of  the  exist- 
ence of  incumbrances/"  The  contract  may  expressly  state  the 
title  to  be  conveyed,  and  the  rights  of  the  vendee  will  be  deter- 
mined by  such  express  terms. ''^ 

It  often  happens  that  an  express  provision  regarding  the  title 
to  be  conveyed  results  disastrously  to  the  vendee.  Thus  where 
the  agreement  is  to  make  a  "good  and  sufficient  deed"  it  has  been 
held  a  satisfaction  of  the  agreement  if  the  instrument  is  sufficient 
as  a  conveyance,  though  the  vendor's  title  was  bad."'"  But  a  con- 
tract by  the  vendor  to  convey  by  good  and  sufficient  warranty 
deed  requires  the  conveyance  of  a  title  free  of  incumbrances.""' 
An  agreement  to  make  a  "clear  deed"  has  been  held  performd  by 
a  deed  conveying  only  a  life  estate.'^*  An  agreement  to  convey  by 
"quitclaim"  is  performed  by  the  conveying  all  the  interest  the 
vendor  has  in  the  property.^"'  Also  an  agreement  to  sell  "all  the 
right,  title  and  interest"  that  the  vendor  has  in  the  premises  is 
performed  by  a  conveyance  of  such  interest  without  regard 
whether  the  title  is  good  or  sufficient.'^''  An  agreement  to  convey 
real  estate,  in  the  absence  of  any  reservation  or  exception  therein, 
requires  the  vendor  to  convey  a  marketable  title. ^^ 

A  marketable  title  is  one  free  from  reasonable  doubt  as  to  its 
validity.^*  There  must  be  no  doubt  involved  either  as  to  matter 
of  law  or  fact.^^  Thus,  if  the  title  depends  upon  the  validity  of  a 
marriage — or  upon  a  condition,  and  is  liable  to  be  forfeited  by  a 
breach  of  it — the  vendor  can  not,  in  the  absence  of  satisfactory 
evidence  of  the  marriage,  or  of  the  performance  of  the  condition, 

■*9  FHnn  v.  Barber,  64  Ala.  193 ;  Has-  ''■'  Holland  v.  Rogers,  33  .A.rk.  251  ; 

ton   V.    Montgomery,   90   Cal.   307,   27  Fitch  v.  Willard.  73  111.  92. 

Pac.  280,  25  Am.  St.  123 ;  Donlon  v.  •""•  Babcock  v.  Wilson.  17  Maine  372. 

Evans.  40  Minn.  501,  42  N.  W.  472.  35  Am.   Dec.  263;  Johnston  v.  Men- 

•"■'0  Newark   Sav.    Inst.   v.   Jones,   37  denhall,  9  W.  Va.  112. 

N.  J.  Eq.  449.  5"  Curtis   Land  &  Loan   Co.  v.   In- 

•"•i  Vardeman  v.  Lawson,  17  Tex.  10.  terior  Land  Co..  137  Wis.  341,  118  N. 

=2  Brown  v.  Covillaud,  6  Cal.  566.  W.  853,  129  Am.  St.  1068. 

■'^  Powell  V.  Huey,  214  111.   132,  89  ^^  Crouter  v.  Crouter,  133  N.  Y.  55. 

N.  E.  299.                                           .  30  N.  E.  726. 

^*  Knapp   V.   Lee,   3   Pick.    (Mass.)  •'^•'Herman  v.   Somers,    158   Pa.   St. 

452.  424,  27  Atl.  1050,  .38  Am.  St.  851. 


427  CONTRACTS    OF   SALE  §    399 

insist  on  the  vendee  taking  the  title.  A  contract  to  convey  a  good 
and  marketable  title  is  complied  with  by  conveying  a  title  based 
on  adverse  possession  for  the  prescriptive  period.*^"  But  the  ven- 
dee can  not  be  compelled  to  accept  such  title  where  he  has  con- 
tracted for  a  title  of  record."  The  record  contemplated  by  a  con- 
tract of  sale  giving  the  vendee  a  right  to  have  a  title  "fairly  de- 
ducible  of  record,"  is  the  entire  record  of  the  city  and  county  set- 
ting forth  the  chain  of  title.''" 

A  merchantable  title  which  a  vendee  who  has  contracted  for 
such  title  may  be  compelled  to  accept  is  a  title  deducible  of  record 
reasonably  clear  from  defects  which  affect  its  salability,  and  such 
a  title  is  not  shown  where  parol  evidence  is  necessary  to  show 
how  a  grantor  in  the  chain  of  title  acquired  title."^  The  contract 
between  vendor  and  vendee  with  reference  to  the  title  to  be  con- 
veyed must  be  carefully  examined  by  counsel  to  determine  if  the 
title  proffered  meets  the  requirements  of  such  contract. 

§  399.  Forfeiture  of  contract  of  sale. — Where,  for  any  rea- 
son, agreements  for  conveyance  do  not  contemplate  an  immedi- 
ate consummation,  forfeitures  are  of  frequent  occurrence.  In  all 
cases  of  unfulfilled  contracts  appearing  in  the  chain  of  title  coun- 
sel should  spare  no  pains  to  determine  if  there  has  been  a  com- 
plete forfeiture  thereof.  Evidence  of  forfeiture  is  sometimes 
found  in  a  foreclosure  of  the  vendor's  lien  for  purchase-money, 
but  is  more  often  discovered  by  express  or  implied  declarations 
in  the  contract  itself.  Thus  a  forfeiture  is  implied  from  nonpay- 
ment of  the  purchase-money,  where  time  is  made  the  essence  of 
the  contract.*^*  In  such  case  the  vendor  will  not  be  required  to 
notify  the  vendee  of  his  intention  to  declare  a  forfeiture,'''^  but  the 
vendor  may  treat  the  property  as  his  own  and  convey  it  to 
another.^'^ 

A  declaration  of  forfeiture  must  be  clear  and  unambiguous." 
But  a  vendee  does  not  forfeit  his  contract  by  failure  to  make  pay- 
ments to  his  vendor  after  the  latter  has  put  it  out  of  his  power 

"oTewksbury  v.  Howard  ,138  Ind.  *■-*  Martin    v.    Thomas,    56   W.    Va. 

103,  Zl  N.  E.  355;  Freedman  v.  Op-  220.  49  S.  E.  118. 

penheim,  187  N.  Y.  101,  79  N.  E.  841,  ''■>  Prairie  Development  Co.  v.  Lei- 

116  Am.  St.  595.  berg.  15  Idaho  379,  98  Pac.  616. 

"1  Page  V.  Greely,  75  111.  400.  "'-Harmon    v.    Thompson,    119   Ky. 

62Crim    V.    Umbsen,    155    Cal.   697,  526,  84  S.  W.  569. 

103  Pac.  178,  132  Am.  St.  127.  "  Maday  v.  Roth,  160  Mich.  289.  16 
f'3  Watson  V.  Boyle,  55  Wash.  141,  Det.    Leg.    N.    1099,    125    N.    W.    13, 

104  Pac.  147.  136  Am.  St.  441. 


§    400  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  428 

to  comply  with  his  contract  by  conveying  the  property  to  an- 
other."* Where  time  is  made  the  essence  of  the  contract  in  re- 
spect to  the  making  of  the  deferred  payments,  a  forfeiture  pro- 
vided for  nonpayment  may  be  enforced  in  accordance  with  the 
express  terms  of  the  contract,"^  But  where  time  is  not  made  of 
the  essence  of  the  contract,  an  immaterial  delay  by  a  party  will 
not  work  a  forfeiture  of  his  right. "'^  An  attempted  forfeiture  of 
a  land  contract  will  not  be  effective  where  both  parties  subse- 
quently deal  with  the  contract  and  land  as  though  there  had  been 
no  rescission/^ 

The  vendor  and  vendee  may,  at  any  time  before  conveyance, 
rescind  the  contract  by  consent,"  which  consent  may  be  express 
or  implied  from  the  acquiescence  of  the  one  party  in  the  acts  of 
the  other.  But  in  order  to  bind  the  one  party  by  his  presumed 
acquiescence  in  the  acts  of  the  other,  it  must  clearly  appear  that 
he  had  notice  of  the  intent  of  the  other  to  rescind,'^  or  knowl- 
edge of  such  acts  on  the  part  of  the  latter  as  constituted  in  them- 
selves a  rescission.'^* 

The  party  having  an  option  to  declare  a  forfeiture  must  exer- 
cise it  promptly  upon  discovering  the  ground  therefor,^^  and, 
where  the  vendor  has  waived  timely  performance  by  extension  of 
the  time  of  performance  or  by  leading  the  purchaser  to  believe 
that  prompt  payment  will  not  be  demanded,  he  can  not  declare 
a  forfeiture  until  he  has  notified  the  vendee  and  given  him  a  rea- 
sonable time  to  perform  it.'^'^ 

§  400.  Title  bond. — Agreements  for  conveyance  some- 
times take  the  form  of  a  sealed  obligation  under  penalty  on  the 
part  of  the  vendor  to  convey  a  good  title,  in  which  case  the  in- 
strument is  known  as  a  "bond  for  a  deed"  or  a  "title  bond."" 
Where  the  purchaser  has  knowledge  of  imperfections  in  the  title, 
but  takes  a  bond  for  a  deed,  he  waives  all  right  of  rescission,  and 
must  sue  on  the  bond  in  case  of  loss  by  reason  of  defective  title." 

68  Brofllicad    v.    Rein1)old.    200    Pa.  "^  2  Warvelle  Vend.  883. 

618,  50  Atl.  229,  86  Am.  St.  735.  '■'  Ball  v.  Belden,  59  Te.x.  Civ.  App. 

60  Whitman    v.    Perkins,    56    Nebr.  29,  126  S.  W.  20. 

181.  76  N.  W.  547.  7o  Specr  v.  Phillips,  24  S.  Dak.  257, 

•0  Lcse  V.  Lamprecht,  196  N.  Y.  32,  123  N.  W.  722. 

89  N.  E.  365.  "  Vardeman  v.  Lawson,  17  Tex.  10. 

71  Clark  V.  Neumann,  56  Nebr.  374,  ^s  Contra :     Bellows    v.    Cheek,    20 

76  N.  W.  892.                                           '  Ark.  424;  Home  v.  Rogers,  110  Ga. 

"Lauer  v.  Lee.  42  Pa.  St.  165.  362,  35  S.  E.  715,  49  L.  R.  A.   176; 

'^3  Hussey    v.    Roquemore,    27    Ala.  Baldridge  v.  Cook,  27  Tex.  565. 
281. 


429  CONTRACTS    OF    SALE  §    401 

The  assignee  of  a  bond  for  title  acquires  all  the  rights  and  equities 
to  which  the  assignor  was  entitled  thereunder."  The  vendor  who 
has  given  a  bond  for  title  and  taken  purchase-money  notes  there- 
for, does  not  by  their  hypothecation  pass  the  legal  title  to  the 
land.^°  A  vendee  accepting  a  bond  for  title  containing  a  power  to 
sell  in  the  vendor  in  case  of  nonpayment  of  the  purchase-money 
notes,  is  bound  by  such  power  though  he  did  not  sign  the  bond.^^ 
Where  the  bond  has  been  fulfilled  by  a  deed  of  conveyance  only 
a  brief  reference  to  the  bond  need  be  made  in  the  abstract,  while 
if  the  bond  remains  executory  a  complete  synopsis  of  it  should 
be  given.  This  should^contain  the  usual  formal  requisites  of  such 
instruments.    The  following  is  deemed  sufficient : 


John  Doe 


Richard  Roe. 


Title  bond. 
Dated 


Recorded , 

Vol. of  deeds,  page 


In  the  penal  sum  of  $1,000. 
Conditioned  that  if  the  above  bonded  obligor,  John  Doe,  shall, 

on  the  day  of  ,  19 — ,  execute  and  deliver  unto  said 

Richard  Roe,  on  payment  of  $500.00,  a  good  and  sufficient  war- 
ranty deed  to  the  following  described  real  estate  to  wit:  [here 
describe  real  estate.]    Acknowledged . 

§  401.  Agreement  to  devise  real  estate. — A  contract  by 
an  owner  of  real  estate  to  make  a  will  disposing  of  it  in  a  partic- 
ular way,  if  based  upon  sufficient  consideration  and  clearly  estab- 
lished, may  l3e  enforced  in  equity  against  persons  taking  title  to 
the  property  upon  his  decease.^'  The  consideration  for  such  con- 
tract must  be  valuable,  as  distinguished  from  a  merely  good  or 
moral  consideration.^^  A  mere  voluntary  agreement  or  gratui- 
tous promise  to  provide  for  the  promisee  by  will  is  uninforci- 
ble;^*  nor  will  a  court  of  equity  decree  specific  performance  of  a 
unilateral  contract  so  to  provide,  which  by  its  terms  remains  ex- 

"  Walker  v.  Maddox,  105  Ga.  253,  ^^Klussman    v.    Wessling.    238    111. 

31  S.  E.  165.  568.  87  N.  E.  544. 

80  Morrison    v.    Cliambers,    122    N.  '^■-  Grant  v.  Grant,  63  Conn.  530,  29 

Car.  689,  30  S.  E.  141.  Atl.   15,  38  Am.  St.  379. 

^1  Battery  Park  Bank  v.  Loughran,  **  Studer  v.  Seyer,  69  Ga.  125. 
122  N.  Car.  668.  30  S.  E.  17. 


§    401  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  430 

ecutory  until  the  death  of  the  person  so  contracting.^'"'  Such  con- 
tracts are  within  the  statute  of  frauds  and  must  be  in  writing.^" 
But  a  partial  performance  of  a  verbal  contract  of  this  character 
will  take  it  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  frauds  when  a 
breach  of  the  contract  would  work  a  fraud  on  the  party  so  per- 
forming.^^ Where  services  have  been  performed  under  a  verbal 
contract  to  devise  real  estate,  and  the  contract  being  unin forcible 
by  reason  of  the  statute  of  frauds,  an  action  will  lie  against  the 
personal  representative  of  the  decedent  on  a  quantum  meruit  to 
recover  the  value  of  the  services. ^^  Where  a  contract  to  devise 
real  estate  is  found  on  the  record  and  it  affects  the  real  estate  in 
question,  it  should  be  set  out  in  the  abstract  and  carefully  con- 
sidered by  counsel  in  passing  upon  the  title. 

s'' Colt  V.   O'Connor,  59  Misc.    (N.  ^7  Cgrmichael     v.     Carmichael.     72 

Y.)  83,  109  N.  Y.  S.  689.  Mich.  76.  40  N.  W.  173,   1  L.  R.  A. 

86  Pond  V.  Sheean,  132  111.  312.  23  596,  16  Am.   St.  528;  Duvale  v.  Du- 

N.  E.   1018.  8  L.  R.  A.  414;  Austin  vale,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  581.  35  Atl.  750. 

V.  Davis,  128  Ind.  472,  26  N.  E.  890,  ««  Grant  v.  Grant,  63  Conn.  530.  29 

12  L.  R.  A.  120,  25  Am.  St.  456.  Atl.  15,  38  Am.  St.  379. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


LEASES 
SEC.  SEC. 

405.  Leases  defined  and  distinguished.     407.  Covenants  in  leases. 

406.  Formal  parts  of  leases.  408.  Assignment  of  leases. 

§  405.  Leases  defined  and  distinguished. — A  lease  is  a 
species  of  contract  for  the  possession  and  profits  of  lands  and 
tenements  either  for  life,  or  for  a  certain  term  of  years,  or  dur- 
ing the  pleasure  of  the  parties.^  The  lease  grants  to  and  vests  in 
the  lessee  a  present  interest  and  estate  in  the  land  for  the  term 
designated,  and  for  the  purposes  specified."  By  such  contract,  ex- 
press or  implied,  a  tenancy  is  created  whereby  one  person  permits 
another  to  occupy  lands  actually  or  constructively,  and  without 
such  a  contract  there  can  be  no  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.^ 
On  the  other  hand,  contractual  relations  may  exist  between  per- 
sons with  regard  to  the  occupation  of  land  which  imposes  duties 
and  restrictions  similar  to  those  of  tenancy,  and  yet  there  will  not 
be  a  tenancy.  Thus  an  agent  using  and  controlling  the  land  of 
his  principal  would  not  ordinarily  become  a  tenant.'* 

Contracts  for  the  cultivation  of  land  upon  shares,  contracts  for 
lodgings,  contracts  for  employment,  and  a  license  to  do  certain 
acts  upon  the  land  of  another  may  all  be  made  without  establish- 
ing the  technical  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant.  Some  agree- 
ment between  the  parties  for  a  tenancy,  whether  it  be  made  ex- 
pressly in  words,  or  arises  from  their  acts  and  conduct  in  relation 
to  the  land  is  essential  to  create  the  relation.^  Whether  an  instru- 
ment is  a  contract  of  lease  or  merely  an  agreement  to  execute  a 
contract  of  lease  depends  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  be 
gathered  from  the  whole  instrument  considered  in  the  light  of 
surrounding  circumstances.''     Where  a  contract  of  sale  is  made 

1  Paul  V.  Cragnaz.  23  Nev.  293,  59  ^  Tucker  v.  Adams,  52  Ala.  254 ; 
Pac.  857,  60  Pac.  983,  47  L.  R.  A.  540.     Paige  v.  Akins,  112  Cal.  401,  44  Pac. 

2  Chandler  v.  Hart,  161  Cal.  405,  119     666. 

Pac.  516.  Ann.  Cas.  1913  B.  1094n.  «  Schultz  v.  Hastings  Lodge  No.  50. 

3  Rogers  v.  Coy,  164  Mass.  391,  41  L  O.  O.  F.,  90  Nebr.  454,  133  N.  W. 
N.  E,  652.  846. 

4  Hopkins  V.  Ratliflf,  115  Ind.  213,  17 
N.  E.  288. 

431 


§    406  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  432 

between  the  vendor  and  purchaser  of  land,  and  the  instrument 
provides  that  upon  the  nonperformance  of  conditions  respecting 
payment  of  the  purchase-price,  it  has  been  held  that  either  party 
may  treat  the  transaction  either  as  a  purchase  and  sale  contract, 
or  a  lease,  and  if  the  election  is  made  to  treat  it  as  a  tenancy,  the 
relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  relates  back  to  the  inception  of  the 
contract/ 

§  406.  Formal  parts  of  leases. — No  particular  form  of 
words  is  necessary  to  create  a  lease  f  nor  is  it  necessary  that  the 
word  "lease"  be  used/'  Any  written  instrument  expressing  the 
agreement  of  the  parties,  signed  by  one  and  accepted  and  acted 
on  by  the  other,  will  be  obligatory  upon  both.^''  Whatever  words 
are  sufficient  to  explain  the  intent  of  the  parties  that  the  one  shall 
divest  himself  of  the  property  and  the  other  come  into  the  pos- 
session of  it  for  a  definite  time,  whether  they  run  in  the  form  of 
a  license,  covenant,  or  agreement,  will  be  construed  as  a  lease  as 
well  as  if  the  most  pertinent  words  were  used."  Thus  an  instru- 
ment in  the  form  of  a  receipt  acknowledging  the  payment  of 
money  as  rent  for  a  house  has  been  held  to  be  a  lease/"  Though 
no  formal  words  are  requisite  to  a  lease  at  common  law,  the  usual 
words  of  operation  in  it  are  "demise,  grant  and  to  farm  let."" 

Where  the  lease  is  for  a  longer  period  than  that  which  the 
statute  allows  for  verbal  leases,  it  must,  ordinarily,  be  by  deed, 
and  requires  the  same  solemnities  as  to  signing,  sealing,  attesta- 
tion, release  of  dower,  and. acknowledgment  as  are  required  in 
other  deeds  of  conveyance.  The  local  statute  should  be  con- 
sulted when  in  doubt  about  these  matters." 

7  Murphy  v.  Myar,  95  Ark.  32,  128  only  as  tenancies  at  will,  even  as  be- 

S.  W.  359,  Ann.  Cas.  1912  A,  573.  tween    the   parlies    thereto.     In    Ari- 

■^  Alcorn    v.    Morgan,   77   Ind.    184;  zona,  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado, 

Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  Connecticut,    Delaware,    Idaho,   Iowa, 

83  Va.  319,  2  S.  E.  195.  Kansas,    Kentucky,    Mississippi,    Mis- 

••  Bussman   v.    Ganster,    72    Pa.    St.  souri,    Montana,    Nebraska,    Nevada, 

285.  -North  Dakota,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island, 

10  Alcorn  v.  Morgan.  77  Ind.  184.  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota,  Texas 

"  Munson     v.     Wray,     7     Blackf.  and  Wisconsin,  leases  for  a  term  of 

(Ind.)  403.  more  than  one  year  must  be  execu- 

12  Eastman  v.  Perkins,  111  Mass.  ted,  acknowledged,  and  recorded  in 
30.  the  same  manner  as  deeds,  otherwise 

13  Folden  v.  State,  13  Nebr.  328,  14  they  are  invalid  as  against  tliird  par- 
N.  W.  412.                                         .  ties  without  notice.    In  Florida  leases 

1*  In  most  of  the  states  leases  for  a  for  more  than  two  years  must  be  re- 
term  of  more  than  one  year  must  be  corde^.  In  Indiana,  Minnesota,  New 
in  writing,  otherwise  they  take  effect     York  and  Tennessee,  leases  for  more 


433  LEASES  §  406 

A  description  of  the  premises,  the  amount  of  rent  to  be  paid, 
and  the  duration  of  the  term  should  be  set  out.  Words  of  present 
demise  must  be  used,  or  such  words  as  will  indicate  that  the 
parties  intended  the  instrument  to  have  that  effect. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  lease  that  it  should  be 
dated,  as  it  does  not  take  effect  from  its  date,  but  from  its  de- 
livery. But  the  date  of  a  lease  is  important  in  determining  the 
duration  of  the  term. 

Where  a  lease  of  the  premises  appears  in  the  chain  of  title,  biit 
an  examination  of  its  contents  shows  that  it  has  expired  by  its 
own  limitation  no  further  consideration  should  be  given  it,  except 
perhaps  it  might  be  well  to  make  an  inquiry  in  pais  to  determine 
if  there  has  been  a  surrender  of  possession  on  the  part  of  the 
lessee.  But  when  the  term  for  which  it  was  given  has  not  ex- 
pired a  complete  synopsis  of  the  instrument  should  appear  in  the 
abstract.  Its  treatment  should  be  as  full  and  succinct  as  in  cases 
of  conveyances  of  the  fee.  Where  the  lease  remains  a  charge 
upon  the  fee  such  matters  as  the  date,  the  names  of  the  parties, 
the  description  of  the  premises,  the  duration  of  the  term,  the  rent 
reserved,  the  covenants,  the  conditions  and  restrictions,  and  any 
special  agreements  appearing,  should  all  be  made  to  appear. 

Below  is  an  example  of  such  synopsis : 

William  Druley  ']  Lease. 

Dated . 


[  Recorded . 

Harvey  Cox.  J  Misc.  Rec.  ,  page . 

First  party  leases,  demises  and  lets  to  second  party  the  follow- 
ing described  real  estate  in  Marion  County,  Indiana,  to  wit :  [here 
describe  property] .  To  hold  for  the  term  of  five  years  from  date 
hereof,  at  a  rental  of  $200.00  per  annum,  payable  semi-annually. 

Second  party  covenants :    To  pay  rent  reserved ;  to  pay  taxes 

than  three  years  must  be  recorded,  be  in  writing,  and  for  more  than  twen- 
In  Kentucky,  Virginia,  and  West  Vir-  ty-one  years  must  be  recorded.  In 
ginia,  leases  for  more  than  five  years  New  Mexico.  Utah,  Vermont,  Wash- 
must  be  recorded.  In  Maine,  Mary-  ington,  and  Wyoming,  leases  must  be 
land,  Massachusetts,  and  New  Hamp-  executed  and  recorded  in  the  same 
shire,  leases  for  more  than  seven  manner  as  deeds.  In  North  and 
years  must  be  recorded.  In  New  Jer-  South  Dakota,  leases  of  agriculture 
sey,  leases  for  more  than  three  years  land  are  limited  to  ten  years,  those 
must  be  in  writing.  In  Pennsylvania,  of  city  lots  to  twenty  years, 
leases  for  more  than  three  years  must 

28 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    407  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  434 

levied  and  assessed  against  premises  for  the  term;  against  wasle, 
and  against  subletting: 

Second  party  covenants :   For  quiet  enjoyment,  etc. 

Provides  for  forfeiture  in  case  of  failure  on  part  of  second 
party  to  perform  any  one  or  more  of  covenants. 

Signed  by  both  parties. 

Acknowledgment. 

§  407.  Covenants  in  leases. — All  covenants  between 
lessor  and  lessee  are  either  express  or  implied,  the  latter  depend- 
ing for  their  existence  upon  the  intendment  and  construction  of 
the  law.  A  covenant  for  title^'"'  and  for  quiet  enjoyment  are 
usually  implied  from  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant." 
There  is  also  an  implied  covenant  that  the  tenant  shall  have  the 
right  of  possession,  occupancy,  and  the  beneficial  use  of  every 
portion  of  the  leased  premises. ^^  The  designation  in  a  lease  of 
the  purpose  for  which  the  premises  may  be  used  amounts  to  a 
covenant  not  to  use  them  for  other  purposes. ^^  But  where  a 
lease  contains  an  express  covenant  in  regard  to  any  subject,  no 
covenants  are  to  be  implied  in  respect  to  the  same  subject.^"  If 
the  estate  out  of  which  the  lease  was  granted  determines  before 
the  expiration  of  the  lease,  the  implied  covenant  will  be  at  an 
end.-'' 

It  is  usual  to  provide  in  the  lease  for  a  short  term  for  which 
the  lessee  is  bound  to  return  the  premises  and  then  give  him  a 
right  to  occupy  them  for  a  further  period  at  his  option.  This 
option  must  be  exercised  by  the  tenant  during  the  original  term, 
and  while  the  privilege  is  dependent  on  the  will  of  only  one  of 
the  parties  it  does  not  impair  the  mutuality  of  the  contract.^^  A 
distinction  is  sometimes  made  between  the  effect  of  a  mere  hold- 
ing over  by  a  tenant  in  case  of  a  covenant  to  extend  a  lease,  and 
of  a  covenant  to  renew  a  lease,  and  it  is  held  that,  although  a 
mere  holding  over  is  sufficient  to  extend  a  lease,  it  is  not  sufficient 
to  renew  a  lease.-"     Besides  the  covenants  already  mentioned  a 

15  Preswood    v.    Carlton,    162    Ala.  "  Crouch  v.  Fowle,  9  N.  H.  219,  32 

327 ;  50  So.  254.  Am.  Dec.  350 ;  Burr  v.  Stenton,  43  N. 

i«  Milheim  v.  Baxter,  46  Colo.  155,  Y.  462. 

103  Pac.  376,  133  Am.  St.  50 ;  Ragland  20  Gessner    v.    Palmateer,    89    Cal. 

V.  Conqueror  Zinc  Cas.,  136  Mo.  App.  89.  24  Pac.  608,  26  Pac.  789,  13  L.  R. 

631.  118  S.  W.  1194.  A.    187;    Brookhaven   v.    Baggett,   61 

I'Talbott  V.  English,  156  Ind.  299,  Miss.  383. 

59  N.  E.  857.  21  Spear  v.  Orendorf.  26  Md.  Z7. 

i«  Kraft   V.    Welch,    112    Iowa   695,  22  shamp  v.  White,  106  Cal.  220.  39 

84  N.  W.  908.  Pac.  537 ;  Callahan  Co.  v.  Michael,  45 


435  LEASES  §  408 

lease  may  contain  a  covenant  restricting  the  use  of  the  premises, 
a  covenant  as  to  the  sale  of  the  premises,  a  covenant  for  insur- 
ance, a  covenant  for  repairs,  and  a  covenant  to  pay  taxes.  Such 
covenants  run  with  the  land  where  they  touch  or  concern  it."^ 

Where  the  lease  contains  a  provision  for  forfeiture  in  case  of 
a  breach  of  covenant,  such  provision  should  be  set  out  at  such 
length  as  its  importance  seem  to  demand.  If  the  lease  contains 
an  option  in  favor  of  the  lessee  to  purchase  the  premises,  such 
option  must  be  included  in  the  synopsis. 

§  408.  Assignment  of  leases. — The  lessor  has  power  to 
transfer  either  the  entire  reversion,  or  his  interest  under  the 
lease,  and  such  transfer  is  effective  to  vest  in  the  transferee  the 
right  to  all  rent  reserved  in  the  lease,  without  any  further  action 
on  the  part  of  the  tenant."*  A  warranty  deed  by  the  lessor  of  the 
demised  premises  operates  as  an  assignment  of  the  lease, ■'^  and 
entitles  the  grantee  to  all  the  rights  of  a  lessor.-''  So  a  convey- 
ance of  a  reversion  in  fee  to  a  lessee  or  his  assignee  holding  an 
outstanding  lease  causes  the  lease  to  merge  in  the  freehold 
estate."^ 

The  rule  of  the  common  law  is  that  the  owner  of  a  leasehold 
estate  has  a  right  to  alienate  his  interest,  either  by  assigning  the 
lease  in  toto  or  by  subletting  a  part  of  the  premises.^^  As  a  rule, 
a  tenant  under  a  lease  which  contains  no  provision  against  sub- 
letting has  a  perfect  right  to  sublet,  remaining  himself  bound  for 
rent  to  his  landlord.  An  exception  to  the  general  rule  has  been 
made  in  case  where  the  amount  of  rent  received  must  depend  on 
the  character  and  skill  of  the  lessee.^''  Some  states  have  enacted 
statutes  against  assignment  and  subletting,  but  in  the  absence  of 
such  statute  or  a  restrictive  covenant  in  the  lease,  the  tenant  may 
assign  his  lease.""     Covenants  against  assignment  or  subletting 

Ind.  App.  215,  90  N.  E.  642;  Quinn  26  Depere  v.   Revnen,  65  Wis.  271, 

V.  Valiquette,  80  Vt.  434.  68  Atl.  515,  22  N.  W.  761,  27  N.  W.  155. 

14  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  962n.  -'"  McMahan    v.   Jacoway,    105    Ala. 

23  Gibson  V.  Holden,  115  111.  199,  3  585.  17  So.  39. 

N.  E.  282,  56  Am.  Rep.  146;  Conover  ^s  Crommelin  v.  Thiess.  31  Ala.  412. 

V.    Smith,    17   N.   J.    Eq.   51,   86  Am.  70  Am.  Dec.  499;  Robinson  v.  Perry. 

Dec.  247.  21  Ga.  183,  68  Am.  Dec.  455 ;  Kew  v. 

24  American    Freehold   Land   Mort-  Trainor,  150  111.  150,  11  N.  E.  223. 
gage  Co.  V.  Turner,  95  Ala.  272,   11  2;.  Ra„dell  v.  Chubb.  46  Mieh.  311. 
So.  211.  9  N.  W.  429,  41  Am.  Rep.  165. 

2<"'  Starbuck  v.  Averv,  132  Mo.  App.         ■■*«  Gazlay  v.  Williams,  210  U.  S.  41, 
542,  112  S.  W.  iZ.  28  Sup.  Ct.  687,  52  L.  ed.  950. 


§  408 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


436 


arc  not  looked  upon  with  favor  by  the  courts,  and  are  hberally 
construed  in  favor  of  lessees  so  as  to  prevent  the  restriction  from 
extending  any  further  than  necessary. ^^  By  the  assignment  the 
tenant  is  not  thereby  released  from  his  covenants  unless  the  land- 
lord accepts  the  assignee  as  a  substitute  tenant.""  An  assignment 
of  a  lease  carries  with  it  a  clause  giving  the  tenant  the  right  to 
renew  at  the  end  of  the  term  as  well  as  all  other  clauses. ^^ 

The  assignment  may  be  by  indorsement  on  the  back  of  the 
lease  or  by  separate  instrument,^*  and  in  the  latter  case  such  in- 
strument, being  a  transfer  of  an  interest  in  land,  may  properly 
be  recorded ;  but  it  will  not  operate  as  constructive  notice  to  a 
subsequent  purchaser  if  it  fail  to  describe  the  premises  and  define 
the  terms  or  to  contain  language  of  description  by  wdiich  the 
original  lease  can  be  recognized  as  the  thing  transferred.^^  The 
express  covenants  in  a  lease  continue  to  be  binding  upon  the  cove- 
nantor notwithstanding  his  assignment  of  the  lease. ^®  An  as- 
signee of  a  lease  is  bound  by  privity  of  estate  to  perform  the  ex- 
press covenants  which  run  with  the  land,  but  in  the  absence  of 
express  agreement  on  his  part,  he  is  liable  only  on  such  covenants 
as  run  with  the  land  and  only  during  such  time  as  he  holds  the 
term.^'' 


21  Caley  v.  Portland,  12  Colo.  App. 
397,  56  Pac.  350;  Presby  v.  Benjamin, 
169  N.  Y.  ni,  62  N.  E.  430,  57  L. 
R.  A.  317. 

32  Page  V.  Ellsworth,  44  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  636. 

33  Sutherland  v.  Goodnow,  108  111. 
528,  48  Am.  Rep.  560;  McClintock  v. 
Joyner,  11  Miss.  678,  27  So.  837,  78 
Am.  St.  541. 


34  Cleveland  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mitchell.  74  111.  App.  602;  Esty  v. 
Baker,  48  Maine  495. 

35  Martindalc  v.  Price,  14  Ind.  115. 
3"  Brosman  v.  Kramer,  135  Cal.  36, 

66  Pac.  979;  Jones  v.  Parker,  163 
Mass.  564,  40  N.  E.  1044,  47  Am.  St. 
485. 

37  Bonetti  v.  Treat,  91  Cal.  223,  27 
Pac.  612,  14  L.  R.  A.  151. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


MORTGAGES 


SEC. 

415.  Definition,  origin,  and  nature  of 
mortgages. 

416.  Legal    and    equitable    theory    of 
mortgages. 

417.  Equitable  mortgages. 

418.  Mortgages     distinguished     from 
other  transactions. 

419.  Absolute  deed  as  mortgage. 

420.  Equity  of  redemption. 

421.  Form  of  mortgage  in  general. 

422.  Description  of  the  parties. 

423.  Description  of  the  premises. 

424.  Description  of  the  debt  secured 
or  obHgation  to  be  performed. 

425.  Covenants    of    a   mortgage   gen- 
erally. 

426.  Special     covenants     and     condi- 
tions. 

427.  Estoppel    of    mortgagor     subse- 
quently acquiring  title. 

428.  Merger     as     applied     to     mort- 
gages. 

429.  Payment  or  discharge  of  mort- 
gage. 

430.  Purchase-money  mortgages. 

431.  Mortgages  of  the  homestead. 


SEC. 

432.  Mortgages      of      after-acquired 
property. 

433.  Record  of  mortgages. 

434.  Possession  as  notice. 

435.  Correction    of    errors    in    record 
and  re-recording  mortgage. 

436.  Assignment    of    mortgages    and 
deeds  of  trust. 

437.  Form,  requisites,  and  method  of 
assignment. 

438.  Record  of  assignments  of  mort- 
gages. 

439.  Equitable   assignments   of   mort- 
gages. 

440.  Abstracting    mortgage    and    as- 
signment of  mortgage. 

441.  Trust  deeds. 

442.  Power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or 
deed  of  trust. 

443.  Release  or  satisfaction  of  record. 

444.  Foreclosure    by    entry    and    pos- 
session. 

445.  Foreclosure  by  writ  of  entry. 

446.  Foreclosure  by  exercise  of  power 
of  sale. 

447.  Foreclosure  by  equitable  suit. 


§  415.  Definition,  origin,  and  nature  of  mortgages. — A 
mortgage,  in  its  broadest  sense,  is  a  conveyance  of  land  as  secur- 
ity for  the  payment  of  a  debt  or  the  performance  of  an  obliga- 
tion.^ This  definition  embraces  two  essential  things  necessary  to 
constitute  a  mortgage,  and  if  more  be  attempted  it  results  in  a 
description  of  one  of  the  many  forms  which  a  mortgage  may 
take.  The  origin  of  the  law  of  mortgages  of  real  property  in 
English  law  dates  back  to  the  time  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  kings. 
The  records  of  this  early  period  are  extremely  meager  and  the 
extent  of  the  custom  to  pledge  real  estate  to  secure  the  payment 
of  debts  is  unknown,  but  enough  evidence  exists  to  conclusively 

1  Williams  v.  Davis,   154  Ala.  422,     S.)   285n ;  Gassert  v.  Bogk,  7  Mont. 
45  So.  908 ;  Priddy  v.  Smith,  106  Ark.     585,  19  Pac.  281,  1  L.  R.  A.  240. 
79,  152  S.  W.  1028,  44  L.  R.  A.  (N. 

437 


§    416  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  438 

show  that  such  pledges  were  sometimes  made."  Upon  the  advent 
of  the  Norman  kings  and  the  inauguration  of  the  feudal  system 
the  alienation  of  land  was  so  restricted  that  the  custom  fell  into 
disuse  and  was  practically  unknown  for  a  period  of  two  hundred 
years.  After  the  statute  of  Quia  Emptores,  A.  D.  1325,^  remov- 
ing the  feudal  restrictions  and  permitting  tlie  alienation  of  land, 
the  records  show  that  pledges  of  real  property  gradually  came 
into  use  again  as  one  of  the  means  of  securing  the  payment  of 
debts.  Little  is  known  of  the  nature  of  the  contract  under  the 
early  English  law  and  the  rights  of  the  parties  thereunder.  It 
seems,  however,  that,  upon  the  execution  of  the  mortgage,  the 
mortgagee  was  entitled  to  take  possession  of  the  property  as  the 
legal  owner  thereof,  and  to  hold  the  same  so  long  as  the  debt  re- 
mained unpaid.  But  upon  the  payment  of  the  debt  which  the 
mortgage  was  given  to  secure,  the  mortgagor  was  entitled  to  have 
the  property  reconveyed  to  him,  and  upon  failure  of  the  mort- 
gagee to  do  so  he  could  resort  to  the  courts  for  the  enforcement 
of  this  right. 

§  416.  Legal  and  equitable  theory  of  mortgages. — A 
mortgage  at  law  and  in  equity  and  the  rights  of  the  parties  there- 
under were  very  different.  At  law,  a  mortgage  was  a  convey- 
ance of  an  estate  upon  condition,  and  upon  the  failure  of  the 
mortgagor  to  perform  the  condition  strictly  according  to  its 
terms,  his  rights  to  the  estate  were  forfeited  and  the  title  vested 
absolutely  in  the  mortgagee.  The  mortgagor  had  no  further 
right  that  a  court  of  law  could  enforce,  and,  no  matter  how  un- 
just the  forfeiture,  he  was  without  remedy.  But  in  equity  the 
rule  was  different.  While  courts  of  equity  could  not  alter  the  le- 
gal effect  of  the  forfeiture  which  followed  a  breach  of  condition 
and  did  not  attempt  to  do  so,  they  regarded  it  as  in  the  nature  of 
a  penalty  which  ought  to  be  relieved  against.  They  recognized 
the  purpose  as  merely  a  pledge  to  secure  a  debt,  and  declared  it 
as  unreasonable  that  the  mortgagee  should  by  the  failure  of  the 
debtor  to  meet  his  obligation  at  the  day  aj^pointed,  be  entitled 
to  keep  as  his  own  what  was  intended  as  a  pledge.  At  law  the 
legal  right  of  the  mortgagor  to  have  his  estate  again  was  for- 
feited; but  in  equity  he  was  still  allowed  to  reclaim  it  upon  pay- 

2  Essays  in  Anglo-Saxon  Law,  Ap-         ^  18  Edw.  2,  Stat.  1. 
pendix,  Case  No.   18,  p.  .342. 


439  MORTGAGES  §    416 

ment  of  his  debt  with  interest.  In  equity  a  mortgage  was  merely 
a  security  for  the  payment  of  a  debt  or  the  performance  of  an 
obHgation  and  this  is  the  view  which  prevails  at  the  present  time 
in  courts  of  law  as  well  as  in  courts  of  equity/ 

While  the  common-law  doctrine  of  mortgages  prevails  in  some 
of  the  states,  with  more  or  less  modification  by  equitable  prin- 
ciples, a  majority  however,  partly  by  force  of  statute,  and  partly 
by  judicial  decisions,  the  common-law  doctrine  has  been  abro- 
gated, and  has  given  place  to  the  purely  equitable  theory.  Thus, 
by  statute  in  California,  Colorado,  Florida,  Georgia,  Idaho,  In- 
diana, Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
Montana,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New  Mexico,  New  York,  North 
Dakota,  Oklahoma,  Oregon,  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota, 
Texas,  Utah,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin,  a  mortgage  is  re- 
garded as  merely  a  lien  upon  the  property  both  before  and  after 
breach  of  condition.  It  passes  no  title  or  estate  in  the  property 
to  the  mortgagee,  and  gives  him  no  right  to  possession  before 
foreclosure.  In  Iowa,  Kansas,  and  Nevada  the  statutes  imply 
that  the  parties  may,  by  express  stipulation,  give  the  right  of  pos- 
session to  the  mortgagee.^  However,  in  Alabama,  Arkansas, 
Connecticut,  Illinois,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  New 
Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania, 
Rhode  Island,  Tennessee,  Vermont,  Virginia,  and  West  Vir- 
dnia,  the  courts  have  adhered  to  the  doctrines  of  the  common 
law  as  regards  the  nature  of  the  mortgage  interest  and  the  re- 
spective rights  of  the  parties.  They  regard  the  mortgage  deed 
as  passing  at  once  the  legal  title  to  the  mortgagee,  subject  to  de- 
feasance, as  a  condition  subsequent  which  divests  or  defeats  the 
estate  on  performance  of  it.  The  right  of  possession  follows  the 
title  so  that  the  mortgagee  may  enter  into  possession  of  the  mort- 
gaged property  immediately  unless  restrained  by  express  provi- 
sions, or  necessary  implication,  of  the  mortgage;  and  in  any 
case  upon  breach  of  the  condition  he  becomes  entitled  to  the 
possession  and  may  recover  it  by  action.  The  legal  title  is  in  the 
mortgagee  only  for  the  protection  and  enforcement  of  his  inter- 
ests. The  mortgagee's  title  is  in  the  nature  of  a  base  or  deter- 
minable fee,  which  continues  only  so  long  as  the  debt  continues.^ 

*  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Broecker,  Kans.   384;    Barber    v.     Crowell,     55 

166  Ind.  576.  11  N.  E.  1092.  Nebr.  571,  75  N.  W.  1109. 

=  Whitley  v.  Barnett,  151  Iowa  487.  c  Lightcap  v.  Bradley,   186  111.  510, 

131  N.  W.  704;  Chick  v.  Willetts,  2  58  N.  E.  221. 


§    417  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  440 

^  417.  Equitable  mortgages. — The  term  "equitable  mort- 
gage" is  properly  applied  to  a  transaction  which  would  not  in  law 
be  held  to  be  a  mortgage  yet  the  effect  of  which  is  to  convey  re^l 
estate  or  some  interest  therein  as  security  for  a  debt.  The  term 
is  used  more  properly  with  reference  solely  to  the  kind  of  instru- 
ment or  contract  by  which  equity  establishes  a  lien.  It  is  the 
equitable  form  of  the  transaction  and  not  the  equitable  nature  of 
the  property  which  is  necessary  to  create  an  equitable  mortgage. 
A  deed  or  contract  which  does  not  contain  a  condition  or  de- 
feasance but  is  used  for  the  purpose  of  pledging  real  property  or 
some  interest  in  it  as  security  for  a  debt  or  obligation  and  with 
the  intention  of  creating  a  mortgage  is  an  equitable  mortgage.'^ 
Deeds  and  contracts  which  are  wanting  in  the  characteristics  of 
a  common-law  mortgage  are  often  used  by  parties  for  the  pur- 
pose of  pledging  real  property,  or  some  interest  in  it,  as  security 
for  a  debt  or  obligation,  and  with  the  intention  that  they  shall 
have  effect  as  mortgages.  Equity  comes  in  to  aid  the  parties  in 
such  cases,  and  gives  effect  to  their  intentions.  Mortgages  of  this 
kind  are,  therefore,  called  equitable  mortgages.^  There  are  as 
many  kinds  of  equitable  mortgages  as  there  are  varieties  of  ways 
in  which  parties  may  contract  for  security  by  pledging  some  in- 
terest in  land.''  Whatever  the  form  of  contract  may  be,  if  it  is 
intended  thereby  to  create  a  security,  it  is  an  equitable  mortgage.^" 
The  intent  to  create  an  equitable  mortgage,  or  security  for  the 
payment  of  a  debt  must  be  manifest,  as  distinguished  from  an 
intent  to  apply  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  the  proceeds  from  the 
sale  of  the  property.^^  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  contract 
should  be  in  express  terms  a  security,  for  equity  will  often  imply 
this  from  the  nature  of  the  transaction  between  the  parties.^'" 
As  in  the  case  of  a  legal  mortgage  there  must  be  some  debt, 
liability  or  obligation  secured. ^^  But  the  debt  secured  by  an 
equitable  mortgage  need  not  be  evidenced  by  notes,  lx)nds,  or 

''Alexander    v.    Mortgage    Co.    of  i" Woodruff  v.  Adair,  131  Ala.  530, 

Scotland.  47  Fed.  131.  32    So.    515;    New    Vienna    Bank    v. 

«Gessner  v.  Palmateer,  89  Cal.  89,  Johnson,  47  Ohio   St.  306,  24   N.   E. 

24  Pac.  608,  26  Pac.  789,  13  L.  R.  A.  503,  8  L.  R.  A.  614. 

187n ;  Brown  v.  Brown,   103  Ind.  23,  ii  Smith  v.  Rainey,  9  Ariz.  362,  83 

2  N.  E.  233.  Pac.  463. 

^  Donald  v.  Hewitt,  33  Ala.  534,  73  ^~  Bradley  v.  Merrill,  89  Maine  319, 

Am.  Dec.  431 ;  Newlin  v.  McAfee-,  64  34  Atl.  160. 

Ala.  357 ;  Payne  v.  Wilson,  74  N.  Y.  ^^  McLaren  v.  Clark,  80  Ga.  423,  7 

348.  S.  E.  230. 


441  MORTGAGES  §    417 

other  written  obligation.^*  An  agreement  to  give  a  mortgage 
or  security  on  certain  property,  not  objectionable  for  want  of 
consideration,  is  treated  in  equity  as  a  mortgage,  and  as  such, 
will  bind  the  maker  of  it  and  his  heirs,  and  persons  having 
notice."  Instruments  which  attempt  to  create  a  legal  mortgage 
or  trust  deed,  and  fail  through  some  defect  in  their  execution  or 
form,  and  written  contracts  intended  to  operate  as  mortgages  or 
as  charges  upon  property,  which  are  too  informal  or  defective  to 
operate  at  law,  are  generally  given  effect  and  enforced  as  equita- 
ble mortgages.^*^  A  mortgage,  or  trust  deed,  which  can  not  be 
enforced  by  a  sale  under  the  power  by  a  judgment  of  foreclosure, 
on  account  of  the  omission  of  some  formality  requisite  to  a  com- 
plete mortgage  or  deed  of  trust,  will  nevertheless  be  regarded  as 
an  equitable  mortgage,  and  the  lien  will  be  enforced  by  special 
proceedings  in  equity. ^^  Any  agreement  between  the  parties  in 
interest  that  shows  an  intention  to  create  a  lien  may  be  in  equity 
a  mortgage. ^^  Although  a  mortgage  signed  in  blank,  and  after- 
ward filled  in  by  an  agent  of  the  grantor,  is  not  a  legally  executed 
deed,  it  may,  however,  create  an  equitable  lien  which  the  courts 
will  enforce." 

An  assignment  by  the  vendee  of  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of 
land  made  as  security  for  a  debt  or  loan,  may  be  regarded  as  an 
equitable  mortgage. -°  Also  a  bond  for  a  conveyance  may  be  as- 
signed by  way  of  mortgage;  and  if  the  assignee  subsequently  ob- 
tains the  legal  title  to  the  land  by  virtue  of  the  bond,  and  sur- 
renders that,  he  will  hold  the  land  subject  to  the  right  of  his  as- 
signor to  redeem.-^  Likewise  the  assignment  of  a  certificate  of 
purchase  of  public  lands  issued  by  the  state  or  federal  govern- 
ment operates  as  an  equitable  mortgage,  when  intended  to  secure 
a  debt  due  from  the  assignor  to  the  assignee. " 

"Bradley  v.  Merrill,  88  Maine  319,  i- Dyson  v.  Simmons,  48  Md.  207; 

34  Atl.  160.  Sprague  v.   Cochran,   144   N.   Y.   104, 

1=5  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Berke-  38  N.  E.  1000 ;  Atkinson  v.  Miller,  34 

ley  &c.  R.  Co.,   168  Fed.  770;   Rich-  W.  Va.  115,  11  S.-  E.  1007,  9  L.  R.  A. 

ardson  v.  Wren,  11  Ariz.  395,  95  Pac.  544. 

124,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  190.  i^Qest  v.  Packwood,  39  Fed.  525; 

"Wood    V.    Holly    Mfg.    Co.,    100  Courtner  v.   Etheredge,   149  Ala.   78, 

Ala.  326,  13  So.  948,  46  Am.  St.  56;  43  So.  368. 

Bell  V.   Pelt,   51   Ark.  433,   11    S.  W.  i9  Fox  v.  Palmer,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  416. 

684,  4  L.  R.  A.  247,  14  Am.   St.  57;  -»  Andrews  v.  Cone,  124  U.  S.  720 

Peers  v.  McLaughlin,  88  Cal.  294,  26  8  Sup.  Ct.  686,  31  L.  ed.  564:  Heard 

Pac.  199,  22  Am.  St.  306:  Howard  v.  v.  Heard,  181  Ala.  230,  61  So.  343. 

Iron  &c.  Co.,  62  Minn.  298,  64  N.  W.  ^i  Fenno   v.    Sayre,     3     Ala.     458 ; 

896;   White  v.  University  Land   Co.,  Lewis  v.  Boskins,  27  Ark.  61. 

49  Mo.  App.  450.  22  Hill  v.  Eldred,  49  Cal.  398 ;  Stew- 


§    418  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  442 

An  equitable  mortgage  may  at  common  law  be  created  by  de- 
posit of  the  title  deeds  of  a  legal  or  equitable  estate  as  security 
for  the  payment  of  money. "^  But  this  method  of  creation  of  an 
equitable  mortgage  is  sometimes  repudiated  on  the  ground  that  it 
is  contrary  to  the  policy  of  the  registration  laws  and  in  violation 
of  the  statute  of  frauds.** 

§  418.     Mortgages  distinguished  from  other  transactions. 

— A  mortgage  is  distinguished  from  other  conveyances  of  land  in 
that  there  must  be  a  debt  or  an  obligation  to  perform,  which  the 
conveyance  was  given  to  secure,  and  that  the  grantor  must  have 
an  absolute  right  to  a  reconveyance  of  the  land  upon  the  per- 
formance of  the  condition  specified  in  the  deed.  The  debt  may  be 
either  a  present  subsisting  obligation  or  it  may  be  one  that  is  to 
be  incurred  in  the  future,  but  there  must  be  a  debt  to  secure  or  an 
obligation  to  perform. 

At  law,  an  agreement  for  a  reconveyance,  to  constitute  a  de- 
feasance and  make  the  transaction  a  mortgage,  must  be  executed 
at  the  same  time  with  the  conveyance  and  as  a  part  of  the  same 
transaction  and  must  be  under  seal ;  while  in  equity  any  evidence, 
whether  it  be  in  writing  or  merely  parol,  which  clearly  shows  that 
the  conveyance  was  in  fact  intended  only  as  a  security,  will  make 
the  transaction  a  mortgage;  and  if  there  be  a  written  agreement 
for  reconveyance,  it  matters  not  how  informal  it  may  be  when  it 
was  executed. ^^  It  follows,  therefore,  that  a  court  of  equity  will 
often  pronounce  that  to  be  an  equitable  mortgage  which  at  law- 
would  be  considered  a  conditional  sale.  A  court  of  equity  is  not 
concluded  by  the  form  of  the  transaction,  whether  this  seems  to 
indicate  a  mortgage  or  conditional  sale,  but  will  have  regard  to 
the  actual  facts.""  Whether  a  conveyance  be  a  mortgage  or  a 
conditional  sale  must  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  the  pe- 
culiar circumstances  of  each  case."^     While  a  conditional  sale 

art  V.   McLauglilin,   11    Colo.  458,    18  Bcidleman  v.  Koch,  42  Ind.  App.  423 

Pac.  619.  85    N.    E.    977;    Harmon    v.    Grant's 

^-Higgins  V.  Manson,  126  Cal.  467,  Pas.s  &c.  Trust  Co.,  60  Ore.  69,   118 

58  Pac.  907.  n  Am.  St.  192 ;  Hamil-  Pac.  188. 

ton  Trust  Co.  v.  Clemes,   163  N.  Y.  2"  McNamara  v.    Culver,   22   Kans. 

423.  57  N.  E.  614.  661. 

2*  Lehman  v.  CoHins,  69  Ala.   127;  2"  Horbach  v.  Hill,   112  U.  S.  144, 

Pierce  v.  Parrish,  111  Ga.  725,  11  S.  5  Sup.  Ct.  81,  28  L.  ed.  670;  Pender- 

E.  79;  Tuller  v.  Leaverton,  143  Iowa  grass  v.   Burris.   11   Cal.    19,    19  Pac. 

162,  121  N.  W.  515,  136  Am.  St.  756.  187;  Heath  v.  Williams,  30  Ind.  495. 

23  Pearson   v.   Seay,   38    Ala.    643 ; 


443  MORTGAGES  §    419 

and  a  mortgage  are,  in  form  and  substance,  very  much  alike,  the 
rights  of  the  parties  under  them  are  very  different."*  A  mort- 
gage may  be  redeemed  at  any  time  before  the  right  is  cut  off  bv 
foreclosure,  but  there  can  be  no  redemption  under  a  conditional 
sale  after  the  day  appointed.  This  is  the  contract  of  the  parties 
and  either  one  of  them  is  entitled  to  have  it  enforced  according 
to  its  terms. ^^  The  option  to  purchase  under  a  conditional  sale 
may  be  a  personal  privilege  which  can  not  be  enforced  in  case  of 
the  death  of  the  obligee  during  the  continuance  of  the  option."" 

§  419.  Absolute  deed  as  mortgage. — At  law  an  absolute 
deed  and  separate,  absolute  defeasance  or  agreement  to  reconvey, 
executed  at  the  same  time  as  security  for  a  debt  amount  to  a 
mortgage.^^  Although  there  has  been  considerable  objection  by 
the  courts  to  separate  defeasances  as  tending  to  encourage  fraud, 
yet  a  deed  absolute  in  form,  intended  to  operate  as  a  security,  if 
given  in  good  faith  to  secure  an  actual  indebtedness,  is  not  con- 
structively fraudulent  as  to  the  grantor's  other  creditors.^-  Such 
a  deed  and  agreement  to  reconvey  the  estate  upon  payment  of  a 
certain  sum  of  money,  or  upon  the  performance  of  some  other 
condition,  have  always  been  held  to  constitute  a  leg-al  mortsras^e  if 
the  mstruments  are  of  the  same  date,  or  were  executed  and  de- 
livered at  the  same  time  and  as  one  transaction.^^ 

As  between  the  parties  themselves,  the  relation  is  the  same  as 
if  the  mortgage  had  been  in  the  ordinary  form.^^  The  fact  that 
possession  of  the  property  is  given  to  the  grantee  by  the  contract 
for  conveyance  does  not  affect  the  character  of  the  transaction.^' 
The  instrument  of  defeasance  must  be  of  as  high  character  as  the 
deed  itself ;  and  consequently  a  written  agreement  to  reconvey  not 

-'Tlagg  V.  Mann,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  Appeal,    55    Conn.    149,    10   Atl.   498: 

467.  Wylly-Gabbett     Co.   v.    Williams,     53 

2"  People  V.  Irwin,   14  Cal.  428.   18  Fla.  872.  42  So.  910 ;  Mutual  L.  Ins. 

Cal.    117;    Sha.vs    v.    Norton,    48    111.  Co.    v.    Nicholas,    144    App.    Div     95, 

100;  Trucks  v.  Lindsey.  18  Iowa  504;  128  N.  Y.  S.  902;  Adams  v.  Mclntyre' 

Cornell  v.  Hall,  22  Mich,  yil  \   Mer-  22  N.  Dak.  ZH ,  133  N.  W.  915. 

ntt  V.  Brown,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  286.  -"is  McClure  v.  Smith,  14  Colo.  297, 

^"Newton  v.  Newton,  11  R.  I.  390,  23  Pac.  786. 

2^  Am-  .^^P-  ^''^-  "^  Nugent  v.  Riley.  1  Mete.  (Mass.) 

31  Teal  V.   Walker.    Ill   U.    S.   242,  117,  35  Am.  Dec.  355;  Clark  v.  Lan- 

4  Sup.  Ct.  420,  28  L.  ed.  415;  Cosby  don.  90  Mich.  83,  51  N.  W.  357. 

V.  Buchanan.  81  Ala.  574,  1   So.  898;  34  short  v.  Caldwell,   155  Mass    57 

Shcrrer  v.   Harris    (Ark.)    13   S.   W.  28  N.  E.   1124. 

730;   Booth  v.  Hoskins,   75   Cal.  271.  so  ciark  v.  Landon,  90  Mich.  83,  51 

17   Pac.   225 ;    McClure   v.    Smith,    14  N.  W.  357. 
Colo.  297,  23  Pac.  786;  In  re  Gunn's 


^    419  TITLKS    AND    ABSTRACTS  444 

under  seal,  though  made  at  the  same  time  with  the  deed,  does  not, 
at  law,  constitute  a  mortgage.""  If  not  under  seal,  the  agreement 
will  constitute  a  mortgage  only  in  equity."^^  If  the  deed  and  de- 
feasance do  not  on  their  face  show  that  the  transaction  is  a  secur- 
ity for  a  debt,  the  instruments  do  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  consti- 
tute a  mortgage,  though  they  may  be  proved  to  be  such  by  ex- 
trinsic evidence.^* 

The  absolute  deed  may  secure  advances  to  be  made,  and  in  that 
case  the  mortgage  becomes  effectual  when  the  advances  are 
made.^^  It  is  not  material  that  there  should  be  any  note  or  bond 
or  other  written  evidence  of  debt,  nor  is  it  material  that  the  in- 
debtedness should  have  arisen  in  any  particular  manner.  It  is 
only  material  that  there  should  be  a  bona  fide  debt.*"  Whenever 
a  debt  is  recognized  by  the  parties  or  established  by  the  evidence, 
an  agreement  to  reconvey  serves  to  make  a  mortgage  of  the  con- 
veyance.'*^ But  a  debt  either  pre-existing  or  created  at  the  time, 
or  contracted  to  be  created,  is  essential.*"  And  if  an  absolute 
deed  was  intended  as  security,  it  is  a  mortgage,  though  the  bond 
for  reconveyance  makes  time  the  essence  of  the  contract.*^ 

No  agreement  or  intention  of  the  parties,  whether  at  the  time 
of  the  transaction  or  subsequently,  can  change  the  redeemable 
character  of  a  mortgage."  In  some  states,  although  the  mort- 
gage is  a  deed  absolute  in  form,  the  grantee  acquires  no  legal  title 
to  the  land.  The  deed  is  a  mere  security,  just  as  a  formal  mort- 
gage is  in  the  same  states."  But  in  other  states,  in  which  a  formal 
mortgage  is  held  to  pass  the  legal  title,  a  deed  absolute  in  form 
intended  to  operate  as  a  mortgage  does  not  pass  such  title. ''^ 

3fi  Warren  v.  Lovis.  53  Maine  463;  Guire,  146  Iowa  270,  125  N.  W.  180; 

Flint  V.  Sheldon,  13  Mass.  443,  7  Am.  White  v.  Walsh,  62  Misc.  423,  114  N. 

Dec.  162;  Runlet  v.  Otis,  2  N.  H.  167.  Y.  S.  1015. 

•"^^  Kelleran  v.  Brown,  4  Mass.  443 ;  ^-  Bridges  v.  Linder,  60  Iowa   190, 

Phelen    v.    Fitzpatrick,    84    Wis.   240,  14  N.  W.  217. 

54  N.  W.  614.  ^-^  Jackson  v.  Lynch,  129  111.  72,  21 

38  Teal  V.  Walker,  111  U.  S.  242.  4  N.    E.   580,   22    N.    E.   246;    Voss   v. 
Sup.  Ct.  420,  28  L.  ed.  415 ;  Carroll  v.  Eller,  109  Ind.  260,   10  N.  E.  74. 
Toinlinson,  192  111.    398,  61  N.  E.  484,  "Woods    v.    Wallace,    22    Pa.    St. 
85  Am.  St.  344.  171  ;   Hart  v.   Eppstein,  71   Tex.  752, 

39  Bull  V.  Coe,  77  Cal.  54,  18  Pac.  10  S.  W.  85 ;  Wing  v.  Cooper,  37  Vt. 
808.  11  Am.  St.  235.  169. 

40  Overstreet  v.  Baxter,  30  Kans.  ^5  Smith  v.  Smith,  80  Cal.  323,  21 
55,  1  Pac.  825.  Pac.  4,  22  Pac.  186.  549. 

41  Thomas   v.    Livingston,    155  .Ala.  *«  Woodward   v.   Jewell,    140  U.   S. 
546,  46  So.  851:  Wilson  v.  Rehm.  117  247,   11   Sup.   Ct.  784.  35  L.  ed.  478; 
111.  App.  473;  Voss  v.  Eller,  109  Ind.  Thaxton  v.  Roberts,  66  Ga.  704. 
260,  10  N.  E.  74;  Henninger  v.  Mc- 


I 


445  MORTGAGES  §    420 

§  420.  Equity  of  redemption. — At  common  law  a  mortgage 
was  an  absolute  conveyance  with  the  condition  that,  on  the  pay- 
ment of  the  debt  which  the  mortgage  was  given  to  secure,  the 
property  would  be  reconveyed  to  the  mortgagor.  Upon  the  fail- 
ure of  the  mortgagor  to  pay  at  the  specified  time  or  to  otherwise 
comply  with  the  strict  terms  of  the  condition,  he  lost  his  right  to 
the  property  and  the  mortgagee  became  the  absolute  owner 
thereof.  The  injustice  of  this  condition,  especially  in  those  cases 
where  the  value  of  the  property  was  out  of  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  the  debt  secured,  was  so  apparent  that  courts  of  equity 
assumed  jurisdiction  to  grant  relief  to  the  debtor.  This  relief 
was  known  as  the  equity  of  redemption  and  under  it  a  party  was 
permitted  to  pay  the  debt  after  the  day  specified  in  the  condition 
had  passed,  and,  upon  so  doing,  the  court  would  compel  the  mort- 
gagee to  restore  the  property  to  him.  "Once  a  mortgage  always 
a  mortgage,"^'  early  became  one  of  the  important  maxims  in  this 
branch  of  the  law  and  has  always  been  strictly  adhered  to.  Ac- 
cordingly the  parties  can  not  provide  that  upon  the  happening  of 
a  specified  contingency,  the  transaction  will  cease  to  be  a  mort- 
gage and  become  an  absolute  conveyance.  An  agreement  made 
at  the  time  of  giving  the  mortgage,  cutting  off  the  right  of  re- 
demption has  always  been  held  void,*^  and  a  subsequent  release 
of  the  right  will  only  be  upheld  when  it  clearly  appears  that  it  was 
made  without  oppression  and  upon  sufficient  consideration.'*'' 

If  originally  taken  as  a  mortgage,  nothing  but  a  subsequent 
agreement  of  the  parties  can  change  its  character  and  deprive  the 
mortgagor  of  his  right  of  redemption;  and  even  such  an  agree- 
ment can  not  change  its  character  as  to  intervening  interests. ■'" 
The  right  of  redemption  can  not  be  waived  or  abandoned  by  any 
stipulation  of  the  parties  made  at  the  time,  even  if  embodied  in 
the  mortgage.^ ^  The  mortgagor's  equity  of  redemption  may  be 
seized  upon  execution  by  a  third  person,  or  even  by  the  mort- 
gagee, upon  an  execution  obtained  upon  a  debt  not  secured  by 

47  Newcomb  v.  Bonham.  1  Vern.  7.     Iowa  395,  75  N.  W.  321 ;  LeComte  v. 

48  Quartermous  v.  Kennedy,  29  Pennock,  61  Kans.  330,  59  Pac.  641 ; 
Ark.  544;   Lee  v.  Evans,  8  Cal.  424.     McPherson   v.   Hayward,    81     Maine 

43  Pritchard  v.  Elton.  38  Conn.  434 ;  329,  17  Atl.  164. 

Wilson  V.  Fisher,  148  N.  Car.  535,  62  =i  Peugh  v.  Davis,  96  U.  S.  322,  24 

S.  E.  622.  L.  ed.  775,  revg.  2  McArthur  (D.  C.) 

r.opeagler  v.   Stabler,   91   Ala.  308,  114;  Turpie  v.  Lowe,  114  Ind.  2>1 ,  15 

9  So.  157 ;  Haggerty  v.  Brower,   105  N.  E.  834. 


§    421  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  446 

mortgage  either  before  or  after  default/''  The  levy  of  an  execu- 
tion by  any  other  creditor,  or  by  the  mortgagee  upon  another 
debt,  or  the  sale  under  it,  does  not  affect  the  rights  of  the  mort- 
gagee/^ A  purchaser  of  the  equity  of  redemption  at  execution 
sale  succeeds  to  the  equitable  rights  of  the  mortgagor,  and  may 
redeem  the  estate  just  as  the  mortgagor  could. ■'^*  The  legal  estate 
remaining  in  the  mortgagor,  he  may  execute  a  second  or  subse- 
quent mortgage  thereon ;  but  a  party  taking  a  mortgage  on  land 
pending  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  prior  mortgage  or  lien,  will  be  bound 
by  the  decree  and  sale  thereunder  the  same  as  if  made  a  party  to 
the  foreclosure,  and  will  be  bound  to  redeem  from  such  sale 
within  the  period  allowed  by  law.  If  he  fails  to  do  so  his  equity 
of  redemption- will  be  barred. ^^ 

§  421.  Form  of  mortgage  in  general. — No  particular  form 
is  necessary  to  constitute  a  mortgage.""'  It  must  be  in  writing,  ' 
and  must  clearly  indicate  the  creation  of  a  lien,  specify  the  debt 
to  secure  which  it  is  given,  and  the  property  upon  which  it  is  to 
take  effect. ^^  "An  instrument  must  be  deemed  and  held  a  mort- 
gage, whatever  may  be  its  form,  if,  taken  alone  or  in  connection 
with  the  surrounding  facts  and  attendant  circumstances,  it  ap- 
pears to  have  been  given  for  the  purpose  or  with  the  intention  of 
securing  the  payment  of  money,  and  the  mere  absence  of  terms 
of  defeasance  can  not  determine  whether  it  is  a  mortgage  or 
not.'"^"  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  entire  mortgage  be  embraced 
in  one  instrument.  It  may  consist  of  an  absolute  deed  with  a 
separate  defeasance  executed  by  the  grantee;  and  this  defeasance 
may  even  rest  in  parol.  It  differs  from  a  warranty  deed  in  an 
added  condition  that,  if  the  grantor  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money, 

S2  Bernstein  v.  Humes,  71  Ala.  260 ;  "  Williams  v.  Davis,  154  Ala.  422, 

Seaman  v.  Hax,  14  Colo.  536,  24  Pac.  45  So.  908 ;  Eikelman  v.  Perdew,  140 

461,  9  L.  R.  A.  341  ;  Walters  v.  De-  Cal.  687,  74  Pac.  291 ;   Duke  v.  Cul- 

fenbaugh,  90  111.  241.  pepper,  72  Ga.  842;    American    Sav. 

^3Atcheson  v.   Broadhead,  56  Ala.  Bank   &   Trust    Co.   v.    Helgesen,   64 

414.  Wash.    54,    116    Pac.    837,    Ann.    Cas. 

■'>4Shaw   V.    Lindsay,   60   Ala.   344;  1913A,  390n. 

Turner  v.  Watkins,  31  Ark.  429.  •"'«  New  Orleans  Nat.  Bank  Assn.  v. 

55  Parsons  v.  Noggle,  23  Minn.  .328.  Adams,  109  U.  S.  211,  3  Sup.  Ct.  161, 

56  De  Leon  v.  Higuera,  15  Cal.  483 ;  27  L.  ed.  910 ;  National  Bank  v.  Tenn. 
Connor  v.  Connor,  59  Fla.  467,  52  So.  Coal  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Ohio  St.  564,  57 
727 ;   Burnside  v.  Terry,  45  Ga.  621  ;  N.  E.  450. 

Baldwin    v.    Jenkins,    23    Miss.    266;         so  Connor   v.    Connor,   59   Fla.  467, 
Cagliostro  v.   Galgano,  69  Misc.  321,     52  So.  727. 
125  N.  Y.  S.  523;  Harris  v.  Jones,  83 
N.  Car.  317. 


I 


447  MORTGAGES  §    422 

or  perform  other  obligations  named,  then  it  shall  be  void.  There 
may  be  other  conditions  contained  in  the  instrument,  such  as  the 
payment  of  interest  and  of  taxes  upon  the  premises,  or  insurance 
upon  the  buildings;  but  these  do  not  change  the  effect  of  the  con- 
veyance as  a  mortgage.  In  some  states  statutes  have  been  enacted 
providing  forms  for  the  execution  of  mortgages.  Under  these 
statutes  the  granting  part  of  the  deed,  as  well  as  the  condition, 
differs  much  in  different  parts  of  the  country.  Under  them  the 
legal  tenor  and  effect  of  the  different  covenants  may  be,  and  in 
some  states  are,  obtained  simply  by  naming  them,  without  re- 
peating the  covenants  themselves.  In  like  manner  the  full  effect 
of  a  power  of  sale  may  be  had  by  a  simple  reference  in  the  mort- 
gage to  a  statutory  power,  instead  of  incumbering  the  record  with 
the  elaborate  powers  now  in  use.  The  purpose  of  this  legislation 
has  been  to  simplify  the  mortgage  conveyance  and  to  get  away 
from  the  cumbersome  forms  that  grew  up  under  the  common 
law.*"^ 

A  deed  of  trust  to  secure  a  debt  is  in  legal  effect  a  mortgage.*'^ 
It  is  a  conveyance  made  to  a  person  other  than  the  creditor,  con- 
ditioned to  be  void  if  the  debt  be  paid  at  a  certain  time,  but  if  not 
paid  that  the  grantee  may  sell  the  land  and  apply  the  proceeds  to 
the  extinguishment  of  the  debt,  paying  over  the  surplus  to  the 
grantor.  "- 

§  422.  Description  of  the  parties. — While  it  is  important 
that  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  mortgage  should  be  given, 
accurately  and  fully,  in  the  granting  part  of  the  instrument,  it  is 
not  absolutely  necessary.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show 
who  was  really  intended  as  the  mortgagee,  when  the  name  is 
claimed  to  be  erroneous  and  there  is  a  person  of  the  name  used  in 
the  mortgage.''"  It  is  not  absolutely  essential  that  the  mortgagee 
be  described  by  name,  if  there  be  such  other  description  as  will 
distinguish  the  person  intended  from  all  others.*'*  Even  a  mort- 
gage made  under  an  assumed  name  by  the  owner  of  the  land  is 
valid  if  the  identity  of  the  mortgagor  as  owner  is  proved. ''^  While 

"0  For  further  statutory  forms  see  es  Peabody     v.     Brown,     10     Gray- 
Jones  on  Mortgages    (7th  ed.),  §  61.  (Mass.)  45. 

61  Union    Nat.    Bank    v.    Bank    of  ^4  Frederick    v.    Wilcox,    119    Ala. 

Kansas  City,   136  U.  S.  223,  10  Sup.  355.    24    So.    582.    12    Am.    St.    925-; 

Ct.  1013,  34  L.  ed.  341.  Richey  v.  Sinclair.  167  111.  184,  47  N. 

«-Huene  v.  Cribb,  9  Cal.  App.  141,  E.  364. 

-'8  Pac.  78.  05  Scanlan    v.    Grimmer,    71    Minn. 

351,  74  N.  W.  146,  70  Am.  St.  326. 


§    423  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  448 

the  mortgagor's  name  and  description  should  be  stated  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  instrument,  it  will  be  valid  if  it  occurrs  later  in  the 
body  of  the  same.**"  The  omission  of  the  mortgagee's  name  from 
the  granting  clause  will  not  invalidate  the  mortgage,  if  the  person 
intended  to  be  secured  is  identified  by  other  parts  of  the  instru- 
ment."' The  designation  of  "junior"  or  "second"  is  no  part  of  a 
man's  name ;  and,  although  convenient  and  desirable  for  the  pur- 
pose of  distinguishing  one  party  from  another  of  the  same  name, 
it  is  not  essential,  and  the  person  intended  may  be  shown  in  some 
other  way.*^^  The  description  of  a  person  by  his  occupation  is  an 
addition  of  the  same  character,  though  of  less  importance  because 
the  terms  used  to  describe  the  occupation  are  so  general  that  they 
are  of  little  aid  in  identifying  the  person. 

§  423.  Description  of  the  premises. — An  accurate  descrip- 
tion of  the  premises  is  important  as  affecting  the  value  of  the  se- 
curity, and  oftentimes  affecting,  as  well,  the  interest  of  the  mort- 
gagor and  of  persons  holding  title  under  him.  But  a  description, 
although  general  and  indefinite  in  itself,  if  by  extrinsic  evidence 
it  can  be  made  practically  certain  what  property  it  was  intended 
to  cover,  will  be  sufificient  to  sustain  the  lien.*"'^  Thus  a  description 
by  reference  to  other  deeds  is  sufficient. "°  A  description  by  bound- 
aries prevails  as  against  the  description  by  reference  to  other 
deeds  ;'^  and  a  description  by  metes  and  bounds  prevails  over  a 
general  description  of  the  land  as  being  "all"  of  a  certain  tract 
of  which -a  person  died  seised.'"  If  the  mortgage  clearly  and  un- 
equivocally describes  more  land  than  is  embraced  in  the  deeds 
referred  to,  although  the  premises  are  mentioned  as  "the  same 
estate"  mentioned  in  the  deeds,  the  conveyance  is  not  restricted 
by  such  reference  to  the  premises  .described  in  the  deeds  referred 
to.  but  will  also  embrace  the  land  described  by  metes  and 
bounds.'^  The  lines  of  ascertained  boundaries  generally  control, 
rather  than  a  description  of  the  quantity  of  the  land,  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  the  averment  or  covenant  was  intended  to  control.^* 

'••«  Frederick   v.   Wilcox       119   Ala.  ^^  Steele  v.  Williams,  12  Ky.  L.  770, 

355.  24  So.  582,  12  Am.  St.  925.  15  S.  W.  49. 

"  Richey  v.  Sinclair,  167  111.  184,  47  "  Cummings  v.  Black,  65  Vt.  76,  25 

N.  E.  364 :  Bay  v.  Posner,  78  Mel.  42,  Atl.  906. 

26  Atl.  1084.                                      .  73  Congregational  Churcli  v.  Walk- 

<■'*>  Kincaid  v.  Howe.   10  Mass.  203.  er,  124  Mass.  69. 

•^"Johnson  v.  McKav.  119  Ga.  196.  ^4  Maguire  v.  Bisscll,  119  Ind.  345, 

45  S.  E.  992,  100  Am.  St.  166.  21  N.  E.  326;  Dovle  v.  Mellen,  15  R. 

70  Wallace  v.  Furber,  62  Ind.  103.  I.  523,  8  Atl.  709. 


449  MORTGAGES  §    424 

A  reference  to  the  "same  premises"  may  enlarge  the  terms  of  a 
specific  description.'"'  If  the,  description  of  the  property  in  the 
granting  clause  of  the  mortgage  be  inconsistent  with  the  provi- 
sions contained  in  the  condition  the  former  will  prevail. ^'^  Al- 
though, in  some  cases,  a  mortgage  describing  land  by  township 
and  range,  without  stating  in  what  county  and  state  the  land  was 
situated,  has  been  held  void,' *  the  courts  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  government  surveys  and  legal  subdivisions,  and,  when  the 
county  and  state  are  not  named,  will  generally  presume  that  the 
land  is  situated  in  the  state  where  the  parties  reside. '^^  A  mort- 
gage describing  land  as  parts  of  different  sections,  without  stating 
the  township  or  range,  has  been  held  void.^^  But  an  error  in  the 
number  of  the  range  or  in  the  omission  of  it  will  not  affect  the 
validity  of  the  mortgage,  if  the  property  be  otherwise  described 
with  such  certainty  as  to  clearly  identify  it.*"  A  mortgage  which 
does  not  name  the  town,  county  or  state  in  which  the  land  is  situ- 
ated may  nevertheless  be  rendered  certain  in  the  description  of  the 
premises  by  reference  to  another  deed,  which  contains  a  full  and 
accurate  description,**^  or  to  the  land  of  the  adjacent  owners,^'  or 
by  extrinsic  evidence.''^ 

§  424.  Description  of  the  debt  secured  or  obligation  to  be 
performed. — To  constitute  a  mortgage  there  must  neces- 
sarily .be  a  debt  or  obligation  which  is  the  subject  of  security.  It 
is  not  necessary,  however,  that  there  be  any  personal  liability  to 
pay  the  debt,  as  in  the  case  of  a  mortgage  for  future  advances, 
where  the  mortgagee  agrees  to  rely  solely  on  the  pledge  of  real 
estate  for  his  security.**  Literal  exactness  in  describing  the  in- 
debtedness is  not  required ;  it  is  sufficient  if  the  description  be  cor- 
rect as  far  as  it  goes,  and  full  enough  to  direct  attention  to  the 
sources  of  correct  and  full  information  in  regard  to  it,  and  the 
language  used  is  not  liable  to  deceive  or  mislead  as  to  the  nature 
or  amount  of  it.*''     It  need  not  be  so  complete  as  to  exclude  ex- 

'^  Patterson  v.  Harlan,  124  Pa.  St.  ^i  Robinson  v.   Brennan,   115  Mass. 

67,  16  Atl.  496.  582. 

'^'"' Donnan   v.    Intelligence    Printing  ^-Johnson  v.  McKay,  119  Ga.  196, 

&c.  Co.,  70  Mo.  168.  45  S.  E.  992,  100  Am.  St.  166. 

""  Murphy    v.    Hendricks,    57    Ind.  *^^  Slater   v.   Breese,   36  Mich.   IT . 

593.  s*Hickox    V.    Lowe.    10    Cal.    197; 

•^  Smith  V.  Green.  41  Fed.  455.  Hodgdon  v.  Shannon.  44  N.  H.  572. 

"9  Boyd  V.  Ellis,  11  Iowa  97.  '^■'O'Connor  v.  Nadei,  117" Ala.  595. 

»"  White  V.  Hermann.  51  111.  243,  99  23  So.  532;   Schierl  v.  Newberg,   102 

Am.  Dec.  543.  Wis.  552,  78  N.  W.  761. 

29 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    425  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  450 

traneous  inquiry  concerning  the  liens  on  the  property.  But  it 
must  show  with  reasonable  certainty  what  is  the  subject-matter 
of  the  mortgage,  and  must  define  the  encumbrance  so  that  a 
fraudulent  mortgagor  may  not  substitute  other  debts  and  shield 
himself  from  the  demands  of  his  creditors.**'^ 

It  is  not  essential  that  there  be  a  note  or  bond  or  other  obli- 
gation separate  from  the  mortgage.**^  It  is  only  necessary  that 
there  be  a  debt  or  duty  to  be  performed,  either  present  or  to  arise 
in  the  future,  and  that  this  be  recited  in  the  mortgage.***  This 
need  not  be  evidenced  by  any  writing.  The  nature  and  amount 
of  the  indebtedness  secured  may  be  expressed  in  terms  so  general 
that  subsequent  purchasers  and  attaching  creditors  must  look  be- 
yond the  deed  to  ascertain  both  the  existence  and  the  amount  of 
the  debt.****  If  the  amount  of  the  debt  be  left  blank,  this,  it  is  held, 
may  be  supplied  by  parol  evidence. '^^  All  the  description  required 
to  be  made  of  the  debt  is  a  general  one,  which  will  put  those  in- 
terested upon  inquiry.'"  The  mortgage  usually  describes  the  note, 
stating  the  date,  amount,  the  makers  of  it  and  the  time  when  it  is 
payable.     Such  description  serves  to  identify  the  note.''" 

§  425.  Covenants  of  a  mortgage  generally. — The  cove- 
nants of  a  mortgage  are  usually  those  of  a  warranty  deed,  and 
have  the  same  effect  and  construction.  If,  however,  a  mortgage 
with  covenants  be  given  for  purchase-money  of  land  conveyed 
to  the  mortgagor  by  a  deed  having  like  covenants,  and  the  mort- 
gagor is  evicted,  he  may  recover  damages  in  an  action  for  breach 
of  the  covenant,  and  the  vendor  who  holds  the  mortgage  is  not  al- 
lowed to  set  up  the  covenants  in  the  mortgage  deed  as  a  defense 
by  way  of  rebutter,  especially  when  he  holds  the  plaintiff's  prom- 
issory notes  secured  by  the  mortgage."^ 

The  covenants  of  warranty  in  a  mortgage  are  often  of  im- 

86  Cazort  &  McGehee  Co.  v.   Dun-  N.  E.  492 ;  Burnett  v.  Wright,  135  N. 

bar,  91  Ark.  400,  121  S.  W.  270;  Pot-  Y.  543,  32  N.  E.  253;  Kcagy  v.  Trout, 

tibone  v.   Grisvvold,   4  Conn.    158,    10  85  Va.  390,  7  S.  E.  329.  27  Cent.  L.  J. 

Am.  Dec.  106.  407. 

^7  O'Connor  V.  Nadel,  117  Ala.  595.  '■•o  Burnett    v.    Wright,    135    N.    Y. 

23  So.  532 ;   Schierl  v.  Newberg,   102  543,  32  N.  E.  253. 

Wis.  552,  78  N.  W.  761.  '■'i  Curtis    v.     Flinn.     46    Ark.     70; 

88  Knight  V.  Coleman,  117  Ala.  266,  Bouton  v.  Doty,  69  Conn.  531,  37  Atl. 
22    So.    974;    Stuyvesant   v.    Western  1064. 

Mtg.   &c.    Co.,   22    Colo.   28,   43-Pac.         -'nVehb  v.   Stone.  24  N.  H.  282. 
144.  "3  Hubbard    v.    Norton,     10     Conn. 

89  Gardner  v.  Cohn,  191  111.  553,  61     422 ;  Smith  v.  Cannell,  32  Maine  123. 


J 


451  MORTGAGES  §    426 

portance  where  the  mortgagor  has  no  title,  or  an  imperfect  one 
at  the  time  of  making  the  mortgage,  but  afterward  acquired  one; 
they  then  operate  by  way  of  estoppel  or  rebutter,  so  that  the  after- 
acquired  title  inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  holder  of  the  mortgage. 
Except  in  this  way  the  ordinary  covenants  are  of  little  use  in  a 
mortgage,  because  the  damages  for  a  breach  of  them  would  only 
entitle  the  holder  of  the  mortgage  to  recover  the  amount  due  him 
on  the  mortgage,  and  this  he  can  more  readily  recover  by  suit 
for  the  mortgage  debt  upon  the  note  or  bond,  or  upon  the  cove- 
nant for  the  payment  of  it  sometimes  contained  in  the  mortgage.''* 
A  mortgage  may,  however,  contain  covenants  ^\•hich  do  not  cease 
to  exist  upon  its  discharge.  Thus,  where  a  mortgage  securing  a 
debt  payable  in  five  years  contained  covenants  by  the  mortgagor 
with  the  grantee  and  his  heirs  and  assigns  that  no  building  nor 
part  of  a  building  should  be  erected  upon  the  granted  premises 
for  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  mortgage,  and  that  no  build- 
ing nor  part  of  a  building  erected  thereafter  upon  the  granted 
premises  should  be  more  than  two  stories  in  height,  and  that  these 
covenants  should  be  binding  upon  and  available  to  heirs  and  as- 
signs and  run  with  the  land  for  the  benefit  of  the  adjoining  land 
of  the  grantee,  and  in  the  condition  it  is  further  provided  that, 
upon  payment  and  other  performance  by  the  grantor  the  deed, 
with  the  exception  of  the  covenants  above  recited,  should  be  void; 
an  intention  is  clearly  manifested  that  the  operation  of  the  cove- 
nants should  not  cease  with  the  discharge  of  the  mortgage,  and 
the  covenant  that  the  land  should  not  be  used  for  buildings  of 
over  a  certain  height  is  in  effect  the  grant  of  an.easement  in  favor 
of  the  adjoining  premises  the  violation  of  which  may  be  re- 
strained.^^ 

§  426.  Special  covenants  and  conditions. — It  is  not  essen- 
tia! that  the  mortgage  contain  a  covenant  to  pay  the  debt.^**  The 
debt  is  usually  referred  to  in  the  condition  and  there  merely  by 
way  of  recital  of  the  event  upon  which  the  deed  is  to  be  void. 
But  unless  expressly  forbidden  by  statute,  an  express  covenant 
in  the  mortgage  to  pay  the  debt  enables  the  mortgagee  to  maintain 
an  action  upon  the  debt  aside  from  his  remedy  by  foreclosure 

»*Todd   V.   Johnson,   51    Iowa    192,         f'«  Evans    v.    Holman,   244    111.   596, 
1  N.  W.  498.  91  N.  E.  723. 

95  Brown  v.  O'Brien,  168  Mass.  484, 
47  N.  E.  195. 


§    426  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  452 

suit.^^  It  is  competent  for  the  parties  to  so  provide  that  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  loan  shall  depend  upon  the  promptness  of  the  bor- 
rower's pa3nng-  the  interest,  or  the  instalments  of  principal."^*  The 
rate  and  time  of  payment  of  interest  should  be  accurately  stated  in 
the  mortgage ;  but  where  the  rate  is  not  definitely  stated  the  debt 
will  bear  interest  at  the  rate  fixed  by  law  at  the  place  of  per- 
formance."'' 

It  is  competent,  also,  for  the  parties  to  provide  that  upon  a  de- 
fault of  the  mortgagor  in  the  payment  of  the  taxes  assessed  upon 
the  premises  the  whole  mortgage  debt  shall  become  due.'  Some- 
times the  mortgage  provides  that  such  taxes,  when  paid  by  the 
mortgagee,  shall  became  a  part  of  the  mortgage  debt;  but  without 
such  provision,  the  amount  so  paid  in  fact  becomes  a  lien  under 
the  mortgage.-  A  stipulation  in  the  mortgage  that  upon  a  failure 
to  pay  the  taxes  levied  upon  the  premises,  the  principal  debt  shall 
become  immediately  due  and  payable,  is  valid."'  The  covenant  to 
pay  taxes,  being  part  and  parcel  of  the  mortgage,  expires  with  it.'* 
The  mortgage  usually  contains  a  condition  that  the  mortgagor 
shall  keep  the  buildings  upon  the  premises  insured  against  loss 
for  the  benefit  of  the  mortgagee,  as  the  latter  may  direct,  and  a 
breach  of  this  condition  is  as  effectual  in  giving  the  mortgagee  a 
right  to  enforce  his  mortgage  as  is  a  breach  of  the  condition  to 
pay  an  instalment  of  interest  or  principal  or  the  whole  principal 
debt.'  In  most  jurisdictions  a  promise  by  a  mortgagor  to  pay  a 
stipulated  attorney's  fee  in  case  of  foreclosure  is  valid,  when  the 
sum  stipulated  for  is  reasonable  and  not  unjust  or  oppressive." 
Where  the  laws  authorize  an  attorney's  fee  it  becomes  a  part  of 
the  mortgage  debt  on  default  though  stipulated  for  in  the  note 
alone  and  not  in  the  mortgage." 

Provision  is  sometimes  inserted  that  upon  making  certain  pay- 
s'^ Newbury  V.  Ruttcr,  38  Iowa  179.        •"  Standi  ft  v.  Norton,  11  Kans.  218. 
08  Whitcher  v.  Webb,  44  Cal.   127 ;         *  Hitchcock  v.  Merrick.  18  Wis.  375. 
Cassidy  v.   Caton,   47   Iowa  22 ;    Na-         -''  Mix   v.    Hotchkiss,    14   Conn.   32 ; 
tional  Ins.  Co.  v.  Butler,  61  Nelir.  449,     Uedelhofen  v.  Mason,  201  111.  465,  66 
85   N.  W.  437,  87  Am.   St.  462.  N.   E.  364;   Barthell  v.   Syverson,  54 

03  Hayes  v.    Southern   Home   Bldg.     Iowa  160,  6  N.  W.  178. 
&c.  Assn..   124  Ala.  663,  26  So.  527,        ••Burns  v.  Scoggin.  16  Fed.  734.  9 
82  Am.  St.  216.  Sawy.    (U.  S.)   1Z\   Bailey  v.  Butler, 

iSmalley  v.  Renken,  85  Iowa  612.  138  Ala.  153,  35  So.  Ill;  Hovey  v. 
52  N.  W.  507;  Hockett  v.  Burns,  90  Edmison,  3  Dak.  449,  22  N.  W.  594. 
Nebr.  1.  132  N.  W.  718.  '  '^  Bailey  v.  Butler,  138  Ala.  153,  35 

-'Sharp   V.    Barker.    11    Kans.    381;     So.  111. 
Green  v.  Grant,  134  Mich.  462,  96  N. 
W.  583. 


\\ 


453  MORTGAGES  §    427 

ments  the  mortgagor  shall  be  entitled  to  have  certain  portions  of 
the  mortgaged  premises  released  from  the  operation  of  the  mort- 
gage;^ or  that  the  mortgagor  may  pay  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the 
debt,  at  his  option,  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  payment  of  it." 
But  a  provision  for  the  release  of  a  portion  of  the  land  on  the  pay- 
ment of  stated  amounts  must  correctly  describe  the  portions  to  be 
released.^*' 

Modern  mortgages  almost  universally  contain  the  provision 
that,  until  default  in  the  performance  of  the  condition  of  the 
deed,  the  mortgagor  may  hold  possession  of  the  premises.  The 
mortgage  should  be  examined  carefully  by  the  abstracter  and  all 
conditions  essentially  a  part  of  the  contract,  or  which  are  apt  to 
result  in  a  foreclosure  before  the  expressed  maturity  of  the  debt, 
should  be  set  out  in  the  abstract,  and  carefully  noted  by  the  attor- 
ney in  his  examination. 

§  427.  Estoppel  of  mortgagor  subsequently  acquiring 
title. — If  one  having  no  title  to  land  conveys  it  by  a  duly  re- 
corded mortgage  with  covenants  of  warranty,  and  afterward  the 
mortgagor  acquires  title  to  the  land,  the  estoppel  by  which  he  is 
bound  under  the  covenants  is  turned  into  a  good  estate  in  the 
mortgagee,  so  that  by  operation  of  law  the  title  is  considered  as 
vested  in  him  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  conveyed  to  the 
mortgagor  before  he  executed  the  mortgage.  The  mortgagor 
is  estopped  to  say  he  was  not  then  seised.  Then  if  the  mortgagor 
executes  another  mortgage,  and  this  and  the  deed  by  which 
the  mortgagor  acquired  his  title  are  both  recorded  together, 
which  mortgagee  has  the  better  title?  The  estoppel  binds  not 
only  the  mortgagor  and  his  heirs,  but  his  assigns  as  well.  A  sec- 
ond mortgagee  is  therefore  estopped  to  aver  that  the  grantor  was 
not  seised  at  the  time  of  his  making  the  first  mortgage,  and  that 
mortgage  being  first  recorded  must  have  priority.^ ^  But  if  a 
mortgagor  has  title  at  the  time  of  executing  two  mortgages,  the 
fact  that  one  contains  covenants  of  warranty  does  not  give  it 
priority  over  the  other  which  contains  no  such  covenants,  if  the 

s  Ontario  Land  &  Imp.  Co.  v.  Bed-  Cal.  174 ;  Salisbury  Sav.  Soc.  v.  Cut- 
ford.  90  Cal.  181,  27  Pac.  39.  ting,  50  Conn.  113;  Yerkes  v.  Hadlev, 

'••  Stalworth  v.  Blum,  41  Ala.  319.  5  Dak.  324,  40  N.  W.  340,  2  L.  R.  A. 

^0  McCormick  v.  Parsons,  195  Mo.  363 ;    Boone    v.    Armstrong,    87    Ind. 

91,  92  S.  W.  1162.  168;  Newell  v.  Burnside  Banking  Co. 

"Christy  v.  Dana,  34  Cal.  548,  42  (Ky.  App.)   118  S.  W.  267. 


§    428  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  454 

latter  be  first  filed  for  record/-  Where  the  mortgagor  was  part 
owner  of  the  mortgaged  premises  at  the  time  of  giving  the  mort- 
gage, it  was  held  that  the  mortgage,  though  containing  a  general 
warranty,  conveyed  only  the  interest  which  the  mortgagor  had  in 
the  land  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  mortgage,  and  did  not 
pass  an  interest  subsequently  acquired  by  will.^^  Where  the  mort- 
gagor was  in  possession  at  the  date  of  the  mortgage,  under  a 
parol  contract  of  sale,  the  record  of  the  mortgage  was  held  effect- 
ive though  the  mortgagor  had  not  3^et  acquired  title,  and  the 
holder  of  a  subsequent  mortgage  was  bound  thereby.^*  And, 
where  a  homestead  entry  woman  mortgaged  her  property  before 
obtaining  her  patent,  the  recording  of  the  mortgage  prior  to  final 
proof  was  held  constructive  notice,  the  same  as  though  the  mort- 
gage had  been  executed  and  recorded  after  patent.^'*  A  quitclaim 
deed  or  other  deed  without  warranty  does  not  have  the  effect  of 
estopping  the  grantor  from  setting  up  a  superior  right  and  title 
subsequently  acquired  from  another  source.'''  A  grantee  under  a 
quitclaim  deed  is  not  a  bona  fide  purchaser  under  the  recording 
acts,  and  his  rights  are  subordinate  to  a  prior  unrecorded  mort- 
gage.'' 

§  428.  Merger  as  applied  to  mortgages. — It  is  a  general 
rule  that  when  the  legal  title  to  land  becomes  united  with  the 
equitable  title,  so  that  the  owner  has  the  whole  title,  the  mortgage 
is  merged  by  the  unity  of  possession.  But  if  the  owner  has  an  in- 
terest in  keeping  these  titles  distinct,  or  if  there  be  an  intervening 
right  between  the  mortgage  and  the  equity,  there  is  no  merger."* 
To  effect  a  merger  at  law,  the  right  previously  held,  and  the  right 
subsequently  acquired,  must  coalesce  in  the  same  person  and  in 
the  same  right  without  any  other  right  intervening.''*  An  inter- 
vening encumbrance  or  equity  of  any  kind  is  generally  sufficient 

12  Vandercook  v.   Baker,    48    Iowa  351,   12  N.   E.  514 ;  Truman  v.   Tru- 
199.  man,    79    Iowa   506,    44    N.    W.    721; 

13  Newell  V.  Burnside  Banking  Co.  Wilson  v.  Vanstone,  112  Mo.  315,  20 
(Ky.   App.)    118   S.   W.   267.  S.  W.  612;    Salvage  v.   Haydock,  68 

14  Crane  V.  Turner,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.)  N.    H.    484,    44    Atl.    696;    Lynch    v. 
357,  aff'd,  67  X.  Y.  437.  Pfeiffcr,  110  N.  Y.  33,  17  N.  E.  402; 

15  Adam  v.  AlcClintock,  21  N.  Dak.  Crane  v.  Aultman-Taylor  Co.,  61  Wis. 
483,  131  N.  W.  394.  110,  20  N.  W.  673. 

i«  Smith  V.  Pollard.  19  Vt.  272.  i"  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  14  Pick.   (Mass.) 

17  Snow   V.    Lake,   20   Fla.    656,    51  374.  384,  25  Am.  Dec.  400;  Lime  Rock 
Am.  Rep.  625.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mowry,  66  N.  H.  598, 

18  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corn,  89  22  Atl.  555,  13  L.  R.  A.  294. 
111.    170;    Bunch   v.    Grave,    111    Ind. 


455  MORTGAGES  §    428 

to  prevent  a  merger  of  a  mortgage  with  the  equity  of  redemption, 
provided  the  encumbrance  be  not  one  which  the  owner  has  as- 
sumed to  pay,  or  one  against  which  he  is  estopped  from  defend- 
ing whether  such  encumbrance  be  an  attachment,""  a  levy  of  ex- 
ecution,"^ another  mortgage,""  a  Hfe  interest  reserved  to  the  as- 
signor,'^ or  any  other  Hen  or  equity."*  No  merger  occurs  when 
the  mortgagee  purchases  the  equity  of  redemption  at  an  execution 
sale,  so  long  as  the  debtor's  right  to  redeem  from  such  sale  con- 
tinues.^^ An  assignment  of  a  mortgage  to  one  of  two  tenants  in 
common  of  the  equity  of  redemption  does  not  discharge  it."** 
Where  one  who  has  purchased  part  of  the  premises  subject  to  a 
mortgage  takes  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage,  although  it  may 
operate  as  a  merger  in  respect  to  the  part  of  the  premises  bought 
by  him,  it  will  not  have  this  operation  in  respect  to  the  part  not 
bought.'^  Nor  is  there  any  merger  when  a  mortgagee  becomes  a 
devisee  of  an  undivided  half  of  the  premises."^ 

If  the  assignee  of  an  undivided  interest  in  a  mortgage  pur- 
chases the  equity  of  redemption,  assuming  the  mortgage,  his  in- 
terest under  the  mortgage  is  merged  in  the  title  acquired  by  pur- 
chase, and  he  becomes  the  debtor  to  the  other  part-owner  of  the 
mortgage  for  the  amount  due  him,  and  the  whole  property  may  be 
sold  on  foreclosure  for  the  payment  of  such  other  part  of  the 
debt."^  The  assignment  of  a  mortgage  to  the  wife  of  the  mort- 
gagor operated  at  common  law  as  a  discharge  of  it.  But  under  the 
statutes  now  in  force  in  all  or  nearly  all  our  states,  authorizing 
married  women  to  buy  and  sell  real  estate,  such  an  assignment 
would  not  operate  as  a  discharge  or  merger.  The  marriage  of  a 
single  woman,  who  holds  a  mortgage,  with  the  mortgagor,  does 
not  extinguish  the  mortgage  lien  or  debt,  under  the  statutes  in 
regard  to  the  rights  of  married  women  in  their  separate  property 
now  generally  in  force. ^°  Neither  does  the  execution  by  the  hus- 
band and  wife,  after  marriage,  of  a  mortgage  upon  the  same 

20  Scnvner    v.    Dietz,   84    Cal.   295,  25  Southworth  v.  Scofield,  51  N.  Y. 
24  Pac.  171.  513. 

21  Denzler  v.  O'Keefe,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  26  Barker  v.  Flood,   103  Mass.  474. 
361.  27  Wilhelmi    v.    Leonard,    13    Iowa 

22  Button   V.    Ives,    5     Mich.     515;  330. 

Hooper  v.   Henry,  31    Minn.   264,   17         28  Sahler   v.    Signer,   44    Barb.    (N. 

N.  W.  476.  Y.)  606. 

23  Cox    V.    Ledward,    124    Pa.    St.         29  Ehrman     v.      Alabama      Mineral 
435,  16  At!.  826.  Land  Co..  109  Ala.  478.  20  So.  112. 

24 Bunch  V.  Grave,  111  Ind.  351.  so  Power  v.  Lester,  23  N.  Y.  527. 


j5  429 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


456 


premises  to  a  third  person,  discharge  the  Hen  of  the  wife's  mort- 
gage against  her  husband,  if  she  uses  no  words  of  release  to  op- 
erate upon  her  mortgage,  and  it  is  apparent  from  the  instrument 
that  she  joined  merely  to  release  her  inchoate  right  of  dower.''^ 
In  case  the  equitable  estate  has  been  in  any  way  extinguished,  the 
doctrine  of  merger  has  no  application."" 

The  question,  whether  there  is  a  merger  in  a  particular  case, 
depends  not  so  much  upon  the  kind  or  form  of  instrument  by 
which  one  estate  is  transferred  to  the  holder  of  the  other  as  upon 
the  intention  of  the  parties,  and  if  the  intention  be  declared  in 
such  instrument  it  may  control  the  construction  of  its  effect.'''' 
If  at  the  time  the  mortgagee  received  a  conveyance  of  the  equity 
of  redemption,  the  parties  to  such  conveyance  expressly  stipulate 
that  there  shall  be  no  merger,  such  stipulation  will  usually  prevent 
a  merger."* 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  record  does  not  import  notice  of 
merger,  or  of  any  other  fact  depending  alone  on  the  intention  of 
the  parties,  a  thorough  investigation  should  always  be  made  by 
counsel  whenever  it  is  apparent  that  a  merger  has  taken  place. 
When  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  intention  of  the  owner  in  unit- 
ing the  legal  and  equitable  estates  in  himself,  it  is  proper  to  pre- 
sume that  he  intended  that  effect  which  is  the  most  beneficial  to 
himself."'^' 

§  429.  Payment  or  discharge  of  mortgage. — At  common 
law,  payment  or  tender  of  payment  at  the  time  mentioned  in  the 
condition  of  the  mortgage  wholly  discharges  the  encumbrance. 
I'ayment  before  the  day  named  in  the  condition,  equally  with 
payment  at  the  day,  saves  the  breach  of  the  condition  and  defeats 
the  estate ;"'"  and  the  title  to  the  mortgaged  premises  revests  in  the 
mortgagor  without  a  reconveyance."^  In  such  case  no  written 
release  is  needed  except  as  evidence  of  the  facts,  and  to  remove 
the  apparent  encumbrance  from  the  records. 


•■51  Gillig  V.  Maass,  28  N.  Y.  191. 

32  Hill  V.  Pixley,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
200. 

33  Weston  V.  Livezey,  45  Colo.  142, 
100  Pac.  404 ;  Oak  Creek  Valley  Bank 
V.  Helmer,  59  Nebr.  176,  80  N.  W. 
891. 

34  Cullum  V.  Emanuel,  1  Ala.  23.  34 
Am.  Dec.  757 ;  Neff  v.  Elder,  84  Ark. 
277,  105  S.  W.  260,  120  Am.  St.  67. 


3''  Factors'  &  Traders*  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Murphy.  Ill  U.  S.  738,  4  Sup.  Ct. 
679,  28  L.  ed.  582. 

3«  Five  V.  Berry,  181  Mass.  442,  63 
N.  E.  i071. 

37  Barrett  v.  Hinkley.  124  III.  32, 
14  N.  E.  863,  7  Am.  St.  331 ;  Steven- 
son V.  Polk,  71  Iowa  278,  32  x\.  W. 
340. 


i 


457  MORTGAGES  §    429 

When  the  mortgage  debt  is  due,  if  a  tender  of  the  sum  secured 
be  made  and  refused,  the  mortgagor  may  re-enter  and  the  land  is 
freed  from  the  condition,  though  the  tender  be  not  kept  good ; 
the  debt,  however,  is  not  discharged,  but  may  be  recovered  by  ac- 
tion.^* 

Neither  party  to  the  mortgage  can  enforce  payment  before  the 
day  on  which  the  debt  falls  due;^"  but  if  the  mortgagee  accepts 
such  payment,  it  will  operate  to  extinguish  the  lien.  At  common 
law,  payment  after  the  breach  of  condition  and  forfeiture  does 
not  divest  the  title  of  the  mortgagee, *°  and  in  case  of  the  mort- 
gagee's failure  or  refusal  to  reconvey,  the  mortgagor  may  compel 
reconveyance  by  a  suit  in  equity.*^  Under  our  modern  lien  theory, 
however,  payment  at  any  time  before  foreclosure  will  discharge 
the  mortgage,  and  the  title  revests  in  the  mortgagor  without  a 
reconveyance.*" 

The  possession  of  the  mortgage  note  or  bond  by  the  mortgagor 
or  those  claiming  under  him  raises  a  presumption,  in  the  absence 
of  all  other  proof,  that  it  has  been  paid.  This  presumption  is  one 
of  fact  and  not  of  law,  and  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence  account- 
ing for  the  mortgagor's  possession  of  the  note  without  having 
paid  it,*^  or  in  any  way  rebutting  the  inference  of  payment.** 
The  purchase  of  a  mortgage  and  note  secured  thereby  by  one 
who  has  bought  the  land  and  assumed  the  payment  of  the  mort- 
gage operates  as  payment.*^  Payment  is  also  presumed  from 
lapse  of  time ;  as  where  the  mortgagor  has  remained  in  possession 
without  making  any  payment  of  either  principal  or  interest,  or 
doing  any  other  act  in  recognition  of  the  mortgage  debt  for  a 
period  of  twenty  years  or  more,  or  whatever  may  be  the  statutory 
period  of  limitation.*^     Such  presumption  is  not  conclusive,  and 

38  Security  State  Bank  v.  Waterloo  ^3  Martin  v.  Walker,  102  Ga.  72.  29 

Lodge,  85  Nebr.  255,  122  N.  W.  992.  S.  E.  132 ;  Flower  v.  Elwood,  66  111. 

30Bowen  v.  Julius,  141  Ind.  310,  40  438;  Shipley  v.  Fox,  69  Md.  572,   16 

N.  E.  700 ;  Gordon  v.  Ware  Savings  Atl.  275. 

Bank,   115   Mass.   588;   Armstrong  v.  **  Anderson  v.  Culver,  63  Hun  633, 

Wilson   (Tex.  Civ.  App.)    109  S.  W.  6  N.  Y.   S.  181,  25  N.  Y.   St.  314.  2 

955.  Silvernail  1 ;  Mynes  v.  Mynes,  47  W. 

'•o  Perre  v.  Castro,   14  Cal.  519,  76  Va.  681,  35  S.  E.  935. 

Am.  Dec.  444 ;  Munson  v.  Munson,  30  ^^  Northwestern      Nat.      Bank      v. 

Conn.  425.  Stone,  97  Iowa  183,  66  N.  W.  91. 

"Doton  V.  Russell,  17  Conn.  146;  «  Chick  v.  Rollins,  44  Maine  104; 

Currier  v.  Gale,  9  Allen  (Mass.)  522.  Anthony  v.  Anthony,  161   Mass.  343, 

42Willemin   v.   Dunn,   93    111.   511;  37  N.  E.  386. 
Kortright  v.  Cady,  21  N.  Y.  343,  78 
Am.  Dec.  145. 


§    430  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  458 

circumstances  may  be  shown  sufficiently  strong  to  repel  the  pre- 
sumption.*' No  presumption  of  payment,  however,  can  arise 
from  lapse  of  time  when  the  mortgagee  or  his  assignee  is  in  pos- 
session.'** As  a  general  rule,  when  the  mortgage  or  the  accom- 
panying security  does  not  appoint  any  place  at  which  the  principal 
or  interest  is  to  be  paid,  the  debtor  is  bound  to  seek  the  creditor 
to  make  his  payments.'*"  The  indorsement  on  a  mortgage  and  its 
surrender  to  the  mortgagor  is  held  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  re- 
ceipt in  full  of  the  mortgage  debt,  which,  as  between  the  original 
parties,  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  payment.^" 

The  rule  is  well  settled,  that  when  the  mortgagor  becomes  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator  of  the  mortgagee's  estate,  the  debt  itself 
is  not  extinguished  or  released  w^ithout  actual  payment,  but  the 
right  of  action  is  discharged  or  suspended  because  the  executor 
or  administrator  can  not  maintain  an  action  against  himself,  and 
because  of  this  impossibility  of  action  such  inde1)tedness  should  be 
regarded  as  prima  facie  assets  in  the  hands  of  such  executor  or 
administrator.^^ 

No  change  in  the  form  of  indebtedness  or  in  the  mode  or  time 
of  payment  will  discharge  the  mortgage.  Nothing  short  of  actual 
payment  of  the  debt,  or  an  express  release,  will  operate  to  dis- 
charge the  mortgage.''^  A  new  note  is  not  a  discharge  as  against 
a  subsequent  purchaser,  unless  it  is  so  as  to  the  mortgagor. •"'•' 

§  430.  Purchase-money  mortgages. — A  mortgage  given 
at  the  time  of  the  purchase  of  real  estate,  to  secure  the  payment 
of  purchase-money,  or  the  balance  thereof,  has  preference  over 
all  judgments,  mortgages,  liens  and  other  debts  of  the  mortgagor, 
to  the  extent  of  the  land  purchased,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that 
they  should  be  so  designated  in  the  abstract.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  lien  of  a  purchase-money  mortgage  is  entitled  to  the 
highest  consideration  in  a  court  of  equity. °*    If  a  mortgage  is  in 

■'"  Hughes    V.    Edwards,    9    Wheat.  •'''2  Kieser  v.   Baldwin,  62  Ala.  526; 

(U.  S.)   489,  6  L.  ed.  142.  Greist   v.    Gowdy,    81    Conn.    351,    71 

48Brobst   V.    Brock,    10  Wall.    (U.  Atl.   555;    Brockway  v.   McClun,   243 

S.)  519,  19  L.  ed.  1002.  111.  196,  90  N.  E.  374;  Grihben  v.  Cle- 

«  Smith   V.    Smith,   25   Wend.    (N.  ment,   141   Iowa  144,   119  N.  W.  596, 

Y.)  405.  133  Am.  St.  164. 

^0  Montague  v.  Priester,  82  S.  Car.  ^^  R^jfj  y    Abernethy,  11  Iowa  438, 

492,  64  S.  E.  393.                             '  42  N.  W.  364. 

■''•1  Stewart  v.  Hurd,  107  Maine  457,  ^'•*  Brace  v.   Superior  Land  Co.,  65 

78  Atl.  838,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  671,  Wash.  681,  118  Pac.  910. 
Ann.  Cas.  1912D,  662n. 


459  MORTGAGES  §    431 

fact  given  for  purchase-money,  the  fact  need  not  be  recited  or 
appear  on  its  face,  to  give  it  priority,"  and  in  such  case  the  fact 
that  the  mortgage  is  for  purchase-money  need  not  be  stfited  in  the 
abstract  unless  it  be  known  to  the  abstracter. 

The  purchase-money  mortgage  executed  and  recorded  contem- 
poraneously with  a  title  deed  has  preference  over  a  prior  mort- 
gage given  by  the  purchaser  to  a  creditor  and  recorded  before  the 
title  deed,  since  the  purchaser  had  no  title  when  he  executed  the 
first  mortgage/*^  A  purchase-money  mortgage  is  good  and  ef- 
fectual against  the  wife  of  the  mortgagor,  without  her  joining  in 
the  execution  of  it.  The  seisin  of  the  husband  is  instantaneous 
only;  and  it  is  a  well  settled  rule  that  in  such  case  no  estate  or  in- 
terest can  intervene. ^^  The  rules  giving  preference  to  a  purchase- 
money  mortgage  and  holding  it  effectual  against  the  wife  of  the 
mortgagor,  apply  even  where  the  mortgage  is  made  to  a  third 
person,^^  who  as  part  of  the  same  transaction  advances  the  pur- 
chase-money ;  but  one  advancing  money  is  not  entitled  to  be  sub- 
rogated to  the  rights  of  the  vendor,  where  this  would  result  in 
defeating  the  vendor's  lien  or  mortgage  for  the  unpaid  purchase- 
money.^'"^ 

§  431.  Mortgages  of  the  homestead. — While  a  mortgage 
of  the  homestead  is  valid  if  duly  executed  the  law  regards  such 
transactions  with  jealous  care.  In  some  states,  however,  a  mort- 
gage of  a  homestead  is  prohibited  altogether.'^"  In  some  states 
homesteads  may  be  mortgaged  for  specific  purposes  only,  such  as, 
for  instance,  to  secure  payment  of  money  loaned  for  improve- 
ments on  the  land.*^^  In  a  majority  of  the  states  permitting  mort- 
gages of  homesteads  such  mortgages  are  effectual  only  when 
there  has  been  a  special  release  and  waiver  of  the  homestead 
right  ;''^  while  in  all  the  states,  the  free  and  voluntary  assent  of 

^^  Commonwealth      Title      Ins.      &  ^^  Brower    v.    Witmeyer,    121    Ind. 

Trust  Co.  V.   Ellis,   192   Pa.   St.  321,  83,  22  N.  E.  975. 

43  Atl.  1034,  7Z  Am.  St.  816.  «»  Planters'   Loan   &   Sav.   Bank   v. 

5«Hinton  v.  Hicks,  156  N.  Car.  24,  Dickinson,  83  Ga.  711,  10  S.  E.  446; 

71  S.  E.  1086.  Van  Wickle  v.  Landry,  29  La.  Ann. 

"  Jones  V.  Davis,  121  Ala.  348,  25  330 ;  Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Bla- 

So.  789 ;  Birnie  v.  Main,  29  Ark.  591 ;  lock,  76  Tex.  85,  13  S.  W.  12. 

Frederick   v.    Emig,    186   111.   319,    57  «i  Hicks  v.  Texas   Loan  &  Invest- 

N.  E.  883,  78  Am.  St.  283;  Walters  v.  ment  Co.,  51  Tex.  Civ.  App.  298,  111 

Walters.  72,  Ind.  425.  S.  W.  784. 

'^s  Protestant    Episcopal    Church    v.  ''^  g^lkum   v.   Wood,   58   Ala.  642; 

E.  E.  Lowe  Co.,   131  Ga.  666,  63  S.  Browning  v.  Harriss,  99  111.  456. 
E.  136,  127  Am.  St.  243. 


§  432 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


460 


the  mortgagor's  wife,  if  he  be  a  married  man,  is  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  vesting  of  the  lien."^  But  a  husband  may  execute 
a  vahd  mortgage  upon  a  community  homestead  in  his  own  name 
and  as  his  wife's  attorney  in  fact,  she  giving  him  a  general  power 
of  attorney  to  convey  or  otherwise  dispose  of  their  community 
property.*^*  If  the  statute  provides  that  the  homestead  release 
shall  l>e  made  by  the  joint  deed  of  the  husband  and  wife,  a  deed 
or  mortgage  made  by  the  husband  alone  is  void,  and  it  does  not 
become  valid  by  reason  that  the  homestead  is  afterward  aban- 
doned.®^ Also  if  the  statute  provides  that  the  wife  shall  acknowl- 
edge her  deed  releasing  her  homestead  rights,  a  mortgage  with- 
out her  acknowledgment  creates  no  lien  upon  the  homestead."" 
The  mere  signature  of  a  married  woman  to  a  mortgage  by  her 
husband  is  no  evidence  of  a  release  or  waiver  by  either  him  or 
her  of  the  homestead  exemption  unless  it  is  affirmatively  and  sub- 
stantially stated  in  the  body  of  the  instrument  that  she  is  a  party 
to  and  unites  in  the  conveyance."^  A  mortgage  given  to  secure 
the  purchase-price  of  a  homestead  need  be  signed  only  by  the  per- 
son taking  title  to  the  homestead. '^'^  In  all  cases  where  an  express 
waiver  of  the  homestead  is  required,  the  mortgage  should  recite 
the  fact  of  waiver,  and  in  the  absence  of  such  recital  the  abstract 
should  contain  a  statement  that  no  such  waiver  appears  in  the 
mortgage.  This  the  abstractor  need  not  do,  however,  when  the 
mortgage  is  for  unpaid  purchase-money.  All  mortgages  executed 
by  the  husband  only,  as  well  as  those  executed  jointly  by  husband 
and  wife,  but  unaccompanied  by  a  release  or  waiver  of  the  home- 
stead, is  sufficient  to  give  rise  to  an  inquiry  in  pais,  unless  the 
mortgage  is  for  purchase-money. 

§  432.  Mortgages  of  after-acquired  property. — At  com- 
mon law,  nothing  can  be  mortgaged  that  does  not  belong  to  the 
mortgagor  at  the  time  the  mortgage  is  made.®*  Therefore  at  law, 
although  a  mortgage  in  terms  is  made  to  cover  after-acquired 
property,  yet,  after  such  property  is  acquired,  an  execution  levied 


'■■3  Long  V.  Mostyn.  65  Ala.  543 ;  An- 
derson V.  Culbert,  55  Iowa  233,  7  N. 
W.  508 ;  Justice  v.  Souder,  19  N.  Dak. 
613.  125  N.  W.  1029. 

*■'*  Oregon  Mtg.  Co.  v.  Hersner,  -14 
Wash.  515,  45  Pac.  40. 

^^  Gleason  v.  Spray,  81  Cal.  217,  22 
Pac.  551,  15  Am.  St.  47. 

««  Park  V.  Park,  71  Ark.  283,  IZ  S. 


W.  993;  Montana  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Schmidt,   6   Mont.  609,   13   Pac.   382. 

'■7  Hawkins  v.  Pugh,  91  Ky.  522,  13 
Ky.  L.  104,  16  S.  W.  277. 

'''S  Jarvis  v.  Armstrong,  94  Miss. 
145.  48  So.  1;  Prout  v.  Burke.  51 
Nebr.  24,  70  N.  W.  512. 

'■9  Moodv  V.  Wright,  13  Mete. 
(Mass.)  17,  46  Am.  Dec.  706. 


461  MORTG.\GES  §    432 

upon  it  as  the  property  of  the  mortgagor  or  a  sale  by  him  will 
prevail  over  the  mortgage.'^''  Equity,  however,  will  give  effect  to 
a  mortgage  embracing  future  acquired  realty,"  and  will  enforce 
it  against  the  mortgagor  and  all  other  persons  except  purchasers 
for  value  and  w^ithout  notice."'  A  conveyance  of  what  does  not 
exist  does  not  operate  as  a  present  transfer  in  equity  any  more 
than  it  does  in  law.  The  difference  is  merely  that  at  law  the  con- 
veyance, having  nothing  to  operate  upon,  is  void ;  while  in  equity, 
what  is  in  form  a  conveyance  operates,  by  way  of  present  con- 
tract, to  take  effect  and  attach  to  the  subject  of  it  as  soon  as  it 
comes  into  being;  the  agreement  to  convey  then  ripens  into  an 
actual  transfer."  Courts  of  equity  hold  such  conveyances  oper- 
ative as  executory  agreements  binding  on  the  property  when  ac- 
quired ;  the  mortgagor  holding  the  property  and  equity  enforcing 
the  trust,  and  in  some  of  the  decisions  the  adjudications  rest  upon 
the  ground  of  equitable  lien.'* 

Equity  considers  as  done  that  which  the  mortgagor  distinctly 
agreed  to  do,  and  is  in  consequence  bound  to  do.  Upon  every 
acquisition  of  property  w^ithin  the  description  contained  in  the 
mortgage,  a  decree  might  be  obtained  that  the  mortgagor  should 
execute  a  mortgage  of  such  property;  but  instead  of  actually  fol- 
lowing out  this  process,  equity  treats  the  mortgage  as  already 
attaching  to  the  newly  acquired  property  as  it  comes  into  the 
mortgagor's  possession,  or,  in  other  words,  considers  that,  of 
every  particle  of  property  as  acquired,  there  was  an  actual  mort- 
gage then  executed  in  fulfillment  of  the  mortgagor's  contract. '° 

The  mortgage  lien  upon  after-acquired  property  only  attaches 
from  the  time  of  the  acquisition  thereof  by  the  mortgagor,  and  is 
subject  to  all  pre-existing  liens. ^^  After-acquired  land  not  w'ithin 
the  terms  of  the  mortgage  is  not  covered  by  it.^^  The  mortgage 
is  subject  to  any  liens  there  may  be  upon  the  property  when  ac- 

"0  Looker  v.   Peckwcll,  38  N.  J.  L.  ^4  National    Shoe   &  Leather    Bank 

•253.  V.  Small,  7  Fed.  837. 

""-  Hickson     Lumber     Co.     v.     Gay  "^  Semple   v.    Scarborough,    44    La. 

Lumber  Co.,   150  N.  Car.  281,  63   S.  Ann.  257,  10  So.  860. 

E.  1048.  ' '■■  Brady  v.  Johnson.  75  Md.  445,  26 

'-  Toledo  D.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Hamil-  At!.  49,  20  L.  R.  A.  737 ;  Monmouth 

ton,  134  U.  S.  296,  10  Sup.  Ct.  546,  33  County  Electric  Co.  v.  McKenna,  68 

L.  cd.  90S.  N.  J.  Eq.  160,  60  Atl.  32. 

'■'  Mitchell  V.  Winslow,  2  Storv  (U.  ' '  Wheeler  v.  Aycock,  109  Ala.  146, 

S.)  630.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  9673;  Rust  v.  19  So.  497. 
Electric   Lighting   Co.,    124   Ala.  202, 
27  So.  263. 


§  433  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  462 

quired  by  the  mortgaji^t^r.  The  mortgage  attaches  to  the  property 
in  the  condition  in  which  it  comes  into  the  mortgagor's  hands.  If 
it  Ije  at  that  time  subject  to  mortgages  or  other  liens,  the  general 
mortgage  does  not  displace  them,  though  they  may  be  junior  to 
it  in  point  of  time.^** 

§  433.  Record  of  mortgages. — The  record  of  a  deed  or 
mortgage  is  constructive  notice  to  all  purchasers  and  mortgagees 
in  the  line  of  title/"  As  to  them  the  instrument  takes  effect,  not 
because  of  its  prior  execution,  but  by  reason  of  its  prior  record. 
Subsequent  purchasers  are  bound  conclusively  by  the  record  of 
the  deed,  or  other  conveyance  in  the  line  of  their  title,  as  much  as 
the  purchaser  himself.****  It  is  notice  only  to  subsequent  pur- 
chasers and  incumbrancers  under  the  same  grantor,  or  through 
one  who  is  the  common  source  of  title  in  the  line  of  title  to  which 
the  recorded  deed  belongs. ^^  Of  course  the  record  of  the  mort- 
gage operates  as  notice  to  persons  subsequently  acquiring  title  to 
the  mortgaged  premises  from  the  mortgagor,*^-  and,  so  long  as 
the  mortgage  remains  unsatisfied,  the  record  protects  not  only  the 
rights  of  the  mortgagee,  but  those  of  the  assignee  of  the  mortgage 
as  well.**^  A  mortgage  by  a  stranger  to  the  record  title  is  not  con- 
structive notice  to  an  intending  purchaser  of  a  prior  unrecorded 
deed  to  the  purchaser,  nor  is  the  fact  that  the  property  is  assigned 
to  another  than  the  record  owner  such  notice.^*  When  a  mort- 
gage is  recorded  prior  to  another  conveyance  from  the  mort- 
gagor, it  does  not  matter  that  this  conveyance  w^as  made  in  pur- 
suance of  contract  entered  into  without  the  execution  of  the 
mortgage,  and  before  the  record  of  it,  if  nothing  had  been  done 
toward  carrying  the  contract  into  execution  at  the  time  of  filing 
the  mortgage  for  record. ^^     A  mortgage  duly  recorded  is  notice 

"^  Bear  Lake  &  River  Waterworks  Robley  v.  Withers,  95   Miss.  318,  51 

&  Irr.  Co.  V.  Garland.  164  U.  S.  1,  17  So.  719. 

Sup.  Ct.  7,  41  L.  ed.  327.  **«  Nortli  v.  Knowlton.  23  Fed.  163. 

"'Jin    re    Vigilancia,    68    Fed.    781;  «i  Hager  v.  Spect,  52  Cal.  579;  Ker- 

Kent  V.  Williams,  146  Cal.  3,  98  Pac.  foot  v.  Cronin,  105  111.  609;  Baker  v. 

527;   Smith  v.   Russell,  20  Colo.  554,  Griffin.  50  Miss.  158. 

80   Pac.   474 ;    Beach   v.    Osborne,    74  ^-  Commercial    Bank    v.     Prichard, 

Conn.  405,  50  Atl.  1019,  1118:  Havig-  126  Cal.  600,  59  Pac.  130. 

horst  V.  Bowen,  214  111.  90,  72,  N.  E.  ^^  Curtis  v.  Moore,  152  N.  Y.  159, 

402 :  Schmidt  v.  Zahrndt,  148  Ind.  447,  46  N.  E.  168,  57  Am.  St.  506. 

47  N.  E.  335;  Wilson  v.  Godfrey,  145  «*  Advance  Thresher  Co.  v.  Esteb, 

Iowa  696,  124  N.  W.  875  :  Banton  v.  41  Ore.  469,  69  Pac.  447. 

Shorey,  77   Maine    48;    Campbell    v.  ^s  Kyle  v.   Thompson,   11   Ohio   St. 

Keys,  130  Mich.   127,  89  N.  W.  720;  616. 


463  MORTGAGES  §    434 

not  only  of  the  existence  of  the  mortgage  but  of  all  its  contents 
so  far  as  these  fall  within  the  line  of  the  chain  of  title.^*'  It  is 
notice,  too,  of  the  covenants  contained  in  it,"  of  the  debt  which 
it  secures,*^  and  all  easements  and  privileges  created  thereby,  or 
referred  to  in  the  mortgage.^''  Although  the  debt  or  the  property 
be  not  fully  described,  the  record  is  notice  of  all  that  is  said  about 
it,  and  a  purchaser  is  bound  by  the  statement  made,  and  by  the 
information  he  has  or  may  upon  inquiry  find  out.^**  It  is  notice 
of  the  statements  in  it  regarding  the  deed,  whether  the  description 
be  fully  carried  out  or  consists  of  references  to  other  instru- 
ments.''' It  is  notice  of  a  prior  unrecorded  mortgage  referred  to 
in  the  covenant  against  incumbrances.''-  The  record  imparts  no- 
tice of  all  the  facts  which  could  have  been  ascertained  from  a 
casual  examination  thereof,  including  not  only  those  recited  in  the 
record,"^  but  also  material  matters  suggested  thereby  which  might 
be  disclosed  by  reasonable  inquiry.'**  But  constructive  notice  from 
the  record  of  the  mortgage  can  not  be  more  extensive  than  the 
facts  stated  therein,  and  only  embraces  information  which  could 
have  been  obtained  from  an  actual"  inspection  of  the  record.^^ 
The  record  of  the  mortgage  containing  a  power  of  sale  puts  sub- 
sequent purchasers  upon  inquiry  whether  any  proceedings  had 
been  had  thereunder;  so  that  if  there  has  been  a  sale  under  the 
power,  although  the  deed  has  not  been  recorded,  a  subsequent 
purchaser  from  the  mortgagor,  instead  of  acquiring  an  equity  of 
redemption  may  find  that  this  has  been  cut  off  by  sale  under  the 
power.*"^ 

§  434.  Possession  as  notice. — Possession  by  one  who  is 
not  the  owner  of  record  is  a  fact  which  should  induce  one  in  pro- 
posing to  purchase  or  take  a  mortgage  to  inquire  whether  the  pos- 
session is  founded  on  any  right  or  title.  It  is  notice  of  the  rights 
of  the  occupant,  whatever  they  may  be;  and  if  he  claim  by  deed 

SG  Beach  v.  Osborne,  74  Conn.  405,  ^-  Taylor  v.  Mitchell,  58  Kans.  94, 

50  Atl.  1019,  1118;  Matt  v.  Matt,  156  48  Pac.  859. 

Iowa  503,  137  N.  W.  489.  «=*  Weldon  v.  Tollman,  67  Fed.  986. 

87  Morris  v.  Wadsworth,  17  Wend.  9*  Mattlage    v.    Mulherin,    106    Ga. 
(N.  Y.)  103.  834,  32  N.  E.  940;  Loser  v.  Plainfield 

88  Whitney  v.  Lowe,  59  Nebr.  87,  Sav.  Bank,  149  Iowa  672,  128  N.  W. 
80  N.  W.  266.  1101.  31  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)    1112. 

89  Bellas  V.  Lloyds,  2  Watts  (Pa.)  o^  Smith  v.  Lowry,  113  Ind.  37,  15 
401.  N.  E.  17. 

90  Bright  V.  Buckman,  39  Fed.  243.  »«  Dixie    Grain    Co.    v.    Quinn,    181 

91  Dimon  v.  Dunn,  15  N.  Y.  498.  Ala.  208,  61  So.  886. 


§  434 


TITI-ICS    AND    ABSTRACTS 


464 


his  possession  is  regarded  by  most  authorities  as  equivalent  to  the 
recording  of  such  deed.''"  Thus,  possession  by  a  person  other 
than  the  mortgagor,  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  a  mortgage, 
is  sufficient  to  put  the  mortgagee  upon  inquiry  as  to  the  rights  of 
the  person  in  possession,  and  he  takes  the  mortgage  subject  to 
such  rights."**  Possession  by  a  vendee  under  a  contract  of  pur- 
chase, whether  it  l)e  personal  or  by  a  tenant,  is  constructive  notice 
of  his  equitable  rights  as  purchaser,  and  any  one  taking  a  mort- 
gage under  such  circumstances  from  his  vendor  takes  subject  to 
his  rights."'*  The  mortgage  lien  in  such  case  covers  the  property 
only  to  the  extent  of  the  unpaid  purchase-money.'  Possession 
does  not  amount  to  constructive  notice  of  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  rights  of  the  person  in  possession;  but  puts  the  purchaser 
or  mortgagee  upon  inquiry  as  to  such  rights.  He  is  bound  to 
pursue  the  inquiry  with  diligence,  and  to  ascertain  what  those 
rights  are." 

Inquiries  should  be  made,  in  the  first  instance,  of  the  person  in 
actual  possession ;  and  the  mortgagee  is  chargeable  with  notice  of 


o^Kirhy  v.  Tallmadgc.  160  U.  S. 
379,  16  Sup.  Ct.  349,  40  L.  ed.  463; 
Gamble  v.  Black  Warrior  Coal  Co., 
172  Ala.  669,  55  So.  190;  Campbell  v. 
Southwestern  Tel.  &c.  Co.,  108  Ark. 
569,  158  S.  W.  1085;  Beattie  v. 
Crevvdson,  124  Cal.  577,  57  Pac.  463 ; 
Davis  V.  Pursel,  55  Colo.  287,  134  Pac. 
107 ;  Harral  v.  Leverty,  50  Conn.  46, 
47  Am.  Rep.  608;  Tate  v.  Pensacola 
&c.  Land  &c.  Co..  Zl  Fla.  439,  20  So. 
542,  53  Am.  St.  251  ;  Garbutt  v.  Mayo, 
128  Ga.  269.  57  S.  K.  495,  13  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  58n  ;  Merchants'  &  Farmers' 
State  Bank  of  Sullivan  v.  Dawdv,  230 
111.  199,  82  N.  E.  606;  Adams  v.'Betz, 
167  Ind.  161,  78  N.  E.  649;  Sanders 
V.  Sutlive,  163.  Iowa  172,  143  N.  W. 
492 ;  Penrose  v.  Cooper,  86  Kans.  597, 
121  Pac.  1103;  Brvant  v.  Main,  25  Kv. 
L.  1242,  n  S.  W.  680 ;  Duval  v.  Wil- 
mer.  88  Md.  66.  41  Atl.  122;  Torpin 
V.  Peabody,  162  Mass.  473,  39  N.  E. 
280;  Holden  v.  Butler,  173  Mich.  116, 
38  N.  W.  1071  ;  Niles  v.  Cooper,  98 
Minn.  39,  107  N.  W.  744,  13  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)  49n;  Bolton  v.  Roebuck,  11 
Miss.  710,  27  So.  630 ;  Squires  v.  Kim- 
ball. 208  Mo.  110.  106  S.  W.  502; 
McParland  v.  Peters,  87  Nebr.  829. 
128  X.  W.  523;  Stillings  v.  Stillings, 


67  N.  H.  584,  42  Atl.  271 ;  Wood  v. 
Price,  79  N.  J.  Eq.  620,  81  Atl.  983,  38 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  772,  Ann.  Cas.  1913A. 
1210n ;  Carthage  Tissue  Paper  Mills 
V.  Carthage,  200  N.  Y.  1.  93  N.  E.  60; 
Lee  V.  Giles,  161  N.  Car.  541,  11  S. 
E  852;  O'Toole  v.  Omlie,  8  N.  Dak. 
444,  79  N.  W.  849;  Brown  v.  Trent. 
36  Okla.  239,  128  Pac.  895 ;  Randall  v. 
Lingwall,  43  Ore.  383,  i:!>  Pac.  1; 
Wertheimcr  v.  Thomas,  168  Pa.  St. 
168,  31  Atl.  1096,  47  Am.  St.  882; 
Harris  v.  Arnold,  1  R.  I.  125 ;  Folk  v. 
Brooks,  91  S.  Car.  7,  74  S.  E.  46; 
Phillis  V.  Gross,  32  S.  Dak.  438,  143 
N.  W.  Z1Z\  Kuteman  v.  Carroll 
(Tex.)  80  S.  W.  842;  Sowles  v.  But- 
ler, 71  Vt.  271,  44  Atl.  355;  Effinger 
V.  Hall,  81  Vt.  94. 

98  Dennis  v.  Atlanta  Nat.  Bldg.  & 
Loan  Assn.,  136  Fed.  539,  69  C.  C.  A. 
315. 

9!' Reynolds  v.  Kirk,  105  Ala.  446, 
17  So.  95;  Mcintosh  v.  Bowers,  143 
Wis.  74,  126  N.  W.  548. 

iHouzik  v.  Delglise,  65  Wis.  494, 
27  N.  W.  171,  56  Am.  Rep.  634. 

2  International  Harvester  Co.  v. 
Myers,  86  Kans.  497,  121  Pac.  500, 
39  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  528. 


465  MORTGAGES  §    434 

all  the  facts  affecting  the  validity  of  the  mortgage,  which  he  could 
have  ascertained  by  proper  inquiry  of  such  person.^  Possession 
under  an  apparent  claim  of  ownership  has  been  held  to  constitute 
notice  to  purchasers  of  whatever  interest  the  person  actually  in 
possession  has  in  the  fee,  whether  the  interest  be  either  legal  or 
equitable/  A  mortgagee  who,  in  reliance  upon  the  record  title, 
takes  a  mortgage  upon  property  from  one  to  whom  it  has  been 
transferred  by  a  fraudulent  grantee,  is  not  chargeable  with  con- 
structive notice  of  the  fraud,  although  the  person  defrauded  occu- 
pies the  property,  where  at  the  time  such  person  was  ignorant  of 
the  fraud  perpetrated  and  could  not  have  disclosed  the  fact  to  the 
mortgagee  had  he  made  inquiry.^ 

A  mortgagee  is  chargeable  with  constructive  notice  of  the  legal 
and  equitable  rights  of  a  tenant  in  possession  under  a  lease;*'  as 
well  as  the  claims  of  a  third  person  through  such  tenant.'^ 

Possession  is  notice  only  during  its  continuance.  In  order  to 
operate  as  notice,  or  to  suggest  inquiry  to  a  purchaser  or  mort- 
gagee, the  possession  must  have  existed  at  the  time  of  the  pur- 
chase or  the  taking  of  the  mortgage."*  Possession,  to  operate  as 
implied  notice,  must  be  visible  and  open,  notorious  and  exclusive, 
and  not  merely  a  constructive  possession.^  An  equivocal,  occa- 
sional, or  temporary  possession,  will  not  take  the  case  out  of  the 
operation  of  the  registration  laws.'"  Generally,  a  mortgagee  is 
not  chargeable  with  notice  arising  from  a  mixed  possession  or 
joint  occupancy  shared  by  the  mortgagor  and  relatives;  although 
the  person  sharing  such  tenancy  with  the  mortgagor  may  have 
actual  claims  upon  the  estate  originating  prior  to  the  mortgage." 
Possession  of  a  part  of  the  premises  described  in  a  deed  or 
mortgage  may  be  notice  to  a  purchaser  or  mortgagee  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  title  of  the  entire  tract,  if  the  purchaser  or  mort- 
gagee has  actual  notice  of  the  possession. '~ 

8  Collins  V.  Moore,  115  Ga.  327,  41  «  Christopher      v.       Curtis-AttaJla 

S.  E.  609.  Lumber  Co.,  175  Ala.  484,  57  So.  837. 

4  Kirby  v.  Tallmadge,  160  U.  S.  379,  "  Kirby    v.    Tallmadge,    160    U.    S. 

16  Sup.  Ct.  349,  40  L.  ed.  463.  379,   16  Sup.  Ct.  349,  40  L.  ed.  463. 

•'Cornell  v.  Maltby,  165  N.  Y.  557,  lo  Boynton  v.  Rees.  8  Pick.  (Mass.) 

59  N.  E.  291.  329,  19  Am.  Dec.  326. 

«  Kerr  v.  Kingsbury,  39  Mich.  150,  "  Atlanta  Nat.  Bldg.  &  Loan  Assn. 

33  Am.  Rep.  362 ;  Allen  v.  Gates,  73  v.  Gilmer,  128  Fed.  293. 

Vt.  222,  50  Atl.  1092.  i-  Staples  v.  Fenton,  5  Hun  (N.  Y.) 

7  Collins  V.  Moore,  115  Ga.  327,  41  172. 
S.  E.  609. 

30 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    435  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  466 

^  435.  Correction  of  errors  in  record  and  re-recording 
mortgage. — The  record  of  the  mortgage,  duly  transcribed, 
can  not  be  altered  by  the  recorder,  even  with  the  consent  of  the 
parties.  The  proper  method  to  correct  a  material  mistake  in  a 
recorded  mortgage  is  to  execute  and  record  a  new  mortgage,  re- 
citing that  it  is  given  to  correct  the  former  mortgage. ^^  A  second 
mortgage  covering  the  same  realty  and  securing  the  same  debt, 
between  the  same  parties,  reciting  that  it  is  given  to  correct  a 
former  mortgage,  supersedes  the  first,  and  the  two  constitute  one 
mortgage,  nothing  having  intervened  to  affect  the  mortgages  se- 
cured.^* When  there  are  tw^o  records,  which  differ  only  in  one 
or  two  material  points  in  the  description  of  the  property,  and  the 
debt,  grantor,  grantee,  consideration,  acknowledgment,  and  the 
signature  of  the  entry  are  the  same  in  each,  the  presumption  is  not 
that  the  first  record  is  the  correct  record  and  the  other  the  record 
of  some  other  deed,  or  of  the  original  debt  after  a  change  in  the 
description  has  been  made,  l)ut  that  they  are  records  of  the  same 
debt,  with  mistakes  in  one  of  them;  and,  in  seeking  to  determine 
in  which  of  the  two  the  mistakes  are,  the  original  deed  being  lost, 
the  court  will  consider  the  evidence  afforded  by  the  records  them- 
selves as  to  which  has  been  more  carefully  registered,  the  situa- 
tion of  the  property  as  described  in  each,  and  the  conduct  of  the 
parties  in  reference  to  the  property  in  dispute."  Where  the  re- 
records  of  mortgages  have  been  made  to  correct  errors  of  a 
former  record,  such  re-record  and  former  record  should  be  care- 
fully compared,  and  if  they  disclose  that  the  former  is  a  record 
of  the  latter  it  should  be  placed  in  the  abstract  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  entry  of  the  first  record. 

§  436.     Assignment  of  mortgages  and  deeds  of  trust. — A 

mortgagee  may  transfer  his  rights  either  by  a  legal  or  equitable 
assignment. ^"^  In  general,  if  an  assignment  of  a  mortgage  be 
made  without  any  transfer  of  the  note,  bond  or  debt  secured  by 
the  mortgage,  the  assignee  takes  only  a  naked  legal  estate,  which 
he  will  hold  in  trust  for  the  owner  of  the  note  or  other  mortgage 
debt.    The  transfer  of  the  debt  is  essential  to  an  effective  assign- 

i^Youtz  V.  Julliard,   10  Ohio  Dec.         i^  Stinson  v.  Doolittle,  50  Fed.   12. 
298,  20  Wkly.  L.  Bui.  26.  lo  Densmore   v.    Savage,    110   Mich. 

"Rossbach  v.  Micks,  89  Nebr.  821,     27,  Q  N.  W.  1103. 
132  N.  W.  526,  42  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 
444. 


467  MORTGAGES  §    436 

ment  of  the  mortgage.^'  A  purchaser  of  the  mortgage  title,  not 
finding  the  note  in  the  possession  of  the  mortgagee,  is  held  to  take 
it  subject  to  the  rights  of  any  persons  to  whom  the  mortgage  debt 
has  been  previously  assigned. ^^  Yet  it  is  held  that  an  assignment 
of  the  mortgage  generally  carries  the  debt.  The  assignment  of  it 
conveys  the  right  to  receive  payment  of  the  notes,  if  these  be 
actually  sold  and  delivered  to  the  assignee  of  the  mortgage,  or  if 
they  be  in  terms  included  in  the  assignment,  though  they  be  not 
actually  delivered  to  the  assignee. ^^  On  the  other  hand,  the  mort- 
gage being  merely  an  incident  of  the  debt  it  can  not  be  assigned 
separately  from  it  so  as  to  give  any  beneficial  interest.  The  inci- 
dent must  pass  by  a  grant  of  the  principal,  but  not  the  principal 
by  the  grant  of  the  incident.^"  And  it  is  held  that  the  mere  de- 
livery of  the  mortgage  deed  without  the  bond  or  note  does  not 
constitute  a  transfer  of  it  either  by  way  of  sale  or  pledge,  though 
the  full  consideration  was  paid  or  money  was  advanced  upon  it.^^ 
When  a  mortgage  has  been  formally  assigned  and  the  mortgage 
note  delivered  to  the  assignee  without  any  indorsement  of  it,  the 
mortgagor  is  not  justified  in  refusing  payment  to  the  assignee  on 
the  ground  that  the  note  has  not  been  indorsed  by  the  payee. ^" 
The  formal  assignment,  duly  acknowledged  and  recorded,  and  the 
possession  of  the  note,  are  the  best  possible  evidence  of  owner- 
ship, and  the  assignee  is  entitled  to  demand  and  enforce  payment 
whether  the  note  is  endorsed  or  not,  or  whether  it  be  negotiable 
or  not.^^  Such  an  assignment  is  a  good  equitable  transfer  of  the 
mortgage  and  note.  It  is  sufficient  evidence  of  an  intention  to 
pass  the  beneficial  interest  in  them."*  Whether  the  assignee  of  a 
mortgage  has  paid  value  for  it  does  not  concern  the  mortgagor, 
except  in  his  interposing  an  equitable  defense  in  the  way  of  pay- 
ment or  set-off.-^  The  assignee  of  a  mortgage  should  also  as  a 
practical  matter  give  notice  of  the  assignment  to  the  mortgagor  so 

"Farrell  v.    Lewis,   56   Conn.   280,  v.   Sanborn  Land  Co.,  135  Wis.  354, 

14  Atl.  931;   Hamilton  v.   Browning,  115  N.  W.  1102. 

94  Ind.  242;  Lunt  v.  Lunt,  71  Maine  21  Warden  v.  Adams,  15  Mass.  233; 

'i^^.  Bowers  V.  Johnson,  49  N.  Y.  432. 

1*  Fletcher  v.   Carpenter,   Zl   Mich.  —  Moreland  v.  Houghton,  94  Mich. 

412.  548,  54  N.  W.  285 ;  Thorndike  v.  Nor- 

19  Hilton  V.  Woodman's  Estate,  124  ris.  24  N.  H.  454. 

Mich.  326,  82  N.  W.  1056 ;  Williams  23  Morris  v.  Peck,  1Z  Wis.  482,  41 

V.  Teachey,  85  N.  Car.  402.  N.  W.  623. 

20  Morrison  v.  Roehl,  215  Mo.  545,  2*  Pratt  v.  Skolfield,  45  Maine  386. 
114  S.  W.  981;  Luetchford  v.  Lord,  25  Johnson  v.  Beard,  93  Ala.  96,  9 
132  N.  Y.  465,  30  N.  E.  859;  Roach  So.  535. 


§  437 


TITLES    AXU    ABSTRACTS 


468 


as  to  protect  himself  against  payment  which  may  be  made  in  good 
faith  to  the  assignor.  A  mortgage  securing  a  promissory  note 
passes  as  an  incident  upon  transfer  of  a  note,  but  an  assignment 
of  the  mortgage  alone  and  separate  from  the  note  will  not  trans- 
fer the  note  unless  it  is  in  fact  delivered.'-" 

§  437.     Form,  requisites,  and  method  of  assignment. — An 

assignment  of  a  mortgage  is  usually  effected  by  a  brief  form  in 
which  the  mortgage  is  identified  by  a  recital  of  the  names  of  the 
parties  to  it,  of  its  date,  and  of  the  book  and  page,  in  the  registry 
where  it  was  recorded,  without  any  other  description  of  the  prop- 
erty. It  is  usual  to  deliver  with  the  assignment  the  original  mort- 
gage; but  this  is  not  essential.""  It  is,  however,  essential  to  a 
formal  and  complete  assignment  that  the  note  or  bond  secured  by 
the  mortgage  should  be  indorsed  or  otherwise  assigned,  and  de- 
livered with  the  assignment;'^  or,  at  any  rate,  that  an  intention 
should  be  manifest  to  assign  the  mortgage  debt,  to  which  the 
mortgage  is  only  an  incident;  otherwise  the  assignment  will  only 
pass  a  naked  legal  title  to  the  land.^"  The  legal  title  to  a  mortgage 
can  only  be  transferred  by  deed,  executed  with  due  formality  with 
words  of  conveyance,  except  in  those  states  where  the  common- 
law  character  of  the  mortgage  as  an  estate  in  land  has  given  place 
to  the  doctrine  that  the  mortgage  is  a  mere  chattel  interest.^'"  An 
assignment,  though  indorsed  upon  the  mortgage,  and  delivered 
wath  it,  if  not  under  seal,  has  been  held  to  convey  only  an  equit- 
able interest."^  It  does  not  pass  the  legal  estate,  though  it  will 
authorize  the  assignee  to  enforce  the  mortgage  in  equity.^"  It 
must,  also,  contain  the  words  necessary  in  an  ordinary  deed  of 


2«In  re  Tobin's  Estate,  139  Wis. 
494.  121  N.  W.  144. 

-"  Warden  v.  Adams,  15  Mass.  233. 
See  also,  Goettlicher  v.  Wille,  76 
Misc.  361,  134  N.  Y.  S.  977. 

-'^  Bailey  v.  Gilliland,  2  Kans.  App. 
558,  44  Pac.  747. 

-'■'  Hill  V.  Alexander,  2  Kans.  App. 
251,  41  Pac.  1066. 

20  Sanders  v.  Cassady,  86  Ala.  246, 
5  So.  503 ;  New  England  Mtg.  Sec. 
Co.  V.  Clayton,  119  Ala.  361.  24  So. 
362;  Barron  v.  Barron,  122  Ala.  194, 
25  So.  55 ;  Givan  v.  Doe,  7  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  210;  Burton  v.  Baxter,  7 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  297;  Vose  v.  Handy,  2 
Greenl.    (Maine)    322,    11    Am.    Dec. 


101 ;  Dorkray    v.    Noble,     8     Greenl. 
(Maine)    278;    Smith    v.    Kelley,    27 
Maine  237,  46  Am.  Dec.  595;  Dwinel 
V.    Perley,   Z2   Maine   197 ;    Lyf ord   v 
Ross,    2)2)    Maine      197;      Warren     v 
Homestead,  Z2)  Maine  256;  Douglass 
V.    Durin,   51    Maine    121  ;    Phelps    v 
Townsley,    10    Allen      (Mass.)     554 
Adams  v.   Parker,   12  Gray    (Mass.) 
53;  Warden  v.  Adams,  15  Mass.  233 
Williams  v.  Teachey,  85  N.  Car.  402 
Henderson  v.   Pilgrim,  22  Tex.  464 ; 
Torrey  v.  Deavitt,  53  Vt.  331. 

31  Adams      v.      Parker,      12     Gray 
(Mass.)   53. 

32  Kinna  v.  Smith,  3  N.  J.,  Eq.  14. 


469  MORTGAGES  §    438 

land  to  pass  the  legal  estate,  as,  for  instance,  words  of  grant,^^ 
but  an  assignment  which  purports  to  pass  all  the  mortgagee's 
interest  in  the  mortgaged  premises  and  the  debt  vests  in  the  as- 
signee all  the  mortgagee's  rights,  and  not  merely  a  life  estate, 
though  no  words  of  inheritance  are  used  in  the  assignment.'^* 

§  438.  Record  of  assignments  of  mortgages. — The  regis- 
tration laws  and  the  doctrines  of  priority  by  record  generally  ex- 
tend to  assignments  of  mortgages,  either  by  express  provision  of 
statute  or  by  judicial  construction.  Where  the  statutes  them- 
selves do  not  in  terms  directly  apply  to  assignments  of  mortgages, 
the  courts  have  generally  drawn  an  inference  of  intended  applica- 
tion.^'' But  this  liberal  construction  to  include  assignments  of 
mortgages  has  not  been  invariably  adopted  by  the  courts;  and 
many  decisions  hold  that  assignments  are  not  within  the  applica- 
tion of  the  recording  acts  unless  they  are  expressly  made  so,  or 
the  language  of  the  statute  is  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  fairly 
include  them.^°  An  assignment  of  a  recorded  mortgage  need  not 
be  recorded  to  protect  the  assignee  against  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser of  the  mortgaged  premises,  but  the  assignment  must  be 
recorded  to  protect  him  against  a  subsequent  assignment  from  the 
same  assignor,  for  value  and  without  notice."  The  mere  assign- 
ment of  a  note,  which  as  an  incident  carries  with  it  the  mortgage 
securing  it,  is  not  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage,  such  as  is  re- 
quired to  be  recorded  or  noted  in  the  margin  of  the  original  rec- 
ord of  the  mortgage.^^  But  a  mortgage  passing  as  collateral  to  a 
negotiable  note  before  maturity  must  be  assigned  of  record,  where 
required  by  the  registration  laws  to  give  it  priority  over  subse- 
quent mortgages. ^'"^ 

An  acknowledgment  is,  of  course,  essential  to  a  valid  record  of 
an  assignment.*''    And  likewise  proper  attestation  is  essential,  and 

■''3  Cottrell  V.  Adams,  2  Biss.  (U.  S.)  Leonia  Higlits  Land  Co.,  81  N.  J.  Eq. 

351,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3272,  2  Leg.  Gaz.  489.   87   Atl.   645,    Ann.    Cas.    1914C, 

275 ;  Lanigan  v.  Sweany,  53  Ark.  185,  749n. 

13  S.  W.  740;  Williams  v.  Teachey,  s^  People's  Trust  Co.  v.  Tonkono- 

85  N.  Car.  402.  gy,   144  App.  Div.  333,  128  N.  Y.  S. 

^'^  Barnes  v.  Boardman,   149  Mass.  1055. 

106,  21  N.  E.  308,  3  L.  R.  A.  785.  ^s  Perry   v.    Fisher,    30    Ind.    App. 

35  Reeves  v.  Hayes,  95  Ind.  521.  261,  65  N.  E.  935. 

^'^  Oregon  &  W.  Trust  Inv.  Co.  v.  ^^    Newman  v.  Fidelity  Savings  &c. 

Shaw,  5  Sawy.  (U.  S.)  336,  Fed.  Cas.  Assn.,  14  Ariz.  354,  128  Pac.  53. 

No.    10556:    Garrett   v.    Fernauld,   63  ^o  Wright  v.  Shimek,  8  Kans.  App. 

Fla.  434,  57  So.  671 ;  Hull  v.   Diehl,  353,  55  Pac.  464. 
21  Mont.  71,  52  Pac.  782 ;  Leonard  v. 


§    438  TITLES  AND    ABSTRACTS  470 

the  record  of  an  assignment  of  a  mortgage  executed  by  a  corpo 
ration  without  the  attestation  of  its  secretary  as  required  by  stat- 
ute, is  not  constructive  notice.^ ^ 

The  assignment  is  invaHd  against  subsequent  purchasers  with- 
out notice  unless  it  is  recorded.  Consequently,  if  a  mortgagee 
transfers  the  note  secured  by  the  mortgage,  or  makes  a  formal 
assignment  of  a  mortgage  which  is  not  recorded,  and  afterwards 
enters  a  satisfaction  of  the  mortgage  upon  the  record,  or  if  the 
mortgagee  takes  a  conveyance  of  the  equity  of  redemption,  and 
then  with  an  apparent  ample  title  conveys  the  property  to  another, 
the  mortgage  ceases  to  be  a  lien  as  against  one  who  purchases  the 
property  in  good  faith  and  without  notice.*"  In  like  manner  an 
assignee  of  the  mortgage  is  not  bound  by  an  unrecorded  agree- 
ment executed  between  the  parties  to  the  mortgage,  whereby  the 
mortgagee  was  bound  to  release  a  portion  of  the  premises  upon 
receiving  a  certain  sum  in  payment.'*"^  An  assignee  of  the  mort- 
gage whose  assignment  is  not  recorded  is  barred  by  a  decree  fore- 
closing a  prior  lien  in  a  suit  against  his  assignor,  who  appeared 
of  record  as  owner  of  the  incumbrance,  unless  his  assignment  is 
recorded  prior  to  the  deed  of  sale  under  such  decree.'**  The  doc- 
trine, that  the  assignee  of  a  mortgage  takes  it  subject  to  all 
equities  existing  between  the  mortgagor  or  his  grantees  and  the 
mortgagee,  can  not  be  applied  to  those  instruments  which  are 
properly  designated  in  the  recording  acts  as  conveyances,  which 
both  a  release  of  the  mortgage  and  an  agreement  for  such  release 
would  be,  without  nullifying  the  acts  to  that  extent,  and  with- 
holding the  protection  they  were  designed  to  confer  on  the  pur- 
chasers. But  the  record  of  an  assignment  of  a  mortgage  is  not 
constructive  notice  of  it  to  the  mortgagor  so  as  to  make  invalid 
a  payment  made  by  him  to  the  mortgagee.*'^  It  is  desirable,  for 
this  reason,  that  personal  notice  should  be  given  him  of  the  as- 
signment, though  the  assignee's  title  is  complete  without  notice  to 
the  owner  of  the  equity  of  redemption. *°     A  purchaser  of  the 

41  Randall    Co.   v.   Glcndenning,    19  ''•''  Warner    v.    Winslow,    1    Sandf. 
Okla.  475,  92  Pac.  158.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  430. 

42  Commercial  Bank  v.  King,  107  "  jones  v.  Fisher,  88  Nebr.  627,  130 
Ala.  484,  18  So.  243 ;  Buehler  v.  Mc-  N.  W.  269. 

Cormick.   169  111.  269.  48  N.  E.  287 ;         *■■  Williams  v.  Keyes.  90  Mich.  290, 
Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.-Tal-     51  N.  W.  520,  30  Am.  St.  438. 
bot.  113  Ind.  373,  14  N.  E.  586,  3  Am.         ^r,  games     v.     Long     Island     Real 
St.  655.  Estate  &c.   Co.,  88  App.   Div.  83,  84 

N.  Y.  S.  951. 


471  MORTGAGES  §    439 

equity  of  redemption  is  charged  with  notice  of  the  assignment  of 
the  mortgage  which  has  been  recorded  prior  to  the  purchase.*' 
The  record  of  the  assignment  is  a  part  of  the  record  title  of  which 
he  must  take  notice  at  the  time  of  his  purchase.  Akhough  the 
assignment  of  a"  debt  is  not  recorded,  it  carries  with  it  the  mort- 
gage securing  the  same,''  leaving  the  original  mortgagee  without 
any  interest.*^  The  effect  of  recording  an  assignment  is  not  only 
to  protect  the  assignee  against  a  subsequent  sale  of  the  mortgage 
by  the  apparent  holder  of  it,  but  also  to  prevent  a  wrongful  dis- 
charge of  it  by  the  mortgagee."*  A  separate  assignment  of  a 
mortgage  is  generally  recorded  in  the  same  manner  as  the  mort- 
gage itself  or  any  other  instrument  affecting  lands. ^^  When  an 
assignment  of  a  mortgage  is  indorsed  upon  the  mortgage  deed, 
which  is  referred  to  as  "the  within  described  mortgage,"  it  is 
sufficient  to  record  the  assignment  without  recording  the  mort- 
gage with  it  anew,  and  identification,  by  cross-references  to  the 
respective  pages  on  which  the  instruments  are  recorded  is.  suffi- 
cient.^^ Such  reference  is  usually  made  by  the  register  from  the 
record  of  one  instrument  to  the  other ;  but  unless  required  by  law 
this  is  not  essential.  A  recital  of  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the 
mortgage,  and  its  date  is  a  sufficient  identification  of  it;  although 
it  is  usual  in  addition  to  this  description,  when  the  assignment  is 
not  indorsed  upon  the  mortgage  to  refer,  in  the  description  of  it, 
to  the  book  and  page  of  the  record.  But  neither  a  reference  to 
the  record  of  the  mortgage  nor  a  description  of  the  mortgaged 
lands  is  necessary.  An  assignment  is  sufficient  which  so  identifies 
the  mortgage  that  by  examining  the  records  the  one  referred  to 
can  be  ascertained."  It  is  usual  for  the  register  to  note  an  as- 
signment upon  the  margin  of  the  record  of  a  mortgage;  and  in 
many  states  it  is  made  by  statute  his  duty  to  do  so. 

§  439.  Equitable  assignments  of  mortgages. — An  equita- 
ble assignment  of  a  mortgage  may  be  made  by  a  sale  of  it,  with- 
out either  a  formal  transfer  of  the  mortgagee's  interest  in  the 
property,  or  an  indorsement  of  the  note.    In  those  states  where  a 

47  Brewster  v.  Carnes,  103  N.  Y.  ^o  Parmenter  v.  Oakley,  69  Iowa 
556,  9  N.  E.  323.  388,  28  N.  W.  653. 

48  Fish  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  150  Fed,  ^i  Merrill  v.  Luce,  6  S.  Dak.  354,  61 
524,  80  C.  C.  A.  266.  N.  W.  43,  55  Am.  St.  844. 

49  Turpin  v.  Derickson,  105  Md.  ■^•2  Soule  v.  Corbley,  65  Mich.  109, 
620,  66  Atl.  276.  31  N.  W.  785. 

53  Viele  V.  Judson,  82  N.  Y.  32. 


439 


TITLES    AND    A1?STF<ACTS 


472 


niortgap^e  is  considered  a  mere  chattel  interest  and  not  a  convey- 
ance, and  the  doctrines  of  the  courts  of  equity  in  regard  to  mort- 
gages obtain,  a  parol  assignment  is  sufficient  if  accompanied  by  a 
transfer  of  the  note,  lx)nd  or  other  evidence  of  the  mortgage  debt, 
l)y  delivery  without  indorsement  or  other  formal  assignment,  and 
the  assignee  may  maintain  an  action  in  his  own  name."'^*  The 
equitable  interest  of  the  purchaser  enables  him  to  deal  with  the 
mortgage  for  all  beneficial  purposes.  He  may  enforce  it  against 
the  property  and  the  person  liable  upon  it.'^'"  But  it  has  been  held 
that  the  mere  possession  by  a  third  ])erson  of  a  mortgage  not  as- 
signed and  a  note  not  indorsed  by  the  mortgagee  is  not  sufficient 
evidence  of  his  ownership  of  them  to  enable  him  to  sustain  an 
action  upon  them.  He  must  allege  and  prove  his  ownership  by 
other  evidence.^"  He  must  show  that  there  was  an  intention  to 
transfer  the  beneficial  interest  in  the  securities  by  the  mere  man- 
uel  delivery  of  them.^^  After  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage 
note  the  mortgagee  can  not  discharge  the  mortgage  if  the  note 
be  negotiable  and  it  be  assigned  to  an  innocent  party,  before  due 
and  for  a  good  consideration,  although  the  note  be  without  any 
consideration;  and  satisfaction  so  entered  will  be  vacated  by  a 
court  of  equity.°^ 

Where  there  is  no  statute  requiring  assignments  of  mortgages 
to  be  recorded,  the  mortgagor  or  other  person  paying  the  mort- 
gage debt  and  taking  the  discharge  is  bound  to  know  that,  if  the 
mortgagee  has  indorsed  the  notes  before  maturity  to  a  bona  fide 
holder,  the  mortgagee  has  no  longer  authority  to  satisfy  the  mort- 
gage; and  therefore  the  person  taking  the  discharge  is  bound  to 
ascertain  whether  the  mortgagee  still  held  the  note  at  the  time 
he  discharged  the  mortgage. ^'^  The  notes  in  such  case  become  the 
evidence  of  the  mortgagee's  authority  to  enter  satisfaction  of  the 


•'■'*  Younker  v.  Martin,  18  Iowa  143 ; 
Haescig  v.  Brown,  34  Mich.  503 ; 
Greeley  State  Bank  v.  Line,  50  Nebr. 
434.  69  N.  W.  966 ;  Strause  v.  Joseph- 
thai,  n  N.  Y.  622 ;  Sprague  v.  Lovett, 
20  S.  Dak.  328.  106  N.  W.  134;  An- 
drews V.  Powers,  35  Wis.  644. 

•^^  Barron  v.  Barron,  122  Ala.  194, 
211.  25  So.  55. 

5^  Haescig  v.  Brown,  34  Mich.  503. 

^"^  Strause  v.  Josephthal,  11  N.  Y. 
622. 


"■"^  Brewer  v.  Atkeison.  121  Ala.  410, 
25  So.  992,  n  Am.  St.  64;  Reeves  v. 
Hayes,  95  Ind.  521 ;  Vandercook  v. 
Baker,  48  Iowa' 199 ;  Mutual  Benefit 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Huntington,  57  Kans. 
744.  48  Pac.  19;  Dunham  v.  W.  Steele 
Packing  &c.  Co.,  100  Mich.  75,  58  N. 
W.  627;  State  Bank  v.  Frame,  112 
Mo.  502,  20  S.  W.  620. 

^^  Reeves  v.  Hayes,  95  Ind.  521 ; 
Perry  v.  Baker,  61  Nebr.  841,  86  N. 
W.  692. 


473  MORTGAGES  §    440 

lien.""  After  discharge  by  a  mortgagee  who  has  transferred  the 
mortgage  notes  before  maturity,  a  subsequent  mortgagee  or  pur- 
chaser in  good  faith  and  without  notice  of  the  unauthorized  dis- 
charge of  the  mortgage  is  entitled  to  rely  on  the  record."^  The 
assignee  may  take  free  from  existing  equities  between  the  mort- 
gagor and  mortgagee.*^"  If  the  note  or  other  debt  secured  by  a 
mortgage  be  transferred  without  any  formal  assignment  of  the 
mortgage,  or  even  of  a  delivery  of  it,  the  mortgage  in  equity  goes 
with  the  debt  unless  there  be  an  agreement  to  the  contrary.''^ 

§  440.  Abstracting  mortgage  and  assignment  of  mort- 
gage.— The  abstract  should  contain  a  synopsis  of  every  un- 
satisfied and  unenforced  mortgage  appearing  of  record  affecting 
the  particular  land  in  question,  and  of  every  such  mortgage  fol- 
lowed by  foreclosure  in  equity.  An  unsatisfied  and  unenforced 
mortgage  may  be  shown  as  follows : 


William  J.  Kennedy  and  Maria  " 
Kennedy,  his  wife, 

to 


Mortgage. 

Dated  Jan.  1,  1887. 

Recorded  Feb.  17,  1887. 

„,,,.,       ,       T       1  f  Book  98.  page  75. 

The  Milwaukee  Land  ^    ^ 

^      ^'  J       To    secure    the   payment    of 

$200  in  three  years  from  date  thereof  with  interest  at  the  rate 
of  6  per  cent,  per  annum,  evidenced  by  note  signed  by  said  Will- 
iam J.  Kennedy,  of  even  date  with  mortgage.  Conveys  the  south- 
west quarter  of  section  No.  31,  township  No.  110,  range  No.  55, 
containing  160  acres.  Acknowledged  January  1,  1887,  by  Will- 
iam J.  Kennedy  and  Maria  Kennedy,  before  A.  F.  Bothwell, 
notary  public,  Walworth  County,  Wisconsin.  Notary  seal  an- 
nexed. Where  the  mortgage  was  given  to  secure  the  payment  of 
the  purchase-price  of  the  land  this  fact  may  be  noted  in  connec- 
tion with  the  above  synopsis  in  the  manner  following:  It  is 
stated  in  the  mortgage  that  it  is  given  to  secure  the  payment  of 
the  unpaid  purchase-money  for  the  land  described  therein.  In 
case  there  has  been  an  assignment  of  the  mortgage,  a  synopsis  of 

'■'"Swift  V.    Smith.    102   U.    S.   442,  "s  Crosby  v.  Roub,  16  Wis.  616.  84 

26  L.  ed.  193,  2  Ky.  L.  127 ;  Ayres  v.  Am.  Dec.  720. 

Hays,  60  Ind.  452  ;  Livermore  v.  Max-  '^'^  New  England  Mtg.  Security  Co. 

well,  87  Iowa  705,  55  N.  W.  2>7 .  v.  Clayton,  119  Ala.  361.  24  So.  362; 

"Porter  v.  Ourada,  51   Nebr.  510,  Farrell  v.  Lewis,  56    Conn.    280,    14 

71  N.  W.  52.  Atl.  931. 


441 


TITLKS    AND    ABSTRACTS 


474 


such   assignment  should    fuUow   immediately  after  that  of  the 
mortgairc.  thus : 


Milwaukee  Land  Company,  by  ' 

WiUiam  Jenkins,  president. 

Attest:  J.  C.  Wilkes, 

secretary, 

to 


The  \\'ilkins  Investment 
Company. 


Assignment  of  mortgage. 
Dated  July  9,  1888. 
Recorded  July  17,  1888. 
Recorded  book  96,  page  344. 
Consideration  $200. 


Acknowledged  July  15,  1888. 

by  said  William  Jenkins.    Cor- 

Assigns  mortgage  described  in  mortgage  rec- 


porate  seal  affixed, 
ord  98,  page  75. 

§  441.  Trust  deeds. — The  delay  and  expense  incident  to  a 
foreclosure  and  sale  in  equity  have  brought  power  of  sale  mort- 
gages and  trust  deeds  into  general  favor  both  in  England  and 
America;  and  although  their  general  use  is  now  confined  only  to 
a  part  of  our  states,  the  same  influences  which  have  already  led  to 
their  partial  adoption  and  use  are  likely  to  lead  to  their  general 
use  everywhere  at  an  early  day."*  A  trust  deed  is,  in  legal  effect, 
a  mortgage  with  a  pow'er  of  sale.''^  It  differs  only  from  a  mort- 
gage by  providing  for  sale  without  foreclosure.'"* 

There  is  a  manifest  and  well  settled  distinction  between  an  un- 
conditional deed  of  trust  and  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  in  the 
nature  of  a  mortgage.  The  former  is  an  absolute  and  indefeas- 
ible conveyance  of  land  for  the  purpose  expressed,  whereas  the 
latter  is  conditional  and  defeasible.  By  an  absolute  deed  of  trust 
the  grantor  parts  absolutely  with  the  title  which  rests  in  the 
grantee  unconditionally  for  the  purpose  of  the  trust,  while  a  deed 
of  trust  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage  is  a  conveyance  in  trust  for 
the  purpose  of  securing  a  debt,  subject  to  a  condition  of  defeas- 
ance.*^' In  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  a  debt  the  conveyance  is 
made  to  a  person  other  than  the  creditor  conditioned  to  be  void  if 
the  debt  be  paid  at  a  subsequent  time,  but  if  not  paid  the  grantee 


«*  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bell  &c.  Min- 
ing Co.,  8  Mont.  .32,  19  Pac.  403,  affd. 
156  U.  S.  470,  15  Sup.  Ct.  440,  39  L. 
ed.  497. 

'■•'■  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Jones.  8  Fed.  303,  1  McCrary  (U. 
S.)  388. 


<■•«  Axman  v.  Smith,  156  Mo.  286,  57 
S.  W.  105. 

""  Hoffman  Burneston  &  Co.  v. 
Mackall,  5  Ohio  St.  124,  64  Am.  Dec. 
637. 


I 


475  MORTGAGES  §    442 

may  sell  the  land  to  the  extinguishment  of  the  debt,  paying  over 
the  surplus  to  the  grantor."^  Such  a  deed  has  all  the  essential 
elements  of  a  mortgage;  it  is  a  conveyance  of  land  as  security  for 
a  debt  and  the  addition  of  a  power  of  sale  does  not  change  the 
character  of  the  instrument.*'^  Both  instruments  convey  a  de- 
feasible title  only ;  and  the  right  to  redeem  is  the  same  in  one  case 
as  it  is  said  to  be  in  the  other.  The  only  important  difference 
between  them  is  that  in  the  one  case  the  conveyance  is  directly  to 
the  creditor,  while  in  the  other  it  is  to  a  third  person  for  his 
benefit  and  the  trustee's  title  is  in  the  nature  of  a  base  or  deter- 
minable fee.^'^  An  absolute  deed  of  trust  and  a  deed  of  trust  in 
the  nature  of  a  mortgage  should  not  be  confused.  The  former  is 
for  trust  purposes  and  is  unconditional  and  indefeasible;  while 
the  latter  is  conditioned  and  defeasible,  in  the  same  way  that  a 
mortgage  is.'^  In  abstracting  a  deed  of  trust  unexecuted  and 
still  a  lien,  it  should  be  treated  in  the  same  manner  as  a  mortgage. 
The  abstract  should  disclose  the  name  of  the  trustee,  and  his  suc- 
cessor, if  named  in  the  deed;  the  cestui  que  trust  if  named;  and 
should  describe  the  indebtedness  as  in  case  of  an  original  mort- 
gage. The  synopsis  of  a  trust  deed  may  be  in  the  following 
form : 

Trust  deed. 


Perry   Martin 

to 

Frank  Lobdell,  trustee. 


Dated  May  1.  1896. 
Recorded  May  5.  1896. 
Book  178,  page  83. 


To  secure  the  payment  of  $500.00  due  in  three  years  with  in- 
terest at  the  rate  of  6  per  cent,  per  annum  evidenced  by  one  prom- 
issory note  of  even  date  herewith  signed  by  said  Perry  Martin 
and  made  payable  to  said  Frank  Lobdell.  Conveys  the  northeast 
quarter  of  the  northwest  quarter  of  section  25,  north  of  range  8 
east,  in  Grant  County,  State  of  Indiana,  in  trust  and  upon  the 
conditions  therein  specified.  Power  of  sale  given  after  default 
for  sixty  days.    Acknowledged  May  1,  1896. 

§  442.     Power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust. — 

Powers  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  are  contractual,  and 

^'^^  DeWolf    V.    A.    &    W.    Sprague  'O  Ware  v.  Schintz,  190  111.  189.  60 

Mfg.  Co..  49  Conn.  282 ;  State  Bank  N.  E.  67. 

V.  Chapelle.  40  Mich.  447.  "i  Weber    v.    McCleverty,    149    Cal. 

R9  Newman  v.    Samuels,     17     Iowa  .316,  86  Pac.  706;   Fox  v.   Frazer,  92 

528 ;      Eaton     v.     Whiting,     3     Pick.  Ind.  265 ;   Union   Co.  v.   Sprague,   14 

(Mass.)  484.  R.  I.  452. 


^  442 


titi.es  and  arstracts 


476 


as  there  arc  many  opportunities  for  oppression  in  their  enforce- 
ment courts  of  equity  are  disposed  to  criticise  them,  and  to  hold 
the  mortgagee  to  the  letter  of  the  contract.  If  a  different  view 
should  prevail,  and  we  should  dispense  with  some  stipulation  in 
the  power  because  we  could  not  see  that  injury  had  ensued  from 
failure  to  observe  it  we  could  practically  destroy  the  contract  of 
the  parties.'"  It  is  probably  safe  to  say  that  in  its  practical  oper- 
ation the  power  of  sale  is  not  used  to  oppress  or  injure  the  debtor 
more  frequently  than  is  the  process  of  foreclosure  by  suit.  At  the 
present  time  every  mortgage  has  a  power  of  sale;  for  when  not 
inserted  in  the  deed,  as  is  usually  the  case,  a  power  of  sale  is  sup- 
plied by  statute.  A  power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust 
authorizing  foreclosure  by  advertisement  or  sale  without  resort 
to  the  courts,  is  considered  perfectly  valid, '^  except  in  a  few 
states,  where  the  exercise  of  the  power  is  expressly  forbidden  by 
statute."  Such  powers  have  been  reccjgnized  as  valid  even  in  the 
absence  of  any  statute  authorizing  them.'^ 

The  validity  of  these  powers  of  sale  is  everywhere  recognized, 
and  the  use  of  them,  either  in  mortgages  or  trust  deeds,  is  becom- 
ing general.'*'  The  use  of  power  of  sale  mortgages,  however,  has 
not  yet  l:)ecome  so  universal  here  as  to  lead  to  their  being  regarded 
as  a  necessary  incident  of  the  mortgage.  The  terms  of  a  mort- 
gage or  trust  deed  have  sometimes  been  held  to  imply  a  power  of 
sale,  although  generally  such  power  should  be  expressly  con- 
ferred. Generally  a  power  of  sale  does  not  affect  the  right  to 
foreclose  in  equity,  either  by  a  strict  foreclosure,""  or  by  judicial 
sale,^^  or  to  foreclose  in  any  way  provided  by  statute  for  the  ordi- 
nary foreclosure  of  mortgages,  as  by  entry  and  possession,  or  by 
suit  at  law.  The  power  is  mereh''  a  cumulative  remedy.  It  is  one 
species  of  foreclosure,  but  it  does  not  exclude  jurisdiction  in 
equity.^''    The  option,  however,  to  proceed  in  equity  lies  wholly 


"-  Eubanks  v.  Becton,  158  N.  Car. 
230,  IZ  S.  E.  1009. 

^3  Fogarty  v.  Sawyer,  17  Cal.  589 ; 
Moseley  v.  Rambo,  106  Ga.  597,  32  S. 
E.  638;  Lariverre  v.  Rains,  112  Mich. 
276.  70  N.  W.  583 ;  Pearson  v.  Gooch, 
69  N.  H.  208,  40  Atl.  390;  Elliott  v. 
Wood,  45  N.  Y.  71. 

"*  See  Jones  on  Mortgages,  Nos. 
1723-1763.. 

"Walthall   V.   Rives,   34    Ala.    91; 


Bloom  V.  Van  Rensselaer,  15  111.  503 ; 
Clark  V.  Condit,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  358. 

'•-•Very  V.  Russell,  65  N.  H.  646, 
23  Atl.  522. 

""  Cormerais  v.  Genella,  22  Cal. 
116. 

"■^  Vaughan  v.  Marable,  64  .Ala.  60 ; 
Martin  v.  Ward,  60  Ark.  510.  30  S. 
W.  1041 ;  Green  v.  Gaston,  56  Miss. 
748. 

■"Dupee  V.  Rose,  10  Utah  305,  2>1 
Pac.  567. 


477  MORTGAGES  §    443 

with  the  mortgagee.- °  A  resort  to  a  court  of  equity  is  not  neces- 
sary, except  where  made  so  by  statute ;  it  can  be  effectually  exer- 
cised without  the  aid  of  the  courts. *"'  If  the  power  proves  to  be 
defective,  a  resort  to  a  suit  in  equity  is  rendered  necessary.**"  A 
power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  may  be  enforced  by 
the  court,  but  the  sale  is  by  virtue  of  the  power  and  not  of  the 
degree  when  the  court  enforced  the  power.  It  has  been  held  that 
a  power  of  sale  given  to  a  mortgagee  includes  the  power  to  make 
a  conveyance  in  pursuance  of  a  sale  by  him ;  and  where  the  mort- 
gagee has  the  power  to  purchase  at  a  sale  and  becomes  the  pur- 
chaser he  has  the  power  to  execute  a  deed  to  himself  which  will 
convey  the  title. ^" 

Where  a  link  in  the  chain  of  title  is  based  upon  a  conveyance 
made  in  pursuance  of  a  power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of 
trust,  inquiry  must  be  made  to  ascertain  if  the  stipulations  of  the 
expressed  power  or  the  provisions  of  the  statute  regulating  such 
sales  have  been  complied  with.  It  is  important  that  there  was  a 
default  in  the  payment  of  the  debt  secured  which  authorized  the 
execution  of  the  power.  Such  matters  as  notice,  advertisement, 
and  the  manner  of  sale  should  not  be  overlooked  in  the  inquiry. 
Where  the  title  is  based  on  a  trustee's  deed  executed  under  a 
power  of  sale  in  a  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust,  the  abstract  should 
contain  such  power  of  sale  in  full. 

§  443.  Release  or  satisfaction  of  record. — Upon  payment 
of  the  mortgage  debt,  or  the  performance  of  the  conditions  ren- 
dering it  void,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  mortgagee  or  his  repre- 
sentative to  cancel  the  mortgage  of  record  in  the  manner  and 
form  recognized  by  the  law  of  the  place  where  the  mortgage  is 
recorded.  Statutes  generally  provide  that  satisfaction  may  be  by 
a  brief  entry  upon  the  margin  of  the  record  of  the  mortgage, 
signed  by  the  holder  of  it,  or  by  his  executing  a  certificate  of  sat- 
isfaction which  is  recorded  at  length  with  a  proper  reference  to 
and  from  the  record  of  the  mortgage.  The  record  then  becomes 
a  conveyance  within  the  meaning  of  the  recording  acts.''*  In 
general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  entry  or  certificate  provided  for 
may  be  made  by  the  person  who  appears  of  record  to  be  entitled 

80  Lang  V.  Stansel,  106  Ala.  389,  17  §3  Jackson  v.  Tribble,  156  Ala.  480, 

So.  519.  47  So.  310. 

f"!  Hvde  V.  Warren,  46  Miss.  13.  ^*  Bacon   v.    Van    Schoonhoven,    19 

s"  Webb  V.  Haeffer,  53  Md.  187.  Hun  158,  affd.  87  N.  Y.  446. 


^    443  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  478 

to  receive  payment  of  the  mortgage,  or  wlio  could  properly  exe- 
cute a  deed  of  release  of  tiie  premises.'''^' 

The  person  making  the  entry  should  have  authority  to  make 
same,  and  such  authority  should  appear  in  the  entry/"  The  entry 
of  satisfaction  may  be  made  by  the  mortgagor's  attorney  acting 
under  a  formal  power,*'^  or  by  his  duly  appointed  agent."'*  Where 
the  security  is  in  the  form  of  a  trust  deed  satisfaction  should  be 
entered  by  the  trustee,  but  only  upon  payment  or  actual  satisfac- 
tion of  the  debt.^**  Where  there  are  several  trustees,  all  must  join 
in  the  certificate  of  satisfaction."''  Where,  by  statute  or  other- 
wise, it  is  customary  to  enter  satisfaction  upon  the  margin  of  the 
record,  the  mortgagor  has  an  absolute  right  to  have  such  entry 
made  when  he  has  paid  the  full  amount  due  under  the  mort- 
gagor."' 

The  statutes  generally  provide  for  the  recovery  of  a  penalty 
from  the  person  who  has  refused  or  neglected  to  discharge  a 
mortgage  after  having  received  payment  of  it.  This  is  a  means 
of  compelling  a  discharge,  in  addition  to  the  relief  that  may  be 
had  under  the  general  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  equity."'"  An 
assignee  of  a  mortgage,  who  has  received  payment  of  the  debt,  is 
liable  for  failure  or  neglect  to  execute  a  release  or  enter  satisfac- 
tion,"" at  least  where  the  assignment  is  duly  recorded,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  statute."*  One  to  whom  the  note  or  del)t  is  trans- 
ferred becomes  the  owner  of  the  security,  and,  on  being  paid  the 
note  or  debt,  he  may  be  required  to  acknowledge  satisfaction  of 
the  mortgage,  and  it  is  his  duty,  if  need  be,  to  provide  himself 
with  authority  to  satisfy  the  mortgage  of  record."'' 

A  mortgage  to  several  persons  who  are  partners  may  be  dis- 

^^  Jefferson    v.     Burhans,    85    Fed.  oo  People    v.    O'Loughlin,   79   Misc. 

924,   29   C.    C.    A.   487 ;    Summers    v.  650,  140  N.  Y.  S.  488. 

Kilgus,  14  Bush  (Ky.)  449;  Seymour  ^'i  Murray  v.   Brokaw,  67  111.  App. 

V.  Laycock,  47  Wis.  272,  2  N.  W.  297.  402 ;  Baker  v.  Central  Nat.  Bank,  86 

««Cerney  v.   Pawlot,  66  Wis.  262,  Kans.   293,    120   Pac.   549;   Verges  v. 

28  N.  W.  183.  Giboney,  47  Mo.  171. 

87  Hutchings  v.  Clark.  64  Cal.  228,  02  Beach  v.  Cooke,  28  N.  Y.  508,  86 
30  Pac.  805.  Am.  Dec.  260. 

88  Storch   V.    McCain,   85    Cal.    304,  03  Southwestern  BIdg.  &  Loan  Assn. 
24    Pac.   639;    Douglass   v.    Douglass  v.  Acker,  138  Ala.  523,  35  So.  468. 
Bagging  Co..  94  Mo.  226,  7  S.  W.  280.  "*  Low  v.  Fox,  56  Iowa  221,  9  N. 

89Murto  V.  Lemon.   19  Colo.  App.    W.  131. 
314,    75    Pac.    160 ;    Feld    v.    Roanoke         'J=^  Daniels    v.    Densmore,    32    Nebr. 
Inv.  Co.,  123  Mo.  603,  27  S.  W.  635 ;    40,  48  N.  W.  906. 
Browne  v.  Davis,  109  N.  Car.  23,  13 
S.  E.  703. 


479  MORTGAGES  §    443 

charged  by  any  one  of  them,  but  all  are  jointly  liable  to  the  pen- 
alty for  failure  of  one  to  enter  satisfaction.""  An  entry  of  satis- 
faction by  a  stranger,  without  authority,  is  void  and  ineffectual.'*' 
Under  statutes  which  require  the  holder  of  a  mortgage  upon  re- 
ceiving payment  to  enter  satisfaction  upon  the  record,  such  entry 
is  the  act  of  the  holder  of  the  mortgage,  not  of  the  recorder.  The 
latter  is  merely  the  custodian  of  the  records.  Though  he  attests 
the  entry,  this  does  not  constitute  a  judicial  determination  of  the 
fact  that  the  mortgage  has  been  satisfied.  If  by  mistake  the  entry 
is  made  upon  the  margin  of  the  record  of  a  mortgage  between  the 
same  parties,  but  not  held  by  the  person  who  makes  the  entry,  the 
real  owner  of  the  mortgage  may  show  that  such  entry  was  made 
by  mistake  by  an  unauthorized  person,  even  as  against  a  bona  fide 
purchaser  for  value  without  notice  of  the  mortgage."^  Since  it 
is  not  generally  necessary  to  describe  the  land  released,  an  errone- 
ous description  thereof  is  immaterial  where  the  mortgage  is 
otherwise  identified.""  A  release  obtained  from  the  mortgagee  by 
fraud,  concealment,  or  misrepresentations,  or  by  means  of  prom- 
ises which  have  not  been  fulfilled,  is  inoperative  and  may  be  can- 
celed in  equity.^  Although  payment  of  the  debt  is  in  effect  a  dis- 
charge of  the  mortgage,  a  release  of  the  security  does  not  of  itself 
discharge  the  debt.-  A  deed  of  release  in  the  ordinary  form,  as 
well  as  an  entry  of  satisfaction  upon  the  margin  as  usually  made, 
contains  an  express  acknowledgment  of  the  payment  of  the  debt; 
and  in  such  case  this  would  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  dis- 
charge of  the  debt,^  and  perhaps  conclusive  evidence  of  it,  unless 
fraud  or  mistake  be  shown  in  making  such  entry  or  release.^  But 
this  is  otherwise  if  the  release  contains  no  such  recital;  although, 
if  the  purpose  be  to  release  the  security  without  releasing  the  debt, 
this  should  be  distinctly  stated.  If  the  mortgage  note  be  left  out- 
standing, and  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  release  was  intended 
to  operate  as  payment  of  the  note,  the  mortgagee  may  still  collect 

'•^G  Renfro  v.  Adams,  62  Ala.  302.  i  San  Francisco  Mut.  Loan  Assn.  v. 

•■'^Mallett  V.   Page.  8   Ind.  364;   In  Bowden,   137  Cal.  236,  69  Pac.   1059. 
re  Brownell,  60  Hun   586,   15   N.  Y.         2  Sherwood  v.  Dunbar,  6  Cal.  53. 
S.  475,  39  N.  Y.  St.  918.  3  Burke  v.  Snell,  42  Ark.  57 ;  Van 

•'8  Brown  v.  Henry,  106  Pa.  St.  262.  Slooten   v.   Wheeler,    140   N.   Y.  624, 

90  Bryant   v.    Richardson,    126   Ind.  35  N.  E.  583. 
145,  25  N.  E.  807.  4  Ellis  v.  Bashor,  17  Idaho  259,  105 

Pac.  214. 


444 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


480 


or  negotiate  the  note."'    A  satisfaction  of  mortgage  may  be  shown 
as  follows : 


The  Wilkins  Investment  Com-' 

pany,  by  George  D.  West, 

president, 

to 

William  J.  Kennedy  and  Maria 
Kennedy,  his  wife. 


Release. 

Dated  Sept.  7,  1891. 
Recorded  Dec.  8,  1891. 
Recorded  in  book  78,  page  456. 


Shows  satisfaction  and  release  of  mortgage  recorded  in  book 
78.  page  75.  Corporate  seal  affixed.  Acknowledged  by  said 
president  September  7,  1891. 

§  444.  Foreclosure  by  entry  and  possession. — Various 
modes  of  foreclosure  are  in  use  in  the  several  states,  and  in  a 
number  of  jurisdictions  the  subject  is  fully  covered  by  statutory 
provisions.  Generally,  there  is  no  difference  in  the  manner  of 
foreclosure  between  equitable  mortgages  and  those  in  the  usual 
form."  In  Maine,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Rhode 
Island,  foreclosure  may  be  effected  by  an  entry  by  the  mortgagee 
on  the  mortgaged  premises  and  the  retention  of  the  possession  for 
a  limited  time,  after  which  all  rights  of  redemption  become 
barred.  The  entry  serves  to  give  notice  to  the  mortgagor  that  his 
right  of  redemption  will  be  lost  unless  he  discharges  the  obliga- 
tions of  his  deed.  Being  a  statutory  procedure,  the  provisions  of 
the  statute  must  be  strictly  observed.'  After  the  expiration  of 
the  time  limited  for  possession  on  the  part  of  the  mortgagee  he 
takes  an  absolute  estate,**  and  when  several  parcels  are  covered  by 
the  same  mortgage,  an  entry  on  one  is  sufficient.''  There  must 
be  an  actual  entry  by  the  mortgagee,  but  the  possession  may  be 
passed  to  an  assignee  or  tenant.'"  Upon  the  death  of  the  mort- 
gagee the  entry  should  be  made  by  his  executor  or  adminis- 
trator.'' 

After  the  foreclosure  is  complete,  the  legal  estate  vests  in  the 
heirs,  subject,  like  other  real  estate  of  the  deceased,  to  be  used  for 


^  Van  Deusen  v.  Frink,  15  Pick. 
(Mass.)  449. 

"  Sprague  v.  Cochran,  144  N.  Y. 
104.  38  N.  E.  1000. 

^  Freeman  v.  Atwood,  50  Maine 
473. 


s  Randall  v.  Bradley.  65  Maine  43. 

»  Green  v.  Cross.  45  N.  H.  574. 

^"  Lncier  v.  Marsales,  133  Mass. 
454 ;  Green  v.  Pettingill,  47  N.  H.  375, 
93  Am.  Dec.  444. 

11  Fifield  V.  Sperry,  20  N.  H.  338. 


I 


481  MORTGAGES  §    444 

the  purposes  of  administration;  but  until  the  title  is  thus  made 
complete  in  the  heirs,  they  can  do  nothing  with  the  mortgage  or 
with  the  premises  covered  by  it.  The  entry  is  made  by  the  person 
entitled  to  make  same  in  the  presence  of  witnesses  who,  upon 
being  satisfied  that  the  entry  is  made  under  the  particular  mort- 
gage, sign  and  make  oath  to  a  certificate  of  the  fact  of  entry. 
This  certificate  is  duly  recorded  within  thirty  days  in  the  registry 
of  deeds  for  the  county  where  the  land  lies.^"  The  purpose  of 
the  certificate  being  to  give  notice  to  all  persons  concerned  that 
the  mortgagee  has  entered  for  foreclosure,-  its  allegations  must  be 
definite,  and  must  cover  all  matters  necessary  to  effect  this  change 
of  title.  The  mortgage  to  be  foreclosed  must  be  identified.  The 
fact  of  entry  and  the  date  of  it  are  the  most  essential  features. 
The  purpose  of  it  should  be  declared;  but  the  manner  in  which 
the  entry  is  made  is  not  material  so  far  as  the  certificate  goes. 
The  certificate  should  state  that  the  entry  was  open  and  peaceful, 
and  was  made  in  the  presence  of  the  witnesses.  The  form  of  cer- 
tificate in  general  use  is  as  follows:   "We  hereby  certify  that  we 

were  this  day  present  and  saw ,  the  mortgagee  named  in  a 

certain  mortgage  deed  given  by .  dated ,  and  recorded 

■ ,  make  an  open,  peaceable  and  unopposed  entry  on  the  prem- 
ises described  in  the  said  mortgage,  for  the  purpose  by  him  de- 
clared of  foreclosing  said  mortgage  for  breach  of  the  condition 

thereof.     In  witness  whereof  we  hereto  set  our  hands  this ■ 

day  of , . 

"A.  B. 
(Jurat)  .  C.  D." 

The  statutes  generally  require  that  the  mortgagor  shall  also 
sign  the  certificate  of  entry  by  the  mortgagee ;  the  form  of  the 
mortgagor's  certificate  usually  being:  'T,  the  within  named  mort- 
gagor, hereby  acknowledge  and  certify  that  ,   the  within 

named  mortgagee,  has  this  day  made  an  open,  peaceable,  and  un- 
opposed entry  upon  the  premises  described  in  the  within  mort- 
gage, for  breach  of  condition  therein  contained.     Witness  my 

hand  this day  of , .  "A.  B." 

The  record  of  the  certificate  being  all  the  notice  of  the  entry 
required  to  be  given,  it  is  essential  that  the  record  be  made  as  re- 

■•-  Thompson  v.  Kenyon,  100  Mass.     108. 
31 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


^    445  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  482 

quired,  or  the  certificate  is  wholly  inoperative.'^  A  sufficient  entry 
properly  recorded  is  constructive  notice  to  all  persons  who  claim 
by  any  title  acquired  subsequently  to  the  mortgage.  The  statutes 
sometimes  require  that  notice  shall  be  given  to  all  parties  whose 
interests  may  i^e  affected  by  the  foreclosure,  and  that  actual  notice 
must  be  given  to  the  mortgagor  or  owner  of  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion. Where  these  requirements  obtain  care  should  be  taken  to 
see  that  the  statute  has  been  complied  with  in  respect  to  the  form 
of  such  notice  and  the  manner  of  giving  same.  Where  the  mort- 
gagee has  complied  w^ith  all  the  requirements  respecting  entry 
and  notice,  his  continued  possession  for  the  statutory  period 
effects  a  complete  foreclosure,'^  cuts  off  all  right  of  redemption, 
and  invests  him  with  a  complete  and  indefeasible  title  to  the 
land.'= 

In  compiling  an  abstract  to  land,  the  title  to  which  is  based 
upon  a  foreclosure  by  entry  and  possession,  the  material  parts  of 
the  record  pertaining  to  such  forclosure  should  be  set  out,  to- 
gether with  an  affidavit  showing  that  the  mortgagee's  possession 
was  for  the  period  prescribed  by  the  statute. 

§  445.  Foreclosure  by  writ  of  entry. — The  process  of  fore- 
closure by  a  writ  of  entry  as  used  in  Massachusetts  and  Maine, 
although  in  form  a  suit  at  law,  is  in  effect  a  bill  in  ecjuity.  In- 
stead of  possession  obtained  by  entry,  the  mortgagee  may  obtain 
possession  by  writ  of  entry,  declaring  on  his  own  seisin,  stating 
that  it  is  in  the  mortgagee,  and  if  it  appears  that  he  is  entitled  to 
possession  for  breach  of  the  condition,  the  court  on  motion  of 
either  party  awards  a  conditional  judgment,  if  the  defendant  be 
the  mortgagor  or  any  one  claiming  under  him,  that  if  he  within 
two  months  after  the  judgment  pays  to  the  plaintiff  the  sum 
found  due  on  the  mortgage  with  interest  and  costs  the  mortgage 
shall  be  void ;  otherwise  that  the  plaintiff  shall  have  his  execution 
for  possession.  Action  may  be  brought  by  an  assignee  of  the 
mortgage,  and  after  his  death  by  his  executor  or  administrator. 
It  may  be  brought  against  whoever  is  tenant  of  the  freehold. 
Possession  obtained  in  this  w^ay  must  be  continued  for  three  years 
to  foreclose  the  right  of  redemption.    In  Rhode  Island,  instead  of 

!••' Potter  V.  Small,  47  Maine  293.  i^  Randall  v.  Bradley,  65  Maine  43. 

^*  Tompson    v.   Tappan,    139   Mass. 
506,  1  N.  E.  924. 


483  MORTGAGES  §    446 

a  writ  of  entry  for  obtaining  possession,  an  action  of  ejectment, 
or  of  trespass  and  ejectment,  is  used  for  the  purpose. 

The  declaration  in  an  action  to  foreclose  by  writ  of  entry 
should  allege  the  seisin  to  be  in  the  mortgagee.  It  should  show 
that  a  foreclosure  is  desired,  rather  than  possession  for  taking  the 
profits.  It  should  describe  the  demanded  premises  with  sufficient 
certainty  and  particularity.  Possession  obtained  in  this  way  has 
the  same  effect  as  an  entry  in  pais  as  described  in  the  preceding 
section,  and  if  continued  for  three  years  the  right  of  redemption 
at  the  end  of  that  period  is  forever  foreclosed.  The  conditional 
judgment  usually  requires  that  redemption  may  be  accomplished 
by  payment  of  the  mortgagee's  claim  and  costs  by  a  day  named 
therein,  and  on  failure  to  make  said  payment  in  the  time  desig- 
nated the  mortgage  will  be  deemed  to  be  perpetually  foreclosed. ^"^ 
In  Massachusetts  the  execution  and  the  officer's  return  thereon 
must  be  recorded  in  the  registry  of  deeds,  in  order  that  the  three 
years  necessary  for  foreclosure  shall  run  from  the  time  of  the 
delivery  of  seisin,  as  against  any  person  other  than  the  parties  to 
the  action  and  their  heirs  and  devisees,  and  those  having  actual 
notice. ^^ 

Where  the  chain  of  title  shows  a  foreclosure  by  writ  of  entry, 
the  abstract  should  show  the  essential  features  of  each  step  in  the 
proceedings.  It  should  show  the  mortgage,  the  court  in  which 
the  action  was  brought,  the  number  and  title  of  the  case,  and  a 
statement  of  the  fact  of  the  judgment.  This  should  be  followed 
by  an  affidavit  showing  that  the  mortgagor  held  possession  of  the 
property  for  the  period  fixed  by  the  statute  for  redemption,  and 
that  the  right  to  redeem  was  not  exercised  by  the  party  entitled 
to  redeem. 

§  446.  Foreclosure  by  exercise  of  power  of  sale. — A  sale 
of  property  pursuant  to  a  power  given  in  the  mortgage,  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  is  effectual  to  foreclose  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion of  the  mortgagor. ^^  A  foreclosure  sale  under  a  power  con- 
tained in  a  mortgage,  which  conveys  the  title  of  the  mortgagor,  is 
in  a  legal  sense  the  complete  foreclosure  proceedings,  beginning 
with  the  act  of  sale  and  terminating  with  the  execution  of  the 

^®  Pitman  v.  Thornton,  66  Maine  i"  Walsh  v.  Anderson,  135  Mass. 
469;  Gage  v.  Porter,  64  N.  H.  619,  15     65. 

Atl.  147.  18  Dunn  v.  Oettinger,   148  N.  Car. 

276,  61  S.  E.  679. 


^    447  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  484 

deed  after  the  expiration  of  the  period  allowed  for  redemption. 
It  includes  all  the  proceedings  for  the  foreclosure  of  the  right  of 
redemption  by  sale  and  deed.  The  title  conveyed  by  such  com- 
pleted foreclosure  sale  is  all  the  right,  title,  and  interest  in  and 
to  the  mortgaged  premises  which  the  mortgagor  possessed  at  the 
lime  the  mortgage  was  executed  or  which  was  subsequently  ac- 
quired by  him.^°  This  method  of  foreclosure  is  not  in  any  sense 
an  action  at  law  or  a  suit  in  equity,  but  when  the  sale  is  made  in 
conformity  to  statute,  it  is  held  to  be  a  judicial  sale,  or  at  least  a 
quasi-judicial  sale.^"  A  foreclosure  under  a  power  of  sale,  when 
made  in  conformity  with  the  statute  and  the  provisions  of  the 
mortgage,  has  the  effect  to  extinguish  the  debt  and  to  bar  the 
mortgagor's  equity  of  redemption."^  The  effect,  in  fact,  is  the 
same  as  that  of  a  strict  foreclosure  by  a  suit  in  equity."  Where 
the  proceedings  are  regular  and  in  compliance  with  law,  the 
l)urchaser  at  the  sale  obtains  the  same  title  the  mortgagor  had 
when  he  executed  the  mortgage."''  The  mortgage  usually  specifies 
the  manner  of  conducting  the  sale,  although  statutes  generally 
regulate  such  matters.  Where  the  statute  requires  notice  to  be 
given,  the  requirement  must  be  strictly  observed."*  The  mortgage 
may,  however,  expressly  waive  notice,"^  and  a  private  sale  may 
be  expressly  authorized.  Strict  compliance  w-ith  the  provisions 
of  the  mortgage  and  statute  must  be  had  in  reference  to  such 
matters  as  the  time  of  sale,  the  place  of  sale,  and  the  conditions  of 
the  sale,  as  by  public  auction,  if  so  required.  The  proceeds  of  the 
sale  must  be  first  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  mortgage  debt, 
and  any  residue  remaining  should  be  paid  to  the  mortgagor. 

The  abstract,  in  such  case,  should,  of  course,  show  the  deed 
made  in  execution  of  the  power,  and  this  deed  should  show  a 
compliance  with  the  necessary  conditions  precedent  to  the  sale. 

§  447.  Foreclosure  by  equitable  suit. — The  most  usual 
mode  of  foreclosure  is  by  suit  in  equity.     In  many  states,  juris- 

w  North    Dakota    Horse    &    Cattle  23  Beach  v.  Shaw,  57  111.  17;  Mar- 
Co.   V.    Serumgard,    17    N.    Dak,   466,  tin  v.  Castle,  193  Mo.   183,  91  S.  W. 
117  N.  W.  453,  29  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  930. 
508n,  138  Am.  St.  717.  24  chace  v.   Morse,    189  Mass.  559, 

^0  Vizard    v.    Moody,    119   Ga.   918,  76  N.  E.  142;  Reading  v.  Waterman, 

47  S.  E.  348.                                  .  46  Mich.  107,  8  N.  W.  691. 

21  Meier  v.  Meier,  105  Mo.  411,  16  25  Princeton  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v, 
S.  W.  223.  Munson,  60  111.  371. 

22  Aiken  v.  Bridgeford.  84  Ala.  295, 
4  So.  266. 


485  MORTGAGES  §    44/ 

diction  in  equity  of  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  is  expressly  con- 
ferred by  statute.  When  provisions  in  detail  are  made  on  this 
subject,  they  are  generally  founded  upon  principles  and  rules  of 
practice  already  established  by  courts  of  equity  under  the  general 
jurisdiction  they  have  always  exercised  of  the  subject;  and  the 
powers  of  these  courts  are  only  enlarged  and  defined  by  the  stat- 
utes. Although  the  mortgage  contains  a  power  of  sale,  courts  of 
chancery  are  not  generally  deprived  of  their  jurisdiction  to  fore- 
close it;^^  neither  does  the  fact  that  there  is  a  statutory  remedy 
oust  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  equity.-^  The  suit  is  generally 
required  to  be  brought  in  the  county  where  the  mortgaged  prem- 
ises or  some  part  thereof  are  situated,  but  where  separate  mort- 
gages are  given  upon  land  in  different  counties  and  each  secures 
a  part  of  the  debt,  there  must  be  separate  foreclosures  in  the  sep- 
arate counties."^ 

The  general  requisites  of  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  are, 
that  it  shall  allege  the  execution  and  delivery  of  the  mortgage 
and  of  the  note  or  bond  secured  by  it;  the  names  of  the  parties 
to  it;  the  date  and  amount  of  it;  the  title  of  the  mortgagor  in  the 
mortgaged  premises ;  when  and  where  recorded ;  a  description  of 
the  premises ;  the  amount  claimed  to  be  due ;  and  the  default  upon 
which  the  right  of  action  has  accrued.  It  must  show  also  that  the 
complainant  is  entitled  to  maintain  the  action,  and  that  the  de- 
fendants have,  or  claim  to  have,  certain  interests  in  the  premises, 
or  liens  upon  them.-**  The  bill  should  close  with  a  prayer  for 
the  foreclosure  of  the  equity  of  redemption  and  a  decree  for  the 
sale  of  the  property. 

The  decree  may  be  either  for  strict  foreclosure,  or  merely  for 
the  sale  of  the  property.  A  decree  of  strict  foreclosure  cuts  off 
the  equity  of  redemption  immediately,  or  within  a  limited  time 
after  the  decree  is  granted,  whereupon  the  estate  becomes  abso- 
lute in  the  mortgagee. "°  Such  decree  is  given  in  some  states  where 
the  mortgagor  is  shown  to  be  insolvent,  or  where  the  property 
is  worth  less  than  the  mortgage  debt.^^     But  in  most  states,  the 

26  Martin  v.  Ward,  60  Ark.  510,  30        so  Gates  v.   Boston  &c.   R.  Co.,  53 

S.  W.  1041 ;  Green  v.  Gaston,  56  Miss.  Conn.  333,  5  Atl.  695 ;  Ellis  v.  Leek, 

748.  127  111.  60,  20  N.  E.  218,  3  L.  R.  A. 

-^Benjamin   v.   Cavaroc,   2  Woods  259;  Higgins  v.  West,  5  Ohio  554. 
(U.  S.)   168,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1300.  si  Carpenter  v.   Plagge,  192  111.  82, 

28    Citizens'   Nat.   Bank  v.   Abbott,  61    N.    E.    530;    Miles    v.    Stehle,    22 

72  Wash.  73,  129  Pac.   1085.  Nebr.  740,  36  N.  W.  142. 

^'J  Jones  On  Mortgages,  §  1452. 


§    447  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  486 

court  simply  decrees  a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  land,  or  so  much 
thereof  as  is  necessary  to  pay  the  debt.""*"  The  sale  under  the  de- 
cree must  be  conducted  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  statute,  and 
before  the  sale  can  become  effective  it  must  be  confirmed  by  the 
court. ■'*" 

Certain  persons  must  be  made  parties  to  the  suit  or  the  decree 
will  not  be  valid.  These  are  termed  "necessary  parties,"  and  in- 
clude the  mortgagee,  or  whoever  may  be  the  real  beneficial  owner 
of  the  debt  secured;  the  mortgagor,  unless  he  has  parted  with  all 
his  interest  in  the  property ;  and  all  other  persons  who  have  any 
interest  in  the  mortgaged  premises,  since  such  persons,  if  not 
made  parties,  may  redeem  from  the  mortgage."'*  A  trustee  in  a 
deed  of  trust  is  a  necessary  party,  since  he  holds  the  legal  title. ^^ 
One  who  has  purchased  the  mortgaged  property  since  the  execu- 
tion of  the  mortgage  should  be  made  a  party  if  it  is  desired  to  cut 
off  his  right  and  equity  of  redemption.^''  The  holders  of  equitable 
estates  or  liens  are  necessary  parties,^^  as  also  are  persons  having 
vested  estates  in  remainder  in  the  mortgaged  premises.^"* 

Where  there  has  been  a  foreclosure  by  suit  in  equity,  every 
step  necessary  to  sustain  the  title  under  the  foreclosure  must  be 
shown  in  the  abstract.  The  essential  features  of  the  mortgage 
should  be  set  out,  but  it  need  not  be  described  in  detail.  As  much 
of  the  judgment  roll  must  be  given  as  will  disclose  the  regularity 
of  the  proceedings  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  both  as  to  the 
subject-matter  and  the  parties.  So  much  of  the  final  and  inter- 
locutory decrees  must  be  given  as  will  show  every  material  point 
decided.  The  officer's  certificate  of  sale,  his  report,  and  the 
court's  confirmation  thereof  should  be  set  out.  Finally,  the  offi- 
cer's deed  should  be  included. 

32  Moore  v.  Crandall,  146  Iowa  25,  ^'^  Anderson  v.  Thompson,  3  Ariz. 

124  N.  W.  812,  140  Am.  St.  276.  62,   20   Pac.   803;    Watson    v.    Grand 

3'' Zinkeisen  v.  Lewis.  71  Kans.  837,  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,  91   Mich.  198,  51 

80  Pac.  44.  83   Pac.  28 ;   Gerhardt  v.  N.  W.  990. 

Ellis,  134  Wis.  191,  114  N.  W.  495.  ^'^  Noyes  v.  Hall,  97  U.   S.  34,  24 

3*  Moulton   V.    Cornish,    138   N.    Y.  L.  ed.  909. 

133,  33  N.  E.  842.  20  L.  R.  A.  370.  ^8  Hope  v.   Shevill,   137  App.   Div. 

35  Gardner  v.  Brown,  21  Wall.  (U.  86,  122  N.  Y.  S.  127. 
S.)   36,  22  L.  ed.  527. 


CHAPTER   XX 


WILLS 


SEC. 

450. 
451. 
452. 

453. 

454. 

455. 
456. 
457. 
458. 
459. 
460. 

461. 

462. 
463. 
464. 

465. 
466. 

467. 
468. 
469. 
470. 


471. 


Introductory  remarks. 
Nature  of  title  acquired  by  will. 
Wills     and     related     words     de- 
fined. 

Distinguishing  characteristics  of 
a  will. 

Kinds  of  wills. 
Codicils. 

What  laws  govern  devises. 
Capacity  to  make  a  will. 
Capacity  to  take  under  a  will. 
Construction  of   wills. 
False,  erroneous,  conflicting,  and 
repugnant  descriptions. 
Repugnant  provisions  and  condi- 
tions. 

Void  conditions  and  provisions. 
Operative  words  of  a  will. 
Words   of   purchase   and   limita- 
tion. 

Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. 
How      particular      words      and 
phrases  are  interpreted. 
Words  passing  real  estate. 
Estates  in  remainder. 
Executory  devises. 
Gifts     of     the     use,     possession, 
rents,  profits,  and  income  of  real 
property. 
Devise  to  a  class. 


SEC. 

472.  Devise  of  life  estate  with  power 
of  disposition. 

473.  Devise  charged  with  payment  of 
debts,  legacies,  and  support. 

474.  Devise  on  condition  precedent 
or  subsequent. 

475.  Conditional  limitations. 

476.  Gifts  over  on  death  of  bene- 
ficiary or  death  without  issue  or 
heirs. 

477.  Conditions  restraining  marriage. 

478.  Conditions  against  alienation. 

479.  Devise  to  separate  use  of  mar- 
ried woman. 

480.  Devises  in  trust. 

481.  Designation  of  the  devisee. 

482.  Perpetuities. 

483.  Lapsed  devises. 

484.  Equitable  conversion. 

485.  Residuary  devises. 

486.  Revocation  of  wills. 

487.  Form  and  language  of  wills. 

488.  Abstracting  the  will. 

489.  Method  of  abstracting  will  and 
proof  of  probate. 

490.  Example  of  an  abstract  of  a 
will. 

491.  Probate  of  wills. 

492.  Effect  of  probate. 

493.  Probate  of  foreign  wills. 

494.  Abstracting  probate  proceedings. 


§  450.  Introductory  remarks. — In  most  titles  of  long  dura- 
tion will  be  found  one  or  more  testamentary  instruments  standing 
as  a  muniment  of  title  to  the  premises.  If  such  instrument  has 
been  properly  probated  and  administration  thereunder  completed, 
its  dignity  is  equal  to  that  of  a  deed.  Technically,  however,  a 
will  is  not  a  conveyance.  A  conveyance  operates  in  the  lifetime 
of  the  grantor,  while  a  will  does  not  operate  until  after  the  death 
of  the  maker.  Of  course,  death  transfers  all  property,  and  a 
will  says  where  it  shall  go;  but  this  does  not  render  a  will  a  con- 
veyance.^   While  a  will  is  a  muniment  of  title,  to  be  efifectual  to 

1  Comstock  v.  Adams,  23  Kans.  513,     33  Am.  Rep.  191. 

487 


>^    451  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  488 

pass  the  title  to  real  estate,  it  must  be  duly  probated  as  required 
by  law."  Testamentary  instruments  purporting  to  transfer  landed 
interests  present  a  greater  variety  of  phases  and  give  rise  to  more 
questions  of  construction  than  any  other  form  of  transfer.  They 
have  been  the  subject  of  a  great  deal  of  litigation,  and  there  is 
a  lack  of  harmony  among  the  court  decisions  respecting  their  con- 
struction and  interpretation.  An  abstracter  is  not  liable  if  he 
mistakes  the  law  in  a  matter  of  difificulty  where  the  law  is  not  well 
settled,  but  if  he  undertakes  to  note  in  the  abstract  those  provi- 
sions only  of  a  will  upon  which  the  passing  of  the  title  depends, 
he  should  be  familiar  with  the  general  nature  and  operation  of  de- 
vises, the  different  varieties  of  devises,  their  manner  of  execution, 
and  the  rules  and  principles  of  construction  applicable  to  them. 
The  attorney  who  is  called  upon  to  examine  the  title  is  supposed 
to  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  law  of  wills,  and  especially 
with  the  provisions  which  operate  to  transfer  the  title  to  real 
property.  It  is  apparent  that  only  a  brief  outline  of  this  im- 
portant branch  of  the  law  can  be  included  in  a  work  of  this  char- 
acter, but  it  is  deemed  appropriate  to  discuss  the  leading  and 
more  important  characteristics  of  this  form  of  transferring  title, 
and  to  call  attention  to  some  of  the  questions  that  arise  in  the 
examination  of  titles  acquired  by  will. 

§451.  Nature  of  title  acquired  by  will. — Title  to  land  is 
said  to  be  either  by  descent  or  by  purchase.  The  former  is  that 
title  by  which  one  person  upon  the  death  of  another  acquires  the 
real  estate  of  the  latter  as  his  heir  at  law.  The  latter  includes  all 
methods  of  acquiring  real  estate  other  than  by  descent.  It  fol- 
lows, therefore,  that  title  by  purchase  includes  title  by  devise,  or 
will,  and  the  devisee  is  a  purchaser  in  the  same  sense  that  the 
grantee  in  a  deed  is  a  purchaser,  although  the  title  acquired  by 
devise  does  not  always  possess  that  indefeasible  character  which 
attaches  to  a  title  acquired  by  deed.  Thus,  an  innocent  purchaser 
for  value  by  deed  takes  the  title  free  from  any  and  all  outstanding 
trusts  or  equities  in  favor  of  third  parties,  while  a  devisee  takes 
only  such  title  as  the  testator  had  at  the  time  of  his  death.  In 
most  jurisdictions,  if  the  personal  estate  left  by  the  testator  is 
insufficient  to  pay  his  debts. and  the  costs  and  expenses  of  admin- 
istration, the  land  may  be  sold  to  make  assets  for  their  payment 

2Hanley    v,    Kraftczyk.    119    Wis.     352,  96  N.  W.  820. 


489  WILLS  §  452 

against  not  only  the  devisees,  but  against  persons  claiming  under 
them.  This  liability  of  the  land  to  sale  constitutes,  in  effect,  a 
lien  on  the  land.'  If  the  will  expressly  directs  that  specific  leg- 
acies shall  be  paid  out  of  the  land,  or  if  the  intention  thus  to 
charge  it  may  be  implied  from  the  whole  will,  an  equitable  lien  is 
thereby  created  for  their  payment.*  If,  after  giving  certain  leg- 
acies and  making  disposition  of  specific  articles,  the  testator,  by  a 
residuary  clause,  gives  the  remainder  of  his  property  to  a  residu- 
ary legatee,  he  will  be  held  to  have  intended  in  case  of  a  deficiency 
in  personalty  to  charge  the  unpaid  legacies  upon  the  realty  devised 
by  such  residuary  clause.^  The  title  to  land  devised,  as  a  rule, 
takes  effect  immediately  upon  the  death  of  the  testator,"  although 
the  will  may  provide  that  title  shall  not  vest  until  some  time  after 
the  testator's  death, ^  and,  in  some  states,  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  title  to  realty  shall,  for  the  purposes  of  administration,  vest 
temporarily  in  the  executor  of  the  will.^ 

§  452.  Wills  and  related  words  defined. — Will. — A  will  is 
a  legal  declaration  of  a  person's  intention  or  wish  respecting  what 
shall  be  done  after  his  death  touching  the  disposition  of  his  prop- 
erty, the  guardianship  of  his  children,  or  the  administration  of 
his  estate."  Testament. — Originally  the  term  "will"  was  used  to 
denote  an  instrument  disposing  of  real  estate,  while  an  instrument 
disposing  of  personal  property  was  termed  a  "testament."  An 
instrument  disposing  of  both  real  and  personal  property  was 
called  a  "last  will  and  testament."  This  distinction,  however,  is 
no  longer  observed,  the  term  "will"  being  used  to  designate  an 
instrument  disposing  of  both  real  and  personal  property,  while 
the  term  "testament"  is  practically  obsolete.'"  Codicil. — A  codi- 
cil is  a  supplement  or  addition  to  a  will  made  after  the  execution 

3  Davis  V.  Van  Sands,  45  Conn.  S.  E.  3 ;  Hall  v.  Hall,  98  Wis.  193,  72, 
600.    Fed.    Cas.    No.   3655;    Myers    v.     N.  W.  1000. 

Pierce,  86  Ga.  786,  12  S.  E.  978.  '  Henry  v.  Henderson,  81  Miss.  743, 

4  Hibler  V.  Hibler,  104  Mich.  274,  62     2,2>  So.  960,  63  L.  R.  A.  616. 

N.  W.  361;   Johnson  v.   Poulson,  32  «  Banks  v.  Speers,  97  Ala.   560.   11 

N.  J.  Eq.  390.  So.  841 ;    Dexter  v.   Hayes,   88   Iowa 

■'■'Walker  v.   Atmore.  50  Fed.  644;  493,   55   N.   W.  491;    Grady  v.   War- 

Reid  V.  Corrigan,  143  111.  402.  32  N.  rell,  105  Mich.  310,  63  N.  W.  204. 

E.  387 ;  American  Cannel  Coal  Co.  v.  "  Colton  v.  Colton,  127  U.  S.  300,  8 

Clemens,  132  Ind.  163.  31  N.  E.  786.  Sup.  Ct.  1164,  32  L.  ed.  138;  Rice  v. 

"Simmons  v.  Spratt,  26  Fla.  449,  8  Rice,  68  Ala.  216;  In  re  Wood's  Es- 

So.  123,  9  L.  R.  A.  343 ;  Flemister  v.  tate,  36  Cal.  75. 

Flemister,   83   Ga.   79,    9    S.    E.    724;  lo  Compton    v.    McMahan,    19    Mo. 

Batcher  v.  Grice,  53  S.  Car.   126,  31  App.  494. 


§    453  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  490 

of  tlie  will  and  annexed  to  or  to  be  taken  as  a  part  thereof,  by 
which  the  disposition  made  in  the  original  will  is  explained,  added 
to  or  altered.'^  Testator. — The  word  "testator"  has  reference  to 
the  person  who  makes  a  will,  and  a  woman  who  has  made  a  will 
is  sometimes  called  a  "testatrix."  Devisor. — A  person  disposing 
of  real  property  by  will  is  termed  a  "devisor."  Devisee. — A  per- 
son taking  real  property  under  a  will  is  termed  a  "devisee."  Be- 
queath.— As  a  verb  the  word  "bequeath"  denotes  the  making  of  a 
bequest  or  will  of  personalty.  Bequest. — A  bequest  is  a  gift  of 
personal  property  in  general  by  will.  Legacy. — A  legacy  denotes 
a  gift  of  money,  also  of  personalty  generally  by  will.  Legatee. — 
A  person  taking  personal  property  under  a  will  is  termed  a  "leg- 
atee." Devise. — When  used  as  a  verb  the  word  "devise"'  denotes 
the  act  of  disposing  of  real  property  by  will,  and  when  used  as 
a  noun  it  denotes  a  gift  of  real  property  by  will.  The  terms  used 
to  designate  gifts  of  realty  and  personalty,  respectively,  have* no 
fixed  legal  meaning,  and  w^hen  used  interchangeably  in  a  w^ill  do 
not  affect  the  validity  of  the  gift. 

§  453.  Distinguishing  characteristics  of  a  will. — From  the 
definition  given  of  a  will,  it  will  be  observed  that  the  instrument 
does  not  pass  a  present  interest  or  right  in  the  property,  and 
that  such  right  or  interest  does  not  take  effect  until  the  death  of 
the  testator.  During  his  lifetime  it  is  entirely  inoperative;^-  in 
other  words,  the  will  is  ambulatory  during  the  life  of  its  maker. 
It  is  in  effect  reiterated  as  his  will  at  each  moment  during  his 
life.''^  The  true  test  of  the  character  of  the  instrument  is  not  the 
testator's  realization  that  it  is  a  will,  but  his  intention  to  create 
a  revocable  disposition  of  his  property  to  accrue  and  take  effect 
only  upon  his  death,  and  passing  no  present  interest.'*  To  be  a 
will  the  instrument  must  have  been  intended  as  such.  Mere  m.em- 
oranda  or  direction  for  drawing  a  will,  or  a  paper  reciting  the 
terms  of  a  proposed  or  partly  executed  will  do  not  constitute  a 
will,  though  sufficiently  executed  as  such.^^ 

A  will  is  distinguished  from  a  deed  of  conveyance  in  that  the 

"  Home    for    Incurables    v.    Noble,  ^^  j,-,   re  Kopmier's  Will,   113  Wis. 

172  U.  S.  383.  19  Sup.  Ct.  226.  43  L.  233,  89  N.  W.  134. 

ed.  486;  Watson  v.   Turner,  89  Ala.  iM-Cenney  v.  Parks,  125  Cal.  146,  57 

220.  8  So.  20;  In  re  Zeile.  74  Cal.' 125,  Pac.  772,  rev'g  54  Pac.  251. 

15  Pac.  445.  '''  Peake  v.  Jenkins,  80  Va.  293. 

^-  Dunn  V.  Houghton    (N.  J.  Eq.), 
51  Atl.  71. 


491  WILLS  §  454 

latter  instrument  must  pass  a  present  interest  in  the  property. 
Whether,  therefore,  an  instrument  be  a  deed  or  a  will  depends 
upon  whether  the  maker  intended  the  estate  to  vest  before  his 
death  and  upon  execution  of  the  paper,  or  whether  he  intended 
that  all  the  interest  and  estate  should  take  effect  only  after  his 
death.  If  the  former,  it  is  a  deed;  if  the  latter,  a  will;  and  it  is 
immaterial  whether  he  calls  it  a  will  or  a  deed,  the  instrument 
will  operate  according  to  its  legal  effect.^"  Generally,  without  re- 
gard to  its  form,  any  instrument  which  does  not  pass  a  present 
interest  in  property,  and  is  to  take  efifect  on  the  death  of  the 
maker,  and  is  testamentary  in  character,  may  operate  as  a  will.^' 

§  454.  Kinds  of  wills. — Wills  are  sometimes  divided  into 
two  general  classes  (1 )  Written  wills;  and  (2)  oral  or  nuncupa- 
tive wills. ^*  To  the  former  class  belong  practically  all  wills,  as 
the  statutes  generally  provide  that  wills  must  be  in  writing.  This 
class  of  wills  is  divided,  with  respect  to  their  manner  of  execu- 
tion, into  ( 1 )  Ordinary  written  wills  signed  by  the  testator  and 
attested  as  required  by  law;  (2)  holographic  wills,  or  wills  writ- 
ten entirely  by  the  hand  of  the  testator;  (3)  mystic  wills,  or  those 
required  to  be  enclosed  in  an  envelope  and  sealed  in  the  presence 
of  witnesses;  and  (4)  nuncupative  wills  required  under  the  civil 
law  to  be  either  dictated  to  a  notary  by  the  testator,  or  written 
by  himself  or  another  at  his  request  in  the  presence  of  witnesses. 
A  nuncupative  will  at  common  law  is  an  oral  declaration  made  by 
the  testator  in  extremis,  and  in  the  presence  of  witnesses.  Nei- 
ther form  of  nuncupative  will  can  be  used  to  transfer  title  to 
real  property,  except  under  certain  circumstances  lands  may  be 
devised  by  this  form  of  will  in  the  states  of  North  Carolina, 
Tennessee,  Georgia,  and  Mississippi. 

With  respect  to  their  contents  and  effect  written  w'ills  may  be 
divided  into :  ( 1 )  Contingent  or  conditional  wills,  or  such  as  are 
to  take  effect  upon  the  happening  or  not  of  some  event;  (2)  al- 
ternative wills,  as  where  a  testator,  after  having  executed  one  or 
more  wills,  executes  another  in  which  he  expresses  a  contingency 
upon  which  that  will  or  one  of  the  former  wills  is  to  become  op- 
erative; (3)  joint  and  mutual  v^^ills,  or  one  where  the  same  in- 

^'''  Adair  v.  Craig,  135  Ala.  332,  33  i'^  Leathers  v.  Greenacre,  S3  Maine 

So.  902.  561;    Hubbard  v.   Hubbard,   12  Barb. 

1^  Corwine  v.  Corwine,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  (N.  Y.)   148. 
579. 


§    455  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  492 

strnnicnt  is  niadc  the  will  of  twn  or  more  ])crs()ns  and  is  jointly 
signed  l)y  them;  (4)  separate  wills  in  relation  to  property  in 
different  jurisdictions;  (5)  wills  appointing  an  executor  only; 
and  (6)  wills  operative  at  the  direction  of  another. 

§  455.  Codicils. — We  have  said  that  a  codicil  is  an  addi- 
tion to,  qualification  or  alteration  of,  a  will.  It  is  practically  a 
supplemental  will,  incomplete  in  itself,  but  merely  an  appendage  to 
an  existing  will,  of  which  it  is  a  part.  It  must  be  executed  with 
all  the  formalities  required  in  executing  wills. ^'■'  But  an  instru- 
ment testamentary  in  character  and  executed  with  the  formalities 
of  a  w^ill  may  operate  as  a  codicil,  although  it  be  in  the  form  of  a 
deed,*"  power  of  attorney,^^  or  a  letter."" 

A  codicil  is  often  made  for  the  sole  purpose  of  naming  an  ex- 
ecutor. In  case  of  the  death  of  the  beneficiary  during  the  life- 
time of  the  testator,  a  codicil  is  sometimes  made  to  prevent  a 
lapse.  Its  use  is  generally  to  modify  or  vary  the  terms  of  the  w-ill, 
and  does  not  revoke  it  unless  it  is  expressly  stated  that  it  is  made 
for  that  purpose.-^  Nothing  short  of  an  absolute  inconsistency 
w\\\  work  a  revocation  by  implication."* 

Codicils  are  included  in  the  term  "will"  and  all  legal  provisions 
pertaining  to  wills  must  be  understood  as  embracing  codicils.""' 
The  will  and  codicil  are  to  be  taken  and  construed  as  part  of  one 
and  the  same  instrument,  and  the  dispositions  of  the  will  are  not 
to  be  disturbed  further  than  are  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the 
codicil.-*^  For  certain  purposes  the  codicil  brings  the  will  to  its 
own  date.  It  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  part  thereof;  both  are  to  be 
construed  as  one  instrument,  and  they  are  alike  subject  to  the 
rules  of  law  governing  the  admission  of  parol  evidence  for  the 
purpose  of  adding  to,  varying,  or  explaining  their  respective  con- 
ditions.    The  authority  of  both  rests  upon  the  execution  of  the 

i^Home    for    Incurables   v.    Noble,  44  Atl.   783;   HerzoR  v.   Title   Guar- 

172  U.  S.  383.  19  Sup.  Ct.  226.  43  L.  antee  &  Trust  Co..  177  N.  Y.  86.  97, 

ed.  486;   Green  v.   Lane,  45   N.   Car.  69    N.    E.    283.    67    L.    R.    A.    146; 

102.  Thompson   v.    Churchill,   60   Vt.    371, 

20  Kelly    V.    Richardson,    100    Ala.  14  Atl.  699. 

584.  13  So.  785.  -*  Bosley   v.   Wvatt.    14    How.    (U. 

21  Stewart    v.    Stewart,    177    Mass.     S.)  390.  14  L.  ed.  468. 

493.  59  N.  E.  116.  2.".  pry  y.  Morrison,  159  111.  244,  42 

22  Barney  v.  Hays,  11  Mont.  571,  29     N.  E.  774. 

Pac.  282,  28  Am.  St.  495.  ~"  Herzog    v.    Title     Guarantee    & 

23  Colt  V.  Colt,  32  Conn.  422  ;  Trust  Co.,  177  N.  Y.  86,  69  N.  E.  283, 
Bringhurst  v.   Orth,  7   Del.   Ch.   178,     67  L.  R.  A.  146. 


493  WILLS  §  456 

writing  in  accordance  with  the  statutory  requirements.-'  The 
distinction  between  a  will  and  a  codicil  exists  only  in  their  rela- 
tion to  each  other.  Thus  a  will  has  the  effect  of  revoking  all  wills 
previously  made ;  whereas  a  codicil  recognizes  the  existence  of 
a  previous  will,  to  which  it  is  supplementary,  but  leaves  it  in  full 
force  except  so  far  as  it  undertakes  to  alter  its  terms.-*  If  the 
codicil  is  not  attached  to  the  original  will,  it  must  expressly 
identify  the  will  to  which  it  relates.""  If  a  codicil  is  executed  with 
all  due  formalities,  and  expressly  confirms  the  will  so  far  as  it  is 
consistent  with  such  will,  it  serves  to  republish  the  will,  supplies 
all  omissions,  and  remedies  all  defects,  if  any,  in  the  execution  of 
the  will.^"  It  is  provided  by  statute  in  many  states  that  the  word 
"will"  shall  include  or  mean  a  codicil,  but  in  the  absence  of  such 
statute  such  word  does  not  cover  or  embrace  the  codicil  where 
anything  appears  to  show  that  it  was  not  intended  to  do  so.'^^ 

§  456.  What  laws  govern  devises. — It  is  a  well-settled  pol- 
icy of  the  law  in  this  country,  except  where  not  modified  by 
statute,  that  wills  of  real  estate  or  affecting  real  estate  must  be 
executed  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  state  where  the  real 
estate  is  situated,  and  that  the  provisions  disposing  of  such  real 
estate  must  be  valid  under  the  laws  of  such  state.  It  is  not  enough 
that  such  will  and  the  provisions  thereof  are  valid  in  the  state  of 
the  testator's  domicil."-  This  rule  includes  not  only  the  form  and 
mode  of  execution  of  a  will,  but  also  the  lawful  power  and  au- 
thority of  the  testator  to  make  such  disposition.^"  It  also  includes 
the  capacity  of  the  testator  to  make  such  disposition.'"*  The  rule 
also  includes  the  power  to  devise  after-acquired  property,"^  the 

2"  Dunham  v.  Averill,  45  Conn.  61,  57  So.  743.  42  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  454n ; 

29  Am.  Rep.  642.  Crossett    Lumber    Co.    v.    Files.    104 

"^  Kelly    V.    Ricliardson,    100    Ala.  Ark.  600,    149   S.   W.   908;    Lucas   v. 

584.  13  So.  785:   In   re  Plumel's   Es-  Tucker,    17    Lid.    41;    Succession    of 

tate.  151  Cal.  11.  90  Pac.  192.  121  Am.  Herber,    128    La.    111.    54    So.    579; 

'^t-  100.  Rackcmann  v.  Taylor.  204  Mass.  394. 

20  Ferrell  v.  Gill.  130  Ga.  534.  61  S.  90  N.  E.  552:   Li  re  Turner,  82  Misc. 

I-  131,  14  Knw.  Cas.  471.  25,  143  N.  Y.  S.  692;  Ford  v.  Ford, 

•«'Camp  V.  Shaw,  52  111.  App.  241;  70  Wis.  19.  2>2,  N.  W.  188,  5  hm.  St. 

McCurdy  v.  Neall,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  2,Z7>,  117. 

7  Atl.  566.    But  see   Phelps  v.   Rob-  -^  Ford  v.  Ford.  70  Wis.  19.  ZZ  N. 

bins.  40  Conn.  250.  271,  272.  W.  188.  5  Am.  St.  117. 

••'Sloane  v.  Stevens,  107  N.  Y.  122,  34  Evansville    Ice    &    Cold    Storage 

''\N  ,E.  618.  Co.  V.  Winsor,  148  Ind.  682,  48  N.  E. 

•-'Clarke  v    Clarke,   178  U.  S.  186,  592. 

20  Sup.  Ct.  873,  44  L.  ed.  1028:  His-  ^^=  Frazier  v.  Boggs.  Zl  Fla.  307.  20 

gms  V.   Eaton.   188  Fed.  938:   Black-  So.  245;  Wynne  v.  WVnne,  23  Miss, 

sher  Co.  v.   Northrup,    176  Ala.    190,  251,  27  Am.  Dec    139 


456 


TITI.KS    AXD    A  P. ST U  ACTS 


494 


power  to  devise  properly  held  in  common,"-'  the  power  to  disin- 
herit by  devise,^^  the  appHcation  of  the  rule  in  Shelley's  Case,''** 
the  application  of  the  rule  against  perpetuities,^"  and  the  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  equitable  conversion.*" 

There  are  cases  holding  that  a  will  disposing  of  real  estate  is 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  testator's  domicil,  unless  it  appears 
from  the  will  that  he  drew  it  with  reference  to  the  law  of  the 
place  where  the  land  was  situated.'*^  The  rule  that  the  lex  rci 
sitcTe  governs  a  will  devising  real  property  has  been  modified  in 
some  states  by  the  adoption  of  the  rule  that  a  will  is  valid  to  pass 
land  anywhere  if  it  is  valid  by  the  law  of  the  jurisdiction  where 
the  testator  was  domiciled  at  the  time  of  his  death.*-  The  rule 
that  a  will  devising  real  estate  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
place  W'here  the  real  estate  is  situated  includes  the  capacity  of  the 
devisee  to  take  under  the  wnll.^''  Where  a  will  creates  a  trust  in 
relation  to  lands  devised,  its  validity  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
place  where  the  land  is  situated.**  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to 
the  contrary,  the  law  of  the  domicil  of  a  donor  of  a  power  created 
by  will  controls  in  determining  the  validity  of  the  execution  of  the 
power.  *^ 

The  revocation  of  a  will  devising  real  property  is  governed  by 
the  law^  of  the  place  where  the  land  is  situated,  whatever  be  the 
mode  of  revocation.*" 

Questions  of  election  with  regard  to  real  property  are  gov- 
erned by  the  lex  rei  sitae. *^ 

The  lex  rei  sitse  governs  in  interpreting  the  interest  created 
by  a  devise  of  real  estate.** 


3«  Pratt  V.  Douglas,  38  N.  J.  Eq. 
516. 

3^  In  re  Lewis'  Estate,  32  La.  Ann. 
385. 

^^  De Vaughn  v.  Hutchinson,  165  U. 
S.  566,  17  Sup.  Ct.  461,  41  L.  ed.  827. 

30  Ford  V.  Ford,  80  Mich.  42,  44  N. 
W.  1057;  Hobson  v.  Hale,  95  N.  Y. 
588. 

*o  In  re  Clark's  Appeal,  70  Conn. 
195.  39  Atl.  155. 

"Higgins  V.  Eaton,  188  Fed.  938; 
Keith  V.  Eaton,  58  Kans.  732.  51  Pac. 
271 ;  Lincoln  v.  Perry,  149  Mass.'  368, 
21  N.  E.  671,  4  L.  R.  A.  215;  Wash- 
burn V.  Van  Steenwyk,  32  Minn.  336, 
20  N.  W.  324. 

*2  Green  v.  Alden,  92  Maine  177,  42 
Atl.  358. 


^3  Jones  V.  Habersham,  107  U.  S. 
174,  2  Sup.  Ct.  336.  27  L.  ed.  401; 
White  V.  Howard,  46  N.  Y.  144. 

"  Ford  V.  Ford,  80  Mich.  42,  44  N 
W.  1057. 

45  Sewall  V.  Wilmer.  132  Mass.  131 
In  re  Bingham's  Appeal,  64  Pa.  St 
345;  Cotting  v.  DeSartiges,  17  R.  I 
668.  24  Atl.  530,  16  L.  R.  A.  367. 

•*'■'  De Vaughn  v.  Hutchinson,  165  U 
S.  566.  17  Sup.  Ct.  461.  41  L.  ed.  827; 
Ware  v.  Wisncr,  50  Fed.  310;  In  re 
Clark's  Appeal,  70  Conn.  195,  39  Atl. 
155. 

47  Apperson  v.  Bolton,  29  Ark.  418 ; 
Jennings  v.  Jennings,  21  Ohio  St.  56. 

*""  Handley  v.  Palmer.  103  Fed.  39, 
43  C.  C.  A.  100;  McCartney  v.  Os- 
burn,    118    111.    403,    9    N.    E.    210; 


495  WILLS  §  457 

As  a  general  rule  the  validity  of  the  execution  of  a  will  is  con- 
.trolled  by  the  statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  its  execution.  And 
a  statute  enacted  subsequent  to  the  execution  and  prior  to  the 
death  of  the  testator,  changing  the  rule  with  respect  to  the  form 
of  the  instrument,  the  capacity  of  the  testator  and  the  like,  has  no 
retrospective  effect. ***  But  if  the  legislative  intent  is  manifest  that 
the  act  shall  govern  wills  already  executed,  it  will  have  a  retro- 
spective effect.^"  However,  if  this  intention  is  not  manifest  the 
act  will  apply  only  to  wills  executed  after  its  passage,  and  the 
statute  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  testator  controls 
their  validity.^^  Until  the  death  of  the  testator,  therefore,  the 
power  of  the  legislature  over  wills,  the  manner  of  their  execution, 
and  the  mode  of  carrying  out  their  provisions  is  absolute  and  su- 
preme, but  upon  the  death  of  the  testator  the  interest  passing 
under  the  will  becomes  vested  if  the  will  is  valid,  and  the  legisla- 
ture may  not  interfere  with  or  divest  the  estate.^" 

§  457.  Capacity  to  make  a  will. — The  capacity  of  a  person 
to  make  testamentary  disposition  of  his  property  is  generally  ex- 
pressed or  implied  in  the  different  statutes  of  wills,  and  the  other 
statutes  relating  thereto  of  the  different  states."  In  some  juris- 
dictions, however,  it  is  held  that  every  one  of  mature  age  and 
sound  mind  has  an  inherent  right  to  make  a  will  and  have  it  car- 
ried out  according  to  his  intent."*  The  very  purpose  of  the  statute 
of  wills  was  to  recognize  and  create  a  right  in  the  owner,  having 
testamentary  capacity,  to  make  disposition  of  his  property  accord- 
ing to  his  own  choice  and  pleasure,  and  in  variance,  if  need  be,  to 
the  usual  rules  of  inheritance  as  fixed  by  the  statute  of  descent 
and  distribution."   The  legislative  body  of  each  state  has  plenary 

Thompson  v.  Penn,  149  Ky.  158,  148  re  Deake's   Appeal,  80   Maine  50,   12 

S.  W.  33.  Atl.  790 ;  Remington  v.  Metropolitan 

^'•>  In    re    Lane's    Appeal,    57    Conn.  Sav.  Bank,  76  Md.  546.  25  Atl.  666. 
182,  17  Atl.  926,  14  Am.  St.  94,  4  L.  R.         ss  United  States  v.  Perkins,  163  U. 

A.  45;  Coleman  v.  O'Leary,  114  Ky.  S.   625,    16   Sup.   Ct.    1073,   41    L.   ed. 

388,  24  Ky.  L.  1248,  70  S.  W.  1068.  287;  Wolfe  v.  Mueller,  46  Colo.  335. 

•"'0  Hoffman    v.    Hofifman,    26    Ala.  104  Pac.  487;   In   re  Graves,  242  111. 

535;  In  re  Learned's  Estate,  70  Cal.  212,  89  N.  E.  978;  In  re  Noyes'  Es- 

140.  11  Pac.  587;  Hargroves  v.  Redd,  tate,    40    Mont.    178,    105    Pac.    1013; 

43  Ga.  142;  Crawford  v.  Thomas.  114  Strand  v.  Stewart,  51  Wash.  685,  99 

Ky.  197.  21  Ky.  L.  1100,  .54  S.  W.  197;  Pac.  1027.    See  also  digest  of  statute 

Perkins  v.  George,  45  N.  H.  453.  of  wills  in  appendix  to  this  work. 

51  Powell  V.  Powell,  30  Ala.  697;  54  in  re  Ball,  153  Wis.  27,  141  N. 
Gregory  v.  Gates,  92  Ky.  532,   18  S.  W.  8. 

W.  231.  13  Ky.  L.  761.  ss  Purdy  v.  Evans,  156  Ky.  342,  160 

52  White  V.  Keller,  68  Fed.  796;  In     S.  W.  1071. 


§    457  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  496 

power  to  withhold  or  grant  the  right  to  make  a  will,  and  where  a 
legislative  body  does  grant  this  right,  it  may  make  its  exercise 
subject  to  such  regulations,  restrictions  and  requirements  as  it 
may  see  fit  to  impose  upon  the  testator.""  In  all  cases  where  the 
capacity  to  make  wills  is  regulated  by  statute,  the  provisions 
thereof  must  be  strictly  followed.  The  point  of  time  at  which 
the  competency  of  the  testator  to  execute  a  will  is  to  be  tested  is 
that  of  the  execution  of  the  will,  and  where  a  codicil  is  subse- 
quently made  he  must  have  capacity  at  both  the  date  of  the  will 
and  the  date  of  the  codicil,  as  a  codicil  draws  the  will  down  to  its 
own  date,  and  makes  the  will  speak  as  of  the  date  of  the  codicil. ^^ 
If  there  be  a  want  of  testamentary  capacity  at  the  time  of  the 
execution  of  the  will,  such  will  never  takes  effect,  or,  rather,  is 
not  so  made  and  executed  as  to  take  effect,  without  republication, 
although  a  statute  giving  testamentary  capacity  should  be  subse- 
quently passed,  but  that  a  will  which  was  legally  executed  by  a 
person  having  testamentary  capacity,  which  attempted  to  pass 
property  not  then  effectually  devised,  and  hence  invalid  as  to  such 
devise,  will  be  validated  and  pass  such  property  included  by 
force  of  a  subsequent  statute  operating  to  authorize  it."**  Gener- 
ally speaking,  a  testator  may  dispose  of  his  property  as  he 
chooses,  but  in  doing  so  he  must  not  contravene  any  settled  prin- 
ciple of  public  policy,  or  any  clear  right  of  another  growdng  out 
of  the  statutory  provisions  or  court  decisions.^'' 

At  common  law  aliens  had  no  right  to  transmit  real  property 
by  devise,  but  this  rule  has  been  greatly  modified  by  statute,  so 
that  in  some  states  resident  aliens  are  placed  upon  the  same  foot- 
ing as  citizens  in  this  respect.  In  other  states  the  statutes  apply 
only  to  aliens  who  have  resided  for  a  certain  length  of  time  in  the 
state  or  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens. 

As  a  general  rule,  at  common  law,  infants  can  not  make  a  valid 
devise  of  real  property,  but  at  present  the  age  of  testamentary 
capacity  is  regulated  by  statute  everywhere,  the  age  ranging  from 
fourteen  to  twenty-one  years,  and  is  not  in  all  cases  uniform 
between  the  sexes. 

At  common  law  a  married  woman  could  not  make  a  valid  de- 

•"^^  In   re  Walker's   Estate,   110  Cal.         ■'^^^  Mitchell  v.  Kimbrough,  98  Tenn. 
387.  42  Pac.  815.  30  L.  R.  A.  460,  52     535.  41  S.  W.  993. 
Am.  St.  104.  59  Rhoads  v.  Rhoads,  43  111.  239. 

•"'^  Smith  V.  Day,  2  Pennew.   (Del.) 
245,  45  Atl.  396. 


497  WILLS  §  458 

vise  of  her  real  estate,  but  modern  statutes  generally  empower  her 
to  make  a  devise  as  if  sole. 

In  this  country,  where  forfeiture  for  crime  is  not  generally 
recognized,  the  conviction  of  a  crime  does  not  afifect  the  capacity 
of  a  person  to  transfer  real  property  by  will. 

The  mental  capacity  of  a  person  to  make  a  valid  will  is  a  matter 
of  primary  investigation  and  proof  upon  probate,  and  is  seldom 
if  ever  encountered  in  the  examination  of  a  title. 

§  458.  Capacity  to  take  under  a  will. — As  a  general  rule 
any  person  may  take  real  property  by  devise.  But  for  reasons  of 
public  policy  and  good  morals  the  law  has  seen  fit  to  designate 
who  may  and  who  may  not  be  the  objects  of  the  testator's 
bounty.  The  capacity  of  a  person  to  take  a  present  vested 
interest  in  the  land  under  a  will  is  judged  as  of  the  date  of 
the  testator's  death,*"*  and  if  the  capacity  existed  at  that 
date,  a  prior  or  subsequent  incapacity  does  not  render  the 
devise  invalid.  But  where  a  devise  is  intended  to  be  vested 
in  the  beneficiary,  not  at  the  death  of  the  testator,  but  at  some 
later  time,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  beneficiary  is  capable 
of  taking  at  the  time  of  the  death,  provided  he  is  capable  at 
the  time  when  the  gift  is  intended  to  become  vested.''^  A  benefi- 
ciary under  a  will  must  be  in  existence  either  at  the  death  of  the 
testator  or  at  the  time  the  gift  vests.""  A  devise  to  a  corporation 
not  in  existence  at  the  death  of  the  testator  is  void.*'^  Also  a  will 
devising  property  to  the  estate  of  a  person  is  void;  it  not  being  a 
person  or  entity  which  can  take  under  a  will.*^*  In  most  states 
aliens  are  permitted  to  take  real  property  by  devise  as  fully  as 
citizens  can."^  In  some  states,  however,  nonresident  aliens  are 
forbidden  by  statute  to  acquire  any  interest  in  real  estate  by  de- 
vise.*^°  By  the  common  law  a  private  corporation  may  acquire 
title  to  real  estate  by  devise,"'  and  unless  prohibited  by  statute  the 

60  Hargroves  v.  Redd.  43  Ga.  142.  v.   Phillippi,  91   Ala.  299,  8  So.  561 ; 

"^  Loughced   v.    Dykeman's    Baptist  Utassy  v.  Geidinghagen,  132  Mo.  53, 

Church,  129  N.  Y.  211,  29  N.  E.  249,  33   S.   W.   444;    Stamm   v.    Bostwick, 

14  L.  R.  A.  410.  122  N.  Y.  48,  25  N.  E.  233,  9  L.  R.  A. 

62  Milne  V.  Milne,  17  La.  46.  597. 

«3  Zeisweiss    v.    James,    63    Pa.    St.         go  Ryan  v.  Egan,  156  111.  224,  40  N. 

465,  3  Am.  Rep.  558  E.  827 ;   Meier  v.  Lee,  106  Iowa  303, 

''*  In  re  Glass'  Estate,  164  Cal.  765,  76  N.  W.  712. 
130  Pac.  868.  e?  Hubl^ard  v.  Worcester  Art  Mu- 

6=5  DeGeoffroy  v.   Riggs,   7   Mackey  seum,  179  Fed.  406;  In  re  McGraw's 

(18  D.  C.)  33  rev'd,  133  U.  S.  258,  10  Estate,  111  N.  Y.  66,  19  N.  E.  233,  2 

Sup.  Ct.  295,  33  L.  ed.  642 ;  Nicrosi  L.  R.  A.  387. 

32 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


^    458  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  498 

devise  may  be  made  to  a  foreign  corporation. "^  In  some  states 
statutes  have  been  enacted  which  provide  that  no  devise  to  a  cor- 
poration shall  be  valid  unless  it  is  expressly  authorized  to  take  by 
devise.  Other  statutes  provide  that  certain  corporations  shall  not 
take  by  gift,  grant,  or  devise  more  than  a  certain  stated  amount  in 
value  of  property.  So  a  devise  to  a  corporation  not  authorized 
to  take  real  estate,  or  to  one  which  has  acquired  all  the  property 
it  is  entitled  by  its  charter  to  take,  is  void.*'®  As  a  general  rule 
a  municipal  corporation,  unless  specially  restricted,  is  capable 
of  taking  property  by  devise,  and  acting  as  trustee  for  the  purpose 
of  a  public  nature  germane  to  the  objects  of  the  corporation.'^" 
Unincorporated  societies  are  generally  held  incapable  of  taking 
property  by  devise,  for  the  reason  that  the  beneficiary  is  uncer- 
tain;'^^ although  a  devise  may  be  made  to  the  trustees  of  such  so- 
ciety for  its  benefit.^-  Charitable,  religious,  and  educational  in- 
stitutions can  generally  take  real  property  under  a  will,  but  the 
statutes  of  many  states  regulate  the  amount  and  value  thereof." 
Under  modern  statutes  a  husband  or  wife  may  devise  real  estate 
to  each  other ;  and  married  women  are  now  generally  empowered 
to  make  wills  disposing  of  both  real  and  personal  property  as  if 
sole.  Unless  there  is  a  statute  prohibiting  or  restricting  it,  a  tes- 
tator may  devise  his  property  to  his  illegitimate  children,  and 
even  to  the  exclusion  of  his  legitimate  children."*  In  many  juris- 
dictions it  is  held  that  a  devise  to  an  attesting  witness  is  void.^'' 
But  where  such  attesting  witness  would  be  entitled  to  a  share  of 
the  testator's  estate  in  case  of  intestacy,  it  is  held  that  so  much 
of  such  share  shall  be  preserved  to  him  as  does  not  exceed  his  gift 
under  the  will.^"  It  has  also  been  held  that  if  there  are  sufficient 
other  competent  witnesses  besides  the  beneficiary  to  prove  the  will 
the  gift  may  l^e  valid,  and  it  matters  not  whether  the  beneficiary 

(■■»  West  Virginia  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.  "^  Jones   v.   Habersham,    107  U.    S. 

V.  Miller,  176  Fed.  284.  174.  2  Sup.  Ct.  336,  27  L.  ed.  401. 

'•^Barton    v.    King,    41    Miss.    288;  "*  Dunlap     v.     Robinson,     28     Ma. 

DeCamp    v.    Dobbins,    31    N.    J.    Eq.  100;  Smith  v.  Du  Bose.  78  Ga,  41.3,  3 

671  ;  Wood  v.  Hammond,  16  R.  I.  98,  S.   E.  309.  6  Am.   St.  260 ;   Elliott  v. 

17  .\tl.  324,  18  Atl.  198.  Elliott,  117  Ind.  380,  20  N.  E.  264.  10 

"^  Handley  v.  Palmer,  91  Fed.  948 ;  Am.  St.  54. 

Quincy      v.      Attorney-General,      160  ""'  Hodgman  v.  Kittredge,  67  N.  H. 

Mass.  431,  35  N.  E.  1066.  254.  .32  Atl.  158.  68  Am.  St.  661. 

■iKennett  v.    Kidd,   87   Kans'.  652,  7"  Clark  v.  Miller,  65  Kans.  726,  68 

125  Pac.  36,  44  E.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  544n,  Pac.  1071,  aff'd,  65  Kans.  726.  70  Pac. 

Ann.  Cas.  1914A.  592.  586:  Grimm  v.  Tittman,  113  Mo.  56, 

'-  Stone  V.  Griffin,  3  Vt.  400.  20  S.  VV.  664. 


I 


499  WILLS  .         §  459 

testified  as  a  witness  or  not.^"  Under  the  general  principle  of  law 
that  no  man  is  permitted  to  acquire  property  as  the  result  of  his 
own  crime,  the  murderer  of  a  testator  is  not  allowed  to  take  as 
beneficiary  under  the  will  of  his  victim. ^^ 

§  459.  Construction  of  wills. — Perhaps  the  most  difficult 
questions  on  which  title  to  real  estate  depends  are  those  which  in- 
volve the  true  construction  of  wills  which  form  a  part  of  the 
muniments  of  title.  The  true  intent  of  the  testator,  whose  will 
has  been  inartificially  and  unskilfully  drawn,  is  often  a  question 
difficult  of  determination.  In  the  law  of  contingent  remainders, 
executory  devises,  restraints  upon  alienation,  the  creation  of  per- 
petuities, and  the  like,  many  niceties  and  subtleties  arise,  concern- 
ing which,  as  related  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  each  case, 
the  most  learned  in  the  law  are  sometimes  in  doubt. 

The  rule  for  the  construction  of  wills  followed  by  courts  in 
recent  times  is  to  ascertain  the  intent  of  the  testator  from  the 
whole  instrument,  attributing  due  weight  to  all  its  language,  and 
then  give  effect  to  that  intent  unless  prevented  by  some  positive 
rule  of  law,  rather  than  to  try  to  make  the  interpretation  of  par- 
ticular words  or  phrases  in  one  instrument  square  with  that  be- 
fore given  to  somewhat  similar  words  used  by  some  one  else  un- 
der other  surroundings  to  accomplish  a  more  or  less  different  end. 
A  few  combinations  of  words  have  become  so  fixed  in  their  mean- 
ing by  long  and  unvarying  use  as  to  be  rules  of  property.  But 
ordinary  canons  for  the  interpretation  of  wills,  having  been  estab- 
lished as  aids  for  determining  testamentary  intent,  are  to  be  fol- 
lowed only  so  far  as  they  accomplish  that  purpose,  and  not  when 
the  result  would  be  to  defeat  it.^''  The  intention  of  the  testator 
is  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  will  rather  than  from  the 
phraseology  of  any  particular  clause. ^° 

In  determining  the  nature  of  an  estate  created  by  will,  the  will 
itself  is  to  be  first  consulted  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  tes- 
tator, and  after  this  has  been  determined  the  statute  is  to  be  con- 

"Caw  V.  Robertson,  5  N.  Y.  125;         =0  Cook  v.  Hart,  135  Ky.  650,  117  S. 

Davis  V.  Davis,  43  W.  Va.  300,  27  S.  W.  357:  Ball  v.  Phelan,  94  Miss.  293, 

K.  323.  49  So.  956,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  895; 

^sRiggs  V.  Palmer,  115  N.  Y.  506,  In   re  Title  Guarantee  &  Trust  Co., 

22  N.  E.  188,  5  L.  R.  A.  340,  12  Am.  195  N.  Y.  339,  88  N,  E.  375 ;  In  re 

St.  819.  Prasser's  Will,   140  Wis.  92,    121    N. 

■3  Ware  v.  Minot,  202  Mass.  512,  88  W.  643. 
N.  E.  1091. 


§    459  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  500 

suited  in  order  to  ascertain  how  far  the  estate  intended  to  be  cre- 
ated by  the  testator  is  affected,  hmited  or  inhibited  by  law.^^ 
While  the  terms  of  a  will  are  not,  of  necessity,  to  be  construed 
technically  and  with  strict  reference  to  grammatical  accuracy,  yet 
the  importance  of  a  correct  use  of  language  should  not  be  over- 
looked. "Words  and  expressions  used  are  to  be  taken  in  their 
ordinary,  proper  and  grammatical  sense ;  unless,  upon  so  reading 
them  in  connection  with  the  entire  will,  or  upon  applying  them  to 
the  facts  of  the  case,  an  ambiguity  or  difficulty  of  construction 
arises;  in  which  case  the  primary  meaning  of  the  words  may  be 
modified,  extended,  or  abridged,  and  the  words  and  expressions 
supplied  or  rejected,  in  accordance  with  the  presumed  intention, 
so  far  as  to  remove  or  avoid  the  difficulty  or  ambiguity  in  ques- 
tion, but  no  further."^" 

The  law  favors  that  construction  by  which  gifts  will  be  vested 
at  the  earliest  moment  consistent  with  a  fair  interpretation  of  the 
whole  will,^^  which  is  usually  at  the  death  of  the  testator.^*  Con- 
tradictory clauses  will  be  construed  so  as  to  avoid  intestacy  where 
possible ;  and  where  a  w'hole  subject  is  covered  by  clear  and  care- 
ful provisions  such  will  be  modified  by  subsidiary  contradictory 
provisions  in  as  restricted  a  way  as  consistent  with  the  language 
used.^'" 

An  endless  variety  of  expressions  have  been  employed  to  charge 
real  estate  with  the  payment  of  debts  and  legacies,  and  whether 
there  is  such  a  charge  in  any  particular  case  depends  upon  the  in- 
tention of  the  testator,  to  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  the 
whole  will.  But  legacies  may  be  charged  upon  real  estate  with- 
out the  use  of  express  words  where  an  intention  on  the  part  of 
the  testator  to  so  charge  his  real  estate  is  clearly  manifested  by 
the  whole  will.^*'  In  order  to  charge  real  estate  specifically  de- 
vised with  the  payment  of  debts  and  legacies  the  will  must  con- 
tain an  express  provision  to  that  effect,  or  the  charge  must  be 
clearly  and  unmistakably  implied  from  the  whole  will,  read  in 
the  light  of  all  the  surrounding  circumstances.**'     It  is  a  familiar 

81    In  re  Prasser's  Will,  140  Wis.  v.  Ludington,  103  Wis.  629,  79  N.  W. 

92.  121  N.  W.  643.  1073,  74  Am.  St.  910. 

S2  Hawkins  Wills  (2d  ed.)  2.  .  «"•  In    re    Phillips'    Estate,    205    Pa. 

^^  Johnson  v.  Washington  Loan  &c.  504,  55  Atl.  210,  97  Am.  St.  743. 

Co.,  224  U.  S.  224,  32  Sup.  Ct.  421,  56  ^''  Davidson  v.  Coon,  125  Ind.  497, 

L.  ed.  741.  25  N.  E.  601,  9  L.  R.  A.  584. 

84Sumpter  v.   Carter.   115   Ga.  893,  ^' Hibler  v.  Hiblcr,   104  Mich.  274, 

42  S.  E.  324,  60  L.  R.  A.  274;  Patton  62  N.  W.  361. 


501  WILLS  §  460 

rule  of  construction  that  when  an  estate  is  devised  to  be  divided 
equally  between  certain  persons,  whether  specifically  named,  or 
designated  by  more  general  terms,  as  the  children  or  heirs  of  cer- 
tain persons,  the  language  imports  the  taking  of  an  equal  share  by 
each  devisee,  in  the  absence  of  other  provisions  showing  a  con- 
trary intention.*^  The  general  rule  of  construction,  both  as  to 
deeds  and  wills,  is  that  if  there  be  an  interest  and  a  power  exist- 
ing together  in  the  same  person  over  the  same  subject,  and  an  act 
be  done  without  particular  reference  to  the  power,  it  will  be  ap- 
plied to  the  interest  and  not  to  the  power.^^ 

§  460.  False,  erroneous,  conflicting,  and  repugnant  de- 
scriptions.— As  a  general  rule  technical  accuracy  in  the  use  of 
language  to  describe  the  real  estate  which  the  testator  intended  to 
devise  is  not  required,  if  from  the  whole  will  it  appears  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  pass  his  interest  in  the  property. ^°  Gifts  by 
words  of  general  description  will  not  be  limited  by  subsequent 
attempts  at  particular  description,  unless  such  appears  to  be  the 
intention  of  the  testator.^^  Where  the  property  intended  to  be 
given  is  described  in  different  ways  which  do  not  agree,  and  some 
of  the  property  answers  all  the  descriptions  and  some  answers 
a  part  only,  the  expressions  will  be  understood  as  restrictive,  and 
only  that  property  will  pass  which  answers  all  the  descriptions.^" 
If  the  description  is  wholly  false,  or  so  defective  that  the  prop- 
erty can  not  be  identified  with  the  aid  of  such  light  as  the  tes- 
tator's situation  throws  on  the  will,  the  gift  must  fail  for  uncer- 
tainty."" In  arriving  at  the  intention  of  the  testator,  so  much  as 
is  false  in  the  description  of  the  premises  devised  may  be  stricken 
out,  and  if  enough  remains  to  identify  the  premises  intended,  the 
will  will  be  sustained  with  the  false  words  eliminated  there- 
from."* While  no  particular  form  of  expression  is  required  to 
pass  the  whole  estate,  the  intention  to  do  so  must  be  expressed  in 
some  form,  and  wherever  the  words  used  are  such  as  will  carry 

88  Kling  V.  Schnellbecker,  107  Iowa  '■'-  Bourke  v.  Boone,  94  Md.  472,  51 

636,  78  N.  W.  673 ;   Smith  v.  Curtis,  Atl.  396. 

29  N.  J.  L.  345.  ^3  Williams    v.    Williams.     189    111. 

80  Phillips  V.  Brown,   16  R.  I.  279,  500,  59  N.  E.  966;  Sturgis  v.  Work, 

15  Atl.  90.  122  Ind.  134,  22  N.  E.  996,  17  Am.  St. 

00  Lindsay  v.  Wilson,  103  Md.  252,  394. 

63  Atl.  566,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  408.  ='*  Whitcomb    v.    Rodman,    156    111. 

oiChace   v.   Lamphere,    148   N.    Y.  116,  40  N.  E.  553,  28  L.  R.  A.  149,  47 

206,  42  N.  E.  580.  Am.  St.  181. 


§  461  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  502 

the  whole  estate,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  testator  intended  to 
dispose  of  all  his  property."' 

As  a  rule,  general  words  are  sufficient  to  pass  after-acquired 
real  estate,  and  a  simple  devise  of  all  the  testator's  real  property 
will  pass  land  acquired  by  him  after  the  making  of  his  will,  un- 
less a  different  intention  appears  by  the  will.'"'  Where  a  testator 
devised  the  "west  one-half"  of  a  certain  quarter  section  "contain- 
ing about  76  acres,"  when  the  only  land  owned  by  him  in  that 
county  w-as  76  acres  in  the  north  one-half  of  that  quarter  section, 
it  was  held  that  the  word  "west"  should  be  stricken  out  and  the 
will  be  given  effect  as  a  gift  of  the  76  acres  in  the  north  one-half 
of  the  section,  though  there  was  a  residuary  clause.'"*^  On  the 
contrary,  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  will  purported  to  devise  the 
northeast  quarter  of  a  certain  section  which  the  deceased  did  not 
own,  but  he  owned  the  southeast  quarter  of  the  section,  and 
owned  no  other  land,  a  rejection  of  the  false  description  in  the 
will  as  surplusage,  left  no  description  whatever  by  which  the  land 
intended  to  be  devised  could  be  identified,  and  the  will  did  not  de- 
vise the  land  owned  by  the  testator.""* 

§  461.  Repugnant  provisions  and  conditions. — Where  two 
clauses  in  a  will  are  irreconcilably  inconsistent  and  repugnant  the 
earlier  clause  in  point  of  local  position  must  be  rejected  and  the 
later  clause  allowed  to  prevail  as  e.xpressing  a  later  testamentary 
intention.®"  But  if  a  subsequent  clause  is  vague  and  unintelligi- 
ble, and  the  prior  clause  is  clear,  the  prior  clause  will  not  be  de- 
stroyed, cut  down  or  limited  by  the  subsequent  clause.'  It  is  a 
familiar  rule  of  construction  that  no  portion  of  a  will  is  to  be  re- 
jected for  repugnancy  except  from  necessity;  but  that  every  por- 
tion will  be  upheld,  if  possible,  and  to  effect  this  the  order  of  the 
devises  will  be  reversed.'  Conditions  which  are  repugnant  to 
the  estate  limited  are  void.  Thus  a  testator  can  not  create  a  fee 
with  absolute  power  of  disposal,  and  at  the  same  time  clog  that 

05  Given  v.  Hilton,  95  U.  S.  591,  21  ^^  Mansfield    v.    Slielton,    67    Conn. 

L.  ed.  458.  390,    35    Atl.    271.    52    Am.    St.   285; 

9«  Graham  v.  DeYampert,   106  Ala.  Heidlehaugh  v.  Wagner,  72  Iowa  601, 

279,  17  So.  355;  Johnson  v.  White,  76  34  N.  W.  439;  Hiestand  v.  Meyer,  150 

Kans.  159,  90  Pac.  810.  Pa.  St.  501,  24  Atl.  749. 

'••7  Collins  V.  Capps.  235  111.  560,  85  i  Hovey  v.  Walbank,  100  Cal.  192, 

N.  E.  934.  126  Am.  St.  232.  .34  Pac.  650;  Howe  v.  Howe,  152  111. 

•■'8  McGovern      v.      McGovern,      75  252,  38  N.  E.  1083. 

Minn.  314,  11  N.  W.  970,  74  Am.  St.  -  Bailey  v.  Sanger,  108  Ind.  264,  9 

489.  N.  E.  159. 


503  '  WILLS  §  462 

power  of  alienation  by  limitations  over  to  another;  in  other  words 
he  can  not  include  provisions  which  are  absolutely  inconsistent  in 
terms  and  meaning,  and  have  all  given  force  and  effect." 

§  462.  Void  conditions  and  provisions. — A  testator  may- 
subject  his  gifts  to  such  lawful  conditions  and  limitations  as  he 
chooses  to  impose;  but  conditions  in  conflict  with  public  poHcy, 
or  inhibiting  the  performance  of  acts  which  the  public  has  an  in- 
terest in  having  performed,  are  void,  and  can  not  be  imposed  on 
his  beneficiaries.*  If  a  condition  precedent  be  void,  or  if  it  be  or 
become  impossible  of  performance,  even  though  there  be  no  fault 
on  the  part  of  the  devisee,  the  devise  can  not  take  effect.^  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  condition  be  subsequent,  the  estate  becomes 
absolute  in  the  devisee.''  Conditions  which  are  impossible  of  per- 
formance are  void ;  and  when  a  condition  precedent  becomes  im- 
possible to  be  performed,  even  though  there  be  no  default  or 
laches  on  the  part  of  the  devisee  himself,  the  devise  fails.  "Where 
the  performance  of  the  condition  is  the  sole  motive  of  the  be- 
quest, or  its  impossibility  was  unknown  to  the  testator,  or  the 
condition  which  was  possible  in  its  creation  has  since  become  im- 
possible by  the  act  of  God,  or  where  it  is  illegal  as  involving 
malum  in  se,  in  these  cases  the  civil  agrees  with  the  common  law 
in  holding  the  gift  and  conditions  void."'^ 

At  common  law  if  a  testator  devised  his  estate  to  his  heir-at- 
law,  so  that  the  heir  took  neither  a  greater  nor  a  less  estate  by 
the  devise  than  he  would  have  taken  without  it,  the  heir  was  ad- 
judged to  take  by  descent  and  not  by  purchase,  and  the  devise 
was  held  to  be  void.  This  rule  still  obtains  in  some  jurisdictions,^ 
although  the  prevailing  rule  in  this  country  is  that  such  devise 
is  valid,  and  that  the  devisee  takes  by  purchase  and  not  by  de- 
scent." 

§  463.  Operative  words  of  a  will. — The  operative  words 
of  a  will  are  the  words  by  which  the  estate  passes  from  the  testa- 

3  Law  V.  Douglass,  107  Iowa  606,  78  '  2  Jarman  Wills,  ?  853.  See  also 
N.  W.  212.  Stark  v.  Conde.  100  Wis.  633,  76  N. 

4  New  Orleans  v.  Baltimore.  13  La.     W.  600. 

Ann.  162.  s  Akers  v.  Clark,  184  111.  136,  56  N. 

sHalsey  v.    Goddard,   86   Fed.   25;  E.   296,   75    Am.    St.    152;    Biedler   v. 

bobbins    v.    Boulder   County   Com'rs,  Biedler,  87  Va.  300,  12  S.  E.  753. 

50  Colo.  610,  115  Pac.  526.  'J  Robinson    v.    Le    Grand,    65    Ala. 

"New  Haven  County  v.  New  Ha-  111;   Gilpin  v.  Hollingsworth.  3  Md. 

ven  Trinity  Church,  82  Conn.  378,  7i  190,   56   Am.    Dec.   7i7\    Campbell   v. 

Atl.  789,  17  Ann.  Cas.  432.  Wiggins,  1  Rice's  Eq.  (S.  Car.)   10. 


§    464  TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS  504 

tor  to  the  beneficiary.  The  words  generally  used  for  this  purpose 
are  "give,"  "devise,"  or  "bequeath."  Either  of  these  words  are 
sufficient  to  pass  title  to  real  estate,  although  the  technical  word 
for  this  purpose  is  "devise."  The  word  "give"  may  be  used  with 
reference  to  either  real  or  personal  property.  The  word  "be- 
queath" is  used  W'ith  reference  to  personal  property,  but  it  may  be 
used  in  the  popular  sense  to  include  "devise."^*'  But  whether  the 
word  "bequeath"  means  the  same  thing  as  "devise,"  when  used  in 
a  will,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  connection  in  which  it  is  found. ^^ 
When  the  context  shows  that  the  word  is  used  by  the  testator  to 
denote  a  gift  of  real  estate  it  will  be  construed  to  be  synonymous 
with  the  term  "devise."^"  Even  where  the  will  contains  no  for- 
mal words  of  gift,  a  gift  will  be  implied  where  the  intention  of 
the  testator  to  dispose  of  his  property  by  will  is  clearly  shown. ^'^ 

Gifts  may  also  be  made  indirectly  by  direction  to  executors  or 
trustees  to  pay  or  divide,  but  in  'such  case  the  direction  to  pay  or 
divide  constitutes  the  devise,  and  therefore  the  vesting  in  interest 
is  postponed,  as  well  as  the  vesting  in  possession  or  enjoyment.^* 

Where  a  testator  desires  his  devisee  to  benefit  some  third  per- 
son out  of  the  estate  given,  he  frequently  expresses  his  desire  by 
words  of  entreaty,  expectation,  request,  recommendation,  hope, 
wash,  desire,  and  the  like,  rather  than  by  words  of  command. 
Such  expressions  in  wills  are  termed  "precatory  words,"  and  they 
have  often  been  held  sufficient  to  create  a  trust  in  favor  of  the 
person  or  object  sought  to  be  benefited.  But  in  order  that  a  trust 
may  be  created  by  the  use  of  such  words  it  must  appear:  (1) 
That  the  testator  intended  his  words  to  be  imperative  upon  the 
legatee,  so  that  the  latter  will  have  no  option  to  comply  or  re- 
fuse to  comply  with  them  ;  (2)  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  wish 
or  recommendation  is  certain;  and  (3)  that  the  beneficiaries  are 
clearly  designated.^'' 

§  464.  Words  of  purchase  and  limitation. — Words  of  pur- 
chase in  a  will  are  such  as  designate  the  person  or  persons  who 
are  to  take  the  estate  or  estates  limited ;  while  words  of  limita- 
tion are  those  which  fix  the  time  for  the  commencement  of  the 

10  Ogle  V.  Tayloe.  49  Md.  158.  "  Jn  re  Reiff's  Appeal,  124  Pa.  St. 

11  Dow  V.  Dow,  36  Maine  211.  •         14.S.  16  Atl.  636. 

12  Borgner  v.  Brown,  133  Ind.  391,  '^  Colton  v.  Colton,  127  U.  S.  300. 
33  N.  E.  92.  8  Sup.  Ct.  1164,  32  L.  ed.  138:  Burnes 

i3Masterson  v.  Townshend,  123  N.  v.  Burnes,  137  Fed.  781,  70  C.  C.  A. 
Y.  458,  25  N.  E.  928,  10  L.  R.  A.  816.     357. 


505  WILLS  §  464 

estate  or  estates,  and  their  quantum  or  duration.  A  numl)er  of 
words,  such  as  "heirs,"  "issue,"  "children,"  etc.,  are  capable  of 
use  either  as  words  of  limitation  or  as  words  of  purchase,  and 
the  determination  of  the  purpose  of  their  use  in  a  particular  in- 
strument is  often  a  matter  of  difficulty.  When  used  to  designate 
beneficiaries  such  words  are  said  to  be  used  as  words  of  pur- 
chase, that  is,  they  designate  the  purchasers  or  persons  who  are 
to  take  the  estate.  When  used  to  descril^e  the  estate  or  interest 
given,  they  are  said  to  be  used  as  words  of  limitation,  that  is, 
they  limit  or  describe  the  estate  or  interest  given.  When  used  as 
a  word  of  purchase,  the  term  "heirs,"  unless  influenced  by  the 
context,  has  reference  to  the  persons  upon  whom  the  law  casts  the 
estate  immediately  upon  the  death  of  the  ancestor.^*^  A  devise 
of  real  estate  to  one  and  to  his  "heirs  and  assigns"  is  the  safest 
method  of  creating  a  fee  in  the  devisee,^'  but  even  in  the  absence 
of  the  word  "heirs,"  other  words  in  the  will  showing  an  inten- 
tion to  devise  a  fee  simple  estate  are  sufficient  to  pass  such  an 
estate. ^^  But  the  intention  must,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
changing  the  rule,  appear  in  some  way  on  the  face  of  the  will,  and 
it  is  sometimes  said  that  there  must  be  words  from  which  an  in- 
tention to  pass  a  fee  may  necessarily  be  implied.^"  It  is  to  be 
noted  with  care,  as  explaining  much  of  the  law  of  estates,  that 
the  word  "heirs,"  when  used  in  its  general  sense,  does  not  indi- 
cate that  the  heir  or  heirs  of  the  devisee  take  any  interest  in  the 
property  by  or  through  the  will ;  but  it  is  the  technical,  legal  term 
necessary  to  express  the  fact  that  the  devisee  himself  takes  all 
the  interest  in  fee  simple. 

Where  the  word  "heir"  or  "heirs"  is  accompanied  with  quali- 
fying words,  such  as  "heirs  now  living,"  "heirs  should  he  have 
any,"  "heirs  then  surviving,"  "heirs  resident  in  the  state,"  "heirs 
other  than  those  hereinbefore  mentioned,"  and  the  like,  those  an- 
swering the  description  will  take  to  the  exclusion  of  the  general 
heirs.-"    A  devise  "to  A  and  the  heirs  of  his  body"  gives  an  estate 

oo'l?-^Ji^"  ^'-   Shepard,   139  111.  433,  Kendall   v.   Clapp,    163   Mass.   69,   39 

28  N.  E.  751,  34  N.  E.  254 ;  Lincoln  N.  E   772, 

y.  Perry,  149  Mass.  368.  21  N.  E.  671,  is  Schneer   v.    Greenbaum.    27   Del. 

^  ^•,?;  C-  215;  Johnson  v.  Erasing-  97.  86  Atl.  107;  Ashhy  v.  McKinlock, 

ton.  156  N.  Y.  181.  50  N.  E.  859.  271  111.  254,  111  N.  E.  101 

1  r^  ?Hl°.^^^  ^-  Darby.  105  Ark.  558,  inVheaton   v.   Andrcss.   23   Wend. 

151  S.  W.  1044,  44  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  452 

782    Ann    Cas.   1914D,   712;   Reddick  20  Graham  v.   DeYampert,   106  Ala. 

V.  Lord,  131  Ind.  336,  30  N.  E.  1085 ;  279,    17   So.   355 ;   Plummer  v.   Shep- 


§  465 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


506 


in  fee  tail  to  A.  But  any  words  which  will  show  that  the  word 
"heirs"  is  to  be  restricted  to  the  heirs  of  the  body  will  suffice  to 
restrict  the  inheritance  to  a  fee  tail."^ 

§  465.  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. — The  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case 
is  this:  Where  a  freehold  estate  is  limited  to  one  for  life,  and 
by  the  same  instrument  the  inheritance  is  limited,  either  immedi- 
ately or  after  another  estate  in  freehold,  to  his  heirs,  or  the  heirs 
of  his  body,  the  whole  estate  vests  in  him,  either  in  fee  simple  or 
in  fee  tail,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  estate  had  been  given  to 
him  and  his  heirs,  or  to  him  and  the  heirs  of  his  body;  and  the 
words  "heirs"  and  "heirs  of  his  body"  are  words  of  limitation 
and  not  of  purchase."  The  rule,  though  of  feudal  origin,  has 
been  repeatedly  declared  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  general  pol- 
icy of  modern  jurisprudence.""  While  the  rule  has  been  gen- 
erally alxjlished  by  statute  in  this  country,  it  remains  a  rule  of 
property  in  the  construction  of  both  deeds  and  wills  in  several 
states."*  In  jurisdictions  where  the  rule  has  been  abolished,  a 
devise  that  would  formerly  have  vested  a  fee  in  the  first  taker 
now  gives  him  a  life  estate  only,  with  remainder  in  fee  to  his 
heirs. "'"^ 

Generally  speaking,  the  rule  is  not  one  of  construction  or  inter- 
pretation, but  a  rule  of  property,-"  and  is  governed  by  the  inten- 
tion of  the  testator."^  But  it  has  been  held  that  where  the  inten- 
tion of  the  testator  is  clearly  ascertainable,  such  intention  will 
prevail  even  against  the  rule."''   Tlie  rule  is  not  regarded  as  a  de- 


herd,  94  Md.  466,  51  Atl.  173;  Wood 
V.  Billiard,  151  Mass.  324,  25  N.  E.  67, 
7  L.  R.  A.  304;  Snider  v.  Snider,  160 
N.  Y.  151,  54  N.  E.  676. 

21  Brown  v.  Addison  Gilbert  Hos- 
pital. 155  Mass.  323,  29  N.  E.  625; 
Pollock  V.  Speidel,  17  Ohio  St.  439. 

22  Holt  V.  Pickett,  111  Ala.  362,  20 
So.  432;  Norris  v.  Hensley,  27  Cal. 
439;  Goodrich  v.  Lambert,  10  Conn. 
448;  Seay  v.  Cockrell,  102  Tex.  280, 
115  S.  W.  1160. 

23Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  Car.  1,  16 
S.  E.  1011,  22  L.  R.  A.  598. 

24  Hardage  v.  Stroopc,  58  Ark.  303, 
24  S.  W.  490:  Fowler  v.  Black,' 1.16 
Til.  363,  26  N.  E.  596.  11  L.  R.  A.  670; 
Lane  v.  Utz.  130  Ind.  235.  29  X.  E. 
772 :  Broliar  v.  Marquis,  80  Iowa  49, 
45  X.  W.  395 ;  Thomas  v.  Higgins,  47 


Md.  439;  Starnes  v.  Hill,  112  N.  Car. 
1.  16  S.  E.  1011.  22  L.  R.  A.  598; 
Carson  v.  Fuhs.  131  Pa.  St.  256.  18 
Atl.  1017;  Carrigan  v.  Drake,  36  S. 
Car.  354,  15  S.  E.  339. 

25  Copley  V.  Ball.  176  Fed.  682; 
Wilkerson  v.  Clark,  80  Ga.  367,  7  S. 
E.  319,  12  Am.  St.  258;  Cross  v. 
Hoch,  149  Mo.  325,  50  S.  W.  786. 

-'•  Baker  v.  Scott,  62  111.  86. 

2^  Jones  V.  Rees,  6  Pennew.  (Del.) 
504,  69  Atl.  785,  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
734;  Robert  V.  West,  15  Ga.  122; 
Brown  v.  Bryant.  17  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
454,  44  S.  W.  399. 

2^*  Slemmer  v.  Crampton,  50  Iowa 
302;  Albin  v.  Parmele,  70  Nebr.  740, 
98  N.  W.  29;  Tendick  v.  Evetts,  38 
Tex.  275. 


507  WILLS  §  466 

vice  to  discover  the  intention  of  the  testator,  but  is  only  appHed 
after  such  intention  has  been  discovered,  when,  by  its  own  inex- 
orable force,  it  unites  in  the  ancestor  any  estate  which  his  heirs 
are  to  take  as  such,  after  a  precedent  estate  given  to  him,  no  mat- 
ter what  the  purpose  of  the  testator  may  have  been;  and  there  is 
a  material  and  controlling  distinction  between  a  devise  of  an  es- 
tate to  a  person  named  and  his  lawful  heirs,  and  a  devise  to  the 
lawful  heirs  of  a  person.-"' 

§  466.     How  particular  words  and  phrases  are  interpreted. 

— In  every  case  the  words  used  in  a  will  must  be  capable  of  bear- 
ing the  meaning  sought  to  be  put  upon  them.  Where  a  testator 
uses  technical  words,  he  is  presumed  to  employ  them  in  their  legal 
sense  unless  the  contents  clearly  indicate  a  contrary  intention. 
Technical  words  do  not  have  such  a  fixed  legal  meaning  that  a 
gift  wall  fail  because  the  testator  does  not  use  the  words  descrip- 
tive of  the  gift  or  act  of  giving  with  technical  accuracy.^"  In 
seeking  the  intention  of  the  testator  courts  will  presume,  in  the 
absence  of  any  language  in  the  will  repelling  such  presumption, 
that  the  words  and  expressions  used  were  employed  in  the  light 
of  the  settled  meaning  which  the  law  attaches  to  such  words;"*' 
and  technical  words  will  be  given  their  legal  effect  unless,  from 
subsequent  inconsistent  words,  it  is  very  clear  that  the  testator 
meant  otherwise,  and  the  law  will  even  supply  words  where  to  do 
so  does  not  oppose  the  manifest  intention  of  the  testator.^-  We 
have  said  that  the  word  "heirs,"  when  used  as  a  word  of  purchase 
has  reference  to  the  persons  upon  whom  the  law  casts  the  estate 
immediately  upon  the  death  of  the  ancestor,''^  and  usually  refers 
to  the  heirs  of  the  testator."*  The  word  "heirs"  may  be  so  re- 
stricted by  the  context  as  to  mean  children  or  grandchildren."'"' 

The  term  "next  of  kin"  is  limited  in  legal  meaning,  as  in  com- 
mon use,  to  blood  relations,  and  it  ordinarily  includes  ancestors 

2*'  Conger  v.  Lowe,  124  Ind.  368,  24        33  Lincoln  v.  Perry,  149  Mass.  368, 

N.  E.  889.  9  L.  R.  A.  165n.  21  N.  E.  671,  4  L.  R.  A.  215. 

30  White  V.  Massachusetts  Inst,  of  -*  Miller  v.  Metcalf,  11  Conn  176, 
Technology.  171  Mass.  84,  50  N.  E.  58  Atl.  743;  Abel  v.  Abel,  201  Pa. 
512.  543,  51  Atl.  ZZZ. 

31  Taylor  v.  Stephens,  165  Ind.  200,  -'^  Anthony  v.  Anthony,  55  Conn. 
74N.  E.  980.  256.    11    AtK   45;    McCartney   v.    Os- 

32  Fowler  v.  Duhme,  143  Ind.  248,  burn,  118  111.  403,  9  N.  E.  210;  Allen 
42  N.  E.  623 ;  Coulter  v.  Crawfords-  v.  Craft,  109  Ind.  476,  9  N.  E.  919,  58 
ville  Trust  Co.,  45   Ind.  App.  64,  88  Am.  Rep.  425. 

N.  E.  865. 


5    466  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  508 

as  well  as  descendants  in  the  same  degree  of  consanguinity.'"'  It 
includes  relatives  of  the  half  blood  with  those  of  the  whole  blood 
in  the  same  degree. ^^ 

The  primary  and  usual  meaning  of  the  term  "issue,"  when  used 
as  a  word  of  purchase,  includes  lineal  descendants  of  every  de- 
gree;''** but  where  it  is  apparent  from  extrinsic  circumstances,  or 
from  the  provisions  of  the  will,  that  the  testator  intended  to  use 
the  word  in  the  sense  of  "children"  it  will  be  so  limited.^'' 

The  true  meaning  of  the  terms  "representatives,"  "legal  rep- 
resentatives," and  "personal  representatives,"  when  used  in  wills, 
is  to  be  gathered  from  the  language  of  the  entire  will,  read  in  the 
light  of  relevant  circumstances.  They  may  mean  the  heirs  or 
next  of  kin  of  the  testator  or  a  person  named,***  but  when  used  in 
connection  with  estates  of  deceased  persons  such  terms  primarily 
mean  those  artificial  representatives,  the  executors  and  admin- 
istrators, who,  by  law,  represent  the  deceased,  in  distinction  from 
the  heirs  who  are  the  natural  representatives.*^ 

The  term  "husband"  or  "wife"  may  apply  to  the  person  who 
answers  that  description  at  the  date  of  the  will.*"  But  a  gift  to 
the  "widow"  of  a  designated  person  includes  such  wife  as  may 
survive  him.*'' 

The  word  "descendants"  includes  all  those  who  have  issued 
from  an  individual,  including  his  children,  grandchildren,  and 
their  children  to  the  remotest  degree,**  but  does  not  include  "next 
of  kin"  or  "heirs  at  law"  generally,  as  these  terms  comprehend 
descendants  as  well  as  ascendants  and  collaterals.*''  The  term 
"offspring,"  as  used  in  a  will,  is  said  to  be  synonymous  with  is- 
sue,**^ and  includes  lineal  descendants  of  every  degree.*'^ 

The  word  "children,"  in  its  technical  as  well  as  popular  mean- 

3"  Clark  V.  Mack,  161  Mich.  545,  126  ■*-  Johnson    v.    Wel)hcr,    65    Conn. 

N.  W.  632.  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  479n.  501.  33  Atl.  506;  Van  Syckel  v.  Van 

;"  Morse   v.   Lowe,    182   Mich.   607,  Svckel,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  194.  26  Atl.  156; 

148  N.  W.  970.  Meeker  v.  Draffen,  137  App.  Div.  537. 

38  Miller  v.  Miller,  151  Ky.  563.  152  121  N.  Y.  S.  1051. 

S.   W.    542;    Union    Safe    Deposit   &  4''' Swallow    v.    Swallow,    27    N.    J. 

Trust  Co.  V.  Dudley,  204  Maine  297,  Eq.  278. 

72  Atl.  166.  i^Lich  V.  Lich,  158  Mo.  App.  400, 

39  Clark  V.  Kittenplan,  63  Misc.  122,  138  S.  W.  558. 

118  N.  Y.  S.  404.  >3  Tompkins  v.  Verplanck,  10  App. 

■lo  Greene  v.  Huntington.  73  Conn.  Div.  572.  42  N.  Y.  S.  412. 

106,   46   Atl.   883 ;    In    re   Riesenherg,  ^'^  Barber  v.   Pittsburg  &c.   R.  Co., 

116  Mo.  App.  308.  90  S.  W.  1170.  166  U.  S.  83,  17  Sup.  Ct.  488,  41   L. 

"  Briggs  V.  Walker,  171  U.  S.  466,  ed.  925. 

19  Sup.  Ct.  1,  43  L.  ed.  243.  'i' Allen  v.  Markle,  36  Pa.  St.  117. 


i 

i 


509  WILLS  §  466 

ing,  includes  the  immediate  legitimate  offspring  of  the  person  in- 
dicated as  the  parent.*'*  Usually  it  does  not  include  grandchil- 
dren,'"' stepchildren,^*^  adopted  children,^^  or  illegitimate  chil- 
dren,"- unless  there  be  some  word  or  expression  in  the  will  to 
show  that  the  testator  used  the  word  in  a  broader  sense, ^^  or  un- 
less the  extrinsic  circumstances  show  that  the  testator  intended  to 
include  such  persons.^* 

Where  the  testator  uses  the  word  "brothers"  or  "sisters"  in  his 
will,  he  will  be  presumed  prima  facie  to  mean  brothers  or  sisters 
of  the  half  blood  as  well  as  those  of  the  whole  blood.^^ 

"Nephews"  and  "nieces"  mean  the  immediate  descendants  of 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  persons  named,^*^  and  do  not  ordinarily 
include  grandnephews  or  grandnieces,"  unless  the  context  shows 
that  such  was  the  plain  intention  of  the  testator. ^^ 

Prima  facie,  the  word  "cousin"  means  first  cousin,  and  not  a 
first  cousin  once  or  more  times  removed ;  still  less  does  it  mean  a 
second  or  third  cousin,  which  might  go  on  indefinitely.^^ 

The  term  "descend  to  them"  in  a  will  should  be  construed  to 
mean  "go  to  them."''*'  A  devise  to  a  wife  "during  her  natural 
life"  means  that  she  is  given  the  use  of  all  income,  and  can  only 
enjoy  it  during  her  life  without  waste." 

The  word  "survivor,"  or  "surviving,"  will  be  understood  as  the 

48  Duncan  v.   DeYampert,   182  Ala.  ^4  !„    re    Schedel's    Estate,    IZ    Cal. 

528,   62    So.  673;    Carpenter   v.    Per-  594,   15   Pac.  297;   Lichter  v.   Thiers, 

kins,  83  Conn.  11.  74  Atl.   1062;  Ar-  139  Wis.  481,  121  N.  W.  153 

nold  V.  Alden,  173  111.  229.  50  N.  E.  ss  McAlister  v.  Burgess,  161   Mass. 

704;   Pugh  V.  Pugh,   105   Ind.  552,  5  269.  il  N.  E.  173,  24  L.  R.  A.  158. 

^'-  E.  673.  56  In   re   Butler,  66   Misc.  406,   123 

4a  Phinizy  v.  Foster,  90  Ala.  262.  7  N.  Y.  S.  282. 

So.  836;  West  v.  Rassman,   135  Ind.  "  Willard  v.  Darrah,  168  Mo.  660. 

278,     34     N.     E.     991 ;      Thomas     v.  68  S.  W.  1023,  90  Am.  St.  468 ;  White 

Thomas.   97    Miss.   697,    53    So.    630;  v.  Old,  113  Va.  709,  75  S.  E.  182    L 

Kondolf    V.    Britton,    160    App.    Div.  R.  A.  1916F,  787n,  Ann.  Cas.  1913E;, 

381.  145  N.  Y.  S.  791.  586n 

50  Coon  V.  McNelly,  254  111.  39,  98  ^s  Shull    v.    Johnson,    2    Jones    Eq. 

N.  E.  218;  In  re  Kurtz's  Estate,  145  (N.  Car.)  202. 

Pa.  St.  637.  23  Atl.  322.  so  white  v.  Massachusetts  Inst,  of 

"Russell  V.  Russell.  84  Ala.  48,  3  Tech.,    171    Mass.  84,   SO   N.   E.   512; 

So.   900:    In   re  Woodcock's   Appeal,  Stevenson  v.  Abington,  31  Beav.  305, 

103  Maine  214,  68  Atl.  821,  125  Am.  9  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1063,  9  L.  J.  74,  11  W 

St.  291.  R.  935. 

52  Flora  V.  Anderson,  67  Fed.  182 ;  go  Hayes  v.  Martz,  173  Ind.  297,  89 

Adams  v.  Adams.   154  Mass.  290,  28  N.  E.  303,  90  N.  E   309 

N.  E.  260,  13  L.  R.  A.  275.  «i  In    re    Churchman's    Appeal,    9 

"Edwards  v.  Bender,  121  Ala.  11,  Sad.  (Pa.)   423,  12  Atl.  6000. 
2.T  So.  1010 ;  Miller  v.  Carlisle.  90  Ky. 
205,  12  Ky.  L.  66,  14  S.  W.  75. 


§    467  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  510 

equivalent  of  the  word  "other,"  where  in  any  other  sense  it  would 
lead  to  intestacy  or  inequality  among  those  standing  in  the  same 
degree  of  relationship  to  the  testator,  or  to  a  distribution  not  in 
accordance  with  the  general  scheme  of  the  will."" 

The  words  "equally  to  be  divided,"  or  "share  equally  with," 
means  a  division  per  capita,  and  not  per  stirpes."^ 

§  467.  Words  passing  real  estate. — In  legal  parlance  the 
word  "estate"  was  anciently  confined  to  land,  and  meant  degree, 
quantity,  or  extent  of  ownership  rather  than  the  land  itself.  As 
used  in  wills,  however,  the  term  is  sometimes  held  to  be  synony- 
mous with  "property"  when  not  qualified  by  the  word  "real"  or 
"personal"  ;  the  presumption  being  that  the  testator  used  the  term 
in  its  exclusive  signification,  unless  the  context  restricts  its  mean- 
ing to  some  particular  species  of  property."*  When  used  in  a  will 
to  describe  property  given,  the  word  "estate"  will  include  all  of 
the  property  of  the  testator,  both  real  and  personal,  unless  the 
term  is  limited  in  meaning  by  the  context. "^^  When  the  term  is 
intended  to  apply  to  real  property,  it  may  either  express  the  quan- 
tity of  interest  devised  or  designate  the  thing  devised  or  both."" 

The  term  "property,"  when  used  in  its  most  comprehensive 
sense,  will  include  both  real  and  personal  property,  unless  re- 
stricted in  its  meaning  by  the  context."' 

The  most  comprehensive  words  of  description  applicable  to  real 
estate  are  "tenements"  and  "hereditaments,"  as  they  include  every 
species  of  real  property,  corporeal  as  well  as  incorporeal.®" 
The  term  "real  estate"  includes  lands,  tenements,  and  heredita- 
ments, whether  the  latter  be  corporeal  or  incorporeal."^ 

The  word  "lands"  is  not  so  comprehensive  as  "real  estate"  or 
"tenements  and  hereditaments,"  as  it  would  not  comprehend  in- 
corporeal hereditaments, ^°  nor  would  it  include  an  advow^'^on.'^ 

The  word  "premises,"  when  used  in  a  will,  means  a  separate 

"s  In    re    Devine's    Estate,    199    Pa.  "s  Hart  v.  White,  26  Vt.  260. 

250.  48  Atl.  1072.  «7  Fosdick   v.    Hempstead.    55    Hun 

«3  Kaufman  v.  Anderson,  31  Ky.  L.  611,  8  N.  Y.  S.  772,  29  N.  Y.  St.  545. 

888,  104  S.  W.  340.  cs  in   re  Handley,  208   Pa.  388,  57 

04  Powell  V.  Woodcock,  149  N.  Car.  Atl.  755. 

235.  62  S.  E.  1071.  «9  Gillett  v.  Gaffney,  3  Colo.  351. 

•■5  Warner    v.    Williard,    54    Conn.  " <>  In   re   Handley,  208   Pa.  388,   57 

470,  9  Atl.  136;  Smith  v.  Runnels,  97  Atl.  755. 

Iowa  55,  65  N.  W.  1002 ;  Walker  v.  ^i  Westfaling  v.  Westfaling,  3  Atk. 

Hill,  73  N.  H.  254,  60  Atl.   1017,  10  460. 
Prob.  Rep.  Ann.  650. 


I 


511  WILLS  §  468 

portion  or  parcel  of  land  with  all  buildings,  tenements  and  other 
appurtenances  on  it.'"  If  the  testator  uses  the  term  to  describe 
a  dwelling  house,  it  will  include  not  only  the  garden  and  land  ad- 
jacent, with  its  stables,  barns  and  outhouses,  but  whatever  else  is 
permanently  annexed  to  the  land  devised.'"' 

Other  words  which  operate  to  pass  real  estate  or  interest 
therein  are  such  as  "freehold,"'*  "house,"'"'  "homestead,""'' 
"farm,"'"  "home  place,""''  "appurtenances,"''*  and  the  like.  The 
words  "property"  and  "estate,"  when  used  in  a  general  sense,  are 
always  held  sufficient  to  embrace  all  the  testator's  property,  real 
as  well  as  personal,-"  but  when  coupled  with  directions  applicable 
only  to  personalty,  they  will  not  have  this  effect,  nor  when  subse- 
quent particulars  clearly  indicate  that  the  testator  had  only  per- 
sonalty in  contemplation.*^ 

The  word  "effects,"  though  savoring  strongly  of  personalty, 
may,  when  the  context  clearly  shows  the  intention,  as  when  used 
in  connection  with  the  word  "real,"  be  sufficient  to  pass  land.*- 
The  phrase  "all  my  worldly  goods,"  if  used  without  specific  enum- 
eration, may  reasonably  be  supposed  to  embrace  lands,  and  in 
some  instances  has  been  so  construed.®^ 

§  468.  Estates  in  remainder. — An  estate  created  to  take 
effect  upon  the  termination  of  a  prior  estate  in  the  same  property 
created  by  the  same  instrument  is  an  estate  in  remainder.  Such 
estate  may  be  created  by  any  expression  which  shows  the  testa- 
tor's intention  to  dispose  of  his  entire  estate  in  the  property  in 
such  manner  that  there  is  at  the  same  time  created  a  particular 
estate  therein,  less  than  a  fee,  followed  by  a  limitation  over  to 
take  effect  upon  the  termination  of  such  preceding  particular 
estate.*** 

72  Doe  V.  Willetts,  7  Mann.  Gr.  &  to  Myers  v.  Norman,  20  Ky.  L.  343, 
S.  709.  46  S.  W.  214. 

73  Powers  V.  Pomeroy,  21  Ohio  St.  «<>  Korn    v.     Cutler,    26    Conn.    4; 
184.  Fogg  V.  Clark,  1  N.  H.  163;   Monroe 

74  In  re  Steel,  L.  R.   (1903).  1  Ch.  v.  Jones.  8  R.  I.  526. 

135,  72  L.  J.  Ch.  42,  87  L.  T.  Rep.        si  Smith  v.  Hutchinson,  61  Mo.  83. 
252.  S2  Page  y   Foust,  89  N.  Car.  447. 

75  Richmond  v.  State.  5  Ind.  334.  s3  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  27  Ky. 

76  Smith  V.  Dennis.  163  111.  631.  45  L.  949,  87  S.  W.  790 ;  Krechter  v 
N.  E.  267;  Morton  v.  Morton.  120  Grofe,  166  Mo.  385,  66  S.  W.  358; 
Ky.  251,  27  Ky.  L.  661,  85  S.  W.  McNally  v.  McNally.  23  R.  I.  180,  49 
1^88.  Atl.  699. 

r.7'^A^,^°y'"^  ^-  Mason,  76  Conn.  459,  §4  Smith  v.  Chadwick,  111  Ala.  542, 

^^..^-  \^^-  20  So.  436:   Fleming  v.   Rav.  86  Ga. 

^^^*  Burke   v.    Chamberlain,    22    Md.  533.   12  S.  E.  944:   Barclay"  v.   Piatt, 

298.  170  111.  384.  48  N.  E.  972. 


§    469  TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS  512 

The  essential  characteristics  of  a  remainder  are:  (1)  There 
must  be  a  precedent  particular  estate,  whose  regular  termination 
the  remainder  must  await;  (2)  the  remainder  must  be  created  by 
the  same  conveyance,  and  at  the  same  time,  as  a  particular  estate ; 
(3)  the  remainder  must  vest  in  right  during  the  continuance  of 
the  particular  estate,  or  eo  instanti  that  it  determines;  (4)  no 
remainder  can  be  limited  after  a  fee  simple/'^  The  chief  distinc- 
tion between  a  remainder  and  an  executory  devise  is  that  a  re- 
mainder follows  a  particular  estate,  while  an  executory  devise 
follows  a  fee.**'  So  an  estate  in  remainder  can  not  be  limited  after 
an  estate  in  fee  simple,^"  whether  it  be  a  qualified  or  defeasible 
fee,  or  a  conditional  fee.**^  An  estate  in  remainder  is  usually 
limited  after  an  estate  for  life,*''^  although  it  may  be  limited  after 
an  estate  tail,'"*"  or  an  estate  for  years. '"'^ 

§  469.  Executory  devises. — An  executory  devise  is  such  a 
limitation  of  a  future  estate  and  interest  in  lands  as  the  law  ad- 
mits in  the  case  of  a  will,  though  contrary  to  the  rules  of  limita- 
tions in  conveyances  inter  vivos  at  common  law.  It  is  an  estate 
created  by  will  to  take  effect  at  some  future  time  subsequent  t(j 
the  death  of  the  testator  without  reference  to  the  existence  or 
continuance  of  an  intermediate  estate.^-  Thus  a  will  devising  to 
testator's  niece  an  estate  in  fee  simple,  with  a  provision  that  if  she 
married  and  left  no  issue  the  estate  should  go  to  the  testator's 
brothers  and  sisters  or  their  children,  and  that  if  she  left  living 
issue  at  her  death  the  estate  should  go  to  such  issue,  was  given 
effect  as  an  executory  devise."'  There  are  two  kinds  of  executory 
devises :  one,  where  an  estate  is  devised  to  one,  but  upon  some  fu- 
ture event  that  estate  is  terminated,  and  the  estate  thereupon  is  to 
go  to  another ;  the  other,  when  the  estate  is  limited  to  commence 

85  Wells  V.  Houston,  23  Tex.  Civ.  ^^  Anderson  v.  Messinger,  146  Feci. 
App.  629,  57  S.  W.  584.  929,  7  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1094. 

86  Sullivan    v.    Garesche,    229  Mo.  "o  Hall  v.    Priest,  6  Gray    (Mass.) 
496.  129  S.  W.  949,  49  L.  R.  A.  (N.  18. 

S.)   605n.  niprazcr  v.  Frazer,  24  Kj-.  L.  2517, 

"Lambe  v.   Drayton,    182   111.    110,  74  S.  W.  259. 

55    N.    E.    189:    Watkins   v.   Watkins  s^  St.  John  v.  Dann,  66  Conn.  401, 

(Kv.  App.),  120  S.  W.  341;  Simmons  34  Atl.    110;    Glover   v.   Condell,    163 

V.   Cabanne,   177   Mo.  336,   76  S.  W.  111.  566,  45  N.  E.  173,  35  L.  R.  A.  360; 

618.  In  re  Bank's  Will,  87  Md.  425.  40  Atl. 

88  Sullivan    v.    Garesche,    229    Mo.  268;  Fisher  v.  Wister,  154  Pa.  St.  65, 

496.  129  S.  W.  949,  49  L.  R.  A.   (X.  25  Atl.  1009. 

S.)   605n.  "^Ashby  v.  McKinlock,  271  111.  254, 

111  N.  E.  101. 


J 


513  WILLS  §  470 

in  futuro,  contrary  to  the  rules  of  the  common  law.  In  the  latter 
case  the  fee  in  the  meantime  remains  in  the  heir  of  the  devisor.^* 
An  executory  devise  may  be  contingent  not  only  on  the  event  that 
is  to  determine  the  fee,  but  also  on  the  being  of  the  person  to  take 
when  the  event  occurs."'"'  One  of  the  distinctions  between  a  re- 
mainder and  an  executory  devise  is  that  a  remainder  follows  a 
particular  estate,  while  an  executory  devise  follov/s  a  fee."*^ 
Where  there  is  doubt  whether  a  certain  disposition  is  an  execu- 
tory devise  or  a  contingent  remainder,  the  courts  will  favor  the 
latter.'"'  The  first  taker  under  an  executory  devise  has  no  right 
to  alienate  or  encumber  the  property  as  against  those  who  may  be 
entitled  to  succeed  thereto  upon  the  termination  of  his  estate."^ 
Care  should  be  exercised  that  the  testator  has  not,  in  creating  an 
executory  devise,  postponed  the  vesting  beyond  the  period  fixed 
by  the  rule  against  perpetuities.'"' 

§  470.  Gifts  of  the  use,  possession,  rents,  profits,  and  in- 
come of  real  property. — An  unqualified  and  unlimited  gift  of 
the  "rents,"  "income,"  or  "profits"  of  real  estate,  if  there  be  no 
disposition  of  the  property  itself,  passes  the  absolute  interest  in 
the  property  to  the  beneficiary,  for  the  reason  that  the  value  of  the 
property  lies  in  the  rents,  income,  and  profits  thereof.^  Also  a 
gift  of  the  "rents"  and  "profits"  of  land  for  life  is  a  gift  of  the 
land  itself  for  life,"  and  a  gift  of  a  part  of  the  rents  is  a  gift  of 
a  corresponding  part  of  the  land.^  A  gift  of  "rents  and  profits" 
has  been  held  to  pass  real  estate  v^hich  was  purchased  with  the 
proceeds  of  such  rent.* 

But  the  rule  stated  above  is  not  applicable  where  the  testator 
has  expressly  or  by  implication  disposed  of  the  corpus  in  some 

»*  Nightingale  v.    Burrell,    15   Pick.  i  Angus  v.  Noble.  "J?,  Conn.  56.  46 

(Mass.)  104,  111.  Atl.    278.    5    Prob.    Rep.    Ann.    643; 

«••  Sullivan    V.    Garesche,    229     Mo.  Drake  v.  Steele,  242  111.  301,  89  N.  E. 

496,  129  S.  W.  949,  49  L.  R.  A.  (N.  1018;   McCoy  v.  Houck,  180  Ind.  634, 

S.)  605n.  99  N.  E.  97. 

86  Doe   V.    Considine,    6  Wall.    (U.  2  Mather   v.    Mather,    103    111.   607; 

S.)  458,  18  L.  ed.  869;  Bristol  v.  At-  Sampson  v.   Randall,   72   Maine   109; 

water,  50  Conn.  402.  Brombacher  v.  Berking,  56  N.  J.  Eq. 

»7  Burleigh  v.  Clough,  52  N.  H.  267.  251,  39  Atl.  134. 

13  Am.  Rep.  23.  3  Morrison  v.   Schorr,   197  111.  554, 

98  Moody  V.   Walker,   3   Ark.    147 ;  64  N.  E.  545 ;  Durfee  v.  Pomeroy,  154 

St.  John  V.   Dann,  66  Conn.  401,  34  N.  Y.  583,  49  N.  E.  132. 

Atl.  110;  Satterfield  v.  Tate,  132  Ga.  *  Roe  v.  Vingut,  117  N.  Y.  204,  22 

256,  64  S.  E.  60.  N.  E.  933. 

so  Chilcott  V.  Hart,  23  Colo.  40,  45 
Pac.  391,  35  L.  R.  A.  41. 

^2) — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    471  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  514 

other  way.  Thus  a  gift  of  the  "profits  and  l)enefits"  of  certain 
real  estate,  followed  by  a  provision  for  the  sale  of  such  real  estate 
at  a  fixed  time,  was  held  not  to  pass  the  fee.^  While  a  gift  of  the 
use  or  the  use  and  occupation  of  land  will  carry  the  fee,  yet  if  the 
gift  be  to  a  trustee  to  permit  the  beneficiary  to  occupy  without 
rent,  the  interest  passing  will  amount  to  a  license  only."  If  the 
use  be  restricted  to  life,  during  minority,  during  widowhood  or 
during  widowhood  until  marriage,  until  a  certain  age,  and  the 
like,  only  an  estate  or  interest  commensurate  with  the  limitation 
prescribed  will  pass." 

§  471.  Devise  to  a  class. — Whether  a  devise  is  to  a  class  or 
to  individuals  as  tenants  in  common  must  depend  on  the  language 
employed  by  the  testator  in  making  the  gift.^  It  is  by  no  means 
an  easy  matter  to  formulate  language  necessary  to  constitute  a 
gift  to  a  class,  and  unless  the  language  employed  discloses  an  in- 
tention to  create  a  class,  the  beneficiaries  will  take  individually." 

Gifts  to  a  class  are  usually  made  under  such  general  terms  as 
"children,"  "grandchildren,"  "brothers  and  sisters,"  "nephews  and 
nieces,"  and  the  like;  but  they  may  be  made  under  such  technical 
terms  as  "heirs,"  "descendants,"  "issue,"  and  "family."^"  Where 
the  beneficiaries  are  designated  by  such  words  as  "children"  or 
"nephews,"  without  indicating  individuals  by  name  or  by  descrip- 
tion, the  gift  will  be  treated  as  one  to  a  class  ;^^  but  where  the  gift 
is  made  to  persons  who  are  designated  individually,  as  by  name  or 
description,  or  where  the  property  is  devised  severally  to  a  num- 
ber of  persons,  the  gift  is  not  one  to  a  class,  since  the  share  of 
each  does  not  depend  upon  the  ultimate  number  of  those  who 
compose  the  class.^"  If  a  number  of  beneficiaries  are  indicated 
by  name,  and  also  by  reference  to  a  class  to  which  they  belong, 

=  Collier  v.  Grimesey,  36  Ohio   St.  "In  re  Russell,   168  N.  Y.  169,  61 

17.  N.  E.  166. 

cLeBreton   v.    Cook,    107   Cal.   410,  lo  In  re  Logan,   131   N.  Y.  456,  30 

40    Pac.    552 ;    Shindler   v.    Robinson,  N.  E.  485. 

150  App.  Div.  875,  135  N.  Y.  S.  1056;  ii  Dryer  v.  Crawford.  90  Ala.  131, 

Jackson  v.  Jackson,  56  S.  Car.  346,  33  7   So.  445 ;    Pendleton   v.   Kinney,  65 

S.  E.  749.  Conn.  222,  32  Atl.  331. 

7  Lewis  V.  narrower,  197  111.  315.  12  Sturgis  v.  Work,  122  Ind.  134,  22 
64  N.  E.  374;  Fogler  v.  Titcomb,  92  N.  E.  996,  17  Am.  St.  349;  Horton  v. 
Maine  184,  42  Atl.  360;  Diament  v.  Earle,  162  Mass.  448,  38  N.  E.  1135; 
Lore,  31  N.  J.  L.  220.  In  re  Markle's  Estate,  187  Pa.  St.  639, 

8  Mobley  v.  Mobley,  85  S.  Car.  319,  41  Atl.  304. 
67  S.  E.  556 ;  Saunders  v.  Saunders, 

109  Va.  191,  63  S.  E.  410. 


I 


515  WILLS  §  471 

the  gift  is  prima  facie  a  distributive  gift  and  not  a  gift  to  a 
class. ^^  There  can  be  no  survivorship  in  such  cases. ^*  But  where 
it  clearly  appears  that  the  names  were  added  to  the  description 
for  the  purpose  of  greater  certainty  the  gift  will  be  treated  as 
one  to  a  class.  ^^  Where  the  language  used  indicates  that  the 
number  of  persons  who  are  to  take  and  the  amounts  of  their 
shares  are  uncertain  until  the  gift  takes  effect,  the  beneficiaries 
will  generally  take  as  a  class  i**^  while  if  the  number  of  benefi- 
ciaries and  the  amounts  of  their  shares  are  certain  at  the  time  of 
making  the  will,  the  gift  will  generally  go  to  the  individual  bene- 
ficiaries distributively.^'^ 

Where  a  devise  is  made  to  a  class,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
will  showing  a  contrary  intention,  the  numbers  of  the  class  will 
be  determined  upon  the  death  of  the  testator."  If  the  time  for 
determining  the  class  is  at  the  death  of  the  testator,  only  the  per- 
sons answering  the  description  at  that  time  will  be  included.^'' 
Unless  there  is  something  in  the  w^ill  showing  a  contrary  inten- 
tion, a  gift  to  a  class  would  seem  to  exclude  those  dying  before 
the  death  of  the  testator,'"  and  to  include  those  born  after  the 
execution  of  the  will."^  Where  the  members  of  a  class  are  to  be 
determined  at  the  death  of  the  testator,  those  who  have  died  be- 
fore the  testator's  death  can  not  be  counted  in  the  class  so  that 
the  devise  will  inure  to  their  heirs  or  representatives.""  The  will 
may  expressly,  or  by  necessary  implication,  fix  the  time  when  the 
members  of  a  class  are  to  be  ascertained  at  a  time  other  than  the 

13  Bill  V.   Payne,  62   Conn.   140,   25  493,  88  N.  W.  1064,  91  Am.  St.  175 ; 

Atl.  354;  Frost  v.  Courtis,  167  Mass.  Hooper  v.  Smith,  88  Md.  577,  41  Atl. 

251,  45  N.  E.  687;  Dildine  v.  Dildine,  1095. 
32  N.  J.  Eq.  78.  "  Parker  v.  Churchill,  104  Ga.  122, 

1*  Hoppock    V.    Tucker,    59    N.    Y.  30  S.  E.  642 ;  Ingraham  v.  Ingraham, 

202;    Wildberger    v.    Cheek,    94    Va.  169  111.  432,  48  N.  E.  561,  49  N.  E. 

517,  27  S.  E.  441.  320;  Pierce  v.  Knight,  182  Mass.  72, 

i''Bolles   V.    Smith,    39   Conn.   217;  64  N.  E.  692. 
Rixey  V.  Stuckey,  129  Mo.  Zll ,  31  S.        ^o  Martin  v.  Mercer  University,  98 

W.  770.  Ga.   320,   25    S.    E.   522 ;   Downing  v. 

isPulghum   V.    Strickland,    123   Ga.  Nicholson,    115    Iowa  493,  88   N.   W. 

258,    51    S.    E.   294;    In    re    Raab,   79  1064,    91    Am.    St.    175;    Rowland    v. 

Misc.  185,  139  N.  Y.  S.  869.  Slade.  155  Mass.  415,  29  N.  E.  631. 

17  In   re   Henderson,    161    Cal.   353,         ^i  Gray  v.  Pash.  24  Ky.  L.  963,  66 

119   Pac.   496;    Staples   v.   Mead,    152  S.  W.    1026;   Coggins  v.   Flythe,    113 

App.  Div.  745,  137  N.  Y.  S.  847.  N.  Car.  102,  18  S.  E.  96. 

1-^  Lancaster   v.    Lancaster,    187    111.         --  Hoadly  v.  Wood,  71   Conn.  452, 

540.  58  N.   E.  462,  79  Am.   St.  234;  42  Atl.  263;   Buzby  v.  Roberts,  53  N. 

Morgan  v.  Robbins,  152  Ind.  362,  53  J.  Eq.  566,  Zl  Atl.  99. 
N.  E.  283;  In  re  Nicholson,  115  Iowa 


§    472  TITLES    AND    AHSTR\CTS  516 

testators  death.""  The  time  (jf  ascertainment  may  also  he  fixed 
at  a  date  siihsequent  to  the  death  of  the  testator,  as  long  as  the 
time  so  fixed  is  not  so  remote  as  to  violate  the  rule  against  per- 
petuities. 

§  472.  Devise  of  life  estate  with  power  of  disposition. — 
The  power  of  disposition  in  a  tenant  for  life  under  a  will  must  he 
expressly  given,  as  it  does  not  generally  arise  from  implication.-* 
It  is  usually  construed  strictly,  and  will  he  confined,  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  remainderman,  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
given. "^  Thus  where  the  life  tenant  is  given  the  power  of  sale 
in  case  it  becomes  necessar)^  for  his  support  or  maintenance,  he 
can  not  exercise  the  power  in  the  absence  of  such  necessity.""  But 
it  has  been  held  that  where  the  wife  of  the  testator  is  given  a  life 
estate  with  power  to  sell  the  property  "for  her  own  comfort  and 
support"  the  power  to  sell  is  at  her  discretion,  and  it  is  not  essen- 
tial to  the  exercise  of  the  power  that  the  sale  is  necessary  for  her 
support  and  comfort."^  Where  the  gift  is  for  life  with  power  of 
disposal  for  the  necessary  benefit  of  the  life  tenant,  the  power 
must  be  exercised  during  the  active  enjoyment  of  the  life  estate, 
and  in  aid  of  that  enjoyment."^  When  real  estate  is  given  abso- 
lutely to  one  person,  with  a  gift  over  to  another  of  such  portion  as 
may  remain  undisposed  of  by  the  first  taker  at  his  death,  the  gift 
over  is  void,  as  repugnant  to  the  absolute  estate  first  given  ;^°  and 
it  is  also  established  law  that,  where  an  estate  is  given  to  a  person 
generally,  or  indefinitely,  with  a  power  of  disposition,  it  carries 
a  fee,  and  any  limitation  over  is  void  for  repugnancy.^"  Where 
the  testator,  by  residuary  clause,  leaves  the  rest  and  residue  of 
his  estate  to  one  for  his  sole  use  and  benefit  during  the  term  of 
his  natural  life  and  upon  his  death  the  remainder  to  be  divided  in 
a  specified  manner,  but  further  provides  that  "it  is  my  will"  that 

-''  In  re  Swcnson's  Estate,  55  Minn.  -^  Small    v.    Thompson,    92    Maine 

300.  56  N.  W.  1115.  539,  43  Atl.  509;  Ford  v.  Ticknor,  169 

2*  Glore  V.   Scroggins,  124  Ga.  922.  Mass.  276,  47  N.  E.  877. 

53    S.    E.   690;    Bramell   v.    Cole,    136  29  Mulvane  v.   Rude,    146  Ind.  476, 

Mo.  201,  37  S.  W.  924,  58  Am.  St.  45  N.  E.  659. 

619.  •'■"Norris  v.  Hensley,  27  Cal.  439; 

=••  McMillan  v.  Cox,  109  Ga.  42,  34  Wiley  v.  Gregory,  135  Ind.  647,  35  N. 

S.  E.  341.  E.  507;  Bills  v.  Bills,  80  Iowa  269,  45 

sfi  Peckham  v.  Lego,  57  Conn.  553,  N.  W.  748.  8  L.  R.  A.  696,  20  Am.  St. 

19  Atl.  392,  7  L.  R.  A.  419,  14  Am.  St.  418;   Combs  v.  Combs.  67  Md.  11,  8 

130.  Atl.   757.    1    Am.    St.   359;   Kdley  v- 

27  Griffin  v.  Nicholas,  224  Mo.  275,  Mcins,  135  Mass.  231. 
123  S.  W.  1063. 


I 


517  WILLS  §  473 

the  first  taker  "be  not  restricted  in  any  manner  from  using  or 
disposing  of  all  or  any  part"  of  the  property,  it  was  held  that  a 
life  estate  with  power  of  disposition,  and  not  a  fee  was  created. ^^ 
Gifts  for  life  with  power  of  sale  in  the  life  tenant  are  a  constant 
source  of  litigation,  due  mainly  to  the  confused  ideas  respecting 
the  scope  of  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred.  Such  gifts  gen- 
erally subject  the  property  to  the  payment  of  the  life  tenant's 
debts,  and  often  give  rise  to  contention  and  litigation  between  the 
life  tenant  and  the  remainderman. 

§  473.  Devise  charged  with  payment  of  debts,  legacies, 
and  support. — The  will  must  be  carefully  examined  to  ascer- 
tain if  the  land  devised  is  charged  with  the  payment  of  debts, 
legacies,  annuities  or  support.  We  have  seen  that  such  charge 
may  be  expressly  made,  or  the  intention  thus  to  charge  the  devise 
may  be  implied  from  the  whole  will  taken  together.  An  endless 
variety  of  expressions  have  been  employed  to  charge  real  estate 
with  the  payment  of  debts  and  legacies,  and  whether  there  is 
such  a  charge  in  any  particular  case  depends  upon  the  intention 
of  the  testator,  to  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  the  whole 
will.  A  gift  of  the  testator's  estate,  "after"  a  certain  legacy  is 
paid,  charges  such  legacy  upon  the  real  estate.^^  Also  a  specific 
direction  to  take  a  certain  sum  "out"  of  the  real  estate  devised  to 
a  named  devisee  creates  a  charge  on  such  real  estate.^"  A  charge 
upon  real  estate  is  clearly  created  by  a  provision  in  the  will  that 
certain  property,  part  of  which  is  realty,  is  "to  be  used  for  the 
payment  of  my  debts. "^*  Legacies  may  be  charged  upon  real  es- 
tate without  the  use  of  express  words  where  an  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  testator  to  so  charge  his  real  estate  is  clearly  mani- 
fested by  the  whole  will.^^  A  direction  in  the  will  to  pay  a  legacy 
without  sacrificing  the  real  estate  if  possible,  impliedly  charges 
the  real  estate  with  such  payment.^"  Also  a  charge  is  impliedly 
created  on  real  estate  by  a  power  created  by  the  will  to  sell  the 

31  Mooy  V.  Gallagher,  36  R.  I.  405,  •'*  Watts  v.  Watts,  38  Ohio  St.  480. 

90   Atl.   663,    L.    R.    A.    1916C,    1040,  S'^  Sistrunk  v.   Ware,   69  Ala.  273; 

Ann.  Cas.  1916D,  395n.  Miller    v.    Cooch,    5    Del.    Ch.    161  ; 

32Atmore  v.  Walker,  46  Fed.  429;  Reid  v.  Corrigan,  143  111.  402,  32  N. 

Cunningham      v.      Cunningham,      72  E.    387 ;    Thissell    v.    Schillinger,    186 

Conn.    157,   44   Atl.  41 ;    Davidson   v.  Mass.  180,  71  N.  E.  300,  9  Prob.  Rep. 

Coon,  125  Ind.  497,  25  N.  E.  601,  9  Ann.  290. 

L.  R.  A.  584.  30  Price  v.  Price,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  326, 

33  In  re  Roberts'  Estate,  163  Pa.  St.  29  Atl.  679. 
408,  30  Atl.  213. 


§    473  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  518 

real  estate  for  the  purpose  of  paying  a  legacy  bequeathed  f  and 
a  direction  to  executors  or  trustees  to  pay  an  annuity  during  the 
hfe  of  the  beneficiary  imi)Hedly  charges  such  annuity  upon  the 
testator's  entire  estate.""*  Where  the  testator  has  no  personal 
property  at  the  time  he  executes  a  will  and  bequeaths  specific 
legacies,  the  reasonable  presumption  is  that  he  intended  to  charge 
them  upon  the  land,  for  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  he  did  no 
more  than  make  an  empty  show  of  giving  a  bounty  to  the  legatee. 
But  this  presumption  does  not  prevail  where  there  is  personal 
estate  at  the  time  the  will  was  executed,  although  it  may  subse- 
quently be  lost  to  the  testator. "'"*  Real  estate  may  be  charged  by 
will  with  the  payment  of  an  annuity,  or  the  support  of  some  per- 
son other  than  the  owner.  But  a  provision  in  a  will  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  widow  or  others  out  of  the  estate  or  some  portion  of 
the  property  does  not  ordinarily  give  such  widow  or  other  person 
any  title  to  any  portion  of  the  property  even  though  a  particular 
part  thereof  is  charged  with  the  performance  of  the  obligation.'*" 
Such  provisions  usually  constitute  mere  equitable  liens  in  favor  of 
the  person  entitled  to  the  support  or  annuity,  and  are  en  forcible 
against  the  executor,  testamentary  trustee,  residuary  devisee  or 
other  person  in  possession  of  the  estate  as  a  trust  obligation."  A 
mere  recommendation  or  request  that  the  devisee  shall  support 
and  care  for  another  does  not  impose  a  charge  on  the  realty  de- 
vised.*^ Where  the  care  contemplated  by  a  direction  in  the  will 
is  in  the  nature  of  ])ersonal  attention  merely,  and  can  not  be  com- 
plied with  by  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  to  another,  the 
charge  is  personal  to  the  devisee  and  is  not  a  charge  upon  the  real 
estate.^'^  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  direction  to  support  another 
is  imperative,  the  real  estate  is  charged  with  the  support.'**  A 
residuary  clause,  blending  realty  and  personalty,  does  not  charge 
specific  legacies  upon  real  estate  specifically  devised,'*''  nor  does 

37  Clark  V.  Marlovv.  149  Ind.  41,  48  "  In  re  Simons'  Will,  55  Conn. 
N.  E.  359;  Stevens  v.  Flower,  46  N.  239,  11  Atl.  36;  Whitehead  v.  Park. 
J.  Eq.  340.  19  Atl.  777 ;  In  re  Blake's  53  Ga.  575  ;  Blair  v.  Blair,  82  Kans. 
Estate.  134  Pa.  St.  240.  19  Atl.  850.  464,  108  Pac.  827. 

38  Hunt  V.  Hayes,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  42  pgrdue  v.  Perdue,  124  N.  Car. 
151,  10  Ohio  C.  D.  388.  161.  32  S.  E.  492. 

3f»  Duncan  v.  Wallace,  114  Ind.  169,  ^s  South  Mahoning  Tp.  v.  Marshall, 

16  N.  E.  137:  In  re  Clotilde  Lutz,  157  138  Pa.  St.  570,  21  Atl.  79. 

Mo.  439,  57  S.  W.  1018,  50  L.  R.  A.  "  Bell  v.  Watkins.  104  Ga.  345.  30 

847.  S.  E.  756:  Clark  v.  Marlow,  149  Ind. 

40  Farnam  v.  Farnam,  83  Conn.  369.  41,  48  N.  E.  359. 

77    Atl.    70 :     Gross    v.     Sheeler,    7  -i-'  In  re  Peet's  Estate,  99  Iowa  314, 

Houst.  (Del.)  280,  31  Atl.  812.  68  N.  W.  705. 


I 


519  WILLS  §  474 

a  charge  of  legacies  in  general  terms  upon  all  the  testator's  real 
and  personal  property  show  his  intention  to  charge  realty  spe- 
cifically devised.''" 

§  474.  Devise  on  condition  precedent  or  subsequent. — A 
condition  in  a  devise  is  a  qualification  of  the  estate  devised.  The 
condition  is  precedent  when  it  must  be  performed  before  the 
estate  can  commence,  and  it  is  subsequent  when  it  is  to  l^e  per- 
formed after  the  estate  has  vested  in  the  devisee.  A  condition 
subsequent  does  not  prevent  the  vesting  of  the  estate,  but  may 
defeat  an  estate  already  vested  if  the  condition  be  not  per- 
formed.*^ Where  the  devise  is  upon  condition,  diligent  inquiry 
should  be  made  to  ascertain  if  the  condition  has  been  performed. 
If  the  condition  is  subsequent,  and  has  not  been  performed,  the 
estate  is  liable  to  be  defeated;  and  if  the  condition  be  precedent 
and  has  not  been  performed  no  estate  has  vested  in  the  devisee. 
The  same  technical  words  of  condition  are  appropriate  to  create 
either  a  condition  precedent  or  a  condition  subsequent. '*''  But 
whether  a  condition  be  precedent  or  subsequent  is  a  question  of 
intention  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  will.*'"'  If  the  thing  to 
be  done  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vesting  of  the  estate  in 
the  devisee,  but  rnay  accompany  or  follow  it,  and  may  as  well 
be  done  after  as  before  the  vesting  of  the  estate,  the  condition  is 
subsequent. "'' 

The  tendency  of  the  courts  is  to  construe  a  condition  as  sub- 
sequent, rather  than  as  precedent,  so  as  to  give  the  devisee  a  pres- 
ent estate  liable  to  be  divested,  rather  than  to  defer  the  vesting.^^ 
The  rule  is  that,  if  the  act  or  event  named  must  necessarily  pre- 
cede the  vesting  of  the  estate,  it  is  a  condition  precedent,  while, 
if  the  act  or  event  may  accompany  or  follow  the  vesting  of  the 
estate,  it  is  a  condition  subsequent.^" 

When  a  condition  precedent  becomes  impossible  to  be  per- 
formed, the  estate  which  depended  upon  it  can  never  take  effect  f^ 

4«  Davenport  v.  Sargent,  63  N.  H.  49  Burdis  v.   Burdis,  96  Va.  81,  30 

538,  4  Atl.  569;  Kitchell  v.  Young,  46  S.  E.  462,  70  Am.  St.  825. 

N.  J.  Eq.  506,  19  Atl.  729.  -""O  Hawkins  v.  Hansen,  92  Kans.  73, 

47  In  re  Tappan's  Appeal,  52  Conn.  136  Pac.  1022.  L.  R.  A.  191SA,  90n. 
412;    Alexander    v.    Alexander,    156  ^i  Ege  v.  Hering,   108  Md.  391,  70 
Mo.   413,    57    S.    W.    110;    Smith    v.  Atl.  221. 

Smith,  64  Nebr.  563,  90  N.  W.  560;  -'^  Winn    v.    Tabernacle    Inf..     135 

Tilley  V.  King,  109  N.  Car.  461,  13  N.  Ga.  380,  69  S.  E.  557,  32  L.  R.  A.  (N. 

E.  936.  S.)  512;  Burdis  v.  Burdis,  96  Va.  81, 

48  Hopkins    v.     Smith,     162     Mass.  30  S.  E.  462,  70  Am.  St.  825. 

444,  38  N.  E.  1122.  ss  Ransdell  v.   Boston,   172  111.  439, 


475 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


520 


and  this  is  true  even  wliere  the  conditicm  was  beyond  the  control 
of  the  devisee,  and  he  was  entirely  free  from  blame. ''^  Where, 
however,  a  condition  subsequent  becomes  impossible  of  perform- 
ance, the  general  rule  is  that  the  estate  granted  upon  it  vests  abso- 
lutely in  the  beneficiary  as  though  no  condition  had  ever  at- 
tached.'^"  Conditions  as  to  support,  payment  of  debts,  etc.,  are 
generally  construed  as  conditions  subsequent.""  A  devise  condi- 
tioned on  the  devisee's  paying  certain  annuities,  or  furnishing 
support  or  care  to  another  is  ordinarily  held  to  be  a  condition  sub- 
sequent, and  therefore  does  not  defeat  the  devise  on  failure  of 
performance  caused  by  the  death  of  the  annuitant  before  time  of 
payment,"'  or  by  a  waiver  of  the  provision."'- 

§  475.  Conditional  limitations. — If  a  condition  subsequent 
be  followed  by  a  limitation  over  in  case  the  condition  is  not  com- 
plied with,  it  is  termed  a  conditional  limitation,  and  takes  effect 
without  any  entry  or  claim,  and  no  act  is  necessary  to  vest  the 
estate  in  the  person  to  whom  it  is  limited.^''  A  condition  deter- 
mines a  precedent  estate  after  breach  upon  entry  by  the  person 
next  entitled,  while  a  limitation  determines  the  estate  without 
entry,  and,  if  a  condition  subsequent  is  followed  by  a  limitation 
over  upon  breach,  it  is  a  conditional  limitation  and  no  entry  is 
necessary.*^"  Upon  the  happening  of  the  prescribed  contingency, 
the  estate  first  limited  comes  at  once  to  an  end,  and  the  subsequent 
estate  arises.''^  This  form  of  gift  is  of  a  mixed  nature,  and  par- 
takes of  a  condition  and  a  limitation;  of  a  condition,  because  it 
defeats  the  estate  previously  limited;  and  of  a  limitation,  because 
upon  the  happening  of  the  contingency  the  estate  passes  to  the 
person  having  the  next  expectant  interest,  without  entry  or 
claim. "- 


50  N.  E.  Ill,  43  L.  R.  A.  526:  Co- 
nant  v.  Stone,  176  Mich.  654,  143  N. 
W.  39. 

54  Stark  V.  Conde,  100  Wis.  633,  76 
N.  W.  600. 

^^'  Harrison  v.  Harrison,  105  Ga. 
517,  31  S.  E.  455,  70  Am.  St.  60; 
Hawkins  v.  Hansen,  92  Kans.  73,  139 
Pac.  1022,  _L.  R.  A.  1915A,  90n. 

^"  Gingrich  v.  Gingrich,  146  Ind. 
227.  42  N.  E.  101 ;  Allen  v.  Allen,-  121 
N.  Car.  328,  28  S.  E.  513. 

^7  Sherman  v.  American  Cong. 
Assn..  98  Fed.  495 ;  Morse  v.  Hay- 
den,  82  Maine  227,  19  Atl.  443. 


58  Alexander  v.  Alexander,  156  Mo. 
413.  57  S.  W.  110. 

•'''•'  Stearns  v.  Godfrey,  16  Maine 
158;  Williams  v.  Jones,  166  N.  Y.  522, 
60  N.  E.  240. 

60  Bean  v.  Atkins  (Vt.).  89  Atl. 
643. 

<'i  Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant, 
3  Gray  142,  69  Mass.  142,  63  Am. 
Dec.  725. 

i'2  Fowlkes  V.  Wagoner  (Tenn.),  46 
S.  W.  586 ;  Lockridge  v.  McCommon, 
90  Tex.  234,  38  S.  W.  33. 


521  WILLS  §  476 

A  conditional  limitation — an  example  of  which  is  a  grant  to 
one  so  long  as  he  occupies  the  premises,  or  to  a  widow  during 
widowhood — differs  from  a  condition  subsequent,  which  is  a  con- 
tingency named  on  the  happening  of  which  a  grant  may  be  de- 
feated, only  in  form,  and  the  fact  that  re-entry  is  not  necessary 
to  terminate  the  grant. ^" 

No  precise  language  is  necessary  to  create  a  conditional  limita- 
tion, but  the  words  most  commonly  used  are  "while,"  "so  long 
as,"  "until,"  "provided  that,"  "so  that,"  "as  long  as,"  "whereso- 
ever," "as  far  as,"  "up  to,"  and  "so  long."  But  the  form  or  con- 
nection of  the  words  used  is  immaterial,  as  the  particular  charac- 
ter of  the  provision  may  be  determined  from  the  intention  of  the 
testator  manifest  from  the  whole  will."*  Where  an  estate  in  fee 
is  created  on  condition,  the  entire  interest  does  not  pass  out  of  the 
testator.  All  that  remains  after  the  gift  takes  effect  continues  in 
the  testator,  and  goes  to  his  heirs;  while  in  the  case  of  a  condi- 
tional limitation,  the  whole  interest  of  the  testator  passes  at  once, 
and  creates  an  estate  to  arise  and  vest  in  a  third  person  upon  a 
contingency,  at  a  future  and  uncertain  time.*^^ 

§  476.  Gifts  over  on  death  of  beneficiary  or  death  without 
issue  or  heirs. — As  a  general  rule  where  a  gift  over  is  made 
contingent  upon  the  death  of  a  named  beneficiary,  the  gift  can 
not  take  effect  unless  the  death  referred  to  occurs  after  the  date 
of  the  will.*^"  When  an  absolute  gift  is  made  to  one  with  a  pro- 
vision over  in  "case  he  die,"  or  "if  he  should  happen  to  die,"  or 
"if  he  die,"  or  other  like  form  of  words,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
the  testator  had  in  mind  something  else  than  merely  to  provide 
for  the  case  of  the  devisee  dying  at  the  same  time.  In  such  case 
the  courts  will  construe  the  devise  over  as  intended  to  take  effect 
in  case  the  death  referred  to  should  occur  in  the  testator's  lifetime 
or  before  some  period  fixed  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  estate  which 
is  in  such  event  to  go  over."  So  when  a  devise  over  to  a  third 
person  is  made  dependent  upon  the  death  of  the  first  taker  as  a 
contingency,  the  death  referred  to  is  generally  held  to  be  a  death 

63  Hague  V.  Aherns,  53  Fed.  58,  3  cr,  Hoadly  v.  Wood.  71   Conn.  452, 

C.  C.  A.  426.  42  Atl.  263;  Grant  v.  Mosely  (Tenn.), 

«*  Chapin  v.  School  Dist.  No.  2,  35  52  S.  W.  508. 

N.  H.  445 ;  Schaefifer  v.  Messersmith,  ct  McClellan     v.     Mackenzie,     126 

10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  366.  Fed.  701. 

^^  Summit  v.  Yount,   109  Ind.  506, 
9  N.  E.  582. 


§    476  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACT?,  522 

in  the  lifetime  of  the  testator.  Though  when  the  devise  is  of  a 
remainder  the  question  is  enlarged  by  the  inquiry  as  to  whether 
a  death  during  the  lifetime  of  the  testator  is  referred  to  or  a  death 
before  the  remainder  falls  in."-  The  general  rule  is  that,  where 
the  gift  over  is  to  take  effect  after  a  prior  estate  or  at  a  time  ap- 
pointed, the  death  referred  to  means  at  any  time  before  the  vest- 
ing in  possession,  whether  before  or  after  the  death  of  the 
testator."^ 

Where  property  is  devised  to  a  named  devisee  with  the  condi- 
tion that  if  such  devisee  shall  die  "without  issue"  or  "without 
heirs"  the  property  shall  go  to  another  designated  person  and 
there  is  nothing  in  the  will  to  indicate  a  different  intention,  the 
weight  of  authority  is  that  the  death  referred  to  means  death  in 
the  lifetime  of  the  testator,  and  if  the  named  devisee  dies  before 
the  testator  the  estate  goes  to  such  other  person,  while,  if  he  sur- 
vives the  testator,  he  takes  the  devise  absolutely  free  of  any  con- 
dition.'" Under  such  construction  the  words  used  are  not  strictly 
conditions,  but  directions  for  substitution  in  order  to  prevent 
lapse.  The  death  without  issue  of  such  beneficiary  after  the  death 
of  the  testator  does  not  prevent  the  estate  from  going  to  his  heirs 
or  beneficiaries.'^  The  use  of  such  words  of  condition  in  connec- 
tion with  a  limitation  over  creates  a  doubt  respecting  the  testator's 
intention,  and  this  doubt  is  accordingly  settled  by  construing  the 
will  as  creating  an  absolute  estate,  with  a  substitution  of  the 
beneficiary  in  case  the  primary  beneficiary  dies  before  the  tes- 
tator.'" Many  cases,  however,  do  not  restrict  the  words  to  death 
before  the  testator,  but  hold  them  to  mean  death  at  any  time, 
either  before  or  after  the  death  of  the  testator."  But  the  testator 
may  fix  some  other  point  of  time  as  that  upon  which  such  death, 

•■-Terguson   v.   Thomason.   87   Ky.  &  C.  P.  Dec.  16,  29  Wkly  Law  Bui. 

519,    10   Ky.    L.   562,   9    S.    W.   714;  313;  In  re  Engel's  Estate,  180  Pa.  St. 

Stokes  V.  Weston,  142  N.  Y.  433,  Z1  215.  36  Atl.  727. 
N.  E.  515.  '-'Austin  v.   Bristol,  40  Conn.   120, 

•■•^  Hollister      v.      Butterworth,      71  16  Am.   Rep.  23 ;   Fowler  v.  Duhme, 

Conn.   57,  40  Atl.    1044 ;   Woolverton  143  Ind.  248,  42  N.  E.  623 ;  Cornwall 

V.  Johnson,  69  Kans.  708,  11  Pac.  559 ;  v.    Falls   City   Bank,   92    Ky.   381,    13 

Powell  V.    Cosby,  28   Ky.   L.  619,  89  Ky.  L.  606,   18  S.  W.  452. 
S.   W.   721;    Robards   v.    Brown,    167         '•' Summers  v.   Smith,   127   111.  645. 

Mo.  447,  67  S.  W.  245 ;  Paul  v.  Phil-  21   N.   E.   191  ;   Dorr  v.  Johnson,   170 

brick,  IZ  N.  H.  237,  60  Atl.  282.    •  Mass.  540,  49  N.  E.  919 ;   Naylor  v. 

-"First   Nat,   Bank  v.   DePauw,  86  Godman,   109  Mo.  543,   19  S.  W.  56; 

Fed.  722;   Smith  v.   Smith,   157  Ala.  Durfee  v.  McNeil.   58  Ohio   St.  238. 

79,   47    So.   220,   25    L.    R.   A.(X.S.)  50  N.  E.  721;   Selman  v.  Robertson, 

1045n.  46  S.  Car.  262,  24  S.  E.  187. 

■1  Patterson  v.   Earhart,  6  Ohio  S. 


DJ^d 


WILLS  §  477 


or  death  without  issue,  is  to  occur  in  order  to  entitle  the  substitu- 
tionary beneficiary  to  take  the  estate." 

§  477.  Conditions  restraining  marriage. — As  a  general 
rule  a  condition  in  a  gift  restraining  the  marriage  of  a  person 
who  has  never  been  married  is  void,  as  against  public  policy,  and 
the  person  to  whom  the  gift  is  made  takes  an  absolute  gift  free 
of  the  condition;"'  and  a  subsequent  marriage  in  violation  of  such 
condition  does  not  defeat  the  donee's  title  to  the  gift.'°  This 
rule  is  applicable  generally  where  the  condition  is  a  subsequent 
one ;  but  where  the  condition  is  precedent,  with  a  limitation  over 
on  breach  of  the  condition,  it  is  valid."  But  a  gift  to  the  wife  or 
husband  of  the  testator  or  testatrix  while  the  beneficiary  shall 
continue  unmarried  or  until  he  or  she  remarries  is  valid,  without 
any  limitation  over,  and  the  condition  must  be  complied  with. 
In  such  case  the  restriction  is  not  treated  as  a  condition  subse- 
quent divesting  the  beneficiary's  estate  upon  breach  of  the  condi- 
tion, but  as  a  conditional  limitation  or  a  qualification  determining 
the  duration  of  the  donee's  estate,  so  that  the  contingency  upon 
which  the  gift  depends,  although  there  is  no  gift  over,  is  good  as 
a  conditional  limitation.''^  Conditions  against  marrying  specified 
persons  or  persons  of  a  specified  class,  have  been  upheld. '°  Like- 
wise a  gift  with  a  condition  that  the  beneficiary  shall  not  marry 
until  he  or  she  arrives  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  is  lawful, 
and  a  violation  of  it  with  notice  works  a  forfeiture  of  the  estate 
devised.^**  Also  a  condition  precedent  requiring  consent  to  marry 
generally  without  limitation  of  age  is  good  if  there  is  a  gift  over; 
and  some  cases  hold  that  if  there  is  no  gift  over,  the  condition 
must  be  considered  in  terrorem  merely,  and  void.**^  However,  a 
condition  precedent  in  partial  restraint  of  marriage,  as  not  to 

74  HolHster     v.     Butterworth,     71  70  Conn.  357,  39  Atl.  739,  66  Am.  St. 

Conn.    57,   40   Atl.    1044:    Kinney   v.  112;   Rose   v.   Hale,   185   111.   378,   56 

Keplinger,  172  111.  449,  50  N.  E.  131.  N.  E.  1073,  76  Am.   St.  40;   Opel  v. 

"Vaughn  v.  Lovejoy.  34  Ala.  437;  Shoup,  100  Iowa  407.  69  N.  W.  560, 

In    re    Alexander's    Estate,    149    Cal.  37  L.  R.  A.  583;  Haring  v.  Shelton, 

146,  85   Pac.  308;  Kennedy  v.  Alex-  103  Tex.  10,  122  S.  W.  13:  In  re  Pop- 

ander,  21   App.   D.   C.  424;  Knost  v.  pleton's  Estate,  34  Utah  285,  97  Pac. 

Knost,  229  Mo.  170,   129  S.  W.  665,  138,  131  Am.  St.  842. 

49  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  627n.  ^o  Qraydon    v.    Graydon,   23    N.    J. 

''■'^Williams  v.  Cowden,  13  Mo.  211,  Eq.  229;  Phillips  v.  Ferguson,  85  Va. 

53  Am.  Dec.  143.  509,  8  S.  E.  241,  1  L.  R.  A.  837,  17 

^7  Collier  v.  Slaughter,  20  Ala.  263.  Am.  St.  78. 

78  Giles  V.  Little,  104  U.  S.  291,  26  so  Shackelford  v.  Hall.   19  111.  212. 

L.  ed.  745 ;  Helm  v.  Leggett,  66  Ark.  si  Gough  v.  Manning,  26  Md.  347. 
23.  48  S.  W   675 :  Bennett  v.  Packer, 


478 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


524 


marry  under  a  certain  age,  or  requiring  consent  to  marriage  if 
under  a  certain  age.  is  valid  though  there  is  no  gift  over."-  If  the 
testator  makes  provision  for  a  beneficiary  as  long  as  she  remains 
single,  but  upon  her  marriage  the  gift  is  to  go  over,  such  limita- 
tion has  been  held  valid,  and  not  in  restraint  of  marriage."*'  Such 
a  devise  or  bequest  is  merely  a  limitation  as  to  the  time  of  enjoy- 
ment, and  therefore  valid.*^* 

§  478.  Conditions  against  alienation. — Conditions  subse- 
quent preventing  any  and  all  alienation  of  an  estate  in  fee,  even 
for  a  limited  time,  are  generally  declared  void.  But  a  devise  of 
an  estate  for  life  or  for  years  with  a  condition,  either  subsequent 
or  precedent,  restraining  alienation,  has  been  held  valid.'"''  Also 
a  condition  that  the  devisee  shall  not  sell  to  a  particular  person 
or  limited  class  of  persons,  has  been  held  good.****  But  in  order 
to  make  a  valid  restriction  upon  alienation,  even  for  a  limited 
time  or  to  a  limited  class  of  persons,  there  must  be  a  provision 
for  a  reversion  or  limitation  over  to  a  third  person,  in  case  of  vio- 
lation of  the  restriction."  A  condition  that  the  devisee  shall  not 
sell  the  land  until  he  arrives  at  a  certain  age,  as  twenty-five  years 
or  thirty-five  years,  is  valid,  the  restriction  not  being  unreason- 
able.*** Also  a  condition  that  the  land  devised  shall  not  be  sold 
or  conveyed  by  the  devisees  until  they  have  been  in  the  possession 
of  it  for  twenty  years,  has  been  held  good.*°  It  is  generally  held 
that  a  married  woman  may  be  restrained  by  will  from  the  volun- 
tary or  involuntary  alienation  of  her  estate;''"  and  the  fact  that 
she  was  unmarried  at  the  time  the  restriction  was  made  does  not 
render  it  invalid."^    The  restriction,  however,  will  have  no  bind- 


82  Phillips  V.  Ferguson.  85  Va.  509, 
8  S.  E.  241,  1  L.  R.  A.  837,  17  Am. 
St.  78. 

83  Nagle  V.  Hirscli,  59  Ind.  App. 
282.  108  N.  E.  9;  Mann  v.  Jackson, 
84  Maine  400.  24  Atl.  886,  16  L.  R.  A. 
707,  30  Am.  St.  358. 

s^In  re  Bruch's  Estate,  185  Pa.  St. 
194.  39  Atl.  813. 

85  Conger  v.  Lowe,  124  Ind.  368,  24 
N.  E.  889,  9  L.  R.  A.  165;  Roberts 
V.  Stevens,  84  Maine  325,  24  Atl. 
873,  17  L.  R.  A.  266;  Lampert  v. 
Haydel,  96  Mo.  439,  9  S.  W.  780, '2 
L.  R.  A.  113,  9  Am.  St.  358. 

86  Overton  v.  Lea,  108  Tenn.  505, 
68  S.  W.  250. 


87  Conger  v.  Lowe,  124  Ind.  368, 
24  N.  E.  889,  9  L.  R.  A.  165;  Man- 
dlebaum  v.  McDonell,  29  Mich.  78, 
18  Am.  Rep.  61. 

88  Wallace  v.  Smith.  113  Ky.  263, 
24  Ky.  L.  139,  68  S.  W.  131. 

89  Call  V.  Shewmaker,  24  Ky.  L. 
686;  69  S.  W.  749. 

'-'0  Robinson  v.  Randolph,  21  Fla. 
629,  58  Am.  Rep.  692;  Gunn  v. 
Brown,  63  Md.  96;  Simonton  v. 
White,  93  Tex.  50,  53  S.  W.  339,  11 
Am.   St.  824. 

»i  Robinson  v.  Randolph,  21  Fla. 
629,  58  Am.  Rep.  692. 


525  WILLS  §  479 

ing  force  so  long  as  she  is  unmarried,  but  will  become  binding 
upon  her  marriage,  unless  the  testator  limits  the  restraint  to  a 
particular  coverture. ^^ 

§  479.  Devise  to  separate  use  of  married  woman. — A  tes- 
tator may  make  a  devise  for  the  sole  and  separate  use  of  a  mar- 
ried woman,  and  such  devise  will  be  free  from  the  claims  of  any 
present  or  future  husband."'"  But  in  order  to  vest  such  gift  in 
the  beneficiary  alone  the  intention  must  be  clearly  stated.  This 
is  usually  done  by  making  the  gift  to  the  beneficiary  "to  her  sole 
and  separate  use"  or  "to  her  own  use,  independent  of  her  hus- 
band."^* It  would  seem  that  the  use  of  language  prohibiting  her 
from  alienating  the  property  is  not  alone  sufficient. ^^  If  the  tes- 
tator intended  in  creating  a  separate  use  to  destroy  the  curtesy 
of  the  husband,  such  intention  must  be  clearly  stated.  The  mere 
fact  that  the  estate  is  limited  to  her  separate  use,  or  that  it  shall 
be  exempt  from  the  husband's  debts,  or  that  she  is  given  unlim- 
ited power  to  dispose  of  it  by  will,  does  not  destroy  his  right  of 
curtesy,  unless  she  disposes  of.it  by  will.""'*' 

Real  estate  may  also  be  devised  in  trust  for  the  sole  use  of  a 
married  woman,  and  the  husband's  marital  rights  therein  will  be 
entirely  barred.  But  such  rights  of  the  husband  are  not  excluded 
by  the  intervention  of  a  trustee,  where  the  terms  of  the  will  do 
not  expressly  exclude  them."'  Where  real  estate  is  devised  in 
trust  for  the  sole  use  of  a  married  woman  she  may  dispose  of  it 
by  sale,  mortgage  or  devise,  free  from  the  control  of  the  husband, 
unless  the  will  expressly  limits  her  power  of  alienation.*'® 

§  480.  Devises  in  trust. — A  trust  is  the  general  name  ap- 
plied to  the  relation  between  two  persons,  by  virtue  of  which  one 
of  them,  as  trustee,  holds  property  for  the  benefit  of  the  other, 
the  cestui  que  trust.  In  testamentary  trusts,  the  legal  title  to  the 
property  devised  is  in  one  who  is  known  as  the  trustee;  while 
the  equitable  title  is  in  another  who  is  known  as  the  cestui  que 

"2  Phillips  V.  Grayson.  23  Ark.  769.  ^6  Pool  v.  Blakie,  53  111.  495 ;  No- 

'•'■■  Brock  V.  Sawyer,  39  N.  H.  547 ;  land  v.  Chambers,  84  Ky.  516,  8  Ky. 

Little  V.  Bennett,  58  N.  Car.  156.  L.  557,  2  S.  W.  121 ;  Tremmel  v.  Klei- 

«4  Swain   V.    Duane.    48     Cal.     358 ;  boldt,  75  Mo.  255. 

Wood  V.  Wood.  83  N.  Y.  575  ;  Holli-  ^''  Pollard   v.    Merrill.    15   Ala.    169. 

day  V.  Hively,  198  Pa.  335.  47  Atl.  988.  «»  Townshend  v.  Frommer,   125  N. 

■'■■  Stogdon  V.   Lee.  60  L.    T.   Q.   B.  Y.  446,  26  N.  E.  805. 
669.  1  Q.  B.  661,  64  L.  T.  494,  39  W. 
R.  476,  55  J.  P.  533. 


§  480  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  526 

trust.  During  the  existence  of  the  trust  relation  the  legal  title 
is  separated  from  the  equitable. 

To  constitute  a  testamentary  trust  there  must  be  sufficient  lan- 
guage to  sever  the  legal  from  the  equitable  estate,  and  to  clearly 
identify  the  beneficiaries  and  the  property  out  of  which  the  trust 
is  to  take  effect. 

Testamentary  trusts  may  be  created  for  various  purposes,  such 
as,  to  prevent  a  spendthrift  from  squandering  the  estate,  to  pro- 
tect a  married  daughter  from  the  influence  and  importunity  of  her 
untrustworthy  husband,  to  continue  the  administration  of  the  es- 
tate beyond  the  time  allowed  by  statute  so  as  to  protect  the  prop- 
erty from  sacrifice  or  forced  sale,  to  provide  support  for  minors 
and  incomjDetents,  to  establish  charities,  grant  annuities,  pay  debts, 
and  the  like. 

While  no  particular  or  technical  words  are  required  to  create 
a  testamentary  trust,  the  words  used  for  that  purpose  must 
clearly  show  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  testator  to  give  to  one 
the  legal  title  to  the  property  devised,  and  the  other  the  equitable 
title  thereto.'^''  There  must  concur  sufficient  words  or  acts  to 
show  an  unequivocal  intention  to  devote  the  subject-matter  to 
the  object  of  the  trust;  the  subject-matter  must  be  definite  in 
character  and  so  at  the  disposal  of  the  settler  as  to  enable  him 
to  devote  it  to  the  object  of  the  trust ;  and  this  object  must  be  one 
that  is  lawful,  certain,  and  ascertained.^  The  words  "trust"  and 
"trustee,"  though  effective  in  creating  a  trust,  are  not  necessary.^ 
It  is  sufficient  if  the  will  as  a  whole  shows  a  purpose  of  creating 
a  trust  though  no  special  words  be  used.^  The  use  of  precatory 
words  have  often  been  held  sufficient  to  create  a  trust  in  favor  of 
the  person  or  object  sought  to  be  benefited ;  but  such  words  will 
not  have  this  effect  unless  it  clearly  appears  that  the  testator  in- 
tended to  make  his  desire,  request,  recommendation,  or  confi- 

^^  In  re  Heywood's  Estate,  148  Cal.  ^  Lines  v.  Darden.  5  Fla.  51;  In  re 

184,  82  Pac.  755;  Hughes  v.  Fitzger-  Soulard's  Estate,  141   Mo.  642,  43  S. 

aid,  78  Conn.  4,  60  Atl.  694;   Quinn  W.   617;    In    re    Smith's    Estate,    144 

V.     Shields,    62     Iowa     129.     17     N.  Pa.   St.  428,  22  Atl.  916,  27  Am.  St. 

W.  437,  49  Am.  Rep.  141  :  Patrick  v.  641. 

Patrick,  135  Ky.  307.  122  S.  W.  129 ;  2  Hughes  v.  Fitzgerald.  78  Conn.  4, 

Rohinson  v.  Cogswell.   192  Mass.  79,  60  Atl.  694;    Patrick  v.  Patrick,   135 

78  N.  E.  389;  Pembroke  Academy  v.  Ky.  307,  122  S.  W.  159. 

Epsom  School  Dist.,  75  N.  H.  408,  75  s  Rvder  v.  Lyon,  85  Conn.  245,  82 

Atl.  100,  n  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  646n.  Atl.  573. 


527  WILLS  §  481 

dence  imperative  upon  the  devisee,  so  that  he  will  have  no  option 
to  comply  or  refuse  to  comply  with  it.* 

A  trust  may  often  be  implied  from  the  nature  of  the  powers 
granted  or  duties  imposed  by  the  will.  Thus  a  trust  will  be  im- 
plied from  an  express  authorization  to  the  executor  to  pay  cer- 
tain annuities,  as  this  would  be  impossible  unless  the  executor  has 
a  trust  estate  in  the  property.^  The  same  result  will  follow  from 
a  provision  giving  directions  to  manage,  dispose  of,  or  distribute 
property  for  the  benefit  of  others.^  Trusts  will  usually  be  created 
by  a  provision  for  the  support,  maintenance,  or  education  of 
others;^  especially  where  the  direction  for  support,  maintenance 
or  education  is  imposed  on  the  executor,**  or  guardian. °  Gen- 
erally speaking,  an  executor  may  always  be  regarded  as  a  trus- 
tee. His  duties  as  executor,  being  fiduciary  in  their  character, 
courts  of  equity  early  exercised  a  superintending  control  over  him 
in  the  administration  of  his  trust.  But  probate  courts  now  very 
generally  superintend  his  acts,  and  courts  of  equity  will  extend 
their  supervision  only  when  the  executor  is  acting  as  trustee  un- 
der the  will.^"  There  is  a  difference  between  a  devise  to  an  exec- 
utor to  sell  real  estate  and  a  devise  to  an  executor  of  real  estate 
with  power  to  sell.  In  one  case  a  naked  authority  is  given  to  sell ; 
in  the  other  an  authority  to  sell,  coupled  with  an  interest  is 
given. ^^  The  legal  title  to  the  land  devised  does  not  pass  to  the 
executor  unless  there  are  express  words  to  that  effect  or  unless 
such  title  is  essential  to  the  performance  of  a  trust  imposed  upon 
him.^^ 

§  481.  Designation  of  the  devisee. — To  entitle  a  devisee  to 
take  under  a  will  he  must  be  named  therein  or  described  with  such 
certainty  that  he  may  be  distinguished  from  every  other  person. 
But  where  the  beneficiary  is  inaccurately  named  or  described,  so 
that  there  is  no  one  who  fully  answers  the  name  or  description, 

^McDuffie     V.     Montgomery.      128  145.  19  So.  220;  Barnes  v.  Marshall, 

Fed.   105;   Hayes  v.  Hayes,  242  Mo.  102  Mich.  248,  60  N.  W.  468. 

155,  145  S.  W.  1155.  » Smithwick    v.    Jordan,    15    Mass. 

^  United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Maresi,  113. 

33  Misc.  539,  68  N.  Y.  S.  918.  lo  Ball  v.  Tompkins,  41    Fed.  486; 

6  Prince  v.  Barrow,  120  Ga.  810,  48  Proctor  v.  Dicklow,  57  Kans.  119,  45 
S.  E.  412 ;  Holmes  v.  Walter,  118  Wis.  Pac.  86. 

409,  95  N.  W.  380,  62  L.  R.  A.  986.        "  Smith  v.  Hunter.  241  111.  514,  89 

7  In  re  Reith's  Estate,  144  Cal.  314,     N.  E.  686,  132  Am.  St.  231. 

77    Pac.    942;    Dexter    v.    Evans,    63         12  Simmons  v.   Spratt,  26  Fla.  449, 

Conn.  58,  27  Atl.  308,  38  Am.  St.  336.     8  So.  123,  9  L.  R.  A.  343 ;  Wilmarth 

«  Succession  of  McCan,  48  La.  Ann.     v.  Reed,  83  Mich.  44,  46  N.  W.  1031. 


§    481  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  528 

the  court  will,  if  possible,  gather  from  the  contents  of  the  will  and 
the  surrounding  circumstances  who  was  meant.^^ 

There  is  no  rule  in  the  construction  of  wills  which  prefers  a 
name  to  a  description.  Often  a  correct  name  is  given,  coupled 
with  an  erroneous  description.  There  is  a  person  of  the  name 
given,  but  no  one  to  whom  the  description  applies.  In  such  case 
the  person  named  is  the  beneficiary.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there 
is  no  one  who  answers  to  the  name,  but  there  is  a  person  who 
answers  to  the  description,  the  person  described  is  the  beneficiary. 

Misnomer  is  especially  frequent  in  gifts  to  charitable  corpora- 
tions. As  the  real  name  of  such  corporation  is  seldom  used  and 
never  known  to  the  public  at  large,  many  testators  do  not  feel  the 
need  of  giving  the  real  name  of  the  proposed  beneficiary.  So 
where  such  a  corporation  is  indicated  in  a  will  by  an  erroneous 
name,  such  mistake  will  not  avoid  the  gift  if  it  is  possible  by 
means  of  the  name  used,  or  by  parol  evidence,  to  identify  the  cor- 
poration intended  as  beneficiary  with  sufficient  certainty.'*  A 
gift  to  a  corporation  is  not  rendered  void  by  a  mistake  in  naming 
the  corporation,  if  it  can  be  identified  by  a  description  of  its  build- 
ings.^'' A  gift  to  a  corporation  or  association  to  be  formed  after 
the  death  of  the  testator  will  go  to  the  corporation  or  association 
formed  in  conformity  with  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  will,^** 
and  when  he  directs  the  creation  of  a  corporation,  he  means  a 
legal  entity  coming  into  being  as  the  statute  directs. ^^ 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  testator,  in  his  will,  name  the  devi- 
see, in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  devise.  It  is  sufficient  if  he  is  so 
described  therein  as  to  be  ascertained  and  identified.^**  Where  the 
designation  of  the  devisee  is  by  description  instead  of  by  name, 
the  description  must  clearly  distinguish  the  devisee  from  all 
others.^"  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  beneficiary  correspond 
in  all  respects  to  the  description,  it  being  held  sufficient  if  he  cor- 
responds thereto  in  enough  particulars  to  make  it  reasonably  cer- 

13  American    Dramatic   Fund  Assn.  Andrews  Institute,  191  N.  Y.  254,  83 

V.  Lett,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  43.  6  Atl.  280.  N.  E.  981,  14  Ann.  Cas.  708. 

1*  Reilly   v.    Union    Protestant    In-  i^  Boyle  v.  John  Boyle  &  Co.,  136 

firmary,  87  Md.  664,  40  Atl.  894 ;  El-  App.  Div.  367,  120  N.  Y.  S.  1048. 

well  V.  Universalist  General  Conven-  ^'^  Dennis    v.    Holsapple,    148    Ind. 

tion,  76  Tex.  514,  13  S.  W.  552.  .  297,  47  N.  E.  631,  46  L.  R.   A.   168, 

1^  Tualatin   Academy  v.   Keene,   59  62  Am.  St.  526. 

Ore.  496,  117  Pac.  424.  "Brewster    v.    McCall,    15    Conn. 

i""'  Nason  v.  First  Bangor  Christian  274 ;    Condit  v.   DeHart,  62   N.  J.   L. 

Church,  66   Maine    100;    St.  John   v.  78,  40  Atl.  776;  Button  v.  American 

Tract  Soc,  23  Vt.  336. 


11 


529  WILLS  §  482 

tain  that  he  was  intended  and  no  other  person  exists  who  corre- 
sponds sufficiently  to  the  description  to  raise  a  doubt  as  to  the 
identity  of  the  beneficiary.-"  A  devise  will  not  fail  because  of 
the  mere  inaccuracy  in  the  designation  of  the  devisee,  where  the 
meaning  of  the  testator  can  be  gathered  with  reasonable  certainty 
from  the  instrument  itself,  or  where  the  identity  of  the  object  of 
his  bounty  can  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence ;  and  such  evidence 
is  always  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  the  beneficiary 
where  there  is  uncertainty  or  ambiguity  in  the  designation.  This 
rule  applies  to  corporations  as  well  as  to  individuals,  and  to  trus- 
tees as  well  as  those  taking  for  their  own  benefit.-^  A  devisee 
may  be  sufficiently  designated  by  his  profession  or  occupation. -- 
He  may  also  be  sufficiently  designated  by  his  fulfilling  certain 
conditions  mentioned  in  the  will.-" 

§  482.  Perpetuities. — A  perpetuity  in  law  is  a  grant  or  de- 
vise of  property  wherein  the  vesting  of  an  estate  or  interest  is 
unlawfully  postponed.  The  law  allows  the  vesting  of  an  estate 
or  interest,  and  also  the  power  of  alienation  to  be  postponed  for 
the  period  of  a  life  or  lives  in  being  and  twenty-one  years  and 
nine  months  thereafter;  and  all  restraints  upon  the  vesting  that 
may  suspend  it  beyond  that  period  are  treated  as  perpetual  re- 
straints, and  void,  and  the  estates  or  interests  which  are  depend- 
ent on  them  are  void."*  The  above  is  the  common-law  rule,  and 
prevails  in  all  the  states,  excepting  as  it  may  have  been  modified 
by  statute. ^°  Statutes  modifying  the  rule  usually  forbid  the  limi- 
tation for  a  longer  period  than  the  continuance:  (1)  Of  lives  in 
being,  (2)  of  two  lives  in  being,  or  (3)  some  other  period.  The 
limitation,  in  order  to  be  valid,  must  be  so  made  that  the  estate, 
or  whatever  is  devised,  not  only  may,  but  must  necessarily,  vest 
within  the  prescribed  period.  If  by  any  possibility  the  vesting 
may  be  postponed  beyond  this  period,  the  limitation  over  will  be 
void.^*^ 

20  Woman's  Union  Missionary  Soc.     148  Ind.  297,  47  N.  E.  631,  46  L.  R. 
of  America  v.   Mead,   131   111.  33,  23     A.  168,  62  Am.  St.  526. 

N.  E.  603 ;  Reillv  v.  Union  Potestant  24  Pulitzer  v.  Livingston,  89  Maine 

Infirmary,  87  Md.  664,  40  Atl.  894.  359,  36  Atl.  635. 

21  McDonald  v.  Shaw,  81  Ark.  235,  25  i„  ,-e  Lawrence's  Estate,  136  Pa. 
98  S.  W.  952.  St.  354,  20  Atl.  521,  11  L.  R.  A.  85, 

22  In    re    Benson's   Estate,    169   Pa.  20  Am.  St.  925. 

St.  602,  32  Atl.  654.  2,;  Posdick     v.     Fosdick,     6     Allen 

23  Knowles  v.  Knowles,  132  Ga.  806,     (Mass.)  41. 
65    S.   E.    128;    Dennis   v.   Holsapple, 

34 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    483  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  530 

The  rule  against  perpetuities  is  not  complicated  or  difficult  of 
understanding,  but  like  most  rules  of  universal  application,  it  is 
often  found  difficult  of  application  to  the  facts  of  a  particular 
case.  If  the  object  or  purpose  of  the  rule  is  kept  in  mind,  and  the 
kind  of  interests  or  estates  which  come  under  its  operation,  the 
proper  application  of  the  rule  will  be  very  much  simplified.  The 
rule  is  aimed  against  undue  restraints  or  alienation,  by  prohibit- 
ing the  clogging  of  the  title  with  future  interests  dependent  on 
contingencies  which  may  not  occur  at  all,  or  until  a  remote  period. 
The  rule  covers  the  entire  field  of  estates,  interests,  rights  and 
possibilities.  It  applies  to  all  trusts,  whether  created  by  will  or 
deed,  whether  providing  for  remainders  or  executory  devises,  or 
merely  restraining  the  power  of  alienation  for  a  fixed  period  of 
years,  and  then  providing  for  sale  with  gift  over.-'  But  it  is  gen- 
erally held  that  the  rule  does  not  apply  to  the  contingent  right  of 
entry  for  breach  of  condition,  even  though  annexed  to  a  fee."** 
Nor  does  the  rule  generally  apply  to  a  possibility  of  reverter  after 
a  determinable  fee."^  Also  a  public  or  charitable  trust  may  be 
perpetual  in  its  duration,  and  the  rule  against  perpetuities  is  not 
applicable  thereto.^" 

Many  devises  are  void  as  being  in  contravention  of  the  rule 
against  perpetuities,  and  where  the  limitation  over  is  void-  under 
the  operation  of  this  rule,  the  estate  becomes  vested  in  the  first 
taker,  discharged  of  the  limitation  or  condition  over,  according 
to  the  terms  in  which  it  was  devised;  if  for  life,  then  it  takes 
el¥ect  as  a  life  estate;  if  in  fee,  then  as  a  fee  simple  absolute. ^^ 

v^  483.  Lapsed  devises. — A  devise  is  said  to  lapse  when  it 
fails  because  the  beneficiary  in  some  way  becomes  incapable  of 
taking  under  the  will  before  such  devise  vests.^"  This  may  result 
from  the  death  of  the  beneficiary  before  the  testator,  or  before  the 
estate  vests.^^    Where  the  lapse  is  caused  by  the  death  of  the  l^ene- 

"In  re  Walkcrly's  Estate,  108  Cal.  659.   35    Atl.    1072,   35   L.   R.   A.    113, 

627.  41   Pac.  772,  49  Am.  St.  97.  55  Am.  St.  594. 

2«  Hopkins  v.  Grimshaw,   165  U.  S.  ^^  Brattle  Square  Church  v.  Grant, 

342,    17  Sup.  Ct.  401,  41   L.  ed.  739;  3  Gray  (Mass.)  142,  156,  63  Am.  Dec. 

In  re  Stickney's  Will,  85  Md.  79,  36  725. 

Atl.  654,  35  L.  R.  A.  693,  60  Am.  St.  ^2  Hibler  v.  Hibler,  104  Mich.  274, 

308.  62  N.  W.  361:    Murphy  v.   McKeon, 

2«  First  Universalist  Soc.  v.  Bo'land,  53  N.  J.  Eq.  406,  32  Atl.  374 ;  In  re 

155  Mass.  171,  29  N.  E.  524,  15  L.  R.  Wain's    Estate,    189    Pa.    St.    631,    42 

A.  231.  Atl.  299. 

ao  Mills   V.    Davison,   54   N.    J.    Eq.  ^3  Galloway  v.  Darby,  105  Ark.  558, 


I 


531  WILLS  §  483 

ficiary  before  that  of  the  testator,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
testator  had  knowledge,  in  his  lifetime,  of  the  death  of  such 
beneficiary."*  A  devise  will  also  lapse  where  the  beneficiary  dies 
after  the  testator,  but  before  the  time  arrives  for  the  devise  to 
vest.^^ 

A  devise  in  trust  or  in  the  nature  of  a  trust  does  not  lapse  by 
reason  of  the  death  of  the  trustee  before  the  testator,^®  but  lapses 
where  the  cestui  que  trust  dies  before  the  testator"  in  case  there 
is  no  gift  over.^® 

There  is  no  lapse  because  of  the  death  of  a  life  tenant  before 
the  testator,  where  the  will  gives  a  remainder  in  fee.^**  Where 
the  gift  is  to  several  as  tenants  in  common,  the  death  of  one  be- 
fore the  testator  will  occasion  only  his  share  of  the  gift  to  lapse. *** 
But  where  the  devise  is  made  to  several  as  joint  tenants,  or  as  a 
class,  there  is  no  lapse  on  account  of  the  death  of  any  member 
so  long  as  any  survive,  but  the  entire  gift  goes  over  to  the  sur- 
vivor or  survivors." 

Where  real  estate  devised  is  charged  with  the  payment  of  a 
legacy,  such  legacy  does  not  lapse  by  reason  of  the  death  of  the 
devisee  before  the  testator,  but  the  heir  takes  subject  to  the 
charge.*"  A  devise  will  also  lapse  where  there  is  no  one  in  exist- 
ence at  the  testators  death  capable  of  taking  the  gift,*^  or  when 
the  purpose  of  the  gift  fails,**  or  when  it  is  void,*"  or  where  it 
becomes  impossible,**^  or  where  the  beneficiary,  though  competent 
to  take  the  gift,  refuses  to  do  so.*^  Where  the  gift  is  to  a  corpo- 
ration, and  it  ceases  to  have  a  corporate  existence  for  the  purpose 

151  S.  W.  1014,  44  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  "  Rudolph  v.  Rudolph.  207  111.  266, 

782n,   Ann.   Cas.   1914D,   712;   Goebel  69  N.  E.  834,  99  Am.   St.  211;   Me- 

V.  Wolf,  113  N.  Y.  405,  21  N.  E.  388,  serve  v.  Haak,  191   Mass.  220,  11  N. 

10  Am.  St.  464.  E.  2>11. 

34  Dixon  V.   Cooper,  88  Tenn.   177,  42  Cady   v.    Cady.   67    Miss.    425,    7 

12  S.  W.  445.  So.  216;  Gilroy  v.  Richards.  26  Tex. 

3-'  McClain  v.  Capper,  98  Iowa  145,  Civ.  App.  355,  63  S.  W.  664. 

67  N.  W.  102.  43  New   Orleans  v.   Hardie,  43   La. 

3«In    re    Elmslie's    Estate,    10    Pa.  Ann.  251,  9  So.  12. 

Dist.  397.  44  Chadwick  v.  Chadvvick,  Zl  N.  J. 

3^  Stanwood      v.      Stanwood,      179  Eq.  71. 

Mass.  223,  60  N.  E.  584.  45  in   re   Russell's   Estate.    150   Cal. 

38  Thompson      v.      Thornton,      197  604.  89  Pac.  345  ;  Wolfe  v.  Hatheway, 

Mass.  273,  83  N.  E.  880.  81  Conn.  181,  70  Atl.  645. 

39Lacey  v.  Floyd,  99  Tex.  112,  87  4o  Hall  v.  Smith.  61  N.  H.  144. 

S.  W.  665.  47  Sawyer    v.    Freeman,    161    Alass. 

40  Bill  v.    Payne,  62   Conn.   140,  25  543,  Zl  N.  E.  942. 
Atl.  354;   Dorsey  v.   Dodson,  203   111. 
32,  67  N.  E.  395. 


i$    484  TITLES    ANW    ABSTRACTS  532 

of  taking  the  gift  prior  to  the  death  of  the  testator,  the  gift  will 
lapse.*"  As  a  general  rule,  where  a  specific  devise  lapses  on  account 
of  the  death  of  the  devisee  before  the  testator,  and  such  deceased 
devisee  was  also  a  residuary  devisee,  the  lapsed  devise  falls  into 
the  residuum.*"  Where,  however,  the  lapse  is  in  the  residuary- 
clause,  and  the  beneficiary  dying  before  the  testator  is  the  sole 
beneficiary,  or  one  of  several  who  take  as  tenants  in  common,  the 
gift  which  lapses  is  not  reabsorbed  into  the  residue,  but  goes  to 
the  heirs  or  next  of  kin  of  the  testator  as  intestate  property.^'* 

§  484.  Equitable  conversion. — Equitable  conversion  is  a 
constructive  alteration  in  the  nature  of  property  by  which  in 
equity  real  estate  is  regarded  as  personalty  or  personal  estate  as 
realty.''^  The  doctrine  is  based  on  the  rule  that  what  is  to  be  or 
ought  to  be  done  should  be  treated  as  if  done  already.  It  is  a 
fiction,  therefore,  invented  to  sustain  and  carry  out  the  intention 
of  the  testator,  never  to  defeat  it.°'  To  constitute  an  equitable 
conversion,  the  direction  to  sell  and  convert  the  property  must  be 
absolute  and  imperative.'^'  Where  a  testator  orders  his  land  to  be 
sold,  the  conversion  will,  unless  a  contrary  intention  distinctly 
appears,  be  deemed  to  have  been  directed  merely  for  the  purposes 
of  the  will,  and,  consequently,  if  those  purposes  fail,  or  do  not 
require  it,  it  will,  in  equity,  be  considered  land  and  be  given  to 
the  heir."*  While  there  need  be  no  express  direction  in  the  will, 
in  order  that  land  shall  be  treated  as  money  and  money  as  land, 
yet  it  is  requisite  in  all  cases  that  an  intention  shall  be  clearly  and 
positively  expressed  that  the  land  shall  be  sold,  and  turned  into 
money,  or  that  money  shall  be  expended  in  the  purchase  of  land.'"'' 
Where  the  will  directs  that  all  of  the  estate,  real  and  personal,  of 
the  testator  be  sold  and  the  proceeds  divided  the  devises  must  be 
treated  as  devises  of  money  and  not  land.'^"  But  under  the  doc- 
trine as  announced  in  some  cases,  until  the  time  of  sale  arrives, 

4«  Gladding       v.       St.       Matthews  ^2  Yerkes   v.    Yerkes,   200   Pa.   419, 

Church.  25  R.  I.  628,  57  Atl.  860,  65  50  Atl.  186. 

L.  R.  A.  225,  105  Am.  St.  904.  ^^  Fosdick   v.    Hempstead.    55    Hun 

""Dresel   v.    King.    198    Mass.   546,  611.  8  N.  Y.  S.  772,  29  N.  Y.  St.  545. 

85  N.  E.  n,  126  Am.  St.  459;  Givens  ^'^  In  re  Alabone's  Estate,  75  N.  J. 

V.  Ott,  222  Mo.  395,  121  S.  W.  23.  Eq.  527,  72  Atl.  427. 

•'«  Hamlet  v.  Johnson,  26  Ala.  557 ;  -'^  In  re  DuU's  Estate,  222  Pa.  208, 

Wentworth  v.  Read,   166  111.  139,  46  71  Atl.  9,  128  Am.  St.  796. 

N.  E.  m.  •"■  Pasquay  v.   Pasquay,  235  111.  48, 

•"'1  Beaver    v.    Ross.    140    Iowa    154,  85  N.  E.  316. 
118  N.  W.  287,  20  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.) 
65n,  17  Am.  Gas.  640. 


533  WILLS  §  485 

the  land  is  treated  as  realty ;  title  vesting  in  the  devisees  and  being 
subject  to  any  liens  which  may  be  created  in  the  interim."''  How- 
ever, the  true  rule  seems  to  be  that,  where  there  is  a  mandate  to 
sell  at  a  future  time,  equity,  upon  the  principle  of  regarding  that 
done  which  ought  to  be  done,  will  for  certain  purposes,  and  in  aid 
of  justice,  consider  the  conversion  as  effected  at  the  time  when  the 
sale  ought  to  take  place,  whether  the  land  be  then  really  sold  or 
not.  But  whenever  the  direction  is  for  a  future  sale,  up  to  the 
time  fixed  the  land  is  governed  by  the  law  of  real  estate.^^ 

§  485.  Residuary  devises. — A  residuary  devise  is  a  gift  of 
all  the  rest,  residue  or  remainder  of  the  testator's  property  gen- 
erally or  of  a  particular  kind  after  certain  specific  or  general 
legacies  are  discharged.  No  particular  mode  of  expression  is 
necessary  to  constitute  such  devise;  it  being  sufficient  if  the  lan- 
guage used  clearly  expresses  the  testator's  intention  that  the  sur- 
plus of  the  estate,  after  payment  of  debts  and  legacies,  shall  go  to 
the  beneficiary  designated.^''  The  expression  commonly  used  to 
create  a  residuary  devise  is  "give,  devise,  and  bequeath  all  the 
rest,  residue,  and  remainder,"  and  is  included  in  a  clause  at  the 
end  of  the  will.  But  the  position  of  the  residuary  clause  in  a  will 
is  of  no  importance  except  as  it  bears  on  the  intention  of  the 
testator.**"  In  most  jurisdictions  a  residuary  devise  carries  all  the 
real  estate  which  the  testator  has  attempted  but  failed  to  dispose 
of,"  unless  a  contrary  intention  appears  from  the  will."- 

We  have  said  that  as  a  general  rule,  where  a  specific  devise 
lapses  on  account  of  the  death  of  the  devisee  before  the  testator, 
and  such  deceased  devisee  was  also  a  residuary  devisee  the  lapsed 
specific  devise  falls  into  the  residuum.*'"  It  has  been  held  in  some 
jurisdictions,  however,  that  lapsed  devises  pass  to  heirs  as  in- 
testate property  rather  than  under  a  general  residuary  clause.^* 
In  order  that  a  residuary  clause  shall  operate  to  pass  after  ac- 

■'■''  Nelson  v.   Nelson,   Z6  Ind.   App.  192 ;   Hinzie  v.   Hinzie,  45  Tex.   Civ. 

331,  75  N.  E.  679;   Shipman  v.  Rol-  App.  297,  100  S.  W.  803. 

lins,  98  N.  Y.  311.  15  Abh.  N.  C.  288.  «o  Morton  v.  Woodbury,  153  N.  Y. 

•"'s  In  re  Walkerly's  Estate,  108  Cal.  243,  47  N.  E.  283. 

627,  41  Pac.  772;  Underwood  v.  Cur-  ci  Qallowav  v.  Darbv.  105  Ark.  558, 

tis,  127  N.  Y.  533,  28  N.  E.  585;  De-  151  S.  W.  1014,  44  L."R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

Wolf  V.  Lawson,  61  Wis.  469,  21  N.  782n.  Ann.  Cas    1914D    712 

W.  615,  50  Am.  Rep.  148.  "2  Moss  v.  Helslev,  60  Tex.  426. 

■>^  In  re  Granniss'   Estate,   142  Cal.  "■^-  See  lapsed  devises,  §  483. 

1,  75  Pac.  324;  Giddings  v.  Giddings,  '■*  Stockwell  v.  Bowman,  23  Ky.  L. 

65  Conn.  149,  32  Atl.  334,  48  Am.  St.  2304,  67  S.  W.  379. 


§    486  TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS  534 

quired  real  estate  it  should  either  be  specifically  referred  to,  or 
some  such  expression  as  "owned  by  me  at  the  time  of  my  death" 
should  be  used.  The  residuary  clause  will  include  devises  which 
were  originally  void,  either  because  the  disposition  was  illegal,  or 
because  for  any  other  reason  it  was  impossible  that  it  should  take 
effect." 

In  a  number  of  states  there  are  statutory  provisions  to  the 
effect  that  real  estate  comprised  in  void  or  lapsed  devises  shall  be 
included  in  the  residuary  devise.  Even  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
expressly  making  the  residuary  devise  operative  upon  land  in- 
cluded in  a  lapsed  devise,  the  courts  in  a  number  of  states  have 
held  that,  since  the  passage  of  the  statutes  making  a  will  pass 
after-acquired  realty,  the  reason  for  treating  the  residuary  de- 
vise as  a  specific  provision  no  longer  exists,  and  that  consequently 
it  covers  all  real  estate  included  in  a  devise  which  has  lapsed  or 
become  void/'" 

§  486.  Revocation  of  wills. — The  testator  has  control  over 
the  property  devised  and  power  to  revoke  the  instrument  as  long 
as  he  lives,  and  no  title  to  the  property  under  the  will  can  vest  in 
the  beneficiary  until  the  testator's  death."'  A  testator  may  revoke 
his  will  by  a  writing  not  testamentary  in  character,  by  a  subse- 
quent wnll,  by  a  codicil,  by  mutilation,  cancelation,  or  destruc- 
tion, and  by  alterations  or  additions.  A  \vill  may  also  be  revoked 
by  operation  of  law  resulting  from  a  change  in  the  circumstances 
of  the  testator  after  the  making  of  the  will,  such  as  marriage  of 
the  testator,  birth  of  issue,  alteration  of  estate,  or  loss  of  estate. 

The  subject  of  revocation  of  wills,  whether  by  act  of  the  tes- 
tator himself  or  by  operation  of  law,  is  the  occasion  of  many 
statutory  enactments  and  legal  rules.  As  a  general  rule,  questions 
respecting  the  revocation  of  a  will  are  concluded  by  the  order  or 
decree  admitting  the  will  to  probate;  certainly  in  cases  in  which 
the  probate  was  resisted.  An  ex  parte  probate,  however,  ascer- 
tains nothing  but  the  prima  facie  validity  of  the  will  and  that  the 
instrument  is  seemingly  what  it  purports  to  be.*'*    In  examining  a 

*'■''  Drew    V.    Wakefield,     54     Maine  ""  Cozzens  v.  Jamison,  12  Mo.  App. 

291 ;  Molineaux  v.  Raynolds,  55  N.  J.  452 ;  Hart  v.  West,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

Eq.   187,  36  Atl.  276 ;   Cruikshank  v.  395,  41  S.  W.  183. 

Home  for  Friendless,  113  N.  Y.  iZ7,  ««  Burns  v.  Travis,  117  Ind.  44,  18 

21  N.  E.  64,  4  L.  R.  A.  140.  N.  E.  45. 

*'*'  Thayer    v.    Wellington,    9    Allen 
(Mass.)  283,  85  Am.  Dec.  753. 


535  WILLS  §  487 

will  the  attorney  should  carefully  note  any  fact  or  circumstance 
that  would  indicate  a  revocation  of  the  instrument.  Thus  a  dif- 
ference in  the  name  of  a  woman  might  suggest  her  subsequent 
marriage  resulting  in  a  revocation  of  her  will. 

§  487.  Form  and  language  of  wills. — Statutes  generally 
provide  that  the  will  must  be  in  writing,  but  they  do  not  always 
attempt  to  prescribe  what  form  the  writing  shall  assume.  A  pro- 
vision that  the  instrument  shall  be  in  writing  is  usually  complied 
with  if  the  instrument  is  typewTitten,  printed,  engraved,  litho- 
graphed, or  by  writing  made  with  a  lead  pencil.®^  A  will  partly 
printed  and  partly  written  has  been  held  sufificient  compliance 
with  the  statute  requiring  wills  to  be  written.'"  It  would  seem 
that  it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  writing  is  made  on  any  material 
capable  of  retaining  the  impression.  But  a  will  has  been  denied 
probate  because  written  on  a  slate. '^ 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  instrument  be  designated  a  will.  It 
will  be  admitted  to  probate  as  a  will  if  it  is  intended  to  operate 
after  the  death  of  the  maker,  and  it  and  the  property  remain 
under  the  maker's  control,  although  the  form  be  that  of  a  con- 
tract or  a  deed.^-  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  an  instrument 
may  be  testamentary  in  part  and  a  contract  in  part.^^  Also  an 
instrument  in  the  form  of  a  letter  showing  a  testamentary  intent 
may  be  probated  as  a  will.^*  Likewise  it  has  been  held  that  an 
instrument  executed  with  the  formalities  of  a  will  may  be  ad- 
mitted to  probate  as  such,  although  it  be  in  form  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  indebtedness,"  an  assignment,"*^  an  indorsement,'^  a  bank 
deposit,"  or  a  promissory  note.''' 

The  form  in  which  a  will  is  found  at  the  death  of  the  testator 

69  Philbrick  v.  Spangler,  15  La.  "*  Barney  v.  Hays,  11  Mont.  571, 
Ann.  46 ;  In  re  Tomlinson's  Estate,  29  Pac.  282,  28  Am.  St.  495 ;  Cowley 
133  Pa.  St.  245,  19  Atl.  482,  19  Am.    v.  Knapp,  42  N.  J.  L.  297. 

St.  637.  75  In  re  Beard's  Succession,  14  La. 

70  Roush  V.  Wensel,  15  Ohio  C.  C.     Ann.  121. 

133,  8  Ohio  C.  D.  141.  "c  Morrison  v.  Bartlett,  148  Ky.  833, 

"Reed     v.     Woodward,    11    Phil.  147  S.  W.  761,  41  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.) 

(Pa.)  541.  39n. 

"Jackson  v.  Rowell,  87  Ala.  685.  "Hunt  v.  Hunt,  4  N.  H.  434,   17 

6  So.  95,  4  L.   R.  A.  637;   Smith  v.  Am.  Dec.  434. 

Holden,  58  Kans.   535,   50  Pac.  447;  ^s  in  re  Armstrong's  Estate,  2  Pa. 

Miller  V.  Holt.  68  Mo.  584;  Gage  v.  Co.  Ct.  166. 

Gage,  12  N.  H.  371.  "^  Jackson     v.     Jackson,     6     Dana 

73  Gomez  V.  Higgins,  130  Ala.  493,  (Ky.)  257. 

30  So.  417;    Powers  v.    Sharling,   64 

Kans.  339,  67  Pac.  820. 


§  487  titt.es  and  abstracts  536 

is  presumed  to  be  the  same  as  when  it  was  executed/'^  but  this 
presumption  may  be  rebutted,  and  it  may  be  shown  that  one  or 
more  of  the  sheets  of  paper  on  which  it  was  written  have  been  de- 
stroyed, rewritten  or  transposed."^  Where  a  will  duly  executed 
mentions  certain  other  papers  which  the  testator  intended  to  at- 
tach to  and  make  a  part  of  the  will,  the  absence  of  such  papers  in- 
validates the  will/"  Before  an  extrinsic  document  can  be  incorpo- 
rated into  a  will  by  reference  thereto,  a  description  of  it  in  the  will 
must  be  so  clear,  explicit  and  unambiguous  as  to  leave  its  identity 
free  from  doubt/^^  Such  separate  writing  can  be  given  effect  only 
to  the  extent  that  it  appears  from  the  contents  of  the  will  to  have 
been  the  intention  of  the  testator.***  The  separate  instrument 
must  be  shown  to  be  the  identical  one  referred  to  in  the  will  ;'*"' 
and  that  it  was  in  existence  before  the  will  was  executed. *'' 

Where  the  testator  intended  some  further  act  to  complete  the 
instrument,  it  is  not  a  will.^^  It  must  be  clearly  made  to  appear, 
upon  a  just  view  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case, 
that  the  testator  had  come  to  a  final  resolution  in  respect  to  the 
will  as  far  as  it  goes.^'^ 

It  seems  to  be  well  settled  that  the  testator  may  put  his  will  in 
any  language  which  he  understands,  or  in  any  language  not  un- 
derstood by  him  if  so  explained  that  he  understands  its  import 
before  executing  the  will.**'' 

The  examiner  must  give  due  attention  to  alterations  and  addi- 
tions to  the  will.  If  they  were  made  prior  to  the  execution  of  the 
will  and  noted  in  the  attestation  clause,  they  are  valid  and  ef- 
fective.^°  If  the  will  is  complete  without  the  alterations  or  addi- 
tions, they  are  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  con- 
trary, to  have  been  made  after  the  execution  of  the  will,  but  if  the 
will  would  be  incomplete  without  them  the  presumption  is  that 
they  were  made  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  will.  The  grammat- 

80  Barnewall   v.    Murrell,    108    Ala.  ^«  In  re  Shillaber's  Estate,  74  Cal. 

366,  18  So.  831.  144.  15  Pac.  453.  5  Am.  St.  433. 

siVarnon  v.  Varnon,  67  Mo.  App.  «' Tabler  v.  Tabler,  62  Md.  601. 

534.  s^Orgain  v.  Irvine,  100  Tenn.  193, 

82  St.  John's  Parish  v.  Bostwick,  8  43  S.  W.  768. 

App.  D.  C.  452.  8''  In  re  Walter's  Will,  64  Wis.  487, 

83  In    re   Young's    Estate.    123   Cal.     25  N.  W.  538.  54  Am.  Rep.  640. 

337.  55  Pac.  1011.  "o  Holman    v.    Ri*ldle.   8    Ohio    St. 

8*  Hunt  V.  Evans,  134  111.  496,  25  384;  In  re  Morrow's  Estate,  204  Pa. 
N.  E.  579,  11  L.  R.  A.  185.  479,  54  Atl.  313. 

85  In  re  Baker's  Appeal,  107  Pa.  St. 
381,  52  Am.  Rep.  478. 


537  WILLS  §  488 

ical  construction,  or  the  order  of  particular  sentences,  is  never 
allowed  to  defeat  the  general  intention  of  the  testator,  as  clearly 
manifested  by  the  provisions  of  the  will  taken  as  a  whole. "^  But 
in  every  case  the  words  used  must  be  capable  of  bearing  the  mean- 
ing sought  to  be  put  upon  them.  The  testator's  intention  is  only 
to  be  ascertained  from  the  language  of  the  will,  and  words  will 
be  supplied  only  when  necessary  to  carry  out  his  apparent  inten- 
tion as  gathered  from  the  whole  will.^" 

The  formalities  prescribed  by  statute  for  the  execution  of  the 
will  must  be  strictly  observed,  otherwise  the  instrument  will  be 
inoperative  as  a  will.  They  usually  are  :  ( 1 )  That  the  will  shall 
be  in  writing,  (2)  that  it  shall  be  signed  by  the  testator  or  some 
one  in  his  presence  and  by  his  direction,  and  (3)  that  it  shall  be 
witnessed  by  a  designated  number  of  witnesses.  The  probate  of 
the  will,  even  in  common  form,  is  deemed  sufficient  to  justify 
the  establishment  of  the  will  as  a  muniment  of  title,  but  the  exam- 
iner should  carefully  note  every  defect  in  form  so  that  inquiry 
may  be  made  concerning  it.**^ 

§  488.  Abstracting  the  will. — Where  a  will  is  relied  upon 
as  a  muniment  of  title  the  attorney  should  have  access  to  a  ver- 
batim copy  of  all  clauses  which  in  any  way  affects  the  land  in 
question.  The  intention  of  the  testator  is  not  in  all  cases  clear, 
and  it  often  becomes  necessary  to  peruse  the  entire  instrument  in 
order  to  determine  such  intention.  For  this  reason  it  is  thought 
preferable  to  set  out  a  complete  copy  of  the  will  in  the  abstract, 
and  this  is  the  practice  of  many  abstracters.  By  some  it  is  not 
deemed  necessary  that  the  entire  instrument  should  appear,  but 
only  such  parts  as  have  reference  to  the  land  in  question.  The 
competent  abstracter  will  be  governed  in  this  matter  by  the  char- 
acter of  the  will  itself  with  reference  to  its  having  been  drafted 
by  a  professional  or  nonprofessional  person.  If  its  appearance 
and  language  indicates  that  an  unskilled  hand  had  prepared  the 
instrument,  the  safe  course  would  be  to  copy  the  will  in  full. 
Matters  contained  in  the  preamble  are  usually  of  no  special  im- 
portance, and  may  be  safely  omitted.  Also  devises  of  other  lands 
than  those  in  question  need  not  be  included.     Bequests  and  gifts 

»i  Metcalf  V.  First  Parish  in  Fram-         '^2  Butterfield  v.  Hamant,  105  Mass. 
ingham,  128  Mass.  370.  338. 

'■'^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  wills  in 
appendix. 


§    489  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  538 

of  personal  property,  unless  made  a  charge  on  the  real  estate  in- 
volved, may  be  advantageously  omitted.  Care  should  be  exer- 
cised not  to  deviate  from  the  language  of  the  will,  as  it  is  the 
general  rule  that  the  testator's  intention  is  only  to  be  ascertained 
from  the  language  used.  The  attorney's  scrutiny  will  be  mainly 
directed  to  ascertaining  the  meaning  of  the  instrument  from  the 
language  employed,  and  if  the  formal  parts  are  not  closely  or  even 
literally  copied,  an  erroneous  opinion  of  the  title  is  apt  to  result 
therefrom.  Particular  attention  is  called  to  the  necessity  of  set- 
ting out  the  names  of  the  parties,  testator,  legatees  and  devisees; 
legacies,  debts,  and  annuities  which  are  a  charge  on  the  land; 
trusts  and  powers;  executors,  trustees  and  guardians,  and  their 
powers ;  the  residuary  clause ;  and  the  formal  execution  and  attes- 
tation of  the  instrument.  The  particular  words  creating  the 
estate  devised  must  be  given  with  literal  exactness.  "The  points 
to  be  attended  to  are  to  show  to  whom  the  lands  are  devised ;  the 
words  used  in  description  of  the  lands;  the  words  of  limitation 
by  which  the  estate  is  devised,  the  power,  if  any,  in  pursuance  of 
which  the  devise  is  made;  the  words  of  modification,  or  of  sever- 
ance of  the  tenancy,  if  there  be  any;  the  words  of  qualification 
which  may  abridge  or  defeat  the  estate;  the  uses  and  trusts,  if 
any  are  created ;  the  conditions,  or  conditional  limitations  by  way 
of  executory  devise,  or  otherwise,  annexed  to  the  devise  or  ap- 
pointment; the  charges  imposed  on  the  devisee;  the  indemnity,  if 
any,  against  seeing  to  the  application  of  the  purchase-money,  or 
mortgage  money ;  such  powers,  if  any,  as  are  material  to  the  title ; 
and  when  leasehold  lands  are  the  subject  of  the  title,  the  appoint- 
ment of  executors.'"** 

§  489.     Method  of  abstracting  v^^ill  and  proof  of  probate. — 

The  abstract  should  contain  an  orderly  arrangement  of  all  the 
essential  provisions  of  the  will,  together  with  the  steps  taken  in 
the  proceeding  to  probate  same.  It  is  suggested  that  the  entry 
should  begin  with  a  statement  of  the  testator's  name,  the  date  of 
the  will,  the  date  of  the  probate,  the  court  in  which  probate  was 
had,  and  the  volume  and  page  of  the  record  where  the  will  .and 
probate  proceedings  are  recorded.  A  synopsis  of  the  contents  of 
the  will,  so  far  as  it  affects  the  land  in  question,  should  follow. 
After  this  should  come  a  summary  of  the  proof  adduced  before 

94  Prest.  on  Abst.  180. 


I 


539  WILLS  §  490 

the  probate  court.  Finally,  all  proceedings  relative  to  the  admin- 
istration and  settlement  of  the  estate  should  be  shown.  This 
order,  however,  may  be  varied  to  suit  the  abstractor's  individual 
notion,  but  the  above  is  deemed  to  be  the  logical  order  of  presen- 
tation. If  the  time  allowed  by  law  for  contesting  the  probate  has 
expired  the  examiner  may  safely  assume  that  the  testator  had 
sufficient  capacity  to  make  the  will,  and  that  it  was  duly  executed ; 
but  if  the  heirs  at  law  are  nonresidents,  or  under  legal  disabili- 
ties, or  otherwise  within  the  saving  of  the  statute  of  limitations, 
the  abstract  should  proceed  to  state  all  the  facts  which  show  a 
compliance  with  the  statute  of  wills,  such  as  the  signing,  the  at- 
testation of  the  witnesses,  and  the  like.  When  heirs  or  devisees 
have  made  conveyances  prior  to  probate  or  record,  the  chrono- 
logical arrangement  should  come  after  the  date  of  execution  of 
the  will,  rather  than  of  proof  or  record. 

§  490.     Example  of  an  abstract  of  a  will. — A  synopsis  of  a 
will  and  the  proof  of  probate  thereof  may  be  shown  as  follows: 


John  Jones,  testator, 

to 

Mary  Jones,  and  Albert  Jones, 
devisees  and  legatees. 


Last  will  and  testament. 
Admitted   to   probate   June    1, 

1908. 
Recorded  Aug.  10,  1908. 
Book  150,  page  75. 


Directs  payment  of  all  debts  and  funeral  expenses  and  expenses 
of  administration. 

Gives,  devises,  and  bequeaths  to  Mary  Jones,  his  wife,  the  sum 
of  five  hundred  dollars,  and  the  following  described  real  estate 
(describe  real  estate  devised). 

Gives,  devises  and  bequeaths  to  his  son,  Albert  Jones,  the  fol- 
lowing described  real  estate  (here  describe  real  estate  devised  to 
son ) . 

Gives,  devises,  and  bequeaths  all  the  rest,  residue,  and  re- 
mainder of  his  estate  to  his  wife,  Mary  Jones,  and  his  son,  Albert 
Jones,  in  equal  shares. 

Appoints  Samuel  Grove  executor  of  his  estate. 

Testimonium  and  attestation  clauses  added. 

This  synopsis  may  be  followed  by  affidavit  of  death  and  proof 
of  the  will  before  the  clerk  of  the  court  or  before  the  judge  of 
the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  probate  matters.    The  certificate 


§  491  TITLES  AND  ARSTRACTS  540 

of  probate  may  also  be  added.  Ikit  a  reference  in  the  margin  of 
the  synopsis  of  the  will  to  the  fact  and  date  of  probate  and  the 
record  where  the  proceedings  may  be  found  is  all  that  is  ordi- 
narily required. 

§  491.  Probate  of  wills. — To  probate  a  will  means  to 
prove  before  some  officer  or  tribunal,  vested  by  law  with  author- 
ity for  that  purpose,  that  the  instrument  offered  to  be  proved  is 
the  last  will  and  testament  of  the  deceased  person  whose  testa- 
mentary act  it  is  alleged  to  be,  and  that  it  has  l>een  executed,  at- 
tested and  published  as  required  by  law,  and  that  the  testator  was 
of  sound  and  disposing  mind.'*'^  It  is  a  proceeding  in  rem,""  call- 
ing for  the  exercise  of  the  judicial  powers  of  the  court. ^^ 

As  the  probate  of  a  will  of  real  estate  was  unknown  to  the  com- 
mon law,  there  is,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute,  no  necessity  for 
its  probate,  and  in  order  that  it  may  operate  as  a  conveyance  of 
the  land  it  must  be  proved  in  a  suit  by  proof  of  the  testator's  sig- 
nature.'""^  But  by  statute  in  most  of  the  states  of  this  country  wills 
of  both  real  and  personal  property  are  expressly  required  to  be 
probated,  and  they  can  have  no  force  or  validity  until  this  is 
done.®**  Until  a  will  is  duly  probated  the  courts  will  not  recog- 
nize, in  an  action,  any  powers  of  a  person  named  in  a  will  as 
executor,^  nor  any  title  of  a  devisee  under  the  will."  The  will  is 
wholly  ineffectual  as  an  instrument  of  title  until  it  is  duly  pro- 
bated.^ 

The  probate  of  the  will,  in  the  first  instance,  should  be  made 
in  the  place  of  the  testator's  domicil  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
regardless  of  where  he  died,*  or  where  the  will  was  executed.^ 

»5  Pettit  V.  Black,  13  Nebr.  142,  12  Johncs   v.   Jackson,   67   Conn.   81,   34 

N.  W.  841.  Atl.  709. 

»«  In  re  Davis'  Estate.  151  Cal.  318.  ^  McClaskey  v.  Barr.  54  Fed.  781  ; 

86  Pac.  183,  90  Pac.  711,  121  Am.  St.  Knox   v.   Paull.   95   Ala.   505,    11    So. 

105;   State  v.  Twelfth  Judicial    Dist.  156;   Crow  v.   Powers.   19  Ark.  424; 

Ct.,  34  Mont.  96.  85  Pac.  866.  6  L.  R.  Turner  v.  McDonald.  76  Cal.  177.  18 

A.    (N.  S.)  617n,  115  Am.  St.  510,  9  Pac.  262.  9  Am.  St.  189;  Hartwell  v. 

Ann.  Cas.  418.  Parks,  240  Mo.  537.  144  S.  W.  793 ; 

"^  Stowe  V.  Stowe,  140  Mo.  594,  41  Lake  v.  Hood,  35  Tex.  Civ.  App.  32, 

S.  W.  951 ;  McClure  v.  Spivcy,  123  N.  79  S.  W.  323. 

Car.    678.    31    S.    E.    857;    Stout    v.  3  jnge  v.  Johnston.  110  Ala.  650,  20 

Young.  217  Pa.  427,  66  Atl.  659.  So.  757 ;  Chidsey  v.  Brookes,  130  Ga. 

98  Campbell    v.    Porter,    162    U.'    S.  218,  60  S.  E.  529.  14  Ann.  Cas.  975; 

478.   16  Sup.  Ct.  871.  40  L.  ed.   1044.  Mackey  v.  Mackey.  71  N.  J.  Eq.  686, 

'"■>  Campbell    v.    Porter,    162    U.    S.  63  Atl.  984. 

478.  16  Sup.  Ct.  871.  40  L.  ed.  1044.  "  shultz  v.  Houck.  29  Md.  24;  Con- 

Chilcott  v.  Hart  23  Colo.  40,  45  Pac.  verse  v.  Starr,  23  Ohio  St.  491. 

391,  35  L.  R.  A.  41.  ^  In  re  Olson,  63  Iowa  145,  18  N. 

1  Brock    v.    Frank,     51     Ala.     85;  W.  854. 


II 


541  WILLS  §  491 

\Miere  a  testator  left  real  estate  in  a  state  other  than  that  of  his 
domicil,  the  will  may  be  probated  in  any  county  in  which  any  of 
the  land  lies.  And  where  the  only  disposition  in  a  will  consists 
of  real  estate  situated  in  another  jurisdiction,  the  courts  of  the 
testator's  domicile  sometimes  refuse  to  entertain  probate  jurisdic- 
tion thereof.® 

An  instrument  which  neither  disposes  of  property  nor  appoints 
an  executor  is  not  testamentary  in  character,  and,  consequently,  is 
not  entitled  to  probate.^  A  codicil  should  be  probated,  even 
though  it  contains  nothing  but  the  revocation  of  a  former  will. 
But  a  will  may  be  probated  even  though  the  codicil  can  not  be 
found,  for  it  may  operate  separate  and  apart  from  the  codicil."^ 

Upon  application  made  for  admitting' a  will  to  probate,  notice 
of  the  pendency  thereof  is  usually  required  to  be  served  upon  per- 
sons interested.  But  w^here  no  notice  of  the  original  application 
is  required  by  statute,  and  none  is  given,  the  judgment  admitting 
the  will  to  probate  is  valid  if  the  statute  makes  ample  provision 
for  a  contest  by  appeal  or  by  some  other  mode.^  A  failure  to 
give  notice  as  required  by  statute  may  be  objected  to  in  the  pro- 
ceedings,^" or  the  judgment  may  be  reversed  on  appeal,  or  va- 
cated in  some  other  form  of  direct  attack. ^^ 

In  some  states  a  will  may  be  probated  either  in  common  form, 
or  solemn  form.  A  probate  in  common  form  is  where  the  will  is 
produced  before  the  proper  court  or  officer,  and  after  proof  by  the 
attesting  witnesses  of  the  validity  of  its  execution,  is  admitted  to 
probate  without  notice  to  any  person  interested  therein.^'  This 
form  of  probate  is  an  ex  parte  proceeding,  and  does  not  con- 
template a  contest.^^  A  will  is  said  to  be  probated  in  the  solemn 
form  when  all  parties  interested  have  been  duly  notified  to  appear 
at  the  time  of  its  probate  and  the  will  then  duly  proved  by  the 

^  Succession   of   Earhart,     50     La.  cisco   Protestant   Orphan   Asylum   v. 

Ann.  524,  23  So.  476.  Superior   Ct.,   116  Cal.   443,   48   Pac. 

^Coffman  v.  Coffman,  85  Va.  459,  379. 

8  S.  E.  672,  2  L.  R.  A.  848,  17  Am.  "  Floto  v.   Floto,   213   111.  438,   72 

St.  69.  N.  E.  1092 ;  Duperier  v.  Berard,  107 

8  In  re  Sternberg's  Estate,  94  Iowa  La.  91,  31  So.  653. 

305,  62  N.  W.  734.  12  Bent   v.   Thompson,   5   N.    Mex. 

9  Knight  V.  Rollings,  73  N.  H.  495,    408,  23  Pac.  234. 

63  Atl.  38.  13  Wright  v.  Young,  75  Kans.  287, 

1"  Leach  v.  Burr,  188  U.  S.  510,  23    89  Pac.  694. 
Sup.  Ct.  393,  47  L.  ed.  567;  San  Fran- 


^  492  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  542 

witnesses.^*     This   form  contemplates  that  the  probate  of  the 
will  in  the  probate  court  may  be  opposed. ^^ 

§  492.  Effect  of  probate. — In  a  number  of  states  a  decree 
of  probate  is  neither  essential  nor  conclusive  as  to  the  validity  of 
wills  in  proving  title  to  real  estates;  such  will  may  be  contested,  if 
it  has  been  admitted  to  probate  in  the  probate  court,  or  proved 
originally  if  not,  in  all  common-law  courts  in  which  the  title  to 
land  is  in  issue. ^'^  But  in  other  states  neither  courts  of  law  nor  of 
equity  will  take  cognizance  of  testamentary  papers,  or  of  the 
rights  depending  upon  them,  until  after  the  will  has  been  properly 
probated.^"  It  is  the  function  of  the  probate  court  to  determine 
whether  the  instrument  offered  for  probate  has  been  executed 
with  all  the  formalities  required  by  law,  and  whether  the  testator 
possessed  sufificient  testamentary  capacity  to  make  a  valid  will.^'* 
The  probate  proceeding  does  not  construe  or  interpret  the  will, 
nor  does  it  establish  any  of  its  provisions.  Where  the  probate  is 
in  solemn  form  it  establishes  the  validity  of  the  will  as  against  all 
the  world, ^°  and  affirms  the  title  of  the  devisee  under  the  will 
from  the  time  of  the  testator's  death. ^°  An  ex  parte  probate,  or 
probate  in  common  form,  ascertains  nothing  but  the  prima  facie 
validity  of  the  will  and  that  the  instrument  is  seemingly  what  it 
purports  to  be.^^  Such  probate  is  conclusive  as  to  the  fact  that 
the  will  was  executed,  and  the  proceeding  can  not  be  attacked  col- 
laterally; but  such  probate  is  conclusive  only  as  to  the  fact  of  the 
valid  execution  of  the  will ;  it  adjudicates  nothing  as  to  the  mean- 
ing or  operation  of  the  will.-^  Questions  of  title  to  lands  devised 

"Roy   V.    Segrist,    19    Ala.    810;  Sup.  Ct.  327,  27  L.  ed.  1006;  Wood 

Petty  V.  Ducker,  51   Ark.  281,   11   S.  v.  Matthews.  53  Ala.  1;  Pitts  v.  Mel- 

W.  2 ;  In  re  Middleton,  72  Iowa  424.  ser,  72  Ind.  469. 

34  N.  W.  193 ;  Martin  v.  Perkins,  56  ^^  Jn    j-g    Bent's    Appeal,    35    Conn. 

Miss.   204;    Roberts   v.    Flanagan,   21  523;  Cox  v.  Cox,  101  Mo.  168,  13  S. 

Nebr.  503,  32  N.  W.  563;  George  v.  W.   1055;   George   v.   George,   47   N. 

George,  47  N.  H.  27.  H.  27. 

1'^  Clough  V.  Clough,  10  Colo.  App.  i»  Brock  v.  Frank.  51  Ala.  85;  Janes 

433.  51  Pac.  513.  v.  Williams.  31  Ark.  175 ;  Tucker  v. 

i«  Darby  v.  Mayer,  10  Wheat.    (U.  Whitehead,    58    Miss.     762 ;     Orr     v. 

S.)    465,   6  L.    ed.   367;    Campbell   v.  O'Brien,  55  Tex.  149. 

Porter,    162    U.    S.   478,    16    Sup.    Ct.  20  Dublin   v.    Chadbourn,    16   Mass. 

871.  40  L.  ed.  1044;  Janes  v.  Williams,  433;   Sutphen  v.  Ellis,  35  Mich.  446; 

31  Ark.  175 ;    Belton    v.    Summer,    31  Allaire  v.  Allaire,  Z7  N.  J.  L.  312. 

Fla.  139,  12  So.  371,  21  L.  R.  A.  146;  21  Burns  v.  Travis,  117  Ind.  44,  18 

Corley  v.   McElmeel,   149  N.  Y.  228,  N.  E.  45. 

43  N.  E.  628.  22  Paught  v.   Faught.  98   Ind.  470 ; 

17  Ellis  V.  Davis,  109  U.   S.  485,  3  Fallon  v.  Chidester,  46  Iowa  588,  26 


543  WILLS  §  493 

are  not  affected  by  the  probate  proceedings,  the  will  having  no 
greater  effect  after  probate  than  other  legal  conveyances."^ 

§  493.  Probate  o£  foreign  wills. — A  will  devising  land  sit- 
uated in  a  state  other  than  that  in  which  the  will  was  executed 
must  be  probated  in  the  state  where  the  land  lies  in  order  that  the 
courts  of  the  latter  state  may  enforce  its  provisions.-*  This  is 
true  except  in  those  states  in  which  the  statutes  confer  certain 
powers  upon  foreign  executors,  which  powers  may  be  exercised 
by  virtue  of  such  statutory  regulations.'^  The  probate  of  a  will 
in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  testator's  domicile  has  no  force  in  estab- 
lishing the  sufficiency  or  validity  of  a  devise  of  real  estate  in  a 
state  other  than  the  state  of  such  probate,  unless  by  virtue  of  a 
statute  of  the  state  in  which  the  real  estate  is  situated.^'"'  Thus 
the  title  to  real  estate  in  Kentucky  does  not  pass  by  a  will  of  a 
nonresident  until  it  is  probated  in  Kentucky  according  to  its 
laws.^" 

It  is  provided  by  statute  in  many  states  that  the  will  of  a  non- 
resident, admitted  to  probate  according  to  the  law  of  the  tes- 
tator's domicile  at  the  time  of  his  death,  may  be  admitted  to 
probate  upon  the  production  of  a  duly  authenticated  copy  thereof, 
together  with  the  probate,  without  other  proof,  or  notice.  In 
some  states,  however,  notice  is  required  to  be  given  to  interested 
parties  of  the  production  of  such  authenticated  copies.^^  Such 
statutes  were  not  intended  to  deny  original  probate  of  foreign 
wills  in  states  where  property  disposed  of  by  wall  is  situated.-^ 
Where  a  will  devising  real  estate  in  one  state  is  probated  in  an- 
other state  by  a  court  having  no  authority  to  probate  wills,  a 
transcript  of  such  will  and  probate  filed  in  the  state  where  the 
land  lies  has  no  effect  to  transfer  the  title  to  the  devisee.  A  title 
traced  through  such  will  is  defective,  since  the  record  does  not 
show  a  proper  establishment  of  the  will.^"    Even  in  states  making 

Am.   Rep.   164;    Poplin   v.   Hawke,   8  419;  Martin  v.  Stovall,  103  Tenn.  1, 

N.   H.    124;    Evans   v.    Anderson,    15  52    S.    W.    296,    48    L.    R.    A.    130; 

Ohio  St.  324.  Thrasher  v.  Ballard.  33  W.  Va.  285, 

23  Fallon  V.  Chidester,  46  Iowa  588,  10  S.  E.  411,  25  Am.  St.  894. 

26  Am.  Rep.  164.  27  Foster   v.   Jordan,    130    Ky.    445, 

2nVard  V.  Gates,     43     Ala.     515;  113  S.  W.  490. 

Thieband   v.    Sebastian,    10   Ind.  454.  28  See  statutes  of  various  states. 

25  Mansfield  v.  Turpin,  32  Ga.  260.  20  Parnell   v.    Thompson,   81    Kans. 

26Chidsey  V.  Brookes,  130  Ga.  218,  119,  105  Pac.  502.  33  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

60  S.  E.  529,  14  Ann.  Gas.  975 ;  New-  658n. 

comb   V.   Newcomb,    108   Ky.   582,  22  so  Chew  v.   Tome,  93   Md.  244,   48 

Ky.  L.  286,  57  S.  W.  2,  51  L.  R.  A.  Atl.  701. 


§    494  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  544 

foreign  probate  exclusive  as  to  real  estate  without  probate  anew 
it  may  become  necessary  to  probate  the  vvill  where  the  land  lies 
in  order  to  perfect  the  title.  For  instance,  a  person  having  a 
claim  against  the  decedent  is  not  required  to  make  proof  thereof 
m  a  foreign  state,  but  may  enforce  his  statutory  lien  against  the 
land  in  the  state  of  his  domicil.  These  statutory  liens  can  be  extin- 
guished only  by  a  proper  probate  of  the  foreign  will  in  the  state 
of  such  creditor's  domicile.  Where  no  ancillary  probate  of  a 
foreign  will  is  shown  this  fact  should  be  noted  by  the  examining 
attorney  and  such  objections  founded  thereon  as  are  deemed 
proper. 

§  494.  Abstracting  probate  proceedings. — Title  to  real 
property  may  change  hands  at  frequent  intervals  by  any  method 
of  alienation  except  through  a  devise,  but  it  is  only  about  once  in 
every  generation  that  the  title  to  lands  will  pass  by  devise  or 
descent.  So,  the  title  to  real  estate  that  has  passed  from  the 
government  will  pass  under  the  supervision  of  the  probate  courts 
about  once  in  every  twenty-five  years.  In  case  the  owner  of  real 
estate  dies  siesed  thereof  leaving  a  will  by  which  the  land  is  de- 
vised to  another,  such  wall  becomes  a  muniment  of  title  to  the 
land  only  upon  its  proper  prol^ate.  It  is  important,  therefore,  that 
the  abstract  show  the  proceedings  of  the  probate  court  respecting 
the  land  in  question,  and  that  all  steps  necessary  to  a  proper  pro- 
bate of  the  will  be  set  forth  in  chronological  order.  The  proceed- 
ings in  probate  usually  consists  :  ( 1)  Of  the  petition  for  probate, 
(2)  notice  or  service  of  summons  to  interested  parties,  (3)  proof 
of  due  execution  of  the  will,  (4)  acceptance  or  renunciation  of 
trust  by  the  executor,  (5)  qualification  by  executor,  (6)  issuance 
of  letters  testamentary,  (7)  inventory  and  appraisement  of 
property,  (8)  adjustment  or  payment  of  claims,  (9)  final  report 
of  executor,  and  (10)  order  discharging  executor  and  declaring 
estate  settled.  Where  dower  and  homestead  have  been  assigned 
this  should  be  shown.  Also  any  sale  or  partition  of  the  land  by 
the  executor  should  appear.  However,  it  is  not  necessary  in 
all  cases  that  all  the  different  matters  enumerated  above  be  in- 
cluded in  detail.  A  brief  summary  of  such  matters  as  have  a 
direct  influence  on  the  title'  is  all  that  is  required. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

MISCELLANEOUS  INSTRUMENTS  AFFECTING  TITLE 


SEC. 

SEC. 

500. 

General  considerations. 

505. 

Official  certificates. 

501. 

Municipal  ordinances. 

506. 

Easements  and  servitudes. 

502. 

Approval  and  publication  of  or- 

507. 

Party  wall  agreements. 

dinances. 

508. 

Letters,      receipts     and     memO' 

503. 

Operation    and    effect    of    ordi- 

randa. 

nances. 

509. 

Affidavits. 

504. 

Resolutions  of  municipal  bodies. 

510. 

Unrecorded  evidence. 

§  500.  General  considerations. — There  are  a  variety  of  in- 
struments affecting  the  title  to  real  estate  which  do  not  properly 
belong  under  any  of  the  classifications  heretofore  given,  and  we 
have  seen  fit  to  treat  them  in  this  connection  under  the  head  of 
"miscellaneous  instruments  affecting  title."  They  include  all 
deeds  in  which  the  description  of  the  land  is  in  general  terms 
though  not  ambiguous;  all  powers  of  attorney  not  expressing  or 
implying  a  power  to  sell  and  convey;  all  releases,  confirmations, 
etc.,  which  do  not  describe  the  property  but  merely  refers  to  the 
instrument  which  it  purports  to  affect;  affidavits,  party  wall 
agreements ;  easements  and  servitudes ;  letters ;  notes ;  memo- 
randa ;  official  certificates ;  municipal  ordinances  and  resolutions ; 
legislative  enactments;  corporate  charters  and  resolutions,  and 
all  other  instruments  and  documents  affecting  real  estate,  but 
which  do  not  on  their  face  describe  the  particular  tract  affected. 
Such  instruments  affect  the  title  to  real  estate,  and  where  they 
appear  of  record  during  the  period  covered  by  the  examination 
they  should  be  included  in  the  abstract. 

§  501.  Municipal  ordinances. — Municipal  corporations, 
while  having  a  twofold  aspect  as  instrumentalities  of  state  gov- 
ernment and  local  self-government,  are  mere  instrumentalities  of 
the  state  for  the  more  convenient  administration  of  local  govern- 
ment and  their  powers  are  not  only  such  as  the  legislature  may 
confer,  but  may  also,  at  least  as  to  those  granted  as  an  agency 
of  the  state  for  public  purposes,  be  enlarged,  abridged  or  en- 
tirely withdrawn  at  its  pleasure.     The  functions,  powers,  and 

545 

35 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


501 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


546 


duties  of  the  council  are  controlled  entirely  by  the  terms  of  the 
charter/  and  persons  dealing  with  it  are  bound  to  know  the  ex- 
tent of  its  authority,  whether  determined  by  the  statute  or  the 
common  law." 

Ordinances  must  be  definite,  and  in  compliance  with  statutory 
or  charter  directions  as  to  their  enactment.^  It  is  sometimes  pro- 
vided that  ordinances  shall  not  become  effective  until  a  specified 
time  after  their  passage  or  publication;  but  in  the  absence  of  a 
charter  provision,  an  authorized  ordinance  is  effective  from  its 
enactment,  neither  publication  nor  promulgation  being  necessary 
to  its  validity.*  Since  a  city  council  can  only  speak  by  its  records, 
these,  when  properly  read  and  signed,  are  the  only  evidence  of  its 
action,^  A  failure  of  the  clerk  to  copy  an  ordinance  into  the  rec- 
ord book  correctly  does  not  invalidate  the  ordinance.^ 

It  is  only  when  the  real  estate  involved  has  been  affected  by  the 
opening  of  a  street  or  alley,  or  by  a  conveyance  from  the  munici- 
pality that  the  ordinance  or  resolution  authorizing  it  should  ap- 
pear in  the  abstract,  and  then  only  a  brief  recital  of  the  important 
features  need  be  set  out.    The  following  example  is  submitted : 


Vacation 

by 
The  City  of  Centralia. 


1  Ordinance  No.  896. 
I  Adopted  Sept.  8,  1908. 
(Recorded  Sept.  15.  1908. 
J  PMat  book  10,  page  45. 


Recites,  that  whereas,  a  petition  was  filed  with  the  city  council 
of  the  city  of  Centralia,  in  the  state  of  Washington,  signed  by 
Elmer  Jones  and  Susan  Jones,  representing  that  they  are  the 
owners  of  blocks  45  and  46  in  Fairview  addition  to  said  city,  and 
praying  said  council  to  vacate  that  part  of  Towner  avenue  lying 
between  said  blocks  45  and  46,  commencing  at  Jefferson  street 
and  running  to  Randolph  street. 

And  whereas,  it  having  been  shown  to  said  council  by  satisfac- 
tory evidence  that  said  Towner  avenue  was  not  used  by  the  pub- 
lic or  the  adjoining  property  holders,  and  that  public  necessity  re- 


1  Campbell    v.    Brackett,     45     Ind. 
App.  293,  90  N.  E.  111. 

2  Barre  v.  Perry,  82  Vt.  301,  IZ  Atl. 
574. 

3  Bye  V.  Atlantic  City,  IZ  N.  J.  L. 
402,  64  Atl.  1056. 


4  Greer  v.  Jackson,  127  Ga.  47,  56 
S.  E.  IZ. 

•'■'  Mt.  Pleasant  v.  Eversole,  29  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  830,  96  S.  W.  478. 

^  Kenaston  v.  Riker.  146  Mich.  163, 
13  Det.  Leg.  N.  709,  109  N.  W.  278. 


547  MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS  §    502 

quired  its  vacation,  and  after  due  notice  of  said  petition  had  been 
given,  and  no  objection  appearing,  therefore  it  is  ordained  by  the 
said  common  council  of  said  city  that  all  of  said  Towner  avenue 
in  Fairview  addition  which  lies  between  blocks  45  and  46,  begin- 
ning at  Jefferson  street  and  running  through  to  Randolph  street, 
be  and  the  same  is  hereby  vacated. 

Published  September  9,  1908. 

Proceedings  to  vacate  or  discontinue  streets  and  highways  are 
regulated  by  local  statutes  which  differ  materially  in  different  jur- 
isdictions. It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  state  many  rules  of 
general  application,  and  it  would  not  be  profitable  to  consider  in 
detail  the  mode  of  procedure  in  any  particular  jurisdiction.  In  a 
majority  of  instances  it  is  not  necessary  to  set  out  a  complete 
synopsis  of  the  ordinance,  but  a  reference  to  the  record  where 
the  same  may  be  found  will  suffice.    For  example  : 

T.  L.  record  313,  page  591,  contains  a  certified  copy  of  action 
of  the  board  of  public  works  of  the  city  of  Indianapolis,  Indiana, 
April  24,  1899,  vacating  Frank  A.  Maus'  New  York  street  sub- 
division in  the  city  of  Indianapolis.  Plat  of  this  vacation  is  in 
plat  book  11,  page  186. 

§  502.  Approval  and  publication  of  ordinances. — The  fail- 
ure of  the  mayor  to  expressly  approve  or  sign  an  ordinance  has 
been  held  not  to  invalidate  it,  unless  the  statute  requires  such  ap- 
proval." But  the  statute  may  be  mandatory  and  require  it,*  and 
in  such  case  the  omission  of  the  officer's  approval  and  signature 
should  be  noted  in  the  abstract. 

The  ordinance  should  be  put  in  force  as  required  by  statute. 
Provisions  requiring  notice  or  publication  of  the  ordinance  for  a 
certain  time  are  usually  mandatory  and  must  be  complied  with.^ 

§  503.  Operation  and  effect  of  ordinances. — A  municipal- 
ity can  not  convey  title  to  real  estate  by  a  simple  ordinance  or 
vote  of  its  board  of  trustees  or  common  council,  but  the  convey- 
ance should  be  in  its  corporate  name  and  under  its  corporate 
seal.^^'     They  are  operative  with  the  same  force  and  effect  as 

-'  McDonald  v.  Dodge,  97  Cal.  112,     Cal.  25,  43  Pac.  396;  East  St.  Louis  v. 

31    Pac.  909;    Martindale   v.   Palmer,     Davis.  233  111.  553,  84  N.  E.  674. 

52  Ind.  411.  10  Jamison  v.  Fopiana,  43  Mo.  565, 

^Saxton  V.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153.  97  Am.  Dec.  414;  Tiffin  v.  Shawhan, 
3  San    Francisco   v.    Buckman,    111     43   Ohio   St.   178.   1    N.   E.  581;    San 

Antonio  v.  Gould,  34  Te      49,  77. 


§    504  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  548 

Statutes  both  against  residents  and  nonresidents  within  the  limits 
of  the  municipahty.^^  While,  strictly  speaking,  ordinances  are 
not  laws,  if  valid  they  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law  within 
the  corporate  limits  of  the  municipality.^"  The  general  rule  is 
that  an  ordinance  vacating  a  street  or  alley  has  the  effect  to  revest 
the  fee  in  the  owner  of  the  land  covered  by  the  street  or  alley 
vacated."  This  general  rule  governs  even  in  cases  where  a  new 
and  different  way  is  substituted  for  the  one  abandoned  or  va- 
cated.^* Although  an  ordinance  has  no  extra  territorial  effect, 
yet  it  usually  becomes  effective  in  the  additional  territory  included 
within  the  limits  of  the  municipality  as  extended  and  is  operative 
in  such  territory  when  afterwards  annexed.^" 

§  504.  Resolutions  of  municipal  bodies. — A  resolution  of  a 
city  council  is  nothing  more  than  the  formal  expression  of  the 
will  of  that  body.^**  It  is  characterized  by  its  enacting  clause,  "Be 
resolved,"  and  if  any  other  term  be  used  it  is  not  a  resolution. ^^ 
It  is  a  very  different  thing  from  a  law  or  ordinance.  It  is  of  a 
temporary  character,  while  a  law  or  an  ordinance  prescribes  a 
permanent  rule  of  conduct  or  government.  But  a  municipal  cor- 
poration may  declare  its  will  as  to  matters  within  the  scope  of  its 
corporate  powers  by  resolution  or  ordinance,  unless  its  charter 
requires  it  to  act  by  ordinance. ^^  Acts  of  legislation  by  a  munici- 
pal corporation,  which  are  to  have  and  continue  in  force  and 
effect,  must  usually  be  embodied  in  ordinances,  while  mere  min- 
isterial acts  may  be  in  the  form  of  resolutions." 

A  conveyance  of  land  by  a  municipal  corporation,  when  regular 
upon  its  face,  made  by  a  corporation  having  power  to  dispose  of 
its  real  estate,  is  presumed  to  have  been  executed  in  pursuance  of 
that  power,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  recite  the  authority  in  the 
deed.  The  seal  of  the  corporation  affixed  to  the  deed  is  prima 
facie  evidence  that  it  was  so  affixed  by  the  authority  of  the  cor- 
poration.    The  officer  executing  the  conveyance  is  not  in  the 

11  North  Birmingham  St.  R.  Co.  v.  "  People  v.  Creiger,  138  111.  401,  28 
Caldervvood.  89  Ala.  247,  7   So.  360,     N.  E.  812. 

18  Am.  St.  105.  i"  El    Paso    Gas,    Electric    Light   & 

12  Chicago  V.  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  Power  Co.  v.  El  Paso,  22  Tex.  Civ. 
146  111.  App.  403.  App.  309,  54  S.  W.  798. 

1"  Harris  v.  Elliott.  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)         i^  State  v.  Delesdenier,  7  Tex.  76. 
25,  9  L.  ed.  ^33 ;  Heard  v.  Brooklyn,         is  Alma  v.  Guaranty  Sav.  Bank,  60 

60  N.  Y.  242 ;  Knight  v.  Thomas,  35  Fed.  203. 
Utah  470,  101   Pac.  383.  i»  McDowell  v.  People,  204  111.  499, 

1*  Benham  v.  Potter,  52  Conn.  248.  68  N.  E.  379. 


I 


549  MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS  §    505 

position  of  a  trustee  acting  under  special  power,  and  required  in 
the  deed  to  recite  the  power  and  show  that  the  contingency  has 
arisen  which  authorizes  the  sale."°  But  where  the  deed  does  not 
show  on  its  face  the  authority  in  pursuance  of  which  it  was  made, 
the  abstract  must  disclose  the  resolution  or  ordinance  authorizing 
the  conveyance  so  that  counsel  may  know  from  inspection  and 
comparison  that  it  was  duly  executed. 

§  505.  Official  certificates. — An  official  certificate  is  a  doc- 
umentary declaration  of  a  public  official  regarding  facts  from  the 
public  authority,  as  an  attestation  of  facts  contained  in  a  public 
record.  They  are  usually  appended  to  instruments  affecting  title 
to  give  affirmative  and  independent  proof  of  matters  within  the 
certifying  officer's  jurisdiction.  Certificates  of  acknowledgment 
to  various  instruments  of  title  have  been  already  alluded  to,  and 
we  have  also  had  occasion  to  speak  of  certificates  of  sale  and 
purchase,  but  there  are  numerous  other  official  certificates  of  evi- 
dentiary value  which  must  not  be  overlooked  in  the  examination 
of  a  title.  We  refer  more  particularly  now  to  the  certificates  of 
keepers  and  custodians  of  public  records.  The  certificates  of  such 
officers,  when  properly  made,  affirm  the  facts  in  the  waiting  to 
which  they  are  attached,  or  to  which  they  relate,  and  render  it 
valuable  as  evidence  of  the  facts  so  authenticated.  A  certificate 
made  by  a  public  officer  in  pursuance  of  authority  or  duty  im- 
posed by  law  touching  an  act  performed  by  him,  or  a  fact  ascer- 
tained by  him  in  the  course  of  his  official  duty,  is  presumptive  evi- 
dence of  the  matters  and  things  contained  therein.  Of  these  may 
be  mentioned  certificates  of  sale  by  masters  in  chancery  and 
sheriflf's  certificates  of  levy  and  attachment. 

When  certificates  are  attached  to  other  documents  for  the  pur- 
pose of  proof  or  verification  of  such  documents  they  require  little 
attention,  but  when  the  certificate  stands  alone  and  affirms  some 
fact  or  facts  appearing  from  the  records  of  federal  or  state  land 
offices,  the  original  evidence  of  which  is  inconvenient  or  impossi- 
ble to  obtain,  such  certificate  becomes  important  and  should  be 
set  out  in  detail. 

20  Jamison  v.  Fopiana,  43  Mo.  565,     97  Am.  Dec.  414. 


§    506  TITLES    A\D    ABSTRACTS  550 

The  following  synopsis  of  certificate  is  given  as  an  example: 
Certificate 


by 


John  Davis,  secretary  of  state, 
of  the  state  of  Indiana. 


Proof  of  conveyance. 
Dated  Jan.  12,  1849. 


Certifies  that  from  the  books, 
files  and  records  of  the  office  of 
secretary  of  state,  it  appears 
that  on  the  10th  day  of  June, 
1832.  the  following  described  real  estate,  situate  in  the  state  of 
Indiana,  viz :  [set  out  description]  was  duly  transferred  by  the 
United  States  to  the  state  of  Indiana,  and  that  on  the  1st  day  of 
April,  1835,  the  above  described  real  estate  was  duly  transferred 
by  the  state  of  Indiana  to  Frank  Thompson.  Signed  by  said 
secretary  and  seal  of  state  of  Indiana  affixed. 

§  506.  Easements  and  servitudes. — An  easement  is  a  lib- 
erty, privilege  or  ownership  of  the  soil,  and  can  not  exist  in 
parol. "^  Contracts  for  the  creation  of  a  permanent  right  of  way, 
for  the  right  to  overflow  or  drainage,  or  for  any  easement  or 
servitude  whatsoever,  are  within  the  statute  of  frauds  and  must 
l^e  in  writing."-  It  often  happens  that  the  grantor  reserves  a 
right  of  way  or  other  easement  for  the  benefit  of  other  land  of 
his  in  the  vicinity  of  the  land  conveyed.  This  is  accomplished  by 
inserting  in  the  deed  the  proper  clauses  of  exception  or  reserva- 
tion. An  exception  relates  to  something  in  existence  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance  as  a  part  of  the  thing  granted,  while  a  reserva- 
tion creates  some  new  interest  for  the  grantor  in  the  thing 
granted.  An  easement  reserved,  being  a  new  right  created  for 
the  grantor  in  property  which  he  conveys,  is  often  regarded  as 
created  by  a  re-grant  or  counter-grant,  made  by  the  grantee  to  the 
grantor.-^  A  reservation  operates  by  way  of  implied  grant.  It 
is  either  a  right  personal  to  the  grantor,  or  is  appurtenant  to  his 
lands  for  the  benefit  of  which  it  is  reserved.  In  the  latter  case  it 
can  not  be  separated  from  or  transferred  independently  of  the 
land  to  which  it  adheres.     If  it  is  a  personal  privilege,  it  is  not 

21  Snowden  v.  Wilas,  19  Ind.  10,  81  22  So.  983 ;  Plunkett  v.  Meredith,  72 

Am.  Dec.  370;  Lawrence  v.  Spinger,  Ark.  3,  77  S.  W.  600. 

49  N.  J.  Eq.  289,  24  Atl.  933,  31  Am.  23  Whitney  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  178 

St.  702.  Mass.  559.  60  N.  E.  384. 

22Tillis  V.  Treadwell,  117  Ala.  445, 


551  MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS  §    506 

assignable,  and  does  not  pass  to  the  grantor's  heirs  or  personal 
representatives.  It  is  a  privilege  strictly  personal  to  the  grantor."* 
There  is  a  distinction  between  easements  and  servitudes  that  are 
personal  and  those  that  are  real.  The  former  exist  in  favor  of  a 
particular  person,  and  upon  the  sale  of  his  land  the  personal  right 
does  not  go  with  it."  But  if  the  right  attaches  to  the  land,  it 
passes  by  the  conveyance  of  the  land,  even  without  the  use  of  any 
words  descriptive  of  the  right."*"' 

The  appropriate  word  or  words  for  the  creation  of  an  excep- 
tion are,  "saving  and  excepting"  or  "excepting,"  alone,  and  for 
a  reservation,  "reserving."  Generally,  one  conveying  part  of  his 
land  impliedly  conveys  with  it  an  apparent  and  visible  right  of 
way,  or  other  easement,  over  that  part  retained  by  him,  which  is 
reasonably  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  part  conveyed  f  but  in 
order  to  so  pass  by  implication  the  easement  must  belong  to  the 
estate  conveyed.  A  reservation  by  the  grantor  of  a  right  or  in- 
terest forever,  gives  him  only  a  life  estate.  To  create  an  estate 
of  inheritance  the  word  "heirs"  must  be  used.^^  But  an  easement 
by  exception  may  be  created  without  words  of  limitation,  because 
the  estate  or  rights  excepted  remain  the  grantor's  property,  and 
inure  to  the  benefit  of  his  heirs  and  assigns,  just  as  any  of  his 
property  does."° 

An  easement  or  servitude  unknown  to  the  purchaser  at  the 
time  of  the  conveyance,  or  subject  to  which  he  can  not  l)e  reason- 
ably presumed  to  have  taken  the  premises,  constitutes  a  breach  of 
the  covenant  against  incumbrances.^"  But  a  servitude  imposed 
upon  the  land  which  is  visible  to  the  eye,  is  not  really  an  incum- 
brance within  the  meaning  of  a  covenant  against  incumbrances, 
because  the  real  subject-matter  of  the  dealings  between  the 
grantor  and  grantee  is  the  land,  subject  to  the  visible  easements.^' 
Nor  is  an  easement  in  the  premises  a  breach  of  the  covenant  of 
seisin,  since  it  does  not  operate  as  a  divestiture  of  the  grantor's 

24Kister  v    Reeser,  98  Pa.  St.  1,  42  Ashcroft  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  126  Mass. 

Am.  Rep.  608.  196,  30  Am.  Rep.  672. 

25  Cave    V     Crafts,    53     Cal.     135 ;  ^9  Bumstead  v.  Cook,  169  Mass.  410, 

Tucker  v.  Jones,  8  Mont.  225,  19  Pac.  48  N.  E.  767,  61  Am.  St.  293 ;  Emer- 

571  son  V.  Mooney,  50  N.  H.  315. 

26Engel  V    Aver,  85  Maine  448,  27  so -peague  v.  Whaley,  20  Ind.  App. 

Atl.  352  26,  50  N.  E.  41. 

27  Irvine  v.  McCreary,  108  Ky.  495,  ^i  Kutz    v.    McCune,    22    Wis.    628, 

56  S.  W.  966,  49  L.  R.  A.  417.  99  Am.  Dec.  85. 

28Koelle  v.   Knecht,    99    111.    396; 


i^    507  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  552 

lechnical  seisin.''"  But  the  covenants  of  warranty  and  f(jr  (juiet 
enjoyment  will  l)e  broken  if  a  stranger  establish  a  right  to  an 
easement  in  the  warranted  premises.''"'  An  easement  by  separate 
instrument  should  be  literally  transcribed  in  the  abstract. 

^  507.  Party  wall  agreements. — Two  adjoining  lot  owners 
in  a  city  or  town  generally  agree,  by  an  instrument  executed  with 
the  formalities  of  a  deed,  purporting  to  bind  themselves,  their 
heirs  and  assigns,  that  a  wall  about  to  be  built  on  the  division  line 
may  be  built  by  one  of  them,  half  on  each  lot,  and  that  the  other 
shall  pay  half  the  cost  of  the  wall  when  he  makes  use  of  it.  Such 
instruments,  when  properly  acknowledged,  may  be  recorded,  and 
the  record  thereof  will  be  constructive  notice  of  their  provisions 
to  subsequent  purchasers  of  either  lot;  and  where  they  are  not 
merely  personal  covenants  between  the  immediate  parties  they 
may  affect  subsequent  owners  of  the  adjoining  lots.  Such  agree- 
ments usually  run  with  the  land  if  they  are  evidently  intended  to 
do  so.''^  Covenants  in  a  deed  in  respect  to  the  making  and  use  of 
party  walls  are  held  to  run  with  the  land.^'^' 

If  it  appears  that  the  intention  of  the  parties  in  making  the 
agreement  was  to  charge  upon  the  land  rather  than  upon  the  per- 
son the  burden  and  expense  of  the  party  wall;  and  also  to  confer 
on  the  owner  of  each  of  the  lots  the  right  to  construct  the  wall, 
on  condition  that  any  owner  of  the  adjoining  lands  using  the 
wall  should  pay  for  what  he  uses,  and  that  the  agreement  relates 
not  merely  to  the  present,  but  to  the  future — the  agreement  may 
1)e  regarded  as  a  covenant  real,  running  with  the  land;  but  if  the 
agreement  is  a  present  one,  and  the  person  who  is  to  build  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  person  who  is  to  pay  on  the  other,  are  clearly 
designated,  and  the  land  is  not  charged  with  the  obligation,  the 
covenant  is  personal  and  does  not  affect  the  assigns  of  the 
parties.^"  The  right  to  use  a  party  wall  belonging  wholly  to 
another,  is  in  the  nature  of  an  easement  and  can  not  l^e  acquired 
by  prescription,  except  by  adverse  user  for  the  statutory  period  of 

^2Blondeau    v.    Sheridan,    81    Mo.  Minn.  25,  69  N.  W.  634,  64  Am.  St. 

545.  385. 

•'•■'  Lamb  V.  Danfortli,  59  Maine  322.  ^''  Richardson   v.  Tobey,   121    Mass. 

8  Am.  Rep.  426;  Scriver  v.  Smith.  iOO  457,  23  Am.    Rep.  283;   Piatt  v.   Eg- 

X.  Y.  471,  3  N.  E.  675,  53  Am.  Rep.  gle.ston.  20  Ohio  St.  414. 

224.  -'"Sebald  v.  Mulholland,  155  N.  Y. 

■■'*  Conduitt   V.    Ross,    102    Ind.    166.  455,  50  N.  E.  260. 
26   X.    E.    198;    Kimm    v.    Griffin,   67 


553  MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS  §    508 

limitation.^"  A  wall  standing  equally  on  both  lots,  and  held  in 
common  by  the  adjoining  proprietors,  is  not  an  incumbrance,  but 
a  valuable  appurtenant  which  passes  with  the  title  to  the  prop- 
erty.^^ 

Where  the  party  wall  agreement  is  contained  in  a  separate  in- 
strument, all  the  material  parts  thereof  must  be  shown  in  the 
abstract.    The  following  example  is  given  : 


A.  B. 
with 
CD. 


Party  wall  agreement. 

Dated day  of ,  19 — . 

Recorded  day   of  , 

19—. 
Misc.  record ,  page  . 


Recites  that  first  party  is  the  owner  of  the  following  described 
real  estate  [describing  same]  and  that  second  party  is  the  owner 
of  certain  real  estate  adjoining  same  described  as  follows  [de- 
scribing same],  and  that  whereas  first  and  second  parties  desire 
that  the  wall  that  may  be  erected  to  separate  the  adjoining  build- 
ings which  may  be  placed  upon  said  parcels  may  be  a  party  wall, 
and  that  whichever  of  said  parties  shall  first  build  on  their  re- 
spective parcels  shall  make  the  wall  on  the  side  adjoining  the 

land  of  the  other  party  of  the  thickness  of inches,  and  shall 

place  the  same  one-half  on  the  land  of  each  party. 

Whenever  either  of  said  parties  shall  use  the  whole  or  any  part 
of  said  wall,  the  one  so  using  shall  pay  to  the  other  party,  or 
those  claiming  under  him  or  them,  who  may  be  owners  for  the 
time  being  of  the  land  of  the  party  who  built  such  wall,  one-half 
of  the  value  at  that  time  of  so  much  of  said  wall. 

The  parties,  for  themselves,  their  successors,  heirs,  executors, 
administrators,  and  assigns,  do  covenant  with  each  other  that  the 
agreements  herein  contained  shall  be  covenants  running  with  the 
land. 

Signed  and  acknowledged  by  both  parties  on  the day  of 

,  19—. 

§  508.  Letters,  receipts  and  memoranda. — It  is  well  set- 
tled that  the  form  of  a  written  agreement  for  the  conveyance  of 

^'^  Hodgkins     v.     Farrington,      150        ^^  Hendricks    v.    Stark,    37    N.    Y. 
Mass.  19.  22  N.   E.  73,   5.  L.  R.  A.     106,  93  Am.  Dec.  549. 
209,  15  Am.  St.  168. 


509 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


554 


land  required  by  the  statute  of  frauds  is  not  material.  The  con- 
tract may  be  evidenced  by  one  writing  or  more.  It  may  be  shown 
entirely  by  written  correspondence.  Whatever  form  the  agree- 
ment may  assume,  if  the  writing  or  writings,  viewed  as  a  whole, 
constitute  in  essence  or  substance,  upon  their  face,  a  note  or 
memorandum  in  writing  subscribed  by  the  party  sought  to  be 
charged,  or  his  agent  lawfully  authorized  in  writing,  showing 
who  the  contracting  parties  are,  the  subject-matter  of  the  sale,  and 
the  consideration,  the  statute  is  satisfied.'" 

By  the  statutes  of  most  states  an  express  or  direct  trust  in  land 
must  be  in  writing.  In  certain  jurisdictions  this  includes  not  only 
trusts  concerning  lands  but  also  trusts  in  any  manner  relating  to 
lands.  In  the  creation  of  a  trust  it  is  unnecessary  to  employ  cer- 
tain specific  words  or  a  prescribed  form.  To  create  a  trust  the 
deed  conveying  the  property  to  be  afifected  by  the  trust  need  not 
contain  the  declaration  of  the  trust,  and  where  by  statute  the  trust 
must  be  in  writing  signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged  or  able  to 
declare  the  same,  setting  forth  the  fiduciary  relations,  terms  and 
conditions  of  the  trust,  any  writing  so  signed  and  setting  forth 
such  matters  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  trust.  Letters,  receipts 
or  other  writings  signed  by  the  trustee  may  be  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish a  trust. *•*  All  writings  of  the  character  indicated  above,  and 
which  in  any  manner  afifect  the  title  being  examined,  should  be 
set  out  in  full  in  the  abstract. 

§  509.  Affidavits. — The  statutes  of  many  states  provide 
that  affidavits  explaining  any  defects  in  the  chain  of  title  to  real 
estate  may  be  recorded  as  instruments  affecting  the  same.  Such 
affidavits  have  the  effect  to  render  a  title  valid  that  would  be  in- 
valid without  it.^^ 

Ouesti(jns  relating  to  deaths,  marriages,  births,  etc.,  are  ex- 
plained and  settled  by  these  ex  parte  sworn  statements  when  no 
other  or  better  evidence  is  available.  An  unexplained  break  in 
the  record  chain  of  title  would  render  the  title  doubtful;  but  it  is 
obvious  that  such  a  break  may  be  satisfactorily  explained  by  an 
affidavit  so  as  to  leave  no  imputation  upon  the  title.  The  non- 
performance of  conditions  antecedent  and  subsequent  and  the 


^«  Gray  v.  Smith,  76  Fed.  525 ;  Jen- 
kins V.  Harrison,  66  Ala.  345. 

40Nesbit  v.  Stevens,  161  Ind.  519, 
69  N.  E.  256. 


4iHautz  V.  May,  137  Iowa  267,  114 
N.   W.  1042. 


555  MISCELLANEOUS    INSTRUMENTS  §    509 

happening  or  nonhappening  of  contingencies  upon  which  the  title 
depends  should  be  shown  by  affidavits.  Also  the  occurrence  of 
marriages,  births  and  deaths,  wherever  they  would  affect  the 
grantor's  title,  must  be  ascertained  by  inquiries  dehors  the  record, 
and  should  be  embodied  in  affidavits.  If  the  abstract  shows  title 
in  the  grantor  as  heir  his  heirship  should  be  sustained  by  the  affi- 
davits of  persons  having  knowledge  of  the  fact  of  inheritance. 
If  the  grantor  claims  title  by  adverse  possession  there  should  be 
affidavits  to  show  such  a  possession  under  color  of  title  for  a 
period  sufficient  to  bar  the  rights  of  all  persons. 

Affidavits  of  the  character  alluded  to  possess  no  legal  validity, 
and  are  not  strictly  evidence  for  any  purpose,  but  for  want  of 
better  evidence  they  are  accepted  as  evidence  of  the  matters  and 
things  to  which  they  relate.  As  a  rule  such  affidavits  may  be 
sworn  to  before  any  officer  authorized  to  take  acknowledgments, 
and  may  be  construed  by  the  same  rules  that  are  applicable  to  the 
construction  of  affidavits  in  legal  proceedings.*"  The  jurat  is  no 
part  of  the  affidavit,  but  simply  evidence  that  the  oath  was  made 
or  the  affidavit  sworn  to.*^  The  affidavit  is  sufficient,  though  in 
place  of  the  jurat  there  is  attached  a  regular  form  of  acknowledg- 
ment.** In  the  absence  of  a  rule  or  statute  requiring  it,  the  affi- 
ant need  not  subscribe  or  sign  his  name,  but  it  must  be  certified 
by  the  officer  before  whom  the  oath  is  taken.*^ 

The  abstract  should  set  out  all  the  essential  parts  of  the  affi- 
davit.   An  example  of  which  is  as  follows: 


Affidavit 

by 

Samuel  H.  Mcllvain. 


Subscribed  and  sworn  to  April 

7,  1904. 
Recorded  April  13,  1914. 
Land  record  43,  page  139. 


Recites  that  Elizabeth  Hensley,  formerly  Elizabeth  Hardin,  the 
widow  of  Harrison  Hardin,  deceased,  was  mother  of  affiant's  first 
wife.  That  said  Elizabeth  Hensley  departed  this  life  several 
years  ago  as  he  is  informed  and  verily  believes  from  his  intimate 
knowledge  with  said  decedent's  family.  That  she  is  the  same 
Elizabeth  Hardin  who  held  a  life  estate  in  a  part  of  the  S.  E.  y^, 

42  Harris  v.  Lester,  80  111.  307.  44  Turner   v.   St.   John,   8   N.   Dak. 

*^  Bantley  v.  Finney,  43  Nebr.  794,     245,  78  N.  W.  340. 
62  N   W  213  4r,  Alford  v.  McCormac,  90  N.  Car. 

151. 


510 


titt.es  and  abstracts 


556 


of  the  S.  W.  ^  of  section  12,  Tp.   16,  north  range  3  east,  in 
Marion  County,  Indiana. 

Jurat  by  George  Carter,  notary  public. 

Notarial  seal  affixed. 

§  510^  Unrecorded  evidence. — The  title  to  a  particular 
tract  of  land  may  depend  as  well  on  facts  external  to  the  records 
as  upon  the  records  themselves.  But  it  is  the  duty  of  the  al}- 
stracter  to  set  out  in  the  abstract  the  items  of  record  which  affect 
the  title.  The  practice  of  abstracting  instruments  not  of  record 
is  not  to  be  commended,  but  many  abstracters  do  not  hestitate  to 
make  note  of  matters  in  pais  affecting  the  title.  Where  the  ab- 
stracter has  knowledge  of  any  such  matters  the  better  practice 
would  be  to  have  them  embodied  in  some  form  of  writing  which 
may  then  be  recorded  if  the  recording  act  permit.  When  so  re- 
corded the  instrument  may  be  included  in  the  examination.  An 
abstracter  is  not  liable  in  damages  for  omitting  from  the  abstract 
any  matter  not  appearing  of  record. 


I 


I 


CHAPTER  XXII 

LIENS  AND  INCUMBRANCES 
SEC.  SEC. 

515.  Liens  defined  and  classified.  529.  Lease  not  strictly  a  lien. 

516.  Equitable  liens  generally.  530.  Grantors'  or  vendors'  liens. 

517.  Statutory  liens.  531.  Vendee's    implied    lien    for    pur- 

518.  Operation  and  effect  of  liens.  chase-money. 

519.  How  liens  exhibited   in  abstract.  532.  Liens  arising  under  trusts. 

520.  Mortgage  liens.  533.  Mechanics'  liens  in  general. 

521.  Dower  rights  as  liens.  534.  Mechanics'  liens  of  subcontract- 

522.  Judgment  and  execution  liens.  ors. 

523.  Attachment  not  strictly  a  lien.  535.  Priority  of  mechanics'  liens. 

524.  The  lien  of  decedent's  debts.  536.  Estates    or    property    subject    to 

525.  Liens  arising  under  devises.  mechanics'  liens. 

526.  Liens  for  taxes.  537.  Assignment  of  a  mechanic's  lien. 

527.  Lien  of  municipal  or  corporation  538.  Assertion     and    enforcement    of 
taxes.  mechanics'  liens. 

528.  Lien  of  officials'  bonds. 

§  515.  Liens  defined  and  classified. — The  term  "lien"  sig- 
nifies an  obligation,  tie,  or  claim  annexed  to,  or  attaching  upon 
property,  without  satisfying  which  such  property  can  not  be  de- 
manded by  its  owner. ^  A  lien,  in  its  proper  sense,  is  a  right 
which  the  law  gives.  But  it  is  usual  to  speak  of  liens  by  contract, 
though  that  be  more  in  the  nature  of  an  agreement  for  a  pledge. 
And  there  ^re  liens  which  exist  only  in  equity,  and  of  which 
equity  alone  can  take  cognizance.  The  existence  of  a  lien,  how- 
ever, and  the  benefit  which  may  be  derived  from  it,  as  well  as  the 
mode  in  which  that  benefit  may  be  obtained,  depends  upon  prin- 
ciples of  law  and  circumstances  so  various  that  it  is  always  in- 
dispensably necessary  to  attend  to  those  particulars  by  which  its 
very  substance  may  be  materially  affected. 

Liens  affecting  real  estate  are  either  (1 )  equitable  or  (2)  stat- 
utory. Liens  are  created  upon  lands  either  by  the  express  dec- 
larations of  the  legislature  to  secure  debts  due  to  the  state,  as  in 
the  case  of  taxes  and  other  debts  due  on  public  account;  or,  in 
consequence  of  the  law  raising  estates  in  favor  of  the  husband  or 
wife  as  an  incident  of  marriage,  such  as  curtesy  and  dower;  or, 
by  the  acts  of  courts  adjudging  that  the  lands  of  a  judgment  de- 

Un  re  Maher,  169  Fed.  997;  Ridge ly  v.  Iglehart,  3  Bland    (Md.)   540. 

557 


316 


TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS 


558 


fendant  lie  taken  in  execution  or  be  subjected  to  a  charge;  or, 
in  consequence  of  the  voluntary  act  of  the  parties  in  making 
leases,  granting  mortgages,  estates  for  life,  and  the  like. 

^516.  Equitable  liens  generally. — At  common  law  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  a  lien  upon  land ;  but  in  equity  there  are  certain 
rights  in  respect  to  land  not  based  on  possession,  yet  of  a  charac- 
ter analogous  to  common-law  liens,  and  known  as  equitable  liens. 
An  equitable  lien  arises  either  from  a  written  contract  which 
shows  an  intention  to  charge  some  particular"property  with  a  del>t 
or  obligation,  or  is  declared  by  a  court  of  equity  out  of  general 
considerations  of  right  and  justice  as  applied  to  the  relations  of 
the  parties  and  the  circumstances  of  their  dealings.  An  equitable 
lien  usually  rests  upon  the  intent  of  the  parties  predicated  upon 
their  express  declaration-  or  implied  from  their  acts  and  agree- 
ments.^ 

An  equitable  lien  on  real  estate  arises  in  favor  of  a  person  who 
advances  purchase-money,*  a  wife  who  advances  money  to  make 
improvements  on  her  husband's  land,''  a  co-tenant  who  advances 
money  to  pay  taxes  on  the  joint  property,"  one  performing  serv- 
ices under  an  agreement  that  the  property  is  to  be  devised  to 
him,"  a  creditor  in  whose  favor  a  will  charges  the  real  estate  with 
the  payment  of  a  debt,^  a  creditor  in  whose  favor  a  debtor's  deed 
charges  land  with  the  payment  of  the  debt,"  a  vendor  who  ex- 
pressly reserves  in  his  deed  a  lien  for  unpaid  purchase-money,^" 
and  a  vendee's  lien  for  money  paid  on  a  contract  of  purchase." 

Equitable  liens  do  not  depend  upon  possession  as  do  liens  at 
law.  They  are  in  the  nature  of  trusts,  and  bind  the  estate  to 
which  they  relate.  To  create  an  equitable  lien  by  agreement  it 
must  appear  that  the  parties  to  it  intended  to  create  a  charge 
upon  the  property.^-  Express  equitable  liens  are  as  various  as 
are  contracts  which  parties  may  make. 


-  Barnard  &  Leas  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  n  Ark.  590.  92  S.  W.  858. 

3  Rugg  V.  Lemlcy,  78  Ark.  65,  93  S. 
W.  570.  115  Am.  St.  17. 

4  Trimble  v.  Puckett.  93  Kv.  218, 
14  Ky.  L.  181,  19  S.  W.  591. 

•''  Stramanti  v.  Seheercn,  7  Colo. 
App.  1.  42  Pac.  191. 

'■  Thiele  v.  Thiele,  57  X.  J.  ICq.  98, 
40  Atl.  446. 

^  Thomas  v.  Feese,  21  Ky.  L.  206, 
51  S.  W.  150. 


''Smith  V.  Moore.  102  Va.  260.  46 
S.  E.  326. 

»  Craig  V.  Leslie.  3  Wheat.  (U.  S.) 
563.  4  L.  ed.  460. 

lOMarkoe  v.  Andras.  67  111.  34; 
Heist  V.  Baker.  49  Pa.  9. 

11  Arnold  v.  Patrick.  6  Paige  Ch. 
(N.   Y.)    310. 

12  Knott  V.  Shepherdstown  Mfg. 
Co.,  30  W.  Va.  790,  5  S.  E.  266. 


559  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    517 

§  517.  Statutory  liens, — In  the  different  states  many  dif- 
ferent liens  have  been  created,  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  no- 
tice them  in  detail  in  this  treatise.  They  embrace  liens  of  judg- 
ments, attachment  liens,  execution  liens,  mechanics'  liens,  liens 
for  taxes  and  assessments,  the  lien  of  decedent's  debts,  statutory 
liens  for  improvements,  the  lien  of  a  widow's  allowance,  and 
various  liens  on  crops  on  land.  Such  liens  may  exist  by  force  of 
a  statute,  either  expressly  providing  for  a  lien  in  a  certain  con- 
tingency, or  in  effect  doing  so  by  making  the  land  liable  for  the 
enforcement  of  an  obligation,  without  reference  to  its  transfer  to 
one  not  originally  liable  on  the  obligatit)n.  To  acquire  a  statutory 
lien  the  terms  of  the  statute  must  be  complied  with,^"  and  the  party 
claiming  such  a  lien  must  bring  himself  clearly  within  the  stat- 
ute.^* General  liens  or  charges  which  are  wholly  of  statutory  cre- 
ation can  be  divested  by  the  legislature  at  any  time  before  rights 
thereunder  have  become  vested." 

§  518.  Operation  and  effect  of  liens. — A  lien  confers  no 
right  of  property  upon  the  holder  thereof.  He  has  no  estate  in  or 
title  to  the  property  subject  to  the  lien.  It  is  neither  a  jus  ad  rem 
nor  a  jus  in  re.  It  is  simply  a  right  of  detainer."  "Liens  are 
not  founded  on  property,  but  they  necessarily  suppose  the  prop- 
erty to  be  in  some  other  person,  and  not  in  him  who  sets  up  the 
right." ^^  It  constitutes  a  breach  of  the  covenant  against  encum- 
brances.^^ Until  discharged  or  satisfied  a  lien  binds  the  estate  not 
only  in  the  hands  of  the  owner  at  the  time  of  its  creation,  but 
after  the  property  has  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser. 

§  519.  How  liens  exhibited  in  abstract. — The  abstract 
must  show  all  unsatisfied  liens  of  record  which  may  in  any  manner 
affect  the  title  to  the  real  estate  being  examined.  The  prevailing 
practice  is  to  exhibit  all  liens  at  the  end  of  the  abstract  immedi- 
ately preceding  the  certificate  instead  of  in  the  regular  course  of 
title.  An  exception,  however,  is  made  respecting  mortgages, 
which  are  shown  in  regular  chronological  order  the  same  as  con- 
veyances of  the  legal  estate.     This  arrangement  tends  to  prevent 

13  In  re  Cramond,  145  Fed.  966.  i'''  Jacobs  v.  Knapp,  50  N.  H.  71. 

1*  Palin  V.  Cooke,   125   Ga.  442,  54         i"  Lickbarrow  v.  Mason,  6  East.  20, 

S.  E.  90.  24. 

"Snyder    v.    Thieme    &    Wagner         i*  Hall  v.  Dean,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

Brew.  Co.,  173  Ind.  569,  90  N.  E.  314.  105. 


§  520  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  560 

confusion  on  the  part  of  counsel,  and  to  enable  him  to  more  read- 
ily determine  the  effect  of  liens.  It  must  l>e  borne  in  mind,  how- 
ever, that  certain  liens  and  incumbrances  may  appear  by  reason 
of  covenants  running  with  the  land,  or  restrictions  of  various 
kinds  by  way  of  condition,  or  covenant,  or  reservation  appearing 
in  instruments  directly  in  the  chain  of  title. 

§  520.  Mortgage  liens. — In  a  few  states  the  common  law 
doctrine  as  regards  the  nature  of  the  mortgage  interest  and  the 
respective  rights  of  the  parties  still  obtains.  The  mortgage  deed 
is  regarded  as  passing  at  once  the  legal  title  to  the  mortgagee,  sub- 
ject to  defeasance  as  a  condition  subsequent,  which  divests  or  de- 
feats the  estate  on  performance  of  it.  The  mortgagee's  title  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  base  or  determinable  fee,  which  continues  only  so 
long  as  the  debt  continues.^'*  In  most  of  the  states,  however,  the 
common-law  doctrine  upon  this  subject  has  been  wholly  abrogated 
by  statute,  and  both  at  law  and  in  equity,  and  both  before 
and  after  breach  of  condition,  a  mortgage  is  regarded  as 
merely  a  lien  upon  the  property.  It  passes  to  the  mort- 
gagee no  title  or  estate,  and  gives  him  no  right  of  pos- 
session before  foreclosure."**  In  jurisdictions  where  the  com- 
mon-law doctrine  of  mortgages  is  still  recognized,  the  instruments 
should  be  exhibited  in  the  order  of  other  conveyances,  but  where 
they  are  regarded  simply  as  liens,  and  remain  unsatisfied  or  fore- 
closed, they  may  be  exhibited  with  other  liens  at  the  end  of  the 
abstract.  But  after  foreclosure  and  extinguishment  of  the  equity 
of  redemption,  the  instrument,  together  with  the  entire  proceed- 
ings had  in  foreclosure  becomes  a  muniment  of  title,  and  should 
appear  in  regular  chronological  order  in  the  chain.  A  mortgage 
that  has  been  fully  satisfied  of  record  need  not  be  noticed  in  the 
examination,  as  its  effect  as  a  conveyance  or  lien  is  at  an  end. 

§  521.  Dower  rights  as  liens. — It  is  generally  considered 
that  a  right  of  dower,  inchoate  or  consummate,  is  an  encum- 
brance.^^ And  the  same  rule  has  been  applied  to  the  statutory 
substitute  for  dower.-"     The  claim  of  the  wife,  after  a  convey- 

loLightcap  V.  Bradley,  186  111.. 510,  siMcCord   v.   Massey,    155   111.   123, 

58  N.  E.  221.                                        _  39  N.  E.  592. 

20  McMillan  v.  Richards,  9  Cal.  365,  --  Crowley  v.  C.  N.  Nelson  Lumber 

70  Am.  Dec.  655 :   Drake  %•.   Root.  2  Co.,  66  Minn.  400,  69  N.  W.  321. 
Colo.   685;    McMahon    v.   Russell,    17 
Fla.  698. 


561  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    522 

ance  by  the  husband  alone,  and  before  the  husband's  death,  is  al- 
together a  contingent  claim.  She  has  a  present  right  of  dower  in 
the  land  sold,  which,  if  she  survives  her  husband,  may  become 
an  estate  for  life,  incumbering,  to  the  extent  of  a  third  of  the 
value,  the  lands  sold.  If  she  dies  first,  the  land  is  thereby  dis- 
incumbered.  This  right  is  not  generally  treated  as  a  lien  on  land ; 
but  it  is  an  interest  in  it."'^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the 
right  of  dower  is  absolute,  and  fixes  a  lien  on  all  lands  of  which 
the  husband  was  seised  of  an  estate  of  inheritance  during  mar- 
riage."* The  rights  of  dower,  or  analogous  statutory  rights,  do 
not  appear  of  record,  and  their  existence  can  be  ascertained  only 
by  investigation  dehors  the  record.  Inasmuch  as  this  right  does 
not  appear  of  record,  it  can  only  be  shown  by  inference  in  the 
abstract.  Thus  a  conveyance  by  a  married  man  without  his  wife 
joining  or  without  in  any  other  way  relincjuishing  her  right  will 
apprise  the  purchaser  of  the  existence  of  the  right. 

§  522.  Judgment  and  execution  liens. — A  judgment  does 
not,  in  the  strict  sense,  constitute  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the 
debtor.  It  is  only  a  general  charge  upon  all  his  real  estate  to  be 
enforced  by  an  execution  and  levy  upon  some  part  or  the  whole 
of  it.  But  a  judgment  is  called  a  lien  in  the  courts  of  law  of 
many  of  our  states."'"^  A  judgment  lien  is  statutory,  as  none  exists 
at  common  law.'"  A  judgment  is  a  general  security,  not  a  spe- 
cific lien  on  the  land  of  the  defendant.  A  judgment  creditor  is 
not  a  purchaser  within  the  recording  acts,  unless  he  is  made  so  by 
statute.  To  become  a  lien  a  judgment  must  be  docketed  and  in- 
dexed in  accordance  with  the  statute."'  Judgments  usually  be- 
come a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  the  defendant  from  the  date  of 
rendition  thereof,  while  executions  become  a  lien  from  the  date 
of  issue  or  levy.  A  further  treatment  of  the  subject  of  judg- 
ments and  executions  will  be  found  elsewhere  in  this  work. 

§  523.  Attachment  not  strictly  a  lien. — An  attachment  on 
mesne  process  does  not  constitute  a  lien  in  any  proper  legal  sense 
of  the  term.     Though  an  attachment  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as 

23  Enyard   v.    Enyard,    190   Pa.    St.  20  Collins  v.  Smith,  75  Wis.  392.  44 

114,  42  Atl.  526,  70  Am.  St.  623.  N.  W.  510. 

-*  Tate  V.  Jay,  31  Ark.  576.  2-  Fulkerson  v.  Taylor,  100  Va.  426, 

2';  Peck  V.  Jenness,  7  How.  (U.  S.)  41  S.  E.  863. 
612,  12  L.  ed.  841  ;  Kittredge  v.  Bel- 
lows, 7  N.  H.  399. 

36 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


524 


TITI-ES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


562 


a  lien,  the  term  is  then  used  only  in  a  general  sense,  by  way  of 
analogy  and  illustration.  It  is  a  charge  upon  the  land  only  when 
it  has  become  absolute,  fixed,  and  vested.'""*  An  attachment, 
though  it  be  in  its  nature  uncertain  and  dependent  upon  the  final 
judgment  to  be  rendered  in  the  action,  is  a  breach  of  the  cov- 
enant against  incumbrances  f^  the  lien  or  charge  which  it  creates 
remains  a  continuing  security  for  any  judgment  that  the  plaintiff 
may  obtain  in  the  suit.^"  A  further  treatment  of  attachments 
will  be  found  in  the  next  chapter. 

§  524.  The  lien  of  decedent's  debts. — The  right  of  a  cred- 
itor to  his  just  proportion  of  the  property  of  his  deceased  debtor 
vests  at  the  instant  of  such  debtor's  death.  This  right  may  be 
enforced  against  not  only  the  heirs  or  devisees  of  the  land  of  the 
decedent,  but  against  persons  claiming  by  purchase,  mortgage, 
or  otherwise  under  such  heirs  and  devisees. ^^  Consequently,  this 
liability  of  the  land  to  sale  constitutes,  in  effect,  a  lien  on  the  land. 
The  liability  of  the  land  for  the  debts  of  the  ancestor  is  one  of 
the  burdens  attaching  to  the  inheritance,  from  which  it  can  not 
be  relieved  by  any  act  of  the  heir  short  of  paying  the  debts.^*  A 
purchaser  from  the  heirs  of  a  decedent  acquires  precisely  the  same 
right  and  interest  which  the  heir  has  from  whom  he  takes  a  con- 
veyance, and  nothing  more.  He  is,  therefore,  bound  to  know 
that,  until  the  estate  is  finally  settled,  the  sale  of  the  real  estate 
may  become  necessary  for  the  payment  of  debts. "'^  The  bare  pos- 
sibility that  a  decedent  may  have  left  debts  for  which  his  property 
would  be  liable,  does  not  render  doubtful  the  title  of  the  heir  or 
one  to  whom  the  heir  has  conveyed  the  land,  unless  there  is 
something  to  show  the  probable  existence  of  such  debts. ^* 

§  525.  Liens  arising  under  devises. — An  equitable  lien 
arises  upon  the  devise  of  real  estate  subject  to  the  payment  of 
debts  and  legacies,  or  of  specific  debts  or  charges,  though  such 
legacies,  debts,  or  charges  be  not  in  express  terms  made  a  charge 


28  Ex  parte  Foster,  2  Story  (U.  S.) 
131.  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4960. 

2»Kclsey  v.  Remer,  43  Conn.  129, 
21  Am.  Rep.  638. 

^*>Johnson  v.  Collin.s,  116  Mass. 
392. 

31  Nelson  v.  Murfee,  69  Ala.  598; 
Davis  V.   Van   Sands,  45   Conn.  600, 


Fed.  Cas.  No.  3655 ;  Myers  v.  Pierce, 
86  Ga.  786,  12  S.  E.  978. 

•■=2  Moore  V.  Moore,  155  Ind.  261, 
57  N.  E.  242. 

33  Fiscus  V.  Moore,  121  Ind.  547, 
23  N.  E.  362,  7  L.  R.  A.  235. 

3''  Garden  City  &  Co.  v.  Miller.  157 
111.  225.  41  N.  E.  753;  Moser  v.  Coch- 
rane, 107  N.  Y.  35,  13  N.  E.  442. 


J 


563  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    526 

upon  the  land  devised."^  Whether  in  a  particular  case  there  is  a 
charge  imposed  by  will  depends  upon  the  intention  of  the  testator 
as  gathered  from  the  whole  will  in  view  of  the  existing  circum- 
stances.^** The  implication,  however,  must  be  a  fair  and  reasona- 
ble one."'  The  testator  may  make  his  debts  in  general,  or  any 
particular  debt,  a  lien  upon  the  lands  devised,  and  any  one  or 
more  of  the  creditors  in  whose  favor  the  charge  is  made  may  en- 
force the  lien.^^  When  a  devise  is  made  conditional  upon  the 
payment  of  a  legacy,  it  is  in  the  strongest  terms  made  a  charge 
upon  the  land  devised.  An  express  direction  in  any  form  of 
words  to  a  devisee,  to  pay  a  legacy  out  of  the  land  devised,  makes 
the  legacy  an  effectual  charge  upon  the  land.^"  The  will  when 
probated  is  notice  to  all  the  world  of  any  liens  created  thereby, 
and  subsequent  purchasers  of  the  property  charged  take  it  with 
notice  of  such  liens." 

§  526.  Liens  for  taxes. — Taxes  are  generally  made  a  lien 
by  statute  on  the  real  estate  assessed,  but  a  right  of  prior  payment 
does  not  constitute  a  lien.  This  lien  for  taxes  is  usually  preferred 
to  all  payments  and  incumbrances.  By  statute  in  some  states, 
taxes  do  not  become  a  lien  upon  the  land  until  a  fixed  time  after 
the  assessment.  Under  such  a  statute  the  assessment  does  not 
make  the  taxes  an  incumbrance."  But  taxes  are  an  incumbrance 
within  the  covenant  against  incumbrances  from  the  time  they  be- 
come a  lien  upon  the  land,  whether  this  be  from  the  date  of  the 
assessment  or  from  a  time  fixed  by  statute,  though  they  have  not 
become  due  and  payable  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.*"  Stat- 
utory authority  is  necessary  to  create  a  lien  for  taxes,  and  a  strict 
compliance  with  the  statutory  requirements  is  necessary  to  the 
creation  of  such  lien.*''  A  more  extensive  treatment  of  the  sub- 
ject of  taxes  will  be  found  in  another  part  of  this  work. 

§  527.     Lien  of  municipal  or  corporation  taxes. — A  city  or 

35  Davidson  v.  Coon,   125  Ind.  497,  40  wiLson  v.  Piper   11  Ind   437 

25  N.  E.  601,  9  L.  R.  A.  584 ;  Thayer  "  Bradley  v.  Dike,  57  N.  j.  L.  471 

V.   Finnegan,    134    Mass.   62,    45    Am.  32  Atl.  132. 

Rep.  285;  Brown  v.  Knapp,  79  N.  Y.  ^2  Hill    v.    Bacon,    110    Mass.    387; 

1^6.  Lindsay  v.  Eastwood,  72  Mich.  336,  40 

3G  Thayer    v.    Finnegan,    134    Mass.  N.  W.  455  ;  Campbell  v.  McClure,  45 

62,  45  Am.  Rep.  285.  Nebr.  608,  63   N.  W.  920. 

3^  Owens  V.  Clayton,  56  Md.  129.  43  n^^    Britain    v.    Mariners'    Sav. 

3s  Dill  V.  Wisner,  88  N.  Y.  153.  Bank,  67  Conn.  528,  35  Atl.  505. 

•■'o  Manifold  V.  Jones,  117  Ind.  212, 
20  N.  E.  124. 


§    528  TITLKS    AND    ABSTRACTS  564 

town  has  a  lien  on  the  real  estate  within  its  corporate  limits  for 
assessments  made  for  various  purposes  beneficial  to  the  health 
and  well-being  of  the  inhabitants  thereof,  if  such  assessments  are 
made  in  pursuance  of  an  ordinance  authorizing  same.  But  such 
taxes  and  assessments  are  not  liens  unless  made  so  by  charter,  or 
unless  the  corporation  is  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  declare 
them  to  be  liens/*  Statutes  authorizing  cities  and  towns  to  make 
improvements  in  streets  generally  provide  that  the  expense 
thereof,  or  some  part  of  such  expense,  may  be  assessed  upon  the 
land  fronting  upon  such  streets,  and  such  assessments  are  made 
a  lien  upon  the  property/''  The  lien  created  by  assessments  for 
local  improvements  is  inferior  to  the  lien  of  general  taxes." 

Until  the  amount  of  a  tax  for  city  improvements  is  ascertained 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law,  no  lien  or  incumbrance  exists  by 
reason  thereof."  But  on  the  other  hand,  such  assessments  are 
a  lien  from  the  time  the  improvements  were  made,  according  to 
the  decisions  in  some  states.*""  A  lien  may  be  given  a  city  or 
town  for  placing  a  water-meter  in  a  building,*'"*  for  water  rates,''" 
or  for  removing  a  nuisance.^^ 

§  528.  Lien  of  officials'  bonds. — By  statute  in  many  states 
the  bonds  of  certain  public  officers  are  made  a  lien  upon  the  real 
estate  of  the  officer  and  his  sureties.  The  most  common  of  such 
bonds  are  those  of  collectors  of  taxes.  Such  a  lien  is  a  general 
lien  like  the  lien  of  a  judgment,  and  is  subject  to  the  equity  of 
third  persons.''-  A  statutory  lien  in  favor  of  the  state  upon  the 
land  of  a  collector  of  taxes  and  his  sureties  attaches  not  only  to  the 
lands  owned  by  him  at  the  time  of  the  approval  and  recording  of 
his  bond,  but  also  to  after-acquired  lands,  the  same  as  in  the  case 
of  a  judgment.''^  Where  official  bonds  are  made  liens  upon  the 
real  estate  of  the  obligor  and  his  sureties,  such  liens  continue  un- 

•1' Ham  V.  Miller,  20  Iowa  450  ;  Jef-  •"''^Provident    Inst,    for    Savings    v. 

ferson  v.  Whipple,  71  Mo.  519;  Quim-  Jersey  City,  113  U.  S.  506,  5  Sup.  Ct. 

by  V.  Wood,  19  R.  I.  571,  35  Atl.  149.  612.  28  L.  ed.  1102. 

*^  Fitch  V.  Creighton,  24  How.   (U.  -'^  Train  v.  Boston  Disinfecting  Co., 

S.)   159,  16  L.  ed.  596.  144  Mass.  523,  11  N.  E.  929,  59  Am. 

46  Ballard   v.   Ross,   38  Wash.   209,  Rep.  113. 

80  Pac.  439.  "  Crisfiel  v.  Murdock,  55  Hun   (N. 

47Gotthelf  V.  Stranahan,  138  N.  Y.  Y.)   143,  8  N.  Y.  S.  593,  28  N.  Y.  St. 

345,  34  N.  E.  286,  20  L.  R.  A.  455.  460. 

4^  LafFerty  v.  Milligan,  165  Pa.  St.  •''•■  Crawford    v.    Richeson,    101    111. 

534.  30  Atl.  1030.  351  ;  Kerr  v.  Hoskin.son,  5  Kans.  .\pp. 

■»«  Mofat  V.  Henderson,  18  J.  &  S.  193,  47  Pac.  172. 
(N.  Y.)  211. 


I 


565  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    529 

til  the  officer  is  discharged  from  his  official  obligation.  Official 
bonds  are  required  to  be  filed  or  recorded  in  some  county  office, 
and  these  should  be  ispected  in  every  case  to  ascertain  if  any 
owner  in  the  chain  of  title  is  under  such  bond  or  a  surety  thereon. 
Every  properly  conducted  abstract  office  should  keep  an  index  of 
the  names  of  bondsmen,  arranged  alphabetically;  so  that  no  time 
may  be  lost  in  compiling  the  abstract.  If  the  name  of  the  party 
appears,  the  record  should  be  examined  to  ascertain  if  there  has 
been  a  discharge,  and  if  no  discharge  of  the  obligation  appears, 
the  abstract  should  recite  all  the  material  parts  of  the  bond ;  other- 
wise it  may  be  wholly  disregarded. 

§  529.  Lease  not  strictly  a  lien. — A  lease  outstanding  is 
more  in  the  nature  of  an  incumbrance  than  a  lien.  A  lease  may 
be  an  actual  benefit,  rather  than  a  detriment  to  the  grantee  or 
mortgagee.  Nevertheless,  on  the  ground  that  the  purchaser  does 
not  obtain  the  full  dominion  and  use  of  the  property  subject  to  a 
lease,  the  lease  is  generally  held  to  be  an  incumbrance  within  the 
covenant  against  incumbrance.'"*  A  lease  should  be  exhibited  in 
the  abstract  along  with  other  incumbrances  at  the  end  of  the  ex- 
amination. Where  the  duration  of  the  term  covers  a  long  period 
of  years,  and  there  has  been  numerous  transfers  of  interests  less 
than  the  original  term,  it  would  seem  that  a  separate  examination 
should  be  made. 

§  530.  Grantors'  or  vendors'  liens. — The  doctrine  prevails 
in  a  number  of  states  that  a  vendor  of  real  estate  has  a  lien  upon 
the  premises  for  the  purchase-money,  as  against  the  vendee  and 
his  heirs,  although  he  has  taken  no  distinct  agreement  or  separate 
security  for  it.  There  is  a  natural  equity,  it  is  said,  that  the  land 
shall  stand  charged  with  so  much  of  the  purchase-money  as  is  not 
paid  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance.'"''  In  a  few  cases  the  vendor's 
right  has  been  regarded  as  in  the  nature  of  a  trust  for  the  payment 
of  the  purchase-money.^*^    The  lien  is  presumed  to  exist  in  all 

•'*  Edwards  v.  Clark,  83  Mich.  246,  Ind.    120.    5    N.    E.    910;    Phillips    v. 

47  N.  W.  112,  10  L.  R.  A.  659;  Taylor  Schall,  21  Mo.  App.  38. 
V.  Heitz,  87  Mo.  660;  Pease  v.  Christ,         '"'^  Dickerson  v.  Carroll.  76  Ala.  377; 

31  N.  Y.  141 ;  Cross  v.  Noble,  67  Pa.  Morgan   v.   Dalrymple,   59   N.  J.   Eq. 

St.  74.  22,  46  Atl.  664 ;   Senter  v.  Lambeth, 

ssBeal  V.  Harrington,   116  111.  113,  59  Tex.  259. 
4  N.   E.  664;    Barrett   v.   Lewis,    106 


§    531  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  566 

cases  unless  an  intention  be  clearly  manifested  that  it  shall  not 
exist. °^ 

Besides  the  purchaser  and  his  heirs,  the  right  exists  against 
the  dower  rights  of  the  purchaser's  wife,  against  the  pur- 
chaser's privies  in  estate,  and  against  subsequent  purchasers 
who  have  notice  of  the  nonpayment  of  the  purchase-money.''" 
Ordinarily  the  lien  is  not  waived  by  taking  a  note  or  bond 
or  other  personal  obligation  of  the  purchaser  alone,  for  the 
amount  of  the  unpaid  purchase-money.'*'  But  the  vendor's  lien 
is  presumptively  lost  by  his  taking  a  mortgage  upon  other  prop- 
erty, or  by  taking  other  independent  security  for  the  purchase- 
money. ''^  Such  liens,  being  secret  and  implied,  are  not  disclosed 
by  the  record,  and,  consequently,  will  not  appear  in  the  abstract. 

Aside  from  vendor's  liens  which  are  implied,  such  liens  may 
arise  by  contract  or  reservation.  Thus  a  lien  for  the  purchase- 
money  expressly  reserved  by  a  vendor  in  his  deed  of  conveyance 
is  a  lien  created  by  contract,  and  not  by  implication  of  law.  The 
lien,  then,  becomes  a  matter  of  record  when  the  deed  is  recorded."^ 
It  is  not  waived  by  the  taking  of  other  security,  as  in  the  case  of 
an  implied  vendor's  lien.'^'  It  is  governed  by  the  same  rules  which 
govern  a  mortgage.  It  passes  by  an  assignment  of  the  note  se- 
cured by  it.*^^  It  is  foreclosed  as  a  mortgage;  and  there  is  the 
same  right  of  redemption  for  a  limited  period  after  a  foreclosure 
sale."*  The  vendee's  title  is  imperfect  until  the  debt  is  paid, 
though  the  debt  for  the  purchase-money  be  barred  by  the  statute 
of  limitations."''  All  deeds  in  the  chain  of  title  should  be  care- 
fully examined  for  any  reservation  or  charge  upon  the  estate 
conveyed. 

§  531.     Vendee's     implied     lien     for     purchase-money. — 

Money  paid  by  a  vendee  of  land  prematurely,  or  before  receiving 
a  conveyance,  is  a  charge  upon  the  estate  in  the  hands  of  the 
vendor,  or  in  the  hands  of  his  grantee  with  notice.""    Whether  the 

•''"  Seymour  v.   Slide   &   Spur   Gold  '-^  Wilcox    v.    First    Nat.    Bank,   93 

Mines,  42  Fed.  633.  Tex.  322,  55  S.  W.  317. 

^»  Wilson   V.    Plutus   Min.   Co.,   174  o-'  Carpenter  v.  Mitchell,  54  111.  126. 

Fed.  317,  98  C.  C.  A.  189.  «*  Markoe  v.  Andras,  67  111.  34. 

5»  Lyon  V.  Clark,  132  Mich.  521,  94  "^  Hale  v.  Baker,  60  Tex.  217. 

N.   W.   4;    Manly   v.    Siason,   21'  Vt.  «p  Cooper  v.   Merritt,  30  Ark.  686; 

271.  52  Am.  Dec.  60.  Stewart  v.  Wood.  63  Mo.  252 ;  Chase 

CO  Rice  V.  Rice,  36  Fed.  858.  v.   Peck,  21   N.   Y.  581  ;   Elterman  v. 

GiQber  v.  Gallagher,  93  U.  S.  199,  Hyman,  192  N.  Y.  113,  84  N.  E.  937, 

23  L.  ed.  829.  127  Am.  St.  862n,  15  Ann.  Cas.  819; 


4 


567  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  |    532 

foundation  of  this  lien  is  natural  equity,  imputed  intention,  par- 
tial ownership,  the  implication  of  a  trust,  or  a  blending  of  some 
of  these  sources,  the  authorities,  almost  without  exception  in 
those  jurisdictions  which  give  a  lien  to  the  vendor,  are  clear  that 
one  exists.  If  a  purchaser  makes  a  deposit  on  account  of  the  pur- 
chase-money, at  the  time  of  executing  an  agreement  of  purchase, 
which  is  not  complete  because  the  vendor  is  unable  to  give  a  good 
title,  the  purchaser  has  a  lien  upon  the  land  for  the  money  so 
paid.^^  In  fact,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  the  default  which 
gives  rise  to  the  claim  for  the  lien  is  because  of  the  inability  or 
wrongful  refusal  of  the  vendor  to  convey  a  good  title.  If  the 
purchaser  has  assigned  his  contract;  his  assignee  has  a  lien  for 
what  has  been  paid."**  The  lien  has  been  allowed  for  moneys  paid 
under  parol  contracts  of  sale.*^"  The  lien  will  cover  interest  on 
purchase-money  paid,'"  or  money  spent  by  the  vendee  for  im- 
provements while  in  possession  under  the  contract."^  The  con- 
tract being  an  essential  basis  of  the  lien,  if  the  contract  is  de- 
stroyed or  annulled,  the  lien  is  at  an  end.^"  Like  the  vendor's  im- 
plied lien,  the  lien  of  the  vendee  does  not  appear  of  record,  and 
consequently  is  not  binding  on  subsequent  purchasers  and  cred- 
itors without  notice.'^ 

§  532.  Liens  arising  under  trusts. — It  is  everywhere  the 
general  rule  that  the  expenses  of  properly  administering  a  trust 
are  a  lien  on  behalf  of  the  trustee  on  the  estate  in  his  hands ;  and 
he  can  not  be  compelled  to  part  with  his  control  of  the  estate  until 
such  expenses  are  paid.  A  resulting  trust  is  sometimes  spoken 
of  as  an  equitable  lien.  Thus  where  one  person's  money  is  used 
to  purchase  land  the  title  to  which  is  taken  in  the  name  of  another, 
the  person  furnishing  the  money  has  an  equitable  lien  on  the 
property  so  purchased  for  the  amount  paid  therefor.'*  But  where 
the  entire  land  purchased  is  clearly  the  fruit  of  the  trust  fund, 

Small  V.  Small,  16  S.  Car.  64;  Wick-  ^iHickson  v.  Lingold,  47  Ala.  449; 

man  v.  Robinson,  14  Wis.  493,  80  Am.  Murray  v.  Hill,  60  111.  App.  80. 

Dec.  789.  '^^  Davis     v.     William     Rosenzweig 

67  Cleveland    v.    Bergen    Bldg.    &c.  Realty  Operating  Co.,  192  N.  Y.  128, 
Co.,  (N.  J.  Eq.)  55  Atl.  117.  84  N.   E.  943,  20   L.  R.  A.   (N.   S.) 

68  Aberaman  Iron  Works  v.  Wick-  175n,  127  Am.  St.  890. 

ens,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  101.  .  "Newberry  v.  French,  98  Va.  479, 

69  Vaughn    v.    Vaughn,    100    Tenn.     36  S.  E.  519. 

282,  45  S.  W.  677.  '-'  Williams  v.   Rice.  60  Mich.   102, 

"0  Rose  V.  Watson,   10  H.  L.  Cas.     26  N.  W.  846 ;  Sinclair  v.  Sinclair,  79 
672.  Va.  40. 


333 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


568 


the  cestui  que  trust  must,  upon  principle,  have  a  right  to  take  the 
land  itself.  Where  a  trustee  misapplies  trust  funds  and  converts 
them  into  different  property,  they  may  he  followed  wherever  they 
can  he  traced  through  their  transformations,  and  subjected  to  an 
equitable  lien  in  favor  of  the  rightful  o.wner  or  cestui  que  trust. '''^ 

§  533,  Mechanics'  liens  in  general. — A  mechanic's  Hen 
upon  real  property  is  wholly  a  creature  of  statute.  At  common 
law  a  mechanic  has  no  lien  upon  a  building  for  labor  done  upon 
it.  Equity  raises  no  lien  upon  it  other  than  the  grantor's  lien  for 
purchase-money.^"  A  mechanic's  lien  is  not  a  vested  right,  but 
an  additional  remedy  provided  by  law,  and  it  is  always  within  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  take  away  such  remedy  provided  it 
leaves  the  remedy  at  common  law  intact."  A  mechanic's  lien 
upon  real  property  has  been  declared  to  l)e  in  the  nature  of  a 
mortgage  of  the  property,'*^  though  it  is  imposed  by  statute  in 
favor  of  a  whole  class  of  persons.  It  has  also  been  likened  to  an 
attachment,  and  to  a  lis  pendens."  The  repeal  of  a  lien  law  with- 
out a  saving  clause  as  to  pending  cases  destroys  all  right  to  a 
lien,  as  it  is  of  entirely  statutory  origin  and  not  dependent  upon 
contract.^" 

A  contract,  express  or  implied,  of  the  ow^ner  of  the  land  is  nec- 
essary to  establish  a  mechanic's  lien  upon  it.  The  lien,  however, 
is  created,  not  by  the  contract,  but  by  furnishing  the  materials  or 
doing  the  work  under  the  contract.  Yet  a  contract  creating  an 
indebtedness  on  the  part  of  the  person  whose  property  is  to  be 
charged  with  a  lien  must  exist  in  the  first  place,  and  then  the  per- 
forming of  the  labor  or  the  furnishing  of  materials  under  the 
contract  creates  the  lien.''^  Tt  is  not  essential,  however,  that  the 
owner  should  be  personally  liable  for  the  work  done  or  the  mate- 
rials furnished.^-  By  written  contract,  independently  of  statute,  a 
mechanic's  lien  may  doubtless  be  reserved  upon  a  building  and 
the  land  connected  with  it.    This  lien  would  1)e  valid  between  the 


T-'Cook  V.  TulHs.  18  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
332,  21  L.  ed.  933;  Ferris  v.  Van 
Vechten,  12>  N.  Y.  113,  9  Hun  12. 

"•■'  Ellison  V.  Jackson  Water  Co.,  12 
Cal.  542. 

77  Durkheimer  v.  Copoeropolis  Cop- 
per Co.,  55  Ore.  TH ,   104  Pac.  895. 

7^  Curnow  v.  Happy  Valley  Blue 
Gravel  Co.,  68  Cal.  262,  9  Pac.  149. 

"•■'  Robins  v.  Bunn,  34  N.  J.  L.  322. 


80  Wilson  V.  Simon.  91  Md.  1,  45 
Atl.  1022.  80  Am.  St.  427. 

'"*!  Klondyke  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 71  Ark.  334.  75  S.  W.  854; 
Wendt  V.  Martin,  89  111.  139;  Cole  v. 
Clark.  85  Maine  336,  27  Atl.  186,  21 
L.  R.  A.  714. 

**2  Davis-Henderson  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Gottschalk,  81  Cal.  6^1,  22  Pac.  860. 


569  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    534 

parties,  and  might  be  enforced  as  against  others  who  might  sub- 
sequently acquire  an  interest  in  the  property,  with  notice  of  such 
reserved  Hen,  which  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage. ^^ 

§  534.  Mechanics'  liens  of  subcontractors. — In  most  of  the 
states,  subcontractors  equally  with  contractors  are  expressly  given 
liens  for  labor  done  and  material  furnished.  In  some  states  a 
subcontractor  in  the  second  or  more  remote  degree  is  not  entitled 
to  a  lien  given  to  a  subcontractor,  and  not  in  terms  given  to  con- 
tractors under  a  subcontractor.®*  A  subcontractor,  laborer,  or 
material-man,  in  dealing  with  the  contractor,  is  presumed  to  rely 
upon  his  lien  upon  the  property.^^  The  statutes  giving  the  sub- 
contractor a  lien  provide  in  general  that  no  subcontractor,  or 
other  person  acting  under  the  principal  contractor,  shall  be  en- 
titled to  a  lien  as  against  the  owner  unless  he  gives  notice  to  the 
owner  within  a  specified  time  of  his  claim  of  lien.  The  statutes 
differ  in  terms  and  in  many  minor  details;  but  in  the  object 
sought,  and  in  their  general  effect,  they  are  the  same.^*^  He  is 
bound  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  between  the  owner  and  the 
contractor."  If  a  principal  contractor  has  agreed  to  erect  a  build- 
ing and  deliver  it  free  of  all  liens  to  the  owner,  he  can  not  himself 
file  a  lien,®^  nor  can  a  subcontractor  under  him  file  a  lien,  because 
the  subcontractor  is  bound  by  the  original  contract,  and  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  notice  of  its  terms. ®^  Generally,  a  subcontractor, 
laborer,  or  material-man  can  acquire  a  lien  only  to  the  extent  of 
the  sum  due  from  the  owner  to  the  contractor  at  the  time  of 
giving  notice  to  the  owner  or  of  filing  the  lien.'-"'  Notice  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  statute  is  essential  to  a  lien  by  a  subcon- 
tractor.^^ 

Payment  in  good  faith  to  th&  principal  contractor,  pursuant  to 
the  terms  of  the  contract,  defeats  the  lien  in  behalf  of  a  subcon- 
tractor who  has  given  no  notice  of  his  claim. ''^ 

83  Smith    V.    Kennedy,   89    111.   485;  "^^  Scheid  v.  Rapp,  121   Pa.  St.  593, 

Martin  v.  Roberts,  57  Tex.  564.  15  Atl.  652. 

8*  McGugin  V.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  ^'•'  Dersheiiner  v.   Maloney,   143  Pa. 

33  W.  Va.  63,  10  S.  E.  36.  St.  532,  22  Atl.  813. 

85  Wolf  V.  Batchelder,  56  Pa.  St.  ='»  Trammell  v.  Hudmon.  78  Ala. 
87.  222;   Turner  v.   Strenzel,   70  Cal.  28, 

86  Frank  v.  Hudson,  39  N.  J.  L.  347.  11  Pac.  389. 

8^^  Dingley  v.   Greene,   54  Cal.  333 ;         ''^  Schmelzer  v.  Chicago  Ave.  Sash 
Andrews  v.  Burdick,  62  Iowa  714,  16     &  Door  Mfg.  Co.,  85  111.  App.  596. 
N.  W.  275.  '■'-  Andrews    v.    Burdick,    62    Iowa 

714,  16  N.  W.  275. 


535 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


570 


§  535.  Priority  of  mechanics'  liens. — A  mortgage  exe- 
cuted and  put  upon  record  in  pursuance  of  a  prior  contract  for  a 
loan,  and  afterwards  delivered  to  the  mortgagee  when  the  money 
is  advanced  on  the  mortgage,  has  priority  over  liens  for  work 
and  materials  furnished  after  the  mortgage  was  recorded,  for  the 
erection  of  a  building  commenced  between  the  time  of  recording 
the  mortgage  and  its  delivery,  in  case  the  mortgagee  had  no 
knowledge  of  the  commencement  of  the  building  when  he  parted 
with  his  money.®'*  Also  a  mortgage  for  the  purchase-money  of 
land,  made  simultaneously  with  the  conveyance,  takes  precedence 
of  any  lien  to  which  the  purchaser  may  subject  the  land.'''* 
Whether  a  mortgage  must  be  recorded  as  well  as  executed  before 
a  mechanic's  lien  has  attached  must  depend  very  much  upon  the 
terms  of  the  different  statutes.  Recording  is  not  necessary  to 
give  the  mortgage  priority  of  such  lien  under  recording  acts 
which  make  the  recording  necessary  only  as  against  subsequent 
purchasers  and  mortgagees."^  Actual  notice  by  a  lien  claimant  of 
an  unrecorded  mortgage  has  the  same  effect  as  a  prior  record  of 
the  mortgage.""  In  several  states  a  prior  mortgage  retains  its 
priority  only  upon  the  land,  the  mechanic's  liens  having  priority 
upon  the  buildings  or  improvements  erected  upon  the  land,  and 
then  only  in  case  the  buildings  can  be  removed  without  injury."^ 
Under  statutes  by  which  a  lien,  so  far  as  the  building  is  con- 
cerned, is  entitled  to  preference  over  a  prior  mortgage,  a  lien  for 
machinery  which  is  furnished  for  a  mill  in  its  construction,  and 
becomes  a  part  of  it,  in  like  manner  takes  precedence  over  a  prior 
mortgage.***  In  several  states  the  priority  of  a  mechanic's  lien 
depends  upon  the  priority  of  the  contract  under  which  the  labor  is 
performed  or  the  materials  furnished.  The  lien  has  priority  over 
a  mortgage  recorded  after  the  making  of  the  contract  under 
which  the  lien  is  claimed.  When  the  labor  is  performed  or  the 
materials  are  furnished  under  the  contract  the  lien  attaches  and 


"3  Jacobus  V.  Mut.  Benefit  Life  Ins. 
Co..  27  N.  J.  Eq.  604 ;  Title  Guarantee 
&  Trust  Co.  V.  Wrenn,  35  Ore.  62,  56 
Pac.  271,  76  Am.  St.  454. 

•'*  Middletown  Sav.  Bank  v.  Fel- 
lovves,  42  Conn.  36;  Ettridge  v.  Bas- 
sett,  136  Mass.  314;  Macintosh  v. 
Thurston,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  242. 

'•'''  Rose  V.  Munie,  4  Cal.  173;  Miller 
V.  Stoddard,  50  Minn.  272.  52  N.  W. 
895,    16    L.    R.    A.    288;    Mungcr    v. 


Curtis,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.)  465,  4  N.  Y. 
St.  847. 

»«  Miller  V.  Stoddard,  50  Minn.  272, 
52  N.  W.  895,  16  L.  R.  A.  288;  Brad- 
ford V.  Anderson,  60  Nebr.  368,  83 
N.  W.  173. 

97  Leach  v.  Minick,  106  Iowa  437, 
76  N.  W.  751. 

98  Hall  V.  St.  Louis  Mfg.  Co.,  22 
Mo.  App.  2ii. 


571  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    536 

relates  back  to  the  time  of  the  contract,  and  takes  priority  of  all 
mortgages  subsequently  made.®^ 

In  a  majority  of  the  states  mechanics'  liens  attach  in  prefer- 
ence to  all  incumbrances  upon  the  land  subsequent  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  buildings  or  improvements,  though  the  work 
was  done  or  the  materials  for  which  the  lien  is  claimed  was  fur- 
nished, subsequent  to  the  incumbrance/  In  the  provisions  in  re- 
gard to  priority,  a  subsequent  conveyance  is  regarded  as  a  subse- 
quent incumbrance,  though  the  statute  in  terms  only  refers  to 
"liens  and  incumbrances.""  If  the  lien  attaches  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  building,  it  takes  precedence  of  an  attachment 
or  judgment  which  becomes  a  lien  subsequently  to  such  com- 
mencement.^ 

Generally,  there  is  no  priority  among  different  persons  having 
mechanics'  liens  upon  the  same  building.^ 

§  536.     Estates  or  property  subject  to  mechanics'  liens. — 

As  a  general  rule,  public  property  can  not  be  subjected  to  a  me- 
chanic's lien.'^  But  the  real  estate  of  a  private  owner,  whether  his 
estate  be  in  fee  or  less  than  a  freehold,  may  be  subject  to  the  lien. 
One  having  only  a  limited  estate,  however,  can  not  create  a  lien 
more  extensive  than  his  own  interest.  If  the  ownership  is  in  f^e, 
the  lien  is  upon  the  fee;  but  if  the  ownership  is  of  a  less  estate, 
the  lien  is  upon  such  smaller  estate."  It  attaches  to  a  leasehold 
estate  not  only  in  the  hands  of  the  lessee,  but  also  in  the  hands  of 
his  assignee.^  It  attaches  even  to  the  interest  of  one  having  only 
a  verbal  lease  for  a  term  of  years, ^  and  to  the  interest  which  one 
has  under  an  agreement  for  a  lease.''  In  general,  the  interest  of 
a  lessor  can  not  be  subjected  by  the  lessee  to  a  mechanic's  lien  for 

'•'^  Thielman    v.    Carr.    75    111.    385 ;  Morganton  Hardware  Co.  v.  Morgan- 

Dunklee  v.  Crane,  103  Mass.  470.  ton  Graded  School.  150  N.  Car.  680. 

1  Brooks  V.  Burlington  &  South-  64  S.  E.  764.  134  Am.  St.  953,  17  Ann. 
western  R.  Co.,  101  U.  S.  443,  25  L.  Cas.  130;  W.  T.  Bradlev  Co.  v.  Gag- 
ed. 1057.  han,  208  Pa.  511.  57  Atl.  985. 

2  Fleming  v.  Bumgarner,  29  Ind.  <>  Choteau  v.  Thompson,  2  Ohio  St. 
424;  Warden  v.  Sabins,  36  Kans.  165,  114. 

12  Pac.  520.  7  Daniel  v.  Weaver,  5  Lea  (Tenn.) 

=5  In  re  Griel's  Appeal,  7  Sad.  (Pa.)  392. 

137,  9  Atl.  861.  -^  Nordyke  &  Marmon  Co.  v.  Hawk- 

4  Long  V.  Abeles,  77  Ark.  156,  93  eye  Woolen  Mills  Co.,  S3  Iowa  521, 
S.  W.  67;  Choteau  v.  Thompson,  2  5  N.  W.  693;  Webster  City  Steel 
Ohio  St.  114.  Radiator  Co.  v.  Chamberlin,  137  Iowa 

5  Albany  v.  Lvnch,  119  Ga.  491,  46  717.  115  N.  W.  504. 

S.  E.  622 ;  A.  L.  &  E.  F.  Goss  Co.  v.         '•'  Montandon   v.    Deas,    14   Ala.   33, 
Greenleaf,  98  Maine  436,  57  Atl.  581 ;     48  Am.  Dec.  84. 


537 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


572 


work  done  or  materials  furnished  on  the  contract  of  the  lessee, 
or  of  any  one  claiming  under  him.  To  bind  the  lessor's  interest, 
his  agreement  or  consent  must  be  shown.'"  It  has  been  held  that 
a  mechanic's  lien  can  not  be  enforced  against  a  building  when  the 
lienee  has  no  interest  in  the  land,  or  the  land  is  exempt  from  sale 
under  liens.''  An  equitable  estate  in  lands  may  be  subjected  to  a 
mechanic's  lien.'"  Thus,  the  interest  of  a  vendee  under  an  execu- 
tory contract  for  the  sale  of  land  is  subject  to  a  mechanic's  lien 
for  labor  and  material  furnished  under  contract  with  the  ven- 
dee.'^ A  building  erected  on  land  not  owned  by  the  party  em- 
ploying a  contractor  is  subject  to  the  lien  of  such  contractor,  and 
if  the  lienee  subsequently  acquires  title  to  the  land,  the  land  is 
also  subject  to  the  Hen.'^  A  lien  may  be  enforced  against  com- 
munity property  for  buildings  erected  under  a  contract  with  the 
husband.''^  A  mechanic's  lien  may  be  enforced  against  the  prop- 
erty of  a  college,'**  or  a  church.''  But  property  exempt  from 
execution  upon  grounds  of  public  necessity  can  not  be  subjected 
to  a  mechanic's  lien.'* 

§  537.  Assignment  of  a  mechanic's  lien. — The  authorities 
are  somewhat  conflicting  as  to  the  assignability  of  a  mechanic's 
lien.  The  prevailing  rule  is,  except  where  the  statute  provides  to 
the  contrary,  that  a  mechanic's  lien  is  strictly  a  personal  privilege, 
w'hich  can  not  be  enforced  by  an  assignee  of  the  debt  for  labor 
and  materials  in  his  own  name.'^  The  above  rule  applies  more 
particularly  to  the  assignment  of  the  mere  right  to  assert  a  me- 
chanic's lien.  If  the  lien  has  been  perfected  it  is  assignable  ac- 
cording to  some  authorities.'""    Some  authorities  hold  that  the  lien 


10  Rothe  V.  Bellingrath.  71  Ala.  5.S. 

"Green  v.  Tenold,  14  N.  Dak.  46, 
103  N.  W.  398,  116  Am.  St.  638. 

1-  Carey-Lombard  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Bierbauer,  76  Minn.  434,  79  N.  W. 
541. 

13  Monroe  v.  West,  12  Iowa  119,  79 
Am.  Dec.  524 ;  Fullmer  v.  Proust,  155 
Pa.  St.  275,  26  Atl.  543.  35  Am.  St. 
881. 

1*  Stewart  Contracting  Co.  v. 
Trenton  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  N.  J.  L.  568, 
60  Atl.  405. 

15  Douthitt  V.  MacCulsky,  11  Wash. 
601,  40  Pac.  186. 

16  University  of  Lewisburg  v.  Re- 
ber,  43  Pa.  St.  305. 


1"  Presbyterian  Church  v.  Allison, 
10  Pa.  St.  413. 

i«  Hall's  Safe  &  Lock  Co.  v.  Scites, 
.38  W.  Va.  691,  18  S.  K.  895. 

loRauer  v.  Fay,  110  Cal.  361,  42 
Pac.  902 ;  Fleming  v.  Greener,  173 
Ind.  260,  90  N.  E.  73,  140  Am.  St. 
254,  21  L.  R.  A.  959;  O'Connor  v. 
Current  River  R.  Co..  Ill  Mo.  185, 
20  S.  W.  16. 

-0  Clarkson  v.  Louderback,  36  Fla. 
660,  19  So.  887;  Williams  v.  Wein- 
baum,  178  Mass.  238.  59  N.  E.  626; 
Kerr  v.  Moore,  54  Miss.  286;  Not- 
tingham V.  McKendrick,  38  Ore.  495, 
57  Pac.  195,  63  Pac.  822. 


I 


573  LIENS    AND    INCUMBRANCES  §    538 

is  not  destroyed  by  the  assignment  of  the  debt;"^  and  while  the 
hen  must  generally  be  enforced  in  the  name  of  the  assignor,  in 
several  states  it  has  been  declared  by  statute  to  be  assignable.  A 
mechanic's  lien  is  assignable  in  equity  either  before  or  after  suit 
to  enforce  it  has  been  commenced."  No  particular  words  are 
necessary  to  constitute  an  assignment  of  a  debt  or  lien ;  it  is  suffi- 
cient if  the  intent  of  the  parties  to  effect  an  assignment  be  clearly 
established."^ 

§  538.  Assertion  and  enforcement  of  mechanics'  liens. — A 
mechanic's  lien  can  be  secured  only  by  compliance  with  the  statute 
in  filing  a  notice,  claim  or  statement  of  lien  in  the  manner  and 
within  the  time  prescribed.  No  other  notice  or  claim  of  lien, 
though  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  owner,  or  of  a  purchaser 
from  him,  has  any  effect.-*  Some  statutes  require  not  only  that 
a  proper  claim  be  filed,  but  that  this  claim  be  properly  indexed  and 
recorded.  The  filing  of  the  account  or  claim  is  a  prerequisite  to 
the  enforcement  of  the  lien.  It  does  not  bring  the  lien  into  exist- 
ence, for  the  lien  exists  inchoately  from  the  time  of  the  making 
of  the  contract,  or  from  the  time  the  building  was  commenced,  or 
the  work  upon  it  was  commenced,  whichever  the  particular  stat- 
ute prescribes  as  the  beginning  of  the  lien.-'^  The  lien  exists  by 
virtue  of  statutory  provisions,  and  the  requirements  prescribed 
for  securing  the  benefits  of  this  remedy  must  be  observed.'-" 

All  the  particulars  required  to  be  stated  in  the  notice  creating 
the  lien  are  material.  They  are  provided  for  in  order  that  a 
proper  record  or  index  or  docket  may  be  made  of  the  claim,  and 
thereby  notice  of  the  claim  given  to  the  owner,  and  protection 
afforded  to  purchasers  and  mortgagees.-  The  admission  of  any  of 
the  particulars  required  by  statute  to  be  stated  is  fatal  to  the 
lien.-^  Statutes  generally  provide  that  the  notice  must  be  filed 
within  a  specified  time  from  the  date  of  the  completion  of  the 
work  or  the  furnishing  of  the  materials,  and  a  notice  or  statement 

21  Midland   R.   Co.   v.   Wilcox,    122  24  Shackle  ford  v.  Beck,  80  Va.  573. 

Ind.  84,  23  N.  E.  506.  -^  Douglas  v.  St.  Louis  Zinc  Co.,  56 

2-  Cairo    &    Vincennes    R.    Co.    v.  Mo.  388. 

Fackney,  78  111.  116;  Murphv  v.  Ad-  26  Rgindollar  v.  Flickinger,  59  Md. 

ams,  71  Maine  113,  36  Am.  Rep.  299.  469. 

2--  Soule   V.    Borelli,   80   Conn.    392.  -~  Cannon  v.  Williams,  14  Colo.  21, 

68    Atl.    979;    Skyrme    v.    Occidental  23  Pac.  456;  Robertson  v.  Moore,  10 

Mill  &  Mining  Co..  8  Nev.  219;  Not-  Idaho  115.  77  Pac.  218. 
tinsham  v.  McKendrick.  38  Ore.  495, 
57  Pac.  195,  63  Pac.  822. 


538 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


574 


filed  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  Hmited  is  ineffectual  to  create 
a  lien,"^  even  as  to  a  purchaser  with  notice.'""  As  a  general  rule 
the  statutes  provide  that  action  be  brought  to  foreclose  the  lien 
within  a  specified  time  after  the  lien  is  filed,""  or  payment  under 
the  contract  becomes  due.^^  A  lien  which  has  lapsed,  by  failure 
to  commence  a  suit  to  enforce  it  within  the  time  prescribed,  can 
not  be  revived.    It  becomes  wholly  void  by  lapse  of  time.^" 


28  Hugg  V.  Hintrager,  80  Iowa  359, 
45  N.  W.  1035. 

29  Von  Tobel  v.  Ostrander,  158  111. 
499,  42  N.  E.  152. 

=">  Hughes  Bros.  v.  Hoover,  3  Cal. 
App.  145,  84  Pac.  681  ;  Service  v. 
McMahon,  42  Wash.  452,  85  Pac.  33. 


31  Eisendrath  Co.  v.  Gebhardt,  222 
111.  113.  78  N.  E.  22. 

32  Union  Nat.  Sav.  Assn.  v.  Hel- 
berg,  152  Ind.  139.  51  N.  E.  916; 
Weyer  v.  Beach,  79  N.  Y.  409. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


LIS  PENDENS  AND  ATTACHMENTS 

SEC.  SEC. 

545.  The  doctrine  of  lis  pendens.  549.  Statutory  provisions   for  record. 

546.  Proceedings    to    which    doctrine  550.  Requisites  of  a  valid  notice, 
applies.  551.  Persons  charged  with  notice. 

547.  Commencement  and  duration  of  552.  Attachment. 

lis  pendens.  553.  Proceedings    to    procure    attach- 

548.  Elements  necessary  to  constitute  ment. 
a  lis  pendens. 

§  545.  The  doctrine  of  lis  pendens. — Lis  pendens  may  be 
defined  to  be  the  jurisdiction,  power,  or  control  which  courts  ac- 
quire over  property  involved  in  a  suit  pending  the  continuance  of 
the  action,  and  until  final  judgment  therein.^  Lis  pendens  is  of 
legal  origin  and  does  not  rest  on  equitable  doctrines  of  notice,^ 
nor  in  the  doctrine  peculiar  to  courts  of  equity.^  The  doctrine  is 
entirely  distinct  from  the  doctrine  which  charges  all  parties  to  an 
action  with  notice  of  the  orders  and  judgments  therein.*  The 
doctrine  is  founded  upon  the  consideration  that  no  suit  could  be 
successfully  terminated  if,  during  its  pendency,  the  property  of 
the  defendant  could  be  transferred  so  that  it  would  not  be  bound 
by  the  decree  or  judgment  in  the  hands  of  the  assignee.^  The 
doctrine  is  not,  however,  carried  to  the  extent  of  making  it  con- 
structive notice  of  a  prior  unregistered  deed.®  Thus  a  creditor 
filing  a  Hs  pendens  in  attachment  proceedings  does  not  thereby 
acquire  priority  over  an  unrecorded  deed  executed  and  delivered 
by  the  defendant  before  the  filing  of  the  attachment.'^ 

§  546,  Proceedings  to  which  doctrine  applies. — The  doc- 
trine of  lis  pendens  applies  to  both  actions  at  law  and  suits  in 

1  Dupee  V.  Salt  Lake  &c.  Trust  Co.,  ^  Allen  v.  Poole,  54  Miss.  323 ; 
20  Utah  103,  57  Pac.  845,  11  Am.  St.  Turner  v.  Houpt,  53  N.  J.  Eq.  526,  12, 
902.  Atl.  28;  Arrington  v.  Arrington,  114 

2  Bridger    v.    Exchange    Bank,    126  N.  Car.  151.  19  S.  E.  351. 

Ga.  821,  56  S.  E.  97,  8  L.  R.  A.   (N.  "  Douglass    y.    McCrackin,    52    Ga. 

S.)  463n,  115  Am.  St.  118.  596. 

^Latta  V.  Wiley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  ^  Kohn  v.  Lapham,   13  S.  Dak.  78, 

92  S.  W.  433.  82  N.  W.  408. 

*  West    Lumber    Co.    v.    Lyon,    53 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  648,  116  S.  W.  652. 

575 


§  547  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  576 

equity,''  but  applies  only  to  actions  and  suits  which  directly  affect 
property."  At  common  law  it  is  applicable  to  all  actions  and  suits 
directly  affecting  real  estate."'  Thus  it  applies  to  an  action  to  set 
aside  a  deed"  or  mortgage,'"  or  for  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  of  sale,'"  or  to  subject  lands  to  a  trust/''  to  enforce  a  ven- 
dor's lien,'""'  or  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,'"  or  to  charge  the 
separate  estate  of  a  married  woman  with  the  payment  of  a  debt,'^ 
or  an  action  to  set  aside  the  probate  of  a  will  devising  land.'" 
iVlso  persons  who  purchase  real  estate  during  the  pendency  of  an 
action  to  recover  the  possession  thereof  takes  or  holds  it  subject 
to  the  judgment  entered  in  such  proceedings."*  The  rule  has  been 
held  to  apply  to  special  proceedings  affecting  land."" 

Administration  proceedings  in  a  probate  court  are  not  consid- 
ered as  lis  pendens,  so  as  to  afford  notice  of  all  the  property  be- 
longing to  the  estate."' 

§  547.  Commencement  and  duration  of  lis  pendens.- — No- 
tice from  a  lis  pendens  arises  from  the  time  of  the  service  of  the 
writ  or  summons,"  and  in  the  absence  of  a  supersedeas  or  its 
equivalent,  it  terminates  with  final  adjudication  in  the  case  and  is 
not  extended  by  appeal."^  But  it  has  been  held  that  an  action  will 
be  deemed  to  be  pending  so  as  to  charge  third  persons  with  notice 
of  the  plaintiff's  rights  until  the  final  determination  of  the  cause 

"Norton    v.    Birge,    35    Conn.    250;  Cooney  v.  Coppock,  119  Iowa  486,  93 

Mclhvrath  v.  Hollander.  1?,  Mo.  105,  N.  W.  495. 

39  Am.  Rep.  484;   Lament  v.  Cheshire.  i^  Boss  v.  Jordan.  118  Iowa  204,  89 

65  N.  Y.  30;  Rollins  v.  Henry.  78  N.  N.  W.  1070,  92  N.  W.  111. 

Car.  342.  ^«  Mcllwrath  v.  Hollander,  12,  Mo. 

"  Greenwood   v.   Warren.    120    Ala.  105,  39  Am.  Rep.  484. 

71,  23  So.  686;  Paine  v.  Root.  121  III.  i'' Kirkland   v.  Trott.   75   Ala.  321; 

n,  13  N.  E.  541  ;  Zoeller  v.  Riley.  100  Equitable  Securities  Co.  v.  Green,  113 

N.  Y.  102,  2  N.  E.  388,  53  Am.  Rep.  Ga.  1013,  39  S.  E.  434. 

157.  20Rubel   V.   Title  &c.   Co.,    101    111. 

10  Di  Nola  V.  Allison,  143  Cal.  106,  App.  439;  Shirk  v.  Whitten,  131  Ind. 

76  Pac.  976.  65  L.  R.  A.  419,  101  Am.  455,  31  N.  E.  87. 

St.  84.  21  Seibel   v.    Bath,   5   Wyo.   409,   40 

11^  Lenders  v.  Thomas.  35  Fla.  518.  Pac.  756. 

17  So.  633,  48  Am.  St.  255;   Bigelow  22  pranklin    Sav.    Bank    v.    Taylor. 

V.  Brewer,  29  Wash.  670.  70  Pac.  129.  131    III.  376,  23  N.   E.  397;   Allen  v. 

12  Ellis  V.  Sisson,  96  111.  105.  Mandaville.    26    Miss.    397;    Haugh- 

1'  Clark    V.    Farrow.    10    B.    Mon.  wout  v.   Murphv.  22   N.  J.   Eq.   531 ; 

(Ky.)   446,  52  Am.  Dec.  552.  Fuller    v.    Scribncr.    76    N.    Y.    190; 

1*  Friedman  v.  Janssen,  23  Ky.  L.  Staples  v.  White,  88  Tenn.  30,  12  S. 

2135.  66  S.  W.  752.  W.  339. 

i"'  Pennington    v.    Martin,    146    Ind.  23  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar- 

635.  45  N.  E.  1111.  rett.  239  III.  297,  87  N.  E.  1009,  130 

icMalone  v.  Marriott,  64  Ala.  486;  Am.  St.  229. 


577  LIS    PENDENS    AND    ATTACHMENTS  §    548 

on  appeal,'*  and  during  the  time  allowed  for  a  petition  for  a  re- 
hearing."'' As  to  a  cross-action  or  cross-complaint  by  the  defend- 
ant, setting  up  afifirmative  rights  against  the  plaintiff,  the  lis  pen- 
dens begins  from  the  filing  of  such  cross-action  or  cross- 
complaint.'"  The  lis  pendens  is  notice  of  matters  alleged  in  an 
amended  bill."''  A  dismissal  of  the  action  defeats  lis  pendens  as 
to  a  grantee  of  the  holder  of  the  legal  title  without  notice.'^ 
When  the  litigation  is  ended,  and  the  rights  of  the  parties  have 
been  determined,  the  notice  ceases.-'' 

§  548.  Elements  necessary  to  constitute  a  lis  pendens. — 
In  order  to  constitute  a  lis  pendens  so  as  to  affect  persons  acquir- 
ing an  adverse  interest  in  specific  property  it  is  essential  that  four 
elements  concur :  ( 1 )  The  suit  must  be  prosecuted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  asserting  some  right  in  or  relating  to  the  identical  prop- 
erty; (2 )  the  property  must  be  of  a  character  to  be  subject  to  the 
rule;  (3)  the  court  must  have  jurisdiction  both  of  the  person  and 
the  property,  and  (4)  the  property  must  be  sufficiently  described 
in  the  proceedings.  If  any  one  of  these  essentials  is  wanting, 
there  is  no  valid  lis  pendens.^** 

Where  there  is  no  statute  permitting  the  filing  of  a  notice  of 
lis  pendens  in  counties  other  than  the  one  where  the  action  is  in- 
stituted, the  action,  in  order  to  affect  lands  purchased  or  incum- 
bered during  its  pendency,  must  be  brought  in  the  county  where 
the  land  is  situated. ^^ 

§  549.  Statutory  provisions  for  record. — In  many  states 
the  original  doctrine  of  lis  pendens  has  been  modified  by  statutory 
provisions  requiring  a  notice  of  lis  pendens  to  be  registered  or 
recorded  in  some  particular  mode,  in  order  to  charge  a  purchaser 
or  mortgagee  with  notice  of  the  litigation.^-  Lis  pendens  acts 
limit  the  method  of  creating  lis  pendens.  They  abrogate  the  com- 
mon law  upon  the  subject;  and,  if  the  statutory  mode  be  not  fol- 

2*  Olson  V.  Leibpke.   110  Iowa  594.  2n  p^ge  y.  Waring.  76  N.  Y.  463. 

81  N.  W.  801.  80  Am.  St.  327.  3°  McCampbell    v.    Mason,    151    111. 

25  Bird  V.  Gilliam.   125  N.   Car.  76,  500,  38  N.  E.  672;   Harrison  v.  Shaf- 

34  S.  E.  196.  fer,  60  Kans.  176,  55  Pac.  881  ;  Leav- 

2«Bridger   v.   Exchange   Bank,    126  ell  v.   Poore,  91    Ky.   321,    13   Ky.   L. 

Ga.  821,  56  S.  E.  97,  8  L  R.  A.  (N.  51.  15  S.  W.  858. 

S.)  463n,  115  Am.  St.  118.  '^i  Benton    v.    Shafer.    47    Ohio    St. 

27  Turner  v.    Houpt,   53   N.   J.   Eq.  117,  24  N.  E.  197.  7  L.  R.  A.  812. 

526,  33  Atl.  28.  ••'2  Smith  v.  Gale,  144  U.  S.  509.  12 

2^  Karr  v.  Burns,  1  Kans.  App.  232.  Sup.  Ct.  674,  36  L.  ed.  521 ;  Todd  v. 

40  Pac.  1087.  Outlaw,  79  N.  Car.  235. 

37 — TnoMP.  Aestr. 


§    550  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  578 

lowed,  there  can  be  no  lis  pendens  as  to  third  parties.'''  The  stat- 
utory method  of  filing  formal  notice  of  lis  pendens  is  made  con- 
structive notice  to  the  world  of  the  litigation/'*  puts  upon  the  pur- 
chaser or  incumbrancer  the  duty  of  informing  himself  in  that  re- 
gard and  binds  him  by  the  result  thereof.^'^  The  notice  provided 
by  statute  ordinarily  takes  the  place  of  such  notice  as  theretofore 
arose  by  operation  of  law,'*^  being  considered,  not  as  constructive 
notice,  but  as  affording  a  convenient  method  of  enforcing  the 
common-law  doctrine  of  lis  pendens. ^^ 

^  550.  Requisites  of  a  valid  notice. — Statutes  usually  pro- 
vide that  no  lis  pendens  or  attachment  shall  be  valid  as  against  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  without  actual  notice,  unless  a  mem- 
orandum thereof  describing  the  premises,  the  title  of  the  cause, 
and  the  names  of  the  parties,  shall  have  been  entered  upon  the 
register  of  deeds.  Generally,  no  particular  form  of  notice  is  re- 
quired; but  it  should  state  the  name  of  the  court  in  which  the 
action  is  pending,  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  action,  the  object 
of  the  action,  and  a  description  of  the  property  sought  to  be  af- 
fected by  the  action.^**  It  is  sometimes  held  that  even  where 
statutes  provide  for  formal  notice  of  lis  pendens,  failure  or  insuf- 
ficiency of  such  notice  may  be  immaterial  where  a  purchase  is 
made  after  suit  has  actually  commenced,^'*  but  it  is  essential  that 
there  should  have  been  some  official  record  of  the  pendency  of  the 
action,'*'^  and  in  some  states  nothing  but  the  statutory  notice  will 
be  deemed  constructive  notice  of  an  action  pending.*^ 

The  provisions  of  state  statutes  with  regard  to  notice  do  not 
apply  to  actions  in  federal  courts,  the  action  in  itself  being  suffi- 
cient notice  of  lis  pendens.*"  The  statutes  generally  provide  that 
notice  of  lis  pendens,  in  order  to  affect  subsequent  purchasers, 
shall  be  filed  in  the  registry  of  deeds  where  the  land  is  situated. 

Where  the  suit  is  pending  at  the  time  of  the  examination,  the 

33  Pennington   v.    Martin,    146   Ind.  3t>  Bryant    Timber    Co.    v.    Wilson, 

635.  45  N.  E.  1111.  151  N.  Car.  154.  65  S.  E.  932,  134  Am. 

3*  Freedman    v.    Safran,    131    App.  St.  982. 

Div.  675,  116  N.  Y.  S.  113.  ^o  Barasch  v.  Kramer,  62  Misc.  475, 

35  Peninsular    Naval    Stores   Co.   v.  115  N.  Y.  S.  176. 

Cox,  57  Fla.  505,  49  So.  191.  "i  First   Nat.    Bank   v.    Farmers'   & 

30Latta  V.  Wiley  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,   171    Ind.  323, 

92  S.  W.  433.  86  N.  E.  417. 

37McVay   v.   Tousley,   20   S.    Dak.  *^ln   re   Miller,  64   Misc.   467,   119 

258,  105  N.  W.  932.  N.  Y.  S.  555. 

38  Potter  V.  Rowland,  8  N.  Y.  448, 
Seld.  Notes  133. 


579  LIS   PENDENS    AND   ATTACHMENTS  §    551 

notice  lis  pendens  may  be  exhibited  at  the  end  of  the  abstract,  but 
where  a  synopsis  of  the  proceedings  in  the  action  is  included,  the 
notice  properly  belongs  in  connection  with  such  synopsis.  An  ex- 
ample of  a  synopsis  of  a  notice  of  lis  pendens  is  as  follows : 


John  Jones 


V. 


Sam  Smith. 


Circuit  Court  of  Marion 

County,  Indiana. 
Notice  of  lis  pendens. 
Filed  Dec.  3,  1917. 
Recorded  Dec.  4,  1917. 
Vol.  45,  page  250. 


Recites  that  the  above  entitled  action  was  commenced  in  the 
said  court  on  the  3d  day  of  December,  1917,  and  is  now  pending 
therein.  Plaintiff  sues  defendant  to  foreclose  a  vendor's  lien  for 
purchase-money  of  the  following  described  real  estate  in  Marion 
County,  Indiana,  to  wit  [describe  premises]. 

§  551.  Persons  charged  with  notice. — Only  those  persons 
are  charged  with  notice,  or  are  affected  by  lis  pendens  who,  pend- 
ing the  suit,  purchase  from  a  party  to  the  suit,^^  or  derive  title 
from  one  so  purchasing.**  It  is  not  notice  to  a  purchaser  whose 
conveyance  was  made  before  the  commencement  of  the  action,*^ 
though  his  deed  is  not  recorded  until  after  a  notice  of  lis  pendens 
is  filed  in  the  recorder's  office.**^  It  is  primarily  applicable  to  pur- 
chasers from  parties  to  the  action,  and  in  general  will  not  bind 
strangers,  although  where  a  judicial  sale  is  absolutely  void  by  rea- 
son of  a  lis  pendens  it  can  confer  no  title  on  a  stranger.*'  While 
most  usually  applied  to  purchasers  pendente  lite,  it  is  also  applied 
to  mortgagees,  lienors,  lessees,  and  attachment  and  judgment 
creditors  pendente  lite. 

§  552.  Attachment. — An  attachment,  as  affecting  real 
property,  is  a  provisional  remedy,  whereby  a  debtor's  property, 
or  any  interest  therein  capable  of  being  taken  under  a  levy  and 
execution,  is  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  law,  to  secure  the  in- 
terests of  the  creditor  pending  the  determination  of  an  action.  It 

43  Bright  V.  Buckman,  39  Fed.  243 ;  ^<-'  Warnock  v.  Harlow.  96  Cal.  298, 

Green    v.    Rick.    121    Pa.    St.    130,    15  31  Pac.  166,  31  Am.  St.  209. 

Atl.  497,  2  L.  R.  A.  48,  6  Am.  St.  760.  *-  McDonald    v.    Rankin,    92    Ark. 

4*  Norton  v.  Birge,  35  Conn.  250.  173,  122  S.  W.  88. 

*^^  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fletcher, 
44  Iowa  252. 


§    553  TITLES    AND    ARSTRACTS  580 

is  purely  a  statutory  proceeding  and  was  unknown  to  tlie  common 
law.  It  is  a  special  proceeding  in  the  nature  of  a  proceeding  in 
rem,  and  is  collateral  to  and  ancillary  to  the  main  action.  It  is 
not  a  fixed  and  vested  charge  on  the  property,  but  is  a  contingent, 
conditional  charge  thereon,  until  the  judgment  and  levy.'*'*  It  is 
a  lien  on  the  property  attached  to  secure  the  satisfaction  of  any 
judgment  that  may  be  recovered.'*'' 

So  long  as  the  property  attached  remains  in  the  custody  of  the 
law,  the  court  has  jurisdiction  over  it  to  make  any  proper  order 
in  reference  thereto,  but  the  property  while  in  custodia  legis  is  not 
subject  to  seizure  and  sale  on  execution.  The  lien  of  the  attach- 
ment is  preserved  by  the  rendition  of  a  final  judgment  in  the  ac- 
tion,'"^  though  it  is  sometimes  merged  in  such  judgment."'^ 

As  a  rule,  an  attachment  reaches  only  the  debtor's  interest  in 
the  property  at  the  time  ot  the  levy,  and  the  lien  created  thereby 
is  subject  to  a  prior  attachment  lien,^-  landlord's  lien,^^  or  me- 
chanic's lien.''* 

§  553.  Proceedings  to  procure  attachment. — Attachment 
proceedings  are  not  precisely  alike  in  any  two  of  the  states,  but 
they  are  subject  to  the  control  of  the  same  general  principles. 
The  procedure  prescribed  by  the  statute  must  be  strictly  followed 
in  order  to  secure  validity  to  the  transaction,^'*  and  the  court  can 
act  only  under  the  special  power  limited  by  the  statute  and  ac- 
cording to  the  forms  of  procedure  it  prescribes. ''" 

The  initial  step  in  a  proceeding  to  (jbtain  a  writ  of  attachment 
is  an  affidavit  made  by  the  plaintiff,  or  some  person  in  his  behalf, 
showing:  (1)  The  nature  of  the  claim,  (2)  that  it  is  just,  (3)  the 
amount  the  plaintiff  ought  to  recover,  and  (4)  that  there  exists 
some  one  or  more  of  the  grounds  enumerated  in  the  statute  for 
an  attachment.  This  affidavit  may  be  made  at  the  time  of  the 
filing  of  the  complaint  or  at  any  time  afterward,  and  it  has  been 

^"^  Ex  parte  Foster,  2  Storv  ( U.  S.)  ^'^  Thomp.son      v.      Simpson      (Mo. 

131,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  4960.  App.),  127  S.  W.  620. 

■«■' Potlatch  Lumber  Co.  v.  Runkel,  ^3  Porter    v.    Rice     (Ky.),    128    S. 

16  Idaho  192.  101   Pac.  396.  23  L.  R.  W.  70. 

A.  (N.  S.)  536n.  18  Ann.  Cas.  591.  f'*  Herrmann     v.     New    York,     136 

50  Hughes  V.   Farmers'   Nat.  'Bank,  App.  Div.  28,  120  N.  Y  .S.  146. 

83  Vt.  386,  76  Atl.  3.3.  •••■Rudolph    v.    Saunders,    111    Cal. 

"  Great    Falls    Nat.    Bank    v.    Mc-  233.  43  Pac.  619. 

Clure.  176  Fed.  208.  ^'-  Estlow  v.   Hanna,   75   Mich.  219. 

42  N.  VV.  812. 


581  LIS    PENDENS    AND    ATTACHMENTS  §    553 

held  that  a  sworn  complaint  may  subserve  the  purpose  of  both 
a  complaint  and  affidavit."^ 

The  general  rule  is  that  before  a  plaintiff  can  sue  out  a  judicial 
attachment  it  is  necessary  to  give  a  bond  to  indemnify  the  defend- 
ant for  any  injury  he  may  sustain  by  reason  of  the  abuse  of  the 
process.  The  bond  is  one  of  the  prerequisites  to  jurisdiction  and 
must  be  given  before  the  attachment  issues.  The  record  must 
show  that  the  bond  was  filed  before  the  writ  was  issued.^'* 

Upon  the  filing  of  a  proper  affidavit  and  bond  in  the  office  of 
the  clerk  of  the  court  having  jurisdiction  in  the  main  action,  the 
court  makes  an  order  directing  the  clerk  to  issue  and  deliver  to 
the  sheriff  a  writ  or  order  of  attachment  requiring  such  sheriff 
to  seize  and  take  possesion  of  the  property  of  the  defendant  not 
exempt  from  execution.  The  order  of  attachment  binds  the 
property  of  the  defendant  from  the  time  of  its  delivery  to  the 
sheriff  in  the  same  maner  as  an  execution.  The  levy  of  the 
writ  of  attachment,  to  be  sufficient,  must  be  made  in  the  presence 
and  with  the  assistance  of  disinterested  persons  who  must  also  ap- 
praise the  property  attached.  The  sheriff  must  make  return  of 
the  order  together  with  the  inventory  and  appraisement  of  the 
property,  and  such  return  must  contain  a  description  of  the  prop- 
erty attached. ^'^^  There  can  be  no  judgment  in  attachment  until 
there  is  a  judgment  in  the  main  action,  and  the  lien  created  by  the 
levy  of  an  attachment  has  no  force  or  effect  after  judgment  has 
been  rendered  in  the  cause,  unless  there  is  a  special  judgment  or 
order  of  sale  of  the  propery  attached,  and  a  special  execution. '""'^ 
In  order  to  seize  and  hold  the  property  of  the  defendant  and  ac- 
quire a  valid  lien  thereon  before  judgment,  the  statute  must  be 
strictly  followed  in  obtaining  the  order  and  in  the  service  of  the 
same."^ 

The  statutes  usually  provide  that  no  attachment  shall  be  valid 
against  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  without  actual  notice, 
unless  a  memorandum  thereof  describing  the  premises,  the  title 
of  the  cause,  and  the  names  of  the  parties,  shall  have  been  entered 
upon  the  register  of  deeds.    The  levy  of  an  attachment,  when  all 

•"'"Fremont   Cultivator   Co.   v.    Ful-  9  Ky.  L.  334.  5  S.  W.  346;  Biicklin  v. 

ton,  103  Ind.  393,  3  N.  E.  135.  Crampton,  20  Vt.  261. 

^8  Snelling    v.    Bryce,    41    Ga.    513 ;  go  Thomas  v.  Johnson,  137  Ind.  244, 

Root  V.  Monroe,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  594.  36  N.  E.  893. 

■''■^  Dronillard    v.    Whistler,   29    Ind.  "i  Harding  v.   Guaranty  &c.   Trusi 

552;   White  v.  O'Bannon,  86  Ky.  93,  Co.,  3  Kans.  App.  519,  43  Pac.  835. 


§    553  TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS  582 

the  Statutory  requirements  are  complied  with,  is  notice  to  only 
those  who  buy  of  a  party  to  the  suit."" 

In  some  states  where  real  property  is  attached,  it  is  required 
that  a  lis  pendens  be  filed,  and  a  failure  to  file  same  renders  the 
attachment  inoperative  as  constructive  notice  against  bona  fide 
purchasers."^ 

Where  a  memorandum  or  certificate  of  the  levy  is  on  file  as  re- 
quired by  the  statute,  this  is  sufficient  notice  of  the  pendency  of 
the  attachment  proceeding,  and  its  notation  in  the  abstract  is  all 
that  is  required,  but  many  capable  abstracters  prefer  to  include  a 
synopsis  of  the  entire  proceedings.  The  following  is  an  example 
of  such  synopsis : 


John  Taylor 

V. 

William  Burns 


Circuit  Court  of  Marion 
County,  Indiana 

Cause  No.  7562 

Attachment 

Affidavit  and  bond  filed,  and 
writ  issued  March  4,  1917.  Return  of  writ  and  appraise- 
ment on  March  5,  1917,  showing  levy  upon  all  the  right, 
title  and  interest  of  said  defendant  in  and  to  the  following  de- 
scribed real  estate:  [Here  describe  property  as  in  return.] 
Personal  service.     (Cause  pending.) 


John  Taylor 

V. 

William  Burns 


Certificate  of  Levy 
Recorded  March  5,  1917 
Book  78,  page  200 


Charles  Coffin,  sheriff  of  Marion  county,  Indiana,  certifies 
that  by  writ  of  attachment,  issued  in  cause  No.  7562  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Marion  County,  Indiana,  in. favor  of  John  Taylor, 
plaintiff,  and  against  William  Burns,  defendant,  dated  March 
4,  1917,  he  did  on  the  4th  day  of  March,  1917,  levy  on  the  right, 
title  and  interest  of  said  defendant  in  and  to  the  following  de- 
scribed real  estate  to  wit :  [Insert  description.] 

62  Travis  v.  Supply  Co.,  42  Kans.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  171  Ind.  323, 
625,  22  Pac.  991.  86  N.  E.  417. 

"3  First   Nat.    Bank   v.    Farmers'   & 


CHAPTER    XXIV 

JUDGMENTS  AND  DECREES 
SEC.  SEC. 

560.  Judgments  in  general.  572.  Exemption   of  real   estate   from 

561.  Effect  of  judgments  and  decrees.  judgments. 

562.  Lien  of  judgments.  573.  Satisfaction     and     discharge     of 

563.  Territorial  extent  of  lien.  judgments. 

564.  Duration  of  judgment  lien.  574.  Decrees  in  general. 

565.  Rank  and  priority  of  lien.  575.  Operation  and  effect  of  decrees. 

566.  Property    or    interest    liable    to  576.  Effect  of  decree  in  the  absence 
lien.  of  personal  service. 

567.  Docketing,  indexing  and  record-  577.  Lien  of  decrees, 
ing  judgments.  578.  Form  of  decrees. 

568.  Requisites  as  to   form  of  judg-  579.  Abstracting  the  decree. 

ments.  580.  Effect    of    misnomer    of    parties 

569.  Points  to  be  noticed  in  the  ex-  generally. 

amination  of  a  judgment  record.     581.  Effect  of   error   or   omission   of 

570.  Judgment      against      deceased  middle  name  or  initial, 
party.                                                      582.  Doctrine  of  idem  sonans. 

57L  Judgments    against    infants  ■  and     583.  Operation  and  effect  of  decrees 
insane  persons.  of  probate  courts. 

584.  Foreign  judgments  and  decrees. 

§  560.  Judgments  in  general. — A  judgment  is  the  final  de- 
cision pronounced  by  the  court  upon  matters  contained  in  the  rec- 
ord before  it.^  It  is  a  judicial  act  and  constitutes  the  conclusion 
of  the  law  upon  the  pleadings  and  evidence."  It  is  the  final  de- 
termination of  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  an  action,  or  proceed- 
ing. Strictly  speaking,  the.term  "judgment"  is  applicable  to  suits  at 
law,  while  a  "decree"  is  applied  to  suits  in  chancery.  But  "judg- 
ment" and  "decree"  are  usually  employed  as  convertible  terms. ^ 
There  is  practically  no  difference  between  judgments  at  law  and 
decrees  in  equity.*  A  decree  is  a  sentence  or  order  of  the  court 
pronounced  on  hearing  and  understanding  of  all  the  facts  in  issue, 
and  determining  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  suit  according  to 
equity  and  good  conscience.^  The  most  numerous  judgments 
are  those  in  personam,  or  those  which  seek  merely  to  fasten  a  per- 

1  Burke  V.  Burke,  142  Iowa  206,  119  s  Lamson  v.  Hutchings,  118  Fed. 
N.  W.  129;  McGuire  v.  Bryant  Lum-     321,  55  C.  C.  A.  245. 

ber  &c.  Co.,  53  Wash.  425,   102  Pac.  *  Cook  v.  Jennings,  40  S.  Car.  204, 

237.  18  S.  E.  640. 

2  Rutter  V.  Carothers,  223  Mo.  631,  ^  Wooster  v.  Handy,  23  Fed.  49,  23 
122  S.  W.  1056.  Blatchf.  112. 

583 


561 


ttti.es  and  abstracts 


584 


sunal  liability  upon  the  defendant,  irrespective  of  any  particular 
property.  These  are  important  only  as  statutory  liens,  and  may 
he  disregarded  after  satisfaction  or  limitation  has  run  against 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  decrees  in  equity  usually  give  affirma- 
tive relief,  or  operate  in  some  way  upon  the  land  of  the  defend- 
ant, and  become  a  part  of  the  chain  of  title. 

^561.  Effect  of  judgments  and  decrees. — The  cause  of 
action  is  merged  in  the  judgment  thereon,''  and  the  parties  and 
their  privies  are  concluded  thereby.  A  judgment  in  rem  adjudi- 
cates the  status  of  particular  subject-matter  and  does  not  per- 
sonally bind  the  judgment  defendant.^ 

In  determining  property  rights  depending  upon  a  judicial  de- 
cree, the  rights  of  the  parties  will  be  deemed  fixed  at  the  time  of 
the  rendition  of  the  decision  by  the  court. ^  A  judgment  or  decree 
of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  which  creates  or  changes  a 
title,  or  any  interest  in  an  estate,  is  final  as  to  the  parties  and  all 
persons  claiming  under  them."  But  a  judgment  or  decree  which 
attempts  to  adjudicate  matters  not  in  isue  is  not  binding  on  the 
parties  attempted  to  be  affected  thereby.^"  Nor  is  a  judgment 
conclusive  between  the  parties  as  to  immaterial  and  unessential 
facts,  even  though  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings  and  directly  de- 
cided." 

In  the  examination  of  a  title  we  are  concerned  only  in  such 
judgments  as  are  liens  on  the  land  involved  created  by  the  acts  of 
courts  adjudging  that  the  land  be  taken  in  execution,  or  be  sub- 
jected to  a  charge. 

§  562.  Lien  of  judgments. — A  judgment  lien  is  the  crea- 
tion of  statute,*-  and  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
abolish  the  lien  before  rights  become  vested  under  it.^^  It  is  not 
a  specific  lien  on  any  particular  real  estate  of  the  judgment  de- 
fendant, but  a  general  lien  upon  all  his  real  estate,  subject  to  all 


<*•  Knight  V.  Rothschild,  132  App. 
Div.  274,  117  N.  Y.  S.  26. 

7  Gassert  v.  Strong,  38  Mont.  18,  98 
Pac.  497. 

**  Robinson  v.  Covers,  138  N.  Y. 
425,  34  N.  E.  209. 

'Prince  v.  Antle.  90  Ky.  138,  11 
Kv.  L.  927.  13  S.  W.  436;  Grevem- 
berg  V.  Bradford,  44  La.  400,  10  So. 
786. 


^"  Stearns  Ranchos  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dowell, 134  Cal.  562,  66  Pac.  724. 

11  House  V.  Lockwood,  137  N.  Y. 
259,  33  N.  E.  595. 

12  Brier  v.  Traders'  Nat.  Bank,  24 
Wash.  695,  64  Pac.  831. 

13  Williams  v.  Hutchinson  &  S.  R. 
Co.,  62  Kans.  412,  63  Pac.  430,  84  Am. 
St.  408. 


585  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    563 

prior  liens,  either  legal  or  equitable,  irrespective  of  any  knowledge 
of  the  judgment  creditor  as  to  the  existence  of  such  liens. ^*  It 
only  confers  a  right  to  levy  on  the  land  of  the  judgment  defend- 
ant to  the  exclusion  of  other  adverse  interests  subsequent  to  the 
judgment,  and  when  the  levy  is  actually  made  on  the  same,  the 
title  of  the  judgment  plaintiff,  for  this  purpose,  relates  back  to  the 
time  of  his  judgment,  so  as  to  cut  out  intermediate  encum- 
brances.^^ The  judgment  lien  attaches  to  all  the  real  estate  of  the 
judgment  debtor,  title  to  which  stands  in  his  name  and  which  is 
situated  in  the  county  where  the  judgment  is  rendered  or  re- 
corded."' In  some  states  issuance  of  an  execution  is  a  prerequi- 
site to  the  attaching  of  the  lien,'"  and  in  others  proper  docketing 
only  is  required.^*  Under  some  statutes  judgments  of  inferior 
courts  are  not  liens  unless  properly  docketed.'" 

The  judgment  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  of  any  other  inferior 
court  usually,  by  express  statutory  provision,  becomes  a  lien  only 
after  the  filing  of  a  transcript  thereof  in  the  circuit  or  superior 
court."" 

§  563.  Territorial  extent  of  lien. — The  judgment  of  a  fed- 
eral court  is  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  defendant 
throughout  the  state  in  which  it  is  rendered  to  the  same  extent, 
and  subject  to  the  same  conditions,  as  in  the  case  of  a  judgment 
rendered  by  a  state  court.-'  And  the  statute  of  a  state  requiring 
judgments  to  be  recorded  in  the  county  in  which  the  land  lies 
has  no  effect  upon  the  lien  of  a  judgment  of  a  federal  court." 
But  according  to  some  authorities  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  fed- 
eral court  is  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor  in 
the  judicial  district  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered."^  In 
1888,  however,  congress  enacted  a  law  restricting  the  lien  of  such 
judgments  primarily  to  the  county  where  the  court  was  sitting  at 

"  Indiana  School  Dist.  v.  Werner,  20  Petray   v.   Howell,  20   Ark.  615 ; 

43  Iowa  643 ;  Rodgers  v.  Bonner,  45  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gibson,  104  Ind. 

N.  Y.  379.  336,  3  N.  E.  892 ;  Easterling  v.  Chiles, 

15  Conard     v.     Atlantic     Insurance  93  Ky.  315,   14  Kv.  L.  287,  20  S.  W. 

Co.,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  386,  7  L.  ed.  189.  227. 

1"  Greenwood    v.    Trigg,    Dobbs    &  ^i^ooke  v.  Avery,  147  U.  S.  375,  13 

Co.,  143  Ala.  617,  39  So.  361.  Sup.  Ct.  340,  ?n  L.  ed.  209. 

1^  Bourn    v.    Robinson    (Tex.    Civ.  --  Doyle  v.  Wade,  23  Fla.  90,  1  So. 

App.),  107  S.  W.  873.  516,  11  Am.  St.  334. 

18  Curry   v.    Lehman,    55    Fla.    847,  23  Sellers  v.  Corwin,  5  Ohio  398,  24 

47  So.  18.  Am.  Dec.  301. 

1^  Haymond  v.  Murphy,  65  W.  Va. 
616,  64  S.  E.  855. 


§    564  TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS  586 

the  time  of  its  rendition,"*  but  authorized  their  transfer  under 
state  laws  to  other  counties  of  the  federal  district  for  the  purpose 
of  making  them  a  lien  on  real  estate  in  the  county  to  which  the 
transfer  is  made.-^ 

In  order  that  the  judgment  of  a  court  in  one  county  may  become 
a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  the  defendant  in  another  county  of  the 
same  state,  the  statutes  usually  provide  that  a  transcript  of  the 
judgment  must  be  recorded  or  docketed  in  such  other  county;^" 
for,  as  a  general  rule,  unless  this  is  done  the  lien  will  bind  only  the 
lands  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  court  rendering 
the  judgment."^ 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary  the  lien  of  a  judgment 
upon  lands  in  an  existing  county  is  not  affected  by  the  creation  of 
a  new  county  out  of  a  portion  of  such  county  including  the  land 
subject  to  such  judgment  lien.-^ 

§  564.  Duration  of  judgment  lien. — The  duration  of  a 
judgment  lien  is  generally  fixed  by  statute,  and  in  most  states 
they  are  made  to  continue  for  the  period  of  ten  years  from  the 
date  of  the  rendition  thereof.  The  period  fixed  is  not  extended 
by  the  levy  of  an  execution  and  the  filing  of  a  creditor's  bill,  nor 
by  a  stipulation  contained  in  the  judgment  that  the  execution  shall 
not  issue  for  a  certain  time.'''  The  courts  have  no  power  to  extend 
the  lien  of  a  judgment  beyond  the  period  prescribed  by  statute.^" 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  a  justice's  court,  does  not 
extend  ten  years  from  the  date  of  filing  the  transcript  with  the 
clerk  of  the  circuit  court,  but  it  extends  ten  years  from  the  date  of 
its  rendition. ^^  The  lien  of  a  judgment  of  a  circuit  court,  filed 
in  a  county  other  than  the  one  in  which  it  was  rendered,  expires 
at  the  same  time  the  lien  expires  in  the  county  in  which  such 
judgment  was  rendered.^" 

2*U.  S.  Comp.  St.   (1901)  p.  701.  28  Garvin  v.  Garvin,  34  S.  Car.  388, 

2"  Rock      Island      Nat.      Bank      v.  13  S.  E.  625. 

Thompson,  173  111.  593.  50  N.  E.  1089,  20  Gardenhire  v.  King,  97  Tenn.  585, 

64  Am.  St.  137.  Zl  S.  W.  548. 

2«  Curry  v.  Lehman.  57  Fla.  385,  49  ^0  McAfee    v.    Reynolds,    130    Ind. 

So.  673;  Yackle  v.  Wightman,  103  111.  2>Z,  28  N.  E.  423,  18  L.  R.  A.  211,  30 

169 ;  Berry  v.  Reed,  12,  Ind.  235  ;  Ber-  Am.  St.  194. 

gen  v.  State,  58  Miss.  623 ;   Perry  v.  3i  Mahoney  v.   Neff,    124   Ind.   380, 

Morris,  65  N.  Car.  221.                   '  24  N.  E.  152. 

27  State    V.    Record,    80    Ind.    348 ;  32  Bradfield  v.  Newby,  130  Ind.  59, 

Close  V.  Close,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  472 ;  Lo-  28  N.  E.  619. 
gan  V.   Pannill,  90  Va.   11,   17  S.   E. 
744. 


II 


587  JUDGMENTS    AND   DECREES  §    565 

Where  the  statute  provides  that  no  execution  can  issue  to  en- 
force a  judgment  which  is  a  Hen  upon  the  real  estate  of  a  deceased 
judgment  debtor  until  one  year  after  his  death,  that  year  can  not 
be  counted  as  part  of  the  ten  years'  limitation,  and  the  lien  of  the 
judgment  continues  for  eleven  years.^^  A  judgment  ceases  to  be 
a  lien  on  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  real  estate  of  a  deceased  judg- 
ment debtor  after  eleven  years  from  the  date  of  its  rendition.^* 

The  lien  of  a  judgment  ceases  at  the  expiration  of  the  period 
fixed  by  statute,  although  an  execution  has  been  issued  before  that 
time.^^  The  levy  of  an  execution  during  the  life  of  the  judgment 
does  not  extend  the  lien  of  the  judgment  beyond  the  period  fixed 
by  the  statute,  nor  does  such  levy  create  a  new  lien.^*^ 

The  duration  of  a  judgment  of  a  federal  court  is  regulated  by 
the  provision  that  "judgments  and  decrees  rendered  in  a  United 
States  circuit  or  district  court,  within  any  state,  shall  cease  to  be 
liens  on  real  estate  or  chattels  real,  in  the  same  manner  and  at 
like  periods  as  judgments  and  decrees  of  courts  of  such  states 
cease,  by  law,  to  be  liens  thereon.""^ 

§  565.  Rank  and  priority  of  lien. — A  judgment  lien  is  in- 
ferior to  rights  and  liens  existing  at  the  time  that  it  attaches,^*  ex- 
cept in  so  far  as  the  rights  of  the  prior  claimant  or  encumbrancer 
may  be  affected  by  the  recording  acts.^®  It  is  inferior  to  the  rights 
of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  acquired  before  it  becomes  effective, *° 
or  before  it  is  docketed  in  such  manner  as  to  give  constructive  no- 
tice to  subsequent  purchasers/^  The  lien  of  a  judgment  is  su- 
perior to  that  of  subsequent  judgments,*"  mortgages,*"  or  convey- 
ances.** Where  a  statute  requires  indexes  to  be  kept,  and  judg- 
ment liens  to  be  entered  therein,  a  judgment  duly  taken,  but  not 
correctly  entered  in  such  index,  can  not  have  priority  over  a  sub- 

33  In  re  Holmes,  131  N.  Y.  80,  29  so  Feinberg  v.  Stearns,  56  Fla.  279, 

N.  E.  1003.                       ^  47  So.  797,  131  Am.  St.  119. 

3*  Taylor  v.  McGrew,  29  Ind.  App.  ^^^  Allen-West    Commission    Co.    v. 

324,  64  N.  E.  651.  Millstead,  92   Miss.  837,  46   So.  256, 

35  Harden  v.  Day,  29  Wash.  664,  70  131  Am.  St.  556. 

Pac.  118.  *i  Haring  v.  Murphy,  60  Misc.  374, 

36  Smith  V.  Schwartz,  21  Utah  126,     113  N.  Y.  S.  452. 

60  Pac.  305,  81  Am.  St.  670.  ^2  Buffalo   Sav.   Bank  v.   Hunt,  64 

37  U.  S.  Rev.  Stat.,  §  967.  Misc.  643,  118  N.  Y.  S.  1021. 

38  Huff  V.  Sweetser,  8  Cal.  App.  ^3  Howard  v.  Rumble,  4  Ga.  App. 
689,   97    Pac.    705 ;    Prather   v.   Hair-  327,  61  S.  E.  297. 

grove,  214  Mo.  142,  112  S.  W.  552;  "  Handford  v.  Edwards,  89  Ark. 
Burling  V.  Stillwell,  74  N.  J.  Eq.  697,  151,  115  S.  W.  1143,  23  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
69  Atl.  978.  S.)   190n. 


^  566  TITLES  AND  ABSTRACTS  588 

sequent  mortgage  taken  without  notice/'  A  specific  equitable 
lien  upon  land  is  preferred  to  a  subsequent  judgment.*"^  If  the 
equitable  lien  and  the  judgment  lien  come  into  existence  at  the 
same  time,  the  former  is  not  entitled  to  preference  in  case  it  was 
created  to  secure  an  antecedent  indebtedness,  with  no  new  consid- 
eration advanced  at  the  time  on  the  faith  of  it.*^ 

Where  judgments  are  held  by  different  persons  which  are  not 
liens  upon  the  prpoerty  of  the  debtor,  the  judgment  creditor  who 
first  issues  execution  and  levies  upon  the  property  secures  a  prior 
lien  ;  and  where  the  lien  of  different  judgments  attach  to  property 
at  the  same  instant,  as  where  the  debtor  acquires  it  subsequent 
to  the  rendition  of  all  the  judgments,  then  neither  judgment  has 
priority  over  the  other.*® 

§  566.  Property  or  interest  liable  to  lien. — As  a  general 
rule  a  judgment  lien  attaches  to  all  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment 
debtor  in  which  he  has  any  beneficial  interest,*'*  and  which  is  sit- 
uated in  the  county  where  the  judgment  is  rendered  or  recorded.'^"' 
In  most  states,  however,  the  docketing  and  recording  of  a  tran- 
script of  the  judgment  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  which  the 
judgment  was  rendered,  extends  the  lien  to  lands  of  the  judgment 
debtor  in  such  other  county.^ ^ 

An  estate  for  life  is  subject  to  a  judgment  lien,  such  estate  be- 
ing "real  estate"  wathin  the  meaning  of  the  statute  creating  the 
lien.'^" 

A  leasehold  estate  is  not  generally  subject  to  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment,^"'' but  sometimes  statutes  expressly  provide  for  a  lien  on  all 
terms  which  have  more  than  a  certain  number  of  years  to  run. 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions  to  the  contrary,  equitable 
estates  or  interests  in  lands  are  not  generally  subject  to  judgment 
liens. ^*    Under  statutes  subjecting  equitable  interests  to  the  lien, 

^-'^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  V.  Hesser,  77  ^-i  Yackle    v.    Wightman,     103     III. 

Iowa  381.  42  N.  W.  325,  4  L.  R.  A.  169;  Hubbard  v.  Jones,  61  Kans.  722, 

122,  14  Am.  St.  297.  60     Pac.     743 ;     Farmers'     Bank     v. 

<6  Stevens  v.  Watson,  4  Abb.  Dec.  Heighe,    3    Md.    357 ;    Firebaugh    v. 

CN.  Y.)  302.  Ward,  51  Tex.  409. 

*-  Dwight  V.  Newell,  3  N.  Y.  185.  ''2  Anderson  v.  Tydings,  8  Md.  427, 

■isKisterson  v.  Tate,  94  Iowa  665,  63  Am.  Dec.  708;  Verdin  v.  Slocum, 

63  N.  W.  350.  58  Am.  St.  419.         -  71  N.  Y.  345. 

4»  H     B.    Claflin    Co.    v.    King,    56  '"'^  Northern     Bank     v.     Roosa,     13 

Fla.  767,  48  So.  Z7.  Ohio  334 ;  Bismark  Building  &  Loan 

50  Greenwood    v.    Trigg    Dobbs    &  Assn.    v.    Bolster,    92    Pa.    St.    123. 

Co..  143  Ala.  617,  39  So.  361 ;  Lehigh  Contra.   First  Nat.  Bank  v.   Bennett, 

&  N.  E.  R.  Co.  V.  Hanhauser,  222  Pa.  40  Iowa  537. 

248   70  Atl.  1089.  ^*  Alorsell   v.    First   Nat.    Bank,   91 


589  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    567 

mortgaged  land  of  the  judgment  debtor,  the  "equity  of  redemp- 
tion," is  subject  to  the  hen,  even  where  the  legal  view  of  a  mort- 
gage is  adopted,  and  in  states  where  the  mortgagee  has  merely  a 
lien  without  the  legal  title,  the  mortgagor's  interest  in  the  land  is 
so  subject  as  a  legal  estate.^" 

In  all  of  the  states  except  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,  land  ac- 
quired by  the  judgment  debtor  subsequent  to  the  rendition  or 
docketing  of  the  judgment,  are  subject  to  the  lien.^'  But  it  is  held 
that  a  judgment  creditor  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  judgment  de- 
clared a  lien  on  land  purchased  by  the  debtor  since  the  debt  was 
contracted  when  the  record  title  thereof  is  not  in  the  debtor, 
although  the  land  may  be  subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  judg- 
ment by  other  proceedings." 

§  567.  Docketing,  indexing  and  recording  judgments. — 
It  is  the  settled  policy  of  the  law  to  require  notice  to  be  given  to 
all  the  world  of  the  title  to  and  encumbrances  upon  real  estate,  to 
the  end  that  an  innocent  purchaser,  having  no  notice  of  liens  or 
adverse  claims  not  disclosed  by  the  records  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  the  statute,  will  hold  land  as  against  such  claims  and 
liens.  Judgments  and  liens,  in  order  to  bind  land  as  against  per- 
sons having  no  actual  notice  thereof,  must  appear  of  record  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  law ;  that  is,  they  must  be  found  in  the  rec- 
ords wherein  the  statute  requires  them  to  be  entered.  It  is  plain 
that  a  judgment,  though  formally  entered  and  signed  upon  a 
paper  duly  filed  and  attached  to  the  court  files,  would  not  operate 
as  a  lien,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  not  found  in  the  books  provided 
by  law  as  the  receptacle  of  the  records  of  judgments.'"* 

In  several  states,  in  order  that  a  judgment  may  become  a  lien 
on  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor,  it  must  be  docketed  and 
indexed  in  accordance  with  the  statute.""  But  a  statute  requiring 
the  docketing  of  a  judgment  to  create  a  lien  does  not  apply  to  a 
judgment  foreclosing  a  mortgage.""     Where  dockets  or  records 

U.  S.  357.  23  L.  ed.  436:  Freedman's  "  Sewell  v.  Drake,  27  Ky.  L.  571, 

Sav.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Earle,  110  U.  S.  85  S.  W.  748. 

710,  4  Sup.  Ct.  226,  28  L.  ed.  301.  r,x  ^^^^  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hesscr,  77 

■•''  Pahlman     v.     Shunnvay.    24    111.  Iowa  381,  42  N.  W.  325,  4  L.  R.  A. 

127;    Macauley  v.    Smith,    132    N.    Y.  122,  14  Am.  St.  297. 

524,  30  N.  E.  997 ;  Trimble  v.  Hunter,  ■••■>  Dewey  v.  Sugg,  109  N.  Car    328 

104  N.  Car.   129.   10  S.  E.  291;   Kin-  13  S.  E.  923,  14  L.  R.  A.  393;  Nye  v. 

ports  V.  Boynton,  120  Pa.  St.  306,  14  Moody,    70   Tex.  434,   8   S.    W.   606; 

Atl.  135.  6  Am.  St.  706.  Fulkerson  v.  Taylor,  100  Va.  426,  41 

^'■Jackson     v.      Bank     of     United  S.  E.  863. 

States.  5   Crancli   C.   C.   1,   Fed.  Gas.  «« Huntington    v.    Meyer,    92    Wis. 

No.  7131.  557,  66  N.  W.  500. 


§    568  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  590 

have  been  lost  or  destroyed  it  will  be  presumed  that  a  judgment 
rendered  was  duly  docketed."^ 

In  some  states  the  entry  of  a  judgment  in  the  proper  court  cre- 
ates a  lien  upon  all  the  debtor's  lands  in  the  county  in  which  the 
judgment  is  rendered.  In  other  states  the  judgment  must  be 
"docketed"  in  some  book,  either  in  the  clerk's  office  of  that  court, 
or  more  frequently  in  the  registry  of  deeds  of  that  or  another 
county,  to  become  a  lien  on  the  lands  of  the  debtor  therein,  at 
least  as  against  purchasers  or  encumbrancers  without  notice.  In 
the  states  which  do  not  require  the  docketing  of  a  judgment  in 
the  county  where  rendered,  the  lien  of  the  judgment  may  run 
back  not  only  to  the  moment  of  its  rendition,  but  to  the  first  day 
of  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered.*'" 

The  docket  usually  recites:  (1)  The  full  name  of  the  defend- 
ant, (2)  the  name  of  the  plaintiff,  (3)  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment, (4)  the  day,  hour,  and  minute  when  the  judgment  roll  was 
filed,  (5)  the  day,  hour,  and  minute  when  it  w^as  docketed,  (6) 
the  court  wherein  the  judgment  was  rendered,  and  (7)  the  name 
of  the  plaintiff's  attorney.  The  docket  entry  must  be  based  on 
a  final  judgment,  and  the  indexing  of  the  docket,  where  the  law 
requires  it,  on  a  valid  docket. 

§  568.  Requisites  as  to  form  of  judgments. — Where  there 
is  no  statute  requiring  a  judgment  to  be  in  any  particular  form,  it 
is  sufficient  if  by  the  use  of  proper  language  it  states  what  the  pre- 
vailing party  shall  receive,  and  what  the  losing  party  is  required 
to  do,  pay,  or  discharge.""  Strict  formality  in  the  language  is 
unnecessary,  it  being  sufficient  if  the  entry  shows  that  the  merits 
of  the  case  have  been  finally  adjudicated  and  determined.  The 
judgment  is  tested  by  its  substance,  rather  than  by  its  form.*^* 
Even  where  the  statute  prescribes  the  form,  a  departure  from  this 
form  is  not  necessarily  fatal  to  the  adjudication."^  A  judgment 
will  be  sufficient  if  it  responds  to  the  pleadings,  proof,  and  find- 
ings, and  is  determinative  of  the  issues  submitted.*"'"  The  judg- 
ment should  also  conform  to  the  prayer,"'  but  this  rule  has  been 

^1  American   Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hill,  •'■^  Lester  v.  Brown.  57  Ga.  79. 

92  Ga.  297,  18  S.  E.  425.                   .  '•«  Stone   v.    Perkins,   217    Mo.   586, 

«2  Hathaway  v.   Howell,   54   N.    Y.  117  S.  W.  717;   Smith  v.  Pitts   (Tex. 

97.  Civ.  App.),   122   S.  W.  46;   Gross  v. 

^3  Robinson   v.   Salt  Lake   City,   Zl  Bennington,  52  Wash.  417,   100   Pac. 

Utah  520.  109  Pac.  817.  846. 

64  Melton  V.  St.  Louis  L  M.  &  S.  R.  ct  Duff  v.  Combs,  132  Ky.  710,  117 

Co.,  99  Ark.  433,  139  S.  W.  289.  S.  W.  259. 


591  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    568 

greatly  relaxed  in  many  states,"''  and  in  equitable  actions  the 
prayer  for  general  relief  authorizes  any  judgment  consistent  with 
the  proof. ^'^ 

When  the  court  has  cognizance  of  the  controversy  as  it  appears 
from  the  pleadings  and  has  the  parties  before  it,  then  the  judg- 
ment or  order  which  is  authorized  by  the  pleadings,  however  er- 
roneous, irregular  or  informal  it  may  be,  is  valid  until  set  aside 
or  reversed  upon  appeal  or  writ  of  error.'^"  The  judgment  should 
be  definite,  certain  and  consistent,  but  indefiniteness  is  no  ground 
for  reversal.'^  Mere  errors  or  irregularities  as  to  matters  of 
form,  which  work  no  prejudice  to  third  persons,  is  not  ground  for 
vacating  or  amending  a  judgment  after  it  has  become  a  finality."" 

No  particular  directions  can  be  usefully  given  as  to  the  matter 
of  setting  out  judgments  in  the  abstract.  The  nature  of  the  judg- 
ment will  usually  dictate  whether  it  is  proper  to  include  a  full 
synopsis,  or  to  pass  the  matter  with  a  brief  reference  to  the  name 
and  title  of  the  court,  the  number  of  the  case,  the  names  of  the 
parties,  plaintiff  and  defendant,  the  fact  of  the  judgment,  its 
amount,  and  the  number  and  page  of  the  record  or  docket  where 
the  case  may  be  found.  The  record  should  be  carefully  perused, 
and  any  errors,  omissions,  and  irregularities  noted  in  connection 
with  the  minute  made  of  the  judgment.  The  following  is  an  ex- 
ample of  what  is  usually  shown  in  an  abstract : 

State  of  Indiana, 


I  ss 
Marion  County 


John  Davis 

V. 

William  Smith 


Superior  Court  of  Marion 

County,  Indiana 
Case  No.  5280 
Action  on  account 
Fee  Book  25,  page  40 
Judgment  rendered  against  de- 
fendant. April  12,  1917  for 
$500.00 
Recorded  April  20  in  Judgment 

TVT  .•       •         1  ;       Docket  150,  page  8 

No  execution  issued.  ^  ^    ^ 

When  the  lien  of  the  judgment  does  not  depend  upon  the  is- 

^8  Garrett  v.   Cohen,  63   Misc.   450,  "i  Frederick     v.     Buckminster,     83 

117  N.  Y.  S.  129.  Nebr.  135.  119  N.  W.  228. 

^^  Kimmerly  v.  McMichael,  83  Nebr.  '-  Loeser  v.  Savings  Deposit  Bank 

789.  120  N.  W.  487.  &  Trust  Co..  163  Fed.  212,  89  C.  C.  A. 

^0  Hope  V.  Blair,  105  Mo.  85,  16  S.  64 ;    Seaboard    Air    Line    R.    Co.    v. 

W.  595,  24  Am.  St.  366.  Harby,  55  Fla.  555,  46  So.  590. 


§    569  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  592 

siiancc  of  an  execution,  the  latter  act  need  not  be  shown,  unless 
it  has  resulted  in  a  reduction  or  partial  satisfaction  of  the  judg- 
ment ;  but  where  the  issuance  of  an  execution  is  necessary  to  con- 
stitute the  judgment  a  lien,  or  to  prevent  the  lien  from  lapsing, 
the  issuance  of  the  execution  l>ecomes  important,  and  should  be 
shown.  \\'here  the  examination  does  not  disclose  the  issuance  of 
an  execution  or  other  proceedings  following  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment,  these  matters  should  be  shown  in  continuations  of  the 
abstract,  either  by  exhibiting  the  judgment  and  all  proceedings 
attending  it,  or  by  noting  the  substance  of  the  proceedings  had 
under  the  judgment. 

§  569.  Points  to  be  noticed  in  the  examination  of  a  judg- 
ment record. — We  have  said  that  it  is  seldom  necessary  to 
give  a  full  synopsis  of  the  judgment,  but  that  the  entire  record 
should  be  carefully  examined  for  errors,  omissions,  and  irregu- 
larities. This  examination  should  cover  such  matters  as  ( 1 )  The 
title  and  name  of  the  court;  (2)  the  names  of  all  parties,  plaintiff 
and  defendant;  (3)  the  summons  or  other  notice,  or  publication 
by  which  the  defendants  were  brought  into  court;  (4)  the  return 
of  the  writ,  showing  w^ho  were  served,  when  served,  and  how- 
served;  (5)  the  nature  of  the  claim  as  disclosed  by  the  bill,  peti- 
tion, or  complaint;  (6)  whether  the  defendant  answered  or  suf- 
fered default,  and  if  he  answered,  the  nature  of  such  answer; 
(7)  if  any  of  the  parties  were  under  legal  disability,  whether  a 
guardian  ad  litem  was  appointed,  and  an  answer  filed  as  pro- 
vided by  law ;  (8)  the  date  of  the  judgment ;  (9 )  the  term  of  the 
court;  (10)  the  number  of  the  record  and  page  where  it  is  en- 
tered; (11)  whether  any  notice  of  appeal,  or  bill  of  exceptions 
appears  of  record;  (12)  whether  a  writ  of  execution  or  order  of 
sale  was  issued  or  made;  (13)  the  return  of  such  writ,  or  com- 
pliance with  the  order;  (14)  w'here  there  was  a  sale,  the  report 
and  confirmation  thereof;  (15)  and  if  the  cause  was  removed 
to  an  appellate  court,  the  proceedings  had  in  connection  there- 
with. The  examiner  should  also  be  careful  to  see  that  the  judg- 
ment lien  has  not  Ijeen  continued  in  favor  of  a  surety,  who  has 
discharged  the  judgment  and  who  is  entitled  to  l)e  subrogated  to 
the  benefit  of  the  lien,  even  as  against  a  purchaser  without  no- 
tice.^^ 

"■''  Hill  V.  King,  48  Ohio  St.  7.S,  26     X.  K.  988. 


593  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    570 

§  570.  Judgment  against  deceased  party. — Although  there 
is  some  conflict  in  the  authorities,  the  greater  weight  seems  to 
support  the  proposition  that,  where  a  court  has  obtained  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  parties  and  the  subject-matter  during  the  hfetime  of 
the  parties  to  the  suit,  a  judgment  rendered  for  or  against  one 
of  them  after  his  death,  ahhough  erroneous  and  hable  to  be  set 
aside  by  proper  direct  proceeding,  is  simply  voidable,  and  not 
void,  nor  subject  to  collateral  attack.^*  Judgments  for  or  against 
joint  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  one  of  whom  is  dead  at  the  time  of 
the  rendition  of  the  judgment,  are,  according  to  this  rule,  merely 
erroneous  and  voidable,  but  not  absolutely  void,  nor  subject  to 
collateral  attack."  But  several  cases  hold  that  a  judgment  ren- 
dered against  a  defendant  who  is  dead  at  the  time  is  null  and 
void/"  This  latter  rule  conforms  to  that  of  the  common  law, 
and  where  it  obtains  such  judgment  may  be  entirely  disregarded 
by  all  parties.  The  representatives  of  the  decedent,  his  credit- 
ors, or  any  one  interested,  need  not  take  any  steps  to  have  the 
judgment  vacated  or  reversed.  It  does  not  create  any  lien  or 
estoppel,  nor  is  it  binding  as  adjudicating  any  rights.  It  can  not 
operate  to  support  or  divest  any  right,  title  or  interest.'^  Of 
course,  if  an  action  is  commenced  in  favor  of  or  against  one  al- 
ready dead,  the  judgment  rendered  therein  will  be  absolutely  null 
and  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction." 

§  571.  Judgments  against  infants  and  insane  persons. — In 
judicial  proceedings  concerning  the  lands  of  infants  or  persons 
of  unsound  mind,  such  persons,  in  order  that  a  judgment  ren- 
dered for  or  against  them  may  be  valid,  must  be  represented  by 
guardian  or  next  friend.  A  guardian  ad  litem  may  be  appointed 
by  the  court  for  infants  or  others  who  are  incapacitated  to  act 
fpr  themselves  by  reason  of  some  legal  disability  wherever  such 
persons  are  made  parties  defendant  in  any  legal  proceeding. 
Process  must  generally  be  served  upon  infant  defendants  in  the 

"  Todhunter  v.  Klemmer,  134  Cal.  Ark.  369,  30  S.  W.  347,  27  L.  R.  A. 

60,  66  Pac.  75 :  Claflin  v.  Dunne,  129  735  :  Watson  v.  Adams,  103  Ga.  72>3, 

111.  241,  21  N.  E.  834.  16  Am.  St.  263 ;  30  S.  E.  577. 

Reid     V.     Holmes,     127     Mass.     326;  "Succession    of    Hoggatt,    36    La. 

Wood  V.  Watson,  107  N.  Car.  52,  12  Ann.  Zi7 ;  West  v.  Jordan,  62  Maine 

S,  E.  49,  10  L.  R.  A.  541.  484 ;  Young  v.  Pickens,  45  Miss.  553. 

^•'■'  Swasey  v.   Antram,  24  Ohio   St.  " «  Reid  v.  Holmes.   127  Mass.  326 ; 

87;  Holt  v.'Thacher,  52  Vt.  592.  Graves  v.  Ewart,  99  Mo.  13,  11  S.  W. 

•«  Bauer  v.  Word,  135  Ala.  430,  ?>i  971. 
So.  538;  Greenstreet  v.  Thornton,  60 

38 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    572  TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS  594 

same  manner  as  upon  adults,  and  the  guardian  ad  litem  has  no 
power  to  waive  such  process."  And  it  is  error  to  render  a  judg- 
ment against  an  infant  defendant  without  full  proof  of  the  mat- 
ters in  issue  notwithstanding  the  admissions  of  his  guardian  ad 
litem/" 

The  real  estate  of  an  infant  may  be  levied  upon  and  sold  upon 
an  execution  issued  on  a  judgment  against  him.*^ 

Statutes  usually  provide  that  an  infant  may,  within  a  specified 
time  after  arriving  at  full  age,  upon  proper  proceedings  being 
instituted  by  him,  have  any  judgment,  order  or  decree,  opened  or 
annulled,  or  set  aside,  if  he  can  show  that  the  same  w-as  obtained 
by  mistake  or  through  fraud.  And  a  judgment  rendered  against 
an  infant  for  whom  no  guardian  ad  litem  or  general  guardian 
appeared,  may  be  vacated  by  such  infant  on  coming  of  age.^" 

§  572.  Exemption  of  real  estate  from  judgments. — In  a 
few  states  a  judgment  debtor,  who  is  a  householder,  may  claim  as 
exempt  from  sale  under  an  execution,  property  owned  by  him, 
the  value  of  which  does  not  exceed  a  specified  amount.  If  the 
value  of  the  land  scheduled  as  exempt  property  exceeds  the  max- 
imum amount  allowed  as  exempt,  the  excess  will  be  subject  to  the 
judgment  lien.  Such  exempted  property  is  in  practice  nearly  al- 
ways the  debtor's  homestead,  though  not  so  designated  in  the 
statutes. 

In  most  states  a  quantity  of  land  and  buildings  owned  and  oc- 
cupied by  a  householder,  or  a  person  with  a  family  or  other  de- 
pendents, is  exempted  from  levy  under  execution,  attachment  or 
process  against  such  ow'ner.  the  quantity  being  defined  either  by 
area  or  by  value,  or  both.  This  is  usually  designated  as  a  "home- 
stead." The  estate  or  interest  of  the  owner  may  be  less  than  a 
fee,  and  it  matters  not  that  he  holds  the  land  jointly  with  others.'^^ 

As  to  the  efifect  of  the  homestead  right  on  the  judgment  lien, 
some  cases  hold  that  the  lien  does  not  attach  at  all  to  the  property 
exempt  by  law,  and  intervening  conveyances,  incumbrances,  or 
even  later  judgments  and  executions  obtain  preference.®*  In  other 

"  Hughes  V.  Sellers,  34  Ind.  2,2>7.        Cohee  v.  Baer,  134  Ind.  375 ;  32  N.  E. 

80  McEndree  v.  McEndree,  12  -Ind.     920,  39  Am.  St.  270. 

97.  83Kaser  v.  Haas,  27  Minn.  406,  7 

81  Shaffner  v.  Briggs,  36  Ind.  55,  10     N.  W.  824. 

Am.  Rep.  1.  «*  Ketchin  v.  McCarley,  26  S.  Car. 

82Childs    V.    Lanterman,    103    Cal.     1,  11  S.  E.  1099,  4  Am.  St.  674. 
387,   Z7   Pac.   382,   42   Am.    St.    121; 


595  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    573 

cases,  however,  it  is  held  that  the  lien  is  only  suspended,  and  at- 
taches itself  to  the  land,  when,  by  the  abandonment  of  the  home- 
stead, by  the  death  of  the  debtor,  and  of  his  dependents,  or  any 
other  means,  the  homestead  exemption  is  brought  to  an  end.*" 
Besides  the  state  exemption  laws,  the  federal  government,  in  dis- 
posing of  the  public  lands,  has  shielded  the  lands  earned  by  set- 
tlement under  the  federal  homestead  law  from  sale  for  any  debt 
contracted  by  the  homesteader  before  the  issue  of  the  patent ;  and 
it  remains  secure  against  those  debts,  without  any  need  for  fur- 
ther occupancy  by  the  grantee.*'*' 

§  573.  Satisfaction  and  discharge  of  judgments. — The  lien 
of  a  judgment  is  terminated  by  an  entry  of  satisfaction  on  the 
record;  by  a  formal  instrument  of  satisfaction  filed  in  the  cause; 
or  by  the  return  of  an  execution  showing  full  satisfaction.  It  is 
obvious  that  a  judgment  fully  satisfied  and  discharged  need  not 
be  noticed  in  the  abstract,  but  where  a  former  examination  dis- 
closes a  judgment  unsatisfied  at  the  time  such  former  examination 
was  made,  a  discharge  must  be  looked  for  in  a  subsequent  con- 
tinuation of  the  examination  in  order  that  the  discharge  may  be 
exhibited  affirmatively  in  the  body  of  the  continuation,  or  in  the 
abstracter's  certificate  showing  that  no  judgments  remain  unsatis- 
fied. 

While  the  certificate  is  often  made  to  show  satisfaction,  the 
better  practice  is  to  embody  in  the  abstract  a  note  showing  the 
manner  of  discharge.    The  following  example  is  given : 

Note. — Circuit  Court,  Marion  County,  Ind.  Case  No.  5,280. 
John  Davis  v.  William  Smith.  Judgment  against  defendant  ren- 
dered April  12,  1917,  for  $500.00.  This  judgment  satisfied  as 
shown  by  return  of  execution  showing  same  fully  satisfied. 

§  574.  Decrees  in  general. — We  have  said  that  the  term 
"decree''  is  applied  to  the  determination  of  suits  in  equity.  Like 
a  judgment  at  law.  it  is  the  sentence  pronounced  by  the  court 
upon  the  matter  of  right  and  justice  between  the  parties,  and  is 
founded  on  the  pleadings  and  proof  in  the  cause. 

Decrees,  like  judgments,  are  either  final  or  interlocutory.  A 
decree  is  interlocutory  when  it  decides  some  intermediate  point 
or  issue  in  the  case,  but  without  disposing  of  the  final  issue  or 

»5  Blose  V.  Bear,  87  Va.  177,  12  S.        §6  Qile  v.  Hallock,  33  Wis.  523. 
E.  294,  11  L.  R.  A.  705. 


§    575  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  596 

issues  in  the  cause.  The  decree  is  final  when  it  disposes  of  all  the 
issues  between  all  the  parties  to  the*  suit,  and  awards  the  costs.**' 
A  decree  adjudging  deeds  to  be  mortgages  and  appointing  ref- 
erees to  take  evidence  as  to  the  value  of  improvements,  etc.,  is  not 
final  and  could  not  be  final  until  the  report  of  the  referee  had  been 
passed  upon  by  the  court. '*^  Even  though  the  rights  of  the  parties 
are  settled  by  the  decree,  the  fact  that  something  remains  to  be 
done  by  the  court  renders  it  interlocutory.**" 

§  575.  Operation  and  efTect  of  decrees. — Among  the  most 
common  occasions  for  invoking  the  aid  of  courts  of  equity  may 
be  mentioned  the  construction,  enforcement,  and  administration 
of  trusts;  the  administration  of  estates  of  decedents;  the  creation 
and  foreclosure  of  liens;  quieting  title  and  the  removal  of  clouds 
from  titles ;  and  cases  involving  fraud  and  mistake.  Equity  also 
has  jurisdiction  to  compel  accounting,  specific  performance,  sub- 
rogation, reformation,  cancellation,  rescission,  and  marshaling 
of  assets.  The  decrees  rendered  in  all  such  matters  has  the 
same  general  effect  as  judgments,  but  their  operation  is  not  al- 
w^ays  the  same.  Thus,  a  decree  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdic- 
tion is  not  only  final  as  to  the  subject-matter,  but  also  as  to  every 
other  matter  which  the  parties  might  have  litigated  in  the  case, 
and  which  they  might  have  had  decided."" 

Under  a  prayer  for  general  relief  it  is  proper  to  grant  the  par- 
ties any  relief  consistent  with  the  facts  set  up,  to  which  they  may 
appear  entitled,  and  which  is  within  the  power  of  the  court  to 
grant. '''^ 

A  decree  does  not  operate  as  an  estoppel  in  a  subsequent  action 
between  the  parties,  as  to  immaterial  and  unessential  facts,  even 
though  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings  and  directly  decided ;  it  is 
simply  final  as  to  the  facts  litigated  and  decided  therein,  haying 
such  a  relation  to  the  issue.''' 

Where  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  the 
parties,  the  decree  is  conclusive  upon  the  parties  until  reversed  on 

8-  Hoit  V.  Hoit,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  551,  5  91 ;  Donnell  v.  Wright,  147  Mo.  639. 

Atl.  103.  49  S.  W.  874. 

««  State  V.  Riley,  219  Mo.  667,  118  ^'^  Merillat  v.  Hensey,  34  App.   (D. 

S.  W.  647.  C).  398;  Alexander  v.  Owen  County, 

S9  White   V.   Gibson,   61    Misc.   436,  136  Ky.  420.   124  S.  W.  386;  Kinder 

113  N.  Y.  S.  983.  V.  Scharff,  125  La.  594,  51  So.  654. 

«o  Hawkins  v.  Taylor,  128  Ind.  431,  ^-2  House  v.   Lockwood,    137   N.    Y. 

27  N.  E.  1117;  Hentig  v.  Redden,  46  259.  33  N.  E.  595. 
Kans.  231,  26   Pac.   701.  26  Am.   St. 


597  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    576 

appeal,  impeached  by  an  original  bill  for  fraud  or  set  aside  by 
bill  in  review. ^^  The  decree  is  not  binding  on  persons  not  par- 
ties to  the  suit."* 

§  576.     Effect  of  decree  in  the  absence  of  personal  service. 

— Jurisdiction  of  the  person,  unless  the  parties  waive  service  and 
voluntarily  appear,  can  only  be  acquired  by  an  observance  of  the 
modes  of  procedure  prescribed  by  law.^^  The  usual  requirement 
with  respect  to  obtaining  jurisdiction  over  the  person,  prescribed 
by  law  regulating  the  proceedings  of  the  court,  is  that  the  defend- 
ant must  have  due  notice  of  the  proceedings.^"  As  equity  acts 
primarily  in  personam,  a  personal  decree  can  not  be  rendered 
against  a  defendant  not  served  with  process  and  who  does  not 
appear  in  person  or  by  an  attorney  duly  authorized. ^^ 

Whenever  judicial  proceedings  in  a  state  court  involves  the  ad- 
judication of  the  personal  liability  of  a  non-resident  defendant,  or 
the  liability  of  his  property  without  the  state,  he  must  be  brought 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  by  the  service  of  process  upon 
him  within  the  state,  or  by  voluntary  appearance. ^^  But  in  most 
states  statutes  have  been  enacted  providing  for  constructive  no- 
tice to  parties  who  are  nonresidents,  or  whose  residence  is  un- 
known. This  method  of  service  is  either  by  posting  the  notices 
or  by  publication  in  the  manner  prescribed,  and  in  some  states 
both  posting  and  publication  is  required.  It  is  sometimes  pro- 
vided that  process  may  be  personally  served  on  a  non-resident  de- 
fendant. A  decree  rendered  against  a  party  who  has  been  con- 
structively served  with  process  will  be  binding  on  such  party,  if 
the  provisions  of  the  statute  in  reference  thereto  have  been  strictly 
complied  with.^^ 

Constructive  service  can  not  be  legally  made  unless  some  ne- 
cessity therefor  appears.  It  can  only  be  made  when  personal 
service  is  impracticable.^  Such  service  confers  jurisdiction  only 
for  the  purpose  named  in  the  bill."    A  decree  based  on  construct- 

»3  Barbour  v.  Tompkins,  58  W.  Va.  Iowa  354,  42  N.  W.  319;  Stephenson 

572,  52  S.  E.  707.  3  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  v.  Davis,  56  Maine  7i. 

715n.  98  Michigan  Trust  Co.  v.  Ferry,  175 

9*  Kelly  V.  Kelly,  126  111.  550,  18  N.  Fed.  667. 

K-  785.  90  Calkins  v.   Miller.   55   Nebr.  601, 

"5  Williams    v.    Monroe,    125    Mo.  75  N.  W.  1108. 

574,  28  S.  W.  853.  i  Bear    Lake    County    v.    Budge,    9 

^«  Boswell  V.  Sharp,  15  Ohio  447.  Idaho  703,  75   Pac.  614.   108  Am.  St. 

"•^Cloyd  V.  Trotter,   118  111.  391,  9  179. 

N.  E.  507 ;  Cassidy  v.  Woodward,  77  ^  McGaw  v.  Gortner,  96  Md.  489,  54 

Atl.  133. 


§    577  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  598 

ive  notice  to  the  party  against  whom  it  was  rendered  must  show 
strict  compliance  with  the  statutory  mode  of  obtaining  jurisdic- 
tion. A  decree  rendered  on  service  by  pubHcation  which  was 
based  on  a  false  affidavit  of  nonresidence,  may  be  collaterally  at- 
tacked.^ 

The  utmost  care  should  be  exercised  to  see  that  the  affidavit  on 
which  the  publication  was  based  was  made  by  a  person  authorized 
to  make  same,  that  the  affidavit  set  forth  the  cause  of  action,  that 
the  name  of  the  party  be  sufficiently  designated  in  the  notice,  and 
that  the  publication  be  for  the  full  period  prescribed  by  the  stat- 
ute. 

§  577.  Lien  of  decrees. — The  word  "judgments,"  used  in 
statutes  making  judgments  a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  parties 
against  whom  they  are  rendered,  is  held  to  embrace  decrees. 
"Judgments"  and  "decrees"  being  usually  employed  as  convertible 
terms.  So  where  there  is  a  money  decree  in  personam,  a  lien  is 
thereby  created  on  the  real  estate  of  the  party  against  whom  it  is 
rendered.*  A  mere  foreclosure  decree,  which  does  not  provide 
for  any  deficiency,  does  not,  as  a  general  rule,  create  a  lien  upon 
the  real  estate  of  the  defendant. °  The  decree  for  a  deficiency  of 
proceeds  does  not  have  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment  at  law 
so  as  to  become  a  lien  until  the  deficiency  is  ascertained."  A  de- 
cree that  a  certain  sum  is  due  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  mort- 
gaged property  be  sold  and  applied  thereon,  there  being  no  pro- 
vision for  docketing  a  judgment  for  any  deficiency,  is  not  a  per- 
sonal judgment  against  defendant.^ 

§578.  Form  of  decrees. — A  decree  should  contain:  (1) 
The  title  of  the  case;  (2)  a  recital  of  the  pleadings,  proceedings, 
and  in  general  language,  the  evidence;  (3)  the  mandatory  clause, 
and  (4)  the  declaratory  clause.  The  title  should  contain  the 
name  of  the  court,  the  term  thereof,  the  names  of  the  parties,  and 
the  date  on  which  the  decree  was  rendered.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  proceedings  be  recited  at  length,  but  premises  on  which 
the  decree  was  predicated  is  sometimes  required  to  be  recited.'* 

3  Eayrs  v.  Nason,  54  Nebr.  143,  74        o  wrinston  v.  Browning,  61  Ala.  80; 
N.  W.  408.  Hershey  v.  Dennis,  53  Cal.  11 ;  Roll 

4  Yackle  v.  VVigiitman,  103  111;  169.     v.  Rea,  57  N.  J.  L.  647,  Z2  Atl.  214. 

=  Hamberger  v.  Easter.  57  Ga.  71 ;         ^  Tolman  v.  Smith,  85  Cal.  280,  24 
Kirby  v.  Runals,   140  111.  289,  29  N.     Pac.  743. 
E.  697.  8  Hartfield  v.  Brown,  8  Ark.  283. 


599  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    579 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  decree  must  contain  findings  of  all 
the  material  facts  necessary  to  sustain  it,''  but  some  cases  hold 
that  no  findings  of  fact  are  necessary.^"  It  must  specify  with 
certainty  the  persons  in  whose  favor  and  against  whom  the  decree 
was  rendered/^  The  amount  must  be  definitely  fixed  and  stated," 
and  the  property  to  be  affected  must  be  specifically  described/^ 

In  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  the  decree  for  the  sale  of  the 
premises  should  contain  a  description  of  the  property  to  be  sold; 
a  statement  of  the  amount  of  the  debt;  a  direction  that  the  prem- 
ises, or  so  much  of  them  as  may  be  necessary,  shall  be  sold  by  an 
officer  designated,  who  shall  execute  a  deed  to  the  purchaser ;  and 
that  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  he  pay  to  the  plaintiff  the 
amount  of  his  debt,  interest,  and  costs,  together  with  the  expenses 
of  the  sale.  If  a  personal  judgment  is  asked  for  and  is  proper, 
the  defendants  who  are  personally  liable  for  the  debt,  must  be 
designated/*  The  decree  should  not  attempt  to  give  any  relief 
not  sought  for  in  the  pleadings,^^  and  should  be  complete  within 
itself."  But  sometimes  under  the  general  prayer  for  relief,  the 
court  may  grant  relief  not  specifically  asked  for.^'  A  decree  is 
not  generally  final  until  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  approved  by  the 
court,  and  filed  for  record  in  the  clerk's  office."  Though  the  prac- 
tice exists  of  signing  the  decree,  it  is  held  that  it  may  pass  on  oral 
direction  by  the  judge  in  open  court  to  enter  it,  the  signature  be- 
ing only  evidence  to  the  clerk  that  it  has  in  fact  passed.  The  date 
of  physical  entry  upon  the  minutes  is  of  no  consequence  in  deter- 
mining the  actual  date  of  the  entry  of  the  decree. ^^ 

§  579.  Abstracting  the  decree. — It  is  the  practice  of  most 
abstracters  to  set  out  a  complete  copy  of  the  decree,  and  this 
method  is  recommended  where  the  decree  does  not  preserve  the 
evidence  on  which  it  is  based.     Matters  of  minor  importance, 

'^  Weeden  v.   Hawes.   10  Conn.  50;  i^  L^grave   v.    Hellinger,    144   App. 

Farrell  v.  Bouck,  60  Nebr.  771,  84  N.  Div.  397.  129  N.  Y.  S.  291 ;  Davis  v. 

W.    260;    Burbank    v.    Wiley,    66    N.  Davis,   81    Vt.   259,   69   Atl.   876,    130 

Car.  58.  Am.  St.  1035n. 

10  Mason   v.    Daly,    117   Mass.  403;  i«  Jessop    v.    Kittanning    Borough, 

Kilroy  V.   Mitchell,  2  Wash.  407,  26  225  Pa.  583,  74  Atl.  553. 

Pac.  865.  17  Sage  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  99  U.  S. 

"  Turner  v.  Dupree,  19  Ala.  198.  334,  25  L.  ed.  394. 

12  Smith  V.  Trimble,  27  111.  152.  is  Bascombe  v.  Marshall,   129  App. 

13  Jones  v.  Minogue.  29  Ark.  637.  Div.  516,  113  N.  Y.  S.  991. 

1*  Leviston   v.    Swan,   33   Cal.   480 ;         la  Ommen  v.  Talcott,  180  Fed.  925. 
Ailing  V.  Nelson,  55  Nebr.  161,  75  N. 
W.  581. 


5(S0 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


600 


such  as  the  capiion  and  parts  that  refer  to  ccfsts,  may  be  con- 
densed.    The.  following  example  is  given: 

State  of  Maine,  / 


County.  ^ 

" 

Sui)reme  Judicial  Court. 

A.  B. 

In  Equity. 

►  Decree  to  foreclose  mortgage. 

V. 

Docket  number . 

C.  D. 

Date  of  hearing . 

Recites,  that  there  is  due  to  the  plaintiff  on  said  mortgage  for 

principal  and  interest,  the  sum  of  dollars,  and  that  if  the 

defendant  shall  pay  said  sum  with  the  costs  of  this  suit  to  the 
plaintiff  within  six  months  from  the  date  of  this  decree,  the  plain- 
tiff shall  thereupon  enter  a  discharge  of  said  mortgage  upon  the 
record  thereof,  but  in  default  of  such  payment,  it  is  ordered  and 
decreed  that  said  mortgaged  premises  be  sold  by  the  master  at 
public  auction  to  the  highest  bidder  and  the  proceeds  therefrom 

applied  in  satisfaction  of  said  sum  of dollars  and  the  costs 

due  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  balance,  if  any  remaining  there- 
from, be  paid  to  the  defendant,  but  if  the  proceeds  of  said  sale 
shall  not  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  said  sum  and  costs,  let  execution 
issue  against  the  defendant  for  such  deficiency. 

Y.  Z., 
Justice  Supreme  Judicial  Court. 

Dated  this day  of ,  19 — . 

§  580.  Effect  of  misnomer  of  parties  generally. — The  ab- 
stracter must  be  skilful  in  determining  whether  judgments  of 
record  are  against  persons  in  whom  he  is  for  the  time  interested, 
and  whether  the  name  of  the  judgment  defendant  is  the  same  in 
legal  effect  as  the  name  for  which  he  is  searching  the  record.  He 
must  be  familiar  with  the  rules  which  govern  names  and  must 
have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  idem  sonans. 
The  record  of  a  judgment  is  constructive  notice  only  of  that 
which  is  contained  within  itself,  and  in  order  to  charge  the  land 
of  the  judgment  defendant  as  against  subsequent  purchasers,  in- 
cumbrancers and  judgment  creditors,  it  must  set  forth  his  name 
with  such  reasonable  accuracy  that  if  they  should  examine  it  they 
would  obtain  from  it  actual  notice  of  all  the  rights  which  were 


i 


601  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    580 

intended  to  be  created  by  it.  Every  error  or  defect  apparent  on 
the  face  of  a  judgment  or  decree  must  be  noticed  in  the  abstract. 
These  are  confined  principally  to  matters  of  practice.  The  most 
serious  defects,  however,  are  not  thus  apparent,  and  may  be 
classed  with  matters  dehors  the  record.  A  judgment  or  decree 
is  in  no  way  conclusive  upon  a  person  against  whom  it  was  ren- 
dered by  using  a  name  not  legally  his,  and  is  not  constructive  no- 
tice of  a  lien  on  his  real  estate.  But  a  judgment  or  decree  is  not 
rendered  void  by  its  own  misnomer  of  the  defendant,  where  the 
record  supplies  data  for  its  amendment,  nunc  pro  tunc,  so  as  to 
make  it  speak  its  rendition  against  the  defendant  by  his  true 
name.^"  Notwithstanding  the  misnomer  of  a  defendant,  if  the 
writ  is  served  upon  the  party  intended  to  be  sued,  and  he  fails  to 
appear  and  plead  in  abatement,  and  suffers  judgment  by  default, 
he  is  concluded  thereby.-^  The  omission  of  the  Christian  name 
of  the  judgment  defendant  will  not  necessarily  vitiate  the  judg- 
ment, if  such  name  is  disclosed  by  other  parts  of  the  record,  or 
if  the  party  can  be  connected  with  the  judgment  by  proper  evi- 
dence.^" 

It  has  been  held  that  the  names  "Hesser"  and  "Hesse"  are  so 
dissimilar  that  one  searching  for  incumbrances  against  the  for- 
mer would  not  be  charged  with  notice  of  a  judgment  against  the 
latter  not  put  upon  inquiry."^  It  has  also  been  held  that  where  the 
statute  relative  to  the  docketing  of  judgments  requires  the  entry 
upon  the  book  of  "the  name  at  length  of  each  judgment  debtor," 
the  docket  entry  of  a  judgment  against  Edward  Davis  is  not 
constructive  notice  of  a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  either  E.  A. 
Davis  or  Edward  A.  David.-*  It  is  only  through  the  medium  of 
a  sufficient  and  legal  docketing  of  a  judgment  or  decree  that  it 
can  become  a  lien  on  the  real  estate  of  the  person  against  whom  it 
was  rendered;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  person  in  whose  favor  it 
was  rendered  to  see  to  it,  if  he  would  secure  such  lien,  that  the 
docket  is  properly  made,  for,  as  against  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for 
value,  any  material  defect  or  omission  in  this  respect  is  the  fault 

20  Ex  parte  Howard-Harrison  Iron  23  ^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hesser,  11 
Co.,  119  Ala.  484,  24  So.  516,  72  Am.  Iowa  381,  42  N.  W.  325,  4  L.  R.  A. 
St.  928.  122,  14  Am.  St.  297. 

21  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jaggers,  31  21  D^vis  v.  Steeps,  87  Wis.  472,  58 
Md.  38,  100  Am.  Dec.  53.  N.  W.  769,  23  L.  R.  A.  818,  41  Am. 

22  Goodgion  v.  Gilreath,  32  S.  Car.  St.  51. 
388,  11   S.  E.  207. 


§    581  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  602 

of  the  judgment  creditor,  and  the  loss,  if  any,  occasioned  thereby 
will  l>e  regarded  as  his  own."' 

Where  the  name  of  the  judgment  debtor  is  not  the  same  as  that 
of  the  person  whose  title  is  under  consideration,  there  is  no  oc- 
casion for  including  the  judgment  in  the  abstract ;  but  where  the 
judgment  was  entered  against  a  person  by  his  true  name,  al- 
though that  is  not  the  name  by  which  he  was  sued,  the  judgment 
and  proceedings  upon  which  it  was  based  must  appear  in  order 
to  show  the  repugnancy.  If  the  abstracter  should  find  the  sur- 
name for  which  he  is  searching,  but  finds  an  entirely  different 
Christian  name  from  the  one  he  is  searching  for,  he  is  entitled  to 
conclude  that  the  judgment  is  not  against  the  person  in  whom  he 
is  interested. 

§  581.  Effect  of  error  or  omission  of  middle  name  or  ini- 
tial.— The  common  law  recognizes  but  one  Christian  name, 
and  failure  in  judicial  proceedings  in  giving  the  name  of  the 
party  to  state  his  middle  name,  or  the  initial  thereof  as  commonly 
used,  is  not  fatal  to  their  validity."*'  Under  this  rule  it  is  no  mis- 
nomer to  improperly  include  or  exclude  the  middle  name  or  ini- 
tial thereof;  it  is  unimportant  and  suggests  nothing."^  But  this 
rule,  like  most  rules  of  judicial  procedure,  is  not  without  excep- 
tions."^ It  has  often  been  held  that  the  failure  in  any  judicial 
proceeding  to  include  the  initial  of  the  middle  name  is  unim- 
portant, and  not  fatal  to  its  validity.""  In  most  states  it  is  held 
that  an  omission  or  the  use  of  a  wrong  initial  does  not  affect  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  where  the  right  party  is  actually  served 
with  process  and  brought  into  court, "°  But  some  cases  hold  that 
the  use  of  a  wrong  initial,  or  other  error  in  defendant's  name,  not 
coming  within  the  rule  of- idem  sonans,  where  the  summons  is 
served  by  publication,  is  not  a  compliance  with  the  statute,  and  is 
fatal  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court. ^^  The  omission  of  the  mid- 
25  Johnson  v.  Hess,  126  Ind.  298.  25  Gross  v.  Grossdale,  177  111.  248,  52 
N.  E.  445.  9  L.  R.  A.  471;  In  re  N.  E.  Z12;  Schofield  v.  Jennings.  68 
Hutchinson's  Appeal.  92  Pa.  St.  186.     Ind.  232. 

2"  Beattie  v.  National  Bank,  174  111.  2h  st^te  ^  Higgins.  60  Minn.  1.  61 
571.  51  N.  E.  602,  43  L.  R.  A.  654,  66  N.  W.  816.  27  L.  R.  A.  74,  51  Am.  St. 
Am.  St.  318;  D'Autremont  v.  Ander-     490. 

son  Iron  Co.,  104  Minn.  165,  116  N.  2u  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
W.  357,  17  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  236.  124  v.  Pcirce,  34  Ind.  App.  188,  72  N.  E. 
Am.  St.  615,  15  Ann.  Cas.  114.  604;  King  v.  Clark,  7  Mo.  269. 

27  Games  v.  Stiles,  14  Pet.   (U.  S.)         ""Casper  v.  Klippen,  61  Minn.  353, 
322,    10    L.    ed.    476;    Edmundson    v.     63  N.  W.  Ill,  52  Am.  St.  604. 
State,  17  Ala.  179,  52  Am.  Dec.  169;        3i  Fanning  v.  Krapfl,  61   Iowa  417, 


603  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    582 

die  initial  of  the  name  of  a  judgment  debtor  on  the  index  of  judg- 
ments is  fatal  to  the  lien  of  the  judgment  creditor  as  against  a 
subsequent  bona  fide  grantee  of  such  debtor  for  value  and  without 
notice.  ^^ 

Omitting  Christian  names  of  judgment  defendants  in  docket- 
ing a  judgment,  though  it  remains  good  between  the  parties,  is 
fatal  to  the  claim  as  regards  subsequent  purchasers  or  judgment 
creditors.^^  The  abstracter's  certificate  should  set  out  the  names 
with  middle  initials,  which  he  has  and  has  not  searched  for. 

§582.  Doctrine  of  idem  sonans. — "Idem  sonans"  means 
"of  the  same  sound,"  or  "sounding  the  same,"  and  is  said  to  exist 
if  the  attentive  ear  finds  difficulty  in  distinguishing  them  when 
pronounced,  or  common  and  long-continued  usage  has  by  corrup- 
tion or  abbreviation  made  them  identical  in  pronunciation.^*  In 
the  matter  of  names  in  a  judicial  record,  orthography  is  not  im- 
portant if  the  sound  is  the  same.  Idem  sonans  exists  where  a 
name  when  pronounced  conveys  practically  the  same  sound  as 
another  name  when  pronounced;  or  if  a  name  incorrectly 
spelled  when  ordinarily  pronounced  sounds  like  the  correct  name 
as  commonly  pronounced.  So  if  the  abstracter  decides  that  two 
names  are  idem  sonans  and  he  searches  both,  the  search  against 
each  must  be  complete  within  itself,  and  if  he  omits  a  judgment 
against  one  of  them,  he  becomes  liable  for  any  loss  occasioned 
thereby."^  The  doctrine  of  idem  sonans  does  not  apply  to  afford 
constructive  notice  of  public  records  where  two  foreign  names, 
pronounced  alike,  in  fact  begin  with  a  different  letter  of  the  al- 
phabet.'"" 

§  583.  Operation  and  effect  of  decrees  of  probate  courts. 
— Decrees  of  a  probate  court,  made  in  matters  and  against  parties 
within  the  sphere  of  its  jurisdiction,  not  appealed  from,  are  con- 
clusive upon  those  to  whom  the  right  of  appeal  is  given,  and  can 
not  be  collaterally  attacked."     The  determination  of  the  title  to 

14  N.  W.  727;  16  N.  W.  293 ;  Skelton  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  177,  53  Am.  Dec 

V.  Sacket,  91   Mo.  Zll ,  3  S.  W.  874;  586. 

Enewold  v.  Olsen,  39  Nebr.  59,  57  N.        3i  Robson  v.  Thomas.  55  Mo.  581. 
W.  765,  22  L.  R.  A.  573,  42  Am.  St.         ^r,  Commonwealth  v.  Owen,  2  Wkly. 

557.  N.  Cas.  (Pa.)  200. 

3-Crouse   V.    Murphy,    140    Pa.    St.         so  i„   ^e  Heil's  Appeal,  40   Pa.   St. 

335.  21   Atl.  358,   12  L.  R.  A.  58,  23  453. 
Am.  St.  232.  3  7  In  re  Well's  Estate,  69  Vt.  388, 

33  In    re    Ridgway    Budd    &    Co.'s  38  Atl.  83. 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


604 


real  estate  under  the  will  of  a  testator  made  in  a  decree  of  dis- 
tribution is  conclusive  of  such  title  between  the  parties  in  interest 
or  those  claiming  under  them.^^  Decrees  of  probate  courts  are 
as  conclusive  upon  the  parties  to  the  record,  until  reversed  or  an- 
nulled on  appeal,  writ  of  error,  or  direct  proceedings  in  chancery 
for  fraud,  as  decrees  in  chancery  or  judgments  at  law;^'*"  but  if 
want  of  jurisdiction  appears  from  the  face  of  the  proceedings, 
they  are,  like  the  judgments  of  any  court,  under  like  circum- 
stances, merely  void.*" 

In  determining  the  extent  of  probate  jurisdiction  reference 
must  usually  be  had  to  the  statute,  as  the  scope  of  such  jurisdic- 
tion is  limited  and  prescribed  by  the  statute  creating  it,  and  "un- 
less a  warrant  for  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  in  a  particular  case 
can  be  found  in  the  statute,  given  either  expressly  or  by  implica- 
tion, the  whole  proceeding  is  void;  but  wdiere  jurisdiction  is  con- 
ferred over  any  subject-matter,  and  it  becomes  necessary  in  the 
adjudication  thereof  to  decide  collateral  matters  over  which  no 
jurisdiction  has  been  conferred  the  court  must  of  necessity  decide 
such  collateral  issues,""  A  judgment  probating  a  will  entered 
by  a  court  having  jurisdiction  of  such  matters  is  binding  not  only 
on  the  parties  who  stand  in  inheritable  relationship  to  the  testator, 
but  as  a  proceeding  in  rem,  as  against  all  the  world.*"  But  it  is 
held  that  a  decree  either  probating  or  refusing  to  probate  a  will 
does  not  conclude  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  testamentary 
devise  of  real  property  in  a  subsequent  litigation  involving  the 
title  thereto." 

Errors,  defects  and  irregularities  in  probate  proceedings  for 
the  sale  of  the  real  estate  of  a  decedent,  or  persons  under  guar- 
dianship, are  the  occasion,  perhaps,  of  more  objections  to  title 
than  any  other  ground.  The  order  or  decree  of  sale  must  be  in 
strict  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  and  this 
should  be  affirmatively  shown  by  the  record.**  The  sale  will  be 
void  unless  the  order  or  decree  authorizing  the  same  is  certain  in 


38  McKenzie  v.  Budd,  125  Cal.  600, 
58  Pac.  199. 

39  Watson  V.  Hutto,  27  Ala.  513; 
Dickinson  v.  Hayes,  31  Conn.  417; 
Cummings  v.  Cummings,  123  Mass. 
270. 

40  Mohr  V.  Tulip,  40  Wis.  66. 


"  Woerner  Law  of  Admin.,  §  142.     kins,  82  Mo.  180. 


42Davies  v.  Leete,  111  Ky.  659,  23 
Ky.  L.  899,  64  S.  W.  441. 

43Corley  v.  McElmeel,  149  N.  Y. 
228,  43  N.  E.  628. 

44  In  re  Rose's  Estate,  63  Cal.  346; 
Gelstrop  v.  Moore,  26  Miss.  206,  59 
Am.  Dec.  254 ;  Teverbaugh  v.  Haw- 


605  JUDGMENTS    AND    DECREES  §    584 

its  terms, ■'^  is  in  accord  with  the  petition,'"'  describes  the  land  to 
be  sold  with  sufficient  accuracy  for  its  identification,*'  specifies  the 
place  of  sale,**  and  prescribes  the  method  and  terms  thereof,*"  as 
well  as  directs  the  manner  of  advertising.^"  An  order  made  sub- 
sequent to  the  sale  is  void;^^  nor  can  a  sale  without  an  order  be 
subsequently  confirmed  on  the  ground  of  the  necessity  of  the  sale 
as  having  been  made  for  the  benefit  of  the  heirs."" 

§  584.  Foreign  judgments  and  decrees. — Full  faith  and 
credit  is  required  by  the  federal  constitution  and  statutes,  to  be 
given,  in  each  state,  to  final  judgments  and  decrees,  rendered  in 
other  states  by  courts  having  jurisdiction  both  of  the  subject- 
matter  and  of  the  parties  in  actions  in  personam,  and  of  the 
res  in  proceedings  in  rem.  This  merely  obliges  the  courts  to 
give  such  judgments  equal  recognition  and  effect,  in  matters 
of  pleading  and  evidence,  with  that  accorded  to  similar  judg- 
ments of  the  domestic  courts,  and  does  not  purport  to  give 
to  such  judgments  any  extraterritorial  force  as  a  judgment.^^ 
Real  property,  being  exclusively  subject  to  the  laws  of  the 
state  within  whose  territory  it  is  situate,  and  being  subject  only 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  state  where  it  is  situ- 
ated, can  not  be  directly  affected  by  the  judgment  or  decree  of 
a  court  of  any  other  state. ^*  So  it  is  held  that  a  decree  probating 
a  will  in  one  state  does  not  establish  its  validity  as  a  will  devis- 
ing real  property  in  another  state,  unless  the  laws  of  the  latter 
state  permit  it.^''^  Such  decree  can  not  operate  beyond  the  state 
in  which  the  jurisdiction  is  exercised.^''  Most  states  have  adopted 
statutes  which  in  effect  make  the  foreign  probate  conclusive  when 
duly  authenticated,  even  with  respect  to  real  property,  but  it  is 
held  that  the  certified  record  of  probate  must  show  that  the  will 

^•'^  Graham  v.  Hawkins,  38  Tex.  628.  -'^  Clarke  v.  Clarke.  178  U.  S.  186, 

46  Williams   v.    Childress,   25    Miss.  20  Sup.  Ct.  873,  44  L.  ed.  1028 :  In  re 
78.  Clark's  Appeal,  70  Conn.  195,  39  Atl. 

47  Crawford  v.  McDonald,  88  Tex.  155;    McCartney   v.    Osburn,    118   111. 
626,  2,Z  S.  W.  325.  403,  9  N.   E.  210;   Cooper  v.  Hayes, 

48  Brown  v.  Brown,  41  Ala.  215.  96  Ind.  386 ;  Blackman  v.  Wright.  96 
4"  In  re  Baily  Appeal,  32  Pa.  St.  40.  Iowa  541,  65  N.  W.  843 ;  Short  v. 
50  Parker  v.  Allen,  4  Atl.    (N.  J.)     Galway,  83  Ky.  501,  7  Ky.  L.  504,  4 

300.  Am.  St.  168. 

5^  Ludlow  V.  Park,  4  Ohio  5.  '•>^'  Clayson  v.  Clayson,  24  Ore.  542, 

•■*2  Bjmerland    v.    Eley,     15     Wash.  34  Pac.  358. 

101.  sGLindley  v.  O'Reilly,  50  N.  J.  L. 

53  Elizabethtown  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Ger-  636,  15  Atl.  379,  1  L.  R.  A.  79,  7  Am. 

ber,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  130.  St.  802. 


584 


TITLES  AND   ABSTRACTS 


606 


was  executed  in  compliance  with  the  lex  rei  sitae,  unless  the  stat- 
ute expressly  or  by  clear  implication  changes  this  rule.^^  In  some 
states,  foreign  judgments  properly  transcribed  constitute  liens  on 
real  estate  in  the  jurisdiction  where  the  transcript  of  such  judg- 
ment is  recorded. ^'^ 


57  State  V.  District  Court,  34  Mont. 
96.  85  Pac.  866,  6  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
617,  115  Am.  St.  510. 


58  Curry  v.  Lehman,  57  Fla.  385,  49 
So.  673. 


I 


CHAPTER    XXV 

JUDICIAL    SALES 
SEC.  SEC. 

590.  Judicial    sales    defined    and    dis-  598.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  judicial 
tinguished.  sale. 

591.  Validity    and    eflfect    of    judicial  599.  Proof    of     title    under    judicial 
sales.  sales. 

592.  Purchaser's    title    under    judicial  600.  Presumptions    pertaining    to    ju- 
sale.  dicial  sales. 

593.  Rights   of   purchaser   at  judicial  601.  Sales  under  orders  and  decrees 
sale.  of  probate  courts. 

594.  Rights  of  grantee  of  purchaser.  602.  Probate    procedure    to    sell    real 

595.  Refusal  to  complete  purchase.  estate. 

596.  Order  confirming  the  sale.  603.  How  probate  sales  shown  in  ab- 

597.  Effect  of  confirmation.  stract. 

§  590.  Judicial  sales  defined  and  distinguished. — A  judicial 
sale  is  one  made  under  an  order  or  decree  of  a  court  having  com- 
petent authority  and  jurisdiction  to  order  it  by  an  officer  legally 
appointed  and  commissioned  to  make  the  sale.^  Some  of  the  cases 
hold  that  a  sale  may  be  considered  a  judicial  sale  only  where  made 
pendente  lite,  and  this  may  perhaps  be  considered  the  general 
rule.-  The  fact  that  the  sale  is  made  pending  the  litigation  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  an  execution  sale,  the  latter  being  made  after 
the  suit  is  terminated. '^ 

Execution  sales  are  based  on  a  general  judgment  for  so  much 
money,  and  a  judicial  sale  is  based  on  an  order  to  sell  specific 
property.  "The  former  are  conducted  by  an  officer  of  the  law 
in  pursuance  of  the  direction  of  a  statute;  the  latter  are  made  by 
the  agent  of  the  court  in  pursuance  of  the  court's  directions.  In 
the  former  the  sheriff  is  the  vendor;  in  the  latter  the  court.  In 
the  former  the  sale  is  usually  complete  when  the  property  is 
struck  off  to  the  highest  bidder ;  in  the  latter  it  must  he  reported 
to  and  approved  by  the  court."*  Where  the  sheriff  in  an  execu- 
tion sale  is  not  required  to  report  the  sale  to  the  court  for  its  ap- 
provel,  the  title  passes  to  the  purchaser  upon  the  execution  and 

1  Williamson  v.  Berry,  49  U.  S.  495,        3  Alexander  v.  Howe,  85  Va.  198,  7 
12  L.  ed.  1170.  S.  E.  248. 

2  Lawson  v.  De  Bolt,  78  Ind.  563 ;         *  Norton  v.  Reardon.  67  Kans.  302, 
Terry  v.  Cole,  80  Va.  695.  72  Pac.  861,  100  Am.  St.  459. 

607 


ij    591  TITLES  AND   ABSTRACTS  608 

delivery  of  the  officer's  deed;  whereas  if  the  sale  is  a  technical 
judicial  sale,  no  title  passes  to  the  purchaser  until  the  court  has 
approved  the  sale.''  When  the  sale  is  confirmed  it  becomes  the 
act  of  the  court,  or.  in  other  words,  a  judicial  sale.  In  a  judicial 
sale  of  lands,  all  the  proceedings  pertaining  to  the  sale  are  under 
the  direction  and  control  of  the  court." 

The  transfer  of  an  estate  in  lands  occurs  by  judicial  sale  in  the 
case  of  :  ( 1 )  Sales  by  order  of  a  court  of  equity  at  the  instance  of 
creditors;  (2)  sales  under  mortgage  foreclosures;  (3)  sales  of 
lands  of  decedents;  (4)  sales  of  lands  of  infants  and  insane  per- 
sons; (5)  sales  and  transfers  for  the  purpose  of  partition;  (6) 
equitable  decrees,  under  state  statutes,  transferring  title,  and 
(7)  adjudications  of  bankruptcy,  by  which  title  passes  to  the 
bankrupt's  trustee. 

§  591.  Validity  and  effect  of  judicial  sales. — The  officer 
making  a  judicial  sale  of  land  has  no  power  to  vary  from  the  di- 
rections given  in  the  decree  under  which  the  sale  is  made.'  but 
confirmation  of  the  sale  is  conclusive  as  to  all  objections  which 
were  raised  or  which  might  have  been  raised  thereto  f  and  though 
a  sale  may  be  irregular  as  not  in  compliance  wnth  the  decree,  it 
may  be  ratified  by  confirmation  where  the  variance  consists  in 
something  which  the  court  could  have  initially  required.^ 

No  error,  defect  or  irregularity  in  the  proceedings,  short  of  ab- 
solute w-ant  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the  court,  or  fraud  or 
mistake,  to  an  extent  that  would  vitiate  the  proceedings,  can  affect 
the  title  of  the  purchaser.  The  jmrchaser  at  a  judicial  sale  may 
always,  before  confirmation,  object  that  the  title  is  bad,  but,  as  a 
general  rule,  no  such  objection  can  be  interposed  after  confirma- 
tion.^" When  the  sale  is  confirmed  it  relates  back  to  the  time  of 
the  sale,  and  cures  all  defects  and  irregidarities,  except  those 
founded  on  fraud  or  want  of  jurisdiction."  The  same  grounds 
are  required  to  set  the  sale  aside  as  would  be  required  to  set  aside 
a  sale  between  individuals.^^    If  there  be  a  defect  in  the  title,  un- 

■■5  Noland   v.   Barrett.    122   Mo.    181,  lo  Cox  v.  Cox,  18  D.  C.  1  :  Wilson 

26  S.  W.  692,  43  Am.  St.  572.  v.  White,  109  N.  Y.  59,  15  N.  K.  749, 

«  Sessions  v.  Peay,  23  Ark.  39.  4  Am.  St.  420. 

'■  Iseman    v.    McMillan,   36   S.-  Car.  ^^  Nevada  Nickel  Syndicate  v.  Na- 

27.  15  S.  E.  336.  tional  Nickel  Co.,  103  Fed.  391. 

^Barnes  v.  Henshaw,  226  111.  605,  '- Virginia  Fire  &  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

80  N.  E.  1076.  V.  Cottrell,  85  Va.  857,  9  S.  E.  132,  17 

f'  Bechtel  v.  Wier,  152  Cal.  443,  93  Am.  St.  108. 
Pac.  75,  15  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  549n. 


609  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    592 

known  to  the  purchaser  at  the  time  of  sale,  and  of  which  he  had 
neither  actual  nor  constructive  notice,  the  court  will  not  ordi- 
narily compel  him  to  take  a  deed  and  complete  the  purchase/^ 

§  592.  Purchaser's  title  under  judicial  sale. — The  doctrine 
of  caveat  emptor  is  said  to  apply  in  all  its  force  to  judicial  sales, 
that  is,  that  it  will  be  conclusively  presumed  that  the  purchaser 
agrees  to  take  the  title,  such  as  it  is,  and  if  he  permits  the  sale  to 
be  confirmed  without  objection,  he  can  not  afterward  refuse  to 
pay  the  purchase-money  because  of  imperfections  in  the  title," 
or  errors  and  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  under  which  he 
purchased/^  He  is  charged  with  notice  of  such  material  facts  as 
the  record  of  the  proceedings  under  which  he  derives  title  dis- 
closes, and  he  will  be  presumed  to  have  examined  the  same  before 
becoming  a  purchaser.^*^  If  all  persons  having  any  claims  or  in- 
terest in  the  property  have  been  made  parties  to  the  proceedings, 
and  the  court  has  jurisdiction,  the  purchaser  will  be  required  to 
take  the  title,  although  the  court  may  have  made  an  erroneous  de- 
cision upon  the  merits,  since  all  parties  are  bound  by  the  decree, 
and  no  one  else  could  question  the  purchaser's  title. ^^ 

If  the  decree  was  valid,  and  the  sale  and  deed  are  regular,  a 
purchaser  in  good  faith  acquires  a  good  title  to  the  property ;  and 
even  though  the  order  of  sale  under  the  decree  is  issued  without 
authority,  such  irregularity  will  not  affect  the  title  of  a  purchaser 
without  notice  thereof,  who  has  paid  the  purchase-money  and  re- 
ceived a  deed.^^  While  the  purchaser  under  a  judicial  sale  sub- 
mits himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  may  be  com- 
pelled to  carry  out  his  contract,  he  is  also  entitled  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  court  in  respect  to  the  avoidance  of  the  purchase,  if  by 
reason  of  imperfections  in  the  title  or  otherwise  he  is  freed  from 
his  agreement." 

The  purchaser  at  a  judicial  sale  is  charged  with  notice  of  every 
fact  appearing  upon  the  face  of  the  record  affecting  the  title  ac- 
quired by  him.-"    But  it  is  held  that  he  need  only  inquire  if  upon 

I'' Union     Trust     Co.     v.     Electric        le  Huber  v.   Hess,   191   111.  30.=!,  61 

Park  Amusement  Co..  168  Mich.  574,  N.  E.  61. 

135  N.  W.  115;  Oakley  v.  Shaw   (N.         i^  Qgden  v.  Walters,  12  Kans.  282; 

J.  Eq.),  69  Atl.  462.  Forest  v.  Parley,  62  N.  Y.  628. 

14  Wood  V.  Mann.  3  Sumn.  (U.  S.)         is  Splahn  v.  Gillespie.  48  Ind.  397. 
318.  _  10  Hofifman's  Referees,  p.  240. 

1^  Jennings  v.  Jenkins,  9  Ala.  285 ;         ~°  Board  of  Education  v.  Berry,  62 

Wilcox  V.  Raben.  24  Nebr.  368,  38  N.  W.  Va.  433,  59  S.   E.   169,   125   Am. 

W.  844,  8  Am.  St.  207.  St.  975. 

39 — TiioMP.  Abstr. 


593 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


610 


the  face  of  the  record  the  court  apparently  had  jurisdiction  of 
the  parties  and  the  subject-matter  in  order  to  be  protected,  pro- 
vided he  buys  in  good  faith,  and  without  notice  of  any  actual  de- 
fect.-^ The  sale  being  by  the  court,  made  through  its  authorized 
agent,  there  is  no  warranty  of  title. ^'  The  purchaser  obtains  only 
the  title  and  interest  held  by  the  original  owner,  subject  to  like 
equities  and  defects  of  title. ^'^ 

There  are  no  covenants  to  which  the  purchaser  may  resort  in 
case  he  acquires  no  title.  The  officer  making  the  sale  is  vested 
wnth  a  mere  naked  power  to  sell  such  title  that  the  original  owner 
had,  without  warranty,  or  any  terms  except  those  imposed  by 
law."*  The  title  of  the  purchaser -relates  back  to  the  date  of  the 
sale,"^  and  where  there  is  an  appeal  from  the  order  of  confirma- 
tion, the  title  relates  back,  on  affirmance  at  least,  as  far  as  that 
order.-"  Although  the  judgment  or  decree  may  be  reversed,  yet 
all  rights  acquired  at  a  judicial  sale  while  the  decree  or  judgment 
were  in  full  force,  and  which  they  authorized  will  be  protected. 
It  is  sufficient  for  the  purchaser  to  know  that  the  court  had  juris- 
diction and  exercised  it,  and  that  the  order,  on  the  faith  of  which 
he  purchased,  was  made,  and  authorized  the  sale.^^  The  rule  is 
the  same  although  the  purchaser  was  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
suit;^^  or  even  if  he  had  notice  at  the  time  of  the  sale  that  an 
effort  would  be  made  to  obtain  a  reversal  of  the  decree."^ 

§  593.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  judicial  sale. — A  purchaser 
at  a  judicial  sale  has  a  right  to  avail  himself  of  a  prior  covenant 
of  warranty.^"  Where,  through  a  mistake,  the  quantity  of  land 
is  materially  less  than  v^^hat  was  intended,  the  purchaser  is  en- 
titled to  a  pro  rata  reduction  in  the  price.^^  An  innocent  pur- 
chaser at  a  judicial  sale  is  not  bound  by  a  secret  equity  in  favor 
of  a  third  person,^-  nor  is  he  bound  to  take  notice  of  errors  in  the 
trial  of  the  proceeding  leading  up  to  the  decree  under  which  he 


siRackley  v.  Roberts,  147  N.  Car. 
201.  60  S.  E.  975. 

22  Williams  v.  Glenn,  87  Ky.  87.  9 
Ky.  L.  941,  7  S.  W.  610,  12  Am.  St. 
461. 

23  Gray  v.  Denson,  129  Ala.  406,  30 
So.  595. 

2*  Bishop  V.  O'Conner.  69  111.  431. 

25  Purser  v.  Cady,  120  Cal.  214,  52 
Pac.  489. 

26  Clark  &  Leonard  Inv.  Co.  v. 
Way,  52  Nebr.  204,  71  N.  W.  1021. 


27  Gray    v.    Brignardello,    1    Wall. 
(U.  S.)  627,  17  L.  ed.  692. 
2«Splahn  V.   Gillespie,  48  Ind.  397. 
2»  Irwin  V.  Jeffers,  3  Ohio  St.  389. 

30  Thomas  v.  Bland.  91  Ky.  1.  12 
Ky.  L.  640,  14  S.  W.  955,  11  L.  R.  A. 
240. 

31  Cooper  V.  Hargis,  20  Ky.  L.  41, 
45  S.  W.  112. 

32  Scarboroug  v.  Holder,  127  Ga. 
256,  56  S.  E.  293. 


611  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    594 

purchased.^^  The  general  doctrine  applying  to  all  judicial  sales 
is  that,  where  one  buys  in  good  faith  he  is  entitled  to  a  vendee's 
lien  to  the  extent  of  the  sum  paid  by  him,  although  the  sale  be 
void.  This  doctrine  is  based  upon  the  principle  of  subrogation.^* 
Where  the  court  had  general  jurisdiction,  but  no  jurisdiction  to 
appoint  the  particular  officer  who  made  the  sale,  and  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sale  were  properly  applied  by  such  officer,  the  pur- 
chaser who  paid  the  purchase-price,  relying  in  good  faith  on  the 
order  made  in  the  matter,  will  be  protected  in  the  title  thus  ac- 
quired.^^  The  purchaser  has  a  right  to  insist  upon  the  terms  of 
the  purchase  being  complied  with.  He  is  not  obliged  to  pay  cash 
where  the  sale  was  made  on  time  payments.^*' 

The  purchaser  acquires  title  to  the  fixtures  as  a  part  of  the 
realty.  If  they  are  wrongfully  severed  by  any  one  after  the 
sale,  though  before  the  execution  of  a  deed  to  the  purchaser,  he 
may  sue  for  them  in  trover,  take  them  by  replevin,  may  recover 
damages  in  an  action  of  waste,  or  may  enjoin  their  removal.^' 
If  the  sale  is  made  to  discharge  liens,  the  purchaser  takes  title 
freed  from  such  liens,  and  the  liens  attach  to  the  proceeds  of  the 
sale.''* 

§  594.  Rights  of  grantee  of  purchaser. — A  bona  fide 
grantee  for  value  from  a  purchaser  at  a  judicial  sale  takes  a  title 
unaffected  by  irregularities,  mistakes,  or  fraud,  of  which  he  had 
no  notice,^**  although  the  sale  was  liable  to  be  set  aside  as  to  his 
grantor;  and  on  the  other  hand  if  his  grantor  was  a  bona  fide 
purchaser  at  such  sale,  he  can  transfer  to  his  grantee  all  the  rights 
of  a  bona  fide  purchaser,  although  such  grantee  has  notice  of 
fraud  sufficient  to  vitiate  the  sale.**^  This  is  upon  the  principle 
that  a  purchaser  with  notice  from  a  purchaser  without  notice  is 
treated  as  a  bona  fide  purchaser.*^  While  the  title  of  a  pur- 
chaser's grantee  is  not  defeated  by  a  vacation  of  the  judgment 
for  error  or  irregularity,  he  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  all  juris- 
ts Hansford  V.  Tate,  61  W.  Va.  ss  Ryker  v.  Vawter,  117  Ind.  425.  20 
207.  56  S.  E.  372.  N.  E.  294. 

3*  Jones  V.  French,  92  Ind.  138.  ^o  Davis  v.  Watson,   54  Miss.  679: 

35  Decker  v.  Fessler,  146  Ind.  16,  44     Fowler  v.  Poor.  93  N.  Car.  466. 

N.  E.  657.  40  Wilson  v.  Hoffman   (N.  J.  Ch.), 

36  Rhodes  V.   Butcher,  6  Hun    (N.     50  Atl.  592. 

Y.)  453.  41  Equitable   Sureties   Co.   v.   Shep- 

3"  Dutro  V.  Kennedy,  9  Mont.  101,     pard,  78  Miss.  217,  28  So.  842. 
22  Pac.  763. 


§  595 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


612 


dictional  defects.*-  Where  the  grantee  of  a  purchaser  at  a  ju- 
dicial sale  has  notice  that  the  purchase-money  is  unpaid,  the  lien 
on  the  land  in  favor  of  the  original  owners  still  subsists  against 
the  property  in  the  hands  of  such  grantee. ^^  But  a  grantee  of  a 
purchaser  under  an  erroneous  decree  in  his  own  favor,  stands  in 
the  position  of  his  grantor,  and  a  subsequent  reversal  of  the  de- 
cree defeats  his  title.** 

§  595.  Refusal  to  complete  purchase. — The  purchaser 
at  a  judicial  sale,  who,  before  paying  the  price  or  entering  into 
possession,  discovers  illegalities  in  the  proceedings  which  have 
led  to  the  sale,  and  which  are  calculated  to  throw  a  cloud  upon 
his  title,  may  refuse  to  execute  the  purchase.*"'  Where  the  sale 
was  had  under  an  erroneous  judgment  liable  to  be  reversed,  he 
can  not  be  compelled  to  accept  the  title.*'*  •  He  may  refuse  to  com- 
plete his  purchase  on  account  of  the  existence  of  incumbrances 
which  were  not  known  to  him  at  the  time  of  making  the  bid,*^ 
He  can  not  be  compelled  to  complete  his  purchase  where  he  was 
misled  as  to  the  identity  of  the  property  upon  which  he  was  bid- 
ding by  false  representations  of  the  person  conducting  the  sale;*** 
or  where  there  is  a  deficiency  in  the  quantity  of  land  intended  to 
be  sold.*''  But  he  will  not  be  relieved  from  complying  with  the 
terms  of  the  sale  on  account  of  defects  of  title  of  which  he  had 
notice  at  the  time  of  the  purchase.'^" 

The  acceptance  of  the  bid  confers  no  title  upon  the  purchaser, 
and  not  even  any  absolute  right  to  have  the  purchase  completed. 
He  is  nothing  more  than  a  preferred  bidder,  or  proposer  for  the 
purchase,  subject  to  the  sanction  of  the  court  afterward. ^^  He 
is  under  no  obligation  to  accept  the  deed  from  the  officer  con- 
ducting the  sale,  until  the  sale  is  reported  to  and  confirmed  by  the 
court.'-  Until  confirmation  by  the  court,  the  contract  of  purchase 
is  executory,  is  open  to  objection,  and  will  not  be  enforced  if  to 


42Albcrs  V.  Kozeluh.  68  Nebr.  522, 
94  N.  W.  521,  97  N.  W.  646. 

^3  Barnes  v.  Morris.  39  N.  Car.  22. 

44  Singly  V.  Warren,  18  Wash.  434, 
51  Pac.  1066,  63  .A.ni.  St.  896. 

45  Succession  of  Nash,  48  La.  1573, 
21  S.  E.  254. 

46  Young    V.     Rathbone,     1     C.     E. 
Green   (N.   T.)  224,  84  .\m.  Dec.  151. 

4- In   re   Box,   11   Wash.   St.  90,  39 
Pac.  240. 


4«  Clay  V.  Kagelmacher,  98  Ga.  149, 
26  S.  E.  493. 

4"  Cooper  V.  Hargis,  20  Ky.  L.  41, 
45  S.  W.  112. 

■'°  Stewart  v.  Devries,  81  Md.  525, 
32  Atl.  285. 

•^1  Wells  V.  Rice.  34  Ark.  346: 
Jones  V.  Williams,  155  N.  Car.  179. 
71  S.  E.  222,  36  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
426n. 

"  Martin  v.  Kellv,  59  Miss.  652. 


613  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    596 

do  so  would  be  against  equity  and  good  conscience.  But  by  bid- 
ding at  the  sale  one  subjects  himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  and  in  effect  becomes  a  party  to  the  proceeding,  and  he 
may  be  compelled  to  complete  his  purchase  by  an  order  of  the 
court,  and  by  its  process  for  contempt  if  necessary. '^'^  Judicial 
sales  are  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  and  are  binding  upon 
the  purchaser  without  any  written  contract  or  memorandum  of 
the  terms  of  sale.^*  This  rule  is  not  universal,  however,"  and 
it  has  been  held  that  a  sale  of  real  estate  by  an  administrator  is 
within  the  statute. ''^^''  The  bidder  may  withdraw  his  bid  at  any 
time  before  the  officer  makes  the  memorandum  necessary  to  make 
the  sale  binding.^'  But  after  the  bid  has  been  accepted  it  becomes 
a  binding  contract,  and  can  not  be  withdrawn  or  changed  except 
under  such  circumstances  as  would  justify  the  rescission  or  refor- 
mation of  other  contracts. ^^ 

Where  the  purchaser  makes  default  in  payment  and  the  prop- 
erty is  resold,  under  an  order  of  court,  at  his  risk,  he  is  entitled 
to  any  excess  in  the  proceeds  at  the  resale  just  as  he  is  responsi- 
ble for  any  deficiency,  being  therefore  a  person  interested  in  the 
property  and  is  entitled  to  file  exceptions  to  the  resale  as  re- 
ported.^'^  It  is  not  proper  for  the  officer  who  has  made  the  sale 
to  resell  the  property  without  an  order  of  court,  on  the  failure  of 
the  purchaser  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  sale;  but  if  he  does  re- 
sell upon  his  own  responsibility,  there  is  not  necessarily  sufficient 
ground  for  holding  the  second  sale  void.'^° 

§  596.  Order  confirming  the  sale. — Until  a  sale  under  the 
order  or  decree  of  court  has  been  reported  to  the  court  by  the 
officer  making  the  sale,  and  such  report  has  been  approved  by  the 
court,  the  sale  is  incomplete  and  no  title  either  legal  or  equitable 
passes  to  the  purchaser."^  The  report  of  the  sale  is  required  to 
inform  the  court  of  the  acts  of  the  officer  in  respect  to  the  sale, 

ssHalleck   v.    Guy,    9   Cal.    181,    70         "Dunham    v.    Hartman,    153    Mo. 

Am.    Dec.   643;    Chandler   v.    Morey,  625.  55  S.  W.  233,  11  Am.  St.  741. 
195  111.  596,  63  N.  E.  512;  Warfield         ss  Continental    Ins.    Co.    v.    Reeve, 

V.  Dorsey,  39  Md.  299,   17  Am.  Rep.  135  App.  Div.  IZI,  119  N.  Y.  S.  901. 
562.  59  Aukam    v.    Zantzinger,    94    Md. 

■>*  Watson   V.   Violett,   63   Ky.   332;  421,  51  Atl.  93. 
Warehime  v.  Graf,  83  Md.  98,  34  Atl.         «"  Dills  v.  Jasper,  ZZ  111.  262. 
364.  «i  Smith  v.  Wert,  64  Ala.  34 ;  .Ape! 

•'5  Jackson    v.    Scott,    67    Ala.    99;  v.  Kelsey,  47  Ark.  413,  2  S.  W.  102; 

Gossard  v.  Ferguson,  54  Ind.  519.  Pool  v.  Ellis,  64  Miss.  555,  1  So.  725; 

S6  Bozza   V.    Rowe,    30    111.    198,    83  Henry  v.  McKerlie,  78  Mo.  416. 
Am.  Dec.  184. 


597 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


614 


and  to  determine  whether  the  orders  in  reference  thereto  have 
been  compHed  with.  Upon  the  report  being  made,  the  court  may, 
l)efore  confirming  the  sale,  inquire  into  the  proceedings  attending 
it,  and  if  they  appear  for  any  reason  to  be  unfair,  or  irregular, 
or  the  land  misdescribed,  the  sale  should  not  be  confirmed."^  An 
order  of  confirmation  can  not  be  properly  made  before  the  com- 
ing in  of  the  report/'^ 

Confirmation  is  usually  made  by  a  formal  order  approving  and 
confirming  the  action  of  the  officer  who  made  the  sale,  and  where 
the  sale  was  regularly  made  in  compliance  with  all  the  provi- 
sions of  the  statute,  no  objections  being  made  thereto,  the  court 
can  not  arbitrarily  withhold  the  order  of  confirmation.''*  The 
usual  order  nisi,  that  the  sale  stand  confirmed  unless  cause  to  the 
contrary  be  shown  within  a  specified  time,  is  sufficient  order  of 
confirmation  of  the  sale.''^  In  all  cases  where  an  order  confirming 
the  sale  is  necessary  to  pass  title  to  the  purchaser,  the  abstractee 
must  examine  the  record  therefor,  and  note  its  existence  or  non- 
existence. 

§  597.  Effect  of  confirmation. — We  here  reiterate  that  the 
sale  is  incomplete  until  confirmed  by  the  court.^"  When  confirma- 
tion is  had,  it  relates  back  to  the  time  of  sale,  and  carries  the  le- 
gal title  from  the  delivery  of  the  deed  and  the  equitable  title  with- 
out a  deed.**^  The  bidder  is  under  no  obligation  to  accept  the 
deed  from  the  officer  conducting  the  sale,  until  the  sale  is  reported 
to  and  confirmed  by  the  court. "'^ 

Confirmation  operates  to  cure  mere  irregularities  in  the  pro- 
ceedings to  obtain  the  sale,  and  in  the  conduct  of  it,'''"'  but  does  not 
make  good  a  defect  arising  from  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  either  of  the  case  or  of  any  party  interested;  and,  more- 
over, fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  which  will  invalidate  a  contract 
generally,  are  grounds  for  setting  aside  the  sale  after  confirma- 
tion."°  And  where  there  are  facts  in  the  record  which  show  that 
the  sale  was  absolutely  void,  a  confirmation  will  not  make  the  sale 


«2Cruikshank  v.  Luttrell,  67  Ala. 
318. 

63  Citizens'  Sav.  Bank  v.  Bauer,  49 
Hun  238,  1  N.  Y.  S.  450,  17  N.  Y.  St. 
81,  14  Civ.  Proc.  R.  340. 

*■'*  Roberts  v.  Robinson,  49  Nebr. 
717.  68  N.  W.  1035.  59  Am.  St.  567. 

"5  Torrans  v.  Hicks,  32  Mich.  307. 

66  Cady  V.  Barnes.  208  Fed.  361. 


"Stang  V.  Redden,  28  Fed.  11. 

"«  Dills  V.  Jasper,  23  111.  262 ;  Mar- 
tin V.  Kelly,  59  Miss.  652. 

'-'■>  Connor  v.  McCoy,  83  S.  Car.  165. 
65  S.  E.  257. 

"0  Jenkins  Land  &  Live  Stock  Co. 
V.  Attwood,  80  Nebr.  806,  115  N.  W. 
305. 


1 


615  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    598 

valid. "^  Confirmation  of  the  sale  is  conclusive  upon  the  pur- 
chaser where  he  had  notice  that  the  title  was  defective/-  or  where 
he  might  have  obtained  notice  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  dili- 
gence, as  where  the  defect  appears  from  records  or  documents 
accessible  to  him." 

After  the  sale  has  been  confirmed  the  purchaser  is  entitled  to 
the  possession  of  the  premises  sold,  and  to  all  the  rents  and  profits 
arising  therefrom ;  and  assumes  all  the  risk  and  hazard  occurring 
to  the  property  after  the  sale.'* 

§  598.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  judicial  sale. — It  is  cus- 
tomary for  the  officer,  upon  accepting  the  purchaser's  bid,  to  exe- 
cute and  deliver  to  him  a  writing  certifying  the  fact  of  the  sale, 
and  describing  the  property  sold  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
the  sale.  This  is  especially  the  practice  where  the  land  is  sold 
under  a  decree  foreclosing  a  mortgage.  In  such  case  the  pur- 
chaser has  no  legal  title  until  the  time  allowed  for  redemption  has 
expired.  The  certificate  of  sale  is  not  a  deed  and  does  not  pass 
title  to  the  land,  but  it  supersedes  the  mortgage  and  is  a  superior 
lien." 

The  purchaser  can  not  maintain  ejectment  or  other  possessory 
action  on  his  certificate  of  purchase.^*'  He  is  not  entitled  to  pos- 
session until  a  deed  has  been  executed  to  him  by  the  officer  sell- 
ing." It  would  seem  that  no  certificate  of  purchase  is  issued  to  the 
purchaser  at  a  sale  by  a  mere  fiduciary  under  order  of  court,  the 
purchaser  taking  only  a  memorandum  of  his  bid  from  the  officer 
making  the  sale.  Such  purchaser  may  assign  his  bid  before  the 
deed  is  made,  and  the  assignee  v/ill  be  entitled  to  have  the  deed 
made  directly  to  himself.^® 

§  599.  Proof  of  title  under  judicial  sales. — "It  is  a  general 
principle  that  the  party  who  sets  up  a  title  must  furnish  the  evi- 
dence necessary  to  support  it.  If  the  validity  of  a  deed  depends 
on  an  act  in  pais,  the  party  claiming  under  that  deed  is  as  much 
bound  to  prove  the  performance  of  the  act  as  he  would  be  bound 

71  Templeton  v.  Falls  Land  &c.  Co.,  ^o  Von  Arx  v.  Boone,  193  Fed.  612, 
n  Tex.  55,  13  S.  W.  964.  113  C.  C.  A.  480. 

72  Jennings  v.  Jenkins,  9  Ala.  285.  ^c  Lightcap  v.  Bradley,  186  111.  510, 

73  Smith  V.  Winn,  38  S.  Car.  188,  17  58  N.  E.  221. 

S.  E.  717,  751.  77  0'Brian  v.  Fry,  82  111.  87. 

7*  Ball  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  80  Ky.  7s  Campbell  v.  Baker,  51  N.  Car. 
501,  4  Ky.  L.  400.  255. 


S  600 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


616 


to  prove  any  matter  of  record  on  which  its  validity  must  depend. 
It  forms  a  part  of  his  title.  It  is  a  link  in  the  chain  which  is 
essential  to  its  continuity,  and  which  is  incumbent  on  him  to  pre- 
serve. These  facts  should  be  examined  by  him  before  he  became 
a  purchaser,  and  the  evidence  of  them  should  be  preserved  as  a 
necessary  muniment  of  title.""  So  in  order  to  show  title  under  a 
deed  obtained  at  a  judicial  sale  the  claimant  is  required  to  produce 
the  entire  record  of  the  proceedings  leading  up  to  the  execution 
and  delivery  of  the  officer's  deed.*"*'  And  in  order  that  counsel 
may  determine  the  validity  of  a  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  an 
order  or  decree  of  sale,  the  abstract  should  contain,  as  a  prelim- 
inary statement  to  the  abstract  of  such  deed,  a  synopsis  of  the 
proceedings  upon  which  the  validity  of  the  deed  depends. 

Counsel  need  only  ascertain  if  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to 
render  the  decree  under  which  the  sale  was  had.  This  should  ap- 
pear from  the  face  of  the  proceedings;  as  where  the  pleadings 
state  a  case  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  or  where 
there  is  nothing  to  show  service  of  process  on  the  defendant,  or 
where  the  pleadings  omit  some  formality  required  to  give  the 
court  jurisdiction. 

§  600.  Presumptions  pertaining  to  judicial  sales. — To  a 
certain  extent,  every  title  depends  upon  rebuttable  presumptions. 
Where  a  title  is  based  on  a  deed  made  under  order  or  decree  of 
court,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  court,  in  making  the  order  of 
sale,  adjudged  every  question  necessary  to  justify  such  order  or 
decree.  If  the  record  shows  the  jurisdictional  facts,  the  order 
or  decree  can  not  be  assailed  collaterally,  but  can  only  be  reviewed 
by  appeal  in  a  direct  proceeding."'*'  It  is  presumed  that  the  records 
of  a  court  are  regular  and  true,  and  that  its  officers  performed 
their  duties  properly."*-  Thus  where  notice  is  required  by  statute, 
and  the  record  of  the  proceedings  in  a  court  of  general  jurisdic- 
tion, while  silent  upon  the  question  as  to  whether  such  notice  was 
given  or  not,  discloses  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  fact  of  such 
notice  having  l^een  given,  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary, 

'» Williams    v.    Peyton's    Lessee,    4     20   So.   994,   59  Am.    St.    100;    Mont- 


Wheat.  (U.  S.)  n,  4  L.  ed.  518. 

**"  Dorrance  v.  Raynsford,  '  67 
Conn.  1,  34  .^tl.  706.  52  .^m.  St.  266. 

^^  Manson  v.  Duncanson,  166  U.  S. 
^12,.  17  Sup.  Ct.  647,  41  L.  ed.  1105; 
Moore  v.   Cottingham,    113   .Ma.    148, 


gomery  v.  Johnson,  31  Ark.  74;  Bur- 
ris  V.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331.  41  Pac. 
458. 

»^2Ayers  v.  Roper,  111  Ala.  651,  20 
So.  460. 


617  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    601 

notice  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  properly  given. *^  Also  if 
the  purchaser  has  taken  possession  and  has  received  from  the  offi- 
cer a  deed  to  the  premises,  a  long  possession  thereunder  will  raise 
in  his  favor  a  presumption  of  the  approval  of  the  sale.** 

But  some  courts  hold  that  no  presumptions  are  allowed  in  favor 
of  the  orders  and  decrees  of  probate  courts,  and  that  the  record 
must  show  the  existence  of  every  fact  which  was  necessary  to  au- 
thorize such  order  or  decree,  or  it  is  void  when  questioned  either 
directly  or  collaterally.'''^ 

§  601.     Sales  under  orders  and  decrees  of  probate  courts. — 

Sales  of  real  estate  by  executors,  administrators,  and  guardians, 
made  under  order  or  decree  of  a  probate  court,  and  where  such 
sales  are  required  to  be  reported  to  the  court  for  approval,  are 
judicial  sales.-"  The  validity  of  such  sales  is  made  dependent  upon 
a  very  rigid  and  literal  compliance  on  the  part  of  the  courts,  as 
well  as  of  such  fiduciaries,  with  statutory  requirements.  In  juris- 
dictions w^here  probate  courts  are  regarded  as  courts  with  judicial 
functions  in  the  common-law  sense,  their  orders  and  decrees 
within  the  scope  of  the  subject-matters  over  which  their  authority 
extends,  are  conclusive  against  all  the  world,  unless  reversed  on 
appeal,  or  avoided  for  error  or  fraud  in  a  direct  proceeding.  But 
where  the  functions  of  such  courts  are  ministerial  only,  or  where 
they  have  no  authority  beyond  special  powers  for  the  perform- 
ance of  specific  duties  not  relating  to  the  general  administration 
of  justice,  it  is  obvious  that,  to  give  validity  to  its  acts,  it  must 
affirmatively  appear  that  everything  necessary  to  such  end  has 
been  observed.  Where  particular  forms  are  required  for  the  exe- 
cution of  a  power,  however  immaterial  they  may  appear  in  them- 
selves, these  forms  are  conditions  that  can  not  be  ignored  with 
any  degree  of  safety.  Very  slight  deviations  therefrom,  or  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  court  or  its  officers  in  making  the  record 
entries,  have  been  held  sufficient  to  avoid  the  sale.  So  it  is  ob- 
viously of  the  gravest  importance  to  see  that  every  step  taken  in 
subjecting  the  real  estate  to  sale  be  as  nearly  as  possible  in  literal 

83  Horner   v.    Doe,    1    Ind.    130,    48  Gaines    v.    Kennedy,    53    Miss.    103; 
Am.  Dec.  355.  Wright  v.  Edwards,  10  Ore.  298. 

84  Smith  V.  Wert,  64  Ala.  34;  Neill  ««  Noland  v.   Barrett.   122  Mo.   181. 
V.  Cody,  26  Tex.  286.  26  S.  W.  692.  43  Am.  St.  592 ;  Maul 

85  Vance  v.    Maroney.   4  Colo.   47;  v.  Hellman,  39  Nebr.  322,  58  N.  W. 
Seymour  v.  Seymour,  22  Conn.  272;  112. 


§  602 


TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS 


618 


compliance  with  the  method  pointed  out  by  the  statute  upon  which 
the  proceeding  was  based/' 

The  rule  of  caveat  emptor  applies  in  all  its  strictness  to  sales  by 
fiduciaries  under  decrees  of  probate  courts,  whether  in  respect 
to  inherent  defects  in  the  title  or  to  those  which  result  from  errors 
and  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  whence  the  authority  to  sell 
is  derived.  The  sale  is  of  the  title  such  as  it  is,  good  or  bad,  and 
the  purchaser  is  conclusively  presumed  to  have  purchased  with 
that  understanding.^** 

One  who  asserts  title  to  land  under  a  deed  from  an  executor, 
administrator,  or  guardian  must  make  proof  of  the  proceedings 
whereby  such  officer  was  authorized  to  make  the  sale.  The  re- 
citals in  the  deed  are  insufficient,  and  the  court  will  not  take  ju- 
dicial knowledge  of  such  proceedings.  The  party  who  produces 
such  deed  must  show  that  its  execution  was  authorized.*" 

§  602.  Probate  procedure  to  sell  real  estate. — By  force  of 
statute  in  most  states,  the  real  estate  of  a  decedent  is  subject  to 
the  payment  of  his  debts  where  the  personal  estate  is  insufficient 
for  that  purpose.  These  statutes  not  only  give  the  personal  rep- 
resentative the  right,  but  make  it  his  duty,  when  the  personal 
property  is  not  sufficient,  to  convert  the  real  estate  into  assets  for 
the  payment  of  debts.  Where  this  right  is  asserted  and  the  lands 
are  sold  and  conveyed,  the  title  to  the  land  which  descended  to  the 
heir  is  completely  divested.®*^  The  law  does  not  confer  upon  an 
executor  or  administrator  any  authority  to  sell  and  convey  the 
real  estate  of  his  decedent  except  by  order  of  the  proper  court,  in 
the  absence  of  a  testamentary  provision  authorizing  such  sale."^ 
The  application  to  sell  can  only  be  made  by  the  executor  or  admin- 
istrator, and  a  sale,  when  ordered,  can  only  be  made  by  such  offi- 
cer. But  if  the  executor  or  administrator  neglects  or  refuses  to 
file  such  application  he  may  be  compelled  to  act  upon  the  petition 
of  any  creditor  of  the  estate  whose  claim  has  been  filed  and  al- 
lowed."^ 


^^  Alabama  Conference  v.  Price,  42 
Ala.  39 ;  Gross  v.  Howard,  52  Maine 
192 ;  Long  v.  Long,  142  N.  Y.  545,  Zl 
N.  E.  486 ;  Haywood  v.  Haywood,'  80 
N.  Car.  42. 

«**  Boiling  V.  Jones,  67  Ala.  508 ; 
Jones  V.  Warnock,  67  Ga.  484 ;  Tilley 
V.  Bridges.  105  111.  336;  Riley  v.  Kep- 
ler. 94  Ind.  308;  Hale  v.  Marquette, 
69  Iowa  376,  28  N.  W.  647. 


89  La  Plante  v.  Lee,  83  Ind.  155. 

»o  Nelson  v.  Murfee,  69  Ala.  598; 
Fiscus  V.  Moore.  121  Ipd.  547,  23  N. 
E.  362,  7  L.  R.  A.  235. 

91  Duncan  v.  Gainey,  108  Ind.  579. 
9  N.  E.  470. 

92  In  re  Pirie,  133  App.  Div.  431, 
117  N.  Y.  S.  753;  Yarboroug  v. 
Moore,  151  N.  Car.  116,  65  S.  E.  763. 


619  JUDICIAL   SALES  §    602 

The  petition  or  application  for  an  order  to  sell  the  real  estate 
of  a  decedent  must  allege  the  necessity  for  the  sale  by  setting 
forth  that  the  debts  which  the  decedent  had  contracted  during  his 
lifetime  are  still  unpaid,  and  that  there  are  not  personal  assets 
sufficient  to  discharge  them,  but  real  estate  which  is  liable  for 
their  payment.  A  schedule  or  detailed  account  of  the  personal 
property  available,  or  that  can  be  made  available,  for  such  pay- 
ment, is  usually  required  to  be  filed  w^ith  or  made  a  part  of  the 
petition  f^  also  a  list  of  the  debts  due  and  remaining  unpaid,"*  and 
an  inventory  of  the  real  estate.^^  The  petition  should  describe  the 
real  estate  of  the  deceased  liable  to  be  made  assets  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debts;  the  title  of  the  decedent  therein  at  his  death, 
and  the  probable  value  thereof  exclusive  of  liens,  and  the  partic- 
ular lien,  if  any,  against  the  real  estate. 

The  statutes  usually  declare  who  are  necessary  parties  to  the 
petition  of  an  executor  or  administrator  to  sell  lands  of  his  de- 
cedent, and  who  are  proper  parties,  and  a  strict  compliance  with 
the  statute  in  this  respect  must  be  had.  The  widow  or  widower, 
the  heirs  or  devisees,  and  lienholders  are  usually  necessary  par- 
ties. It  is  necessary  to  make  the  heirs  parties  to  a  petition,  for  in 
no  other  way  can  their  title  to  the  land  be  divested;""  and  such 
heirs  should  be  named  individually  in  the  petition,  if  their  names 
be  known.  But  an  heir  who  has  conveyed  his  interest  in  a  de- 
cedent's real  estate  is  not  a  necessary  party  to  an  application  to 
sell  real  estate.®^ 

As  in  ordinary  adversary  proceedings,  there  must  be  some  kind 
of  notice  to,  or  a  voluntary  appearance  of,  all  who  are  necessary 
parties  defendant  to  the  petition.  If  it  shall  appear  that  any  of 
the  heirs  or  devisees  of  the  deceased  are  minors,  the  court,  before 
hearing  the  petition  shall  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  for  such 
minors,  and  such  guardian  ad  litem  must  also  be  properly  noti- 
fied."^ The  executor  or  administrator  is  usually  required  to  give 
a  bond  before  making  the  sale,  and  a  failure  to  comply  with  this 
requirement  has  been  held  to  be  ground  for  avoiding  the  sale."" 

93  Gregory  v.  Taber.  19  Cal.  397,  79        ss  Maeck  v.  Sinclair,  10  Vt.  103. 
Am.  Dec.  219;    Rapp  v.  Matthias.  35        s^  Wood  v.  Wood.  150  Ind.  600,  50 
Ind.  332 ;  Bray  v.  Neill,  21  N.  J.  Eq.     N.  E.  573. 

343;    Ford   v.   Walsworth,    15  Wend.  ^^  Piatt  v.  Brickley,  119  Ind.  333,  21 

(N.  Y.)  449.  N.  E.  906. 

94  In  re  Haxtum,  102  N.  Y.  157,  6  ^^  Comparet  v.  Randall.  4  Ind.  55. 
N.  E.  111.  99  Clay  v.   Field,   115   U.   S.  260,  6 


603 


TITLES  AND    ABSTRACTS 


620 


Such  officer  is  sometimes  required  to  take  an  oath  before  selling 
the  land  upon  the  order  of  the  probate  court,  and  sales  are  some- 
times held  void  where  this  is  not  done.^ 

§  603.  How  probate  sales  shown  in  abstract. — Sales  of 
real  estate  by  executors  and  administrators  are  shown  either  in 
connection  with  the  settlement  of  the  decedent's  estate,  or  as  an 
independent  exhibit.  If  a  former  examination  discloses  the  death 
of  the  decedent,  the  institution  of  probate  proceedings,  etc.,  but 
does  not  show  a  sale  of  the  real  estate  or  any  portion  thereof,  such 
sale,  if  any  had,  must  be  shown  in  a  subsequent  examination,  but 
without  re-exhibiting  the  proceedings  already  shown  in  the  for- 
mer examination.  But  where  all  the  proceedings  pertaining  to 
the  sale  of  a  decedent's  real  estate  fall  within  one  examination, 
there  should  appear  a  connected  and  brief  history  of  all  the  pro- 
bate proceedings,  from  their  inception  to  the  court's  approval  of 
the  sale. 

The  following  example  is  submitted : 


Eliza  S.  Yohn,  Admrx.  of  the 
estate  of  James  C.  Yohn,  de- 
ceased, 

V. 

Mary  E.  Yohn,  Charles  G. 
Yohn,  and  Albert  F.  Yohn, 
heirs  of  said  James  C.  Yohn, 
deceased. 


Circuit  Court  of  Marion 
County,  Indiana. 

Case  No.  1621. 

Order  Book  102,  pages  400, 
500. 

Petition  to  sell  real  estate  filed 
Sept.  10,  1893,  by  said  ad- 
ministratrix. 


Petition  shows  among  other  things  that  said  James  C.  Yohn 
departed  this  life  on  the  1st  day  of  March,  1893,  intestate,  the 
owner  in  fee  of  the  following  described  real  estate  situate  in 
Marion  County,  Indiana,  to  wit:  [here  describe  real  estate],  and 
that  the  same  is  of  the  probable  value  of  $3,000.  That  the  per- 
sonal estate  of  decedent,  as  shown  by  an  inventory  and  appraise- 
ment filed  herewith  and  made  a  part  hereof,  is  insyfificient  to  pay 
claims  allowed  against  said  estate  in  the  sum  of  $1,000,  besides 
the  costs  and  expenses  of  administration.   That  said  intestate  left 

Sup.  Ct.  36,  29  L.  ed.  375 ;  Foster  v.         ^  Campbell    v.    Knights,    26    Maine 
Birch.  14  Ind.  445;  Moody  v.  Moody.     224,  45  Am.  Dec.  107. 
1 1    Maine  247 ;   Hannum  v.   Day,   105 
Mass.  33. 


621  JUDICIAL    SALES  §    603 

surviving  the  said  Eliza  S.  Vohn,  his  widow,  and  Mary  E.  Yohn. 
Charles  G.  Yohn,  and  Albert  E.  Yohn,  liis  children  and  only 
heirs  at  law,  and  who  are  of  full  age  and  unmarried.  That 
all  of  said  defendants  and  heirs  answered,  consenting  to  su^h 
sale.    That  the  said  real  estate  was  appraised  for  $3,000. 

Court  ordered  private  sale,  for  not  less  than  the  appraised 
value,  after  notice  given,  etc. 

Proof  of  notice  filed. 

Sept.  16,  1893,  administratrix  filed  report,  showing  private  sale 
of  realty,  Sept.  15,  1893,  f(;r  $3,000.00,  being  the  full  appraised 
value,  to  William  Thron;  said  purchaser  paying  in  cash  the  full 
purchase-price. 

The  court  finds  that  said  administratrix  has  in  all  things  com- 
plied with  the  orders  of  the  court;  the  sale  is  confirmed,  and  the 
administratrix  directed  to  make  deed  to  purchaser  in  fee  simple. 
Said  deed  is  approved  in  open  court,  and  ordered  delivered  to  said 
purchaser. 


CHAPTER    XXVI 


EXECUTION  SALES 


SEC, 

610.  Execution  sales  defined  and  dis- 
tinguished. 

611.  Validity  and  effect  of  execution 
sales. 

612.  Title  under  execution  sale. 

613.  When  title  vests  in  purchaser  at 
execution  sale. 

614.  The  writ  of  execution. 

615.  Levy  and  return  of  execution. 

616.  Notice  of  sale. 

617.  Proof  of  publication  of  notice. 


618.  Effect  of  death  of  judgment 
plaintiff  on  defendant  before  ex- 
ecution. 

619.  Exemption  of  real  estate  from 
execution. 

620.  Effect  of  execution  sale  on 
dower  rights. 

621.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  execu- 
tion sale. 

622.  Assignment  of  officer's  cer- 
tificate. 

623.  Proof  of  title  under  execution 
sale. 


§  610.  Execution  sales  defined  and  distinguished. — Exe- 
cution sales  are  based  on  a  general  judgment  for  so  much  money, 
and  are  conducted  by  an  officer  of  the  law  in  pursuance  of  the 
direction  of  a  statute.  In  our  treatment  of  judicial  sales  we  in- 
cluded all  cases  where  real  estate  is  sold  under  an  order  or  decree 
of  a  court  designating  the  same,  and  authorizing  its  sale.  In 
this  connection  we  propose  to  discuss  only  such  sales  as  are 
made  in  pursuance  of  statute  for  the  recoyery  of  a  specific  sum  of 
money  in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  for  such  sum.  These  sales 
are  not  judicial  sales.  They  must,  it  is  true,  be  supported  by  a 
judgment  or  decree;  but  the  judgment  or  decree  is  not  for  the 
sale  of  any  specific  property.  It  is  only  for  the  recovery  of  a 
designated  sum  of  money.  The  court  gives  no  directions,  and 
can  give  none,  concerning  what  property  can  be  levied  on.  If 
usually  does  not  attempt  any  control  over  the  sale  beyond  setting 
it  aside  for  failure  to  comply  with  some  statutory  requirement. 
In  most  of  the  states  the  officer  making  the  sale  is  not  required 
to  report  the  sale  to  the  court  for  confirmation.  After  complying 
with  the  statute  respecting  levy  and  notice,  he  sells  the  property, 
executes  a  deed  to  the  purchaser,  and  the  transaction  is  ended. 
The  officer  stands  in  the  place  of  the  execution  debtor,  and  sells 
merely  such  title  or  interest  as  the  debtor  may  have  in  the  prop- 
erty.    He  is  merely  a  ministerial  officer,  acting  under  the  writ, 

622 


623  EXECUTION    SALES  §    611 

and  the  court  has  no  control  over  his  actions.  Such  sales  are 
made  by  operation  of  law,  in  which  the  will  and  consent  of  the 
judgment  debtor  is  never  consulted.  But  such  sales  are  required, 
for  the  protection  of  the  debtor,  to  be  made  in  conformity  with  all 
the  statutory  requirements. 

§  611.  Validity  and  effect  of  execution  sales. — A  sale  by 
a  sheriff  under  a  writ  of  execution  is  by  force  of  a  statutory 
power,  and  a  material  departure  from  the  requirements  of  the 
statute  will  render  the  sale  void.  In  order  that  the  sale  may  vest 
title  in  the  purchaser,  the  officer  making  the  sale  must  be  vested 
with  authority  conferred  by  statute.  ^ 

The  general  rule  is  that,  unless  the  contrary  appears  on  the 
face  of  the  record  through  which  the  title  is  claimed,  the  sheriff 
is  presumed  to  have  complied  with  every  statutory  requirement  in 
making  the  sale."  But  mere  errors  and  irregularities  in  judicial 
proceedings  do  not,  as  we  have  stated  elsewhere,  expose  a  judg- 
ment to  collateral  attack,  and,  therefore,  do  not  affect  the  title 
of  a  purchaser  at  an  execution  sale,  and  the  reversal  of  an  erro- 
neous judgment  does  not  affect  the  title  of  a  purchaser  under  the 
judgment^  unless  the  judgment  plaintiff  was  himself  the  pur- 
chaser.^ Nor  do  mere  irregularities  in  the  proceedings  subse- 
quent to  judgment,^  though  there  are  matters  occurring  after 
judgment  that  will  render  a  sale  under  execution  absolutely  void, 
for  example,  a  levy  and  sale  after  the  return  day  of  the  process 
under  which  the  officer  acts.*' 

A  complete  want  of  title  on  the  part  of  the  execution  defendant 
to  the  property  sold,  renders  the  title  of  the  purchaser  worthless.^ 
If  the  judgment  under  which  the  officer  professes  to  act  is  void 
for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court,  or  for  some  other  reason 
was  open  to  collateral  attack,  the  title  of  the  purchaser  at  a  sale 
under  execution  on  such  judgment,  is  worthless.^ 

It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  execution  sale  that  it  be  made 

iHurt  V.   Nave,  49  Ala.  459;   Bell  •'i  Forrest    v.    Camp,    16    Ala.    642; 

V.  Chandler,  23  Ga.  356.  State  v.  Salyers,  19  Ind.  432. 

2  Holmes  v.  Jordan,  163  Mass.  147,  c  Smith  v.  Mundy,  18  Ala.  182,  53 
39  N.  E.  1005 ;  Grand  Rapids  Nat.  Am.  Dec.  221 ;  Jefferson  v.  Curry,  71 
Bank  v.  Kritzer,  116  Mich.  688,  75  N.  Mo.  85. 

W.  90.  7  Thomas  v.  Glazener.  90  Ala.  537, 

3  Shultz  V.  Sanders,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  8  So.  153,  24  Am.  St.  830 ;  Danley  v. 
154.  Rector.  10  Ark.  211,  50  Am.  Dec.  242. 

4  Bryant  v.  Fairfield,  51  Maine  149;  «  Collins  v.  Miller,  64  Tex.  118. 
Mullin  V.  Atherton,  61  N.  H.  20. 


612 


TITLES   AND    AUSTKACTS 


624 


in  the  county  where  the  land  is  situated  and  by  an  official  of  that 
county,"  to  a  person  having  a  right  to  purchase, *°  and  that  it  be 
based  on  a  vahd  levy''  under  an  execution  issued  upon  a  valid'" 
subsisting  judgment.''' 

Mere  irregularities  in  the  method  of  appraisement  and  other 
steps  preliminary  to  an  execution  sale  do  not  render  the  sale 
void.'*  Thus  an  execution  sale  is  not  rendered  invalid  because  of 
the  failure  to  sell  property  in  portions  when  divisible,'"'  or  where 
property  other  than  that  subject  to  the  judgment  lien  is  prema- 
turely levied  on  and  sold,'"'  or  because  of  a  mere  irregularity  in 
the  notice.'^  The  purchaser's  title  can  not  be  prejudiced  by  the 
officer's  return  or  by  an  entire  absence  of  return.'^ 

§  612.  Title  under  execution  sale. — The  purchaser  at  an 
execution  sale  acquires  such  title  as  the  judgment  defendant  had"* 
and  no  more,^"  subject  to  the  equities^'  and  rights  of  third  par- 
ties,^" and  to  the  defendant's  right  to  be  relieved  from  the  eftect 
of  any  fraud  by  the  purchaser."" 

A  purchaser  can  not  recover  the  amount  of  the  bid  from  the 
creditor  w'hen  the  title  fails,  but  he  may  be  subrogated  to  the 
rights  of  the  creditor,"*  and,  while  the  creditor  is  held  responsible 
for  the  validity  of  the  judgment  and  proceedings  employed  to 
collect  the  debt,  such  creditor  is  not  estopped  to  assert  an  after- 
acquired  title  against  the  purchaser  at  the  sale."'"' 

The  purchaser  takes  only  the  interest  of  the  judgment  debtor 
at  the  time  the  judgment  became  a  lien  on  the  land,  and  a  deed 
or  mortgage  then  unrecorded  is  to  be  preferred  as  against  the  title 


^  Tonopah  Banking  Corp.  v.  Mc- 
Kane  Min.  Co.,  31  Nev.  295,  103  Pac. 
230. 

1"  Bell  County  v.  Felts  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  120  S.  W.  1065. 

1^  Tischler  v.  Robinson,  56  Fla.  699, 
48  So.  45. 

1-  Schott  V.  Linscott,  80  Kans.  536, 
103  Pac.  997. 

13  Wever  v.  Parker,  131  Ga.  510,  62 
S.  E.  813. 

^*  Trowbridge  v.  Cunningham.  63 
Kans.  847.  66  Pac.  1015. 

1^  Norman  v.  Eastburn,  230  Mo. 
168,  130  S.  W.  276. 

i«  Bailey  v.  Block  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  125  S.  W.  955. 


1''  Kissinger  v.  Zieger,  138  Wis.  368, 
120  N.  W.  249. 

^^^  Cutting  V.  Harrington,  104  Maine 
96.  71  Atl.  374,  129  Am.  St.  373. 

loWindley  v.  Swain,  150  N.  Car. 
356,  63  S.  E.  1057,  134  Am.  St.  923n. 

20  Wall  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lott-Lewis 
Co.,  5  Ga.  App.  604,  63  S.  E.  637. 

-^  National  Broadway  Bank  v. 
Denny,  133  Ga.  227,  65  S.  E.  412. 

-'  Levengood's  Estate,  38  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  491. 

23  Bowling  V.  Bowling  (Ky.  App.), 
118  S.  W.  923. 

2*  Rosenthal  v.  Mounts  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),   130  S.  W.  192. 

2'J  Rosenthal  v.  Mounts  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.),  130  S.  W.  192. 


625  EXECUTION    SALES  §    613 

of  the  purchaser  at  the  execution  sale,  at  least  if  it  be  recorded 
before  the  sale."" 

§  613.     When  title  vests  in  purchaser  at  execution  sale. — 

The  title  acquired  by  a  sheriff's  deed  on  execution  relates  back  to 
the  date  of  the  judgment  lien,  for  the  judgment  is  the  source  of 
the  officer's  authority,  and  by  such  relation  the  last  act  is  carried 
back  to  the  first  in  making  out  the  title,  and  takes  priority  as  of 
the  date  of  the  first,  which  is  the  day  of  the  judgment.-'  But  the 
title  acquired  under  an  execution  sale  will  not  relate  back  further 
than  the  time  the  lien  was  acquired  under  the  judgment  upon 
which  it  is  based  unless  the  record  of  the  proceeding  clearly 
shows  that  the  sale  was  made  under  a  lien  acquired  prior  to  that 
time.-** 

The  title  of  a  purchaser  at  an  execution  sale,  had  under  a  judg- 
ment in  attachment,  relates  back  to  the  levy  of  the  judgment  and 
has  priority  over  intervening  incumbrances."^  An  equitable  title 
vests  in  the  purchaser  at  the  moment  of  sale,""  but  the  sale  is  not 
consummated  until  the  issuance  of  a  certificate  of  purchase. ^^ 
The  lien  acquired  by  the  issuance  and  levy  of  execution  is  per- 
fected by  the  sale.^"  Most  statutes  require  the  sheriff  to  make  a 
conveyance  of  the  land  to  the  purchaser,  and  this  is  usually  re- 
garded as  necessary  to  vest  the  legal  title  in  the  purchaser,  but  it 
has  been  held  that  such  conveyance  is  not  essential  to  the  investi- 
ture of  title. "^ 

In  jurisdictions  where  the  execution  debtor  is  allowed  a  desig- 
nated time  from  the  date  of  the  sale  in  which  to  redeem  the  prop- 
erty, the  legal  estate  does  not  pass  to  the  purchaser  until  such  time 
for  redemption  has  passed  and  a  deed  from  the  sheriff  has  been 
delivered  to  the  purchaser.  Until  then,  the  purchaser  has  only 
color  of  title. ^■*   In  some  states  sales  of  realty  under  execution  are 

2«Hargreaves  v.  Menken,  45  Nebr.  115  S.  W.  1146,  125  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 

668.  63  N.  W.  951.  lOlln. 

27Hibberd  v.  Smith.  67  Cal.  547,  4  ^i  Kissinger    v.    Zieger,     138    Wis. 

Pac.  473,  8  Pac.  46.  56  Am.  Rep.  726.  368.  120  N.  W.  249. 

28  Pennsylvania    Mtg.    Inv.    Co.    v.  ^^  Mudge     v.     Livermore     (Iowa), 

Gilbert.    13    Wash.    St.    684,    43    Pac.  123  N.  W.  199. 

941,  45  Pac.  43.  :«  Rosenthal  v.  Mounts    (Tex.  Civ. 

20Reilley  v.  Wright.  117  Cal.  11,  48  App.),  130  S.  W.  192. 

Pac.  970.  34  Nesbitt  v.  Delamar's  Nevada  Gold 

30  Harris  v.  Mason,  120  Tenn.  668.  Min.  Co..  24  Nev.  273.  52  Pac.  609.  53 


Pac.  178,  11  Am.  St.  807. 


40 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    614  TITLES  AND   ABSTRACTS  626 

required  to  be  reported  to  the  court  and  confirmed  before  they 
become  conclusive  upon  the  parties. 

§  614.  The  writ  of  execution. — The  execution  writ  should 
sufficiently  identify''''  and  conform  to  the  judgment,^"  dsecribe  the 
property  levied  upon,^'  and  should  be  against  all  the  judgment  de- 
fendants.^^ 

Mandatory  statutes  frequently  require  the  name  of  the  judg- 
ment plaintiff  to  appear  in  the  writ."^  The  writ  should  be  num- 
bered, dated,  sealed  with  the  seal  of  the  court,  specify  to  what 
officer  issued,  and  state  the  nature  of  the  execution.  But  the  writ 
is  not  invalidated  because  of  mere  clerical  irregularities  as  to  its 
form  and  contents.***  The  writ  of  execution  must  issue  from  the 
court  having  control  of  the  judgment,*^  and  within  the  time  pre- 
scribed by  statute,  in  order  to  keep  the  lien  alive.*"  Where  the 
writ  does  not  conform  to  the  judgment  in  any  material  respect, 
the  irregularity  should  be  shown  in  the  abstract  in  order  that 
counsel  may  determine  its  effect  on  transfer  as  a  muniment  of 
title. 

§  615.  Levy  and  return  of  execution. — A  levy  constitutes 
the  acts  by  which  a  sheriff  sets  apart  and  appropriates  for  the  pur- 
pose of  satisfying  the  command  of  a  writ  of  execution  a  part  or 
the  whole  of  the  judgment  defendant's  property.*"  In  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statutory  provision  providing  that  a  levy  on  real  estate 
shall  be  made  a  matter  of  record  it  is  held  that  it  is  not  necessary 
that  a  levy  be  indorsed  upon  the  writ,  but  a  sufficient  levy  is 
shown  where  the  return  of  the  writ  contains  a  copy  of  the  notice 
of  sale  which  recites  a  valid  levy  under  the  writ.**  But  a  formal 
levy  upon  real  estate  is  not  usually  necessary  before  proceeding  to 
advertise  and  sell  the  property.*^ 

^■'  Dugan  V.  Harman,  80  Kans.  302,  4i  Willamette    Real    Estate    Co.    v. 

102  Pac.  465.  133  Am.  St.  209.  Hcndrix,  28  Ore.  485,  42  Pac.  514.  52 

30  Patton's  Ex'r  v.  Smith,   130  Ky.  Am.  St.  800. 

819,  114  S.  W.  315,  23  L.  R.  A.   (N.  42  Evans  v.  Frisbie,  84  Tex.  341.  19 

S.)   1124n.  S.  W.  510. 

"  Thornton   v.    Ferguson,    133    Ga.  ^^  Burkett  v.   Clark,   46   Nebr.  466, 

825,  67  S.  E.  97,  134  Am.  St.  226.  64  N.  W.  1113. 

3**  Merrifield    v.    Western    Cottage  ^i  Herr  v.  Broadwell,  5  Colo.  App. 

Piano  &c.  Co..  238  111.  526,  87  N.  E.  467.  39  Pac.  70. 

379.  128  Am.  St.  148.  «  United  States  Fidelity  &c.  Co.  v. 

39Harkey    v.    Day.    61    Tex.    Civ.  Lentilhon,   64    Misc.   299,    119   N.   Y. 

App.  244,  129  S.  W.  1195.  S.  82. 

*o  Thornton    v.    Ferguson.    133    Ga. 
825,  67  S.  E.  97,  134  Am.  St.  226. 


I 


II 


627  EXECUTION    SALES  §    616 

A  sufficient  and  valid  levy  of  an  execution  on  real  property  may 
consist  in  the  officer  going  upon  the  land  or  getting  the  defend- 
ant's consent  to  levy  upon  a  particular  estate,  or  by  notifying  the 
owner  that  he  intends  levying  upon  such  estate  and  by  making  a 
proper  indorsement  upon  the  writ/''  It  has  been  held  generally 
that,  when  the  judgment  on  which  execution  has  issued  is  a  lien 
upon  the  land,  it  is  unnecessary  to  make  a  formal  levy  of  the  writ 
before  proceeding  to  sell.*^ 

The  validity  of  the  purchaser's  title  is  not  dependent  upon  a 
valid  levy.*^  But  where  the  officer  levies  on  the  real  estate,  his 
indorsement  upon  the  writ  should  describe  the  land  with  such  a 
degree  of  certainty  as  to  enable  any  person  to  identify  the  prop- 
erty taken  by  virtue  of  the  writ,  and  to  designate  in  such  indorse- 
ment the  nature  of  the  right  and  the  interest  of  the  judgment  de- 
fendant in  the  property.*^ 

§  616.  Notice  of  sale. — The  statutes  of  many  states  re- 
quire the  officer  to  give  notice  in  writing  to  the  judgment  defend- 
ant of  the  sale  under  the  judgment.^"  Such  statute  is  fully  com- 
plied with  by  giving  such  notice  to  the  defendant's  agent  or  attor- 
ney. ^^  While  notice  of  an  execution  sale  is  usually  required 
by  statute,  the  sale  is  not  rendered  invalid  because  of  irregularities 
in  this  respect,  and  the  court  may  correct  the  notice  of  sale.^"  But 
a  failure  to  give  any  notice  whatever,  will,  under  some  statutes, 
render  the  sale  void,^^  while  in  other  jurisdictions,  such  failure 
has  the  effect  to  render  the  sale  voidable  merely/*  A  mistake  as  to 
the  time  or  mode  of  advertising  the  sale  will  not  affect  the  title  of 
the  purchaser/^  A  sale  is  not  rendered  void  for  failure  to  give 
notice  where  the  interest  of  the  judgment  defendant  in  the  prop- 
erty levied  on  has  been  transferred/® 

46  Jones  V.  Allen,  88  Ky.  381,  10  Ky.  Pac.  172,  25  Pac.  64;  Fox  v.  Zimmer- 
L.  962,  11  S.  W.  289.  mann,  11  Wis.  414,  46  N.  W.  533. 

47  Bagley  v.  Ward,  Zl  Cal.  121,  99  =2  Walker  v.  Files,  94  Ark.  453,  127 
Am.  Dec.  256;  Wood  v.  Colvin,  5  S.  W.  739;  Kissinger  v.  Zieger,  138 
Hill  (N.  Y.)  228.  Wis.  368,  120  N.  W.  249. 

48  Blood  V.  Light,  38  Cal.  649,  99  ss  Thayer  v.  Roberts,  44  Maine  247 ; 
Am.  Dec.  441 ;  Den  v.  Durham,  29  N.  Henderson  v.  Hays,  41  N.  J.  L.  387 ; 
Car.  151,  45  Am.  Dec.  512.  Borden  v.  Smith,  20  N.  Car.  27. 

49  Bird  V.  Burgsteiner,  100  Ga.  486,  ^^  Jensen  v.  Woodbury,  16  Iowa 
28  S.  E.  219;  Chase  v.  Williams,  71  515;  Hazen  v.  Webb,  68  Kans.  308, 
Maine  190.  74  Pac.  1111  ;  Hall  v.  Moore,  70  Miss. 

^0  Young  V.  Schofield,  132  Mo.  650,  75,  11  So.  655. 
34  S.  W.  497 ;  Mushback  v.  Ryerson,         ^s  stall  v.  Macalester,  9  Ohio  19. 
11  N.  J.  L.  346.  56  Randal  v.  Gould,  225  Pa.  42,  11 

^1  Watson  V.  Sutro,  86  Cal.  500,  24  Atl.  986. 


§    617  TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS  628 

The  statutes  usually  require  such  notice  to  be  posted  in  certain 
public  places  during  a  designated  period  before  the  sale,  or  that 
the  notice  be  given  by  publication  in  a  newspaper  for  a  designated 
number  of  times ;  and  some  statutes  require  both  posting  and  pub- 
lication of  the  notice.  Such  notice  should  describe  the  property 
to  be  sold,  the  time  and  place  of  sale,  the  terms  of  the  sale,  etc. 

Whatever  the  form  of  notice,  or  the  manner  of  giving  it,  the 
abstract  should  always  contain  a  brief  synopsis  thereof,  so  as  to 
enable  counsel  to  determine  if  the  statute  has  been  complied  with 
in  this  respect.  This  synopsis  should  be  given  in  connection  with 
the  full  synopsis  of  the  sale,  and  may  be  noticed  in  the  following 
manner : 

Certified  copy  of  printed  notice  of  sale  filed.  Contains  title  and 
number  of  cause,  describes  real  estate,  fixes  date  of  sale  as  Jan- 
uary 10,  1917,  at  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  fixes  place  of  sale  at  east  door 
of  courthouse,  Indianapolis,  Ind.,  and  designates  terms  to  be  for 
cash. 

§  617.     Proof  of  publication  of  notice. — Where  the  statute 
requires  notice  of  the  sale  to  be  published  in  a  newspaper  for  a         _ 
designated  period  before  the  sale,  proof  of  such  publication  is  f 

usually  made  by  the  officer  by  attaching  a  copy  of  the  notice  and 
the  affidavit  of  the  publisher  to  his  return.  But  in  most  jurisdic- 
tions it  seems  that  a  failure  to  make  such  proof  will  not  invalidate 
the  sale."  The  rule  of  law  seems  to  be  that  where  notice  is  re- 
quired by  statute,  and  the  record  of  the  proceedings  in  a  court  of 
general  jurisdiction,  while  silent  upon  the  question  as  to  whether 
such  notice  was  given  or  not,  discloses  nothing  inconsistent  with 
the  fact  of  such  notice  having  been  given,  in  the  absence  of  proof 
to  the  contrary,  notice  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  properly 
given.''"*  A  sale  without  notice,  when  notice  is  required,  is  per- 
haps void,  though  after  report  and  confirmation  and  the  execution 
and  delivery  of  the  deed,  in  the  absence  of  anything  in  the  record 
negativing  the  fact  of  notice,  the  sale  will  be  upheld  under  the  rule 
that  notice  will  be  presumed. ^^  The  affidavit  making  proof  of  the 
publication  of  the  notice  required  by  the  statute  should  designate 
that  the  notice  annexed  to  the  report  is  a  true  copy  of  the  notice 

57  Drake  v.  Hale,  38  Mo.  346.  65  Am.  Dec.  334 ;  Clark  v.  Hillis,  134 

58  Horner  v.  Doe,  1  Ind.  130,  48  Ind.  421.  34  N.  E.  13;  Schaale  v. 
Am.  Dec.  355.  Wasey,  70  Mich.  414,  38  N.  W.  317. 

59  Saltonstall  v.  Riley,  28  Ala.  164, 


629  EXECUTION    SALES  §    618 

printed,  the  name  of  the  newspaper,  the  period  during  which  the 
notice  was  printed,  and  the  date  of  the  first  and  last  publications. 
These  matters  may  be  shown  as  follows  : 
Appended  to  the  foregoing  report  is. 


Affidavit 

by 

Earl  Diggs,  editor  and  general 
manager  of  the  Marion 
Leader. 


Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before 
W.  D.  Lett,  a  notary  public. 


Recites,  that  the  notice  "of 
which  the  annexed  printed 
copy,"  was  published  in  the  reg- 
ular editions  of  said  paper,  a  weekly  newspaper  of  general  circu- 
lation, printed  and  published  in  Grant  county,  Indiana,  for  the 
period  of  three  successive  weeks,  the  first  of  which  publications 
being  on  the  4th  day  of  May,  1917,  and  the  last  on  the  18th  day 
of  May,  1917. 

§  618.  Effect  of  death  of  judgment  plaintiff  on  defendant 
before  execution. — In  case  the  execution  issue  after  the  death 
of  the  judgment  defendant  it  may  be  ineffectual,  but  if  issued  dur- 
ing his  hfetime  a  valid  sale  may  be  made  thereunder.*"'  Execution 
after  the  death  of  the  defendant  must  be  issued  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  statute  in  order  to  render  the  sale  valid.  The 
common-law  rule  seems  to  be  that  revival  of  the  judgment  by 
scire  facias  is  necessary  before  execution  can  be  issued  after  the 
defendant's  death,  the  statutes  of  a  number  of  states  have  pro- 
vided for  the  suspension  of  the  right  to  issue  execution  for  a 
specified  time  after  the  defendant's  death,  in  place  of  the  common- 
law  revival  by  scire  facias.*'^  Likewise,  in  case  of  the  death  of  the 
judgment  plaintiff  before  issue  of  execution,  the  common-law 
rule  is  that  revival  of  the  judgment  by  scire  facias  is  necessary 
before  execution  can  be  issued;  but  in  some  jurisdictions  the 
cases,  either  practically  or  expressly,  hold  that  revival  by  scire 
facias,  or  in  any  other  manner,  is  unnecessar3^*'- 

Where  letters  testamentary  or  of  administration  issued  in  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  judgment  plaintiff  or  defendant,  and  such 
letters  are  filed  or  recorded  in  the  court  in  which  the  judgment 

«o  Barrett  v.  Furnish,  21  Ore.  17,  Miss.  451.  6  So.  208 :  Landes  v.  Per- 
26  Pac.  861.  kins,  12  Mo.  238 

61  Fowler  v.  Mickley.  39  Minn.  28.  «2  juhan  v.  Julian,  104  Ga.  253,  30 
38  N.  W.  634;  Alsop  v.  Cowan,  66  S.  E.  779;  Armstrong  v.  McLaugh- 
lin, 49  Ind.  370. 


§    619  TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS  630 

was  rendered,  exedition  may  issue  and  proceedings  be  had  there- 
under in  the  name  of  the  executor  or  administrator. 

§  619.     Exemption   of   real   estate   from   execution. — We 

have  said  that  certain  classes  of  persons,  such  as  heads  of  fam- 
ilies, householders,  etc.,  are  entitled  to  claim  as  exempt  from  sale 
on  execution  certain  portions  of  their  property,  and  where  any 
portion  of  the  land  of  a  judgment  debtor  is  exempt  from  execu- 
tion sale  he  may  convey  it  without  regard  to  any  judgment 
against  him,  and  the  purchaser  will  obtain  title  free  from  the 
judgment;'"  but  where  an  execution  debtor's  right  to  have  cer- 
tain property  exempt  from  sale  is  dependent  upon  asserting  a 
claim  of  exemption  before  sale  is  made,  one  who  acquires  his 
title  before  the  execution  sale  of  the  property  must  duly  assert 
the  claim  of  exemption  if  he  desires  the  benefit  of  it.*'*  Unless 
the  exemption  is  absolute,  it  may  be  lost  by  laches  or  by  failure 
to  claim  it,  and  of  course  if  it  be  for  a  limited  period  only,  it  will 
terminate  by  lapse  of  time.*'^  It  is  important,  therefore,  where 
title  is  claimed  through  execution  sale,  to  determine  if  the  prop- 
erty sold  was  subject  to  the  right  of  exemption.  The  property 
exempt  is  usually  the  homestead  or  residence  of  the  debtor,  and 
he  is  not  usually  required  to  lay  claim  to  his  right  at  the  time  of 
the  levy,  nor  at  any  time  before  the  sale. 

§  620.  Effect  of  execution  sale  on  dower  rights. — Where  a 
title  is  claimed  through  a  judicial  or  execution  sale  it  is  important 
to  know  the  facts  respecting  the  domestic  condition  of  the  orig- 
inal owner.  If  the  inchoate  right  of  dower  attached  to  the  prop- 
erty it  is  an  encumbrance  until  extinguished  or  released."*^  Where 
land  is  sold  during  the  husband's  life,  at  forced  sale,  to  satisfy 
a  judgment  against  him,  the  purchaser  acquires  the  same  title, 
as  to  the  wife's  right  of  dower,  that  he  would  acquire  if  he  were 
the  husband's  grantee  by  the  latter's  voluntary  conveyance."^ 
This  is  true  though  the  execution  sale  be  subsequently  confirmed 
by  the  court. *^^  Where  the  whole  of  a  husband's  real  estate  is  sold 

"•^Citizens'    State    Bank   v.    Harris,  *■■«  Atwood  v.  Arnold,  21  R.  I.  609, 

149  Ind.  208,  48  N.  E.  856.  51  Atl.  216. 

«*  Moss  V.  Jenkins,  146  Ind.  589;  45  "  Roan  v.  Holmes,  2>2  Fla.  295,  13 

N.  E.  789.  So.  339,  21  L.  R.  A.  180. 

65  Connor    v.    McCormick    (Iowa),  "^  Butler    v.    Fitzgerald,    43    Nebr. 

117  N.  W.  976.  192,  61  N.  W.  640,  27  L.  R.  A.  252, 

47  Am.  St.  741. 


631  EXECUTION    SALES  §    621 

to  satisfy  liens  prior  to  the  attaching  of  the  wife's  dower  right, 
her  dower  claim  is  only  operative  against  the  surplus  proceeds."'' 

Before  assignment,  a  widow's  right  of  dower  is  a  mere  chose  in 
action  and  is  not  subject  to  execution  sale  to  pay  her  debts.'"  This 
right  becomes  complete  upon  her  husband's  death  and  is  a  thing 
in  action  applicable  to  the  payment  of  her  debts;  but  a  judgment 
against  her  is  not  a  lien  on  her  dower  interest  until  it  has  been 
assigned  and  set  off  to  her.^^ 

Where  a  wife  was  defaulted  and  judgment  entered  against  her 
in  an  action  to  foreclose  a  certain  mortgage  executed  by  her  hus- 
band alone,  in  which  action  no  mention  was  made  of  her  inchoate 
dower  right  and  she  was  mentioned  only  as  a  wife  and  volunteer, 
it  was  held  that  the  foreclosure  sale  did  not  preclude  her  from 
claiming  her  dower  interest  in  the  land  sold.^"  But  a  wife  is  not 
endowed  of  land  sold  to  satisfy  a  lien  or  incumbrance  created  by 
deed  in  which  she  joined." 

It  is  expressly  provided  by  statute  in  some  states  that  a  judicial 
sale  of  property  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  debts  of  the  husband, 
who  is  the  owner  of  the  fee  simple  title,  terminates  the  wife's  in- 
choate right  of  dower. ^*  The  existence  of  dower  and  curtesy 
rights  must  be  ascertained  by  inquiries  dehors  the  record. 

§  621.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  execution  sale. — In  exe- 
cution sales  where  the  right  to  redeem  is  given  the  judgment 
debtor,  a  deed  is  not  made  to  the  purchaser  until  the  time  for  such 
redemption  has  expired.  In  such  cases  the  statutes  usually  pro- 
vide for  the  execution  and  delivery  to  the  purchaser  of  a  certifi- 
cate of  sale  by  the  officer. ^^  Such  certificate  should  recite  the 
name  of  the  court  rendering  the  judgment,  the  parties  to  the  ac- 
tion, the  date  and  amount  of  the  judgment,  a  description  of  the 
premises  sold,  the  date  of  the  sale  and  the  amount  bid,  the  name 
of  the  purchaser,  and  the  redemption  period.'^*'   A  slight  variance 

«9Helm  V.  Board,   114  Ky.  289,  24  ^4  Bowden  v.  Hadley,  138  Iowa  711, 

Ky.  L.  1037,  70  S.  W.  679.  116   N.   W.   689;    McKelvey   v.    Mc- 

""  Harper  v.   Clayton,   84  Md.  346,  Kelvey,  79  Kans.  82,  99  Pac.  238. 

35  Atl.  1083,  35  L.  R.  A.  211,  57  Am.  ^s  Webber  v.  Kastner,  5  Ariz.  324, 

St.  407.  53  Pac.  207 ;  Foorman  v.  Wallace,  75 

^1  Tenbrook  v.  Jessup,  60  N.  J.  Eq.  Cal.  552,   17  Pac.  680 ;  Whitenack  v. 

234,  46  Atl.  516.  Agartt,  56  111.  App.  72;  Hays  v.  Wil- 

"2  Beverly  v.  Waller.    115   Ky.  596,  stach,  82  Ind.  13;  Drake  v.  McLean, 

24  Ky.  L.  2505,  74  S.  W.  264,  103  Am.  47  Mich.  102,  10  N.  W.  126 

St.  342.  7G  Fitch  V.  Pinckard,  5  111.  69. 

"-  Morgan    v.    Wickliffe,     115     Ky. 
226,  24  Kv.  L.  2104,  72  S.  W.  1122. 


§  621 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


632 


between  the  recitals  in  the  certificate  and  the  sheriff's  return  will 
not  invalidate  the  sale."'  The  certificate  of  the  sheriff  is  the 
proper  evidence  of  a  sale  of  real  estate  on  execution,  and  no 
other  memorandum  is  required."^  Where  a  memorandum  is  re- 
quired in  execution  sales  the  courts  are  uniform  in  holding  that 
the  sheriff's  return  upon  the  execution  meets  the  requirements  in 
that  respect. ^'^  An  execution  sale  does  not,  of  itself,  pass  the  title 
to  the  purchaser,  although  the  sale  may  be  manifested  by  a  memo- 
randum thereof  in  writing  signed  by  the  sheriff.  To  pass  the 
title,  a  deed  must  be  executed  by  the  sheriff.®" 

Where  the  sheriff  executes  and  delivers  a  certificate  to  the  pur- 
chaser, and  records  a  copy  thereof  in  the  register  of  deeds,  such 
record,  or  the  orignal  certificate,  becomes  evidence  of  the  facts 
therein  contained.  The  record  of  such  certificate  may  be  shown 
in  the  abstract  in  the  following  manner : 


John  Williams.  Sheriff  of  Grant ' 
County,  Indiana, 

to 

John  Davis. 


Certificate  of  sale  on  execution. 
Dated  May  1,  1905. 
Recorded  May  2,  1905. 
Deed  Record  75,  page  40. 


Certifies  that  by  virtue  of  a  writ  of  execution  to  him  directed 
from  the  Circuit  Court  of  Grant  County,  Indiana,  issued  on  a 
certain  judgment  rendered  at  the  November  term,  1904,  of  said 
court,  in  favor  of  Ephraim  Creviston,  plaintiff,  against  Harvey 
Cox,  defendant,  for  the  sum  of  $500  and  costs,  dated  April  5, 
1905,  he  did  on  May  1,  1905,  at  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  at  the  south 
door  of  the  courthouse  in  the  city  of  Marion  (the  time,  place  and 
terms  of  sale  having  been  duly  advertised  according  to  law),  sell 
at  public  auction  all  right,  title  and  interest  of  the  said  defendant 
in  and  to  the  following  described  real  estate,  to  \w\t:  [here  de- 
scribe premises  as  same  is  described  in  certificate]  to  John  Davis 
for  $525,  said  sum  being  the  highest  and  best  bid  obtainable 
therefor,  and  said  purchaser  will  be  entitled  to  a  deed  for  said 
premises  so  sold  on  the  1st  day  of  May,  1906,  unless  the  same 
shall  have  been  redeemed  as  provided  by  law. 


'■^  Chicago  Dock  &  Canal  Co.  v. 
Kinzie.  93  111.  415. 

^''Armstrong  v.  Vroman,  11  Minn. 
220   (Gill  142),  88  .Am.  Dec.  81. 


"»  Stearns  v.  Edson,  63  Vt.  259,  22 
.Atl.  420,  25  Am.  St.  758. 

^0  Strain  v.  Murphy,  49  Mo.  337. 


I 


633  EXECUTION    SALES  §    622 

§  622.  Assignment  of  officer's  certificate. — The  sheriff's 
certificate  of  sale  on  execution  may  be  assigned  by  the  purchaser 
at  the  sale,  and  the  deed  be  made  to  the  assignee. ^^  In  some 
states  such  assignment  is  expressly  authorized  by  statute."'  The 
assignee  of  a  sheriff's  certificate  of  the  sale  of  land  on  execution 
is  not  a  bona  fide  purchaser.*"^  It  is  subject  in  his  hands  to  all  the 
defenses  which  may  have  been  interposed  against  it  in  the  hands 
of  his  assignor.  But  it  is  held  that  innocent  purchasers  are  en- 
titled to  protection,  and  acquire  good  title  when  they  purchase 
from  a  purchaser  at  the  sale.** 

Upon  the  death  of  a  purchaser  at  an  execution  sale,  the  deed 
is  properly  made  to  his  heirs. -^  And  where  one  entitled  to  receive 
a  sheriff's  deed  dies,  the  subsequent  execution  of  it  to  him,  al- 
though void,  does  not  affect  the  title  of  those  claiming  under 
him.^® 

§  623.  Proof  of  title  under  execution  sale. — As  a  general 
rule,  a  purchaser  claiming  title  through  an  execution  sale  is  bound 
only  to  show  the  judgment  of  a  competent  court,  an  execution 
warranted  by  the  judgment,  and  a  sale  and  deed  under  it.^^  In 
some  cases  it  is  held  that  he  must  prove  a  valid  judgment,  exe- 
cution, and  levy,  independent  of  recitals  in  the  deed.^**  However, 
he  is  not  bound  to  deduce  a  regular  chain  of  title  subsisting  in 
the  execution  defendant,  as  it  is  sufficient  if  he  shows  that  such 
defendant  had  a  legal  title  at  the  date  of  the  rendition  of  the  judg- 
ment.^" In  actions  to  try  the  title  to  real  estate  derived  through 
an  execution  sale  it  is  necessary  for  the  purchaser  to  prove  that 
the  judgment  defendant  had  some  interest  or  estate  in  the  land 
sold  on  which  the  judgment  could  operate."'^ 

The  abstract  should  contain  a  synopsis  of  all  the  proceedings 

«i  Turner    v.    First    Nat.    Bank,    78  «-  Lahr  v.  Ulmer,  27  Ind.  App.  107, 

Ind.  19.  60  N.  E.  1009. 

82Turpie  v.  Lowe.  158  Ind.  314,  62  »«  Ayers  v.  Roper,  111  Ala.  651,  20 

N.  E.  484,  92  Am.  St.  310.  So.  460;  Cloud  v.  El  Dorado  County, 

83  Hays  V.  Peavey,  54  Wash.  78,  102  12  Cal.  128,  "73  Am.  Dec.  526 ;  Wil- 
Pac.  889.  hite  v.  Hamrick,  92  Ind.  594 ;  Parlin 

84  Borders  v.  Vance,  134  Ga.  85,  67  v.  Ware,  39  Maine  363. 

S.  E.  543;  Lightfoot  v.  Horst   (Tex.  ^^  EHJott  v.  Dycke,  78  Ala.   150. 

Civ.  App.).  122  S.  W.  606.  »o  Hendon   v.   White,   52   Ala.   597; 

85  Jones  V.  Webb,  22  Ky.  L.  1100,  Pekin  Mining?  &  Milling  Co.  v.  Ken- 
59  S.  W.  858.  nedy,  81   Cal.  356,  22  Pac.  679 ;   Bel- 

86  Diamond  v.  Turner,  11  Wash,  ford  v.  Crane,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  265,  84 
St.  189,  39  Pac.  379.  Am.  Dec.  155;  Wall  v.  Fairley,  77  N. 

Car.  105. 


623 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


634 


upon  which  such  title  is  based,  so  that  counsel  may  determine 
therefrom  the  merits  of  the  title  as  affected  by  such  proceedings. 
The  court's  jurisdiction  is  a  subject  that  should  be  carefully  in- 
quired into,  as  a  judgment  and  sale  thereunder  does  not  give 
validity  to  a  title  where  the  court  rendering  the  judgment  had  no 
jurisdiction  of  the  parties  or  the  subject-matter. 


CHAPTER    XXVII 


TAXES  AND  TAX  TITLES 

SEC.  SEC. 

630.  Taxes  and  taxation  in  general.  639.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  tax  sale. 

631.  Property  subject  to  taxation.  640.  Redemption  from  tax  sale. 

632.  The  tax  lien.  641.  Certificate    of    purchase    at    tax 

633.  Tax  titles.  sale. 

634.  Assessment  of  taxes.  642.  The  tax  deed. 

635.  Description    of    land    in    assess-  643.  Formal  parts  of  the  deed. 

ment  roll.  644.  Tax  deeds  as  evidence  in  support 

636.  The  tax  sale.  of  title. 

637.  Collection  by  proceedings  of  for-  645.  Legislation     to     strengthen     tax 
feiture.  titles. 

638.  Who    may   be   purchaser   at   tax  646.  Judgment  for  taxes, 
sale.  647.  Local  assessments. 

§  630.  Taxes  and  taxation  in  general. — A  tax  has  been 
variously  defined  as  a  burden  or  charge  imposed  on  persons  or 
property,  or  proportional  contribution  levied  by  the  sovereign,  to 
raise  money  for  the  support  of  the  government  and  for  all  public 
needs  and  purposes.^  It  is  not  a  debt  within  the  ordinary  meaning 
of  that  term,"  but  is  a  charge  or  burden  imposed  upon  property 
for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  It  is  levied  upon  the  authority  of 
the  state  or  municipality,  in  the  exercise  of  its  sovereignty,  for 
governmental  purposes,  or  for  some  object  connected  therewith.^ 

A  tax  levied  on  land  for  the  support  of  the  government  is  para- 
mount to  all  other  claims  and  liens  against  it.  It  is  a  charge  upon 
the  land  without  reference  to  the  matter  of  ownership.'*  Special 
assessments  for  local  improvements  are  not  taxes  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  on  the  gen- 
eral subject  of  taxation.  Hence  they  do  not  come  within  a  pro- 
vision that  "laws  shall  be  passed  taxing  by  a  uniform  rule  all  real 
and  personal  property,  according  to  its  true  value  in  money.  "^ 

The  power  to  tax  is  an  attribute  of  sovereignty, '^  inherent  in  the 

^Louisiana  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Ma-  *  Jack  v.  Weiennett,  115  III.  105,  3 

dere,  124  La.  635,  50  So.  609.  N.  E.  445,  56  Am.  Rep.  129. 

-United   States  v.  Chambcrlin,   156  ■''Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N.  Car.  7)2, 

Fed.  881,  13  Ann.  Cas.  720.  14  S.  E.  521,  17  L.  R.  A.  330. 

3  Iowa  Land  Co.  v.  Douglas  Co.,  8  '•  Federal  St.  &  P.  V.  Pass.  R.  Co. 

S.  Dak.  491,  67  N.  W.  52.  v.  Pittsburg,-  226  Pa.  419,  75  Atl.  662. 

635 


631 


TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS 


636 


legislature,'  whose  powers  in  sucli  regard  are  limited  only  by  its 
own  discretion  and  its  responsibility  to  its  constituents/-  and  by 
constitutional  limitations,''' 

Municipal  corporations  have  no  inherent  power  to  levy  taxes.'" 
They  have  such  power  only  as  is  expressly  given  them  by  statute 
or  charter/^  or  as  constitute  a  proper  exercise  of  their  police 
powers. 

The  maxim  commonly  expressed  is  that  "the  subjects  of  every 
state  ought  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  the  government  as 
nearly  as  possible  in  proportion  to  their  respective  abilities,  that 
is,  in  proportion  to  the  revenue  which  they  respectively  enjoy 
under  the  protection  of  the  state." ^"  Briefly  stated,  this  means 
that  taxation  should  be  equal  and  uniform.  But  absolute  equality 
is  difficult  of  attainment,  and  approximate  equality  is  all  that  can 
be  reasonably  expected  under  the  most  perfect  system  in  vogue. ''■ 

§  631.  Property  subject  to  taxation. — As  a  general  rule  all 
property  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  taxing  power  of  the  gov- 
ernment is  taxable^*  unless  specially  exempted, ^^  or  exempted 
under  some  rule  of  comity/"  independently  of  any  benefit  accru- 
ing to  the  owner. ^'  But  a  tax  will  not  be  held  to  be  imposed  upon 
property  except  by  language  clearly  indicating  the  intent  of  the 
legislature  to  render  the  same  subject  to  the  tax.^*  Property  in- 
tended to  be  relieved  from  the  burden  of  taxation  is  usually  pro- 
tected by  a  special  exemption  based  on  the  purposes  for  which 
it  is  used.  Exempting  statutes  arc  strictly  construed,  and  the  ex- 
emption will  not  be  recognized  unless  clearly  conferred.^^    The 


7  Bradley  v.  Richmond,  110  Va.  521, 

66  S.  K.  872. 

8  Alderman  v.  Wells,  85  S.  Car.  507, 

67  S.  E.  781,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  864n, 
21  Ann.  Cas.  193. 

!»  State  V.  Little,  94  Ark.  217.  126 
S.  W.  713;  Smith  v.  Farr,  46  Colo. 
364,  104  Pac.  401  ;  Smith  v.  Hamilton 
County  Comrs.,  173  Ind.  364,  90  N. 
F.  881. 

10  Booth  V.  Opel,  244  111.  317,  91  N. 
E.  458. 

11  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Pittsburgh, 
226  Pa.  322,  75  Atl.  421,  134  Anr.  St. 
1063. 

12  Adam  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations, 
bk.  4,  Ch.  2. 

13  In  re  Delaware,  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.'s 


Tax  Assessment,  224  Pa.  240,  73  Atl. 
429. 

i*Tn  re  Kissel's  Estate,  65  Misc. 
443.  121  N.  Y.  S.  1088. 

1"' State  V.  Holcomb,  81  Kans.  879, 
106  Pac.  1030,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
251n. 

1''  McDaniel  v.  Texarkana  Cooper- 
age &  Mfg.  Co.,  94  Ark.  235,  126  S. 
W.  727. 

1"  .A.therton  v.  Essex  Junction,  83 
Vt.  218.  74  Atl.  1118,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)   695n,  Ann.  Cas.  1912a,  339n. 

I'*  People  V.  Duffv-Mclnnery  Co., 
122  App.  Div.  336.  106  N.  Y.  S.  878. 

1"  Young  Women's  Christian  Assn. 
V.  Spencer,  9  Ohio  C.  C.  (N.  S.)  351. 


637  TAXES   AND    TAX    TITLES  §    632 

property  usually  exempted  from  taxation  is  that  used  for  relig- 
ious, educational,  charitable,  benevolent,  and  cemetery  purposes. 
Exemptions  are  sometimes  allowed  to  encourage  certain  indus- 
tries,"'' to  prevent  double  taxation,-^  and  in  favor  of  persons  vm- 
able  to  pay."' 

§  632.  The  tax  lien. — Tax  liens  are  of  purely  statutory 
origin.  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  making  taxes  a  lien  on  real 
estate  there  can  be  no  lien,  and  unless  taxes  are  declared  by  pos- 
itive law  to  be  a  lien  upon  the  lands  against  which  they  are  as- 
sessed, no  such  effect  can  be  claimed  for  them.-"  The  statutes 
usually  provide  when  the  lien  for  taxes  will  attach  to  the  property. 
A  day  is  usually  designated  from  and  after  which  a  tax  shall  be 
a  lien,  but  when  no  time  is  specifically  designated  the  attaching 
of  the  lien  should  date  from  the  time  when,  by  the  extension  of 
the  tax  upon  the  assessment  roll,  a  particular  sum  has  become  a 
charge  upon  a  particular  tract  of  land.^*  Prior  to  the  date  fixed 
by  the  statute,  there  exists  nothing  but  a  liability  of  the  land  to  a 
future  lien,  though  the  taxes  have  been  assessed."^ 

Taxes  are  an  incumbrance  within  the  covenant  against  incum- 
brances from  the  time  they  become  a  lien  upon  the  land,  whether 
this  be  from  the  date  of  the  assessment  or  from  the  time  fixed  by 
statute,  though  they  have  not  become  due  and  payable  at  the  time 
of  the  conveyance."''  Assessments  for  street  improvements  which 
have  not  been  laid  at  the  time  of  a  conveyance,  though  the  im- 
provements have  already  been  made,  are  not  within  a  covenant 
against  incumbrances.  Until  the  amount  of  a  tax  is  ascertained 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law,  no  lien  or  encumbrance  exists 
by  reason  thereof."^  A  municipal  claim  for  laying  water  pipes, 
not  entered  of  record  so  as  to  preserve  its  lien,  is  not  an  incum- 
brance upon  the  land  in  the  hands  of  a  subsequent  purchaser.^^ 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  such  assessments  are  an  incumbrance 

20Shreveport     Creosoting     Co.     v.  214.  46  N.  W.  365 ;  Webb  v.  Bidwell, 

Shreveport,   119  La.  637,  44  So.  325.  15  Minn.  (Gil.  394)  479. 

21  Inhabitants  of  Trenton  v.  Stand-  -'  Bradley  v.  Dike,  57  N.  J.  L.  471, 
ard  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  J.  L.  79,  68  32  Atl.  132. 

Atl.  1111.  ^"Campbell   v.    McCIure,   45    Nebr. 

22  New  York  v.  Goss,  124  App.  Div.    608.  63  N.  W.  920. 

680,  109  N.  Y.  S.  151.  -'  Tull  v.  Royston,  30  Kans.  617,  2 

23  Tompkins  v.  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Pac.  866;  Lathers  v.  Keogh,  109  N. 
R.  Co.,  18  Fed.  344,  5  McCrary  597 ;     Y.  583,  17  N.  E.  131. 

Morrow  v.  Dows,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  459.  ^s  st„t|.   ^    Building   Assn.,    12   Pa. 

-*  Eaton  V.   Cheseboroug,  82  Mich.     Co.  Ct.  344. 


633 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


638 


from  the  time  the  improvements  were  made  according  to  the  de- 
cisions in  some  states."®  In  other  states  the  liabiHty  arises  from 
the  date  of  the  order  for  the  improvement,  or  for  laying  out  the 
•street.'** 

Generally  the  tax  lien  is  a  charge  merely  on  each  separate  parcel 
for  the  assessments  made  thereon,'^  but  sometimes  the  taxes  as- 
sessed against  a  landowner  are  made  a  lien  upon  all  his  real  estate 
indiscriminately,  and  in  some  states  even  the  taxes  assessed  on 
his  personal  property  is  made  a  lien  on  his  real  estate.'-  Some 
statutes  fix  a  date  when  the  lien  attaches,  and  also  designate  a  sub- 
sequent date  when  the  lien  attaches  as  between  the  grantor  and 
the  grantee  of  the  land. 

It  is  important  that  a  search  be  made  for  information  concern- 
ing the  levy  and  assessment  of  taxes  afifecting  the  land.  When 
the  date  of  the  search  is  after  the  date  when  taxes  are  due  and 
payable,  and  before  the  time  fixed  by  the  statute  for  the  sale  of 
the  land  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  the  abstract  should  show 
whether  or  not  the  taxes  have  been  paid.  A  brief  note  in  the  ap- 
pendices will  answer  for  this  purpose.  But  where  no  such  taxes 
or  assessments  are  found  unpaid  a  statement  of  this  fact  is  usually 
embodied  in  the  final  certificate  of  the  abstracter. 

§  633.  Tax  titles. — Tax  titles  are  to  some  extent  uncer- 
tain, and  usually  depend  upon  numerous  contingencies.  The  rule 
of  caveat  emptor  applies  with  great  strictness  to  a  purchaser  at  a 
tax  sale;  and  if  he  fails  to  secure  a  good  title  to  the  property  he 
attempts  to  purchase,  because  of  the  invalidity  of  the  tax  sale,  he 
can  not  recover  the  amount  paid  therefor  unless  some  statute  ex- 
pressly provides  such  remedy.''  The  purchaser  at  such  sale 
usually  buys  at  a  nominal  price,  and  assumes  the  liability  of  hav- 
ing his  title  prove  to  be  worthless.  If  he  gets  nothing  by  his  pur- 
chase, he  has,  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision,  no  recourse 
upon  any  one.  The  statutes  of  some  states,  however,  entitle  the 
purchaser  to  be  subrogated  to  the  benefit  of  the  lien  of  the  state 
discharged  with  the  money  paid  by  him,  and  the  party  seeking 


^'^  Hartshorn  v.  Cleveland,  52  N.-J. 
L.  473,  19  Atl.  974;  Lafferty  v.  Milli- 
gan,  165  Pa.  St.  534,  30  Atl.  1030. 

30Carr  v.  Dooley,  119  Mass.  294. 

•''1  Meriden  v.  Maloney,  74  Conn. 
90,  49  Atl.  897;  Toy  v.  McHugh,  62 
Nebr.  820,  87  N.  W.  1059. 

32  Union    Trust    Co.    v.    Weber,    96 


111.  346;  Miller  v.  Anderson,  1  S. 
Dak.  539,  47  N.  W.  957,  11  L.  R.  A. 
317. 

33  Mitchell  V.  Minnequa  Town  Co., 
41  Colo.  367,  92  Pac.  678;  American 
Inv.  Co.  V.  Beadle,  5  S.  Dak.  410,  59 
N.  W.  212. 


639  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    633 

to  have  the  sale  set  aside  must  reimburse  such  purchaser  to  the 
extent  of  the  taxes  legally  assessed,  with  costs  of  the  sale  and 
interest.^*  The  effect  of  such  a  statute  is  to  modify  the  rule  of 
caveat  emptor  applicable  to  such  sales. "^  Still  other  statutes  allow 
the  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  which  is  void  for  errors  and  omissions 
in  the  proceedings  recourse  upon  the  city  or  county  by  whose  au- 
thority the  sale  was  made.'''  So  the  extent  of  the  purchaser's  title 
in  a  particular  case  depends  on  the  statute  under  which  the  sale 
was  made.  If  the  statute  makes  the  lien  for  taxes  a  first  claim  on 
the  property,  paramount  to  all  other  claims  and  liens  whatsoever, 
the  tax  lien  attaches  itself  to  the  property  without  regard  to  in- 
dividual ownership,  and,  if  enforced  by  a  sale  of  the  land  in  con- 
formity with  law,  the  purchaser  will  take  a  valid  and  unimpeach- 
able title. ^"  In  some  states  it  is  held  that  the  land  itself  is  sold 
at  a  tax  sale,  and  not  the  title  or  interest  of  the  owner.^^ 

"A  tax  title,  from  its  very  nature,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
previous  chain  of  title,  and  does  not  in  any  way  connect  itself 
with  it.  It  is  a  breaking  up  of  all  previous  titles.  The  party 
holding  such  title,  in  proving  it,  goes  no  further  than  his  tax 
deed;  the  former  title  can  be  of  no  service  to  him,  nor  can  it 
prejudice  him.  It  was  well  said  by  counsel  in  argument  on  this 
point,  that  a  tax  sale  operated  on  the  property,  not  the  title.  In 
an  ordinary  case,  it  matters  not  how  many  different  interests 
may  be  connected  with  the  title,  what  may  be  the  particular  inter- 
est of  the  party  in  whose  name  the  property  may  be  listed  for  tax- 
ation; it  may  be  a  mere  equitable  right;  if  the  land  be  regularly 
sold  for  taxes,  the  property  accompanied  with  a  legal  title,  goes 
to  the  purchaser,  no  matter  how  many  estates,  legal  or  equitable, 
may  be  connected  with  it.  And  in  case  the  person  in  whose  name 
it  was  listed,  who  had  but  an  equitable  title  to  the  land  at  the  time 
of  the  tax  sale,  gets  a  conveyance  from  the  person  holding  the 
legal  title,  he  can  not  avail  himself  of  it.  The  land  is  gone,  and 
another  title  has  intervened. "^^ 

34  Gage  V.  Pirtle,  124  111.  502,  17  s"  Tyrrel  v.  Wheeler,  123  N.  Y.  76, 
N.  E.  34 ;   Barke  v.   Early,  72   Iowa    25  N.  E.  329. 

ZIZ,  1>2>  N.  W.  677.  38  Biscoe  v.  Coulter,  18  Ark.  423. 

35  Joliet  Stove  Works  v.  Kiep,  230  39  Gwynne  v.  Niswanger,  20  Ohio 
111.  550,  82  N.  E.  875,  12  Ann.  Cas.  556.  See  also  Langley  v.  Chapin,  134 
227.  Mass.  82;   Kunes  v.   McCloskey,   115 

36  Logansport  v.  Case,  124  Ind.  254,  Pa.  St.  461,  9  Atl.  83. 
24  N.  E.  88;   Russell  v.   Hudson,  28 

Kans.  99;  Hart  v.  Smith,  44  Wis.  213. 


§    634  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  640 

Where  the  statute  makes  the  Hen  for  taxes  a  first  claim  on  the 
property,  superior  and  paramount  to  any  and  all  claims  and  liens 
\vhatsoever,  and  the  sale  was  had  in  conformity  with  all  the  statu- 
tory requirements,  so  as  to  invest  the  purchaser  with  the  fee  sim- 
ple title  to  the  land,  even  the  claims  of  homestead  and  the  inchoate 
right  of  dower  will  be  divested."  Under  this  rule  an  easement 
granted  by  the  owner  to  a  third  person  will  be  extinguished  by  a 
sale  of  the  servient  estate  for  nonpayment  of  taxes. *^  In  many 
of  the  states,  however,  the  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  acquires  only 
such  title  or  estate  as  was  vested  in  the  person  in  whose  name  the 
taxes  were  assessed,*^  and  he  holds  the  land  subject  to  liens  hav- 
ing priority  over  the  tax  for  which  it  was  sold.*^ 

Tax  titles  depend  upon  a  strict  compliance  with  all  the  provi- 
sions of  law  under  which  tax  sales  are  made.  Such  sales  have 
been  held  invalid  for  the  most  insignificant  matters,  and  for  this 
reason  they  have  come  to  be  looked  upon  with  distrust  and  sus- 
picion. But  there  is  no  just  ground  for  such  suspicion  where  the 
statute  has  declared  such  sales  to  be  prima  facie  valid.  If  the  tax 
or  assessment  was  authorized  by  law,  was  laid  or  imposed  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  statute,  and  all  the  requirements  of  the  law  pre- 
liminary to  the  sale  and  execution  of  the  deed  has  been  complied 
with,  the  title  of  the  purchaser  is  at  least  the  same  as  that  of  the 
person  against  w^hom  the  assessment  was  made,  and  if  the  statute 
makes  the  tax  a  paramount  lien  to  all  other  claims,  as  heretofore 
explained,  the  purchaser  obtains  a  good  title. 

§  634.  Assessment  of  taxes. — The  statutes  prescribe  cer- 
tain things  that  must  be  done  respecting  property  to  be  taxed  be- 
fore any  charge  will  be  imposed  thereon,  and  it  is  upon  the  proper 
performance  of  these  preliminary  steps  that  the  validity  of  all 
future  proceedings  depend.  The  term  "assessment"  embraces 
all  the  acts  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  imposing  a 
charge  on  land  for  the  payment  of  taxes,  and  these  acts  must  be 
performed  in  the  manner  prescribed  or  the  tax  will  be  invalid.** 
A  list  is  first  prepared  by  the  proper  officer,  comprising  a  descrip- 
tion of  all  the  persons  or  property  within  the  particular  jurisdic- 

•»•>  McWhirtcr   v.    Roberts,   40  Ark.  1Z;  Anderson  v.  Post  (Tenn.),  38  S. 

283;  Robbins  v.  Barron,  32  Mich.  36;  W.  283. 
Jones  V.  Devore,  8  Ohio  St.  430.  ^^  ([^^rdwell  v.  Crumley  (Tenn.),  35 

41  Hill  V.  Williams,  104  Md.  595,  65  S.  W.  767. 

Atl.  413.  41  People  v.   Pearis,    Zl    Cal.    259; 

42  McDonald    v.    Hannah,    51    Fed.     San  ford  v.  People,  102  111.  374. 


641  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    635 

tion  and  liable  to  contribute  to  the  particular  tax.  This  list  is 
then  turned  over  to  the  tax  assessors  who  proceed  to  place  a  valu- 
ation on  the  property,  thus  forming  the  basis  for  an  apportion- 
ment of  the  whole  tax  among  the  taxable  persons  within  the  par- 
ticular jurisdiction.  This  list  is  commonly  called  a  "tax  list"  or 
"assessment  roll." 

The  listing  and  valuation  of  the  property  must  be  made  by  offi- 
cers who  are  designated  by  law  for  the  purpose,  else  the  assess- 
ment will  furnish  no  authority  for  any  further  proceedings.^^  But 
a  mere  de  facto  officer  may  levy  a  valid  assessment.*"  Land  must 
be  properly  assessed  to  resident  or  nonresident  owners,  and  an 
error  in  this  respect  will  make  the  assessment  absolutely  void.*^ 
The  property  listed  must  be  described  with  such  certainty  as  to 
distinguish  it  from  every  other  tract.*^  The  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty must  be  named  if  known,  as  an  assessment  to  one  not  the 
owner  is  void.*^  The  assessment  roll  must  also  conform  with  all 
the  statutory  requirements  relative  to  certification  and  sealing.'^*' 
It  is  only  when  a  tax  deed  is  relied  upon  as  a  muniment  of  title 
that  these  antecedent  proceedings  become  material  and  their  no- 
tation in  the  abstract  a  matter  of  importance.  But  an  assessment 
is  not  rendered  invalid  by  harmless  irregularities.^^  Regularity 
in  assessment  proceedings  will  be  presumed, °-  but  such  presump- 
tion will  not  be  carried  to  the  extent  of  creating  a  presumption 
that  the  provisions  of  a  permissive  statute  have  been  availed  of.^^ 

In  practically  all  the  states  curative  statutes  have  been  enacted 
for  the  purpose  of  validating  or  legalizing  defective  assessments ; 
but  where  an  assessment  has  already  been  made,  such  a  statute 
will  not  operate  retroactively  to  cure  it  where  there  was  a  want  of 
jurisdiction  or  authority  to  make  it.^* 

§  635.  Description  of  land  in  assessment  roll. — We  have 
already  said  that  the  assessment  roll  must  contain  a  sufficient  de- 

45  Paldi  V.  Paldi,  84  Mich.  346,  47  ^i  Fleming  v.  Charnock.  66  W.  ^Va. 

N.  W.  510.  SO,  66  S.  E.  8,  18  Ann.  Cas.  711. 

4G  Welsh  V.  Briggs,  204  Mass.  540,  ^2  California    Domestic    Water    Co. 

90  N.  E.  1146.  V.  Los  Angeles  County,  10  Cal.  App. 

"  Clark  V.  Kirkland,  64  Misc.  585,  185,  101  Pac.  547. 

119  N.  Y.  S.  1117.  53Saranac  Land   &  Timber  Co.  v. 

48  King  V.  Booth,  94  Ark.  306,  126  Roberts,  195  N.  Y.  303,  88  N.  E.  753. 
S.  W.  830.  54  Reis  v.  Graff,  51  Cal.  86;  Hart  v. 

49  State  Land  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  162  Henderson,  17  Mich.  218 :  Cromwell 
Ala.  469,  50  So.  117.  v.  Mac  Lean,  123  N.  Y.  474,  25  N.  E. 

50  Linton  V.  Wanke,   118  N.   Y.   S.  932. 
965. 

41 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    636  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  642 

scription  of  each  parcel  taxed.  By  this  description  the  owner  is 
informed  of  the  claim  on  his  property,  and  in  case  of  nonpay- 
ment, an  intending  purchaser  may  know  just  what  property  will 
be  offered  for  sale.  The  method  sometimes  employed  of  describ- 
ing the  land  by  giving  its  boundaries  sometimes  results  in  giving 
a  confused  and  erroneous  description,  such  as  may  result  in  in- 
validating the  sale.^^  But  this  method  of  description  must  be  re- 
sorted to  where  the  land  has  not  been  laid  off  by  government  sur- 
vey, or  platted  into  city  or  town  lots.  To  aid  a  description  by 
boundaries  the  number  of  acres  in  the  tract  is  often  given,  but  it 
is  Jield  that  a  misstatement  of  the  number  of  acres  will  not  vitiate 
a  description  otherwise  sufficient.^''  Where  the  statute  requires 
the  number  of  acres  to  be  given  the  description  will  be  fatally  de- 
fective without  it.^^ 

City  or  town  lots  are  usually  described  by  giving  the  number  of 
the  lot  and  of  the  block,  and  the  name  of  the  subdivision  or  ad- 
dition according  to  the  recorded  plat,  with  the  name  of  the  city  or 
town.  A  mistake  in  the  number  of  a  town  or  city  lot  will  not 
render  the  sale  void  if  the  description  otherwise  is  such  that  the 
lot  can  be  identified ;  but  when  the  description  is  alike  applicable 
to  either  of  two  lots,  evidence  aliunde  must  be  produced  for  the 
purpose  of  identification.'^'^  Where  the  land  is  described  by  con- 
gressional survey  the  statutes  usually  authorize  the  use  of  ab- 
breviations and  figures  in  describing  such  land  in  tax  assessments, 
and  a  description  in  this  manner  will  be  sufficient  provided  the 
land  can  be  readily  located  by  it.  In  some  states  if  the  name  in 
which  the  land  is  assessed  has  become  associated  to  the  land  by 
some  known  claim  of  title  or  possession,  it  is  a  source  of  indenti- 
fication  and  will  anwer  for  a  description.^** 

§  636.  The  tax  sale. — The  power  to  assess  and  levy  taxes 
and  to  demand  payment  thereof  is  an  essential  and  inherent  at- 
tribute of  sovereignty,  but  the  right  to  make  sale  of  property  for 
the  purpose  of  collecting  taxes  must  be  expressly  given  by  stat- 
ute.®^ The  power  to  provide  for  the  collection  of  taxes  is  implied 
from  the  power  to  assess.*'^  We  have  said  that  a  tax  is  not  a  debt 

sj^  Sutton  V.  Calhoun,  14  La.  Ann.  ^^  Marsh  v.  Nelson,  101  Pa.  St.  51. 

209.  59  Glass  v.  Gilbert,  58  Pa.  St.  266. 

'-"Putnam  v.  Tyler,  117  Pa.  St.  570,  «•' Mclnery  v.  Reed,  23   Iowa  410; 

12  Atl.  43.  McPike  v.  Pen,  51  Mo.  63. 

"  Weeks  v.  Waldron,  64  N.  H.  149,  -'i  Caldwell  Land  &  Lumber  Co.  v. 

5  Atl.  660.  Smith,  146  N.  Car.  199,  59  S.  E.  653. 


643  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    636 

in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  that  term,  and  consequently  an  ac- 
tion at  law  will  not  lie  for  its  recovery,  except  where  such  action 
is  authorized  by  statute."-  But  it  has  been  held  that  where  the 
statute  makes  provision  for  a  tax,  but  is  silent  as  to  the  method 
of  collection,  the  implication  is  strong  enough  to  warrant  the 
remedy  by  a  suit  at  law  for  its  collection. ^^  Where  an  ample  and 
specific  method  of  enforcing  the  collection  of  taxes  is  provided  by 
statute,  such  method  is  exclusive.*^'* 

Each  state  prescribes  its  own  method  of  procedure  for  the  col- 
lection of  taxes,  and  a  discussion  of  these  various  methods  would 
be  impracticable.  Whatever  the  method  prescribed,  the  proceed- 
ings are  summary  in  character,  and  a  strict  compliance  with  the 
statute  is  essential. "^^  "Sales  of  real  estate  for  the  nonpayment  of 
taxes  must  be  regarded  in  a  great  measure  as  an  ex  parte  proceed- 
ing. The  owner  is  to  be  deprived  of  his  land  thereby;  and  a 
series  of  acts  preliminary  to  the  sale  are  to  be  performed  to  au- 
thorize it  on  the  part  of  the  assessors  and  collector,  to  which  his 
attention  may  never  have  been  particularly  called ;  and  experience 
and  observation  render  it  notorious  that  the  amount  paid  by  pur- 
chasers at  such  sales  is  uniformly  trifling  in  comparison  with  the 
value  of  the  property  sold.  It  has  therefore  been  held,  with  great 
propriety,  that,  to  make  out  a  valid  title  under  such  sales,  great 
strictness  is  to  be  required  ;.and  it  must  appear  that  the  provisions 
of  law  preparatory  to  and  authorizing  such  sales  have  been  punc- 
tiliously complied  with."**^ 

It  is  incumbent  upon  a  party  relying  on  a  tax  title  to  show  that 
each  step  required  under  the  law  to  be  taken  in  reference  to  sub- 
jecting the  property  to  taxation  and  a  sale  of  it  for  taxes  was 
strictly  complied  with."  The  covenant  of  warranty  does  not  pass 
to  a  subsequent  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale,  for  the  title  under  such 
deed  is  not  derivative,  but  new  and  independent.''^ 

Wherever  a  tax  deed  is  relied  upon  as  a  muniment  of  title,  the 

62  Baldwin  v.  Hewett,  88  Ky.  673,  «=  Oliver  v.  Robinson,  58  Ala.  46; 
11  Ky.  L.  199,  11  S.  W.  803;  Packard  Millikan  v.  Patterson.  91  Ind.  515; 
V.  Tisdale,  50  Maine  376;  Detroit  v.     Large  v.  Fisher,  49  Mo.  307. 

Jepp,   52   Mich.   458,   18   N.   W.  217;  «6  Brown  v.  Veazie,  25  Maine  359. 

Catling  V.   Carteret   Co.,  92   N.   Car.  e?  Durrett  v.   Stewart,   88   Ky.  665, 

536.  53  Ann.  Rep.  432.  11  S.    W.   Ill;    Ladd  v.    Dickey,    84 

63  Perry  v.    Selma  &c.   R.   Co.,   58  Maine  190,  24  Atl.  813. 

Ala.  546;  Slack  v.  Ray,  26  La.  Ann.        *'«  Bellows  v.  Litchfield,  81  Iowa  36, 
674.  48  N.  W.  1062, 

6*Clizer  V.   Krauss,   57  Wash.  26, 
106  Pac.  145, 


§  637 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


644 


abstract  must  contain  a  full  synopsis  of  each  step  in  the  proceed- 
ing leading  up  to  the  sale  and  execution  and  delivery  of  the  deed. 
But  where  no  such  title  is  relied  upon,  the  tax  sale,  if  any  has  oc- 
curred, is  usually  shown  as  an  incumbrance  on  the  title  by  a 
brief  mention  of  the  fact  of  the  assessment  and  sale,  the  date 
thereof,  and  the  name  of  the  purchaser,  together  with  the  record 
where  the  proceedings  may  be  found.  This  is  all  that  is  required 
where  the  time  of  redemption  has  not  expired  or  a  deed  has  not 
been  executed  and  delivered  to  the  purchaser.  It  may  be  shown 
thus : 


William  Hannaman,  by  auditor ' 


to  tax  sale 


John  C.  S.  Harrison, 


Feb.  11,  1879. 
Book  6,  page  43. 
Lot  25  in  Robson  and  Voor- 
hees'  Add. 


$94.47  for  taxes  of  1877  and  1878. 

§  637.  Collection  by  proceedings  of  forfeiture. — Forfeiture 
of  land  to  the  state  for  the  non-payment  of  taxes  assessed 
against  it  is  sometimes  provided  for,  and  in  order  to  consum- 
mate such  forfeiture  no  judgment  or  decree  or  other  matter 
of  record  is  necessary;  the  statute  a  proprio  vigore  effectively 
divests  title  out  of  the  defaulting  owner,  and  perfectly  vests  it 
in  the  state. ^^  It  is  intended  by  this  method  to  divest  the  owner 
of  all  title  and  to  vest  in  the  state  a  complete  and  indefeasible 
title.  A  subsequent  sale  of  the  land  by  the  state  is  no  part  of  the 
proceeding,  and  a  sale  by  the  state  after  the  time  for  redemption 
has  expired  vests  in  the  purchaser  a  good  and  indefeasible  title. 
It  has  been  doubted,  however,  whether  such  taking  of  property  is 
consistent  with  the  constitutional  inhibition  against  taking  private 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  The  method  has  been 
repudiated  in  a  number  of  w^ell  considered  cases.'** 

The  proceedings  which  operate  to  forfeit  land  to  the  state 
for  non-payment  of  taxes  must  be  strictly  construed  in  a  contro- 
versy between  a  purchaser  from  the  state  and  the  original 
owner. '^^    After  forfeiture  to  the  state  and  before  the  redemption 


fiSLennig  v.  White  (Va.),  20  S.  E. 
831 

70  George  v.  Cole,  109  La.  816.  33 
So.  784;  Hill  v,  Lund,  13  Minn.  (Gil. 


419)  451 ;  State  v.  Sponaugle,  45  W. 

Va.  415,  32  S.  E.  283,  48  L.  R.  A.  727. 

"1  Tolman  v.  Hobbs,  68  Maine  316. 


645  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    638 

period  has  expired,  a  continuation  by  the  state  to  assess  and  col- 
lect taxes  operates  as  a  waiver  of  the  forfeiture." 

The  forfeiture  may  be  noted  in  the  abstract  in  the  following 
manner. 


John  Jones 

to 

State  of  Virginia. 


Forfeiture  for  non-payment  of 

taxes. 
Sale  Oct.  12,  18'96. 
Record  45,  page  18. 


Lot  45  in  Grove's  Addition  to  the  city  of  Richmond,  Va.,  was 
forfeited  to  the  state  of  Virginia,  Oct.  25,  1896,  for  the  non- 
payment of  State  and  County  taxes  for  1894  and  1895,  amount 

$25.00. 

§  638.  Who  may  be  purchaser  at  tax  sale. — It  is  a  well- 
established  principle  that  one  under  a  moral  or  legal  obligation 
to  pay  taxes  can  not  become  a  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,^^  and  if  he  attempts  to  do  so  his  purported 
purchase  will  merely  amount  to  a  payment  of  the  taxes,^*  leav- 
ing the  title  in  precisely  the  same  position  it  would  have  occupied 
had  he  paid  the  taxes  before  the  sale.^^  This  rule  applies  to  a 
person  who  is  under  obligation  to  pay  a  part  of  the  taxes  only, 
unless  he  has  promptly  paid  his  part  thereof.^''  The  owner  of  an 
interest  in  land  can  not  purchase  at  a  tax  sale  of  the  land  and 
acquire  a  title  which  he  can  assert  as  against  his  cotenant.'^  But 
where  an  owner  holds  by  a  title  acquired  subsequent  to  the  levy 
of  the  tax,  and  has  not  assumed  ks  payment,  or  in  any  way 
become  liable  to  see  it  paid,  he  may  become  a  purchaser  at  the  tax 
sale  and  acquire  thereby  any  benefit  that  the  tax  title  may 
afford.^^ 

A  tenant  in  possession  under  an  agreement  with  the  owner  to 
pay  taxes  on  the  land  can  not  obtain  a  tax  deed  upon  such  prem- 
ises for  taxes  which  accrued  during  his  use  and  possession,  and  a 

72  Hodgdon    v.    Wight,     36     Maine  306.  102  S.  W.  997 ;  Gibson  v.  Sexson, 

326.         _  82  Nebr.  475,  118  N.  W.  77. 

'2  National   Surety  Co.   v.  Walker,  "^  Dunn    v.     Snell,    74    Alaine  22 ; 

127  Iowa  518,   125   N.  W.  492 ;   Mat-  Downer  v.  Smith.  38  Vt.  464. 

thewson  v.  Hevel,  82  Kans.   134,   107  '"Lewis  v.  Ward,  99  111.  525. 

Pac.  768 ;  Brooks  v.  Garner,  20  Okla.  " "  Morris  v.  Gregory,  80  Kans.  626, 

236,  94  Pac.  694,  97  Pac.  995.  103  Pac.  137. 

7*  McCune  v.  Goodwillie,  204  Mo.  '«  Oswald  v.  Wolf,  129  111.  200,  21 

N.  E.  839. 


638 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


646 


tax  deed  so  obtained  is  void  and  insufficient  to  start  the  statute  of 
limitations." 

A  mortgagor  or  his  grantee  can  not,  by  acquiring  a  tax  title 
upon  the  land,  defeat  the  lien  of  the  mortgagee. •■°  It  is  generally 
the  duty  of  a  mortgagee  in  possession  and  receiving  an  income 
from  the  land  to  pay  the  taxes  upon  it;  and  therefore  he  is  not 
allowed  to  suffer  the  land  to  be  sold  for  taxes,  and,  upon  pur- 
chasing it  in,  to  set  up  this  title  as  a  bar  to  the  mortgagor's  re- 
deeming. He  is,  on  the  contrary,  regarded  as  holding  this  title 
in  trust  for  the  mortgagor's  benefit.'*^  He  may,  however,  under 
some  circumstances,  acquire  a  tax  title,  and  hold  it  adversely  to 
the  owner  of  the  equity  of  redemption;  but  this  is  only  when 
he  is  under  no  obligation  himself  to  pay  the  taxes  on  which  the 
sale  was  made.*"  A  first  mortgagee  may  cut  off  the  lien  of  a 
second  mortgagee  by  purchasing  the  property  at  a  tax  sale.*^ 

It  is  generally  held  that  one  holding  a  judgment  lien  against 
land  may  become  a  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  of  the  land,  and 
thereby  defeat  the  lien  of  another  incumbrancer.** 

Where  lands  are  owned  by  joint  tenants,  coparceners,  or  ten- 
ants in  common,  a  co-tenant  can  not  purchase  the  land  at  a  tax 
sale  and  thereby  acquire  a  title  paramount  to  that  of  his  co- 
tenants.  He  has  the  same  interest  he  had  before  the  purchase, 
except  that  he  has  a  claim  upon  the  others  for  reimbursement 
according  to  their  respective  shares.*^  An  owner  of  a  life  estate 
in  land  can  not  acquire  an  adverse  title  to  the  real  estate  as 
against  the  owfier  of  the  reversion  by  purchasing  the  same  at  a 
tax  sale,  where  he  was  under  obligation  to  pay  the  taxes.*" 

While  the  relation  of  principal  and  agent  exists  in  relation  to 
real  estate  owned  by  the  principal,  the  agent  can  not  become  a 


70  St.  Clair  v.  Craig,  11  Kans.  394, 
94  Pac.  790,  101   Pac.  3. 

**o  Middletown  Savings  Bank  v. 
Bacharack,  46  Conn.  513 ;  Jordan  v. 
Sayre,  29  Fla.  100,  10  So.  823;  Stin- 
son  V.  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
174  111.  125,  51  N.  E.  193,  66  Am.  St. 
262 ;  Cooper  v.  Jackson,  99  Ind.  566 ; 
Shrigley  v.  Black,  66  Kans.  213,  71 
Pac.  301 ;  Farmer  v.  Ward,  75  N.  J. 
Eq.  2>2>,  71  Atl,  401. 

"Gorham  v.  Parson,  119  111.  425, 
10  N.  E.  1 ;  Cauley  v.  Sutton,  150  N. 
Car.  327,  64  S.  E.  3. 

S2  Lawrence  v.   Lawrence,   145   Ky, 


61.  140  S.  W.  Zd;  Hopkins  v.  Sanders, 
172  Mich.  227,  137  N.  W.  709. 

^"^  Connecticut  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Bulte,  45  Mich.   113,  7  N.  W.  707. 

**  Morrison  v.  Bank  of  Commerce, 
81  Ind.  335 ;  Contra,  Fair  v.  Brown, 
40  Iowa  209. 

85  Bissell  V.  Foss,  114  U.  S.  252,  5 
Sup.  Ct.  851,  29  L.  ed.  126. 

^•^  Howard  Inv.  Co.  v.  Benton  Land 
Co..  5  Kans.  App.  716,  46  Pac.  989; 
Stewart  v.  Matheny,  66  Miss.  21,  5 
So.  387,  14  Am.  St.  538;  Phelan  v. 
Boylan,  25  Wis.  679. 


647  TAXES    AND   TAX    TITLES  §    639 

purchaser  of  such  real  estate  at  a  tax  sale.'^^  But  an  agent  for 
a  non-resident  land-owner,  who  has  informed  his  principal  of  a 
pending  tax  sale  and  has  been  discharged,  may  acquire  a  valid 
title  under  a  tax  deed.^^ 

§  639.  Rights  of  purchaser  at  tax  sale.— -We  have  said  that 
the  maxim  caveat  emptor  applies  with  great  strictness  to  tax 
sales.  This  rule  has  been  held  to  extend  not  only  to  purchasers 
at  tax  sales,  but  to  transferees  of  the  title  so  acquired.*''  Before 
the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  the  owner  to  redeem  the  prop- 
erty the  purchaser  has  neither  the  legal  nor  equitable  title,  nor 
is  he  entitled  to  possession  of  the  land.'''°  During  the  redemption 
period  he  has  a  statutory  lien  on  the  land  for  the  amount  of  his 
purchase  money  with  interest  thereon  and  penalties,  which  lien 
becomes  foreclosed  by  operation  of  law  upon  the  expiration  of 
the  redemption  period,  and  the  execution  and  delivery  to  him  of 
the  tax  deed  vests  in  him  a  complete  and  indefeasible  title.^^ 
Prior  to  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  redemption,  the  pur- 
chaser's title  is  inchoate  as  to  persons  authorized  to  redeem,  but 
absolute  as  to  all  others."' 

The  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  acquirers  only  such  title  as  the 
delinquent  owner  had  and  he  holds  the  land  subject  to  liens 
having  priority  in  time  over  the  tax  for  which  it  was  sold.°"  In 
some  jurisdictions,  however,  the  effect  of  a  tax  deed  is  to  ex- 
tinguish and  destroy  all  prior  grants,  liens,  charges,  assessments 
and  incumbrances  upon  the  property  conveyed,  in  existence  at 
the  time  of  levying  the  taxes  upon  which  the  tax  deed  rests,  in- 
cluding all  prior  tax  deeds  and  liens  claimed  for  taxes  paid  on  the 
property  thereby  conveyed.'^*  But  the  purchaser  at  a  valid  tax 
sale  takes  title  free  from  the  ownership  or  incumbrance  of  rights 
previously  existing  w^hich  had  been  carved  out  of  the  property 

^■^  Bowman  v.  Officer  &  Pusey,  53  ^i  Douglass    v.    Dickson,   31    Kans. 

Iowa  640,  6  N.  W.  28 ;  Day  v.  Davey,  310,  1  Pac.  541. 

132  Mich.   173,  93  N.  W.  256 ;   State  92  Elrod  v.  Owensboro  Wagon  Co., 

V.  Unknown  Heirs  of  Goldberg,   113  128  Ga.  361,  57  S.  E.  712;  Chandler  v. 

Tenn.  298,  86  S.  W.  717;  McMahon  Clark,  151  Mich.  159,  14  Det.  Leg.  N. 

V.  McGraw,  26  Wis.  614.  931,  115  N.  W.  65. 

ssBemis  v.  Plato,  119  Iowa  127,  83  '-'s  Cardwell  v.  Crumley  (Tenn.),  35 

N.  W.  83.  S.  W.  767 ;  Anderson  v.  Post  (Tenn.), 

89  Boyd   V.    Schlesinger,    59   N.    Y.  38  S.  W.  283. 

301.  9*  Douglass  v.  Lowell,  64  Kans.  533, 

90Spaulding   v.    Elsworth,    39   Fla.  67  Pac.  1106. 
76,  21  So.  812. 


§  640 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


648 


by  an  owner,  or  which  had  been  acquired  in  it  by  prescription  or 
otherwise."^ 

The  statute  of  the  particular  state  must  l^e  consulted  as  to  the 
right  to  possession,  rents  and  profits  pending  redemption,  and 
also  as  to  the  rights  of  the  purchaser  as  against  lienors.  As  a 
general  rule  his  rights  can  not  be  superior  to  those  of  the  state 
and  he  can  acquire  no  right  if  the  state  has  no  valid  charge  on 
the  land.^''  The  purchaser  is  usually  entitled  to  a  deed  upon  the 
expiration  of  the  redemption  period,  and  not  before. 

§  640.  Redemption  from  tax  sale. — The  period  during 
which  an  owner  is  allowed  to  redeem  his  land  from  a  sale  thereof 
for  taxes  is  fixed  by  statute,  and  is  not  uniform  in  the  different 
states,  ranging  from  six  months  in  some  states,  to  one.  two,  and 
three  years  in  others.  This  right  is  governed  by  the  law  in 
force  at  the  time  of  the  sale."^  In  most  states  the  period  of  re- 
demption begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  the  sale,  but  where 
a  deed  is  directed  to  be  made  to  the  purchaser  at  the  time  of  the 
sale  or  within  a  limited  time  thereafter,  the  redemption  period 
usually  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  the  filing  and  recording 
of  the  deed.^"*  In  computing  the  time  Avhen  the  redemption  period 
expires,  the  day  of  the  sale  must  be  exclude;d,  and  the  owner  is 
allowed  the  whole  of  the  last  day  in  which  to  redeem.°'^ 

It  is  usually  obligatory  upon  the  party  seeking  to  redeem  that 
he  pay  or  tender  to  the  proper  person,  an  amount  sufficient  to 
reimburse  the  purchaser.^ 

Only  such  persons  may  redeem  from  a  tax  sale  as  come  within 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  such  as  the  owner^  and  persons  having 
an  estate  or  interest  in  the  land  which  would  be  affected  by  the 
maturing  of  the  tax  title  in  the  purchaser.^  Thus,  a  mortgagee, 
even  before  condition  broken,  may  protect  his  lien  by  redeeming 
the  mortgaged  premises  after  a  sale  for  taxes.*    Redemption  by 


»^  Tinsley  v.  Atlantic  Mines  Co.,  20 
Colo.  App.  61.  11  Pac.  12:  Hunt  v. 
Boston,  183  Mass.  303.  G]  N.  E.  244 ; 
Abbott  V.  Frost,  185  Mass.  398,  70  N. 
E.  478. 

o«  Burke  v.  Brown,  148  Mo.  309,  49 
S.  W.  1023. 

97  Merrill  v.  Dearing,  32  Minn.  479, 
21  N.  W.  721. 

08  West  V.  Duncan,  42  Fed.  430. 

ooCromelien  v.  Brink,  29  Pa.  St. 
522. 


1  Solis  V.  Williams,  205  Mass.  350, 
91  N.  E.  148;  Blanton  v.  Nunley,  55 
Tex.   Civ.  App.  427,   119  S.   W.  881. 

-  Bentley  v.  Cavallier.  121  La.  60, 
46  So.  101. 

3  Parsons  v.  Prudential  Real  Estate 
Co..  86  Nebr.  271,  125  N.  W.  521,  44 
L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  666n:  Buchanan  v. 
Tennant,   55   Ore.   116,    105   Pac.   547. 

•t  Ellswortli  V.  Low.  62  Iowa  178, 
17  N.  W.  450;  People  v.  Edwards, 
56  Hun  in,  10  N.  Y.  S.  335. 


649  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    641 

an  heir  to  an  undivided  interest  will  inure  to  the  benefit  of  all  his 
co-heirs,  but  will  not  affect  interests  to  which  he  is  not  an  heir."^ 

The  person  offering  to  redeem  need  only  show  in  himself  a 
bona  fide  title  of  any  kind,  which  may  be  lost  or  prejudiced  by  a 
failure  to  redeem  the  premises.*^  Upon  a  deposit  being  made 
with  the  proper  ofificer  of  the  redemption  money,  a  certificate  or 
receipt  therefor  is  usually  issued  to  the  person  redeeming.  This 
certificate  or  receipt  is  then  filed  and  recorded  in  the  proper 
record,  and  is  thereby  made  record  evidence  of  redemption.  The 
redemption,  if  made  before  the  execution  of  the  deed,  divests  the 
lien  of  the  tax  and  leaves  the  title  as  free  as  before  the  sale.^ 

Care  should  be  exercised  to  ascertain  if  a  new  lien  for  reim- 
bursement in  favor  of  the  redemptioner  has  arisen  by  reason  of 
others  being  jointly  interested  with  him.^  The  abstracter's  cer- 
tificate being  presumed  a  sufBcient  showing  of  the  condition  of 
the  title  at  the  date  thereof,  a  special  mention  of  redemption  from 
a  tax  sale  is  not  ordinarily  deemed  important.  But  the  better 
practice  would  be  to  note  the  fact  of  redemption  in  all  cases  where 
it  appears  of  record,  and  where  there  has  been  a  tax  sale,  dis- 
closed by  a  prior  examination  or  during  the  period  covered  by 
the  examination  being  made,  and  the  period  of  redemption  has 
not  expired,  the  fact  of  no  redemption  should  be  noted. 

§  641.  Certificate  of  purchase  at  tax  sale. — Upon  payment 
of  the  amount  of  his  bid  a  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  is  entitled  to 
receive  from  the  proper  officer  a  certificate  of  purchase.  This  is 
sometimes  in  the  form  of  a  receipt  for  the  amount  of  money 
paid,  but  its  form  is  often  prescribed  by  statute.  It  is  generally 
required  to  state  the  year  of  the  assessment,"  sufficiently  describe 
the  property  sold,^"  state  the  amount  for  which  the  sale  was  made, 
and  fix  the  date  of  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  redemption. ^^ 
A  certificate  which  does  not  at  least  substantially  conform  to  the 
statutory  requirements  is  void.^"  "The  certificate  of  purchase 
does  not  convey  a  legal  title,  but  it  is  evidence  of  an  equitable 

5  Russell  V.   Bell,   160  Ala.  480,  49  « Preston    v.    Hirsch,    5    Cal.    App. 

So.  314.  485,  90  Pac.  965. 

«  Plumb  V.   Robinson,    13  Ohio   St.  "  Bank  of  Lemoore  v.  Fulgham,  151 

298.  Cal.  234.  90  Pac.  936. 

■^  Lake  v.  Gray,  35  Iowa  44.  n  Bank    of    Lemoore    v.    Fulgham, 

sWatkins  V.  Eaton,  30  Maine  529,  151  Cal.  234,  90  Pac.  936. 

50  Am.  Dec.  637.  i-'  Barker  v.  Muehler,  55  Wash.  411, 

104  Pac.  637. 


642 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


650 


title  to  the  land,  and  enables  the  purchaser  to  call  in  the  legal 
title.  And  it  savors  so  strongly  of  the  realty  that  in  our  opinion, 
it  descends  to  the  heir,  and  is  not  assets  in  the  hands  of  the  execu- 
tor. The  act  provides  that  such  certificates  shall  be  assignable 
in  law,  and  vest  in  the  assignee,  or  his  legal  representative,  all 
the  right  and  title  of  the  original  purchaser."^^ 

Under  some  statutes  the  certificate  serves  the  same  purpose  as 
a  tax  deed.^'*  Such  certificate  is  usually  assignable  by  the  pur- 
chaser to  any  person  capable  of  holding  it,  if  the  assignment  be 
made  in  the  form  prescribed  by  statute.  Some  statutes  require  the 
assignment  to  be  executed  by  a  county  officer.  The  certificate  of 
purchase  is  seldom  recorded,  although  many  statutes  make  pro- 
vision for  such  recording.  But  where  such  a  certificate  is  found 
on  the  record  it  must  be  noted  as  a  lien  on  the  land,  but  i.f  a  tax 
deed  has  been  executed  and  delivered  to  the  holder  of  the  cer- 
tificate, only  a  brief  mention  of  the  certificate  need  be  made. 

A  synopsis  of  a  certificate  of  purchase  should  contain  the  es- 
sential facts  recited  therein.  An  example  of  such  synopsis  is 
submitted. 


Auditor 
Ind. 


o  f    Marion    County, ' 


to 


Harry  Hamlyn. 


Certificate  of  sale. 
Certificate  No.  7250. 
►  Register  13,  page  117. 

Said  auditor  certifies  that  he 
did,  on  the  4th  day  of  March,  1910,  sell  at  public  auction,  after 
due  notice  as  required  by  law,  to  said  Harry  Hamlyn,  the  follow- 
ing described  real  estate  situated  in  the  city  of  Indianapolis, 
Marion  County,  Ind.,  to  wit:  [here  describe  real  estate]  at  and 
for  the  price  of  $25.00,  being  the  amount  due  for  taxes,  interest, 
charges  and  penalties  on  said  land  for  the  years  1908  and  1909, 
and  that  said  Harry  Hamlyn  (or  his  assign)  will  be  entitled  to 
a  deed  of  the  same  in  two  years  from  date,  unless  redeemed 
before  that  time.     Signed  by  auditor  of  county. 

§  642.  The  tax  deed. — As  a  general  rule,  the  purchaser  of 
real  estate  at  a  tax  sale  is  not  entitled  to  a  deed  until  the  period 
allowed  for  redemption  has  expired,  and  the  statutes  frequently 
impose  certain  formalities  as  conditions  precedent  to  his  obtain- 


13  Rice  V.  White,  8  Ohio  216. 


"CliflFord   v.   Hyde   County,  24   S. 
Dak.  22,1,  123  N.  W.  872. 


651  TAXES    AND   TAX    TITLES  §    643 

ing  the  deed.  Thus  in  some  states  he  is  required  to  produce 
the  certificate  of  purchase;''  in  other  states  he  is  required  to 
pay  such  legal  fees  as  have  accrued  since  the  issue  of  the  cer- 
tificate;"^ and  in  still  others  he  is  required  to  produce  a  sur- 
veyor's report."  In  some  states  he  must  make  an  affidavit 
showing  service  of  notice  on  the  owner  to  redeem.'^  Notice 
to  the  owner  of  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  redemption, 
usually  including  notice  of  the  purchaser's  intention  to  apply 
for  a  deed,  must  conform  to  statutory  requirements  strictly 
construed,"  and  must  state  the  amount  required  to  redeem"" 
and  properly  describe  the  property.^'  Failure  to  give  the  re- 
quired notice  of  the  expiration  of  the  period  of  redemption  is 
a  fatal  defect  in  the  purchaser's  claim  of  title."  Upon  com- 
pliance with  all  the  preliminary  steps  required  of  the  purchaser, 
and  there  being  no  redemption,  he  is  entitled  to  a  deed,  and  this 
deed  if  regvilarly  made  vests  the  title  in  the  purchaser.^^ 

§  643.  Formal  parts  of  the  deed. — Statutes  usually  pre- 
scribe the  form  and  confents  of  a  tax  deed,  and  there  must  be  at 
least  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  statutory  form.-*  It  must 
be  properly  executed,^^  and  duly  recorded  within  the  time  pro- 
vided by  the  statute.^^  It  is  essential  that  the  deed  sufficiently  set 
forth  all  the  requisite  recitals,"  sufficiently  designate  the  land- 
owner, -*  state  facts  necessary  to  authorize  the  sale  and  convey- 
ance,^® show  facts  from  which  may  be  ascertained  the  amount  of 
the  delinquent  taxes,^°  show  facts  from  which  may  be  ascer- 

15  Reed  V.  Merriam,  15  Nebr.  323,  Sage,  47  Colo.  559,    108    Pac.    160; 
18  N   W   137.  Rector  &  Wilhelmy  Co.  v.  Maloney, 

16  White  V.  Strahl,   17  Wis.   146.  15  S.  Dak.  271,  88  N.  W.  575;  Lain  v. 

17  Orr  V.  Wiley.  19  W.  Va.  150.  Cook,  15  Wis.  446. 

18  Smith  V.  Prall,  113  111.  308,  24  25  Norman  v.  Beekman,  58  Fla.  325, 
N  E  521.  SO  So.  876;   Huber     v.     Brown,     57 

19  Lindsay  v.  Booge,  144  Iowa  168,  Wash.  654,  107  Pac.  850. 

122  N   W   819  ^*^  Slocum   v.    McLaren,   109   Minn. 

20  Shine  V.  Olson,  110  Minn.  44,  124    49,  122  N.  W.  871. 

N.  W.  452,  19  Ann.  Cas.  962.  27  Charland   v.   Trustees   of   Home 

21  Wallace  v.  Weld,  145  Iowa  478,  for  Aged  Women,  204  Mass.  563,  91 
124  N  W  789  N.  E.  146,  134  Am.  St.  696;  Shelton 

22  King  V.  Samuel,  7  Cal.  App.  55,  v.  Franklin,  224  Mo.  343,  123  S.  W. 
93  Pac.  391.  1084. 

23Byington  v.  Stone,  51  Iowa  317,  28  Proctor  v.  Nance,  220  Mo.   104, 

1   N.  W.  647;   Board  of  Regents  v.  119  S.  W.  409,  132  Am.  St.  555n. 

Linscott,   30  Kans.  240,    1     Pac.    81;  29  Houghton    v.    Kern    Val.    Bank, 

Langley  v.  Chapin,  134  Mass.  82.  157  Cal.  289,  107  Pac.  113. 

2*  Seaverns  v.  Costello,  8  Ariz.  308,  so  Finn  v.  Jones,  80  Kans.  431,  102 

71   Pac.  930 ;   Simmons  v.  McCarthy,  Pac.  479. 
118  Cal.  622,  50  Pac.  761;  Sayre  v. 


§  643 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


652 


tained  the  amount  of  the  consideration  paid,^^  and  show  that  the 
sale  was  held  at  the  proper  time.^^ 

The-  deed  should  describe  the  land  sold  with  such  certainty 
that  it- may  be  readily  identified.'^^  The  description  must  identify 
the  land  perhaps  with  greater  certainty  than  an  ordinary  deed 
or  the  return  of  a  levy  on  an  execution.  The  deed  must  bear  the 
proper  date,^*  be  duly  acknowledged,^"  attested  by  the  seal  of  the 
proper  officer/*^  and  filed  in  the.  proper  office.^^ 

In  some  states  a  tax  deed  does  not  confer  any  title  until  it  is 
recorded ;  and  in  other  states  until  it.  is  confirmed  by  the  state. ^'^ 
In  brief,  whatever  recitals  the  statute  requires  the  deed  to  contain 
must  be  inserted. ^^  However,  harmless  error  in  a  tax  deed  will 
not  render  it  void.'"^  The  deed  should  be  made  to  the  purchaser 
at  the  sale,  or  to  his  assignee-,  and  the  deed  in  terms  must  show 
that  it  is  so  niade.*^ 

Where  no  form  is  prescribed  by  statute,  the  deed  should  con- 
tain at  least  the  same  requisites  as  ordinary  deeds,  and  such 
additional  matters  as  will  show  it  to  have  been  made  in  execu- 
tion of  the  statutory  power.*"  Where  the  officer  has  made  a  tax 
deed  so  irregular  and  imperfect  that  no  title  is  passed  by  it  to  the 
purchaser,  a  second  or  other  deed  may  be  executed  to  correct 
such  defective  deed,  if  there  has  been  a  substantial  compliance 
with  all  the  steps  necessary  to  a  valid  sale.  The  purchaser  may 
compel,  by  mandamus,  the  execution  of  a  correct  deed,*"  but  he 
can  not  resort  to  a.  court  of  equity  to  have  the  deed  corrected.** 


31  Gibson  V.  Garst,  81  Kans.  741,  107 
Pac.  40. 

32  Seals  V.  Perkins,  96  Miss.  704,  51 
So.  806,  52  So.  584. 

33  Herod  v.  Carter,  81  Kans.  236, 
106  Pac.  32 :  Lara  v.  Peterson,  56 
Wash.  70,  105  Pac.  160. 

3^  Glos  V.  Cass,  230  111.  641,  82  N.  E. 
827. 

35  Mathews  v.  Blake.  16  Wyo.  116, 
92  Pac.  242,  27  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
339n. 

3''  Jackson  v.  McCarron,  11  Kans. 
776.  95  Pac.  402. 

37  Brannon  v.  Pringle,  94  Miss.  215, 
46  So.  161,  47  So.  674. 


3''  Neal  V.  Wicleman,  59  Ark.  5,  26 
S.  W.  16. 

3»  Burden  v.  Taylor,  124  Mo.  12, 
27  S.  W.  349. 

•loMilbnrn  v.  Beaty,  81  Kans.  696, 
106  Pac.  106xS;  Ensley  v.  Coolbaugh, 
160  Mich.  299,  17  Det.  Leg.  N.  ZZ, 
125  N.  W.  279 ;  Peters  v.  Lohr,  24  S. 
Dak.  605,  124  N.  W.  853. 

"  Krueger  v.  Knab,  22  Wis.  429. 

42  Pitkin  V.  Reibel,  104  Mo.  505,  16 
S.  W.  244. 

43  McCready  v.  Sexton,  29  Iowa 
356,  4  Am.  Rep.  214. 

44  Keepfer  v.  Force,  86  Ind.  81. 


653 


TAXES    AND   TAX    TITLES 


§    644 


The  abstract  should  contain  a  synopsis  of  all  the  essential  re- 
citals of  the  tax  deed.    The  following  example  is  submitted: 


Charles  F.  Grant,  Auditor  of ' 
Marion  County,  Ind. 


to 


Arthur  G.  Fosdyke. 


Tax  Deed. 

Dated  Feb.  18,  1899. 
Recorded  Feb.  23,  1899. 
Land  Record  34,  page  394 


Recites,  that  at  a  public  sale  of  real  estate  for  the  non-payment  of 
taxes,  made  in  the  county  aforesaid  on  Jan.  5th,  1897,  the  fol- 
lowing described  real  estate,  to  wit :  [here  describe  real  estate 
sold]  was  sold  to  said  Arthur  G.  Fosdyke,  for  the  sum  of  $75.00, 
that  being  the  full  amount  of  said  taxes,  interest  and  charges, 
and  that  a  certificate  of  purchase  therefor  was  duly  issued  to  said 
purchaser,  entitling  him  to  a  deed  to  said  real  estate  (Certificate 
?)S72>7,  Register  13,  page  117).  Therefore,  said  county  auditor, 
in  consideration  of  the  premises  and  by  virtue  of  the  statute, 
grants  and  conveys  to  said  Arthur  G.  Fosdyke  the  real  estate 
hereinbefore  described,  subject  to  any  redemption  provided  by 
law.  Signed  by  a  said  auditor,  and  attested  by  the  official  seal 
of  the  county.     Acknowledged,  Feb.  18,  1899. 

§  644.  Tax  deeds  as  evidence  in  support  of  title. — By  some 
statutes  a  tax  deed  is  made  conclusive  evidence  of  the  regularity 
of  all  prior  proceedings.'*^  In  some  states  it  is  held  that  a  statute 
making  a  tax  deed  conclusive  evidence  of  the  regularity  of  the 
tax  proceedings  is  held  unconstitutional. ^°  But  as  a  general  rule, 
the  validity  of  a  tax  deed  depends  upon  a  strict  compliance  with 
all  the  requirements  of  the  statute  respecting  the  proceedings 
leading  up  to  the  deed.  Even  when  the  statute  attempts  to  make 
the  recitals  of  a  deed  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts  recited, 
yet  a  failure  to  comply  with  some  of  the  essential  steps  in  the  pro- 
ceedings will  overthrow  the  prima  facie  character  of  the  deed.*^ 
Thus  if  the  assessment  was  illegal,  the  prima  facie  case  made 
by  the  tax  deed,  conceding  it  to  be  sufficient  in  form,  will  be 


45  White  V.  Flynn,  23  Ind.  46 ;  Mc- 
Cready  v.  Sexton,  29  Iowa  356,  4 
Am.  Rep.  214;  Abbott  v.  Lindenbow- 
er,  42  Mo.  162;  Alagruder  v.  Esmay, 
35  Ohio  St.  221. 


4G  Bradford  v.  Durham,  54  Ore.  1, 
101  Pac.  897,  135  Am.  St.  807. 

•I'Bidleman  v.  Brooks,  28  Cal.  72; 
Ray  V.  Murdock,  .36  Miss.  692;  John- 
son V.  Elwood,  53  N.  Y.  431. 


645 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


654 


overthrown.'*''  Even  if  it  is  provided  by  statute  that,  as  between 
the  purchaser  at  the  tax  sale  and  the  former  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty it  shall  be  conclusively  presumed  that  all  the  steps  necessary 
to  pass  a  good  title  have  been  duly  and  regularly  taken,  yet  the 
former  owner  may  show  by  pleading  and  proof  that  there  is  an 
infirmity  in  the  assessment  or  sale. 

Where  the  statute  makes  a  tax  deed  prima  facie  evidence  of 
the  regularity  of  all  the  proceedings  leading  up  to  and  including 
the  execution  of  the  deed,  it  is  necessary  for  a  person  attacking 
the  tax  title  to  prove,  either  that  the  land  described  in  the  deed 
was  not  subject  to  taxation  at  the  date  of  the  assessment  of  the 
tax  for  vi^hich  it  was  sold,  or  that  the  taxes  for  the  nonpayment 
of  which  the  land  was  sold  were  paid  to  the  proper  officer  within 
the  time  limited  by  law  therefor,  or  that  the  same  had  not  been 
assessed  for  the  taxes  for  the  nonpayment  of  which  it  was  sold, 
or  that  the  same  had  been  redeemed  pursuant  to  law,  or  that  a 
certificate  in  proper  form  had  been  given  by  the  proper  officer, 
within  the  time  limited  by  law  for  paying  taxes  or  for  redeeming 
from  sales  made  for  the  nonpayment  thereof,  stating  no  taxes 
were  due  at  the  time  such  sale  was  made,  or  that  the  lands  were 
not  subject  to  taxation.*"  In  order  to  constitute  prima  facie 
evidence  of  title  under  such  a  statute  the  deed  should  recite 
enough  of  the  proceedings  to  show  authority  for  the  sale.^** 

Unless  the  statute  provides  that  the  deed  shall  be  evidence  of 
the  facts  recited,  the  person  claiming  under  the  deed  must  prove 
that  the  requirements  of  the  statute  as  to  the  tax  proceedings  have 
been  complied  with.^^  He  has  the  burden  of  proving  the  truth  of 
the  recitals  in  his  deed."  At  common  law,  neither  the  tax  deed 
nor  its  recitals  are  competent  evidence  of  the  existence,  legality, 
or  validity  of  the  tax  proceedings;  but  such  proceedings  must  be 
proved  as  a  preliminary  step  to  the  production  of  the  deed  as 
evidence  of  the  title.^^ 

§  645.  Legislation  to  strengthen  tax  titles. — The  legisla- 
tures of  the  various  states  have  frequently  passed  curative  stat- 


es Bldleman  V.  Brooks,  28  Cal.  72. 

49  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.,  Ind.,  1914,  -  § 
10392. 

^0  Woodward  v.  Sloan,  27  Ohio  St. 
592. 

51  Worthing  v.  Webster,  45  Maine 
270,  71  Am.  Dec.  543. 


^2  Pierce  v.  Low,  51  Cal.  580. 

^3  Emeric  v.  Alvarado,  90  Cal.  444, 
27  Pac.  356;  Bowen  v.  Swander,  121 
Ind.  164,  22  N.  E.  725;  Rhodes  v. 
Gunn,  35  Ohio  St.  387. 


655  TAXES    AND    TAX    TITLES  §    645 

utes  for  the  purpose  of  validating  or  curing  irregular  and  de- 
fective tax  proceedings.  Such  acts  have  generally  been  held  con- 
stitutional/'* but  have  been  objected  to  on  the  ground  that  they 
impair  vested  rights. ^^  Such  acts  are  regarded  as  valid  so  far  as 
they  attempt  to  validate  the  proceedings  in  respect  to  a  particular 
step  therein  with  which  the  legislature  could  have  dispensed  in 
the  first  place,  but  no  further.^''  If  the  defect  involves  the  au- 
thority of  the  taxing  officers  to  act,  or  if  it  involves  the  omission 
of  a  step  which  the  legislature  could  not  have  dispensed  with,  or 
if  it  consists  of  an  irregularity  which  was  beyond  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  make  immaterial,  the  statute  will  not  cure  it.^^ 

Legislatures  have  also  undertaken  to  strengthen  titles  of  pur- 
chasers at  tax  sales  by  passing  acts  providing  that  the  tax  deed 
shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings 
leading  up  to  and  including  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  it  has 
sometimes  been  made  even  conclusive  evidence  in  this  respect. 
The  effect  of  these  acts  as  affording  evidence  in  support  of  tax 
titles  was  discussed  in  the  preceding  section. 

Statutes  usually  impose  a  limitation  on  the  right  of  the  former 
owner  to  bring  an  action  to  test  the  validity  of  a  tax  sale.  As  a 
rule,  the  time  within  which  such  action  must  be  brought  is  much 
shorter  than  that  prescribed  by  the  common  law  for  the  bringing 
of  actions  to  try  title  to  real  estate.  These  statutes  have  the 
effect  to  strengthen  that  class  of  titles  which  depend  upon  tax 
sales.  A  literal  application  of  some  of  these  acts  have  the  effect 
to  make  a  tax  title  impervious  to  attack  after  the  limitation  has 
run,  regardless  of  defects  and  irregularities  in  the  proceedings 
under  which  title  is  claimed,  and  irrespective  of  possession  or 
other  circumstances  usually  deemed  necessary  in  such  cases.  But 
these  statutes  have  generally  been  held  insufficient  to  validate 
sales  which  are  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the 
officials  to  make  the  sale.^^  The  time  from  which  such  limitation 
begins  to  run  varies  in  the  different  states.  Thus  it  may  begin 
to  run  from  the  notice  of  the  sale,^''  or  possession  by  the  pur- 

5*  Kearney  v.  Taylor,  15  How.  (U.  57  Exchange    Bank   Tax    Cases,    21 

S.)  494,  14  T..  ed.  787;  Tifft  v.  Buffa-  Fed.  99;  Johnston  v.  Sutton,  45  Fed. 

lo,  82  N.  Y.  204 ;  State  v.  Myers,  52  296. 

Wis.  628,  9  N.  W.  m.  ■'■>8  In  re  Union   College,   129  N.  Y. 

"  Grim     v.     Weissenburg     School  308,  29  N.  E.  460. 

Dist.,   57   Pa.   St.   433,   98   Am.    Dec.  ^u  Hall  v.  Miller,  150  Mich.  300,  113 

237.  N.  W.  1104. 

5c  People  V.  Ingham  Co.,  20  Mich. 


§    646  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  656 

chaser,*^"  or  the  accrual  of  the  attacking  party's  right  of  posses- 
sion,"^   or  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  redemption. "- 

§  646.  Judgment  for  taxes. — A  tax,  not  being  a  debt  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  that  word,  can  not,  unless  expressly  so  provided 
by  statute,  be  enforced  by  the  forms  of  action  ordinarily  applica- 
ble for  the  recovery  of  a  debt.""  In  many  states  the  sale  of  real 
estate  for  the  non-payment  of  taxes,  must  be  founded  upon  the 
judgment  or  order  of  a  court  of  record."'  The  statutory  pro- 
visions and  conditions  must  be  closely  followed  to  authorize  a 
sale  under  such  judgment."^ 

In  some  states  an  action  in  personam  against  the  delinquent 
may  be  maintained  to  recover  the  amount  of  taxes  for  which 
he  is  in  default.  Upon  obtaining  a  judgment  against  him  execu- 
tion may  issue  and  a  levy  be  made  on  his  real  estate  the  same  as 
in  ordinary  cases  of  judgment  for  money.  In  some  states  an  ac- 
tion in  assumpsit  for  delinquent  taxes  may  be  brought,  and  an 
execution  upon  the  judgment  obtained  may  be  levied  as  well  upon 
land  as  upon  personal  property.  The  judgment  relates  back  to 
the  assessments,  and  is  a  lien  superior  to  all  others.  Errors,  ir- 
regularities, or  omissions  in  the  assessment  of  land,  do  not  go  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  to  render  judgment  for  taxes  and  are 
no  ground  for  a  collateral  attack  on  the  judgment.""  But  it  is 
held  that  a  tax  judgment  obtained  under  statutory  provisions  for 
the  collection  of  taxes  by  judicial  proceedings  is  not  an  ordinary 
money  judgment,  and  does  not  expire  by  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions."" When  a  judgment  is  recovered  for  back  taxes,  the  lien 
of  the  taxes  will  not  be  merged  in  the  judgment."* 

§  647.  Local  assessments. — A  distinction  is  made  between 
local  assessments  and  taxes  levied  for  general  revenue  purposes. 
An  assessment  for  a  local  improvement  is  not  a  tax  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uniformity  of 

«o  Long  V.  Boast,  153  Ala.  428,  44  ^5  York  v.  Goodwin,  67  Maine  260. 

So.  955.  Gc  McNamara  v.  Fink,  71  Minn.  66, 

"  Gannon  v.   Moore,  83  Ark.   196,  72,  N.  W.  649. 

104  S.  W.  139.  «T  Hanson  v.  Franklin,  19  N.  Dak. 

C2  Beatty  v.  O'Harrow,  49  Tex.  Civ.  259,  123  N.  W.  386. 

App.  404.  109  S.  W.  414.  '=«  Greenwood  v.  La   Salle,    137   111. 

C3  United    States    v.    Chamberlain,  225,  26  N.  E.  1089;   Beard  v.  Allen, 

156  Fed.  881,  13  Ann.  Cas.  720.  141  Ind.  243,  39  N.  E.  665,  40  N.  E. 

•^•^  Webster  v.  Chicago,  62  111.  302;  654;   Boyd  v.   Ellis,  107  Mo.  394,  18 

Carlin  v.  Cavender,  56  Mo.  286.  S.  W.  29. 


I 


657  TAXES   AND   TAX    TITLES  §    647 

taxation. "^^  Local  assessments  are  charges  laid  upon  individual 
property  because  the  property  upon  which  the  burden  is  imposed 
receives  a  special  benefit  which  is  different  from  the  general  one 
which  the  owner  enjoys  in  common  with  other  citizens.''^  The 
authority  to  levy  assessments  upon  property  for  local  improve- 
ments may  be  delegated  to  local  governmental  instrumentalities. 
The  authority,  however,  is  not  inherent  in  any  public  corporation, 
but  must  be  directly  conferred  by  statute. ^^  Where  the  statute 
from  which  the  authority  is  derived  prescribes  the  mode  in  which 
it  shall  be  exercised,  that  mode  must  be  strictly  pursued.'"  There 
may  be  in  existence  at  the  same  time  two  complete  and  distinct 
systems  of  making  and  enforcing  local  assessments."  The  leg- 
islature may  provide  for  the  collection  of  local  assessments  by  a 
summary  method,'*  or  it  may  provide  for  their  collection  by  an 
ordinary  suit  in  equity  or  in  an  appropriate  action  at  law.'^  What- 
ever steps  the  statute  requires  must  be  taken  or  no  title  will  pass 
upon  the  sale  on  the  assessment.''^  Some  statutes  authorize  a 
proceeding  by  application  to  a  court,  where  an  assessment  is  de- 
linquent, for  a  judgment  and  sale  of  the  property.  This  has 
been  held  to  be  a  proceeding  in  rem."  But  the  most  common 
method  of  enforcing  local  assessments  is  by  a  suit  in  equity  in 
the  nature  of  a  foreclosure  suit.  Whatever  may  be  the  method 
employed,  a  strict  compliance  w-ith  the  provisions  of  the  statute 
is  necessary  to  vest  title  in  the  purchaser. 

Search  must  be  made  by  the  abstracter  for  unpaid  assessments 
against  the  property,  and  should  he  find  any  remaining  unsatisfied 
at  the  time  of  the  examination,  a  brief  statement  of  all  the  es- 
sential particulars  of  the  assessments  should  be  included.  This 
statement  properly  belongs  in  the  appendix  in  connection  with 

«!^  Denver  v.  Knowles.  17  Colo.  204,  "Robinson  v.  Rippey,  111  Ind.  112, 

30  Pac.  1041,  17  L.  R.  A.  135 ;  Rolph  12  N.  E.  141. 

V.   Fargo,  7  N.   Dak.  640,  76  N.  W.  -*  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co.  v.  Hez- 

242,  42  L.  R.  A.  646.  el,  155  Mo.  391,  56  S.  W.  449,  48  L. 

'0  Lamar  Water  Co.  v.  Lamar,  128  R.  A.  285. 

Mo.  188,  26  S.  W.  1025,  31  S.  W.  756,  ^^'  Dowell  v.   Talbot   Pav.   Co.,   138 

32  L.  R.  A.  157.  Ind.  675,  38  N.  E.  389. 

^1  Sargent  v.  Tuttle,  67  Conn.  162,  7^"'  Goring    v.    AlcTaggart,    92    Ind. 

34  All.  1028.  32  L.  R.  A.  822 ;  Roch-  200. 

ester  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  182  N.  Y.  ^r  St.    John   v.    East    St.    Louis,   50 

99^  74  N.  E.  953,  7  L.  R.  A.  773.  111.  92. 

"-Tulare  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Shep- 
ard.  185  U.  S.  1,  22  Sup.  Ct.  531,  46 
L.  ed.  773. 

42 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§  647 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


658 


Statements  regarding  other  unpaid  taxes  and  tax  sales,  should 
any  exist. 

Special  assessments  may  be  shown  as  follows : 

LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS 

Assessment  for  local  sewer  in  Linwood  Ave.  Approved  Sept. 
9,  1912,  payable  under  Barret  Law,  $34.95  on  lot  54  in  Charles 
M.  Cross,  Trustee's  Clifford  Ave.  Addition  to  the  city  of  In- 
dianapolis, Ind. 


I 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

ACTIONS  AND  PROCEEDINGS  AFFECTING  TITLE  TO  REAL  ESTATE 
SEC.  SEC. 

650.  Jurisdiction  in  general.  664.  Reports  of  referees  and  masters 

65L  Legal  or  equitable  jurisdiction,  in  chancery. 

652.  Jurisdiction    in    rem     and    juris-    665.  Verdicts. 

diction  in  personam.  666.  Abstracting     equitable     proceed- 

653.  Probate  jurisdiction.  ings. 

654.  Lands   in   another   county  or   in  667.  Injunctions, 
several  counties.  668.  Ejectment. 

655.  Lands  in  another  state.  669.  Action  to  quiet  title. 

656.  Jurisdiction     of     particular     ac-  670.  Partition. 

tions.  671,  Action  for  specific  performance. 

657.  Record  of  equitable  proceedings  672.  Redemption  by  bill  in  equity, 
as  notice.  673.  Rescission   and   cancellation. 

658.  Process.  674.  Foreclosure  in  equity. 

659.  Style  and  contents  of  process.  675.  Assignment  of  dower. 

660.  Service  of  the  process.  676.  Divorce  proceedings. 

661.  Service  by  publication,  677.  Condemnation  proceedings. 

662.  Return  and  proof  of  service.  678,  Construction  of  wills. 

663.  Effect     of     appearance     without 
process. 

§  650.  Jurisdiction  in  general. — It  has  often  been  said 
that  jurisdiction  is  the  power  to  hear  and  determine  a  case,  and 
this  is  the  generally  accepted  definition  of  the  word.^  The  phrase 
"the  power  to  hear  and  determine,"  does  not  mean,  when  rightly 
interpreted,  the  authority  to  judge  what  settled  law  declares  can 
not  be  decided  in  any  one  of  the  general  class  of  cases  to  which 
the  case  before  the  court  belongs.  Where  the  general  authority 
ends  jurisdiction  ceases,  but  as  long  as  the  general  authority  ex- 
ists, jurisdiction  continues.  If,  therefore,  the  court  having  au- 
thority over  a  general  class  of  cases  should  err  in  its  judgment 
in  a  particular  case,  the  judgment  is  not  void,  for  jurisdiction  is 
not  lost.  Where,  however,  the  judgment  is  entirely  outside  of 
the  kind  or  species  of  judgments  proper  in  the  general  class  of 
cases,  it  is  effective  against  all  within  the  class  of  judgments  that 
may  be  rendered  in  the  general  class  of  cases,  it  is  effective 
against  all  collateral  assaults. - 

1  Smith  V.  Adams,  130  U.  S.  167,  Ex  parte  Gordan,  92  Cal.  478,  28  Pac. 
9  Sup.  Ct.  566,  2,2  L.  ed.  895;  Tucker  489,  27  Am.  St.  154;  People  v.  Lis- 
V,  Sellers,  130  Ind.  514,  30  N.  E.  531.  comb,    3    Hun    760,    6   Thomp,    &    C 

2  Ex  parte  Yarborough,  110  U.  S,  258  (rev'd.,  60  N.  Y,  559,  19  Am.  Rep. 
651,  4  Sup,   Ct.   152,  28  L.   ed.  274;  211). 

659 


§    650  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  660 

The  right  to  hear  and  determine  judicial  controversies  resides 
solely  in  judicial  tribunals.  Where  no  tribunal  can  by  any  legal 
possibility  have  an  existence  there  can  be  no  jurisdiction.  Thus 
a  court  having  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  criminal  cases  is  as  no 
court  in  suits  to  foreclose  mortgages.  Where  there  is  authority 
over  a  general  class  of  cases  but  none  over  a  particular  member 
of  the  class,  then,  a  timely  objection  may  be  fatal  to  the  exercise 
of  jurisdiction  in  the  particular  instance. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  authority  over  the  person  is  essential 
to  the  existence  of  plenary  jurisdiction,  but  it  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  jurisdiction  to  render  decrees  or  judgments  affecting 
property  may  exist,  although,  in  the  strict  sense,  there  is  no  com- 
plete jurisdiction  of  the  person. 

In  a  broad  sense  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  is  derived  from 
the  law  of  the  land."  Consent  of  the  parties  can  not  confer  jur- 
isdiction of  the  general  subject-matter.*  Neither  can  a  court  give 
itself  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  by  reciting  in  its  record 
that  it  has  jurisdiction.  And  where  the  record  is  silent  as  to 
jurisdictional  facts,  no  inference  or  intendment  against  the  pro- 
ceedings is  authorized.^ 

In  courts  of  general  or  superior  jurisdiction,  the  right  to  jur- 
isdiction is  a  presumption  of  law  in  favor  of  such  courts;  but  in 
courts  of  limited  or  inferior  jurisdiction,  no  such  presumption 
exists,  and  all  the  facts  necessary  to  give  such  courts  jurisdiction 
in  any  particular  matter  must  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, or  no  valid  judgment  can  be  rendered. '^ 

In  the  examination  of  the  record  of  an  action  or  proceeding 
affecting  a  particular  title,  care  should  be  exercised  in  determin- 
ing whether  the  court  had  authority  under  the  law  to  entertain 
the  suit,  or  whether  the  court  had  authority  to  entertain  the  suit 
against  the  defendant  as  the  owner  of  the  land.  In  other  words, 
jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and  of  the  parties  must  be  iii- 

^  Martin    v.     Hunter's     Lessee,     1  ^  Dequindre   v.    Williams,    31    Ind. 

Wheat.  (U.  S.)  304,  4  L.  ed.  97;  Mis-  444. 

souri    River    Tel.    Co.    v.    First    Na-  '^  Ex  parte  Watkins,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

tional  Bank,  74  111.  217.  193,   7  L.  ed.  650;  Jackson  v.   State, 

4  Smith  V.  Myers,  109  Ind.  1,  -9  N.  104  Ind.  516,  3  N.  E.  863;  Cooper  v. 

E.  692,  58  Am.  Rep.  375;  Hawkins  v.  Sunderland,  3  Iowa  114,  66  Am.  Dec. 

Hughes,  87  N.  Car.  115;  Weeden  v.  52. 
Richmond,  9  R.  I.  128,  98  Am.  Dec. 
373. 


661  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    651 

quired  into,  and  the  abstract  must  contain  every  statement  of  the 
record  pertaining  to  such  jurisdiction. 

§  651.  Legal  or  equitable  jurisdiction. — The  jurisdiction 
of  the  courts  of  chancery  was  anciently  regarded  as  "the  extra- 
ordinary jurisdiction,"  and  that  of  the  courts  of  law  as  the  or- 
dinary jurisdiction.  It  is  still  true  that  courts  of  law  are  those  of 
ordinary  jurisdiction  and  that  where  a  right  is  created  and  no 
provision  made  for  its  enforcement,  jurisdiction  will  fall  to  the 
courts  of  law  unless  the  case  is  one  legitimately  belonging  to  the 
courts  of  equity  jurisdiction.  But  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of 
equity  is  now  so  well  defined  by  precedent  and  practice  that 
where  a  right  is  created  requiring  for  its  enforcement  the  machin- 
ery of  a  court  of  equity  it  will  be  held  that  the  case  is  one  of 
equity  cognizance,  but  where  there  is  no  equitable  feature  im- 
pressed upon  the  case  by  the  statute  by  which  it  was  created  it 
will  fall  to  the  court  of  ordinary  jurisdiction.^ 

As  is  true  of  law  jurisdiction,  the  jurisdiction  of  equity  is  de- 
termined by  a  decision  of  the  question  whether  the  particular  case 
in  which  the  court  is  asked  to  pronounce  a  decree  is  a  member  of 
a  general  class  over  which  the  courts  of  equity  have  authority. 
Whether  relief  shall  be  granted  or  denied  in  a  particular  instance 
is  not  the  test  of  jurisdiction.  Thus,  if  a  bill  is  filed  asking  the 
foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  the  equitable  jurisdiction  is  invoked 
and  is  not  affected  by  any  consideration  relating  solely  to  the 
merits  of  the  particular  controversy.  Where  equity  assumes  jur- 
isdiction, although  wrongfully,  the  decree  is  not  void.*  Where 
the  jurisdiction  is  in  equity  a  decree  is  as  effective  as  is  a  judg- 
ment of  a  law  tribunal  in  a  matter  of  which  it  has  jurisdiction.^ 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  courts  of  equity  will  not  entertain  juris- 
diction where  the  party  has  a  complete  and  adequate  remedy  at 
law.^"  Where  the  main  features  of  a  case  are  equitable,  they 
control  the  incidents.'^  Equity  will  not  permit  litigation  by  piece- 
meal, but  will  determine  the  whole  controversy,  so  as  to  prevent 

"  Cummings  v.  National  Bank,   101  ■'  Faught  v.  Faught,  98  Ind.  470. 

U.    S.    153,    25    L.    ed.    903;    Ellis    v.  lo  Ashhurst    v.    McKinzie,    92    Ala. 

Davis.  109  U.  S.  485,  3  Sup.  Ct.  327,  484,  9  So.  262 ;  Porter  v.  Frenchman's 

27  L.  ed.  1006.  Bay  &c.    Co.,  84   Maine   195,  24  Atl. 

«  Kilbourn  v.  Sunderland,  130  U.  S.  814 ;  Kelley  v.  Kelley,  80  Wis.  486,  50 

505.  9  Sup.  Ct.  594,  32  L.  ed.   1005 ;  N.  W.  334. 

Mellen    v.    Moline    Iron    Works,    131  "  Brighton  v.  White,  128  Ind.  320, 

U.  S.  352,  9  Sup.  Ct.  781,  33  L.  ed.  27  N.  E.  620. 
178. 


§  652 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


662 


future  litigation.^'  But  the  rule  that  courts  of  equity  having 
jurisdiction  for  one  purpose  will  proceed  to  settle  all  matters 
germane  to  the  disputed  question  can  not  be  invoked  in  cases 
where  the  equitable  jurisdiction  of  the  court  can  not  be  exercised 
until  it  judicially  determines  a  question  of  which  it  has  no  equit- 
able jurisdiction."  By  virtue  of  statutes  in  many  states,  a  de- 
fendant in  an  action  on  a  contract  is  allowed  to  interpose  a  special 
plea  setting  up  any  matter  which  would  entitle  him  to  relief  in 
equity  against  the  obligation  thereof."  Equity  will  not  assume 
jurisdiction  where  there  is  an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  and  this 
rule  prevails  even  in  those  states  where  the  statute  declares  that 
the  distinction  between  law  and  equity  is  abolished.^^ 

§  652.  Jurisdiction  in  rem  and  jurisdiction  in  personam. — 
A  judicial  proceeding  against  property  or  against  a  thing  is  a  pro- 
ceeding in  rem,  but  there  are  proceedings  in  rem  which  are  not 
in  the  true  sense  proceedings  against  the  res.^*^  A  prominent 
characteristic  of  a  proceeding  in  rem  is  that  it  is  effective  against 
all  the  world.  This  is  true  of  all  classes  of  proceedings  in  rem, 
as  well  of  those  called  quasi  proceedings  in  rem  as  of  those  which 
are  strictly  in  rem.  A  proceeding  in  attachment  is  generally  re- 
garded as  a  quasi  proceeding  in  rem.  It  is  not  strictly  a  proceed- 
ing in  rem,  for  the  rights  of  the  pefson  are  often  involved.  Pro- 
bate proceedings  are  also  quasi  in  rem.  The  estate  is  regarded 
as  the  res,  and  the  proceedings  are,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of 
proceedings  in  rem."  Where  a  sale  is  ordered  of  real  property 
by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  in  the  exercise  of  its  probate 
authority  the  proceedings  are  regarded  by  some  of  the  courts 
as  in  rem,^'*  but  by  other  courts  a  different  view  is  taken."  Cases 
in  which  the  relief  sought  is  the  enforcement  of  a  lien  against  real 
estate  are  usually  considered  as  quasi  proceedings  in  rem.  The 
fact  that  there  must  be  some  notice  to  the  person  makes  the  pro- 
ceeding not  strictly  in  rem."**     Where  the  jurisdiction  is  purely 


12  Watson  V.  Sutro,  86  Cal.  500,  21 
Pac.  172,  25  Pac.  64. 

13  Tecumseh  Iron  Co.  v.  Camp,  93 
Ala.  572,  9  So.  343. 

"  Dunn  V.  White,  1  Ala.  645. 

"  Buzard  v.  Houston,  119  U.  S.  347, 
7  Sup.  Ct.  249,  30  L.  ed.  451 ;  Hower 
V.  Weiss,  Malting  &c.  Co.,  55  Fed. 
356. 


1'''  Cross  V.  Armstrong,  44  Ohio  St. 
613,  10  N.  E.  160. 

1^  Gaines  v.  Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10, 
23  L.  ed.  524,  1  Abb.  N.  C.  25n ; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  86  Tenn.  277,  6  S. 
W.  869,  7  S.  W.  640. 

i**Hood  V.  Hood,  110  Mass.  463. 

i''Good  V.  Norley,  28  Iowa  188. 

20Arndt  v.  Griggs,  134  U.  S.  316, 
10  Sup.  Ct.  557,  33  L.  ed.  918. 


'\ 


663  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    653 

in  rem  the  proceedings  are  directly  against  the  thing,  and  hence 
it  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  any  personal  defendant 
present."  Where  the  proceedings  are  against  the  property,  that 
is,  are  proceedings  in  rem  in  the  narrow  and  strict  sense  of  the 
term,  possession  actual  or  constructive  is  essential  to  the  existence 
of  jurisdiction.-^ 

A  fundamental  requisite  to  jurisdiction  of  the  person  is  that 
of  notice.  No  judgment  can  be  valid  as  against  a  person  unless 
he  has  notice  according  to  law.  A  decree  of  a  court  of  equity 
directing  specific  performance  of  a  contract  concerning  land  di- 
rectly affects  the  person,  as  does  a  decree  for  the  cancelation  of  a 
deed,  or  a  decree  directing  the  rescission  of  a  contract.  Where 
the  person  is  acted  upon  by  a  judgment  or  decree  the  proceed- 
ing is  in  personam,  although  real  estate  may  be  involved.  If  a 
personal  judgment  is  sought  there  must  be  notice  other  than  by 
publication.-^ 

In  theory  the  decree  of  a  court  of  equity  acts  only  upon  the 
conscience  of  the  party,  but  practically  they  do  act  upon  the 
property.  Thus,  in  the  great  class  of  cases  where  decrees  enforc- 
ing the  specific  performance  of  contracts  concerning  land  are 
granted,  the  decree  necessarily  and  vitally  affects  the  question  of 
title,  and  yet  it  is  firmly  settled  that  a  suit  to  enforce  such  a  con- 
tract is  a  proceeding  in  personam  and  not  in  rem,  and  may  be 
maintained  where  there  is  jurisdiction  of  the  person,  although  the 
land  involved  may  be  situated  in  another  state."* 

§  653.  Probate  jurisdiction. — The  constitution  of  many  of 
the  states  establishes  or  provides  for  the  establishment  of  courts 
of  probate,  yet  they  derive  all  their  powers  from  the  statutes  reg- 
ulating them.-^  They  can  exercise  such  jurisdiction  only  as  is 
directly  conferred  upon  them  by  the  statute,  ~^  or  necessary  to 
carry  out  some  power  so  conferred."'  So  unless  a  warrant  for 
the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  in  any  particular  case  can  be  found 

21  Belcher    v.     Chambers,    53    Cal.         25  Tucker  v.   Harris,    13   Ga.    1,   58 

635;   Billings  v.   Kothe,  49   Iowa  34.  Am.  Dec.  488;   Pennisson  v.  Pennis- 

2-'  Markle  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio  586.  son,  22  La.  Ann.  131 ;  Pelham  v.  Mur- 

23  St.  Clair  V.  Cox,  106  U.   S.  350,  ray.  64  Tex.  477. 
1  Sup.  Ct.  354,  27  L.  ed.  222.  20  Shafer   v.    Shafer,    85    Md.    554, 

2*Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.   (U.  37  Atl.  167;  Bramell  v.  Cole.  136  Mo. 

S.)  25,  10  L.  ed.  873;  Monnett  v.  201,  37  S.  W.  924,  58  Am.  St.  619. 
Turpie.  132  Ind.  482,  133  Ind.  424,  27  in  re  Verplanck,  91  N.  Y.  439. 
32  N.  E.  328. 


§  654 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


664 


in  the  statute,  given  either  expressly  or  by  impHcation,  the  whole 
proceeding  is  void."^ 

Many  states  have  created  courts  whose  jurisdiction  is  confined 
exclusively  to  probate  matters;  while  in  other  states  probate  juris- 
diction is  conferred  upon  courts  of  plenary  powers,  or  upon  cir- 
cuit courts,  all  of  which,  however,  are  known  as  courts  of  probate 
jurisdiction  when  exercising  authority  over  probate  matters. 
The  jurisdiction  of  circuit  courts  in  probate  matters  are  separate 
and  distinct  from  its  general  jurisdiction  in  civil  cases  and  must 
be  exercised  under  different  forms  and  modes,  and  this  jurisdic- 
tion is  in  all  cases  strictly  statutory.""  Such  courts,  in  the  exercise 
of  their  probate  jurisdiction  and  powers  with  which  they  are 
invested  by  statute  in  respect  to  the  estates  of  decedents,  have  the 
right  or  power,  when  the  necessity  of  the  case  demands,  to  deter- 
mine either  legal  or  equitable  questions,  when  they  are  properly 
presented,  or  arise  in  the  course  of  probate  jurisdiction,  and  to 
award  all  necessary  relief,  whether  legal  or  equitable.^"  The 
statutes  usually  recpire  a  record  of  the  proceedings  in  probate 
courts  to  be  kept,  and  this  record  is  evidence  of  the  acts  of  such 
courts."^ 

The  question  of  jurisdiction  most  frequently  arises  in  connec- 
tion with  the  sale  of  real  estate  by  order  of  the  probate  court,  and 
in  those  states  where  such  courts  are  held  to  be  inferior  tribunals 
of  special  and  limited  jurisdiction  every  power  must  be  strictly 
executed,  and  every  prescribed  formula  observed.  No  presump- 
tions are  allowed,  in  favor  of  such  courts.  The  record  must  show 
every  fact  which  was  necessary  to  authorize  the  order  or  decree, 
or  it  is  void  when  questioned  either  directly  or  collaterally.^" 

§  654.  Lands  in  another  county  or  in  several  counties. — 
The  general  rule  is  that  actions  affecting  the  title  to  land,  to  re- 
cover possession  thereof  and  to  recover  for  injuries  thereto  must 
be  brought  in  the  county  where  the  land  is  situated.  These  ac- 
tions are  local  and  the  venue  is  to  be  laid  in  the  county  where  the 
land  is  situated.""     The  general  doctrine  is  carried  very  far  by 


2s  Smith  V.  Howard,  86  Maine  203, 
29  Atl.  1008,  41  Am.  St.  537;  Riggs 
V.  Cragg,  89  N.  Y.  479,  11  Abb.  N. 
C.  401. 

23  Noble  V.  McGinnis.  55  Ind.  528. 

30Galvin  v.  Britton,  151  Ind.  1.  49 
N.  E.  1064;  Hyland  v.  Baxter,  98  N. 
Y.  610. 


31  State  V.  Chrisman,  2  Ind.  126. 

32Haynes  v.  Meeks,  20  Cal.  288; 
Vance  v.  Alaroney,  4  Colo.  47 ;  Sey- 
mour V.  Sevmour,  22  Conn.  272. 

•''••'Thorn  v.  Maurer,  85  Mich.  569, 
48  N.  W.  640 ;  Kipp  v.  Cook,  46  Minn. 
535,  49  N.  W.  257;  Bent  v.  Maxwell, 
&c.  R.   Co.,  3   N.   Mex.   (Gild.)   227, 


i 


665  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    654 

many  of  the  cases,  for  it  is  held  that  if  a  local  action  is  brought 
in  the  wrong  county  all  the  proceedings  are  void,  no  matter  what 
the  defendant  may  do.^^  While  power  to  adjudicate  upon  a 
subject-matter  which  can  have  no  existence  save  at  a  fixed  place 
pertains  to  the  courts-  established  for  that  place, ^^  other  courts 
may  have  jurisdiction  for  the  purpose  of  adjudicating  personal 
rights  of  parties  present  in  court  which  are  in  respect  to,  but  do 
not  directly  affect,  such  subject-matter.  Thus  a  court  having 
jurisdiction  of  parties  to  a  trust  estate  in  land  outside  the  county 
may  order  the  trustee  to  execute  a  deed  thereof  pursuant  to  a 
judgment  settling  rights  of  parties  therein,  and  such  deed  will 
pass  a  valid  title.^*^  Also  a  county  court  has  jurisdiction  to  decree 
partition  of  several  tracts  of  land  partly  within  and  partly  without 
the  county,  where  each  are  owned  in  common  by  the  same  par- 
ties.^^  It  is  held  that  where  a  court  of  one  county  has  jurisdiction 
of  the  parties  and  the  original  controversy,  it  may  decree  a  sale  of 
the  land  in  another  county  as  incidental  to  the  relief  originally 
sought.^*' 

Actions  for  foreclosure  of  mortgages  are  generally  required 
by  statute  to  be  brought  in  the  county  where  the  mortgaged  prem- 
ises or  some  part  thereof  are  situated.  Such  a  statute  gives  to 
a  mortgagee  whose  mortgage  covers  several  disconnected  tracts 
of  land  in  different  counties  the  right  to  foreclose  as  to  all  of 
them  by  a  single  suit,  in  any  county  where  one  tract  is  situated."^ 
Where,  however,  separate  mortgages  are  given  upon  land  in  sep- 
arate counties  and  each  secures  a  part  of  the  debi,  there  must 
be  separate  foreclosures  in  the  separate  counties.^"  It  is  doubtful 
whether  the  parties  may  confer  jurisdiction  by  consent  in  any 
other  county  than  that  in  which  the  statute  says  the  action  must 
be  instituted.*^    The  titles  to  the  land  can  not  be  investigated.*" 

3   Pac.   721 ;   Thomson   v.   Locke,   66  103  Ky.  710,  20  Ky.  L.  625,  46  S.  VV. 

Tex.  383,  1  S.  W.  112.  219.  43  L.  R.  A.  551,  554. 

3*  Spalding  v.  Kelly,  66  Mich.  693,  ^u  Stevens  v.  Ferry.  48  Fed.  7 ;  Em- 

33  N.  W.  803 ;  In  re  Hayes'  Appeal,  pire   State   Surety  Co.   v.   Ballou,   66 

123  Pa.  St.  110,  16  Atl.  600.  Wash.  76,  118  Pac.  923. 

3^  Puget  Sound  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fish-  ^o  Citizen's    Nat.    Bank.    v.    Abbott, 

er,  52  Wash.  246,  100  Pac.  724.  72  Wash.  73,  129  Pac.   1085. 

36  Steele  v.  Bryant,  132  Ky.  569,  "  Silcox  v.  Jones.  80  S.  Car.  484, 
116  S.  W.  755.  61  S.  E.  948.    But  see  Snyder  v.  Pike, 

37  Middlecoff   v.   Cronise,    155    Cal.  30  Utah  102,  83  Pac.  692. 

185,  100  Pac.  232,  17  Ann.  Cas.  1159.        "Palmer  v.  Mead,  7  Conn.  149. 

38  Doty  V.  Deposit  Bldg.  &  L.  Assn., 


§  655 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


666 


§655.  Lands  in.  another  state. — It  is  a  fundamental  rule 
that  no  state  court  can  have  jurisdiction  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
state  of  its  creation.'*''  Thus  the  courts  of  one  state  can  not 
render  judgment  for  possession  of  lands  in  another  state,  or  for 
damages  arising  from  injuries  to  such  lands.**  Nor  can  the  leg- 
islature of  one  state,  by  mere  enactment,  without  the  co-operation 
of  an  adjoining  state,  extend  its  territorial  jurisdiction  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  latter  state- and  thereby  invest  its  courts  with  extra- 
territorial jurisdiction  over  lands  of  the  other  state, *^ 

A  judgment  or  decree  of  a  court  of  one  state  has  no  effect  to 
pass  title  to,  or  to  affect,  land  in  another  state,  nor  can  a  sale  or 
conveyance  under  it  by  a  trustee  or  commissioner  do  so,*"  but 
where  a  court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parties,  it  may  decree  a 
conveyance  of  real  estate  by  those  parties,  although  the  land  be 
situated  in  another  state.*^ 

A  court  of  one  state  has  no  jurisdiction  to  decree  a  foreclosure 
of  a  lien  on  lands  situated  in  another  state.***  But  when  a  court 
of  equity  has  acquired  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  a  party  in  a 
proper  case,  it  may,  by  virtue  of  its  power  to  coerce  obedience  to 
its  decrees,  enforce  the  performance  of  contracts  relating  to  land 
situated  in  another  state. *^  Such  court,  however,  has  no  power 
to  divest  title  to  real  estate  situated  in  another  state. '^^ 

While  it  is  true  that  the  courts  of  one  state  can  not,  by  any 
decree,  directly  affect  any  interest  in  lands  situated  in  another 
state,  it  is  also  true  that  the  courts  of  one  state  may  render  a  valid 
judgment,  directing  the  parties  properly  before  the  court  to  do  or 
perform  certain  acts  in  reference  to  the  title  to  certain  lands  in 
another  state,  and  such  judgment,  when  properly  pleaded,  may 
be  the  basis  of  a  cause  of  action  or  defense  in  a.  proceeding  in  the 
state  where  the  land  is  situated,  and  when  so  pleaded  is  conclu- 
sive.^^ 


43  Booth  V.  Clark,  17  How.  (U.  S.) 
322,  15  L.  ed.  164;  Lovejoy  v.  Albee, 
33  Maine  414,  54  Am.  Dec.  630. 

''*Dubreuil  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
130  Ind._  137,  29  N.  E.  909;  Allin  v. 
Connecticut  River  Lumber  Co.,  150 
Mass.  560,  23  N.  E.  581,  6  L.  R.  A. 
416. 

«  Rober  v.  Michelsen,  82  Nebr.  48. 
116  N.  W.  949. 

4"  Wilson  V.  Braden,  48  W.  Va.  196, 
36  S.  E.  367. 


47  Muller  V.  Dows,  94  U.  S.  444,  24 
L.  ed.  207;  Noble  v.  Grandin,  125 
Mich.  383,  84  N.  W.  465. 

4«  Richard  v.  Boyd,  124  Mich.  396, 
83  N.  W.  106. 

49  King  V.  Pillow,  90  Tenn.  287,  16 
S.  W.  469. 

•■■'OWinn  v.  Strickland,  34  Fla.  610, 
16  So.  606. 

51  Burnley  v.  Stevenson,  24  Ohio 
St.  474,  15  Am.  Rep.  621. 


667  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  656 

In  cases  of  fraud,  of  trust,  and  of  contract  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  court  of  chancery  is  sustainable  wherever  the  person  is  found, 
ahhough  lands  not  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  may  be 
affected  by  the  decree.^^  A  court  of  equity  having  obtained  ju- 
risdiction of  the  parties,  as  affecting  real  estate  in  another  state, 
may  authorize  jurisdiction  to  appoint  a  trustee,^^  or  to  restore  a 
lost  deed.^^  The  courts  of  a  state  have  jurisdiction  of  an  action 
founded  on  an  instrument  by  which  the  defendant  in  the  action, 
purchasing  land  in  another  state,  agreed  to  allow  the  plaintiff  a 
certain  portion  of  the  net  profits  upon  a  sale  of  the  land.°^ 

§  656.  Jurisdiction  of  particular  actions. — The  particular 
actions  affecting  real  estate  which  must  be  brought  in  the  county 
where  the  land  or  some  portion  thereof  is  situated  are,  actions 
to  quiet  title;'"  actions  to  enforce  liens;"  actions  for  foreclosure 
of  mortgages;'*  actions  for  trespass  for  an  injury  to  land;''' 
actions  for  the  enforcement  of  a  vendee's  lien  ;"*'  actions  for  the 
specific  performance  of  contracts  of  sale;"^  actions  for  destruc- 
tion of  growing  crops  f-  an  action  to  declare  a  mortgage  executed 
by  a  trustee  on  land  a  prior  lien  f^  action  to  declare  one  a  trustee 
of  lands  ;^-*  action  to  cancel  a  mortgage  and  to  expunge  the  record 
thereof ;""  and  an  action  to  enforce  a  bond  given  for  the  purchase 
price  of  real  estate.*''^  These  actions  are  local,  and  disclose  a 
tendency  of  the  decisions  to  enlarge  the  rule  that  prevailed  at 
common  law  and  place  in  the  class  of  local  actions  all  actions  that 
in  any  wise  concern  the  possession  of  land,  the  estate  therein  or 
injuries  thereto. 

The  following  actions  are  transitory  and  need  not  be  brought 

^2  King    V.    Pillow,    90    Tenn.    287,        «o  Bullitt  v.  Eastern  Ky.  Land  Co 

16  S   W.  469.  99  Ky.  324,   18  Ky.  L.  230,  36  S.  w! 

•'•^  Smith   V.    Davis,   90   Cal.   25.   27  16. 
Pac.  26   25  Am.  St.  92.  '^i  State      v.      Superior     Court,     13 

■•*  Pillow  V.  King,  55  Ark.  633,  18  Wash.  St.  187,  43  Pac    19 
S-  W-764.  G2Keaton   v.    Snider,    14   Ind.   App. 

■' ■  McDonald  v.  Dexter,  234  111.  517,  66,  42  N.  E    372 
8.5  NE.  209.  '•■3Staacke  v.  Bell,  125  Cal.  309,  57 

■"■  Urton  V.  Woolsey,  87  Cal.  38,  25  Pac.  1012. 

P^.^.vJ^f-  ,,,  .  ,      ^„  ^,  ,      ^„^         "^  Booth  V.  Bradford,  114  Iowa  562, 

■"  Cobbey  v.  Wright,  29  Nebr.  274,     87  N.  W  685 

^^^^^,^^•460.  «5  Kommer  V.  Harrington,  83  Minn. 

■'"Staacke  v.  Bell,  125  Cal.  309,  57     114,  85  N.  W   939 

f  T  ol?^^,'^  F/'^'^'in.  ^-    ^'^'^"''    ^^^        «'•■  Connor  v.   Dillard,   129  N.   Car. 
Ind.  285,  ?>7  N.  E.  792.  50,  39  S.  E.  641 

^■' Grace  v.  Cox,   16  Ind.  App.  150, 
44  N.  E.  813. 


657 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


668 


where  the  land  lies,  but  the  jurisdiction  is  in  the  county  of  the 
defendant's  residence;  action  to  cancel  a  mortgage  on  the  ground 
of  fraud;'"''  action  to  compel  specific  performance  of  an  agree- 
ment to  convey  land,  if  the  defendant's  obligation  is  in  contract, 
merely,  without  any  element  of  trust  f^  action  for  the  vacation  of 
a  judgment  constituting  a  lien  on  land  f^  and  an  action  to  set  aside 
an  administrator's  sale/*' 

Actions  of  the  character  mentioned  above  are  termed  transi- 
tory actions.  Whether  an  action  is  local  or  transitory  depends 
to  a  very  great  extent  upon  the  statutes  of  the  different  states. 

§  657.  Record  of  equitable  proceedings  as  notice. — Where 
the  title  to  any  particular  real  estate  has  been  the  subject  of  litiga- 
tion, or  has  been  aft'ected  by  the  judgment  or  decree  of  a  court, 
a  subsequent  purchaser  thereof  takes  subject  to  every  defect  or 
irregularity  which  afiirmatively  appears  from  the  record  of  the 
proceedings.  This  is  certainly  true  where  such  purchaser  had  no- 
tice of  the  defect  or  irregularity,  or  where  by  the  exercise  of  rea- 
sonable diligence,  he  might  have  obtained  notice  from  a  search  of 
the  records  and  documents  accessible  to  him."  If  he  was  a  pur- 
chaser of  the  property  at  a  judicial  sale  he  is  presumed  to  have 
notice  of  a  want  of  jurisdiction  appearing  from  the  record  of  the 
proceedings  under  which  he  purchased.'"  He  is  bound  to  see 
that  all  the  persons  who  were  necessary  to  convey  the  title  were 
before  the  court,  and  that  the  sale  was  made  in  accordance  with 
the  decree.'"  Although  a  court  of  equity  has  sold  real  estate,  yet 
the  purchaser  is  bound  to  ascertain  that  all  the  judgment  creditors 
having  legal  liens  has  come  in  under  the  decree,  fo-r  any  one  who 
did  not  might  enforce  his  judgment  against  the  purchaser  al- 
though he  paid  the  whole  of  the  purchase-money  into  court.  A 
purchaser  must  acquaint  himself  with  all  the  facts  disclosed  by 
the  court's  record  in  any  case  affecting  the  title  to  the  premises. 
But  the  purchaser  is  not  bound  to  look  beyond  the  judgment  or 
decree,  and  the  legal  effect  it  may  have  on  the  title  which  is  the 
subject  of  inquiry."* 


"Shouse  V.  Taylor,  115  Ky.  22,  24 
Ky.  L.  1842,  72  S.  W.  324. 

'■•*^  Close  V.  Wheaton,  65  Kans.  830, 
70  Pac.  891. 

fio  State  V.  District  Court,  85  Minn. 
283.  88  N.  W.  755. 

'"Smith  V.  Barr,  76  Minn.  513,  79 
N.  W.  507. 


-1  Smith   V.   Winn.   38   S.   Car.   188, 
17  S.  E.  717.  751. 
"  Campbell  v.  McCahan.  41  111.  45. 

73  Daniel  v.  Leitch,  13  Grat.   (Va.) 
195. 

74  Dugan  V.  Follett,  100  111.  581. 


669  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    658 

§  658.  Process. — The  ordinary  method  of  bringing-  an  ac- 
tion or  suit  is  to  file  a  bill,  petition  or  complaint  with  the  clerk 
of  the  proper  court  and  to  cause  a  summons  to  be  issued  thereon. 
It  is  a  maxim  of  jurisprudence  as  well  as  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision that  every  one  is  entitled  to  his  day  in  court,  and  that  no 
one  shall  be  condemned  unheard.  Hence,  the  necessity  for  proc- 
ess notifying  and  summoning  the  defendant  to  appear  in  court 
to  answer  the  complaint  against  him.  This  process  issues  upon 
the  filing  of  the  bill,  petition  or  complaint,  and  the  action  is  not 
deemed  commenced  until  it  is  issued  and  delivered  to  the  proper 
officer  for  service.'^  Under  this  rule,  the  mere  filing  of  the  bill 
or  complaint  is  not  sufficient;  there  must  be  both  the  filing  of 
the  pleading  and  the  issuing  of  the  process,"*'  and  process  issued 
and  served,  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  pleading  renders  the  proceed- 
ing a  nullity."  The  process  is  the  means  used  to  acquire  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  defendants,''*  and  unless  the  defendants  waive  service 
and  voluntarily  appear,  such  jurisdiction  can  only  be  acquired  by 
an  observance  of  the  modes  of  procedure  prescribed  by  law.^"* 

The  original  writ  of  the  common  law  and  the  subpoena  of 
chancery  have  in  modern  practice  been  suspended  by  a  writ  of 
summons,  although  the  term  ''subpoena"  is  still  applied  to  the 
writ  issued  by  a  court  of  chancery.  Under  the  system  which  pre- 
vails in  almost  all  the  states  the  writ  which  brings  a  defendant 
into  court  is  a  summons  requiring  him  to  appear  to  the  complaint, 
petition,  declaration  or  bill  of  the  plaintiff.  The  term  "process" 
is  often  applied  to  all  writs,  original,  mesne  and  final,  but  some 
courts  hold  that  the  term  does  not  embrace  a  summons  or  the 
writ  which  brings  the  defendant  into  court.*"  The  true  doctrine 
is  that  where  there  is  no  notice  and  no  waiver  by  express  agree- 
ment or  by  conduct  there  is  not  due  process  of  law,  and  where 
there  is  not  due  process  of  law  there  can  be  no  valid  judgment.-^ 

"^  Bracken    v.    McAlvey,    83    Iowa  '^^  Williams  v.  Alonroe,  125  Mo.  574, 

421,  49  N.  W.  1022 ;  Kenney  v.  Lee,  10  28  S.  W.  853. 

Tex.  155.  soKennard  v.   Louisiana,  92  U.   S. 

7G  Sanford  v.   Dick.   17  Conn.  213 ;  480,  23  L.  ed.  478 ;  Comet  Con.  Alin. 

Schroeder  v.  Merchants  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  Co.   v.   Frost,    15   Colo.   310,   25    Pac. 

104  111.  71 ;  Niblack  v.  Goodman,  67  506 ;  Gowdy  v.   Sanders,  88  Ky.  346. 

Ind.  174;  Howell  v.  Shepard,  48  Mich.  10  Ky.  L.  912,  11  S.  W.  82;  Fitzpat- 

472,  12  N.  W.  661.  rick  v.  New  Orleans.  27  La.  Ann.  457; 

"Hodgen  v.  Guttery,  58  111.  431.  Sprague  v.  Birchard,   1  Wis.  457,  60 

78  Wilson  V.   St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  Am.  Dec.  393. 

108  Mo.  588,  18  S.  W.  286,  32  Am.  si  Pennoyer  v.  Neff,  95  U.  S.  714, 

St.  624.  24  L.  ed.  565. 


§  659 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


670 


§  659.  Style  and  contents  of  process. — It  is  provided, 
either  by  constitution  or  statute,  in  many  of  the  states,  that  all 
process  shall  run  in  the  name  of  "The  State"  or  "The  People." 
But  a  defect  or  irregularity  in  this  respect  will  not,  according  to 
the  better  reason  and  the  weight  of  authority,  make  the  proceed- 
ings absolutely  void.^^  Some  courts,  however,  have  held  that  the 
failure  of  process  to  run  in  the  name  of  the  people,  as  required  by 
the  constitution,  will  prevent  jurisdiction  from  attaching  and  ren- 
der the  proceedings  void.^^ 

The  summons  should  inform  the  defendant  in  what  court  or 
office  he  is  required  to  appear.^*  But  a  misnomer  of  the  court  is 
not  a  material  defect  where  there  is  but  one  court  that  could  have 
been  intended  and  the  defendant  could  not  have  been  misled 
thereby.'*^ 

The  summons  should  state  the  name  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
character  in  which  he  sues.  It  should  also  name  the  defendant 
and  state  the  character  in  which  he  is  sued.  But  if  the  name 
of  the  defendant  is  unknown,  that  fact  should  be  stated  in  the 
summons  and  he  may  be  otherwise  identified  therein.  It  is  proper 
that  information  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  plaintiff's  claim 
should  be  given  in  the  summons,  or  by  indorsement  thereon.  The 
defendant  is  entitled  to  know  at  what  time  he  is  required  to  ap- 
pear, and  the  date  at  which  the  summons  is  returnable  should, 
therefore  be  stated  therein,®"  If  the  writ  is  made  returnable  be- 
yond the  first  term  of  court  after  it  is  issued  it  will  be  absolutely 
void,"  and  this  has  also  been  held  to  be  the  rule  where  the  writ 
is  made  returnable  to  an  impossible  term  of  court.®* 

The  summons  should  be  signed  by  the  clerk,  sealed  with  the 
seal  of  the  court  and  delivered  to  the  proper  officer.®^  Under  a 
statute  requiring  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  or  his  attorney  to  be 
subscribed  to  the  summons,  any  signature  which  they  may  adopt. 


s2Kahn  v.  Kuhn,  44  Ark.  404; 
Brewster  v.  Ludekins,  19  Cal.  162 ; 
Carson  v.  Sheldon,  51  Mo.  436;  Mab- 
bett  V.  Vick,  53  Wis.  158,  10  N.  W. 
84. 

83Wallahan  v.  Ingersoll,  117  111. 
123.  7  N.  E.  519;  Yeager  v.  Groves, 
78  Ky.  278. 

***  iCitsmiller  v.  Kitchen,  24  Iowa 
163. 


85  New  Eng.  Manf.  Co.  v.  Star  in, 
60  Conn.  369,  22  Atl.  953. 

s*"'  Phinney  v.  Donahue,  67  Iowa 
192,  25  N.  W.  126. 

**7  Hochlander  v.  Hocklander,  73 
111.  618;  Briggs  v.  Sneghan,  45  Ind. 
14;  McAlpine  v.  Smith,  68  Maine 
423. 

***  Hoxie  V.  Payne,  41  Conn.  539. 

»'J  Dwight  V.  Mcrritt,  4  Fed.  614, 
18  Blatchf.  305,  59  How.   Pr.  320. 


671  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    660 

whether  written,  printed  or  lithographed,  is  sufficient. ""  The 
formal  requisites  of  the  summons  should  be  set  out  in  the  ab- 
stract, especially  where  there  was  no  appearance  to  the  action. 

§  660.  Service  of  the  process. — A  summons,  being  directed 
to  a  certain  officer,  usually  the  sheriff,  should  be  served  by  such 
officer  or  his  deputy,  unless  the  statute  makes  provision  for  serv- 
ice by  some  one  else.^^  It  is  frequently  provided  by  statute,  how- 
ever, that  a  third  person  may  serve  the  summons  and  make  proof 
of  the  service  by  affidavit.''^  In  the  absence  of  any  express  statu- 
tory provision  as  to  the  manner  and  mode  of  service,  personal 
service  is  generally  essential.^"  Strictly,  personal  service  is  serv- 
ice by  reading  and  delivering  the  original  or  a  copy  of  the  sum- 
mons, or  by  merely  delivering  such  copy,  to  the  defendant  by  the 
proper  officer  or  person  authorized  to  serve  the  writ,  and  showing 
the  original  if  demanded.^*  It  is  frequently  provided  that  a 
summons  may  also  be  served  by  leaving  a  copy  at  the  last  and 
usual  abode,  or  place  of  residence  of  the  defendant.  This  is  usu- 
ally called  substituted  service,^^  although  it  is  sometimes  called 
personal  service  as  distinguished  from  service  by  publication.^'' 

Service  on  a  corporation  should  be  made  upon  the  agent  or  offi- 
cer thereof  designated  by  the  statute,  and  the  return  should  show 
his  official  position  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  clear  that  the 
service  was  upon  the  officer  or  agent  designated  by  the  statute, 
and  that  he  was  served  in  his  official  or  representative  character."^ 

Where  partners  are  sued,  service  should  be  had  upon  all  the 
meml^ers  of  the  firm,  but  some  statutes  authorize  a  judgment  to 
be  entered  against  a  partnership  upon  service  on  any  one  or  more 
of  the  partners,  en  forcible  against  the  partnership  property 
and  the  individual  property  of  the  partners  who  are  properly 
served.'"^ 

Except  where  otherwise  provided,  personal  service  should  be 
made  upon  infants  in  the  same  manner  as  upon  adults.^'' 

90  Herrick  v.  Morrill.  Z7  Minn.  250,  178,  20  Atl.  738    (rev'd,  53  N.  J.  L. 

33  N.  W.  849,  5  Am.  St.  841.  645,  23  Atl.  278,   16  L.   R.  A.  200,) 

^1  Rudd  V.  Thompson,  22  Ark.  363 ;  and  note. 

Callaway   v.    Harrold,    61     Ga.     Ill;  ^^  Chittenden  v.  Hobbs,  9  Iowa  417. 

Kyle  V.  Kyle,  55   Ind.  387 ;  Grantier  as  Dunkle  v.  Elston,  71  Ind.  585. 

V.  Rosecrance,  27  Wis.  488.  '•>''  Jones    v.    Hartford    Ins.    Co.,    88 

92  Coffee   V.    Gates,     28    Ark.    43 ;  N.  Car.  499. 

Proctor  V.  Walker,  12  Ind.  660.  ^s  Sugg  v.  Thornton.  132  U.  S.  524, 

93Brydolf  V.   Wolf,  32   Iowa  509;  10  Sup.  Ct.  163,  2,?>  L.  ed.  447. 

Read  v.  French,  28  N.  Y.  285.  '-'o  Abdil  v.  Abdil,  26  Ind.  287;  Lar- 

^^  Wilson  V.  Trenton,  53   N.  J.   L.  kins  v.  Bullard,  88  N.  Car.  35. 


661 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


672 


§  661.  Service  by  publication. — It  is  provided  by  statute 
in  most  states  that  in  certain  classes  of  cases  notice  of  the  pen- 
dency of  an  action  may  be  given  by  pubHcation  in  a  newspaper. 
Service  of  process  in  this  mode  is  called  constructive  service.  It 
is  generally  authorized  where  the  defendant  has  property  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  as  in  cases  of  attachment,  and  suits 
to  foreclose  mortgages,  or  to  determine  and  quiet  title  to  land 
within  the  state,  and  the  defendant  is  a  nonresident  or  has  ab- 
sconded, making  it  impossible  to  get  personal  service  upon  him.^ 
But  a  strictly  personal  judgment  can  not  be  rendered  upon  such 
service." 

As  service  by  publication  is  a  statutory  mode  of  service,  the 
provisions  and  requirements  of  the  statute  must  be  strictly  com- 
plied with.^  It  is  generally  provided  that  an  affidavit  should  first 
be  filed  as  an  essential  requisite  to  a  valid  notice  by  publication, 
stating  the  facts  required  by  statute  to  authorize  service  by  publi- 
cation.* Thus  it  has  been  held  that  it  should  show  the  existence 
and  nature  of  the  cause  of  action,^  that  the  defendant  is  a  non- 
resident," and,  under  some  statutes,  that,  although  the  plaintiff 
had  used  due  diligence  in  attempting  to  find  him,  he  could  not  be 
found  within  the  state, ^  that  he  has  property  within  the  state,'^  and 
all  other  jurisdictional  facts  required  by  statute. 

A  valid  order  is  necessary  to  support  service  by  publication  as 
against  a  direct  attack."  It  must  comply  with  the  statutory  re- 
quirements in  all  material  respects."  The  order  and  notice 
should  be  harmonious,  and  it  is  customary  to  recite  in  the  order 
the  jurisdictional  matters  on  which  it  is  founded.^^    The  notice 


1  People  V.  Huber.  20  Cal.  81; 
Lovejoy  v.  Lunt,  48  Maine  Zll ;  Bobb 
V.  Woodward,  42  AIo.  482.  See  Sex- 
ton V.  Rbames,   1.3  Wis.  99. 

sPennoyer  v.   Neff,  95   U.   S.   714, 

24  L.  ed.  655;  Cloyd  v.  Trotter,  118 
111.  .391,  9  X.  E.  507. 

3  Hartley  v.  Boynton,  17  Fed.  873, 
5  McCrarv  453 ;  Beckett  v.  Cuenin, 
15  Colo.  281.  25  Pac.  167,  22  Am.  St. 
399,  and  note ;  Likens  v.  McCormick, 
39  Wis.  313. 

4  Beckett  v.    Cuenin,   15   Colo.  281, 

25  Pac.  167,  22  Am.  St.  399 ;  Bards- 
ley  V.  Hines,  ZZ  Iowa  157.  See  Schell 
V.  Leland,  45  Mo.  289. 

5  Forbes  v.  Hyde,  31  Cal.  342 ;  Fon- 


taine V.  Houston,  58  Ind.  316;  Clay- 
poole  V.  Houston,  12  Kans.  324. 

C'Bixby  V.  Smith,  49  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  50. 

"'  McDonald  v.  Cooper,  32  Fed.  745, 
13  Sawy.  86;  McCracken  v.  Flanagan, 
127  N.  Y.  493,  28  N.  E.  385,  24  Am. 
St.  481. 

s  Spiers  v.  Halstead,  71  N.  Car. 
209. 

0  Frisk  V.  Reigelman,  75  Wis.  499, 
43  N.  W.  1117,  44  N.  W.  766,  17  Am. 
St.  198. 

10  Fetes  V.  Volmer,  55  Hun  604.  8 
N.  Y.  S.  294,  28  N.  Y.  St.  317,  5  Sil- 
vcrnail  408. 

11  Newnam  v.  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio 
323. 


II 
i 


673  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  662 

should  properly  name  the  defendant,  and  if  the  wrong  party  is 
named  it  will  be  insufficient,  even,  it  seems,  as  against  a  collateral 
attack/"  The  notice  is  generally  required  to  be  published  in  some 
local  newspaper  of  general  circulation.  Where  the  particular 
newspaper  is  designated  in  the  order,  or  the  kind  of  newspaper  is 
specified  in  the  statute,  the  publication  must  be  made  in  the  kind 
of  paper  specified  and  in  the  particular  paper  designated  in  the 
order/^  The  notice  should  be  published  for  the  statutory  period, 
but  the  fact  that  publication  is  made  for  a  longer  period  than  that 
required  by  statute  will  not  invalidate  the  notice/* 

Where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  a  defendant  was  ob- 
tained by  publication,  every  step  essential  to  authorize  such  serv- 
ice must  appear  in  the  abstract,  as  the  validity  of  all  subsequent 
proceedings  in  the  case  is  based  upon  the  due  performance  of 
every  requirement  respecting  such  service.  This  mode  of  service 
requires  the  most  careful  scrutiny  on  the  part  of  counsel,  and  the 
abstracter  should  be  careful  to  give  him  every  possible  means  of 
information. 

§  662.  Return  and  proof  of  service. — There  is  a  sharp  con- 
flict among  the  authorities  as  to  how  far  the  return  of  an  officer 
is  conclusive ;  but  the  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  to  the  effect 
as  between  third  persons  and  in  favor  of  the  officer,  where  he  is 
a  party,  it  is  simply  prima  facie  evidenccof  the  service,^^  while  as 
between  the  parties  to  the  action  and  their  privies  it  is  generally 
regarded  as  conclusive  and  can  not  be  collaterally  impeached.^" 
The  return  is  generally  required  to  be  in  writing,  but  where  it  has 
been  lost  proof  of  the  service  may  be  made  by  parol  evidence/" 
and  it  has  also  been  held  that  where  it  is  defective  it  may  be  aided, 
in  order  to  prevent  a  failure  of  justice,  by  other  proof  of  the 
service.^*  The  return  should  be  signed  by  the  officer  making  it, 
and  if  by  deputy,  he  should  sign  it  in  the  name  of  his  principal  by 

i^Troyer  v.  Wood,  96  Mo.  478,  10  Am.  Dec.  713;  Chadbourne  v.  Sum- 

S.  W.  42,  9  Am.  St.  367 ;  Freeman  v.  ner.  16  N.  H.  129,  41  Am.  Dec.  720. 

Hawkins.  11  Tex.  498,  14  S.  W.  364,  ic  Studebaker  v.  Johnson,  41  Kans. 

19  Am.  St.  769.  326,  21  Pac.  271,  13  Am.  St.  287,  and 

i^Tovvnsend  v.  Tallant,  ZZ  Cat.  45,  note;  Thomas  v.  Ireland,  88  Ky.  .S81, 

91  Am.  Dec.  617;  Otis  v.  Epperson,  88  11  S.  W.  653,  11  Ky.  L.  103,  21  Am. 

Mo.  131.  St.  356. 

1*  Taylor  v.  Coots.  32  Nebr.  30,  48  i- Bridges  v.  Arnold.  Zl  Iowa  221. 

N.  W.  964,  29  Am.  St.  426.  i«  Martin   v.   Gray,    142   U.    S.  236, 

15  Hensley  v.   Rose,   76    Ala!    ZIZ ;  12  Sup.  Ct.  186,  35  L.  ed.  997. 
Nichols  V.   Patten,  18  Maine  231,  Zd 

43 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§  663 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


674 


himself  as  deputy. ^^  It  should  state  the  facts  showing  the  person 
served  and  the  time  and  manner  of  service,  together  with  any 
other  matters  required  by  statute."**  Where  a  private  individual 
is  authorized  to  make  the  service,  his  return  should  be  verified 
by  affidavit.^'^  It  is  also  provided  by  statute  in  some  states  that  a 
written  acknowledgment  of  the  defendant  on  the  back  of  the 
summons  shall  be  sufficient  proof  of  the  service." 

The  publication  of  notice  is  generally  proved  by  the  affidavit  of 
the  editor  or  publisher  of  the  paper,  or  by  his  foreman  or  clerk, 
with  a  copy  of  the  printed  notice  annexed.  It  has  been  held, 
however,  that  although  there  is  no  affidavit  in  the  record,  the  re- 
cital in  the  judgment  or  decree  showing  due  service  of  process  is 
at  least  prima  facie,  if  not  conclusive,  evidence  of  such  service;'"'' 
but  where  the  return  or  proof  shows  that  there  was  no  service  it 
has  been  held  that  the  judgment  is  void,  notwithstanding  a  recital 
of  service  in  the  record."*  The  affidavit  of  publication  should 
show  that  all  the  requirements  of  the  statute  have  been  complied 
with.  Every  step  pertaining  to  the  return  and  proof  of  service, 
whether  personal  or  by  publication,  should  be  set  out  in  the  ab- 
stract, and  carefully  scrutinized  by  counsel. 

§  663.  Effect  of  appearance  without  process. — A  general 
appearance  by  the  defendant  or  his  attorney  waives  all  defects  and 
irregularities  in  notice,  process,  or  service,  and  gives  jurisdiction 
over  the  person  of  the  defendant."^  Such  appearance  is  equivalent 
to  personal  service.^*'  But  it  does  not  give  the  court  jurisdiction 
over  the  subject-matter,  where  it  can  have  no  such  jurisdiction 
under  the  law  f  and  it  has  also  been  held  that  jurisdiction  of 
minors  can  only  l^e  acquired  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law,  and 
that  an  appearance  for  them  will  not,  therefore,  give  jurisdiction 


19  Reinhart  v.  Lugo,  86  Cal.  395,  24 
Pac.  1089,  21  Am.  St.  52;  Bolard  v. 
Mason,  66  Pa.  St.  138. 

20  Richmond  v.  Brookings,  48  Fed. 
241. 

21  Coffee  V.  Gates,  28  Ark.  43;  In 
re  Robinson,  6  Mich.  137. 

22  Hendrix  v.  Cawthorn,  71  Ga. 
742 ;  McCormack  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
53  Ind.  466 ;  Cheney  v.  Harding,  21 
Nebr.  65.  31  N.  W.  255. 

23  Hardy  v.  Beaty.  84  Tex.  562,  19 
S.  W.  778,  31  Am.  St.  80. 

24  Barber  v.  Morris,  Zl  Minn.  194, 
ZZ  N.  W.  559,  5  Am.  St.  836. 


25  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  v.  DeBusk, 
12  Colo.  294,  20  Pac.  752.  3  L.  R.  A. 
350,  13  Am.  St.  221;  Hall  v.  Craig, 
125  Ind.  523,  25  N.  E.  538;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  108  N.  Y.  415,  15  N.  E.  707, 
2  Am.  St.  447. 

26Christal  v.  Kelly,  88  N.  Y.  285; 
Dikeman  v.  Struck,  76  Wis.  332,  45 
N.  W.  118. 

27  Smith  V.  Myers,  109  Ind.  1,  9 
N.  E.  692,  58  Am.  Rep.  375 ;  Schuyl- 
kill V.  Boyer,  125  Pa.  St.  226,  17  Atl. 
339. 


i 


J 


675  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    664 

over  them  and  operate  as  a  waiver  of  process  or  defective  serv- 


ice.' 


One  who  voluntarily  appears  after  being  made  a  party  by  order 
of  court  or  upon  affidavit  requiring  him  to  interplead  can  not  as- 
sail the  ruling  of  the  court  upon  the  ground  that  he  was  not 
brought  in  by  service  of  process."^  A  misnomer  in  the  summons  is 
waived  by  a  general  appearance,^"  and  any  irregualrity  in  the 
service  is  cured  in  the  same  way.^^ 

A  special  appearance  for  a  particular  purpose  does  not  waive 
jurisdiction  over  the  person,  unless  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
admit  the  jurisdiction.^-  And  where  it  is  expressly  made  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  advantage  of  particular  defects  or  irregular- 
ities, it  does  not,  of  course,  waive  such  defects  and  irregularities."^ 

Where  there  has  been  no  service  of  process,  or  where  the  serv- 
ice is  fatally  defective,  the  appearance,  if  any,  should  be  noted  in 
the  abstract  in  such  a  way  as  that  it  will  show  whether  the  appear- 
ance is  such  as  will  amount  to  a  waiver  of  process. 

§  664.     Reports  of  referees  and  masters  in  chancery. — A 

court  is  sometimes  authorized  to  appoint  a  master  or  referee  to 
ascertain  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  proceedings  and  to  aid 
the  court  in  his  judicial  duties.  They  are  not  judges  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  term,  although  they  exercise  duties  of  a  judicial  na- 
ture. Proceedings  before  such  officers  are  ancillary,  and  not  final, 
since  the  final  decision  must  be  pronounced  by  the  court.  They 
convey  information  to  the  court  either  upon  matters  of  fact  or  of 
law,  but  even  this  they  can  not  do  in  matters  which  require  the 
direct  investigation  and  decision  of  the  duly  appointed  or  elected 
judge.  A  master  or  referee,  to  whom  matters  are  referred  is 
controlled  by  the  order  of  the  court  in  the  particular  case,^*  and 
where  the  order  requires  a  report  of  the  evidence,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  master  to  report  it ;  but  where  the  order  does  not  require  a 
report  of  the  evidence,  it  is,  as  a  general  rule,  sufficient  to  report 
the  facts.     Where  there  is  a  general  order  referring  a  matter  to 

28Bonnell  v.  Holt,  89  111.  71.  25  L.  ed.  237;  Dailey  v.  Kennedy,  64 

29  Henderson     v.     Carbondale     &c.     Mich.  208,  31  N.  W.  125.  7  West.  Rep. 
Co.,  140  U.  S.  25,  11  Sup.  Ct.  691,  35     467. 

L-  ed.  332.  33  Campbell  v.  Swasey,  12  Ind.  70 ; 

30  New  Eng.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Starin,  60     Blake  v.  Jones,  7  Mass.  28. 

Conn.  369,  22  Atl.  953.  34  McNaught  v.  McAllister.  93  Ind. 

31  White  V.  Morris,  107  N.  Car.  92,  114;    Simmons   v.   Jacobs,   52   Maine 
12  S.  E.  80.  147. 

32  Harkness  v.  Hyde,  98  U.  S.  476, 


§    665  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  676 

a  master,  the  facts  should  be  reported  so  that  the  court  may  give 
the  ultimate  decision  upon  them."^  The  substantive  facts  should  be 
stated,  and  not  simply  the  master's  deductions  from  them,  inas- 
much as  the  judgment  of  the  court  must  rest  upon  the  facts,  and 
not  upon  the  mere  conclusions  of  the  master.^"  The  master's  duty, 
in  the  absence  of  specific  directions  in  the  order,  is  to  ascertain 
and  state  the  controlling  matters  of  fact  and  of  law,  for  the  in- 
formation of  the  court. ^^  The  report  of  the  master  is  regarded  in 
many  respects  as  the  verdict  of  a  jury,  and  rules  applicable  to  ver- 
dicts are  applied  to  reports  of  masters.^** 

In  suits  for  the  specific  performance  of  contracts  for  the  sale  of 
real  estate,  whether  by  vendor  or  purchaser,  questions  relating  to 
the  ability  of  the  vendor  to  give  such  title  as  the  contract  calls  for 
are  often  referred  to  a  master  with  directions  to  make  inquiry  and 
report  to  the  court  his  findings  with  reference  thereto.  In  such 
cases  the  master's  report  should  state  in  terms  whether  the  title 
can  or  can  not  be  made  out,  and,  it  seems,  in  what  way  it  can  be 
perfected.  If  the  referee's  report  shows  tha^  a  marketable  title 
is  not  offered,  or  if  there  be  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  sound- 
ness of  the  title,  the  court  will  not  compel  the  purchaser  to  com- 
plete the  purchase,  even  if  the  better  opinion  be  that  the  title  is 
good.'" 

In  proceedings  where  a  referee  or  master  has  reported  on  a 
question  involving  the  title  to  the  real  estate,  the  abstract  should 
contain  a  synopsis  of  the  officer's  report. 

§  665.  Verdicts. — A  verdict  is  commonly  understood  to 
mean  the  decision  of  an  issue  by  a  jury,  but  the  term  has  also  been 
held  to  include  the  finding,  upon  the  fact^,  of  a  judge  or  referee 
appointed  to  determine  the  issues  in  a  cause.*"  In  most  jurisdic- 
tions a  suit  in  equity  is  heard  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  but 
where  an  equitable  action  involves  distinct  legal  issues,  the  latter 
may  l^e  sul^mitted  to  a  jury.'*^  Even  where  the  issues  in  a  case  are 
purely  equitable,  they  may,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  be  sub- 

^5  Skinner  v.  Conant ;  2  Vt.  '453,  21  3»  Ely  v.  Mathews,  58  Misc.  365,  110 

Am.  Dec.  554.  N.  Y.  S.  1102. 

3"  Parker  v.   Nickerson,   137.  Mass.  ^o  Lo„e  Tree  Ditch  Co.    v.    Rapid 

487;  Frazier  v.  Swain,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  City  Electric  &c.  Co.,  16  S.  Dak.  451, 

156.  93  N.  W.  650. 

3T  Furrer  v.  Ferris,  145  U.  S.  132,  12  ^i  Conway  v.  Owensboro  Sav.  Bank 

Sup.  Ct.  821,  36  L.  ed.  649.  &  Trust  Co.,  165  Fed.  822. 

3s  Izard  V.  Bodine,  9  N.  J.  Eq.  309. 


677  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    666 

mitted  to  a  jury  for  an  advisory  verdict.*-  The  findings  of  a  jury 
in  an  equity  case  being  advisory  only,  the  court  may  adopt  them 
or  may  ignore  them  and  make  separate  findings." 

When  the  verdict  or  findings  of  a  jury  in  an  equitable  action 
has  been  acted  upon  by  the  court,  it  becomes  an  important  matter, 
and  is  required  to  be  noted  in  the  abstract.  Likewise  the  verdict 
of  a  jury  in  an  action  at  law  involving  the  title  to  the  real  estate 
in  question  should  never  be  omitted  from  the  examination. 

§  666.  Abstracting  equitable  proceedings. — Where  the 
real  estate  under  examination  has  been  the  subject-matter  of  a 
proceeding  in  equity  a  synopsis  of  such  proceeding  should  be 
given  in  the  abstract.  This  should  contain  all  the  material  points 
presented;  such  as  :  (1)  The  title  and  name  of  the  court;  (2)  the 
names  of  all  parties,  plaintiff  and  defendant;  (3)  the  process  by 
which  the  defendants  were  brought  into  court,  the  date,  seal  of 
the  court  thereon,  who  are  named  therein  as  defendants,  to  what 
officer  the  writ  is  directed,  and  his  return  thereon,  showing  who 
were  served,  when  served,  and  how  served;  (4)  the  nature  of  the 
claim  made;  (5)  whether  the  defendant  answered  or  suffered 
default,  and  if  any  answered  the  date  and  a  brief  statement  of 
the  nature  of  the  answer;  (6)  if  any  of  the  defendants  are  under 
legal  disability,  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem,  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  appointment,  and  the  answer  of  such  guardian; 
(7)  reference  to  a  master,  referee  or  jury  and  a  report  of  the 
findings;  (8)  the  decree,  the  date  thereof,  the  term  of  the  court, 
the  number  and  page  where  recorded,  and  a  statement  of  the  ma- 
terial parts  thereof.  Where  any  such  proceeding  is  pending  at 
the  date  of  an  examination  a  subsequent  examination  should  show 
all  steps  taken  after  the  date  of  the  previous  examination.  The 
following  synopsis  of  a  suit  for  specific  performance  will  illustrate 
the  points  suggested : 

Charles  B.  Davis 


Marion  Circuit  Court,  Marion 
County,  Ind. 
!>  Cause  No.  2763. 
Order  Book  8,  page  455. 
Petition  filed  Feb.  9,  1841. 

Alleging  that  in  the  summer  of  1831  plaintiff  purchased  from 

42  Heron  v.  Weston.  44  Colo.  379,  ^^  Bethany  Hospital  Co.  v.  Philippi, 
100  Pac.  1130;  Lawrence  v.  Lawrence,  82  Kans.  64,  107  Pac.  530,  30  L.  R.  A. 
82  S.  Car.  150,  63  S.  E.  690.  (N.  S.)  194n. 


Johnathan  D.  Hagar,  William 
Hagar,  and  Caroline  Hagar. 


§    667  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  678 

Christian  Hagar,  since  deceased,  the  following  described  real 
estate  in  Marion  county,  state  of  Indiana,  to  wit :  The  east  half  of 
the  northwest  quarter  of  section  19  in  township  16  north  of  range 
4  east,  containing  80  acres  for  the  sum  of  $300,  payable  in  three 
annual  instalments  of  $100  each,  and  took  from  said  Christian 
Hagar  his  title  bond  conditioned  for  the  conveyance  of  said  real 
estate  to  plaintiff.     That  said  Christian  Hagar  departed  this  life 

intestate  on  the day  of 18 — ,  leaving  as  his  only  heirs 

at  law  the  above  named  defendants.  That  plaintiff  made  all  the 
payments  in  the  time  and  manner  provided  in  said  bond,  but  said 
Christian  Hagar  died  without  having  executed  to  plaintiff  his 
deed  for  said  land.  That  since  the  death  of  said  Christian  Hagar, 
plaintiff  has  demanded  of  said  defendants  that  they  execute  and 
deliver  to  plaintiff  a  deed  to  said  land  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  said  bond,  but  defendants  have  failed  and  refused  to  do 
so.  Wherefore  plaintiff  prays  for  an  order  or  decree  of  convey- 
ance, and  the  appointment  of  a  commissioner  to  execute  and  de- 
liver a  deed  conveying  said  land  to  plaintiff.    Summons  issued  to 

John  Jones,  sheriff  of  Marion  county,  Indiana,  on  the day 

of ,  18 — .    Return  shows  served  by  reading  to  each  of  said 

defendants  on  the day  of ,  18 — .    Appearance  by  each 

of  said  defendants.     Answer  in  general  denial  filed  on  the 

day  of ,  18 — .  Decree  entered  Nov.  15,  1844.  Shows  find- 
ing of  court  to  be  that  matters  and  things  alleged  in  plaintiff's 
complaint  are  true,  and  that  the  full  amount  of  purchase-price  of 
said  land  is  paid.     That  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  deed  for  same. 

That  said  Christian  Hagar  died  intestate  on  the day  of , 

18 — ,  without  having  conveyed  said  land  to  plaintiff.  That  de- 
fendants are  the  heirs  and  only  heirs  of  said  Christian  Hagar, 
deceased.  That  John  H.  Bradley  is  appointed  commissioner  to 
make,  execute  and  deliver  to  plaintiff  a  deed  conveying  the  legal 
title  to  said  land,  and  to  report  his  proceedings  to  the  court. 

The  above  synopsis  should  immediately  precede  the  commis- 
sioner's deed  in  the  abstract. 

§  667.  Injunctions. — An  injunction  is  a  judicial  order  or 
process  issuing  out  of  a  court  of  equity,  whereby  the  defendant 
is  commanded  to  abstain  from  doing,  or  is  commanded  to  per- 
form, a  certain  act.  It  may  be,  therefore,  either  preventive  or 
remedial  in  its  operation,  but  the  most  ordinary   form  is  that 


679  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  667 

which  operates  to  prevent  the  performance  of  an  act/*  A  suit 
for  injunction  is  always  equitable,  but  when  the  court,  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  its  chancery  powers,  undertakes  to  administer  such  re- 
he  f,  it  has  jurisdiction  to  award  compensatory  damages  when 
there  has  been  a  trespass  and  in  other  proper  cases. *^ 

Mandatory  injunctions  are  frequently  issued  upon  complaints 
for  specific  performance,  as  where  a  defendant  is  required  to  exe- 
cute a  deed,  or  to  perform  some  similar  act/*^' 

The  legal  remedies  for  the  adjudication  of  titles  to  real  prop- 
erty are  so  adequate  as  to  forbid  the  use  of  the  writ  of  injunction 
where  the  sole  question  involved  is  one  of  disputed  title.  The 
writ  is  denied  where  the  right  is  doubtful.*^  Accordingly,  an  in- 
junction will  not  issue  to  evict  a  party  from  the  actual  possession 
of  land  w^here  the  right  to  the  possession  is  disputed.*^  So,  an  in- 
junction is  not  warranted  to  restrain  an  ordinary  trespass  where 
the  title  of  the  plaintiff  is  in  dispute  and  has  not  been  established 
by  a  legal  adjudication.'*^  The  title  is  generally  regarded  as  in 
dispute  where  the  defendant  in  his  answer  denies  the  right  or  title 
of  the  complainant. °°  The  authorities  generally  require  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  title  of  the  complainant  at  law  before  granting  the 
writ  of  injunction,  unless  the  facts  on  which  the  title  is  founded 
are  admitted  or  otherwise  clearly  established.^^ 

A  restrictive  covenant  in  a  conveyance  of  real  property  may  be 
enforced  by  injunction.  The  writ  will  issue  in  cases  of  a  threat- 
ened violation  of  the  restriction  and  a  mandatory  injunction  may 
be  issued  to  undo  the  forbidden  act  after  it  has  been  done.^"  The 
restrictive  covenants  that  are  subject  to  enforcement  by  injunc- 
tion most  commonly  are  restrictions  as  to  the  purposes  for  which 
the  premises  are  used,  the  character  of  buildings  to  be  erected, 
and  the  place  of  the  erection  of  buildings  with  reference  to  lot  or 
street  lines.    Injunctions  may  also  issue  to  restrain  the  foreclosure 

44  Porter  v.  Armour,  241  111.  145,  *«  Vaughn  v.  Yawn,  103  Ga.  557, 
89   N.   E.   356;    Norwood   v.   Leeves     29  S.  E.  759. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.)   115  S.  W.  53.  ".^  Carney   v.   Hadley,   32   Fla.   344, 

45  McClellan  v.  Taylor,  54  S.  Car.  14  So.  4,  22  L.  R.  A.  233,  Zl  Am.  St. 
430  32  S.  E.  527.  101. 

46Biddle  V.  Ramsey,  52  Mo.  153.  ^o  Murphey  v.  Harker,  115  Ga.  11, 

47  Preston  v.   Smith.  26  Fed.  884 ;  41  S.  E.  585. 

Wharton  v.  Hannon,  115  Ala.  518,  22  ^i  In  re  Rankin's  Appeal,  1  Monag. 

So.  287;  Burnside  v.  United  Sawmill  (Pa.)  308.  16  Atl.  82,  2  L.  R.  A.  429. 

Co.,  92  Ark.  118,  122  S.  W.  98;  Roy  -'2  RJverbank  Imp.  Co.  v.  Bancroft, 

V.  Moore,  85  Conn.  159,  82  Atl.  233.  209  Mass.  217,  95  N.  E.  216,  34  L.  R. 

A.  (N.  S.)  730n,  1912B,  450n. 


668 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


680 


of  a  mechanic's  lien,  to  restrain  a  breach  of  covenant  in  a  lease, 
to  prevent  the  removal  of  fixtures,  to  restrain  a  sale  under  a  mort- 
gage fraudulently  executed,  to  restrain  the  violation  of  a  party- 
wall  agreement,  and  to  remove  an  obstruction  to  an  easement.  It 
will  be  seen  that  the  remedy  of  injunction  is  applicable  to  transi- 
tory matters,  and  are  incidental  only  to  the  title.  For  this  reason 
it  is  not  material  that  they  should  be  shown  in  the  abstract. 

§  668.  Ejectment. — At  common  law,  the  action  of  eject- 
ment could  only  be  used  to  recover  the  possession  of  real  prop- 
erty. By  the  structure  of  such  an  action,  and  the  pleadings 
therein,  the  title  of  the  freehold  was  never  directly  put  in  issue." 
It  was  a  mere  possessory  action  between  fictitious  parties.  The 
judgment  therein  did  not  determine  the  estate  or  interest  of  the 
parties  in  the  property,  nor  did  it  conclusively  determine  the  right 
to  possession.  But  in  most  states,  the  common-law  action  has 
been  stripped  of  its  fiction  and  made  a  simple  remedy  for  the 
recovery  of  the  possession  of  real  property,  and  the  trial  of  title 
thereto.^*  It  is  now  generally  considered  a  possessory  remedy, 
and  can  be  resorted  to  only  when  a  right  of  entry  exists. °''  Where 
united  with  trespass  the  action  constitutes  one  distinctly  to  try 
title."" 

The  action  can  be  resorted  to  only  where  the  thing  or  interest 
is  tangible,  so  that  possession  can  be  delivered.  Thus,  it  will  not 
he  to  recover  an  easement  or  thing  incorporeal."  To  authorize 
the  maintenance  of  an  action  of  ejectment  it  must  appear  that  the 
defendant  is  in  actual  possession  of  the  land  in  dispute  at  the 
commencement  of  the  action. ^^  But  in  California  it  is  held  that 
the  constructive  possession  of  the  defendant  is  sufficient  to  au- 
thorize a  recovery.^"  To  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  he  must 
have  a  title,  valid  and  subsisting,  at  the  commencement  of  the 
action.""  He  must  recover  upon  the  strength  of  his  own  title  and 


^3  Brooke  V.  Gregg,  89  Md.  234,  43 
Atl.  38. 

=4  Hoover  v.  King,  43  Ore.  281,  72 
Pac.  880.  65  L.  R.  A.  790,  99  Am. 
St.  754.  _ 

•''•''  United  States  Pipe  Line  Co.  v. 
Delaware.  &c.  R.  Co..  62  N.  T.  L.  254, 
41  Atl.  759,  42  L.  R.  A.  572.  Leprell  v. 
Kleinschmidt,  49  Hun  605,  1  N.  Y.  S. 
821,  17  N.  Y.  St.  231. 

56Lavin  v.  Dodge,  30  R.  I.  8,  72, 
Atl.  376. 


■''"  Lvman  v.  Suburban  R.  Co.,  190 
111.  320,  60  N.  E.  515,  52  L.  R.  A. 
645 ;  Fritscbe  v.  Fritsche,  77  Wis.  270, 
45  N.  W.  1089. 

•"-s  Haden  v.  Goodwin.  217  Mo.  662, 
117  S.  W.  1129. 

■'^  Moore  v.  Moore,  99  Cal.  XVIII, 
34  Pac.  90. 

'•'OCard  v.  Dean,  84  Xebr.  4,  120 
N.  W.  440:  Harris  v.  Mason,  120 
Tenn.  1146,  115  S.  W.  1146:  Wilburn 
V.  Land,  138  Wis.  36,  119  N.  W.  803. 


681  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  668 

not  on  the  weakness  of  that  of  the  defendant."  Subject  to  cer- 
tain exceptions,  the  kind  of  title  necessary  to  support  the  action 
is  a  good  and  vahd  legal  title  or  interest  in  the  premises.''  But  it 
has  been  held  that  an  equitable  title  in  the  plaintiff  will  enable  him 
to  maintain  the  action."^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  an  eq- 
uitable title  based  on  estoppel  will  not  support  an  action  of  eject- 
ment.°*  The  plaintiff  must  show  title  and  a  right  of  possession 
at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  his  action.'^^  A  plaintiff  in 
ejectment  may  recover  the  premises  in  dispute  upon  the  strength 
of  his  prior  possession  alone,  as  against  one  who  subsequently  ac- 
quires possession  of  the  land  by  mere  entry,  and  without  any 
lawful  right  whatever."""  Thus  where  one  occupies  land  under  an 
invalid  tax  deed  he  has  such  possesion  as  will  enable  him  to  main- 
tain ejectment  against  a  mere  trespasser."  Where  both  plaintiff 
and  defendant  assert  title  from  a  common  grantor  it  is  not 
usually  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  go  back  to  the  common 
source  in  order  to  prove  title,  but  he  need  only  show  a  better  title 
through  the  common  source  than  the  defendant  has.""^ 

Where  an  action  of  ejectment  has  been  commenced  against  a 
defendant  in  possession,  one  who  acquires  possession  from  the 
defendant  pendente  lite  will  be  bound  by  the  judgment  that  may 
be  recovered  to  the  same  extent  as  the  defendant.*"^ 

A  judgment  for  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment  should  be  limited  to 
the  issues  raised,  and  must  describe  the  specific  property  in  con- 
troversy, provide  for  recovery  of  possession  by  the  plaintiff,  and 
be  based  on  a  sufficient  verdict  if  the  trial  is  by  a  jury.  The  judg- 
ment is  executed  by  the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  possession  directmg 
the  seizure  of  the  property  and  the  placing  of  the  successful  party 
in  possession. 

Gi  McCauley  v.  Mahon,  174  111.  384,  en  Demps  v.  Hogan.  57  Fla.  60,  48 

51   N.  E.  829;   Comstock  v.  Kerwin,  So.  998;  Welborn  v.  Kimmerhng,  46 

57  Nebr.  1.  11  N.  W.  387;  Jarvis  v.  Ind.  App.  98,  89  N.  E.  517,  91  N    E. 

Lynch,  157  N.  Y.  445,  52  N.  E.  657;  982;  Harris  v.  Mason,  120  Tenn.  668 

Worth  V.  Simmons,  121  N.  Car.  357,  115  S.  W.  1146,  25  L.  R.  A    (N    S.) 

28  S    E    528  lOlln;    Harley   v.    Harley,    140   Wis. 

^■■2  Simmons  v.  Richardson,  107  Ala.  282,  122  N.  W.  761. 

697,  18  So.  245;  Cahill  v.  Cahill,  75  '■«  Bagley  v.   Kennedy,  85   Ga.  703, 

Conn.  522,  54  Atl.  201,  732,  60  L.  R.  11  S.  E.  1091. 

A.  206;  Taylor  V.  Russell,  65  W.  Va.  "Robinson     v.     Gautt,     1      iSebr. 

632,  64  S.  E.  923.  (Unoff.)  51,  95  N.  W.  506. 

P3  Ohio    River   Junction    R.    Co.   v.  ''« Graton   v.   Holliday   Koltz   Land 

Pennsylvania    Co.,   222    Pa.    573,    72  &  Lumber  Co.,  189  Mo.  322,  87  S.  W. 

Atl.  271.  Zl.                                              ^,      „^ 

^••i  Harrison  v.  Alexander,  135  Ala.  '^o  Howard  v.  Kennedy,  4  Ala.  592, 

307,  Zl  So.  543.  39  Am.  Dec.  307. 


669 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


682 


In  abstracting  proceedings  in  ejectment  a  full  synopsis  thereof 
must  appear,  including  all  the  pleadings,  the  verdict,  if  any,  and 
the  judgment. 

§  669.  Action  to  quiet  title. — Equity  has  inherent  juris- 
dictions of  suits  to  quiel  title  to  real  estate  and  to  remove  clouds 
therefrom.'"  Statutory  actions  for  this  purpose  are  generally  re- 
garded as  equitable  in  character,'^  and  provisions  authorizing 
them  as  merely  enlarging  the  powers  of  courts  of  equity,'-  and  as 
creating  concurrent  and  not  exclusive  remedies.'"  There  is  a  con- 
flict of  authority  as  to  whether  the  statutory  action  is  one  in  per- 
sonam or  in  rem.  Most  courts  hold  that  it  is  not  an  action  to  de- 
termine title  as  against  all  the  world  as  in  proceedings  in  rem,  but 
is  one  in  personam  only.'^*  It  is  sometimes  considered  an  action 
for  the  recovery  of  real  property  which  is  the  subject-matter 
thereof.''^ 

A  suit,  the  sole  object  of  which  is  to  remove  a  cloud  on  a  title, 
as  distinguished  from  one  seeking  a  decree  quieting  title,  is  an 
action  in  personam,  and  therefore  maintainable  only  in  the  dis- 
trict where  the  defendant  can  be  personally  served  with  process." 
Statutory  remedies  must  he  strictly  pursued,  though  they  are  fre- 
quently cumulative. ^^  Apart  from  any  statutory  provision  to  the 
contrary  the  plaintiff  must  ordinarily  have  both  possession  and 
the  legal  title,  '*  and  conversely  the  defendant  must  be  out  of  pos- 
session.''" But  the  possession  of  the  plaintiff  may  be  constructive, 
or  by  a  tenant  or  licensee.^" 

The  usual  rule  applies  that  the  decree  must  be  within  the  issues 
raised  by  the  pleadings,'*^  and  be  construed  with  reference  to  the 


'^0  Acord  V.  Western  Pocahontas 
Corporation,  156  Fed.  989. 

71  Carlson  v.  Curren,  48  Wash.  249, 
93  Pac.  315. 

72Siedschlag  v.  Griffin,  132  Wis. 
106.  112  N.  W.  18. 

73  Hudson  V.  Wright,  204  Mo.  412, 
103  S.  W.  8. 

74  Dixon  V.  Hunter,  204  Mo.  382, 
102  S.  W.  970;  Lally  v.  New  York 
Cent.  &c.  R.  Co.,  123  App.  Div.  35, 
107  N.  Y.  S.  868. 

75  Townsend  v.  Driver,  5  Cal.  App. 
581.  90  Pac.  1071. 

7*i  Philadelphia  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  25 
App.  D.  C.  338. 


77  Griffin  V.  Franklin,  224  Mo.  667, 
123  S.  W.  1092. 

78Fies  V.  Rosser,  162  Ala.  504,  50 
So.  287,  136  Am.  St.  57;  Bowling  v. 
Breathitt  Coal  &c.  Co.,  134  Ky.  249, 
120  S.  W.  317;  Solis  v.  Williams,  205 
Mass.  350,  91  N.  E.  148. 

70  Bieber  v.  Porter,  242  III.  616,  90 
N.  E.  183;  Moody  v.  Macomber,  158 
Mich.  209,  16  Det.  Leg.  N.  577,  122 
N.  W.  517. 

80  Stewart  v.  May,  111  Md.  162,  73 
Atl.  460,  18  Ann.  Cas.  856. 

'^i  Rydalch  v.  Anderson.  37  Utah 
99,  iU7  Pac.  25. 


683  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    670 

relief  prayed  for.^"  In  statutory  proceedings,  the  form  and  scope 
of  the  decree  are  frequently  prescribed. '^^  The  decree  in  a  suit  to 
quiet  title  is  binding  only  upon  the  parties  thereto  and  their 
privies.'^* 

The  action  to  quiet  title  is  a  very  common  and  effective  pro- 
cedure employed  in  the  removal  of  a  cloud  from  the  title,  and  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  counsel  to  insist  upon  the  action  being  taken 
when  he  finds  anything  which  is  calculated  to  cast  a  doubt  or 
suspicion  on  the  title. 

§  670.  Partition. — Partition  is  the  division  which  is  made 
between  several  persons  of  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments. 
The  term  is  more  technically  applied  to  the  division  of  real  estate 
made  between  coparceners,  tenants  in  common  or  joint  tenants. 
In  jurisprudence  the  term  is  usually  used  in  speaking  of  a  right, 
or  of  proceedings  to  enforce  the  right,  which  either  of  the  joint 
owners  of  joint  property  has  to  demand  a  division  and  that  his 
share  be  set  off  to  him  in  severalty.  ^^  At  common  law  there  could 
be  no  partition  of  the  common  subject  of  property  between  joint 
tenants,  except  as  the  result  of  voluntary  agreement  of  all  the 
parties.  Joint  tenancy  was  one  of  the  arrangements  of  the  feudal 
law,  and  like  other  feudal  institutions,  was  contrived  to  last  for- 
ever. About  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century  partition  was 
declared  by  statute  to  be  a  compulsory  remedy  at  the  election  of 
any  one  of  the  parties,  by  writ  of  partition.  The  writ  is  now 
abolished  in  England  and  a  bill  in  equity  for  partition  substituted. 
In  this  country,  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  equity  has  always 
been  recognized,  but  in  many  of  the  states  there  are  statutory 
provisions  giving  concurrent  jurisdiction  to  common-law  courts, 
or  to  the  courts  having  probate  jurisdiction,  particularly  in  cases 
of  partition  of  a  decedent's  real  estate. 

Partition,  either  by  division  of  the  property  or  by  its  sale  and  a 
division  of  the  proceeds,  is  a  matter  of  absolute  right,  against 
which  no  consideration  of  hardship,  inconvenience,  or  loss,  on  the 
part  of  other  cotenants,  can  prevail.®*^ 

S2  Del  Notaro  v.  Douglas,  55  Wash.  80  Kans.  209,  102  Pac.  496,  133  Am. 

493,  104  Pac.  774.  St.  199. 

83  Potrero  Neuvo  Land  Co.  v.  All  *""'  Abbott's  Law  Dictionary,  tit.  Par- 
Persons   Claiming,   155   Cal.   371,   101  tition. 
Pac.  12.  '^'^  Hartmann   v.    Hartmann,    59   111. 

'"4  Dovle  V.  Hays  Land  &  Inv.  Co.,  103 ;    Lake    v.    Jarrett.    12    Ind.    395 ; 

Wood  V.  Little,  35  Maine  107. 


§    670  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  684 

Title  and  possession  or  right  of  possession  must  concur  in  the 
plaintiff,  before  he  can  maintain  the  action  of  partition. ''^  Par- 
tition may  be  enforced  by,  or  against,  persons  under  legal  dis- 
ability.**^ It  has  been  uniformly  held  that  remaindermen  can  not 
compel  partition,  that  is,  they  can  not  maintain  such  partition  as 
plaintiffs,  but  they  may  be  made  defendants,  and  will  be  bound  by 
the  decree/'' 

The  petition  for  partition  should  show  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  interest  of  the  petitioner  in  the  premises,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
defendants,  and  that  they  hold  as  joint  tenants  or  tenants  in  com- 
mon. The  title  to  the  real  estate  may  be  put  in  issue,  tried,  and 
determined,  and  the  judgment  rendered  is  binding  upon  all  the 
parties  to  the  issue.  To  give  validity  and  effect  to  a  decree  in 
partition,  all  persons  interested  in  the  property,  either  as  owners 
or  lienholders,  at  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  should  be  made 
parties.  All  persons  dealing  with  the  property,  pendente  lite,  are 
affected  with  notice  of  the  orders  and  proceedings  had  therein  and 
are  bound  thereby. ^'^  The  petition  must  show  that  the  plaintiff, 
at  the  time  of  bringing  the  suit,  is  seized  of  some  definite  undi- 
vided share  of  the  land  of  which  he  seeks  partition. °^  Ordinarily, 
the  title  to  land  is  not  put  in  issue  in  a  suit  for  partition.  Neither 
the  object  of  the  suit  nor  the  effect  of  the  decree  is  to  establish  or 
quiet  title,  but  simply  to  make  division  of  the  land;  and  it  is  by 
interlocutory  orders  that  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  parties 
are  regularly  adjusted  and  defined.  The  business  of  the  court  in 
such  a  suit,  is  not  to  draw  into  discussion  various  and  conflicting 
rights  and  equities  of  encumbrancers.  The  property  is  divided 
cum  onere,  each  taking  the  share  allotted  to  him  subject  to  such 
liens  as  exist  upon  it.'"*'  The  decree  should  be  sufficiently  specific 
as  to  show  on  its  face  what  land  is  intended  to  be  partitioned,  and 
should  be  drawn  so  as  to  give  a  good  title,  but  it  should  not  be 
broader  than  the  scope  of  the  litigation.''" 

"Tower    v.    Tower,    141    Tnd.    223  40  N.  E.  747;  Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  66 

40   N.   E.   747 ;    Whitten   v.    Whitten,  N.  Y.  2,7 ;  Savage  v.  Savage,  19  Ore. 

36  N.  H.  332;  Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  66  112,  23  Pac.  890,  20  Am.  St.  795. 

N.  Y.  Z7;  Nichols  v.  Nichols,  28  Vt.  '><>  Schissel  v.  Dickson,  129  Ind.  139, 

228,  67  Am.  Dec.  699.  28  N.  E.  540. 

**8  Indianapolis    v.    Kingsbury,    101  "^  Brown    v.    Brown.    133    Ind.   476, 

Ind.  200.  51  Am.  Rep.  749;  Cocks  v.  32  N.  E.  1128,  2,2,  N.  E.  615. 

Simmons,   57   Miss.    183;    Mitchell  v.  "2  ggbring   v.    Mcrsereau,    9    Cow. 

Jones.  50  Mo.  438;  Goudy  v.  Shank,  (N.  Y.)  344. 

8  Ohio  415.  '-'3  Stokes  v.  Stokes,  240  111.  330,  88 

so  Tower   v.    Tower,    141    Ind.   223  N.  E.  829. 


685 


ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE 


671 


Provision  is  usually  made  by  statute  for  the  appointment  of  a 
commissioner  or  commissioners  to  make  a  division  and  allotment 
of  the  land,  or  to  sell  same  and  divide  the  proceeds  where  the  land 
is  not  susceptible  of  division.  The  commissioners  are  required  to 
make  report  to  the  court  of  their  acts  and  doings  in  the  premises, 
which  report  must  be  approved  by  the  court. 

Where  title  to  the  land  being  abstracted  has  been  the  subject 
of  a  proceeding  in  partition  a  full  synopsis  of  such  proceeding 
should  appear  in  the  abstract.  The  following  is  given  as  an  ex- 
ample of  such  synopsis : 


Edward  Hall 

V." 

Louisa  Hall  and  James  Hall. 


Circuit  Court  of  Marion 

County,  Indiana. 
Case  No.  5280. 
Action  in  partition. 
Petition  filed  Sept.  12,  1900. 


Plaintiff  alleges  that  he  and  the  defendants  are  each  the  owners 
of  an  undivided  one-third  interest  in  and  to  the  northeast  quarter 
of  section  4,  township  15  north  of  range  4  east,  in  Marion  county, 
State  of  Indiana.  Prays  that  said  real  estate  be  partitioned  among 
parties  according  to  their  rights  and  interests  in  severalty,  if 
same  can  be  done  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  parties,  or  if 
same  can  not  be  so  partitioned,  that  the  land  may  be  sold  accord- 
ing to  law,  and  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  be  divided  among  the 
parties  according  to  their  respective  interests.  Process  issued, 
dated  Sept.  12,  1900,  to  both  defendants,  returnable  Oct.  1,  1900. 
Summons  returned  Oct.  1,  1900,  showing  service  by  reading  same 
to  both  defendants  on  the  12th  day  of  Sept.,  1900. 

Answer  of  both  defendants  filed  Oct.  12,  1900.  Cause  sub- 
mitted and  evidence  heard  Dec.  1,  1900.  Decree  entered  Dec. 
1,  1900,  showing  [here  set  out  all  material  parts  of  decree]. 

If  the  decree  is  interlocutory  only,  the  order  appointing  com- 
missioners, their  report  and  its  confirm.ation,  and  final  decree 
should  follow. 

§  671.  Action  for  specific  performance. — The  common  law^ 
furnishes  no  remedies  for  the  enforcement  of  executory  con- 
tracts, except  to  give  damages  for  their  breach.  Specific  per- 
formance is  a  term  applied  to  a  remedy  in  equity  whereby  a  court. 
in  its  sound  discretion,  will  compel  a  party  making  a  breach  of 


671 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


686 


his  contract  obligations  to  perform  the  same  in  the  terms  agreed 
upon.  This  remedy  is  of  a  purely  equitable  nature,  being  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  legal  remedy  of  compensation  in  damages  when  the 
latter  is  inadequate  or  impracticable,  and  lies  within  sound  judi- 
cial discretion  on  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  surround- 
ing the  case.''*  In  the  great  class  of  cases  where  decrees  enforcing 
the  specific  performance  of  contracts  concerning  land  are  granted, 
the  decree  necessarily  and  vitally  affects  the  question  of  title,  and 
yet  it  is  firmly  settled  that  a  suit  to  enforce  such  a  contract  is  a 
proceeding  in  personam  and  not  in  rem,  and  may  be  maintained 
where  there  is  jurisdiction  of  the  person,  although  the  land  in- 
volved in  the  controversy  may  be  situated  in  another  state. ^'^ 
However,  in  a  limited  and  qualified  sense  a  decree  for  specific 
performance  may  also  operate  in  rem  in  cases  where  the  property 
to  be  conveyed  under  the  contract  is  within  the  court's  jurisdic- 
tion, but  the  defendant  is  absent  therefrom."" 

It  has  also  been  held  that  a  court  of  equity  can  decree  specific 
performance  of  a  contract  to  sell  land  situated  in  another  state  if 
it  has  jurisdiction  of  all  the  parties."''  But  such  decree  is  effectual 
only  upon  the  person,  not  upon  the  land.  The  decree  does  not 
change  the  title  to  the  land.  It  remains  the  same  as  before  the 
decree  was  granted  until  the  person  in  whom  the  title  resides 
either  voluntarily  or  perforce  obeys  the  decree  and  divests  him- 
self of  the  title  by  a  conveyance  valid  under  the  lex  loci.°^  So, 
also,  specific  performance  of  a  contract  to  convey  land  in  one 
state  may  be  decreed  against  an  inhabitant  of  another  state  who 
has  been  personally  served  with  process."*'  A  decree  for  specific 
performance  of  a  contract,  being  an  action  in  personam  and  not 
in  rem,  to  have  effect  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  must  be 
founded  either  upon  personal  service  of  process  or  upon  a  vol- 
untary appearance.^ 

Defective  process  is  waived  if  the  parties  appear  and  proceed  in 
the  cause  without  objecting  thereto."   But  where  the  appearance 


9*  Brown  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co., 
106  Maine  248.  76  Atl.  692. 

"■'•'  Monnett  v.  Turpie.  132  Ind.  482, 
133  Ind.  424.  32  N.  E.  328 :  McQuer- 
rv  V.  Gilliland.  89  Ky.  434.  11  Ky.  L. 
656.  12  S.  W.  1037,  7  L.  R.  A.  454; 
Davis  V.  Headley,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  115. 

"^  Wait  V.  Kern  River  Min.  &c.  Co., 
157  Cal.  16.  106  Pac.  98. 

"Poole  V.  Koons,  252  111.  49,  96 


N.  E.  556:  Barringer  v.  Ryder,  119 
Iowa  121.  93  N.  W.  56. 

08  Proctor  v.  Proctor.  215  111.  275, 
74  N.  E.  145.  69  L.  R.  A.  673,  106  Am. 
St.  168. 

'•"  Dooley  v.  Watson,  1  Gray 
(Mass.)  414. 

iWorthington  v.  Lee,  61  Md.  530. 

2Thebant  v.   Canova,   11   Fla.   143. 


687  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    671 

is  special,  and  for  the  purpose  of  objecting  to  the  process,  the 
irregularities  are  not  necessarily  waived." 

Equity  has  jurisdiction  of  a  suit  to  compel  specific  performance 
on  the  part  of  the  purchaser  of  real  estate,  though  the  vendor  has 
a  remedy  at  law  by  an  action  for  the  purchase-money.''  If  the 
property  contracted  for  was  never  owned  by  the  vendor,  or  was 
not  in  existence  at  the  time  of  the  contract,  or  where  the  vendor 
has  no  title,  a  decree  for  specific  performance  will  be  denied.^ 
On  the  other  hand  equity  will  not  compel  a  purchaser  to  specif- 
ically perform  his  contract  of  purchase  of  real  estate  where  title 
to  the  same  is  defective  or  doubtful." 

The  remedy  of  specific  performance  is  open  alike  to  both 
vendor  and  vendee  in  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate."^ 
The  suit  may  also  be  maintained  by  the  assignee  of  the  vendee.* 

A  contract  for  the  sale  of  real  estate  which  is  not  definite, 
certain  and  clear  will  not  be  specifically  enforced  in  equity." 
When  a  decree  is  based  on  a  certain  contract,  and  requires  its 
specific  enforcement,  it  must  require  the  performance  of  the  con- 
tract by  plaintiff  as  well  as  the  defendant.''  So,  the  contract 
merges  with  the  decree  which  should  leave  the  defendant  no 
alternative  but  to  perform."  Performance  may  also  be  decreed 
in  the  alternative.'" 

A  contract  for  the  testamentary  disposition  of  the  estate  of  a 
decedent  may  be  specifically  enforced  against  the  heirs,  devisees 
or  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  promisor,'^  and  such 
persons  will  be  treated  as  trustees,  whose  duty  under  the  decree 
is  to  convey  the  property  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
contract.'*  In  some  jurisdictions  a  decree  may  be  entered  for 
specific  performance  which  will  operate  as  a  conveyance.'^ 

3  Merrill  V.  Houghton,  51  N.  H.  61.         lo  Thompson    v.    Burns,    15    Idaho 

4  Morgan  v.  Eaton,  59  Fla.  562,  52     572,  99  Pac.  111. 

So.  305,  138  Am.  St.  167.  "  Broemsen   v.   Agnic,   70  W.   Va. 

5  Enslen  v.  Allen,  160  Ala.  529,  49     106,  11  S.  E.  253. 

So   430  '"  Prichard  v.  Mulhall,  140  Iowa  1, 

«Triplett  V.  Williams,  149  N.  Car.  118  N.  W.  43. 

394  63  S.  E.  79,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  ^^  Manning  v.  Pippen.  86  Ala.  357, 

514n  5  So.  572,  11  Am.  St.  46. 

7  Boehly  v    Mansing,  52  Misc.  382,  i*  Owens  v.  McNally,  113  Cal.  444, 
102  N   Y    S    171  45  Pac.  710.  ii  L.  R.  A.  369. 

8  Cheney  v.    Bilby,   74   Fed.   52,   20  i->  Otto  v.  Young,  227  Mo.  193,  127 
C   C   A   291  S.  W.  9;  Ready  v.  Schmith,  52  Ore. 

■9  Ehrenstrom  v.  Phillips,  9  Del.  Ch.     196,  95  Pac.  817. 
74,  n  Atl.  80,  81. 


§  672 


TITLES    AXD   ABSTRACTS 


688 


Where  specific  performance  has  been  decreed,  and  the  decree 
complied  with,  a  full  synopsis  of  all  the  proceedings,  including 
the  final  decree,  should  be  included  in  the  abstract.  But  where 
the  decree  denies  specific  performance  it  would  seem  to  be  only 
necessary  to  set  out  the  contract,  if  it  is  recorded,  and  make  a 
brief  mention  of  the  action.  A  synopsis  of  the  proceedings 
should  always  supplement  the  deed  made  in  pursuance  of  the 
decree  of  specific  performance  whether  such  deed  be  made  by 
the  defendant,  a  commissioner,  or  an  administrator  or  executor. 

§  672.  Redemption  by  bill  in  equity. — The  only  remedy 
of  a  mortgagor  for  enforcing  his  right  to  redeem  after  a  breach 
of  the  condition  is  by  a  bill  in  equity  or  by  an  action  under  the 
statute  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  in  equity.  So  long  as  the  mort- 
gage is  in  fact  not  discharged,  and  is  apparently  a  subsisting 
security,  the  mortgagor  can  not  obtain  possession  by  ejectment,^** 
but  he  must  resort  to  a  suit  in  equity  to  redeem.  The  action 
will  lie  only  where  the  conveyance  was  intended  as  a  security.^ ^ 

The  action  may  be  instituted  for  the  sole  purpose  of  having 
a  deed  declared  to  be  a  mortgage,  but  the  plaintiff  must  also 
offer  to  redeem  the  property  and  place  himself  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court  to  settle  the  whole  controversy.^'^  Recon- 
veyance will  be  decreed  only  upon  payment  of  the  debt  in  full.*" 
In  order  to  maintain  the  bill  there  must  be  an  existing  debt  or 
obligation  which  the  grantee  can  enforce  by  way  of  foreclosure 
proceedings."" 

Any  one  who  has  a  right  to  redeem  is  a  proper  party  plaintiff. 
Upon  the  death  of  one  having  an  interest  in  fee  in  the  land,  his 
heirs  or  devisees  are  the  proper  parties."^  As  a  general  rule,  all 
persons  who  have  an  interest  in  the  mortgage,  or  in  the  ecjuity 
of  redemption,  which  interest  is  apparent  of  record  or  known 
to  the  plaintiff,  should  be  made  parties  to  the  suit.'"  All  persons 
who  appear  to  be  legally  or  equitably  interested  in  the  mortgage 
security  must  be  made  defendants  and  served  with  process."' 


1"  Woods  V.  Woods.  66  Maine  206 ; 
Stitt  V.  Rat  Portage  Lumber  Co.,  96 
Minn.  27,  104  X.  W.  561. 

1"  Russell  V.  Tucker,  136  Ga.  136, 
70  S.  K.  1018 ;  Potts  v.  Reynolds,  131 
La.  421.  59  So.  837. 

i«Gerhardt  v.  Tucker,  187  Mo.  46, 
85  S.  W.  552 ;  Mack  v.  Hill,  28  Mont. 
99,  72  Pac.  307. 


1"  Cumming    v.    McDade,    118    Ga 
612,  45  S.  E.  479. 

20  Martinet   v.    Duff,    178    111.   App 
199. 

21  Sutherland  v.  Rose,  47  Barb.  (N 
Y.)  144. 

22  Hicklin  v.  Marco,  56  Fed.  549. 

23  Rowell  V.  Jewett,  69  Maine  293 


689  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    673 

If  any  of  such  persons  be  dead,  their  heirs  or  devisees,  in  whom 
the  legal  estate  has  become  vested,  must  be  made  defendants; 
and  their  personal  representatives  should  also  be  made  parties, 
because  they  are  entitled  to  recover  the  money  paid."^  When  a 
junior  mortgagee  seeks  to  redeem  he  must  make  the  mortgagor 
or  other  representative  of  the  realty  a  party,  and  the  prior  mort- 
gagees as  well."° 

The  form  of  the  decree  ordinarily  is,  that  the  plaintiff  may 
redeem  upon  paying  the  amount  found  due  on  the  mortgage 
within  a  specified  time,  together  with  costs;  and  that  upon  his 
doing  so  the  defendant  shall  discharge  the  mortgage  and  deliver 
up  the  mortgaged  premises;  and  that  upon  default  of  such  pay- 
ment the  complaint  be  dismissed  with  costs. '°  The  decree  should 
fix  the  time  w^ithin  which  the  redemption  is  to  take  place.  This 
time  rests  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court  in  view  of  all  the 
circumstances.-'  Such  decree  has  an  effect  on  the  title,  and  for 
this  reason  the  entire  proceedings  should  be  noted  in  the  ab- 
stract. 

§  673.  Rescission  and  cancellation. — Rescission  and  can- 
cellation, in  the  sense  in  which  the  terms  are  here  used,  may  be 
regarded  as  one  and  the  same  remedy ;  the  decree  for  rescission 
generally  directs  the  cancellation  of  the  instrument  which  em- 
bodies the  evidence  of  the  contract  in  question,  or  the  obligation 
arising  therefrom,  thereby  rendering  the  decree  of  the  court 
effectual  and  complete.'*  So,  where  rescission  as  well  as  cancel- 
lation is  sought,  the  latter  remedy  is  a  mere  auxiliary  to  effectu- 
ate the  rescission.^''  The  purpose  of  this  remedy  is  to  procure 
the  cancellation  of  a  contract  or  conveyance.  Thus  a  contract 
for  the  sale  of  real  estate  may  be  rescinded  in  this  way  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  or  mistake.^**  Although  such  contract  may  be 
wholly  void,  it  is  still  a  cloud  on  the  vendor's  title  until  removed, 
and  an  action  will  lie  to  rescind.  Also  where  there  is  a  failure 
of  title  on  the  part  of  the  vendor,  or  he  has  not  such  title  as 

24  Dexter  v.  Arnold,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  27  Decker  v.  Patten,  120  111.  464,  11 
3857,  1  Sumn.  109.  N.  E.  897. 

25  Wimpfheimer  v.   Prudential  Ins.  28  Scruggs  v.  Driver's  Exrs..  31  Ala. 
Co.,  56  N.  J.  Eq.  585,  39  Atl.  916.  274 ;   Kirby  v.   Harrison,  2  Ohio   St. 

2G  Machold  v.  Farnan,  20  Idaho  80,  326,  59  Am.  Dec.  677. 

117  Pac.  408;   Chicago  &  C.  Rolling  29  Johnson    v.    United    R.    Co.,   227 

Mill  Co.  V.  Scully,  141  111.  408,  30  N.  Mo.  423,  127  S.  W.  63. 

E.  1062.  3"  Brown  v.  Norman,  65  Miss.  369, 


44 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


4  So.  293,  7  Am.  St.  663. 


§    674  TITLES    AND    ARSTRACTS  690 

the  law  will  require  him  to  accept,  the  vendee  may  have  rescis- 
sion of  the  contract."'^ 

The  vendor  or  grantor  of  real  estate  seeking  cancellation  of 
a  contract  of  sale  must  restore  the  cash  payment  if  any  has  been 
made.^^  So,  also,  the  vendee  of  land  who  has  taken  possession 
thereof,  under  contract  or  conveyance,  must  surrender  posses- 
sion and  must  reconvey,  or  at  least  be  ready  to  do  so,  if  he  has 
received  conveyance. ^^ 

All  persons  interested  in  the  subject-matter  and  who  will  be 
affected  by  the  decree  are  necessary  parties  to  the  suit.^'*  The 
heirs  and  devisees  of  a  deceased  grantor  are  usually  necessary 
parties  plaintiff  to  a  suit  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  made  by  the 
deceased. ^°  Also  in  a  suit  to  cancel  a  mortgage  the  mortgagor 
is  a  necessary  party.^*^ 

Where  a  court  of  equity  has  obtained  jurisdiction  to  cancel 
an  instrument  or  rescind  a  contract  it  will  usually  give  complete 
relief  in  the  premises.  Thus  where  a  deed  is  rescinded  the  court 
will  usually  direct  a  reconveyance  from  the  party  claiming  under 
itf^  or  direct  that  an  entry  of  the  fact  of  rescission  be  made 
upon  the  proper  record  where  the  instrument  is  recorded.^^ 

Where  the  land  in  question  has  been  affected  by  a  suit  in 
rescission  and  cancellation,  the  abstract  should  contain  a  full 
synopsis  of  the  proceeding  including  the  decree;  but  where  relief 
has  been  denied  in  such  suit,  a  mere  mention  of  the  action  will 
suffice. 

§  674.  Foreclosure  in  equity. — An  examination  of  the 
statutes  of  the  several  states  in  relation  to  the  foreclosure  of 
mortgages  can  hardly  fail  to  surprise  one  at  the  great  diversity 
of  systems  in  use,  and  at  the  difference  in  detail  between  those 
which  are  based  upon  the  same  general  principles.  In  general 
it  may  be  said  that  a  bill  in  equity  for  the  foreclosure  and  sale 
of  the  property  is  the  prevailing  method,  and  the  one  most  fre- 
quently met  with  in  the  examination  of  a  title.  Although  other 
remedies  are  used  for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  under  dif- 

31  Boyce  v.  Grundy,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  ^^  Webb  v.  Janney,  9  App.  D.  C.  41. 
210,  7  L.  ed.  655.  ■  3g  Qakes   v.    Yonah    Land   &   Min. 

32  Miller   V.   Louisville   &c.   R.   Co.,     Co.  89  Fed.  243. 

83  Ala.  274,  4  So.  842,  3  Am.  St.  722.  37  Dey    v.    Dunham,    2    Johns.    Ch. 

33Westhafer  v.  Patterson,  120  Ind.  (N.  Y.)   182. 

459,  22  N.  E.  414.  16  Am.  St.  330.  as  penton   v.   Waj',    44    Iowa    438; 

3*  Cummins  v.  Boyle,  1  J.  J.  Alarsh  Jones  v.  Porter,  59  Miss.  628. 
(Ky.)  480. 


691  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    674 

ferent  systems  of  law  and  practice  adopted  in  different  states, 
yet  generally  courts  of  equity  are  not  deprived  of  jurisdiction 
by  the  existence  of  other  remedies.  When  provisions  in  detail 
are  made  by  statute  on  the  subject  of  foreclosure,  they  are  gen- 
erally founded  upon  principles  and  rules  of  practice  already  es- 
tablished by  courts  of  equity  under  the  general  jurisdiction  they 
have  always  exercised  of  the  subject;  and  the  powers  of  these 
courts  are  only  enlarged  and  defined  by  the  statute.  But  even 
where  systems  of  foreclosure  not  derived  directly  from  chancery 
courts  have  been  adopted,  courts  of  equity,  where  they  have  not 
been  superseded  by  codes  of  practice,  which  do  away  with  all 
distinctions  between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  still  have 
concurrent  jurisdiction  of  the  subject,  and  are  resorted  to,  if  not 
generally,  then  in  particular  instances,  for  the  reason  that  they 
afford  a  more  complete  and  certain  remedy.^" 

The  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  does  not  involve  the  title  to 
land  in  the  sense  that  suits  involving  title  to  land  may  be  brought 
only  in  certain  named  courts.'*'*  Jurisdiction  is  not  defeated  by 
the  fact  that  a  state  or  territory  which  has  acquired  a  part  of 
the  mortgaged  premises  refuses  to  be  made  a  party  to  the  suit.^^ 
A  foreclosure  suit  in  its  usual  form  is  partly  an  action  in  rem, 
for  the  seizure  and  sale  of  the  property,  and  partly  an  action  in 
personam,  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  debt  of  the  mortgage 
debtor,  and  obtaining  a  personal  judgment  against  him.*- 

When  no  personal  judgment  is  sought  the  suit  is  essentially 
a  proceeding  in  rem,  and  service  by  publication,  when  this  is 
allowed  by  statute,  is  sufficient  to  give  jurisdiction.'*^ 

Actions  for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  are  generally  re- 
quired by  statute  to  be  brought  in  the  county  where  the  mort- 
gaged premises  or  some  part  thereof  are  situated.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  the  parties  may  confer  jurisdiction  by  consent  in  any 
other  county  than  that  in  which  the  statute  says  the  action  must 
be  instituted.** 

39  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Greene,  ^~  Batjer  v.  Roberts  (Tex.  Civ. 
150  Mass.  317,  23  N.  E.  103;  Ger-  App.),  148  S.  W.  841;  State  v.  Su- 
mania  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Potter,  124  perior  Court  of  King  County,  63 
App.  Div.  814,  109  N.  Y.  S.  435;  In  Wash.  312,  115  Pac.  307,  Ann.  Cas. 
re  McCudy's  Appeal,  65  Pa.  St.  290.  1913D,  1119. 

40  Reynolds   v.   Atlanta   Nat.    Bldg.  *-  Martin  v.  Pond,  30  Fed.  15. 

&c.  Assn.,  104  Ga.  703,  30  S.  E.  942.  44  sikox  v.  Jones,  80  S.  Car.  484, 

4^  Kawananakoa  v.   Polyblank,  205  61  S.  E.  948.    But  see  Snyder  v.  Pike, 

U.  S.  349,  27  Sup.  Ct.  526,  51  L.  ed.  30  Utah  102,  83  Pac.  692. 
834. 


§    674  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  692 

It  is  not  proper  in  a  foreclosure  suit  to  try  a  claim  of  title 
paramount  to  that  of  the  mortgagor.  The  only  proper  object 
of  the  suit  is  to  bar  the  mortgagor  and  those  claiming  under 
him.'*'''  There  are  cases,  however,  which  hold  that  when  the 
plaintiff  in  a  foreclosure  action  makes  any  person  defendant, 
alleging  "that  he  claims  to  have  some  interest  or  lien  upon  the 
mortgaged  premises,  or  some  part  thereof,  which  lien,  if  any, 
has  accrued  subsequently  to  the  time  of  said  mortgage,"  such 
defendant  may  by  his  answer  set  up  a  paramount  claim  to  the 
mortgaged  premises,  or  to  some  part  thereof,  and  that  such  right 
may  be  tried  and  adjudged  in  the  foreclosure  action. ^° 

Aside  from  the  usual  foreclosure  in  equity  resulting  in  a  sale 
of  the  property  to  satisfy  the  mortgage  debt,  we  have,  in  a  few 
states,  what  is  termed  a  "strict  foreclosure,"  by  which  the  abso- 
lute ownership  of  the  property  is  given  to  the  mortgagee  under 
the  decree.  The  effect  of  this  form  of  foreclosure  is  simply  to 
cut  off  the  equity  of  redemption.  The  mortgagee's  title  after 
foreclosure  is  that  conveyed  by  the  mortgage  discharged  from 
the  condition  of  defeasance.  It  is  the  same  as  if  the  original 
mortgage  had  been  an  absolute  deed,  giving  no  right  of  redemp- 
tion at  law  or  in  equity.^^  This  form  of  foreclosure  is  proper 
in  the  case  of  a  mortgage  given  for  the  entire  purchase-money, 
w^hen  the  value  of  the  premises  is  not  more  than  the  mortgage 
debt,  and  the  mortgagor  does  not  appear  in  the  suit.'***  It  is 
proper  where  a  mortgagee  or  purchaser  is  in  possession  under 
a  legal  title  from  the  mortgagor,  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  off 
subsequent  liens  or  incumbrances. '*'■'  It  is  proper,  too,  where  the 
mortgage  is  in  the  form  of  an  absolute  deed  without  any  writ- 
ten defeasance.""'"  In  these  cases  the  decree  of  strict  foreclosure 
perfects  and  confirms  the  title.  It  bars  the  interest  of  persons 
who  have  a  mere  lien  upon  the  land.^^  A  judgment  of  strict 
foreclosure  may  properly  be  rendered  upon  a  land  contract  for 
failure  of  the  vendee  to  make  the  payments  stipulated  for.'^- 

4''  Grosscup    V.    German    Sav.    &c.  ''^  Jackson  v.  Weaver,  138  Intl.  539, 

Soc.  162  Fed.  947.  38  N.  E.  166. 

4«Lego  V.  Medley,  79  Wis.  211.  48  ^'O  Hone  v.  Fisher,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (N. 

N.  W.  375.  24  Am.  St.  706.        '  Y.)  559. 

47  Champion  v.  Hinkle.  45  N.  J.  Eq.  =1  Warner  v.  Freud,  138  Gal.  651. 
162,  16  Atl.  701.  72  Pac.  345. 

48  Jefferson  v.  Coleman,  110  Tnd.  ^2  Taylor  v.  Collins,  51  Wis.  123, 
515,  11   N.  E.  465;   Moulton  v.  Cor-  8  N.  W.  22. 

nish.  138  X.  Y.  133,  33  N.  E.  842,  20 
L.  R.  A.  370. 


693  ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE  §    675 

It  has  frequently  been  said  that  the  only  proper  or  necessary 
parties  to  a  foreclosure  suit  are  the  mortgagor  and  the  mort- 
gagee, and  those  who  have  acquired  rights  or  interests  under 
them  subsequent  to  the  mortgage.^^ 

Where  title  is  claimed  through  a  foreclosure  proceeding  the 
abstract  must  contain  a  synopsis  of  every  step  taken  from  the 
institution  of  the  suit  until  final  decree,  and  where  a  sale  of  the 
property  was  made  under  the  decree,  the  certificate  of  such  sale, 
the  report  thereof  and  final  confirmation.  These  matters  should 
precede  the  officer's  deed.  Care  should  be  exercised  by  counsel 
to  see  that  all  parties  whose  interests  are  affected  by  the  proce- 
dure were  properly  before  the  court,  and  that  they  were  duly 
barred  or  their  rights  protected.  It  is  generally  essential  that 
all  persons  materially  interested  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit 
shall  be  made  parties  to  it,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants.^* 

§  675.  Assignment  of  dower. — Statutes  generally  pre- 
scribe the  method  of  assigning  dower  to  the  widow;  but  at  com- 
mon law,  and  in  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions  to  the  con- 
trary, it  is  not  necessary  to  resort  to  legal  proceedings  for  this 
purpose.  In  such  case  the  heir,  devisee,  or  alienee  of  the  hus- 
band may  make  the  assignment,  and  the  parties  thereto  are 
bound  as  effectually  as  in  any  other  transaction.^^  But  any 
course  of  procedure  laid  down  by  the  statute  must  of  course  be 
observed.  Without  discussing  the  various  modes  of  procedure 
at  common  law  and  under  the  statutes,  we  proceed  to  indicate 
some  of  the  salient  principles  governing  the  assignment  of  dower 
by  summary  proceedings  in  equity  and  in  the  courts  controlling 
the  administration  of  decedents'  estates.  The  assignment  may  be 
properly  made  in  the  probate  court,  unless,  in  some  states,  the 
chancery  court  has  assumed  jurisdiction.^'^  The  jurisdiction  of 
equity  in  cases  of  dower  was  for  a  long  time  doubted.  It  was 
at  first  held  that  a  court  of  equity  would  interfere  in  behalf  of 
a  dowress  when  the  remedy  provided  at  common  law  was  for 

53  Tug   River   Coal   &   Salt    Co.   v.  csLenfers  v.  Henke,  IZ  111.  405,  24 

Brigel,  86  Fed.  818,  30  C.  C.  A.  415 ;  Am.  Rep.  263 ;   Austin  v.  Austin,  50 

Bennett   v.    United    States    Land    &c.  Maine  74,  79  Am.  Dec.  597;  Clark  v. 

Co.,  16  Ariz.  138,  141  Pac.  717 ;  Gam-  Muzzey,  43  N.  H.  59. 

ble  V.  Martin    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),   151  ^o  Hamby  v.  Hamby,   165  Ala.  171, 

S.  W.  327.  51  So.  732,  138  Am.  St.  123. 

51  O'Brien  v.  Moffitt,  133  Ind.  660, 
Zl  N.  E.  616,  36  Am.  St.  566. 


§    676  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  694 

any  reason  inappropriate  or  inadequate.  It  was  finally  decided, 
however,  that  courts  of  equity  had  concurrent  jurisdiction  with 
courts  of  law  in  the  matter  of  dower.^^  The  proceeding  in  equity 
is  as  effective  as  an  action  at  law,  and  in  some  respects  much 
more  so,  as  the  assignment  of  dower  in  equitable  estates  and 
interests  can  thereby  be  enforced.  In  some  states  probate  courts 
have  full  power  to  determine  the  widow's  rights  to  dower,  while 
in  others  they  possess  no  such  power,  but  may  assign  dower 
where  the  right  thereto  is  not  disputed.  In  case  dower  is  not 
assigned  by  the  person  or  persons  whose  duty  it  is  to  assign  it, 
or  if  the  probate  court  in  states  where  such  jurisdiction  is  given, 
the  widow  may,  usually,  after  demand  made,  bring  suit  to  com- 
pel an  assignment.^"* 

The  action  must  be  brought  in  the  county  where  the  land  is 
situated.^* 

Some  statutes  require  the  action  to  be  brought  within  a  cer- 
tain number  of  years  after  the  husband's  death.  But  in  the 
absence  of  such  statutes  the  cases  are  not  agreed  on  whether  the 
general  statute  of  limitations  will  apply. 

The  judgment  or  decree  is  either  for  dower  alone,  or  for 
dower  with  damages  for  its  detention.  The  court  usually  issues 
a  writ  or  order  directing  the  sheriff  or  commissioners  to  set  out 
the  widow's  dower,  and  without  this  or  some  statutory  author- 
ization, she  can  not  take  possession.""  The  action  of  the  official 
is  usually  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  court.  In  abstracting 
proceedings  for  the  assignment  of' dower,  all  the  material  parts 
thereof  must  be  shown.  This  may  appear  in  the  synopsis  of 
the  probate  proceedings,  or  given  as  a  separate  entry.  Some- 
times an  allowance  is  made  in  lieu  of  dower  to  become  a  lien 
on  the  property,  and  a  statement  of  this  fact  becomes  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  synopsis. 

§  676.  Divorce  proceedings. — A  suit  for  divorce  is  re- 
garded as  a  civil  action,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the 
contrary,  is  conducted  according  to  the  rules  of  practice  pre- 
vailing in  ordinary  suits  in  equity."^    In  many  states  it  is  deemed 

"'"Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Cranch   (U.         ^»  Lamar    v.    Scott,    3    Strob.    (S. 
S.)  370.  3  L.  ed.  374 :  Bishop  v.  Wood-     Car.)  562. 
ward.  103  Ga.  281,  29  S.  E.  968.  «»  Hildreth  v.  Thompson,  16  Mass. 

^«  Brooks  V.  Woods,  40  Ala.  538.         191. 

"Hobart  v.  Hobart,  45  Iowa  501. 


695  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  676 

a  proceeding  in  rem  so  far  as  it  affects  the  status  of  the  parties, 
and  the  service  of  summons  by  pubhcation  on  a  non-resident 
defendant.*'-  As  the  decree  operates  to  fix  the  status  of  the 
parties,  it  is  obvious  that  at  least  one  of  the  parties  must  be  a 
resident  of  the  state  in  which  the  divorce  is  granted.  Where  one 
of  the  parties  is  a  bona  fide  resident  of  the  state  the  courts  of 
that  state  have  jurisdiction  to  determine,  upon  constructive  no- 
tice, the  status  of  the  parties."'  There  is,  it  is  evident,  a  differ- 
ence of  an  essential  character  between  the  status  of  persons  and 
rights  which  are  purely  of  a  personal  or  property  nature,  so  that 
there  is  reason  for  holding  that  a  judgment  for  alimony  can  not 
be  rendered  upon  constructive  notice."* 

A  decree  of  divorce  is  a  bar  to  any  action  between  the  parties 
thereto  to  enforce  any  property  rights  growing  out  of  the  mari- 
tal relation."'  Title  to  real  estate  can  not  be  litigated  in  divorce 
proceedings  except  as  incident  to  a  decree  of  divorce.""  The  par- 
ties may  by  contract  fix  their  property  rights  and  such  contract, 
when  approved  by  the  court,  may  be  carried  into  its  decree  and 
thus  bind  the  parties  thereto."'  But  in  some  states  the  court 
may  disapprove  a  stipulation  of  the  parties  for  a  division  of  the 
property  and  may  order  a  more  just  and  equitable  division.^^ 
Generally  the  court  granting  the  divorce  has  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  adjustment  of  property  rights  growing  out  of  the 
divorce,  and  in  the  exercise  of  such  power  may  set  aside,"''  or 
compel  conveyances,'"  or  grant  injunctions  against  disposing  of 
property  during  the  pendency  of  the  suit;''  but  if  a  divorce  is 
denied,  the  court  is  not  usually  vested  with  power  to  adjust  prop- 
erty rights.'' 

It  is  held  in  some  cases  that  the  court  has  authority  to  award 
the  title  to  specific  property  of  the  husband  as  permanent  alimony 

62  In  re  Newman's  Estate.  75  Cal.  Wetmore  v.  Wetmore,  40  Ore.  332, 

213,  16  Pac.  887.  7  Am.  St.  146.  67  Pac.  98. 

03  Cheely  v    Clayton,  110  U.  S.  701,  ''■^  Hassaurek  v.  Hassaurek,  68  Ohio 

4  Sup.  Ct.  328,  28  L.  eel.  298.  St.  554,  67  N.  E.  1066. 

G*  Lytle  V   Lytle.  48  Ind.  200 ;  Pros-  "^  Kohl  v.  Kohl,  143  Wis.  214,  125 

ser  V.   Warner,  47  Vt.  667,   19  Am.  N.  W.  921. 

Rep.  132.  "^  Singleton  v.  Close,   130  Ga.  716. 

fis  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  132  Ind.  61  S.  E.  722. 

288    31   N.   E.  529;   Roe  v.   Roe,   52  "o  Miller  v.   Miller,  234  111.   16,  84 

Kans.  724,  35   Pac.  808,   39  Am.   St.  N.  E.  681. 

367;   Barnett  v.   Barnett,  9  N.   Mex.  '^i  McClelland   v.   Gasquet,    122   La. 

205,  50  Pac.  337.  241,  47  So.  540. 

«GUhl  V.  Uhl,  52  Cal.  250;  Peck  v.  --Burns  v.  Burns  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 

Peck,  66  Mich.  586,  33  N.  W.  893 ;  126  S.  W.  333. 


§  676 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


696 


for  the  wife.'^^  And  it  is  held  that  lands  situated  in  a  county- 
other  than  that  in  which  the  suit  is  brought  may  be  awarded  the 
wife  as  alimony,  even  where  the  proceedings  are  based  only  on 
constructive  notice,  if  the  petition  and  notice  contain  averments 
which  bring  the  subject-matter  within  the  control  of  the  court/* 
But  ordinarily  an  allotment  of  specific  property  by  way  of  ali- 
mony will  not  be  made." 

A  husband  and  wife  become  tenants  in  common  of  community 
property  upon  decree  of  divorce  where  no  order  is  made  con- 
cerning such  property. ^°  But  there  separate  property  remains 
separate.''  Also  an  absolute  decree  of  divorce  changes  a  ten- 
ancy by  the  entirety  to  a  tenancy  in  common.'^*  In  some  in- 
stances statutes  regulate  the  interest  which  one  spouse  shall  have 
in  the  real  estate  of  the  other  upon  obtaining  a  divorce.'" 

Where  property  is  held  jointly  by  the  husband  and  wife  as 
a  homestead  it  is  proper  in  an  action  for  divorce  to  decree  the 
conveyance  of  such  property  as  alimony.-'*  Or  the  court  may 
make  a  judgment  against  the  husband  for  the  support  of  the 
wife  a  lien  on  lands  held  by  him  as  a  homestead  and  direct  a 
sale  thereof. *^^  But  the  homestead  remains  in  the  husband  if  the 
decree  is  silent  on  the  subject.^" 

Also  a  court  may  award  as  alimony  lands,  the  title  to  which 
is  held  by  a  third  person  but  which  in  fact  belongs  to  the  hus- 
band, where  such  third  person  is  made  a  party  to  the  suit  for 
divorce. '^^ 

In  a  suit  to  annul  a  void  marriage  between  two  parties,  the 
court  can  not  award  alimony  as  such,  but  may  make  an  equitable 
division  of  property  jointly  accumulated  by  the  parties  while 
they  lived  together.** 


-3  Powell  V.  Campbell,  20  Nev.  232, 
20  Pac.  156,  2  L.  R.  A.  615,  19  Am. 
St.  350. 

■'^  Wesner  v.  O'Brien,  56  Kans.  724, 
44  Pac.  1090,  32  L.  R.  A.  289,  54  Am. 
St.  604. 

"  Doe  V.  Doe,  52  Hun  405,  5  N.  Y. 
S.  514,  24  N.  Y.  St.  364. 

^■6  Southwestern  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Swan 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  43  S.  W.  813.- 

"James  v.  James.  51  Wash.  60,  97 
Pac.  1113,  98  Pac.  1115. 

■'■s  Mardt  v.  Scharmach,  65  Misc. 
124,  119  N.  Y.  S.  449. 


'"Taylor  v.  Taylor,  54  Ore.  560, 
103  Pac.  524. 

80  Reeves  v.  Reeves,  117  Mich.  526, 
76  N.  W.  4. 

^iWadsworth  v.  Wadsworth,  81 
Cal.  187,  22  Pac.  648,  15  Am.  St.  38; 
Harding  v.  Harding,  16  S.  Dak.  406, 
92  N.  W.  1080,  102  Am.  St.  694. 

s2  Goldsboroueh  v.  Hewitt,  23  Okla. 
66,  99  Pac.  907,138  Am.  St.  795. 

■^3  VanVleet  v.  DeWitt,  200  111.  153, 
65  N.  E.  677. 

8*  Werner  v.  Werner,  59  Kans.  399, 
53  Pac.  127,  41  L.  R.  A.  349,  68  Am. 
St.  372. 


697 


ACTIONS    AFFECTING    TITLE 


§  676 


Where  a  wife  accepts  the  provisions  made  for  her  by  the 
decree  of  divorce  in  heu  of  dower,  she  is  held  to  abandon  all 
claim  under  an  antenuptial  agreement  whereby  she  is  to  receive 
a  certain  sum  in  lieu  of  dower. ^^ 

It  would  seem  that  in  jurisdictions  where  a  decree  for  alimony 
is  given  the  qualities  of  an  ordinary  judgment,  the  real  estate 
of  the  husband  becomes  subject  to  a  lien  for  the  payment  of  such 
alimony.^*'  But  where  the  alimony  is  temporary  during  the 
pendency  of  the  suit,  it  is  held  not  a  judgment  upon  which  execu- 
tion can  issue,  and  is  not  a  lien.*^  In  some  cases  it  is  held  that 
notwithstanding  the  statute  making  judgments  liens  on  the  real 
estate  of  the  debtor  within  the  county,  an  allowance  of  perma- 
nent alimony  payable  in  instalments  does  not  create  a  lien  on  any 
property  of  the  husband,  unless  the  record  affirmatively  discloses 
that  the  court  intended  it  to  have  that  effect.^®  The  weight  of 
authority  to  support  the  proposition  that  courts  have  power  to 
declare  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  husband  to  secure  the 
payment  of  permanent  alimony  awarded. ^^ 

Where  the  question  as  to  whether  a  wife  lost  her  right  of 
dower  in  a  proceeding  for  divorce,  or  where  alimony  to  the  wife 
has  been  awarded  in  such  proceeding,  the  abstract  should  con- 
tain a  synopsis  of  such  proceeding.  Otherwise  it  is  not  custom- 
ary to  make  any  mention  of  a  divorce  proceeding.  An  example 
of  a  synopsis  of  a  divorce  proceeding  is  submitted: 


Sarah  Jones 

V. 

John  Jones. 


Circuit  Court  of  Marion 
County,  Indiana. 

Cause  No.  7280 

Action    for    divorce    and    ali- 
mony. 

Filed  May  1,  1902. 

Order  Book  75,  page  200. 


Decree  of  divorce  granted  plaintiff.     Judgment   for  alimony 


85  Long  V.  Barton,  236  111.  551,  86 
N.  E.  127,  19  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   384. 

86  Wetmore  v.  Wetmore,  149  N.  Y. 
520,  44  N.  E.  169,  33  L.  R.  A.  708,  52 
Am.  St.  752 ;  Conrad  v.  Everich,  50 
Ohio  St.  476,  35  N.  E.  58,  40  Am.  St. 
679;  Goff  v.  Goff,  60  W.  Va.  9,  53 
S.  E.  769. 


S7  In  re  Grove's  Appeal,  68  Pa.  St. 
143. 

88  Scott  V.  Scott,  80  Kans.  489,  103 
Pac.  1005,  25  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  132n, 
133  Am.  St.  217,  18  Ann.  Gas.  564. 

8'' Gaston  v.  Gaston,  114  Gal.  542, 
46  Pac.  609,  55  Am.  St.  86 ;  Hanscom 
V.  Hanscom,  6  Colo.  App.  97,  39  Pac. 
885. 


§    677  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  698 

in  the  sum  of  $1,000.00  awarded  plaintiff,  and  that  same  is  a 
lien  on  the  real  estate  of  the  defendant.  Costs  against  defend- 
ant. 

§  677.  Condemnation  proceedings. — In  another  part  of 
this  work  we  said  the  right  of  eminent  domain  belongs  to  the 
sovereign,  and  consists  in  the  right  to  take  private  property  for 
public  use,  without  the  consent  of  the  owner.  It  embraces  all 
cases  where,  by  the  authority  of  the  state  and  for  the  public 
good,  the  property  of  the  individual  is  taken,  without  his  con- 
sent, for  the  purpose  of  being  devoted  to  some  particular  use, 
either  by  the  state  in  its  soverign  capacity,  or  by  a  corporation, 
public  or  private,  or  by  a  citizen  to  wdiom  such  right  has  been 
granted  by  the  state.""  Every  estate  in  land  is  liable  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  But 
property  exempted  by  the  constitution  or  statute,  or  property 
already  devoted  to  a  public  use  can  not  be  so  taken."^ 

Since  eminent  domain  involves  the  forcible  taking  of  private 
property  against  the  owner's  consent,  all  conditions  precedent 
must  be  strictly  complied  with.  Among  the  more  conmion  of 
such  conditions  are  the  filing  of  maps  and  profiles  of  the  enter- 
prise,°"  procurement  of  the  consent  of  a  designated  per  cent,  of 
the  abutters  to  the  occupation  of  a  street,"^  attempts  to  agree 
upon  the  amount  of  damages,"*  or  to  purchase  the  land  from 
the  owner  thereof."'' 

The  procedure  in  cases  of  seizure  of  private  property  under 
the  right  of  eminent  domain  is  so  largely  controlled  and  regu- 
lated by  statute  that  we  can  not  go  into  details.  We  mention 
only  the  general  principles  of  a  fundamental  nature  which  apply 
to  such  proceedings  almost  universally.  The  proceeding  must  be, 
in  its  nature,  judicial,  but  it  is  not  a  proceeding  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  the  common  law  entitling  the  parties  to  a  trial  by  jury. 
As  to  whether  it  is  a  "civil  action"  or  "special  proceeding," 
within  the  meaning  of  those  terms,  as  used  in  the  codes  of  the 

^0  Consumers'    Gas    Trust     Co.     v.  Untermyer,  133  App.  Div.  146,  117  N. 

Harless,  131  Ind.  446,  29  N.  E.  1062,  Y.  S.  443. 

15  L.  R.  A.  505;  Warren  v.  St. 'Paul  -'^  Lehman  v.  Chambersburg  &c.  R. 

&c.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn    384.  Co.,  224  Pa.  276,  12>  Atl.  440. 

"^  Shepard       Drainage      Dist.,      v.  ■'*  Beechwood    Park    Land    Co.    v. 

Eimerman,  140  Wis.  ill,  122  N.  W.  Summit,  78  N.  J.  L.  182,  12>  Atl.  57. 

775.  ''5  Jersey   City   v.    Bayonne    (N.   J. 

'J- New   York   Cent.    &c.   R.    Co.   v.  L.)  76  Atl.  1010. 


699  ACTIONS  AFFECTING  TITLE  §  677 

different  states  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  some  diversity 
of  opinion,  but  the  weight  of  authority  is  that  it  is,  in  many 
respects,  a  special  proceeding  and  not  a  civil  action.^'' 

The  settled  rule  is  that  the  provisions  of  the  statute  prescrib- 
ing the  mode  of  proceeding  must  be  pursued.'*'  Compensation 
must  be  determined  and  fixed  by  a  judicial  tribunal,  for  the 
question  of  compensation,  under  our  system,  is  a  judicial  ques- 
tion. It  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  decision  of  a  tribunal 
that  it  should  have  jurisdiction  of  the  general  subject.  The 
authorities  with  very  little  conflict  affirm  that  notice  to  the  prop- 
erty owner  is  essential  in  appropriation  proceedings. ^'"^  The  mode 
prescribed  for  serving  the  notice  must  be  substantially  pursued. 
Also  the  provisions  of  the  statute  relative  to  the  appointment  of 
commissioners  or  the  summoning  of  a  jury  must  be  strictly  pur- 
sued. All  persons  who  have  an  estate,  interest  or  right  in  the 
land  sought  to  be  appropriated  should  be  made  parties  to  the 
proceedings.^''  The  fact  that  all  preliminary  requirements  of  the 
statute  have  been  met  should  be  stated  in  the  petition,  except 
where  the  statute  provides  what  the  petition  shall  contain.'  Stat- 
utes sometimes  provide  a  tribunal  for  assessing  benefits  and  dam- 
ages, although  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  tribunal 
may  be  conferred  upon  the  courts.  This  tribunal  Is  sometimes 
called  a  jury,  but  is  more  commonly  designated  as  commission- 
ers. They  should  in  all  cases  be  sworn  as  required  by  the  stat- 
utes, otherwise  their  proceedings  will  be  invalid." 

In  many  of  the  states  the  report  of  the  commissioners  must 
be  confirmed  by  the  court  appointing  them.  The  report  may  be 
accepted  or  rejected  by  the  court,  as  justice  may  require.^  But 
the  court  must  confirm  or  reject  the  report  as  a  whole.*  He  may. 
however,  amend  or  modify  the  report  in  minor  particulars,  and 
confirm  it  as  amended,  or  recommit  it  for  correction  and  amend- 

»« Hartley    v.    Keokuk    &c.    R.,    85  "^  Grand  Rapids  Sic.  R.  Co.  v.  Al- 

lowa  455,  52  N.  W.  352;  Erie  R.  Co.  lev.  34  Mich.  18. 

V.  Steward,  59  App.  Div.   187,  69  N.  i  Colorado   Cent.    R.   Co.   v.   Allen, 

Y.  S.  57.  13  Colo.  229,  22  Pac.  605. 

"^  Alexandria  &c.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Al-  ^  Rohlman  v.  Green  Bay  &c.  R.  Co., 

exandria  &c.   R.   Co.,  75  Va.  780,  40  40  Wis.  157. 

Am.  Rep.  743,  and  note.  ^  Hingham    &    Q'.    Bridge    &    Tpk. 

08  People  V.   O'Brien,   111   N.  Y.  1,  Corp.    y.    Norfolk,   6   Allen    (Mass.) 

18  N.  E.  692,  2  L.  R.  A.  255,  7  Am.  353. 

St.  684,  and  note.  *  Winchester  v.  Hinsdale,  12  Conn. 


677 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


700 


ment.''  The  report,  award  or  verdict  should  be  reasonably  cer- 
tain and  explicit  in  its  statements  of  what  was  done  and  decided. "* 
Where  the  statute  limits  the  time  in  which  a  report  must  be  made, 
it  must  be  made  within  the  time,  or  it  will  be  ineffective.^ 

The  condemnation  of  land  usually  passes  to  the  condemning 
party  only  the  right  to  the  specific  use  for  which  the  land  is  con- 
demned, and  this  is  an  easement  and  not  a  fee.  The  owner  of 
the  fee  has  a  right  to  take  possession  on  abandonment  or  failure 
to  use  the  premises  by  the  condemning  party.*  But  condemna- 
tion may  be  had  of  the  fee  in  the  land.**  The  report  of  the  com- 
missioners should  show  the  estate  or  interest  taken,  as  nothing 
is  taken  by  implication  or  intendment.^" 

W^here  the  title  to  the  particular  land  being  abstracted  was 
obtained  through  condemnation  proceedings,  a  full  synopsis 
of  such  proceedings  should  appear,  but  where  a  particular  part 
of  the  land  in  question,  such  as  a  right  of  w^ay  for  a  railroad,  a 
brief  reference  to  the  essential  steps  of  the  proceeding  will  suf- 
fice. Proceedings  to  condemn  land  for  the  opening  or  widening 
of  a  road  or  street  resulting  in  a  change  in  the  shape  or  dimen- 
sions of  land,  and  in  proceedings  where  benefits  and  damages 
have  been  assessed,  require  a  showing  of  the  essential  steps 
taken. 

An  example  of  a  synopsis  is  as  follow^s: 

In  the  Circuit  Court  of  Marion 
County,  Indiana. 

Cause  No.  12560. 

Petition  to  condemn  land  for 
right  of  way. 


Union  Traction  Company 
of  Indiana 


V. 


Elmer  Howard. 


Petition  filed  February  12. 
1905.  for  the  condemnation  of 
a  strip  of  land  100  feet  in 
wMdth  off  of  the  west  side  of 
the  N.  W.  ji  of  the  N.  E.  ^ 
of  Section  19,  Township  16  North,  Range  4  east,  Marion  County, 


^  Louisiana  Western  R.  Co.  v. 
Grossman,  111   La.  611.  35  So.  784. 

"  Reitenhaiigh  v.  Chester  Valley  R. 
Co..  21  Pa.  St.  100. 

"  AndcrFon  v.  Pemberton,  89  Mo. 
61,  1  S.  W.  216. 


«  Muhle  V.  New  York  T.  &c.  R.  Co., 
86  Tex.  459.  29  S.  W.  607. 

•'  Seton  V.  New  York,  130  App. 
Div.  148.  114  X.  Y.  S.  565. 

10  C.  G.  Larned  Mercantile.  Real 
Estate  &  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Omaha 
&c.  R.  Co.,  56  Kans.  174.  42  Pac.  712. 


701  ACTIONS   AFFECTING    TITLE  §    678 

Indiana,  for  the  purpose  of  an  interurban  railway  right  of  way. 
Appearance  entered  by  defendant  February  20,  1905. 

Cause  heard  May  1,  1905  (Order  Book  75,  page  200).  Ver- 
dict rendered  showing  finding  for  plaintiff  that  it  take  from  the 
defendant  the  following  described  real  estate  to  w^it :  [Here  de- 
scribe real  estate  taken  and  other  items  of  the  finding.] 

Ordered,  by  the  court,  that  plaintiff  have  judgment  of  con- 
demnation, and  that  upon  the  payment  by  it  to  the  clerk  of  said 
court,  of  said  sum.  that  plaintiff  take  possession  of  said  land 
and  hold  the  same  for  the  purposes  provided  by  law. 

§  678.  Construction  of  wills. — It  frequently  becomes  nec- 
essary to  adjudicate  the  rights  and  interests  of  devisees  and  lega- 
tees under  the  provisions  of  a  will;  and  such  adjudication  in- 
volves the  ascertainment  of  the  testator's  intention,  in  order  to 
fix  the  rights  of  beneficiaries  in  accordance  therewith,''  and 
whether  a  disposition  is  valid  or  void,'"  or  adeemed.'^  Perhaps 
the  most  difficult  questions  on  which  title  to  real  estate  depends 
are  those  which  involve  the  true  construction  of  wills  where 
they  form  or  are  relied  on  as  a  muniment  of  title.  The  probate 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  a  testator's  estate  usually  has  power 
in  the  first  instance  to  construe  the  will,  whenever  such  construc- 
tion is  involved  in  the  settlement  and  distribution  of  the  estate. 
The  court's  order  or  decree  is  conclusive  as  to  the  rights  of  heirs, 
legatees  and  devisees.'^ 

A  court  of  equity  may  construe  wills  in  proper  cases,'-''  but  its 
power  in  this  regard  grows  out  of  its  general  jurisdiction  over 
trusts,'*'  hence  it  can  not  entertain  a  suit  the  sole  object  of  which 
is  to  settle  the  legal  title  between  heirs  or  devisees,'"  nor  will  it 
make  premature  adjudications,"  or  recognize  persons  who  are 
without  interest.''^  A  general  decree  construing  a  will  can  not 
be  made  in  a  collateral  proceeding  in  which  all  the  beneficiaries 

"  Glover  v.  Reid,  80  Mich.  228.  45  tate  &  Inv.  Co..  226  Mo.  1.  125  S.  W. 

N.  W.  91;  Brown  v.  Stark,  47  Mo.  1143,  136  Am.  St.  615. 

App.  370.  ^''  Fletcher  v.  Root,  2^0  111.  429,  88 

12  Johnson    v.    Longmire,    39    Ala.  N.  E.  987. 

143  1-  Bieber  v.  Porter,  242  111.  616.  90 

13  May  V.  Alay.  28  Ala.  441.  N.  E.  183. 

i-^Goad  V.  Montgomery,  119  Cal.  is  Gillen  v.  Hadley  (N.  J.  Err.  & 
552.  51  Pac.  681,  63  Am.  St.  145.  App.)  73  Atl.  849. 

15  Davidson  v.  Davidson  Real  Es-         i^  Garrard  v.  Kendall    (Ky.  App.). 

121  S.  W.  997. 


§  678 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


702 


are  not  represented. "*'  The  executor  or  the  devisees  and  legatees 
or  any  of  them,  may  maintain  a  suit  to  secure  a  construction  of 
a  will,  and  the  decree  of  the  court  is  conclusive  upon  all  who  are 
parties  to  the  action. ^^  Also  a  widow  may  maintain  a  suit  to  have 
her  rights  under  a  will  judicially  determined,  and  the  judgment 
is  conclusive.^" 

Where  a  will  is  relied  upon  as  a  muniment  of  title  to  the  real 
estate  in  question,  a  decree  of  court  construing  the  will  is  as 
important  as  the  will  itself,  and  should  be  shown  in  the  abstract. 


-^Hay  V.  Hay  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
120  S.  W.  1044. 

-1  Sherwood  v.  Sherwood,  45  Wis. 
357,  30  Am.  Rep.  757. 


"Faught  V.  Faught,  98  Ind.  470; 
Youmans  v.  Youmans,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 
149. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


ADVERSE   TITLE 


SEC.  SEC. 

685.  General   considerations.  695.  Adverse  title   against  reversion- 

686.  Instruments    affecting    title    ad-  ers  and  remaindermen, 
versely.  696.  Title  by  adverse  possession   be- 

687.  Adverse  possession  in  general.  tween  cotenants  and  joint  own- 

688.  Color  of  title.  ers. 

689.  Actual  possession.  697.  Persons  under  legal  disability. 

690.  Constructive    possession.  698.  Adverse    title    against    state    or 

691.  Tacking    possessions.  municipality. 

692.  How   far  possession  is  notice.  699.  Effect  of  adverse  possession. 

693.  Estates    or    property    subject    to  700.  Evidence  in   support  of  title  by 
adverse  possession.  adverse  possession. 

694.  Who    may    acquire   title   by   ad- 
verse possession. 

§  685.  General  considerations. — It  is  not  unusual  to  find 
on  the  public  records  evidence  of  conflicting  claims  or  titles  to 
the  same  land  held  by  two  or  more  persons.  Where  such  is  the 
case,  the  title  is  absolutely  defective,  and,  as  between  vendor  and 
purchaser,  is  unmarketable.^  An  inquiry  into  the  matter  of  oc- 
cupancy may  result  in  finding  the  premises  in  possession  of  a 
stranger  who  claims  adversely  to  the  record  claimant.  Such 
occupant  may  base  his  claim  to  ownership  on  some  transaction 
or  event  not  disclosed  by  the  record;  such,  for  instance,  as  an 
unrecorded  deed,  an  undisclosed,  heirship,  or  an  adverse  user 
for  the  statutory  period  of  limitation.  The  occupation  of  lands 
by  a  party  as  owner,  under  circumstances  which  usually  charac- 
terize proprietary  occupations,  is  evidence,  or  is  accepted  as  evi- 
dence, that  the  title  of  such  occupant  has  been  created  by  con- 
tracts legally  made  and  has  come  to  him,  if  he  is  not  the  original 
grantee,  by  such  other  contracts  as  the  law  allows,  or  in  such 
other  manner  as  the  law  appoints  for  the  transmission  of  estates 
in  land  from  one  person  to  another,  when  such  proprietary  occu- 
pation has  continued  for  the  period  of  time  fixed  by  law  for 
that  purpose.  It  is  apparent  that  there  is  much  beyond  the  ab- 
stract and  the  records  that  may  encumber  or  defeat  the  title,  and 

1  Reydell  v.  Reydell,  10  Misc.  273,     31  N.  Y.  S.  1,  63  N.  Y.  437. 

703 


§    686  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  704 

while  it  is  not  the  duty  of  counsel  to  look  up  equities  not  appar- 
ent or  fairly  to  be  inferred  from  the  abstract,  nor  to  consider 
the  matter  of  unrecorded  evidence,  nevertheless,  he  should  at 
least  direct  his  client's  attention  to  those  matters  not  shown  by 
the  record  which  may  afifect  the  title.  Wherever  it  is  discovered 
that  there  is  an  adverse  claimant,  a  careful  inquiry  must  be  made 
as  to  the  source  and  strength  of  his  claim.  This  is  perhaps  the 
most  perplexing  and  laborious  part  of  counsel's  task  in  passing 
upon  a  title. 

§  686.  Instruments  affecting  title  adversely. — Aside  from 
defects  appearing  on  the  face  of  instruments  through  which 
title  is  claimed,  and  from  matters  appearing  neither  on  the  face 
of  the  instrument,  nor  in  the  records,  there  may  be  defects  from 
matters  appearing  in  the  record  of  instruments  through  which 
title  is  claimed,  and  in  the  records  of  other  instruments  affect- 
ing the  title.  Thus  an  adverse  conveyance  may  result  from  the 
officer's  transcribing  an  instrument  in  such  a  manner  as  to  affect 
the  land  in  question,  when  a  correct  transcribing  of  the  instru- 
ment would  have  no  such  result.  Such  mistakes  occur  more 
often  in  matters  of  description  than  of  any  other  part  of  the 
instrument.  Mistakes  appearing  on  the  face  of  recorded  instru- 
ments, which  affect  the  title  to  land  not  intended  to  be  affected, 
must  be  shown  in  the  abstract  in  order  that  the  proper  requisi- 
tion for  its  correction  may  be  made.  A  deed  correcting  a  mis- 
take in  a  former  deed  is  not  an  unusual  occurrence,  and  when 
both  are  recorded,  both  should  he  set  out,  or,  as  is  the  practice 
of  some  abstracters,  an  explanatory  note  should  follow  the  ad- 
verse deed.  Where  there  is  a  gap  or  break  in  the  chain,  whether 
it  be  partial,  as  where  one  of  several  joint  owners  fails  to  con- 
vey, or  entire,  as  where  no  privity  of  title  is  shown  to  exist 
between  present  and  past  owners,  the  asserted  claim  becomes  ad- 
verse to  the  original  title  and  inquirv  in  pais  must  be  made  to 
ascertain  if  a  valid  title  Ijy  adverse  possession  exists. 

§  687.  Adverse  possession  in  general. — An  adverse  title 
may  arise  from  possession  merely,  and  need  not  depend  on  a 
deed  or  other  instrument  o'f  record.  A  purchaser  who  examines 
the  records  is  protected  by  them  only  so  far  as  they  are  capable 
of  protecting  him,  but  he  necessarily  assumes  the  risk  of  having 
the  actual  state  of  the  title  correspond  with  that  which  appears 


705  ADVERSE  TITLE  §    687 

of  record.-  As  the  abstract  does  not  show  the  fact  of  posses- 
sion, he  must  make  inquiry  outside  the  record  if  he  would  pro- 
tect himself,  for  he  takes  subject  to  the  right  the  law  gives  the 
occupant  indicated  by  such  possession.^  By  statute  in  some 
states  it  is  necessary  that  the  adverse  occupant  should  hold  un- 
der color  of  title,  and  other  statutes  require  that  he  must  pay 
the  taxes  during  the  running  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  Still 
other  statutes  require  that  the  entry  and  occupation  by  the  claim- 
ant must  have  been  in  good  faith.*  The  possession  of  the  dis- 
seisor, in  order  to  support  his  claim  to  title  by  adverse  posses- 
sion, must  be  hostile  to  the  true  owner,  and  not  merely  subordi- 
nate to  him.^ 

Where  one  enters  upon  the  land  of  another  without  right  or 
claim  of  right,  he  is  a  trespasser,  and  his  possession,  no  matter 
for  what  duration,  can  never  ripen  into  a  title. *^  Some  claim  of 
right,  not  necessarily  distinct  or  valid,  is  necessary  in  all  cases, 
and  whether  such  claim  has  been  adverse  to  the  true  owner  is 
always  a  question  of  fact.^  Title  by  adverse  possession  can  not 
be  acquired  where  entry  was  made  through  mere  permission  or 
license  from  the  owner;**  but  possession  obtained  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner,  and  subsequently  asserted  adversely  to  such 
owner  to  his  knowledge,  becomes  adverse.'' 

A  possession,  to  be  adverse,  must  also  be  continued  for  the 
whole  period  required  to  bar  an  action  for  recovery  under  the 
statute  of  limitations.'"  The  period  of  time  required  to  give  rise 
to  a  title  by  adverse  possession  varies  in  the  different  states,  and 
the  local  statute  should  be  consulted  in  each  case.  In  most  states 
the  statute  does  not  run  against  persons  under  legal  disability. 
In  a  number  of  states  a  possession  based  upon  some  written  in- 
strument or  judgment  is  protected  against  the  entry  or  suit  of 

2  Reck  V.  Clapp,  98  Pa.  St.  581.  g  Kingston  v.  Guck,  155  Mich.  264, 

3Hottenstein  v.  Lercli,  104  Pa.  St.  118  N.  W.  967. 

454 ;  Loughridge  v.  Rowland,  52  Miss.  ^  Highstone   v.   Burdette,   54   Mich. 

546;  Betts  v.  Letcher,  1  S.  Dak.  182,  329,  20  N.  W.  64. 

46  N    W    193  ^  St.  Joseph  v.  Seel,  122  Mich.  70, 

4  May  V.  Dobbins,  166  Ind.  331,  11  80  N.   W.   987 ;   Coleman  v.    Pickett, 

N.  E.  353;  Lindt  v.  Uihlein,  116  Iowa  82  Hun  287,  31  N.  Y.  S.  480,  64  N. 

48,  89  N.  W.  214.  Y.  1^. 

^Toney  v.   Knapp,   142   Mich.  652,  » Vandiveer    v.    Stickney,    75    Ala. 

106  N.  W.  552 ;  Miller  v.  Warren.  94  225. 

App.   Div.    192,   87   N.   Y.    S.    1011;  lo  Overing  v.  Russell,  32  Barb.  (N. 

Ayers  v.  Reidel,  84  Wis.  276  54  N.  Y.)  263. 
W.  588. 

45 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


687 


TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS 


706 


the  dispossessed  owner  after  a  much  shorter  period  than  that 
which  bars  the  right  against  a  possession  not  founded  on  an 
instrument  or  judgment.^ ^ 


11  Latta  V.  Clifford,  47  Fed.  614; 
Stoltz  V.  Doering,  112  111.  234. 
Time  necessary  to  confer  title  by 
adverse  possession  in  the  different 
states;  Alabama,  ten  years;  Alaska, 
ten  years;  Arizona,  three  years, 
where  possession  is  peaceable,  ad- 
verse, and  under  color  of  title;  five 
3'ears  where  possession  is  peaceable, 
adverse,  and  where  possessor  pays 
taxes ;  ten  years  where  there  is  mere- 
ly an  adverse  holding;  Arkansas, 
seven  years  adverse  possession ;  Cal- 
ifornia, five  years  adverse  posses- 
sion; Colorado,  seven  years  ac- 
tual residence  under  a  connected 
title  deducible  of  record,  seven 
years  possession  under  color  of 
title  to  vacant  and  unoccupied 
lands,  taken  in  good  faith,  and  pay- 
ing of  taxes ;  Connecticut,  fifteen 
years  adverse  possession ;  Florida, 
seven  years  adverse  possession ; 
Georgia,  twenty  years  adverse  posses- 
sion, and  seven  years  adverse  posses- 
sion under  color  of  title;  Idaho,  five 
years  adverse  possession ;  Illinois, 
twenty  years  adverse  possession,  and 
seven  years  adverse  possession  cou- 
pled with  color  of  title  and  payment 
of  taxes ;  Indiana,  twenty  years  ad- 
verse possession ;  Iowa,  ten  years  ad- 
verse possession ;  Kansas,  fifteen 
years  adverse  possession ;  Kentucky, 
fifteen  years  adverse  possession; 
Louisiana,  ten  years  continuous  and 
uninterrupted  possession  in  good 
faith,  and  thirty  years  of  such  pos- 
session without  regard  to  good  faith ; 
Maine,  twenty  years  exclusive,  peace- 
able, continuous,  and  adverse  posses- 
sion ;  Maryland,  twenty  years  uninter- 
rupted adverse  possession ;  Massa- 
chusetts, twenty  years  adverse  posses- 
sion ;  Michigan,  five  years  adverse 
possession  under  color  of  title,  and 
fifteen  years  adverse  possession  with- 
out regard  to  color  of  title ;  Minneso- 
ta, fifteen  years  adverse  possession; 
Missouri,  ten  years  adverse  posses- 
sion ;  Montana,  ten  years  adverse  pos- 
session ;  Nebraska,  ten  years  adverse 
possession ;   Nevada,   five    years    ad- 


verse possession  of  property  other 
than  mining  claims,  two  years  ad- 
verse possession  of  mining  claims; 
New  Hampshire,  twenty  years  ad- 
verse possession ;  New  Jersey,  sixty 
years  actual  possession,  uninterrupt- 
edly continued,  and  twenty  years  in 
favor  of  mortgagee  after  default; 
New  Mexico,  ten  years  adverse  pos- 
session under  color  of  title ;  New 
York,  twenty  years  adverse  posses- 
sion ;  North  Carolina,  seven  years  ad- 
verse possession  with  color  of  title, 
and  twenty  years  of  such  possession 
without  color  of  title ;  North  Dakota, 
ten  years  adverse  possession  and  pay- 
ment of  taxes ;  Ohio,  twenty-one 
years  adverse  possession ;  Oklahoma, 
fifteen  years  adverse  possession ; 
Oregon,  ten  years  adverse  possession ; 
Pennsylvania,  twenty-one  years  ad- 
verse possession,  and  forty  years  pos- 
session of  land  in  Philadelphia ; 
Rhode  Island,  twenty  years  adverse 
posession  under  claim  of  ownership 
in  fee ;  South  Carolina,  seven  years 
adverse  possession  under  color  of  ti- 
tle, and  ten  years  possession  without 
color  of  title ;  South  Dakota,  ten 
years  adverse  possession  together 
with  payment  of  taxes;  Tennessee, 
seven  years  adverse  possession  with 
color  of  title,  and  twenty  years  ad- 
verse possession  without  color  of  ti- 
tle ;  Texas,  five  years  adverse  posses- 
sion coupled  with  color  of  title  and 
payment  of  taxes ;  Utah,  seven  years 
continuous  adverse  possession  coupled 
with  payment  of  taxes;  Vermont, 
fifteen  3'ears  adverse  possession ;  Vir- 
ginia, fifteen  years  adverse  posses- 
sion of  lands  lying  east  of  the  Alle- 
ghany mountains,  and  ten  years  ad- 
verse possession  of  lands  lying  west 
of  the  Alleghany  mountains ;  Wash- 
ington, ten  years  adverse  possession, 
and  seven  years  adverse  possession 
under  a  connected  title  deducible  of 
record  from  the  state  or  United 
States ;  West  Virginia,  ten  years  ad- 
verse possession ;  Wisconsin,  ten 
years  adverse  possession  under  color 
of   title,   and   twenty    years    adverse 


707  ADVERSE   TITLE  §    688 

The  possession,  to  be  adverse,  must  be  something  more  than 
temporary  occupancy,  as  occasional  acts  of  dominion  over  the 
land,  although  extended  over  the  statutory  period,  will  not  con- 
stitute continuous  possession.^-  When  the  possession  is  inter- 
rupted, the  running  of  the  statute  is  stopped,  and  a  subsequent 
return  to  possession  will  not  avail.  The  running  of  the  statute 
will  only  begin  from  the  date  of  the  return.^^ 

Adverse  possession  may  be  shown  in  various  ways.  Among 
these  may  be  mentioned  residence  on  the  land,^*  the  erection  of 
buildings  and  other  structures/'^  or  the  actual  inclosure  of  the 
land  with  a  fence.^*^  None  of  these  acts,  however,  are  abso- 
lutely necessary,  and  in  some  cases  they  may  be  impossible,  from 
the  character  of  the  property. ^^ 

§688.  Color  of  title. — The  expression,  "color  of  title," 
when  used  in  connection  with  the  law  of  adverse  possession, 
means  that  which  has  the  appearance  or  semblance  of  title.^^ 
Color  of  title  may  be  given  by  deed,  by  will,  by  descent  cast,  by 
an  execution  sale,  by  a  tax  deed,  by  a  decree  of  court,  or  by  any 
instrument  which  serves  to  define  the  extent  of  the  disseisor's 
claim.^**  Many  decisions  hold  that  color  of  title  may  also  be 
created  by  acts  and  circumstances  which  of  themselves  show  the 
character  and  extent  of  the  disseisor's  entry  and  claim.-'' 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  title  of  the  disseisor  be  valid  to 
constitute  an  adverse  possession.  His  title  may  be  bad,  or  his 
original  entry  may  have  been  by  permission  of  the  true  owner. 
It  is  only  necessary  that  he  should  have  color  of  title,  and  that 
this  color  of  title  should  purport  to  give  him  a  freehold  estate 
adverse  to  that  of  the  original  owner.  He  must  have  title,  or 
color  of  title,  as  distinguished  from  a  mere  claim  of  title.^^  Color 
of  title  is  not  required,  however,  in  order  to  obtain  title  to  land 

possession   without    color    of    title;  ton,  126  111.  233,  18  N.  E.  301,  1  L.  R. 

Wyoming,  ten  years  adverse  posses-  A.  213,  9  Am.  St.  581. 

sion  1"  Murphy  v.  Doyle,  Zl  Minn.  113, 

i2Elyton  Land  Co.  v.   Denny,   108  ZZ  N.  W.  220. 

Ala.  553,  18  So.  561.  is  Wright  v.  Mattison.  18  How.  (U. 

i3Boltz   V.    Colsch,    134   Iowa  480,  S.)  50.  15  L.  ed.  280;  Finley  v.  Ho- 

109  N.  W.  1106.  gan.  60  Ark.  499,  30  S.  W.  1045. 

1*  Bennett    v.    Kovarick,    23    Misc.  ^^  Cook    v.    Norton,    43     111.     391 ; 

73  51  N   Y   S.  752.  Thompson  v.   Burhans,  79  N.  Y.  93. 

15  Hubbard  v.   Kiddo,   87  III.   578 ;  20  Kirby  v.  Kirby,  236  111.  255,  86  N. 

Congdon  v.  Morgan,  14  S.  Car.  587.  E.  259;  Hollingshead  v.  Nauman,  45 

"Illinois  Cent  R.  Co.  v.  Hough-  Pa.  St.  140. 

21  Dawley  v.  Brown,  79  N.  Y.  390. 


§    689  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  708 

by  adverse  possession,  unless  there  are  special  statutory  provi- 
sions to  the  contrary;  but  when  one  enters  upon  land,  under 
color  of  title,  his  possession  is  not  limited  to  the  land  actually 
occupied  by  him,  but  by  construction  is  extended  to  the  entire 
tract  included  in  the  instrument  under  which  he  claims.-^  On  the 
other  hand,  if  one  enters  without  color  of  title,  his  entry  can  give 
the  disseisee  no  notice  of  adverse  occupancy  except  as  to  the  land 
actually  occupied.  ^^ 

§  689.  Actual  possession. — In  order  that  title  to  land  may 
be  gained  by  adverse  possession,  the  possession  of  the  disseisor 
must  be  actual,  and  in  order  to  determine  the  fact  of  actual  pos- 
session in  a  particular  case  all  the  circumstances  must  be  taken 
into  consideration."''  The  disseisor  must  exercise  such  acts  of 
dominion  over  the  property  as  will  apprise  the  owner  of  the  fact 
that  a  claim  of  ownership  is  being  asserted."^  In  all  cases  the 
acts  of  dominion  on  the  part  of  the  disseisor  must  be  done  with 
the  intention  to  disseise  the  owner  f^  but  a  mere  intention  to  dis- 
seise unaccompanied  by  positive  acts  will  not  produce  that  ef- 
fect."^ The  acts  of  dominion  must  be  acts  indicative  of  owner- 
ship.^^ An  entry  made  by  mistake,  although  there  was  color  of 
title,  does  not  amount  to  a  disseisin."'*  Statutes  sometimes  con- 
trol the  question  of  actual  possession  by  requiring  an  actual  resi- 
dence on  the  land,^"*  or  by  requiring  the  land  to  be  inclosed  or 
cultivated. ^^ 

§  690.  Constructive  possession. — We  have  said  that  an 
adverse  occupant  who  holds  land  without  any  color  of  title,  he 
can  obtain  title  by  adverse  possession  only  to  so  much  of  the  land 
as  he  actually  occupied.  But  by  the  doctrine  of  constructive  pos- 
session under  color  of  title  he  may  acquire  title  to  more  land 
than  he  actually  occupied.     He  obtains  title  to  the  entire  area 

22  Anderson  v.  Burnham,  52  Kans.  26  Ewing  v.  Burnet,  11  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
454,  34  Pac.  1056.  41,  9  L.  ed.  624. 

23  Barber    v.    Robinson,    78    Minn.  27  Lynde  v.  Williams,  68  Mo.  360. 
193,  80  N.  W.  968.  28  Algonquin  Coal  Co.  v.  Northern 

24  Houghton   V.  Wilhelmy,  157  Mass.  &c.  Iron  Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  114,  29  Atl. 
521.  32  N.  E.  861.                       .  402. 

25  Anderson  v.  Burnham,  52  Kans.  2'j  Skinner    v.    Crawford,    54    Iowa 
454,  34  Pac.   1056;  Whitaker  v.  Erie  119.  6  N.  W.  144. 

Shooting  Club,  102  Mich.  454,  60  N.  so  stumf  v.  Osterhage,  94  111.  115. 
W.  983.  31  McFarlane    v.    Kerr,    10    Bosw. 

(N.  Y.)  249. 


709  ADVERSE  TITLE  §    691 

defined  or  described  by  the  instrument  giving  color  of  title.^^  By 
entry  under  color  of  title,  the  adverse  claimant  is  presumed  to 
be  in  possession  of  the  whole  of  his  claim. ^'^  In  order,  however, 
to  acquire  adverse  title  by  constructive  possession,  the  owner  of 
the  land  must  have  notice  of  the  claim  of  title,  either  by  actual 
knowledge  or  through  notice  implied  by  law.^*  Any  land  which 
is  actually  held  by  the  owner  can  not  be  acquired  by  another  who 
bases  his  claim  on  constructive  possession. ^^ 

§  691.  Tacking  possessions. — Possession  must  be  contin- 
uous for  the  entire  statutory  period,  but  such  continuous  pos- 
session need  not  be  by  one  and  the  same  person.  One  person 
may  start  the  adverse  possession  to  land,  and  another  in  privity 
with  him  may  continue  it  for  the  statutory  period.^'''  Several 
successive  periods  of  possession  by  different  persons  may  be 
tacked  or  added  to  each  other,  provided  the  successive  occupants 
are  in  privity  of  contract,  estate,  or  blood,"  and  the  combined 
period  of  such  adverse  holdings  will  be  deemed  as  one  continu- 
ous possession  for  the  statutory  period. ^^  Privity  that  will  per- 
mit the  tacking  of  possessions  exists  between  testator  and  devi- 
see,"^ between  ancestor  and  heir,*"  between  landlord  and  tenant,*^ 
between  vendor  and  vendee,"*"  and  between  a  purchaser  at  a  judi- 
cial sale  and  the  occupant  of  the  land.*'^  It  is  essential  in  all 
cases,  however,  that  there  be  no  gap  between  the  holdings  which 
are  to  be  tacked,"**  although,  as  between  landlord  and  tenant,  a 
brief  vacancy  resulting  from  a  change  of  occupancy  does  not 
prevent  tacking  in  favor  of  the  landlord."*^ 

§  692.  How  far  possession  is  notice. — Possession  by  one 
who  is  not  the  owner  of  record  should  induce  one  proposing  to 

^2  Hornblower      v.      Banton,      103  ss  McNeely  v.  Langan,  22  Ohio  St. 

Maine  375.  69  Atl.  568,   125  Am.  St.  32. 

300n ;  Clark  v.  Campau,  92  Mich.  573,  so  Sherin  v.  Brackett,  Z6  Minn.  152, 

52  N.  W.  1026.  30  N.  W.  551. 

33Kittell  V.  Steger,  121  Tenn.  400,  *"  Montague  v.  Alarunda,  71  Nebr. 

117  S.  W.  500.  805.  99  N.  W.  653. 

34  Ellicott  V.  Pearl,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  "  Schneider  v.  Botsch,  90  111.  577. 
412,  9  L.  ed.  475  ;  Little  v.  Downing,  ^^  Merritt  v.  Westerman,  165  Mich. 
Z7  N.  H.  355.  535,  131  N.  W.  66. 

35  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  *'■  Kendrick  v.  Latham,  25  Fla.  819, 
Nugent,  152  111.  119,  39  N.  E.  263.  6  So.  871. 

36  Erck  V.  Church,  87  Tenn.  575,  11  ^^  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Phil- 
S.  W.  794,  4  L.  R.  A.  641.  yaw,  88  Ala.  264,  6  So.  837. 

3Mllinois   Cent.   R.   Co.  v.   Hatter,         « Thompson    v.    Kauffelt,    110    Pa. 
207   111.   88.  69   N.   E.   751 ;    Allis   v.     St.  209,  1  Atl.  267. 
Field,  89  Wis.  327,  62  N.  W.  85. 


§    692  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  710 

purchase  to  inquire  •whether  the  possession  is  founded  on  any 
right  or  title.  It  is  notice  of  the  rights  of  the  occupant,  what- 
ever they  may  be;  and  if  he  claim  by  deed,  his  possession  is  re- 
garded by  most  authorities  as  equivalent  to  the  recording  of  such 
deed.**^  In  a  few  states,  however,  actual  notice  is  essential  in 
order  to  dispense  with  registration,  and  consequently  possession 
does  not  amount  to  notice,  and  does  not  have  the  effect  of  put- 
ting a  purchaser  upon  inquiry,  though  proof  of  possession  may 
be  made  in  connection  with  evidence  of  actual  notice/^  The  pre- 
vaiHng  rule,  however,  is  that  possession  is  notice  although  it  be 
not  actually  known  to  the  purchaser.  It  is  a  fact  which  the  pur- 
chaser should  know,  and  he  is  thereby  put  upon  inquiry  as  to  the 
possessor's  rights.*®  A  purchaser  who  negligently  or  intention- 
ally fails  to  inquire  as  to  the  fact  of  iwssession,  or  as  to  the 
title  or  interest  of  the  person  in  possession,  is  affected  with  no- 
tice of  such  title  or  interest  as  the  possessor  actually  has.  Such 
a  purchaser  can  not  claim  the  position  of  a  purchaser  in  good 
faith  without  notice.*^ 

A  purchaser  of  land  in  the  possession  of  a  tenant  of  the  ven- 
dor has  notice  of  the  actual  interest  of  the  tenant  and  of  the 
whole  extent  of  that  interest,  and  is  bound  to  admit  the  tenant's 
claim  so  far  as  it  could  be  enforced  against  the  vendor.^" 

Actual  possession  of  land,  by  one  who  holds  an  unrecorded 
contract  of  purchase,  or  a  bond  for  a  deed,  is  notice  of  his  rights 
to  one  who  takes  a  mortgage  on  the  land  from  the  vendor,  and 
the  mortgagee  will  take  a  lien  only  on  the  vendor's  right.^^ 

Possession  may  also  be  notice  of  the  homestead  rights  of  the 
possessor.^^    But  possession,  to  operate  as  implied  notice  to  a  pur- 

4fi  Noyes  v.  Hall,  97  U.  S.  34,  24  L.  «  Simmons     Creek     Coal     Co.     v. 

ed.  909 ;_  Price  v.   Bell,  91   Ala.,   180,  Doran,  142  U.  S.  417,  12  Sup.  Ct.  239, 

8  So.  565 ;  Long  v.  Langsdalc,  56  Ark.  35  L.  ed.  1063. 

239,  19  S.  W.  603  ;  Scheerer  v.  Cuddy,  •'<>  Pcasley    v.    McFadden,    68    Cal. 

85   Cal.  270,  24   Pac.  713;   Harral  v.  611,  10  Pac.  179;  Cunningham  v.  Pat- 

Leverty,   50   Conn.   46,   47   Am.   Rep.  tee,  99  Mass.  248;    Seymour  v.   Mc- 

608.  Kinstry,  106  N.  Y.  230,  12  N.  E.  348, 

4"  Harral  v.  Levcrty,  50  Conn.  46,  14  N.   E.  94;    Marsh  v.   Nelson,   101 

47  Am.  Rep.  608;  Moore  v.  Jourdan,  Pa.  St.  51;  Doolittle  v.  Cook,  75  111. 

14  La.  Ann.  414 ;  Beal  v.  Gordon,  55  354. 

Maine  482;  Lamb  v.  Pierce,  113'Mass.  ^''^  Bright  v.  Buckman,  39  Fed.  243; 

72 ;    Drey  v.    Doyle,   99   Mo.   459,    12  Jaeger  v.  Hardy,  48  Ohio  St.  335,  27 

S.   W.   287;    Brinkman   v.   Jones,   44  N.  E.  863. 

Wis.  498.  -'^  Texas  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Bla- 

*^  Pique   V.    Arendale,   71    Ala.   91 ;  lock,  76  Tex.  85,  13  S.  W.  12. 
Loughridge  v.  Bowland,  52  Miss.  546. 


711  ADVERSE   TITLE  §    693 

chaser,  must  be  visible  and  open,  notorious  and  exclusive,  and 
not  merely  a  constructive  possession.^^  Also  possession,  to  oper- 
ate as  notice,  should  be  inconsistent  with  the  title  upon  which  the 
purchaser  relies.^*  Possession  by  a  grantor,  after  a  full  recorded 
conveyance,  is  hot  constructive  notice  to  subsequent  purchasers 
of  any  right  reserved  in  the  land  or  claimed  by  the  grantor. ^^ 

§  693.     Estates  or  property  subject  to  adverse  possession. 

— The  title  to  land  and  the  rights  incident  to  such  title  may  be 
acquired  by  adverse  possession,  without  regard  to  whether  or 
not  such  incidental  rights  could  be  acquired  independently  by  any 
means  wdiatsoever/"  On  the  other  hand,  rights  and  interests  in 
lands  may  be  acquired  by  adverse  possession,  without  regard  to 
the  ownership  of  the  fee  to  the  land."  Thus  easements,  water 
rights  and  the  like,  may  be  created  or  acquired  by  adverse  user 
and  enjoyment.^^  It  is  held  that  title  to  a  building  may  be  ac- 
quired by  adverse  possession,  although  the  title  to  the  support- 
ing land  is  in  another.''^  Also  the  title  to  the  surface  estate  may 
be  acquired  by  adverse  possession  where  the  original  owner  of 
the  entire  estate  has  conducted  such  mining  operations  thereon 
as  amount  to  a  severance  of  the  minerals.*^** 

Title  by  adverse  possession  may  be  acquired  to  the  lands  of  a 
married  woman,"  or  to  the  right  of  dowser  of  a  widow."" 

Title  can  be  gained  as  against  a  railroad  by  adverse  possession 
for  the  statutory  period  of  limitation.*'^  But  the  adverse  user  of 
a  railway  right  of  way  must  be  inconsistent  with  the  use  and  en- 
joyment of  the  easement  by  the  railway  company.''*     Title  by 

53  Townsend   v.   Little,    109   U.    S.  "  Rhoades  v.  Barnes,  54  Wash.  145, 

504.  3  Sup.  Ct.  357,  27  L.  ed.  1012;  102  Pac.  884. 

Bernstein   v.   Humes.    71     Ala.    260;  -'« Alderman    v.    New    Haven,    81 

Smith  V.  Yule.  31   Cal.  180,  89  Am.  Conn.  137,  70  Atl.  626,  18  L.  R.  A.  (N. 

Dec.  167;  Mason  v.  Mullahey,  145  111.  S.)  74.                                 ^        .         ^ 

383    34  N.  E.  36;   Smith  v.  Greenop,  ^o  Fairbanks    v.    San    Francisco    K. 

60   Mich.  61.   26   N.   W.    Rep.    832;  Co.,  115  Cal.  579,  47  Pac.  450. 

Tankard  V.  Tankard.  79  N.  Car.  54;  ^o  Delaware    &    H.    Canal    Co.    v. 

Ellis  V    Young,  31  S.  Car.  322,  9  S.  Hughes.  183  Pa.  St.  66,  38  Atl.  568, 

E  955  63  Am.  St.  743,  38  L.  R.  A.  826. 

'54  Smith   V.  Yule,   31    Cal.   180,   89  «i  Trail  v.  Turner,  22  Ky.  L.  100, 

Am  Dec   167.  56  S.  W.  645. 

•'■-5  Gill  V.  Hardin,  48  Ark.  409.  3  S.  '■-  Brown  v.  Morrisey,  124  N.  Car. 

W.  519 ;  Quick  v.  Milligan,  108  Ind.  292,  32  S.  E.  687. 

419    9  N    F    392    58   Am.   Rep.  49 ;  <">3  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

Dodge  V."  Davis,  85   Iowa  77,  52  N.  31  Ky.  L.  1,  101  S.  W.  317. 

W  2  *''^  Moran   v.    Chicago,    &c.    R.    Co., 

5fi  Golden  V.  Murphv.  31  Nev.  395,  83  Nebr.  680,   120  N.  W.   192,  35  L. 

103  Pac.  394,  105  Pac.  99.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  919n. 


§  694 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


712 


adverse  possession  may  be  acquired  to  lands  held  in  trust. '''^  But 
at  common  law,  as  against  the  public,  no  right  can  be  created  by 
mere  prescription  or  adverse  possession.''"  So  the  general  rule  is 
that  the  mere  possession  of  land,  though  open,  exclusive,  and 
uninterrupted  for  the  statutory  period  of  limitation,  creates  no 
impediment  to  a  recovery  by  the  government,  and  of  course  none 
to  a  recovery  by  one  who  within  that  period  receives  its  con- 
veyance.''^  But  upon  the  question  as  to  whether  title  to  prop- 
erty held  for  public  use  can  be  acquired  by  adverse  possession 
there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.''^ 

§  694.  Who  may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession. — As 
a  general  rule,  title  by  adverse  possession  may  be  acquired  by 
every  class  and  description  of  persons,  natural  or  artificial.''''^ 
Thus  title  by  adverse  possession  may  be  acquired  by  the  nation,'*^ 
by  a  state, ^^  or  by  a  municipality.'^^  A  private  corporation  may 
acquire  land  by  adverse  possession,"  although  the  corporation  is 
incapable  under  its  charter  of  holding  real  estate. '^'*  Corporations 
having  power  to  take  under  eminent  domain  have  been  held,  in 
some  cases,  entitled  to  acquire  real  estate  by  adverse  possession  ;^" 
while  in  other  cases  this  right  has  been  denied.^*'  Title  by  adverse 
possession  may  also  be  acquired  by  foreign  corporations,''^  by 
aliens,^*  by  nonresidents,^^  by  infants,®"  and  by  married  women. ®^ 

§  695.  Adverse  title  against  reversioners  and  remainder- 
men.— The    statute    of   limitations    does    not    begin    to    run 


63  Snyder  v.  Snover,  56  N.  J.  L.  20, 
27  Atl.  1013. 

^'^  Charlotte  v.  Pembroke  Iron 
Works,  82  Maine  391,  19  Atl.  902, 
8  L.  R.  A.  828. 

^'^  Oaksmith's  Lessee  v.  Johnston, 
92  U.  S.  343,  23  L.  ed.  682. 

"^  See  Ostrom  v.  San  Antonio,  77 
Tex.  345,  14  S.  W.  66,  holding  that 
title  to  a  street  or  a  portion  thereof 
may  be  acquired  in  this  manner. 

'^^  Ohio  River  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
50  W.  Va.  499,  40  S.  E.  407. 

■'■o  Maryland  v.  West  Virginia,  217 
U.  S.  577,  30  Sup.  Ct.  630,  54  L.  ed. 
888. 

^1  Rhode  Island  v.  Massachusetts, 
4  How.  (U.  S.)  591,  11  L.  ed.  1116; 
Eldridge  v.  Binghamton,  120  N.  Y. 
309,  24  N.  E.  462. 

'-  New  York  v.  Carleton.  113  N.  Y. 
284,  21  N.  E.  55. 


"Mills  V.  Zion  Chapel,  119  Md. 
510,  87  Atl.  257. 

7*  Hanlon  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  40 
Nebr.  52,  58  N.  W.  590. 

'5  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co  v.  Smith. 
128  Fed.  1,  63  C.  C.  A.  1 ;  Denver  & 
R.  G.  R.  Co.  V.  Doelz,  49  Colo.  48, 
111  Pac.  595. 

^s  Narron  v.  Wilmington  &c.  R. 
Co.,  122  N.  Car.  856,  29  S.  E.  356,  40 
L.  R.  A.  415. 

"  St.  Paul  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
45  Minn.  387,  48  N.  W.  17. 

"**  Scottish  American  Mortg.  Co.  v. 
Butler,  99  Miss.  56,  54  So.  666,  Ann. 
Cas.  1913C,  1236n. 

""  Lindenmaver  v.  Gunst,  70  Miss. 
693,  13  So.  252,  35  Am.  St.  685. 

^'>  Woodruff  v.  Roysden,  105  Tenn. 
491,  58  S.  W.  1066,  80  Am.  St.  905. 

81  Clark  V.  Gilbert,  39  Conn.  94. 


713  ADVERSE   TITLE  §    696 

against  any  person  until  a  right  of  action  has  accrued  to  him. 
Hence  no  disseisin  on  the  part  of  any  one  can  affect  a  rever- 
sioner, or  remainderman  until  the  termination  of  the  life  estate.^^ 
An  owner  can  not  be  barred  while  he  has  no  right  to  possession 
or  capacity  to  sue,  or  where  for  any  other  reason  he  is  prevented 
by  law  from  asserting  his  rights ;  hence  the  rule  that  the  statute 
will  not  run  against  remaindermen  during  the  existence  of  the 
precedent  estate. ^^  But  it  has  been  held  that  one  holding  pos- 
session of  land  adverse  to  the  tenant  in  remainder  for  the  stat- 
utory period,  during  which  time  he  paid  the  taxes,  acquired  a 
valid  title  to  the  estate  in  remainder,  notwithstanding  the  exist- 
ence of  an  outstanding  estate  for  life,  the  estate  of  such  claim- 
ant not  being  in  privity  with  the  life  tenant.**  But  the  posses- 
sion of  the  life  tenant  and  of  any  person  claiming  under  him 
does  not  become  adverse  as  against  the  remainderman,  until  the 
cessation  of  the  life  estate.*^ 

§  696.  Title  by  adverse  possession  between  cotenants  and 
joint  owners. — Mere  possession  by  one  tenant  in  common  for 
any  period  of  time  however  long,  is  not  accepted  as  evidence  of 
a  release  from  his  cotenants,  without  additional  evidence,  giving 
to  that  possession  a  hostile  character.*®  The  possession  of  one 
tenant  in  common  is  regarded  as  the  possession  of  all.  In  order 
for  one  cotenant  to  acquire  title  to  the  common  estate  by  his  ex- 
clusive possession  of  it,  such  possession  must  be  held  in  known 
hostility  to  his  cotenants  and  for  the  prescriptive  period.**'  In 
order  for  the  possession  of  the  disseisor  to  be  adverse  to  his  co- 
tenants  they  must  have  a  knowledge  of  their  rights  and  of  his  as- 
sertion of  adverse  title. *^  The  cotenant  against  whom  the  adverse 
possession  is  asserted  must  have  either  actual  notice  of  it  or  there 
must  be  such  outward  acts  of  exclusive  ownership  of  an  une- 
quivocal character  as  to  impart  notice  to  him.-^     Acts  of  exclu- 

S2  Allen  V.   DeGroodt,  98  Mo.   159,  43  Am.  Dec.  292 :  Brown  v.  Wood.  17 

11  S.  W.  240,  14  Am.  St.  626.  Mass.  68;  German  v.  Alachin,  6  Paige 

83Willwhite  V.  Berry,  232  111.  331,  (N.  Y.)  288. 

83  N.  E.  852 ;  Gholson  v.  Desha,  32  ^-  Tharpe  v.  Holcomb,  126  N.  Car. 

Ky.  L.  996.  107  S.  W.  330.  365.  35  S.  E.  608. 

s*  Nelson  v.  Davidson,  160  111.  254,  ss  jnglis  v.  Webb.  117  Ala.  387.  23 

43  N.  E.  361,  31  L.  R.  A.  325,  52  Am.  So.  125  ;  Morgan  v.  Mitchell.  104  Ga. 

St.  338.  596.  30  S.  E.  792 :  Bovd  v.  Boyd.  176 

S'^  Moore  v.  Childress,  58  Ark.  510.  111.  40,  51  N.  E.  782.  68  Am.  St.  169; 

25   S.  W.  833:   Austin  v.   Brown,  37  Bader  v.  Dyer,   106  Iowa  715,  77  N. 

W.  Va.  634,  17  S.  E.  207.  W.  469.  68  Am.  St.  332. 

s<^  Colburn  v.  Mason,  25  Maine  434,  ""'■>  Casey   v.    Casey,    107    Iowa    192, 


697 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


714 


sive  ownership  by  one  cotenant,  such  as  the  open  sale,  convey- 
ance and  dehvery  of  possession  thereunder  of  the  whole  estate, 
amount  to  a  complete  ouster  of  the  other  cotenant,  and  unless 
he  brings  suit  within  the  prescriptive  period  thereafter  his  right 
of  recovery  will  be  barred."'^  It  has  been  held  that  as  between 
themselves  joint  owners  of  land  can  not  acquire  title  by  adverse 
possession."^ 

§  697.  Persons  under  legal  disability. — Title  by  adverse 
possession  can  not  be  acquired  against  a  person  under  legal  dis- 
ability."^ Thus  possession  for  the  statutory  period  of  limitation 
has  been  held  to  yield  no  title  against  infants  where  no  one  was 
charged  with  the  duty  of  bringing  action,  even  though  such  pos- 
session be  under  color  of  title. ''^  But  where  the  statute  barring 
actions  for  the  recovery  of  real  property  makes  no  exception  in 
favor  of  persons  under  disability  the  fact  that  the  owner  of  the 
land  was  under  disability  at  the  time  the  adverse  possession  com- 
menced does  not  suspend  the  running  of  the  statute  in  his  favor 
during  the  period  of  disability."*  It  has  also  been  held  that  as 
against  a  married  woman  title  by  adverse  possession  can  not  be 
acquired."^  It  has  been  held  that  the  disability  of  coverture  can 
not  be  added  to  that  of  infancy  and  thus  prevent  the  running  of 
the  statute  until  the  removal  of  the  disability  of  coverture."" 

§  698.  Adverse  title  against  state  or  municipality. — While 
title  by  adverse  possession  can  not  be  acquired  against  the  United 
States,"^  or  against  a  state, "'^  yet  a  grant  from  the  state  may  be 
presumed  by  long  continued  possession.""  A  statute  may  also 
make  the  state  subject  to  the  statute  of  limitations.^     In  some 


11  N.  W.  844,  70  Am.  St.  190;  Beniost 
V.  Rothschild,  145  Mo.  399,  46  S.  W. 
1081 ;  Smith  v.  North  Canyon  Water 
Co..  16  Utah  194,  52  Pac.  283. 

ooTalbott  V.  Woodford,  48  W.  Va. 
449,  2>1  S.  E.  580. 

f'l  Simon  v.  Richard,  42  La.  842,  8 
So.  629. 

fl2  Harris  v.  McCrary,  17  Idaho  300, 
105  Pac.  588. 

93  Brown  v.  Hooks,  133  Ga.  345,  65 
S.  E.  780. 

94  De  Hatre  v.  Edmonds,  200  Mo. 
246,  98  S.  W.  744,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
86n ;  Steinberg  v.  Salzman,  139  Wis. 
118,  120  N.  W.  1005. 


ssWhittaker  v.  Thayes,  58  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  282,  123  S.  W.  1137. 

""Quick  V.  Rufe,  164  Mo.  408,  64 
S.  W.  102. 

■'^  United  States  v.  Dastervignes, 
118  Fed.  199;  Anderson  v.  Burnham, 
52  Kans.  454,  34  Pac.  1056. 

o«  Harvey  v.  Holies.  160  Fed.  531 ; 
Eble  V.  State,  11  Kans.  179,  93  Pac. 
803,  127  Am.  St.  412. 

"9  Bullard  v.  Barksdale,  Z2,  N.  Car. 
461. 

1  Sec  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Hinck- 
ley, 53  Minn.  398,  55  N.  W.  560. 


715  ADVERSE  TITLE  §    699 

states  limitations  run  in  favor  of  an  adverse  claimant  against  a 
municipality,-  especially  when  the  land  in  question  is  held  by 
such  municipality  as  private  owner.^  There  is  some  conflict  of 
authority,  however,  with  reference  to  lands  held  by  a  munici- 
pality for  a  public  purpose ;  some  courts  holding  that  such  lands 
may  be  acquired  by  adverse  possession,*  while  others  take  a  con- 
trary view.'' 

§  699.  Effect  of  adverse  possession. — Adverse  possession 
for  sufficient  time  to  bar  an  action  to  recover  real  estate  confers 
title.*'  The  title  is  as  full  and  complete  as  if  the  possessor  had 
always  held  the  undisputed  title  of  record.'^  The  rule  rests  upon 
the  theory  that,  when  possession  and  use  are  long  continued, 
they  create  a  presumption  of  lawful  origin;  that  is,  they  are 
founded  upon  such  instruments  and  proceedings  as  in  law  would 
pass  the  right  to  the  possession  and  use  of  the  property.^  It  is 
held  that  there  is  no  superiority  in  a  title  derived  from  a  grant 
to  that  acquired  by  possession  under  color  of  title  for  the  period 
of  limitations,  although  the  latter  title  is  derived  by  force  of 
statute.^  The  title  thus  acquired  is  respected  in  courts  of  equity 
as  well  as  in  courts  of  law,^^  and  the  title  is  such  as  will  support 
an  action  to  remove  a  cloud  therefrom  ;^^  or  to  maintain  trespass 
against  one  claiming  under  a  senior  grant,  but  w^ithout  posses- 
sion.^- The  effect  of  the  possession  of  the  adverse  holder  for  the 
statutory  period  is  not  only  to  bar  the  remedy  of  the  owner  of 
the  paper  title  but  to  divest  his  estate  and  vest  it  in  the  party  hold- 
ing adversely.  ^^ 

2  Nail  V.  Conover,  223  Mo.  477,  122  36  N.  E.  202 ;  Dyer  v.  Eldridge,  136 
S.  W.  1039.  Ind.  654,  36  N.  E.  522. 

3  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  Detroit,  139  §  Fletcher  v.  Fuller,  120  U.  S.  534, 
Mich.  318,  102  N.  W.  848;  Timpson  7  Sup.  Ct.  667,  30  L.  ed.  759;  Brown 
V.  New  York,  5  App.  Div.  424,  39  N.  v.  Oldham,  123  Mo.  621.  27  S.  W. 
Y.  S.  248.  409 ;  Dunn  v.  Eaton,  92  Tenn.  743,  23 

4  Canton  Co.  v.  Baltimore,  106  Md.  S.  W.  163. 

69,  66  Atl.  679,  67  Atl.  274,  11  L.  R.  »  Ellis  v.  Smith,  112  Ga.  480,  Zl  S. 

A.    (N.   S.)    129n;    Schneider  v.   De-  E.  739. 

troit,  135  Mich.  570,  98  N.  W.  258.  lo  Depue  v.  Miller,  65  W.  Va.  120, 

^DeLand    v.    Dixon    &c.     Lighting  64   S.   E.   740,  23   L.   R.  A.    (N.   S.) 

Co.,  225   111.  212,  80  N.   E.   125;   La  775n. 

Barre  v.  Bent,  154  Mich.  520,  118  N.  ^^  Work  v.  United  Globe  Mines,  12 

W    6.  Ariz.    339,    100    Pac.    813;    Hardy    v. 

G  Jenkins   v.    Dewey,   49   Kans.   49.  Samuels,  92  Ark.  289,  122  S.  W.  654. 

30  Pac.  114;  Logue  v.  Hutson,  24  Ore.  i-  Charleroi  Timber  &  Cannel  Coal 

528,  34  Pac.  477;  Carolina  Sav.  Bank  Co.  v.  Spaulding   (Ky.  App.),  117  S. 

V.  McMahon,  Zl  S.  Car.  309,  16  S.  E.  W.  291. 

31.  i3  0wslev  V.  Matson,  156  Cal.  401. 

7  Walker  v.  Converse,   148  111.  622,  104  Pac.  983 ;  Tarver  v.  Depper,  132 


§  700 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


716 


After  a  title  is  once  acquired  by  adverse  possession,  abandon- 
ment by  the  holder  thereof  does  not  divest  him  of  title  unless 
such  abandonment  brings  about  an  estoppel  or  unless  the  title  to 
the  abandoned  property  vests  in  another  by  reason  of  such  other's 
adverse  possession.^* 

By  the  great  weight  of  authority  it  is  held  that  a  purchaser 
may  be  compelled  to  take  a  title  resting  upon  a  hostile,  adverse 
and  uninterrupted  possession,  under  color  of  title  which  has  con- 
tinued for  a  length  of  time  sufficient  to  bar  an  action  for  the 
recovery  of  the  property. ^^  But  in  all  cases  where  title  is  claimed 
through  adverse  possession,  a  diligent  inquiry  must  be  made  into 
the  facts  upon  which  the  title  rests,  and  if  such  facts  be  clear  and 
undisputed,  the  title  stands  upon  the  same  ground  as  any  other 
title  founded  upon  matters  in  pais.^** 

§  700.     Evidence  in  support  of  title  by  adverse  possession. 

In  titles  based  on  adverse  possession  there  must  be  evidence  to 
show :  ( 1 )  That  the  possession  has  been  open,  notorious  and  un- 
interrupted for  the  statutory  period;  (2)  that  there  is  no  saving 
to  any  person  on  account  of  personal  disabilities;  and  (3)  it 
must  appear  that  there  is  no  probability  but  what  the  means  will 
always  be  at  hand  to  establish  such  title  should  it  be  attacked. ^^ 
To  support  title  by  adverse  possession  it  is  necessary  to  show  that 
the  claimant  against  whom  it  is  asserted  was  not  prevented  by 
law  from  asserting  his  right  during  the  period  of  the  possession 
alleged  to  be  adverse.^* 

Before  passing  on  a  title  claimed  through  adverse  possession 
counsel  should  acquaint  himself  with  every  fact  tending  to  sup- 
port same.  He  may  find  of  record  a  judgment  or  decree  ren- 
dered in  an  action  to  support  the  title,  such  as  a  decree  quieting 
title  in  the  disseisor,  or  a  judgment  in  ejectment,  and  which  is 
the  highest  and  best  evidence  of  title  that  can  be  adduced.     He 


Ga.  798.  65  S.  K.  177,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  1161n:  Hillman  Land  &  Iron  Co. 
V.  Marshall.  (Ky.  App.).  119  S.  W. 
180;  Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Marburg,  110  Md.  410,  72  Atl.  839; 
Xeal  V.  Davis.  53  Ore.  423,  99  Pac. 
69,  101  Pac.  212. 

"Tarver  v.  Depper,  132  Ga.  798, 
65  S.  E.  177,  24  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
n61n. 

1^  Williams  v.    Porter    (Ky.  App.), 


21  S.  \V.  643 ;  Lunnan  v.  Huhner.  75 
Md.  268,  23  Atl.  646 :  Simis  v.  McFJ- 
roy,  160  N.  Y.  156,  54  N.  E.  674,  12, 
Am.  St.  673 ;  Core  v.  Wigner,  32  W. 
Va.  277,  9  S.  E.  36. 

i«Duvall  V.  Parker,  2  Duv.  (Ky.), 
182 

^-  Heller  v.  Cohen,  154  N.  Y.  299, 
48  N.  E.  527. 

1*^  Breeden  v.  Moore,  82  S.  Car.  534, 
64  S.  E.  604. 


717  ADVERSE  TITLE  §    700 

may  also  find  of  record  some  instrument  giving  the  disseisor 
such  color  of  title  as  will  start  the  statute  of  limitations  to  run- 
ning. The  payment  of  taxes  on  the  land  is  another  fact,  which, 
at  least  in  some  jurisdictions,  tend  to  strengthen  the  title/''  The 
mere  payment  of  taxes,  however,  is  not  necessarily  an  element  of 
adverse  possession,  but  tends  to  show  a  claim  of  title."**  Posses- 
sion alone  is  not  necessarily  evidence  of  any  particular  title,  but 
is  only  evidence  of  some  title,  and  counsel  must  make  inquiry 
outside  the  record  to  ascertain  if  all  the  elements  which  go  to 
make  up  a  title  by  adverse  possession  are  present.  If  there  is 
any  present  ground  to  apprehend  that  the  title  will  be  disputed, 
and  the  means  of  sustaining  it  are  not  available,  the  title  should 
be  rejected. 

19  Hardie  v.  Bissell,  80  Ark.  74,  94         20  Cashman    v.    Cashman's    Heirs, 
S.  W.  611.  123  Mo.  647,  27  S.  W.  549. 


CHAPTER    XXX 


TITLE  BY  DESCENT 


SEC.  SEC. 

705.  General  considerations.  726. 

706.  Civil  death — Casting  descent  by     727. 
imprisonment  for  life. 

707.  Ancestors.  728. 

708.  Ancestral  estates.  729. 

709.  When  seisin  of  ancestor  essen-     730. 
tial.  731. 

710.  Per  stirpes  and  per  capita. 

711.  Taking  by  representation.  732. 

712.  Issue. 

713.  Descendants.  733. 

714.  Heirs. 

715.  Forced  heirs. 

716.  Surviving  spouse  as  heir.  734. 

717.  Children  and  children's  children. 

718.  Adopted  children.  735. 

719.  Illegitimate  children. 

720.  Pretermitted  children.  736. 

721.  Posthumous   children. 

722.  Property  subject  to  descent.  737. 

723.  Devolution   of    real   property  to     738. 
heir.  739. 

724.  What  laws  govern.  740. 

725.  Lines  of  descent.  741. 


Computing  degrees  of  kindred. 
Descent  of  estates  of  minors  not 
having  been   married. 
Brothers  and  sisters. 
Next  of  kin. 

Kindred  of  the  half-blood. 
Inheritance    by    parents    of    in- 
testate. 

Inheritance  by  and  through 
aliens. 

Right  of  persons  causing  death 
of  intestate  to  inherit  his  prop- 
erty. 

Descent  of  estate  of  devisee  who 
dies   before   testator. 
Release    of    expectant    share    to 
ancestor. 

Inheritance    liable    for    debts    of 
decedent. 
Advancements. 
Proof  of  heirship. 
Proof  of  death  of  ancestor. 
Proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy. 
Abstract  of  descents. 


§  705.  General  considerations. — When  a  person  dies  with- 
out leaving  a  will,  his  property,  both  real  and  personal,  descends 
to  his  heirs  under  the  laws  of  intestate  succession.^  The  title  lo 
his  real  estate  thus  cast  by  law  upon  his  heirs  is  in  reality  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  ancestor's  title,  although  for  practical  purposes 
it  is  regarded  as  a  new  title,  and  when  asserted  must  be  proved." 
It  is  intended  by  the  laws  of  descent  to  make  such  a  will  for  the 
intestate  as,  if  he  had  died  testate,  he  would  have  been  most  likely 
to  have  made  for  himself,  and  its  obvious  policy  is  to  follow  the 
lead  of  the  natural  affections,  and  to  consider  as  most  worthy  the 
claims  of  those  who  stand  nearest  to  the  affections  of  the  intes- 
tate.^ 


^  Hannon  v.  Southern  Pac.  R. 
12  Cal.  App.  350,  107  Pac.  335. 
2  Marshall  v.  Rose,  86  111.  374. 


Co., 


3  Garland 
(Va.)  368. 


V.    Harrison,    8    Leigh 


718 


719  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    705 

The  word  "intestate"  used  in  the  rules  of  descent  and  distribu- 
tion, refers  to  the  property  of  the  intestate  undisposed  of  by  will, 
and  does  not  mean  that  a  decedent  shall  literally  die  intestate.* 
A  person  also  is  said  to  die  intestate  when  his  will  has  been  re- 
voked or  annulled  as  irregular.  But  where  the  word  "intestate" 
is  used  with  respect  to  particular  property,  it  has  reference  to  a 
person  who  dies  without  effectually  disposing  of  that  property  by 
will,  whether  he  left  a  will  or  not. 

The  descent  and  distribution  of  property  by  intestate  succession 
is  wholly  statutory  and  subject  to  legislative  control.  The  rights 
of  heirs  expectant  are  determined  by  the  law  in  force  at  the  an- 
cestor's death,  and  the  descent  of  realty  is  controlled  by  the  law  of 
situs. ^ 

Upon  the  death  of  the  ancestor  intestate  his  real  estate  descends 
at  once  to  his  heirs,  subject  (where  there  is  a  deficiency  of  person- 
alty for  the  purpose)  to  the  payment  of  debts  and  administration 
expenses,  and  subject  also  to  such  allowance  as  may  be  provided 
by  statute  for  the  surviving  spouse  and  children.^ 

While  the  personal  property  of  the  intestate  is  the  primary 
fund  out  of  which  debts  are  to  be  paid,  the  fact  that  a  decedent's 
real  estate  also  is  liable  for  his  debts  makes  it  important,  so  far  as 
the  title  to  the  real  estate  is  concerned,  that  there  should  be  an 
administration  of  his  estate;  for  if  there  is  no  evidence  in  the 
public  records  of  an  administration,  it  may  prove  difficult  to  show 
that  the  real  estate  may  not  be  held  liable  for  some  unpaid  debt  of 
the  decedent.  At  common  law,  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate  is 
at  once  cast  upon  his  heir  or  heirs;  that  is,  at  the  moment  of  the 
death  of  the  ancestor,  his  heir  becomes  the  owner  of  his  real  es- 
tate. This  common-law  rule  is  unchanged  in  many  American 
states,  but  in  a  few  states  the  administrator  or  probate  court  is 
vested  with  a  trusteeship  over  both  real  and  personal  property 
until  final  settlement  of  the  estate.  The  law  regulating  the  dev- 
olution of  the  property  of  intestates  is  almost  entirely  statutory, 
and  we  have  included  in  the  appendix  to  this  work  a  digest  of  the 
statutes  of  the  various  states  pertaining  to  the  subject.  But  it  may 
be  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  in  most  of  the  states  the  statutes 

*  Rocker  v.  Metzger,  171  Ind.  364,  E.  402,  29  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  780n. 

86  N.  E.  403.  6  In  re  Graves,  242  111.  212,  89  N. 

5  Brandies  V.  Atkins,  204  Mass.  471,  E.  978;   Maitlen  v.   Maitlen,  44   Ind. 

90  N.   E.  861,  26  L.   R.  A.    (N.   S.)  App.  559,  89  N.  E.  966;  Ison  v.  Hal- 

230;  In  re  Majot,  199  N.  Y.  29,  92  N.  comb,  136  Ky.  523,  124  S.  W.  813. 


"06 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


720 


of  descent  are  subject  to,  and  must  be  construed  with  reference 
to  the  law  concerning  dower,  tenancy  by  curtesy,  partnership, 
homesteads,  and  exemption,  and  particularly  to  the  law  in  favor 
of  the  widow  and  minor  children  for  their  immediate  support. 

§  706.  Civil  death — Casting  descent  by  imprisonment  for 
life. — The  term  "civil  death"  is  the  state  or  condition  of  a  liv- 
ing person  who  has  been  deprived  of  all  his  civil  rights  and  ca- 
pacities among  his  fellow  members  of  society,  and  who,  as  to  such 
rights  and  capacities  is  considered  the  same  as  if  he  were  dead/ 
At  common  law  it  involved  a  total  extinction  of  the  civil  rights 
and  relations  of  the  person,  so  that  he  could  neither  take  nor  hold 
property,  but  his  estate  passed  to  his  heirs  as  though  he  were 
really  dead;^  It  seems  to  be  a  necessary  conclusion,  from  the 
rules  of  the  common  law  governing  rights  of  property  as  affected 
by  forfeiture  for  crime,  that  civil  death,  one  of  the  consequences 
of  conviction  for  treason  or  felony,  did  not  of  itself,  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  at  least,  operate  to  divest  the  offender  of  his  title  to 
his  lands. **  It  is  provided  by  statute  in  some  states,  that  whenever 
any  person  who  shall  be  imprisoned  under  a  sentence  of  imprison- 
ment for  life  his  estate,  property  and  effects  shall  be  administered 
and  disposed  of  in  all  respects  as  if  he  were  naturally  dead.^"  Un- 
der such  a  statute  it  has  been  held  that  a  person  sentenced  to  im- 
prisonment in  the  state  prison  for  life,  is  deemed  civilly  dead,  and 
can  not  inherit  from  an  ancestor  dying  after  the  term  of  impris- 
onment has  begun. ^^  In  other  states,  however,  the  estate  of 
such  person  does  not  descend  or  vest  as  in  case  of  death. ^^ 

§  707.  Ancestors. — An  ancestor  is  one  from  whom  an  es- 
tate is  inheritable.  The  term  merely  means  the  person  from 
whom  the  estate  passes,  and  not  as  popularly  understood,  a  pro- 


7  In  re  Donnelly,  125  Cal.  417,  58 
Pac.  61,  li  Am.  St.  62. 

*  Baltimore  v.  Chester,  53  Vt.  315, 
38  Am.  Rep.  677. 

9  Avery  v.  Everett,  110  N.  Y.  317, 
18  N.  E.  148,  1  L.  R.  A.  264,  6  Am. 
St.  368. 

10  In  re  Donnelly.  125  Cal.  417,  58 
Pac.  61,  12>  Am.  St.  62;  State  v. 
Reeves,  97  Mo.  668.  10  S.  W.  841,  10 
Am.  St.  349;  Platner  v.  Sherwood,  6 
Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  118;  Baltimore  v. 
Chester,  53  Vt.  315,  38  Am.  Rep.  677. 


11  In  re  Donclly's  Estate,  125  Cal. 
417,  58  Pac.  61,  12>  Am.  St.  62;  State 
V.  Reeves,  97  Mo.  668,  10  S.  W.  841, 
10  Am.  St.  349 ;  Baltimore  v.  Chester, 
53  Vt.  315,  38  Am.  Rep.  677. 

12  Willingham  v.  King,  23  Fla.  478, 
2  So.  851 ;  Smith  v.  Becker,  62  Kans. 
541,  6i  Pac.  70,  53  L.  R.  A.  141; 
Avery  v.  Everett,  110  N.  Y.  317,  18 
N.  E.  148,  1  L.  R.  A.  264,  6  Am.  St. 
368 ;  Davis  v.  Laning,  85  Tex.  39, 
19  S.  W.  846,  18  L.  R.  A.  82,  34  Am. 
St.  784. 


721  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    707 

genitor.^^  It  does  not  mean  simply  a  lineal  ancestor,  but  the  per- 
son from  whom  property  is  derived  by  an  heir  under  the  statutes 
of  descent  and  distribution/'*  But  the  term  is  sometimes  used  in 
statutes  of  descent  to  mean  a  lineal  ascendant  or  progenitor.^"  In 
legal  contemplation  it  is  the  last  person  seised  of  an  estate  of 
inheritance,  and  from  whom  such  estate  is  transmitted  to  the 
heirs. ^°  As  the  term  is  used  in  a  statute  of  descent  it  means  any 
one  from  whom  the  estate  is  inherited.  In  this  sense  an  infant 
brother  may  be  an  "ancestor"  of  an  adult  brother,  the  former 
having  died,  and  his  estate  having  come  to  the  latter  as  his  heir.'' 
It  may  also  include  a  child,'*  or  a  husband  or  wife."  In  most 
states  the  term  embraces  all  persons  from  whom  a  title  by  descent 
could  be  derived,  thus  using  it  in  a  sense  almost  synonymous  with 
the  word  kindred,-"  and  embraces  both  lineals  and  collaterals.-' 

Where  a  statute  provides  that  if  an  intestate  had  no  children 
the  estate  should  pass  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate 
who  may  be  of  the  blood  of  the  "ancestor  from  whom  the  estate 
came,"  the  word  "ancestor"  means  the  person  from  whom  the 
estate  was  immediately  inherited."  Also  where  a  statute  pro- 
vides that  the  real  estate  which  came  to  the  intestate  from  his  par- 
ent or  "ancestor"  shall  belong  equally  to  the  brothers  and  sisters 
of  the  intestate,  the  term  "ancestor"  signifies  the  one  from  whom 
the  estate  immediately  descended,  and  not  from  a  remote  ances- 
tor.-^ Also,  the  word  "ancestor,"  as  used  in  a  statute  providing 
that  if  the  land  came  to  the  intestate  otherwise  than  by  purchase, 
or,  in  some  states,  if  it  came  to  him  either  by  descent  or  by  gift 
or  devise  from  an  ancestor,  it  shall  pass,  not  to  his  kindred  gen- 
erally, but  only  to  such  kindred  as  are  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor 
from  whom  it  was  derived  by  him,  is  to  be  construed  as  meaning 
the  immediate  ancestor  from  whom  the  intestate  received  the  in- 
heritance, devise,  or  gift."* 

!•'' Bailey  v.  Bailev.  25  Mich.  185;  i"  Cornett  v.  Hough,  136  Ind.  387, 
Prickett  V.  Parker.  3  Ohio  St.  394.         35  N.  E.  699. 

-0  Greenlee  v.  Davis.  19  Ind.  60. 

21  Wheeler  v.  Clutterbuck,  52  N. 
Y.  67. 

22  Clayton  v.  Drake.  17  Ohio  St. 
Z67 ;  Cliver  v.  Sanders,  8  Ohio  St. 
501. 

23  Buckingham  v.  Jaques,  2i7  Conn. 
402;   Clark  v.   Shailer.  46  Conn.   119. 

2*  Wheeler  v.  Clutterbuck,  52  N.  Y. 
67. 

46 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1*  Prickett 

V.    Parker.    3    Ohio    St. 

394. 

1^  Pratt  V. 

Atwood.   108  Mass.  40; 

\'alentine  v. 

Witherill,  31  Barb.   (N. 

Y.)  655. 

i*"'  Gardner 

V.    Collins,   2    Pet.    (U. 

S.)  58,  7  L. 

ed.  347. 

1-  Murphy 

V.    Henrv.   35    Ind.   442. 

18  Lavery  v.  Egan,  143  Mass.  389,  9 

N.  E.  699. 

5$  708 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


722 


By  the  common  law,  in  order  to  transmit  lands  to  his  heir,  it 
was  necessary  for  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  descent  was  cast 
to  have  had  actual  possession  of  the  land  constituting  the  inher- 
itance. Such  actual  seisin  made  a  person  the  strip  or  stock  from 
which  future  inheritance  by  right  of  blood  was  derived.  The 
necessity  for  seisin  in  the  ancestor  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 

§  708.  Ancestral  estates. — An  ancestral  estate  is  one 
which  came  to  a  person  by  descent  or  devise  from  a  now  dead 
ancestor,  or  by  deed  of  actual  gift  from  a  living  one,  there  being 
no  other  consideration  than  that  of  blood,  as  distinguished  from 
a  nonancestral  estate-,  which  is  one  coming  to  a  person  in  any 
other  way."^  "Ancestor"  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  "first  pur- 
chaser," or  one  who  acquired  the  lands  by  purchase.  In  this  con- 
nection the  word  "ancestor"  means  a  person  related  by  blood  to 
the  intestate  from  whom  the  estate  is  immediately  derived,  and 
includes  collaterals  and  refers  to  ancestors  in  estate,  and  not  nec- 
essarily to  ancestors  in  pedigree."*^  In  some  states,  persons  who 
are  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate  came 
can  not  inherit  at  all;'"  in  others  they  are  merely  postponed.""* 
Such  estate  consists  only  in  such  property  as  came  to  the  intestate 
from  an  immediate  ancestor,  from  whom  the  estate  descended, 
and  not  from  whom  it  remotely  descended,  unless  something  in 
the  language  or  context  of  the  instrument  passing  it  conditions  a 
reference  to  an  ancestor  more  remote.""  The  title  to  the  land  in 
question  must  have  come  to  the  intestate  directly  from  the  an- 
cestor in  order  to  come  within  the  rule.^**     In  determining  the 


z-'- Brown  v.  Whalcy,  58  Ohio  St. 
654,  49  N.  E.  65  Am.  St.  793.  Real 
estate  devised  to  a  granddaughter  by 
her  grandfather,  upon  her  death  with- 
out issue,  descends  to  liis  heirs,  in 
preference  to  her  next  of  kin.  Cool- 
idge  V.  Burke,  69  Ark.  237,  62  S.  W. 
583.  Descent  of  property  acquired 
from  an  ancestor.  In  re  Pearson,  110 
Cal.  524,  42  Pac.  960.  The  ancestral 
character  of  property  is  destroyed  by 
a  conveyance  by  the  owner  thereof  to 
another,  on  a  written  agreement,  that 
he  will,  upon  request,  reconvey  it  to 
the  grantor.  Kililken  v.  Kihlken,  59 
Ohio  St.  106,  51  N.  E.  969. 

-'■  Greenlee  v.  Davis,  19  Tnd.  60. 

-^  Clark  V.  Shailer,  46  Conn.  119; 
Gray  v.  Swcrer,  47  Ind.  App.  384,  94 


N.  E.  725;  Power  v.  Dougherty,  83 
Ky.  187,  6  Ky.  L.  621,  7  Ky.  L.  54; 
Cutter  V.  Waddingham,  22  Mo.  206; 
In  re  Simpson,  144  N.  Y.  S.  1099; 
Prickett  v.  Parker,  3  Ohio  St.  394; 
Morris  v.  Potter,  10  R.  I.  58. 
-**  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

2'-'  Gardner  v.  Collins,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
58,  7  L.  ed.  347 ;  Clark  v.  Shailer,  46 
Conn.  119;  Wheeler  v.  Clutterbuck, 
52  N.  Y.  Q;  Curren  v.  Taylor,  19 
Ohio  Z(i\  Morris  v.  Potter,  10  R.  I. 
58;  Amy  v.  Amv,  12  Utah  278,  42 
Pac.  1121. 

30  West  V.  Williams,  15  Ark.  682; 
Bristol  V.  Austin,  40  Conn.  438 ;  Cor- 
nett  V.  Hough,  136  Ind.  387,  35  N.  E. 
699;   Goodrich  v.   Adams,    138   Mass. 


'/2.}i  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    708 

course  of  descent  of  an  ancestral  estate,  all  the  kindred  of  the  de- 
cedent who  are  not  also  kindred  of  t^e  ancestor  from  whom  the 
estate  came  must  be  omitted  from  consideration.^'     Thus  if  a 
daughter  inherits  real  estate  from  her  mother,  and  then  dies  with- 
out issue,  or  surviving  husband,  it  descends  to  her  sister,  to  the 
exclusion  of  her  father,  for  the  reason  that  the  father  is  not  re- 
lated by  consanguinity  to  the  mother.^-    In  Maine,  however,  if  a 
minor  dies  unmarried,  his  estate  which  came  to  him  by  inheritance 
from  one  of  his  parents,  in  the  event  of  his  leaving  no  brother  or 
sister,  or  any  issue  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  his  estate  is 
not  treated  as  ancestral  estate,  but  descends  to  his  next  of  kin  in 
equal  degree,  whether  or  not  they  are  related  by  consanguinity 
to  the  parent  from  whom  the  inheritance  came."^    Where  an  es- 
tate which  an  intestate  received  by  descent  or  devise  from  his  an- 
cestor was  acquired  by  the  latter  from  his  ancestor,  it  would  seem 
that  the  last  or  immediate  ancestor  is  the  sole  stock  of  descent, 
and  that  the  kindred  who  inherit  need  be  of  the  blood  of  only 
such  last  ancestor.^*   But  where  the  fifth  canon  of  the  common 
law  prevails,  he  who  is  to  inherit  an  estate  which  descended  to  the 
intestate  must  also  be  related  to  him  from  whom  it  descended.^"' 
Where  no  distinction  is  made  in  the  statute  between  ancestral  and 
nonancestral  lands,  the  source  of  the  intestate's  title  is  immate- 
rial.^"    Where  such  distinction  is  made,  collaterals  of  the  half- 
blood  take  only  in  case  they  are  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from 
whom  the  inheritance  came." 

Where  the  land  came  to  the  intestate  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent 
from  a  parent,  it  will,  in  default  of  issue,  go  to  the  line  of  the  par- 
ent from  whom  it  came,  unless  there  is  a  statute  which  provides 

552;  Barnum  v.  Barnum,  119  Mo.  63,  Wheeler  v.  Clutterbuck,  52  N.  Y.  67- 

24   S.  W.  780;    Russell  v.   Bruer.  64  Curran  v.  Taylor,   19  Ohio  36.     De- 

Ohio  St.  1,  59  N.  E.  740 ;  In  re  Mc-  scent  of  property  acquired  by  descent, 

Cabe,  15  R.  I.  330,  5  Atl.  79.  devise  or  gift  from  parent  or  other 

31  Beard   v.   Mosely,   30    Ark.   517;  kindred  of  the  testator.     Whipple  v 
Johnson   v.    Lybrook,     16    Ind.    473 ;  Latrobe,  20  R.  I.  508,  40  Atl.  160 
Wheeler  v.  Clutterbuck,  52  N.  Y.  67;  ^.t  Lewis  v.  Gorman.  5  Pa.  St.  164 
Brower   v.    Hunt,    18    Ohio    St.   311;  •'^"  In   re   Pearson,    110  Cal.  524,  42 
Banner  v.  Shissler,  31   Pa.  St.  289.  Pac.  960;   Peacock  v.  Smart,  17  Mo 

32  Churchill    V.     Reamer,     8     Bush  402;  Prescott  v.  Carr,  29  N.  H    453 
(Ky.)  256;  Tillinghast  v.  Coggeshall,  61  Am.  Dec.  652 

7R   I.  383.  37  In    re    Smith,    131    Cal.    433,    63 

33  Decoster  v.  Wmg,  76  Maine  450 ;  Pac.  729,  82  Am.  St.  358 ;  Ryan  v.  An- 
Albee  v.  Vose,  76  Maine  448.  drevvs,  21  Mich.  229 ;  Cutter  v.  Wad- 

34  Oliver    V.    Vance,    34    Ark.    564 ;  dington,  22  Mo.  206. 
Clark     V.     Shalier,     46     Conn.     119; 


"09 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


724 


that  it  shall  go  in  a  different  course.''''  The  distinction  between  the 
devolution  of  ancestral  and  nonancestral  property  is  not  usually 
construed  as  diverting  the  descent  of  an  ancestral  inheritance 
from  the  nearest  of  kin,  but  only  from  those  not  of  the  ancestor's 
blood  who  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kinship  with  others  who  are 
of  the  ancestor's  blood. ^'^  The  general  ol)ject  of  ancestral  inher- 
itance is  to  continue  the  estate  in  the  family  of  the  intestate,  and 
in  effecting  it,  to  pay  due  regard  to  the  claims  of  the  successive 
branches  of  the  family,  and  principally  to  the  paramount  claim 
of  the  proximity  of  blood  to  the  intestate.*" 

As  a  general  rule  ancestral  property  goes  to  the  blood  of  the 
ancestor  from  whom  it  came  in  preference  to  the  next  of  kin  of 
the  intestate  not  of  his  blood. *^  As  the  relation  of  heir  and  ances- 
tor does  not  arise  between  husband  and  wife,  property  derived 
by  a  wife  from  her  husband  or  by  a  husband  from  his  wife,  does 
not,  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary,  de- 
scend to  the  surviving  spouse  as  ancestral  estate.*^ 

§  709.  When  seisin  of  ancestor  essential. — At  common 
law,  real  property  could  descend  only  from  one  seised  or  in  pos- 
session thereof  at  the  time  the  particular  estate  was  created.*^ 
The  possession  of  one  parcener  or  tenant  in  common  was,  how- 
ever, the  possession  of  all ;  and  the  possession  of  a  tenant  for 
years  was  considered  as  the  possession  of  his  lessor.  Hence  it  was 
no  objection  to  one  claiming  by  descent  that  the  estate  at  the  time 


3«  Beard  v.  Mosdy,  30  Ark.  517; 
Murphy  v.  Henrv,  35  Ind.  442 ;  Gar- 
ner V.  Wood.  71  Md.  2,7,  17  Atl.  1031 ; 
Childress  v.  Cutter,  16  Mo.  24;  Wells 
V.  Seeley,  47  Hun  109,  13  N.  Y.  S. 
239;  Bell  v.  Dozier,  12  N.  Car.  32,Z; 
Stannard  v.  Case,  40  Ohio  St.  211; 
Walker  v.  Dunshee,  38  Pa.  St.  430. 
Where  the  owner  of  ancestral  prop- 
erty died  intestate  leaving  no  broth- 
ers or  sisters,  and  tliere  were  no 
other  children  of  the  ancestor,  the 
mother  of  such  intestate  can  not  take 
as  his  legal  representative,  for  the 
words  of  the  state  mean  lineal  de- 
scendants onlv  and  do  not  include  par- 
ents. In  re  Tuttle,  77  Conn.  310,  59 
Atl.  44. 

•"^-'Ryan  v.  Andrews,  21  Mich.  229. 

40  Barnes  v.  Loyd,     Z7     Ind.     523; 


Coolidge  V.   Burke,  69  Ark.  237,  62 
S    W    583 

41  In  reGoetz,  13  Cal.  App.  292. 
190  Pac.  492 ;  Stevenson  v.  Grav.  46 
Ind.  App.  412,  89  N.  E.  509;  Driskell 
V.  Hanks,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  855: 
Garner  v.  Wood,  71  Md.  27,  17  Atl. 
1031 ;  Runey  v.  Edmands,  15  Mass. 
291 ;  Henderson  v.  Slierman,  47 
Mich.  267,  11  N.  W.  153;  Haring  v. 
Van  Buskirk.  8  N.  J.  Eq.  545;  Mat- 
ter of  McMillan,  126  App.  Div.  155. 
110  N.  Y.  S.  622;  Wilkerson  v. 
Bracken,  24  N.  Car.  315;  Brower  v. 
Hunt.  18  Ohio  St.  311;  Schmucker 
v.  Adams,  45   Pa.   Super.  Ct.  58. 

42  In  re  Proctor,  103  Iowa  232,  72 
N.  W.  516. 

4'''  2  Bl.  Comm.  209 ;  Jackson  v. 
Hendricks,  3  Jolins.  Cas.  214 ;  Bates 
V.  Shrader,  13  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  260. 


725  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    710 

the  descent  was  cast  was  in  the  possession  of  a  tenant  for  years, 
or  a  tenant  in  common  or  parcener  of  the  ancestor  under  whom 
a  claim  was  made.*^  This  common-law  rule  requiring  one 
claiming  as  heir  to  trace  his  descent  from  one  actually  seised  is 
not  in  force  in  any  of  the  states  of  this  country,  but  descent  is 
traced  from  the  person  last  entitled  to  the  land,  regardless  of 
whether  he  was  seised,  or  whether  he  obtained  the  land  by  pur- 
chase or  descent.*^  It  is  sufficient  if  the  ancestor  had  an  interest 
in  the  property,  whether  he  was  seised  thereof  or  not.  There  ex- 
ists one  familiar  instance  where,  under  the  statutes  of  many 
states,  an  heir  may  inherit  that  in  which  his  ancestor  never  had 
any  vested  interest.  Thus  if  a  devise  or  bequest  be  made  to  a 
child,  or  other  descendant  of  the  testator,  the  death  of  the  benefi- 
ciary before  the  testator  rarely  causes  the  devise  or  legacy  to 
lapse,  if  the  beneficiary  leave  issue.  Such  issue  inherit  as  though 
the  devise  or  legacy  had  vested  in  his  parent  in  his  or  her  lifetime, 
unless  the  will  shows  a  clear  intent  to  exclude  them.^° 

§  710.  Per  stirpes  and  per  capita. — Where  one  dies  in- 
testate, who  if  he  had  lived  would  be  entitled  to  an  estate  by  in- 
heritance as  heir  of  one  who  has  died  intestate,  his  children  or 
their  descendants  will  be  entitled  to  take  his  share  of  such  inher- 
itance by  descent  as  his  representatives.  As  such  representatives 
they  will  be  entitled  to  take  just  as  much  as  their  principal  would 
have  taken  and  no  more.  This  rule  of  law  is  called  taking  prop- 
erty per  stirpes,  or  by  the  right  of  representation ;  all  the  branches 
of  each  stirp  or  root  taking  the  share  of  the  inheritance  which 
the  root  they  represent  would  have  taken.  The  term  per  stirpes, 
or  according  to  the  root,  is  used  in  distinction  from  taking  per 
capita,  or  where  each  descendant  takes  a  share  of  the  inheritance 
in  his  own  right  as  next  of  kin  to  the  intestate.*' 

By  the  common  law  the  inheritance  invariably  passed  by  right 
of  representation  to  kindred  in  both  the  direct  and  collateral  lines 
of  descent ;  and  this,  too,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  such  de- 
scendants stood  in  equal  or  unequal  degrees  of  consanguinity 
to  the  intestate.     The  civil  law  was  as  strict  in  directing  the  de- 

44Lyell  V.   Kennedy,    14  App.   Cas.  Iowa   38,    124   N.  W.   804;    Mann   v. 

437.  Hyde,   71    Mich.  278,   39   N.   W.   78; 

4"^  4  Kent  Comm.  388.  Rivers  v.  Rivers,  36  S.  Car.  302,  IS 

4«  Ballard  v.   Camplin,  161   Ind.  16,  S.  E.  137. 

67   N.    E.   505 ;    In   re   Freeman,    146  *'  1  Bl.  Comm.  217. 


§    710  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  726 

scent  per  stirpes  so  long  as  the  descent  was  confined  to  the  direct 
line,  but  the  rule  was  not  applied  to  heirs  of  the  collateral  line 
only  where  they  stood  in  equal  degrees.  Where  such  collateral 
descendants  were  all  in  equal  degrees  to  the  intestate,  they  took 
the  inheritance  per  capita  and  not  by  representation.*'*  The  rule 
prevailing  in  America  differs  from  both  these,  in  that  if  the  de- 
scendants, either  lineal  or  collateral,  stand  in  equal  degrees  from 
the  common  ancestor,  they  will  take  the  inheritance  per  capita, 
but  if  they  stand  in  unequal  degree,  they  take  per  stirpes.'"' 
Hence,  if  the  next  of  kin  are  a  brother  or  a  sister  and  the  children 
of  a  deceased  brother  or  sister,  the  children  will  take  per  stirpes ; 
but  if  the  intestate  leaves,  as  his  next  of  kin,  only  nephews  and 
nieces,  the  children  of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters,  they  will  take 
his  estate  in  equal  shares.^" 

A  stirp  is  a  root  of  inheritance;  it  designates  the  an- 
cestor from  whom  the  heir  derives  title,  and  it  necessarily  pre- 
supposes the  death  of  the  ancestor.  When  issue  take  per  stirpes 
it  is  meant  that  the  descendants  of  the  deceased  person  took  the 
property  to  which  he  was  entitled,  or  would  have  been  entitled  if 
living. ^'^  Wliere  a  testator  devised  property  to  his  son  and  pro- 
vided "and  in  case  of  his  death  without  living  heirs  of  his  own, 
the  whole  shall  then  revert  to  my  heirs ;  but  should  he  have  heirs 
of  his  own  body  at  his  decease,  they  shall  share  equally  with  the 
rest  of  my  heirs,"  it  was  held  that  upon  the  death  of  such  son  the 
property  descended  to  the  heirs  of  the  testator  per  stirpes.^"  As 
a  general  rule  when  several  lineal  descendants  all  of  equal  con- 
sanguinity to  the  intestate  come  into  partition  with  others  of  a 
more  remote  degree,  the  former  take  per  capita  and  the  latter 
per  stirpes.^^  Where  the  testator  devised  land  to  his  wife  for  life 
with  remainder  to  his  heirs  and  her  heirs  and  their  heirs  and  as- 
signs forever,  share  and  share  alike,  and  at  the  time  of  the  wife's 
death  there  were  three  stocks  of  heirs,  it  was  held  that  the  heirs 
took  as  if  there  were  but  one  class,  that  they  took  per  capita  but 
not  per  stirpes,  and  that  the  devise  was  to  the  heirs  of  the  testator 

^l   Bl.  Comm.  217;   Sandar's  Jus-  '^'^  Rotmanskey    v.    Heiss,    86    Md. 

linian  pp.  344,  345  and  351,  352.  ■  633,  39  Atl.  415. 

■»■'  4    Kent    Comm.    391 ;    Blake    v.  "  Thomas  v.  Miller,  161   Hi.  60,  43 

Blake,  85  Ind.  65.  N.  E.  848. 

=oin  re  Breg's  Estate.  71  Minn.  11,  5.-5  All  v.   Day,   133   Mo.  337,  34  S. 

73  X.  W.  511;  Douglas  v.  Cameron,  W.  578. 
47  Nebr.  358,  66  X.  W.  430. 


727  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    711 

living  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  wife,  and  not  at  the  time  of 
the  testator's  death.'*  Where  a  will  provided  that,  "after  the 
death  of  the  last  of  my  children,  I  desire  that  my  real  estate  shall 
be  sold  to  the  best  advantage,  and  the  proceeds  equally  divided 
among  my  wife  or  her  heirs  and  my  grandchildren  or  their  heirs 
living  at  the  time,"  it  was  held  that  the  grandchildren  took  per 
capita  and  not  per  stirpes."^'  Where  children  and  grandchildren 
took  through  an  intervening  ancestor  and  not  direct  from  the 
original  ancestor,  they  took  per  stirpes  and  not  per  capita.^'' 
Where  there  is  to  be  a  distribution  between  near  and  remote  heirs 
the  law  will  favor  a  distribution  per  stirpes  in  preference  to  per 
capita."  Where  the  next  of  kin  of  an  intestate  were  nieces  and 
nephews,  it  was  held  that  they  inherited  directly  and  took  per  cap- 
ita and  not  per  stirpes.^^ 

The  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  inheritance  is  to  pass  by 
right  of  representation  or  per  capita,  is  one  of  importance  to  the 
heir,  as  it  will  often  make  a  difference  whether  distribution  is  to 
be  made  to  all  of  the  class  equally,  or  representing  two  or  more 
ancestors  respectively  whose  offspring  are  not  equally  numerous. 
One  effect  of  the  rule  of  taking  an  inheritance  per  stirpes  is  to 
cause  the  heirs  to  take  the  estate  subject  to  any  advancements 
w^hich  have  been  made  by  the  intestate  to  the  parents  of  such  heir, 
so  that  where  descendants  of  unequal  degrees  take  an  inheritance, 
those  of  the  more  remote  degrees  will  have  charged  against  their 
shares  any  advancements  made  to  their  parents ;  but  where  they 
take  per  capita,  or  directly  from  the  ancestor  as  his  next  of  kin 
in  their  own  right,  they  are  not  chargeable  with  advancements.^^ 

§711.  Taking  by  representation. — Inheritance  or  succes- 
sion by  right  of  representation  takes  place  when  the  descendants 
of  the  deceased  heir  take  the  same  share  or  right  in  the  estate  of 
another  person  that  their  parents  would  have  taken  if  living.  It 
means  the  same  as  taking  per  stirpes.*"^  A  right  of  representation 
invests  the  representative  with  the  place,  degree,  and  rights  of  the 

!5*  Bisson    V.    West    Shore    R.    Co.,  ^"  Kilgore  v.  Kilgore,  127  Ind.  276, 

143  N.  Y.  125,  38  N.  E.  104.  26  N.  E.  56. 

55  Morrill  v.  Phillips,  142  Mass.  •«  Baker  v.  Bourne,  127  Ind.  466, 
240,  7  N.  E.  771 ;  Maguire  v.  Moore,  26  N.  E.  1078. 

108  Mo.  267,  18  S.  W.  897.  ^^  Brown    v.    Taylor,   62    Ind.   295 ; 

56  Clark  V.  Cox,  115  N.  Car.  93,  20     Nelson  v.  Bush.  9  Dana  (Ky.)   104. 
S.  E.  176.  "0  Siders  v.  Siders,   169  Mass.  523, 

48  N.  E.  277. 


711 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


728 


person  represented.  It  was  recognized  both  in  the  common  and 
civil  law  as  existing  ad  infinitum  in  the  direct  descending  line.''^ 
This  doctrine  is  one  of  necessity,  and  is  only  resorted  to  when 
the  next  of  kin  are  in  unequal  degree,  to  prevent  the  exclusion 
of  those  in  the  remoter  degree.''"  The  right  to  take  by  representa- 
tion is  given  by  statute  to  children  in  all  the  states;  and  to  the 
desceiidants  of  brothers  and  sisters  in  many  of  them,  through  all 
descending  generations,  while  in  others  the  right  is  limited  to  the 
children  of  brothers  and  sisters.  Under  the  statutes  of  descent 
and  distribution  in  a  number  of  states,  it  has  been  held  that  no 
representation  shall  be  admitted  among  collaterals  after  brothers' 
and  sisters'  children  or  descendants.""  This  rule  is  laid  down  by 
statute  in  Alabama,  Connecticut,  Georgia,  Maine,  Maryland, 
Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Mississippi,  Nebraska,  New  Hamp- 
shire, New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  and  Vermont."* 
Under  these  statutes  it  has  been  held  that  the  children  of  deceased 
uncles  and  aunts  do  not  take  by  representation  as  the  next  of 
kin  of  the  intestate. ''^  It  has  also  been  held  that  where  the  right  to 
take  by  representation  is  limited  to  the  children  of  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  intestate  children  of  first  cousins  who  have  died  be- 
fore the  intestate  are  not  entitled  to  take  by  right  of  representa- 
tion.*^" In  Georgia,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania,  and  South  Carolina,  the  common-law  rule  which 
restricted  the  right  of  representation  among  collateral  kindred  to 
the  children  of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters,  prevails.'''^  The  right 
of  representation  seems  not  to  be  restricted,  but  to  extend  to  the 


^'^  Gaines  v.  Strong,  40  Vt.  354. 

«2In  re  Breg,  71  Minn.  11,  73  N. 
W.  511. 

63  Ector  V.  Grant,  112  Ga.  557,  37 
S.  E.  984,  53  L.  R.  A.  723;  Quin1)y  v. 
Higgins,  14  Maine  309 ;  McCotnas  v. 
Amos.  29  Md.  132;   Conant  v.  Kent, 

130  Mass.  178;  Clary  v.  Watkins,  64 
Nebr.  386.  89  N.  W.  1042;  Page  v. 
Parker,  61  N.  H.  65 ;  Davis  v.  Van- 
dervcer,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  558;  In  re  Un- 
derhill.  62  Misc.  456.  116  N.  Y.  S. 
798;  Contra,  Whitaker's  Estate,  175 
Pa.  St.  139,  34  Atl.  572 ;  In  re  Rogers, 

131  Pa.  St.  382,  18  Atl.  871. 

f'*  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

*^^  Ciiambers  v.  Chambers,  249  111. 
126,  94  N.  E.  108;  Porter  v.  Askew, 


11  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  346;  Page  v. 
Parker,  61  N.  H.  65 ;  Bailey  v.  Ross, 
32  N.  J.  Eq.  544;  In  re  Davenport, 
172  N.  Y.  454,  65  N.  E.  275;  Matter 
of  Nichols'  Estate,  60  Misc.  299,  113 
N.  Y.  S.  277;  Johnston  v.  Chesson, 
59  N.  Car.  146;  Clayton  v.  Drake,  17 
Ohio  St.  367.  Contra,  Whitaker's  Es- 
tate, 175  Pa.  St.  139,  34  Atl.  572. 

•"''  In  re  Campbell's  Appeal,  64 
Conn.  277,  29  Atl.  494,  24  L.  R.  A. 
667;  Ratcliffe  v.  Ratcliffe,  7  Mart. 
(N.  S.)  335;  Davis  v.  Vanderveer,  23 
N.  J.  Eq.  558;  Adee  v.  Campbell,  79 
N.  Y.  52;  A'latter  of  Underbill,  62 
Misc.  456  116  N.  Y.  S.  798. 

<"■  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 


i 


729  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    712 

descendants  of  collateral  relatives  in  Delaware,  Florida,  Kansas, 
Kentucky,  North  Carolina,  and  Rhode  Island.''®  In  Maine,  if  a 
decedent  leaves  a  brother  or  sister,  or  a  child  or  children  of  a 
deceased  brother  or  sister,  such  child  or  children  take  by  right  of 
representation.^''  In  Pennsylvania,  the  right  of  representation  is 
extended  to  the  grandchildren  of  brothers  and  sisters  and  the 
children  of  uncles  and  aunts. '^'^  "Where  the  right  of  representa- 
tion does  prevail,  as  among  descendants,  if  they  are  all  in  the  same 
degree  of  kindred,  as  all  the  grandchildren,  or  all  great-grand- 
children, they  take  in  equal  shares,  though  they  would  be  very 
equal  if  they  took  per  stirpes  and  by  right  of  representation.  The 
rule  of  representation  applies  only  from  necessity,  or  where  there 
are  lineal  heirs  in  different  degrees,  as  children,  and  the  children 
of  a  deceased  child  or  children,  or  brothers  and  sisters,  and  the 
child  of  a  deceased  brother  or  sister."^ ^ 

§  712.  Issue. — The  term  "issue,"  as  applied  to  the  descent 
of  estates,  includes  all  the  lawful  lineal  descendants  of  the  an- 
cestor. The  word  "issue,"  as  used  in  statutes  of  descent  and  dis- 
tribution, necessarily  includes  children.'"  Thus  w^iere  the  word 
"issue"  is  used  with  reference  to  the  parent  of  such  issue,  as 
where  the  issue  is  to  take  the  shares  of  the  deceased  parent,  it 
must  mean  his  children. '^^  While  the  w^ord  "issue"  includes  all 
descendants,  it  does  not  include  the  heirs  at  law^  of  a  person  dying 
without  children.'*  In  some  jurisdictions,  the  word,  when  used 
in  a  statute  to  define  the  rights  of  a  surviving  husband  or  wife  in 
the  estate  of  the  deceased  spouse,  has  been  held  to  include  an 
adopted  child.'^'^  But  there  are  contrary  conclusions  in  other 
jurisdictions. '^'^  Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  if  a  decedent 
leaves  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  but  leaves  issue,  the  whole 

C8  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  rower,    142   Pa.  432,  21   Atl.  826,  24 

in  appendix.  Am.  St.  507. 

•5'J  In  re  Reynolds,  57  Maine  350.  ''*  Bodine  v.   Brown,   12  App.   Div. 

TO  In  re  Hayes,  89  Pa.  St.  256.  335,  42  N.  Y.  S.  202. 

'■I  Knapp     V.     Windsor,     6     Cush.  "^  Drain  v.  Violett,  2  Bush.    (Ky.) 

(Mass.)    156.  155;    Atchison    v.    Atchison,    89    Ky. 

72Bigelow   V.    Morong.    103    Mass.  488,    11    Ky.   L.   705,    12   S.   W.   942; 

287.  Buckley  v.  Frasier,  153  Mass.  525,  27 

73  Madison  v.  Larmon,   170  111.  65,  N.  E.  768;   In  re  Rowan,  6  Pa.  Co. 

48  N.  E.  556,  62  Am.  St.  356;  King  Ct.  461. 

V.   Savage.    121   Mass.  303 ;   Drake  v.  '"'  Morse  v.  Osborne,  75  N.  H.  487, 

Drake,  134  N.  Y.  220.  32  N.  E.  114,  77  Atl.  403,  30  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  914n, 

17  L.  R.  A.  664 ;  Parkhurst  v.  Har-  Ann.    Cas.    1912A,   324 ;    Murdock   v. 

Murdock,  74  N.  H.  77,  65  Atl.  392. 


713 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


730 


estate  goes  to  such  issue,  it  is  held  that  the  word  "issue"  includes 
an  adopted  child."  It  has  been  held  that  the  word  "issue,"  as 
used  in  a  statute  providing  that  when  a  devise  is  made  to  any 
child  or  other  relative  of  the  testator,  and  such  child  or  other  rel- 
ative shall  die  leaving  issue  surviving  the  testator,  such  issue  shall 
take  the  estate,  means  "child  of  the  body"  or  "heir  of  the  body" 
of  the  deceased  relative  of  the  testator,  and  not  an  adopted  child 
of  the  testator.'^^  But  it  would  seem  that  an  adopted  child  is  a 
"lineal  descendant"  of  the  adoptive  parent,  such  as  will  prevent 
a  legacy  to  such  parent  from  lapsing  by  the  death  of  the  legatee 
before  the  testator.^"  It  has  been  held  that  an  adopted  child  is  not 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  providing  that  a  conveyance  or 
devise  attempting  to  create  an  estate  tail  shall  vest  a  life  estate  in 
the  grantee  or  devisee,  and  upon  his  death  the  lands  shall  pass  to 
his  "child"  in  fee,  or  in  case  there  is  no  issue,  to  his  "heirs."**"  An 
adopted  child  is  held  not  to  be  within  the  term  "legitimate  issue" 
as  used  in  a  statute  with  reference  to  the  revocation  of  a  will 
upon  the  birth  of  legitimate  issue. ''^ 

§  713.  Descendants. — Descendants  are  those  who  have 
issued  from  an  individual,  including  his  children,  grandchildren, 
and  their  children  to  the  remotest  degree,"^  but  does  not  include 
"next  of  kin"  or  "heirs  at  law"  generally,  as  these  terms  com- 
prehend descendants  as  well  as  ascendants  and  collaterals.''''  Thus 
a  husband  is  not  a  "descendant"  of  his  wife.^* 

According  to  its  accurate  lexicographical  and  legal  meaning 
the  word  "descendant"  generally  designates  the  issue  of  a  de- 
ceased person,  and  does  not  describe  the  child  of  a  parent  who 
is  still  living.  The  word  is  correlative  to  "ancestor"  or  "ascend- 
ant." *^    It  includes  the  most  remote  lineal  offspring  and  is  prac- 


"In  re  Newman,  75  Cal.  213,  16 
Pac.  887,  7  Am.  St.  146. 

78  Phillips  V.  McConica,  59  Ohio 
St.  1,  51  N.  E.  445,  69  Am.  St.  753. 

''^  Warren  v.  Prescott,  84  Maine 
483,  24  Atl.  948,  17  L.  R.  A.  435,  30 
Am.  St.  370. 

'-0  Clarkson  v.  Hatton,  143  Mo.-  47, 
44  S.  W.  761,  39  L.  R.  A.  748,  65  Am. 
St.  635. 

"Davis  V.  Fogle,  124  Ind.  41,  23 
N.  E.  860,  7  L.  R.  A.  485. 


82Lich  V.  Lich,  158  Mo.  App.  400, 
138  S.  W.  558. 

**•■'  Tompkins  v.  Verplanck,  10  App. 
Div.  572,  42  N.  Y.  S.  412;  Hamlin  v. 
Osgood,  1   Redf.  Surr.    (N.  Y.)   409. 

^■iPrather  v.  Prather,  58  Ind.  141. 
"Descendants  of  such  sisters  and 
lirothers,"  includes  only  legitimate 
descendants.  Giles  v.  Wilhoit 
(Tenn.),  48  S.  W.  268. 

8^'Hillen  V.  Iselin,  144  N.  Y.  365, 
39  N.  E.  368. 


731 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


714 


tically  synonymous  with  "issue"  in  its  legal  meaning,^"  but  does 
not  embrace  as  much  as  the  word  "relations.""  It  does  not 
include  relatives  in  the  ascending  linef*  nor  does  it  include  col- 
lateral relations. ®® 

§  714.  Heirs. — At  common  law,  an  heir  is  one  upon  whom 
the  law  casts  an  estate  in  lands  immediately  upon  the  death  of 
an  ancestor.""  It  included  only  those  born  in  lawful  wedlock."' 
But  the  civil  law  gives  a  more  extensive  meaning  to  the  term. 
By  this  law  all  persons  who  are  entitled  to  succeed  to  the  estate, 
both  real  and  personal,  whether  by  act  of  the  party  or  by  opera- 
tion of  law,  are  included  in  the  term."- 

The  word  "heir"  refers  to  a  class  of  persons  legally  entitled 
to  an  estate  under  the  statutes  of  descent  and  distribution."^  In 
its  strict  sense  it  involves  the  idea  of  descent  or  inheritance  by 
operation  of  law,  and  is  not  properly,  applicable  to  persons  who 
take  under  the  will  of  a  decedent."* 


86  Bates  V.  Gillett.  132  111.  287.  24  N. 
K.  611;  Tichenor  v.  Brewer's  Exr., 
98  Ky.  349,  17  Ky.  L.  936,  33  S.  W. 
86. 

"  Jewell  V.  Jewell  28  Cal.  232. 

88  Tichenor  v.  Brewer's  Exr.,  98 
Ky.  349,  17  Ky.  L.  936.  33  S.  W.  86; 
Schmaunz  v.  Goss,  132  Mass.  141 ; 
Mitchell  V.  Thorne,  134  N.  Y.  536, 
32  N.  E.  10,  30  Am.  St.  699. 

89  Bates  V.  Gillett,  132  111.  287,  24 
N.  E.  611;  Baker  v.  Baker,  8  Gray 
(Mass.)  101.  But  see  Turley  v.  Ttir- 
ley.  11  Ohio  St.  173. 

""2  Bl.  Comm.  201;  Meadowcroft 
V.  Winnebago,  181  111.  504,  54  N.  E. 
949;  Rountree  v.  Pursell.  11  Ind.  App. 
522.  39  N.  E.  747 :  Delashmutt  v.  Par- 
rent,  40  Kans.  641,  20  Pac.  504 ;  In  re 
Weir.  9  Dana  (Ky.)  434. 

■'1  Hoover  v.  Smith,  96  Md.  393, 
54  Atl.  102 ;  Jarboe  v.  Hey,  122  Mo. 
341,  26  S.  W.  968. 

■'2  Adams  v.  Akerlund.  168  111.  632, 
48  N.  E.  454;  Butterfield  v.  Sawyer, 
187  111.  598,  58  N.  E.  602,  52  L.  R.  A. 
75,  79  Am.  St.  246:  Morin  v.  Holli- 
day,  39  Ind.  ApD.  201,  77  N.  E.  861  ; 
Price  V.  Griffin,  150  N.  Car.  523,  64 
S.  E.  372,  29  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  935. 

»3  Mason  v.  Baily,  6  Del.  Ch.  129, 
14  Atl.  309;  Morton  v.  Barrett,  22 
Maine  257,  39  Am.  Dec.  575;  Haley 
V.    Boston,    108    Mass.    576;    Montig- 


nani  v.  Blade,  145  N.  Y.  Ill,  39  N. 
E.  719;  Corbitt  v.  Corbitt,  54  N.  Car. 
114;  Weston  v.  Weston,  38  Ohio  St. 
473;  In  re  McCrea,  180  Pa.  St.  81,  36 
Atl.  412;  Hanna  v.  Hanna,  10  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  97,  30  S.  W.  820. 

o*Slayton  v.  Blount,  93  Ala.  575. 
9  So.  241 ;  Johnson  v.  Knights  of 
Honor,  53  Ark.  255,  13  S.  W.  794,  8 
L.  R.  A.  732;  Hochstein  v.  Berg- 
hauser,  123  Cal.  681,  56  Pac.  547; 
Mason  v.  Baily,  6  Del.  Ch.  129,  14 
Atl.  309:  Butterfield  v.  Sawyer,  187 
111.  598,  58  N.  E.  602,  42  L.  R.  A.  75, 
79  Am.  St.  246 ;  Granger  v.  Granger, 
147  Ind.  95,  44  N.  E.  189,  46  N.  E. 
80,  36  L.  R.  A.  186,  190;  Phillips  v. 
Carpenter,  79  Iowa  600,  44  N.  W. 
898;  O'Brien  v.  Bugbee,  46  Kans.  1, 
26  Pac.  428;  Kent  v.  Owensboro  De- 
posit Bank,  91  Ky.  70,  12  Ky.  L.  668, 
14  S.  W.  962 ;  Lyon  v.  Lvon,  88  Maine 
395,  34  Atl.  180 ;  Hoover  v.  Smith,  96 
Md.  393,  54  Atl.  102 ;  Havden  v.  Bar- 
rett, 172  Mass.  472,  52  N.  E.  530,  70 
Am.  St.  295 :  Hascall  v.  Cox,  49  Mich. 
435.  13  N.  W.  807;  Rozier  v.  Graham, 
146  Mo.  352,  48  S.  W.  470;  State  v. 
Engle,  21  N.  J.  L.  347;  Bodine  v. 
Brown.  12  App.  Div.  335,  42  N.  Y.  S. 
202;  May  v.  Lewis.  132  N.  Car.  115, 
43  S.  E.  550 :  Jamieson  v.  Knights 
Templar  &c.  Assn..  9  Ohio  Dec.  (Re- 
print)   388,    12    Wkly.    L.    Bui.    272; 


;■;    714  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  7}>2 

Ordinarily  the  statute  of  distribution  must  be  looked  to,  to 
ascertain  the  persons  who  are  entitled  to  the  character  of  heirs. "^ 

Heirs  at  law  and  general  heirs  are  synonymous  terms  and 
include  all  who,  upon  the  death  of  the  ancestor,  have  the  right 
to  succeed  to  his  estate.'"' 

The  words  "heirs  of  the  body"  are  technical  words  of  limita- 
tion,"^ meaning  such  of  the  offspring  or  issue  as  may  by  law 
inherit. "^^ 

The  fact  of  heirship  must  be  proved,  as  this  is  a  question  for 
the  court  to  decide,  and  it  is  necessary  for  the  person  claiming 
to  be  heir,  to  show  his  relationship  and  to  leave  the  court  to  de- 
cide upon  his  status.  And  he  must  not  only  show^  his  relation- 
ship, but  also  that  no  other  relation  exists  who  would  impede 
the  course  of  descent,  or  who  could  affect  the  quantity  of  the 
estate  coming  to  him."" 

The  term  "heir  apparent"'  applies  to  persons  who  will  prob- 
ably inherit  from  a  live  ancestor.^  But  such  prospective  heir  will 
not  be  permitted  to  traffic  upon  his  prospective  inheritance,  un- 
less the  ancestor  has  given  his  consent  thereto." 

Heirs  are  lineal  and  collateral,  but  the  generic  term  includes 
both  classes.  Children  in  the  lifetime  of  the  parents  may  be  heirs 
presumptive,  but  they  are  not  heirs.  No  one  can  be  an  heir  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  the  ancestor.^  A  "lineal  heir"  is  one  who 
inherits  in  a  line  either  ascending  or  descending  from  the  com- 
mon source,  as  distinguished  from  a  collateral  heir.'*  An  heir 
is  not  deprived  of  his  right  of  inheritance  to  lands  not  devised, 
although  his  ancestor's  will  declares  he  shall  be.° 

In  re  Nichol,  128  Pa.  St.  428,  18  Atl.  39  111.  484;  Anson  v.  Stein,  6  Iowa 

ZZZ,  5   L.   R.   A.   597;   Cook  v.   First  150. 

Universalist  Church.  23  R.   I.  62,  49  nVard  v.  Stow.  17  N.  Car.  509,  27 

Atl.  389 ;  Barclay  v.  Cameron,  25  Tex.  Am.  Dec.  238. 

232:  Allison  v.  Allison,  101  Va.  537,  2  McClure  v.   Rahen,    125   Ind.   139, 

44  S.  E.  904,  63  L.  R.  A.  920;  Mc-  25  N.  E.  179.  9  L.  R.  A.  477;  Hart  v. 
Gonigal  V.  Colter,  32  Wis.  614.  Gregg,  Z2  Ohio  St.  502. 

95  Dukes  V.  Faulk,  Z1  S.   Car.  255,         ^  Booker  v.  Tarwater,  138  Ind.  385, 

16  S.  E.  122,  34  Am.  St.  745.  7,1  N.  E.  979;  Schoonmaker  v.  Sheely, 

0"  Forrest  V.  Porch,  100  Tenn.  391,  3    Dcnio     (^.    Y.)     485;    Robins    v. 

45  S.  W.  676.  Quinliven,  79  Pa.  St.  ZZ7,. 

"'^  Pearsol  v.  Maxwell,  68  Fed.-  513 ;  •*  Rockv  Mountain  Fuel  Co.  v.  Ko- 

In    re    Bacon's    Estate,   202    Pa.   535,  vaics,   26   Colo.    App.   554,    144    Pac. 

52  Atl.  135.  863. 

9**  Black  V.  Cartmell,  49  Ky.  188.  ^^  Ames  v.  Holmes,  190  111.  561,  6a 

99  Daugherty  v.  Deardorf,  107  Ind.  N.  E.  858. 
527,  8  N.  E.  296;  Skinner  v.  Fulton, 


733  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    715 

§  715.  Forced  heirs. — It  is  a  general  rule  of  law  that  a 
person  may,  by  gift  during  life,  or  by  will  after  death,  divest 
himself  of  his  entire  estate  to  the  exclusion  of  his  heirs  and  every 
one  having  any  interest  therein  except  his  creditors.  Such  dis- 
inheritance may  be  worked  as  against  the  heir  in  favor  of  an 
entire  stranger.  But  this  rule,  like  many  others,  is  subject  to 
exceptions,  one  of  which  is  the  right  given  by  statute  in  nearly 
all  the  states  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  To  these  respect- 
ive rights  all  rules  of  descent  and  distribution  are  made  subservi- 
ent, and  a  person's  right  to  control  the  distribution  of  his  estate 
by  will  is  thus  limited  by  the  statutory  rights  given  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife.  Such  statutes  create  a  class  who  can 
not  be  disinherited,  and  who  in  thus  far  may  be  denominated 
forced  heirs,  a  term  which  is  used  in  the  civil  law  to  designate 
a  class  who  can  not  be  disinherited.  It  means  those  persons 
who  can  not  by  gift  or  will,  be  deprived  of  the  portion  of 
the  estate  which  the  law  reserves  to  them."  Forced  heirs  are 
nothing  more  than  certain  legal  heirs,  who,  by  reason  of  their 
relationship  to  the  deceased  have  reserved  to  them  the  right  to 
claim  as  heirs,  if  they  so  like,  a  certain  portion  of  the  property 
of  the  deceased,  which  he  may  have  disposed  of  to  their  preju- 
dice.^ The  natural  children  of  a  decedent  can  not  be  regarded 
as  his  forced  heirs. - 

Under  a  statute  conferring  upon  a  second  or  subsequent  child- 
less wife  a  fee  in  her  deceased  husband's  real  estate,  and  at  her 
death  casting  the  descent  of  such  fee  upon  the  children  of  such 
husband  by  a  former  wife,  a  species  of  forced  heirship  is  cre- 
ated, and  it  has  been  held  that  such  children  by  the  former  wife 
took  the  descent,  not  from  the  father,  but  as  forced  heirs  of  the 
subsequent  childless  wife  through  whom  the  fee  was  made  to 
pass."  Where  the  law  of  "forced  heirship  obtains,  forced  heirs 
can  not  be  deprived  of  their  rights  by  will,^"  or  postponed  without 
their  consent."     Neither  can  forced  heirs  be  postponed  by  the 

e  Wells  V.  Goss.  110  La.  347,  34  So.  "Thorp  v.   Hanes.  107  Ind.  324,  6 

470;    Hagerty    v.    Hagerty,    12    Tex.  N.  E.  920;  Utterback  v.  Terlmne,  75 

456.  Ind.  363. 

7  Miller  V.   Miller,   105  La.  257,  29  "Cox   v.   Von   Ahlefeldt,   105   La. 

So.  802.  543,  30   So.   175 ;   Conn  v.   Davis,  33 

^  Reed  v.  Crocker,  12  La.  Ann.  436,  Tex.  203. 

443.  11  Portis  v.  Cummings,  14  Tex.  171. 


§    716  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  734 

intervention  of  a  life  estate  in  the  portion  to  which  they  are 
entitled.'-' 

§  716.  Surviving  spouse  as  heir. — At  common  law.  the  sur- 
viving husband  was  entitled  to  an  estate  by  curtesy  in  his  wife's 
real  estate,  and  the  surviving  wife  had  her  right  of  dower  in  the 
husband's  realty.  In  several  of  the  states  of  this  country,  cur- 
tesy and  dower  have  been  abolished  by  statute,  and  the  rights  of 
the  surviving  spouse  are  very  generally  regulated  by  legislative 
enactment,  giving  to  the  survivor  a  certain  portion  of  the  de- 
ceased spouse's  property.  The  interest  given  by  statute  to  the 
surviving  husband  or  wife  is  given  as  a  substitute  for  the  estate 
he  or  she  formerly  had  in  the  deceased  spouse's  lands  by  cur- 
tesy or  dower.  The  surviving  spouse  can  not,  perhaps,  be  said 
to  be  an  heir  in  the  strict  common-law  sense  of  the  term,  but  the 
statute  at  least  clothes  such  a  spouse  with  the  material  attributes 
of  an  heir,  and  places  him  or  her  in  that  relation.^^  The  better 
opinion,  however,  would  seem  to  be  that  the  surviving  spouse  is 
not  to  be  regarded  as  an  heir,  and  that  the  interest  which  he  or 
she  has  in  the  estate  of  the  intestate  spouse  should  be  treated 
as  existing  by  virtue, of  the  marital  relation  rather  than  as  heir 
to  the  decedent."^*  A  widow  is  only  an  heir  of  her  deceased 
husband  in  a  special  and  limited  sense,  and  not  in  the  general 
sense  in  which  the  term  is  usually  used  and  understood.^'"'  Some 
cases,  hold,  however,  that  on  the  death  of  a  resident  owner  of 
real  estate  without  descendants,  leaving  a  widow,  the  widow  is 
one  of  his  heirs  at  law  within  the  strict  legal  sense  of  the  term.^'' 
Some  cases  hold  that  the  surviving  spouse  is  a  statutory  heir,'^* 
or  an  heir  at  law  under  the  statutes  of  descent. ^^ 

Generally,  a  surviving  husband  or  wife  can  not  derive  from 
or  through  the  deceased  spouse  an  interest  in  any  estate  to  which 
the  latter  was  not  entitled  during  his  or  her  lifetime.^"    Nor  can 

"Parker  v.  Parker.  10  Tex.  83.  "Unfried  v.  Heberer,  62>  Ind.  67. 

13  Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  32  Ind.  497.  i"  Smith  v.  Winsor,  239  111.  567,  88 

A  surviving  wife  takes  the  property  N.  E.  482. 

of  her  intestate  husband  as  heir,  sub-  i^^  In    re    Ryan's    Estate,    14    Wkly. 

ject    to    the    payment    of    decedent's  Notes  Cas.  (Pa.)  79. 

debts.    Eastes  V.  Walley,  51  Colo.  166,  '«  Weston  v.  Weston,  38  Ohio  St. 

117  Pac.  136.  473. 

1*  Gauch  V.  St.  Louis  Mut.  L.  Ins.  lo  Prather  v.  Prather,  58  Ind.  141 ; 

Co..   88   111.   251.   30   Am.   Rep.   554;  Lane  v.  McKinstry,.  31  Ohio  St.  640. 
Journell    v.    Leighton,   49    Iowa   601 ; 
Richardson  v.  Martin,  55  N.  H.  45. 


735  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  *  §    717 

a  widow  of  a  deceased  husband  inherit  from  a  child  who  died  in 
the  hfetime  of  such  husband.-" 

§  717.  Children  and  children's  children. — We  have  said 
that  the  term  "descendants"  means  children  or  children's  chil- 
dren to  the  remotest  degree;  but  it  may  be  said  that  the  words 
"children"  and  "descendants"  are  not  ordinarily  synonymous.-^ 
While  children  are  descendants,  descendants  are  not  always  chil- 
dren;"" for  the  better  rule  is,  that  the  words  "child"  or  "chil- 
dren" do  not  include  grandchildren,  unless  there  is  some  expres- 
sion in  the  statute  denoting  that  the  words  were  employed  to 
designate  all  descendants  of  an  intestate. ^^ 

Where  a  statute  provides  for  descent  to  "children"  of  any 
deceased  brother  or  sister,  it  has  been  held  that  the  term  has 
reference  to  sons  and  daughters  of  such  brother  or  sister,  and 
does  not  include  grandsons  or  granddaughters  or  other  more 
remote  descendants."^  The  above  rule  is  subject  to  some  excep- 
tions in  the  cases  of  wills  and  other  conveyances,  when  it  was 
apparent  that  it  was  intended  to  give  the  expression  a  more  ex- 
tended signification.-^  The  commonly  accepted  definition  of  the 
word  "child"  is  a  son  or  daughter  in  the  first  degree.  Grand- 
children are  rarely  called  "children,"  the  word  "descendants"  be- 
ing ordinarily  considered  more  comprehensive  than  the  word 
"children"  or  "grandchildren."  The  term  "children"  can  not  be 
said  to  have  a  technical  or  peculiar  meaning  in  the  law  so  it  has 
been  held  to  extend  to  grandchildren  in  some  cases."'''  The  de- 
scent of  real  estate  to  children  may  be  considered  under  three 
contingencies :  (1)  Where  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  consist  solely 
of  his  children;  (2)  where  they  consist  of  children  and  the  issue 
of  deceased  children;  and  (3)  where  they  consist  of  grandchil- 
dren only.  If  there  are  surviving  children,  and  no  issue  of  de- 
ceased children,  the  inheritance  must  be  divided  equally  among 
such  children.     If  there  are  surviving  children  and  issue  of  de- 

20  In  re  Overdeick,  50  Iowa  244.  2*  Burns    v.    Tiffee,    49    Okla.    262, 

21  Neilson  v.  Brett,  99  Va.  673,  40     152  Pac.  368. 

S.  E.  32.  25  McGuire    v.     Westmoreland.     36 

22  Bates  V.  Gillett,   132   111.  287,  24     Ala.    594;    In    re    Currv's    Estate.    39 
N.  E.  611.  Cal.   529;    Willis   v.    Jenkins.    30   Ga. 

23Starrett  v.  McKim.  90  Ark.  520,     167;    Burgess   v.    Hargrove,   64   Tex. 
119  S.  W.  824;  Shanks  v.  Mills,  25  S.     110. 

Car.  358;  Waldron  v.  Taylor,  52  W.         26  !„  re  Curry's  Estate,  39  Cal.  529; 
Va.  284,  45  S.  E.  336.  In  re  Roberts'  Estate,  84  Wash.  163,. 

146  Pac.  398. 


§    718  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  736 

ceased  children,  the  share  which  would  have  descended  to  the 
parents  of  such  children's  children  wnll  descend  to  them.  In 
other  words,  the  surviving  children  take  per  capita,  while  the 
issue  of  deceased  children  take  per  stirpes.  If,  however,  none 
of  the  children  of  decedent  have  survived,  or  two  or  more  of 
them  have  left  children  surviving  them,  these  children's  children 
no  longer  take  per  stirpes,  but  share  equally  the  estate  of  their 
grandparents.  If  the  descendants  of  the  deceased  consist  solely 
of  grandchildren,  his  estate  will  be  divided  among  them,  but  if 
they  consist  of  grandchildren  and  the  descendants  of  deceased 
grandchildren,  then  such  estate  descends  to  the  grandchildren 
and  to  the  issue  of  the  deceased  grandchildren,  per  stirpes,  to  the 
remotest  degree. ■' 

Upon  these  subjects,  there  is  substantial  unanimity  in  the  stat- 
utory law  of  this  country.  Again,  the  term  "children"  includes 
all  the  legitimate  children  of  the  intestate  in  being  at  the  time  of 
his  death,  whether  the  issue  of  one  or  more  lawful  marriages.-'* 
The  words  "children  and  their  descendants"  used  in  first  rule  of 
the  statutes  of  descent  and  distribution  of  Florida  is  held  not 
to  include  step-children."'* 

§718.  Adopted  children. — The  adoption  of  children  and 
strangers  to  the  blood  was  unknown  to  the  common  law  of  Eng- 
land, and  exists  in  this  country  only  by  virtue  of  statute.^"  Most 
statutes  provide  that  an  adopted  child  shall  be  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  the  child  and  legal  heir  of  the  adoptive  parent  or  par- 
ents, and  entitled  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges,  and  subject  to 
all  the  obligations,  as  a  child  of  such  parent  or  parents,  begotten 

2"  Cox  V.  Cox,  44  Ind.  368 ;  Crump  Supreme  Council  of  Roval  Arcanum, 

V.   Faucett,   70  N.   Car.  345.     Where  59  N.  J.  Eq.  321,  45  Atl.   111.     Chil- 

but  one  child  and  no  surviving  wife,  drcn  of  decedent's  husband  by  former 

the    child    becomes    sole    distributee,  wife    can    not    inherit    from    the    de- 

Buckner  v.  Buckner,  120  Ky.  596,  87  cedent  an  estate  acquired  by  descent. 

S.  W.  776.  Amv  V.  Amy,    12  Utah  278,  42   Pac. 

2SBlacklaws   v.   Milne,   82   111.   505,  1121. 

15  Am.  Rep.  339;  Coffman  v.  Bartsch,  •"'o  Abney  v.  De  Loach,  84  Ala.  393, 

25   Ind.  201  ;   Jackson   v.   Hocke,   171  4  So.  757 :  Morrison  v.  Session's  Es- 

Ind.  371,  84  N.    E.    830;    Croan    v.  tate,  70  Mich.  297,  38  N.  W.  249,  14 

Phelps'  Adm'x,  94  Kv.  213,  14  Ky.  L.  Am.  St.  500;  In  re  Thorne,  155  N.  Y. 

915,  21   S.  W.  874.  23  L.  R.  A.  753 ;  140.  49  N.  E.  661 ;  Ballard  v.  Ward. 

Kent  v.  Barker.  68  Mass.  535;  Bates  89  Pa.  St.  358.     Statute  of  adoption 

V.  Cotton,  32  Miss.  266.  construed    and    applied.      Hilpire    v. 

2'>  Houston    v.    McKinney.    54    Fla.  Claude,  109  Iowa  159,  80  N.  W.  332, 

600,  45  So.  480.     See  also  Tepper  v.  46  L.  R.  A.  171,  77  Am.  St.  524. 


7Z7 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


718 


in  lawful  wedlock.'^ ^  Under  such  a  statute  it  is  held  that  an 
adopted  child  inherits  from  its  adoptive  parent,  but  not  through 
him  from  his  ancestors,  nor  will  he  ordinarily  be  allowed  to  suc- 
ceed to  the  estate  of  any  member  of  the  adopting  family  or  col- 
laterals of  the  adopting  parent,  nor  to  the  estate  of  children  born 
to  the  adopting  parent."" 

A  child,  when  adopted,  may  take  the  family  name  of  the  per- 
son adopting  it,  and  after  adoption,  the  two  usually  sustain  to- 
ward each  other  the  legal  relation  of  parent  and  child,  and  have 
all  the  rights  and  are  subject  to  all  the  duties  of  that  relation.^^ 


31  In  re  Jobson,  164  Cal.  312,  128 
Pac.  938,  43  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1062n; 
In  re  Newman,  75  Cal.  213,  16  Pac. 
887,  7  Am.  St.  146;  Barnes  v.  Allen, 
25  Ind.  222.  The  heirship  of  an 
adopted  child  is  estabhshed  by  the 
order  of  the  court  adopting  such 
child.  Brown  v.  Brown,  101  Ind. 
340.  Legal  status  of  adopted  child 
same  as  that  of  natural  child.  War- 
ren V.  Prescott  84  Maine  483,  24  Atl. 
948,  17  L.  R.  A.  435,  30  Am.  St.  370. 
Duly  adopted  child  as  a  child  capable 
of  inheriting.  Moran  v.  Stewart,  132 
Mo.  li,  2>Z  S.  W.  443;  Lathrop  v. 
Young,  25  Ohio  St.  451 ;  Schafer  v. 
Eneu,  54  Pa.  St.  304.  Giving  an 
adopted  child  a  right  to  inherit  does 
not  make  him  a  son  in  fact,  and  he 
is  so  regarded  in  law  only  to  give 
the  right  to  inherit.  Commonwealth 
V.  Nancrede,  Zl  Pa.  St.  389.  Legal 
status  of  adopted  child  same  as  that 
of  natural  child.  Hilpire  v.  Claude, 
109  Iowa,  159,  80  N.  W.  332,  46  L.  R. 
A.  171,  n  Am.  St.  524.  The  widow 
of  a  deceased  testator  who  dies  leav- 
ing an  adopted  child,  can  not  elect  to 
take  one-half  of  her  husband's  real 
estate  under  a  statute  giving  her  this 
right  in  case  he  "leave  no  child." 
Power  V.  Haflev,  85  Kv.  671,  9  Ky. 
L.  369,  4  S.  W.  683.  A  deed  to  a  per- 
son for  life  with  remainder  to  his 
"bodily  heirs"  does  not  include  an 
adopted  child  of  such  life  tenant. 
Clarkson  v.  Hallon,  143  Mo.  47,  44  S. 
W.  761,  39  L.  R.  A.  748,  65  Am. 
St.  635.  Legal  status  of  adopted 
child  same  as  that  of  child  born  in 
lawful  wedlock.  Glascott  v.  Bragg, 
111  Wis.  605,  87  N.  W.  853,  56  L.  R. 
A.  258. 

47 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


32  Van  Matre  v.  Sankey,  148  111. 
536,  36  N.  E.  628,  23  L.  R.  A.  665,  39 
Am.  St.  196;  In  re  Sunderland,  60 
Iowa  732,  13  N.  W.  655;  Phillips  v. 
McConica,  59  Ohio  St.  1,  51  N.  E. 
445,  69  Am.  St.  753.  Adopted  child 
not  heir  of  adoptive  parent's  kindred. 
Shelton  v.  Wright.  25  Ga.  636;  Pace 
V.  Klink,  51  Ga.  220;  Keegan  v.  Ger- 
aghty.  101  111.  26;  Barnhizel  v.  Fer- 
rell,  47  Ind.  335 ;  In  re  Sunderland, 
60  Iowa  732,  13  N.  W.  655 ;  Power  v. 
Hafley,  85  Ky.  676,  9  Ky.  L.  369,  4 
S.  W.  683 :  Wyeth  v.  Stone,  144  Mass. 
441,  11  N.  E.  729;  Van  Derlyn  v. 
Mack,  137  Mich.  146,  100  N.  W.  278, 
66  L.  R.  A.  437,  109  Am.  St.  669; 
Hockaday  v.  Lynn,  200  Mo.  456,  98 
S.  W.  585,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  117n; 
118  Am.  St.  672n,  9  Ann.  Cas.  775; 
Meader  v.  Archer,  65  N.  H.  214,  23 
Atl.  521;  Phillips  v.  McConica,  59 
Ohio  St.  1,  51  N.  E.  445,  69  Am.  St. 
753;  Helms  V.  Elliott,  89  Tenn.  446,  14 
S.  W.  930,  10  L.  R.  A.  535 ;  Moore  v. 
Moore,  35  Vt.  98.  Statute  of  adoption 
must  be  strictly  complied  with.  Ex 
parte  Clark,  87  Cal.  638,  25  Pac.  967. 
Where  an  intestate  had  adopted  his 
grandchild  as  his  own,  it  was  held 
that  such  adopted  child  could  take 
only  the  interest  of  a  natural  child, 
and  can  not  take  in  the  dual  capacity 
of  a  grandchild  and  as  an  adopted 
child.  Billings  v.  Head,  184  Ind.  361, 
111  N.  E.  177.  The  inheritance  given 
to  an  adopted  child  under  this  rule  is 
limited  to  its  adoptive  parents,  and  it 
can  not  take  from  the  estate  of  their 
collateral  kindred.  Boaz  v.  Swinnej^ 
79  Kans.  332.  99  Pac.  621. 

33  In  re  Jobson,  164  Cal.  312.  128 
Pac.  938,  43  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)   1062n. 


§    718  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  738 

Where  the  law  permits  a  husband  to  adopt  a  child  without  the 
assent  of  his  wife,  the  child  so  adopted  becomes  the  heir  of  the 
husband  alone,  and  it  sustains  no  relation  to  and  is  not  heir  of 
the  wife."*  Where  a  husband  can  not  adopt  a  child  without  his 
wife's  consent,  it  is  held  that  he  may  confer  upon  a  child  the 
right  of  an  heir  by  an  executed  contract  made  with  the  natural 
father  of  such  child."'  Where  the  child,  by  virtue  of  its  adoption, 
inherits  from  its  adopting  parents,  it  does  not  lose  the  right  to 
inherit  from  its  natural  parents."*^  While  an  adopted  child  is  heir 
both  to  its  natural  and  its  adopting  parents,  both  do  not  inherit 
from  it,  and  upon  its  death  unmarried  and  without  descendants, 
its  estate,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the  contrary,  vests  in  its 
natural,  to  the  exclusion  of  its  adopting  parents;^'  although  such 
estate  may  have  been  derived  from  the  adopting  parents.^''  But 
some  statutes  provide  that  when  any  adopted  child  shall  die  seised 
or  possessed  of  any  estate  which  came  to  such  a  child  by  inherit- 
ance from  or  upon  distribution  of  the  estate  of  any  parent  by 
adoption,  not  having  lawfully  devised  the  same  and  leaving  no 
surviving  wife,  husband,  issue  or  descendants,  the  same  shall  not 
go  to  the  kindred  of  the  blood  or  next  of  kin  of  such  adopted 
child,  but  shall  descend  to  the  heirs  or  be  distributed  to  the  next 
of  kin  of  such  parents  by  adoption."^  If  an  adopted  child  pre- 
deceases its  adopting  parents,  its  children  succeed  to  its  share  in 
the  estate  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been  a  natural  child.**' 
The  legal  relation  does  not  end  with  the  death  of  the  adoptive 
child,  and  so  the  line  of  descent  goes  back,  in  default  of  wife  or 

The    expression    "adopted     into     his  ing  a  child,   such   child   sustains   the 

family,"  as  used  in  the  statute  means  same  relations  to  her  as  to  her  hus- 

admitted  and  received  into  one's  fam-  band.     Balch  v.   Johnson,    106  Tenn. 

ily,  given   the   family  name,   and   ac-  249,  61  S.  VV.  289. 

knowledged  and  recognized  as  a  child.  '"•^'  Middleworth  v.  Ordway,  191   N. 

Estate  of  Morton  v.  Morton,  62  Nebr.  Y.  404,  84  N.  E.  291. 

420,  87  N.  W.  182.  so  Wagner  v.  Varner,  SO  Iowa  532. 

34  Barnhizcl  v.  Ferrell,  47  Ind.  335.  "  Upson  v.  Noble,  35  Ohio  St.  655 ; 

Child  adopted  by  a  husband  does  not  Lathrop  v.  Young,  25  Ohio  St.  451 ; 

become  the  child  of  his  wife  so  as  to  Hole  v.  Robbins,  53  Wis.  514,  10  N. 

be  entitled  to  claim  rights  in  her  es-  W.  617. 

tate.     Keith  v.  Ault,  144  Ind.  626,  43  ^s  Reinders  v.   Koppelman,  68  Mo. 

N.  E.  924.    A  child  adopted  by  a  spe-  482,  30  Am.  Rep.  802. 

cial  statute  as  the  heir  of  one  of  his  ^o  jijjnois :       Kurd's      Rev.      Stats, 

adopting  parents  does  not  thereby  be-  (1915-16),    p.    36,    §    6;    Wisconsin: 

come  entitled    to    inherit    from    the  Statutes   (1915),  §  2272a. 

other.    Webb  v.  Jackson,  6  Colo.  App.  ^o  p^ce  v.  Klink,  51  Ga.  220.    Con- 

211,  40  Pac.  467.     Where  a  wife  acts  tra.  In  re   Sunderland,  60  Iowa  732, 

conjointly  with  her  husband  in  adopt-  13  N.  W.  655. 


739  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    718 

children,  to  the  source  from  which  the  property  came/^  Under 
some  statutes  it  has  been  held  that  an  adult  person  may  be  adopted 
and  rendered  capable  of  inheriting  from  the  foster  parent,*"  but 
other  courts  have  held  that  the  word  "child,"  as  used  in  a  statute 
relating  to  adoption  can  not  be  construed  to  authorize  the  adop- 
tion of  an  adult."  Many  courts  have  held  that  the  proceedings 
for  adoption  must  be  in  substantial  conformity  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  statute;*"^  while  others  hold  that  the  proceedings 
must  be  in  strict  conformity  with  the  statute. ^^  But  it  would 
seem  that  omissions  from  the  strict  statutory  requirements  will 
not  necessarily  annul  the  established  status  of  the  person 
adopted. *°  In  some  jurisdictions  an  adopted  child  does  not  in- 
herit from  its  adoptive  parents  in  the  absence  of  an  affirmative 
statement  to  that  effect  in  the  statement  made  and  filed  with  the 
court,  or  the  use  of  language  which  clearly  indicates  the  inten- 
tion of  the  foster  parents  that  the  child  shall  inherit." 

Generally  a  decree  of  adoption  rendered  in  a  state  whose  laws 
make  an  adopted  child  the  heir  of  an  adopting  parent,  entitles 
such  child  to  inherit  the  parent's  land  situated  in  another  state. "*^ 
It  would  seem  that  upon  adoption  a  child  obtains  a  status  at  the 
place  of  its  domicile,  and  that  the  status  thus  obtained  will  be 
everywhere  recognized.*"    But  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  state  in 

41  Paul  V.  Davis,  100  Ind.  422.  111.  396,  65  N.  E.  782,  59  L.  R.  A.  664, 

42  Sheffield  v.  Franklin,  151  Ala.  93  Am.  St.  201;  Jones  v.  Leeds,  41 
492,  44  So.  Z72.  12  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  Ind.  App.  164,  83  N.  E.  526:  Fergu- 
884n,  125  Am.  St.  ?>7,  15  Ann.  Cas.  90;  son  v.  Herr,  64  Nebr.  649,  90  N.  W. 
In  re  Moran,  151  Mo.  555,  52  S.  W.  625.  94  N.  W.  542;  Wilson  v.  Otis.  71 
Z77  N.  H.  483,  53  Atl.  439.  93  Am.  St.  564 ; 

43  In  re  Moore,  14  R.  I.  38;  Wil-  Quinn  v.  Quinn,  5  S.  Dak.  328,  58 
liams  V.  Knight,  18  R.  I.  2>ZZ,  27  Atl.  N.  W.  808,  49  Am.  St.  875 ;  Crocker 
210.  V.  Balch,  104  Tenn.  6.  55  S.  W.  307 ; 

44  In  re  Woodward,  81  Conn.  152,  Parsons  v.  Parsons,  101  Wis.  76,  77 
70  Atl.  453 ;  Non-She-Po  v.  Wa-Win-  N.  W.  147,  70  Am.  St.  894. 

Ta,  2,7  Ore.  213,  62  Pac.  15,  82  Am.  47  Ferguson  v.  Herr,  64  Nebr.  649, 

St.  749 ;    Nugent  v.   Powell.   4  Wyo.  90  N.  W.  625,  94  N.  W.  542. 

173,  2,Z  Pac.  23,  20  L.  R.  A.  199,  62  48  Gloss  v.  Sankev.  148  111.  536,  36 

Am.  St    17.  N.  E.  628,  23  L.  R.  A.  665,  39  Am.  St. 

45Keegan  v.  Geraghty,  101  111.  26;  196;  Ross  v.  Ross,  129  Mass.  243,  Z7 

Watts  V.   Dull,   184  111.  86,  56  N.  E.  Am.  Rep.  321;  Melvin  v.  Martin.  18 

303,    75    Am.    St.    141 ;    Furgeson    v.  R.  I.  650,  30  Atl.  467.    Persons  adopt- 

Jones,  17  Ore.  204,  20  Pac.  842,  3  L.  ing   must  be   residents   of    the    state. 

R.  A.  620,   11  Am.  St.  808.     Statute  Eddie  v.   Eddie.   8   N.   Dak.   376,   79 

of  adoption  must  be  strictly  complied  N.  W.  856,  7Z  Am.  St.  765. 

with.      Tyler   v.    Reynolds,    53    Iowa  49  Scott  v.   Kev,   11    La.   Ann.  232; 

146,  4  N.  W.  902.  Ross  v.  Ross,  129  Mass.  243,  2>7  Am. 

4G  Barnard  V.  Barnard,  119  111.  92,8  Rep.    321;    Smith   v.    Kelly.   23   Miss. 

N.  E.  320;  Flannigan  v.  Howard,  200  167,  55  Am.  Dec.  87.    Legal  status  of 


§    719  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  740 

which  the  claim  of  the  adopted  child  is  urged  has  no  statute  upon 
the  subject  of  adoption,  or  a  statute  essentially  dissimilar  from 
that  of  the  state  in  which  the  adoption  took  place,  the  law  of  the 
adopting  state  wnll  not  be  allowed  to  prevail,  nor  will  the  adopted 
child  be  conceded  any  right  of  inheritance  not  given  it  by  the 
law  of  the  state  in  which  the  inheritance  is  claimed.^" 

§  719.  Illegitimate  children. — An  illegitimate  is  one  who 
is  born  out  of  law^ful  wedlock;  or  one  not  born  within  a  compe- 
tent time  after  the  termination  of  such  wedlock;  or  one  who  is 
born  out  of  wedlock,  the  parents  do  not  intermarry  and  the  father 
does  not  acknowledge  the  child  as  his  own ;  or  one  who  is  born  in 
lawful  w^edlock  w^hen  procreation  by  the  husband  is  show^n  to 
have  been  impossible.^ ^  At  common  law,  however,  one  born  out 
of  lawful  wedlock  w^as  not  made  legitimate  by  the  subsequent 
intermarriage  of  the  parents.^"  In  the  absence  of  positive  evi- 
dence to  the  contrary,  every  child  is  presumed  to  be  legitimate; 
and  this  is  true,  though  the  date  of  the  mother's  marriage  is 
shown,  and  there  are  circumstances  from  w^hich  it  appears  prob- 
able that  the  birth  of  the  child  occurred  at  a  prior  date.^^ 

Generally,  every  child  born  during  wedlock  is  presumed  to  be 
legitimate,  and  nothing  short  of  evidence  excluding  the  possi- 
bility of  its  legitimacy  w^ill  remove  this  presumption. °*  The  pre- 
sumption of  legitimacy  may  arise  if  the  relation  of  parent  and 
child  has  been  established  by  proof  that  the  child  has  always 

adopted  child  same  as  that  of  natural  v.  Ross,  129  Mass.  243,  Zl  Am.  Rep. 

child.     Flannigan  v.  Howard,  200  111.  321. 

396,  65  N.  E.  782,  59  L.  R.  A.  664,  93        ^i  1  Bl.  Comm.  457 ;  Smith  v.  Per- 

Am.  St.  201.     Adoption  of  child  ac-  ry.  80  Va.  563. 

cording  to  laws  of  another  state  giv-         ^^  in    re   Walker's    Estate,    5    Ariz, 

en  full  faith  and  credit  in  Louisiana.  70,  46  Pac.  67;  Brock  v.  State,  85  Ind. 

Succession  of  Caldwell,   114  La.  195,  397. 

38  So.  140.  108  Am.  St.  341.  ss  Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  127  111.  554, 
soLingen  v.  Lingen,  45  Ala.  410.  21  N.  E.  430,  4  L.  R.  A.  434,  11  Am. 
The  statute  has  no  extra-territorial  St.  159;  Strode  v.  Magowan,  2  Bush 
effect.  Brown  V.  Finley,  157  Ala.  424,  (Kv.)  621;  Caujolle  v.  Ferrie,  26 
47  So.  577,  21  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  679n,  Barli.  177  (afif'd.  23  N.  Y.  90)  ;  State 
131  Am.  St.  68,  16  Ann.  Cas.  778;  v.  McDowell,  101  N.  Car.  734,  7  S. 
Barnum  v.  Barnum,  42  Md.  241.  E.  785;  Dennison  v.  Page  29  Pa.  St. 
Rights  of  child  adopted  in  one  state  420,  72  Am.  Dec.  644.  Child  begot- 
to  inherit  lands  in  another  '  state,  ten  before  but  born  after  void  mar- 
Van  Matre  v.  Sankev,  148  111.  536.  36  riage  between  parents  held  legiti- 
N.  E.  628,  23  L.  R.  A.  665.  39  Am.  mate.  Swinnev  v.  Klippert,  20  Ky. 
St.  196;  Gray  v.  Holmes,  57  Kans.  L.  2014.  50  S.  W.  841. 
217,  45  Pac.  596,  33  L.Jl.  A.  207;  Ross        C4  Weatherford  v.  Weatherford,  20 

Ala.  548,  56  Am.  Dec.  206. 


741 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


719 


borne  the  name  of  the  father  to  whom  he  claims  to  belong,  and 
that  the  father  has  treated  him  as  his  child.^°  Though  a  child 
is  conceded  to  have  been  born  out  of  wedlock,  it  will  in  many 
jurisdictions,  be  legitimatized  by  the  subsequent  marriage  of  its 
parents,  thereby  enabling  it  to  inherit  to  the  same  extent  as  other 
children  born  after  such  marriage. ^'^ 

By  statute  in  some  states,  the  innocent  children  of  a  marriage 
de  facto  are  legitimate."  Under  statutes  requiring  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  illegitimate  child  by  the  father,  it  is  held  that 
such  acknowledgment  may  take  place  either  before  or  after  the 
taking  effect  of  the  statute. °^  At  common  law  if  the  parents 
have  been  formally  married  and  such  marriage  is  void  for  any 
reason,  the  issue  thereof  is  illegitimate;  but  if  the  marriage  is 
voidable  only,  and  requires  something  to  be  done  to  avoid  it  the 
issue  thereof  is  legitimate. ^^ 

That  an  illegitimate  child  may  be  legitimatized  is  a  principle 
that  is  unquestioned.  The  power  to  effect  such  legitimation  is 
one  which  is  inherent  in  the  legislature,  and  it  may  be  effected 
in  special  cases  or  by  acts  which  prevent  a  general  method  of 
legitimation.  Such  acts  may  be  both  retrospective  and  retro- 
active in  their  effects,  but  will  not  be  permitted  to  take  effect  to 


55  Lay  V.  Fuller  (Ala.),  59  So.  609. 

56  Houston  V.  Davidson,  45  Ga.  574; 
Jackson  v.  Moore,  8  Dana  (Ky.)  170; 
Miller  v.  Miller,  91  N.  Y.  315,  43  Am. 
Rep.  669.  The  marriage  of  parents 
of  illegitimate  children  does  not  le- 
gitimize the  latter,  except  as  provid- 
ed in  the  statute.  Trayer  v.  Setzer, 
72  Nebr.  845,  101  N.  W.  989.  The 
illegitimate  child  of  an  unmarried 
man  and  a  married  woman  who  sub- 
sequently marry  after  she  has  been 
divorced  from  her  husband  is  legiti- 
mated thereby  and  entitled  to  inheri- 
tance from  the  father  if  he  has  ac- 
knowledged the  child  as  his  child. 
Ives  V.  McNicoll,  59  Ohio  St.  402,  53 
N.  E.  60,  43  L.  R.  A.  772,  69  Am.  St. 
780. 

57  Dyer  v.  Brannoch,  66  Mo.  391, 
27  Am.  Rep.  359;  Wright  v.  Lore,  12 
Ohio  St.  619.  Legitimatization  of 
children  of  slaves  living  together  in 
good  faith  as  husband  and  wife.  Lee 
V.  Lee.  161  Mo.  52,  61  S.  W.  630. 

5«Townsend  v.  Meneley,  Zl  Ind. 
App.  127,  74  N.  E.  274,  76  N.  E.  321. 


Acknowledgment  of  legitimacy  of 
child  can  not  be  subsequently  contra- 
dicted. Binns  v.  Dazey,  147  Ind.  536, 
44  N.  E.  644;  Alston  v.  Alston,  114 
Iowa  29,  86  N.  W.  55.  A  writing,  to 
constitute  an  acknowledgment  of  pa- 
ternity within  the  provisions  of  the 
statute,  must  be  one  in  which  the  pa- 
ternity is  directly,  unequivocally,  and 
unquestionably  acknowledged.  Moore 
V.  Flack,  11  Nebr.  52,  108  N.  W.  143. 
No  intention  to  make  the  child  an 
heir,  and  no  distinct  statement  that  it 
is  an  illegitimate  child,  need  appear 
in  the  writing.  Thomas  v.  Thomas' 
Estate,  64  Nebr.  581,  90  N.  W.  630. 
Writing  held  not  a  sufficient  acknowl- 
ment  of  an  illegitimate  child  to  give 
it  the  right  of  inheritance.  Lind  v. 
Burke,  56  Nebr.  785.  11  N.  W.  444. 

5'J  Sneed  v.  Ewing,  5  J.  J.  Marsh 
(Ky.)  460,  22  Am.  Dec.  41.  Marriage 
between  a  white  woman  and  a  negro 
being  void  their  children  can  not  in- 
herit from  their  father.  Moore  v. 
Aloore,  30  Ky.  L.  383,  98  S.  W.  1027. 


§    719  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  742 

divest  rights  which  have  vested  prior  to  their  passage,  and  a 
descent  that  has  been  cast  will  not  be  opened  to  admit  an  illegiti- 
mate who  has  since  been  legitimatized."" 

By  virtue  of  the  general  principle  governing  the  conflict  of 
laws  that  the  policy  of  a  state  in  which  land  is  situated  must 
prevail  in  matters  appertaining  to  that  land,  statutes  of  legiti- 
mation can  have  no  force  as  to  land  outside  of  the  state  in  which 
they  have  been  passed  so  as  to  enable  a  person  who  has  been 
made  legitimate  in  one  state  to  take  land  by  inheritance  in  an- 
other, where  the  law  of  that  other  state  would  not  hold  him  as 
legitimate  if  he  were  a  citizen  of  that  state.''^  But  a  contrary 
view  has  been  announced  in  some  of  the  states,  and  it  has  been 
held  that  such  statutes  fix  the  status  of  the  person  in  the  place 
of  his  domicil,  and  that  this  status  once  fixed  remains  to  the 
person  and  accompanies  him  into  any  other  state  or  county  into 
which  he  may  remove.''"  At  common  law  an  illegitimate  per- 
son can  acquire  and  transmit  no  rights  of  inheritance  except  such 
as  may  result  from  his  own  marriage.  He  does  not  inherit  from 
his  own  mother  nor  she  from  him ;  nor  from  his  father,  though 
the  paternity  be  stated;  nor  through  the  other  children  of  the 
same  mother,  nor  they  through  him,*'^ 

By  lx)th  the  common  and  civil  law  the  most  important  disa- 
bility under  which  an  illegitimate  labored  was  that  he  possessed 
no  inheritable  blood  and  was  incapable  of  becoming  heir  to 
either  his  father  or  mother  or  to  any  one  else,  nor  could  he 
transmit  inheritance,  save  only  to  heirs  born  of  his  own  body. 
In  this  respect  the  well  settled  American  rule  differs  from  that 
of  both  the  common  and  civil  law,  as  legitimation  by  subsequent 
marriage  between  the  parents  is  the  principle  which  is  very  gen- 
erally admitted  in  the  legislation  of  the  different  states.     The 

eoGregley  v.  Jackson,  38  Ark.  487;  "2  Harvev  v.  Ball,  32  Ind.  98;  Scott 

McGunnigle  v.  McKee.  77  Pa.  St.  81,  v.    Key,    11    La.   Ann.   232;    Ross   v. 

18  Am.  Rep.  428;  Garland  v.  Harri-  Ross,    129    Mass.   243,    37   Am.    Rep. 

son,  8  Leigh    (Va.)    368.     Legitimiz-  321;   Miller  v.   Aliller.  9l   N.  Y.  315. 

ing  bastards  by  subsequent  marriage  43    Am.    Rep.   669.    The   law   of    the 

of  parents  and   recognition  of. child,  state  of  the   father's  domicile  deter- 

Houghton    V.    Dickinson,     196    Mass.  mines  the  status  of  both   father  and 

389,  82  N.  E.  481.  child.     Blythe  v.  Ayres,  96  Cal.  532, 

eiLingen   v.    Lingen.   45   Ala.   410;  31  Pac.  915,  19  L.  R.  A.  40. 

Stohz  V.  Doering,  112  111.  234;  Bar-  «•">  Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  127  111,  554, 

num  V.  Barnum,  42  Md.  251;  Smith  21  N.  E.  430,  4  L.  R.  A.  434,  11  Am. 

V.  Derr,  34  Pa.  St.  126,  75  Am.  Dec.  St.  159;  Hughes  v.  Decker,  38  Maine 

641.  153;  Bent  v.  St.  Vrain,  30  Mo.  268. 


t 


743  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    719 

rule,  too,  is  pretty  generally  recognized  by  statute,  that  permits 
illegitimate  children  to  inherit  from  the  father  under  certain 
restrictions;  and  also  that  an  illegitimate  child  and  its  mother 
shall  mutually  inherit  one  from  the  other.'^'*  Illegitimates  have 
been  made  heirs  of  their  mother  by  statute  in  New  Jersey,  New 
York,  and  North  Carolina,'''^  in  default  of  lawful  issue;  and  in 
all  of  the  other  states  they  inherit  from  the  mother  with  the 
legitimate  children,  share  and  share  alike/'*'  In  Arkansas,  Flor- 
ida, Illinois,  Indiana,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  New  Mexico,  Ohio, 
Pennsylvania,  Rhode  Island,  Texas,  Virginia,  and  West  Vir- 
ginia, illegitimate  children  not  only  inherit  from  their  mother, 
but  represent  her  so  as  to  inherit  from  her  kin,  share  and  share 
alike,  with  legitimate  children."  In  Arizona,  California,  Idaho, 
Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Montana, 
Nebraska,  Nevada,  North  Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Oregon, 
South  Dakota,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin,  illegitimate  children 
do  not  represent  their  mother  so  as  to  claim  any  estate  from  her 
kindred  whether  lineal  or  collateral."* 

The  courts  of  some  states  restrict  the  operation  of  statutes 
giving  to  illegitimate  children  rights  of  inheritance  by  them  from 
their  mother  or  by  her  from  them/^  Where  this  is  the  case,  the 
right  of  an  illegitimate  to  inherit  from  his  legitimate  brothers 

•54  Descent  of  property  from  illegi-  does  not  extend  to  collateral  kindred, 

timate  child.     Ward  v.  Mathews,  122  Hudnall  v.  Ham.  183  111.  486.  56  N. 

Ala.  188,  25  So.  50.    Illegitimate  child  E.  172,  48  L.  R.  A.  557,  75  Am.  St. 

of  testator's  daughter  to  whom  he  has  124.      Where    an    illegitimate    left    a 

devised  land  takes  such  devise  as  is-  widow,  collateral  heirs  were  preclud- 

sue    of    such     daughter.      Cherry    v.  ed  from  inheriting,  although  the  wid- 

Mitchell,   108  Ky.  1,  21   Ky.  L.  1547,  ow  had  released  her  right  to  inherit 

55  S.  W.  689.  bv  an  antenuptial  agreement.     Hud- 

65  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  nail  v.  Ham,  183  111.  486,  56  N.  E. 
in  appendix.  172.  48  L.  R.  A.  557,  75  Am.  St.  124. 

66  Alexander  v.  Alexander,  31  Ala.  gs  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
241;  In  re  Magee,  63  Cal.  414;_Krug  in  appendix.  An  illegitimate  child 
v.  Davis.  87  Ind.  590;  McGuire  v.  can  not  inherit  directly  from  the  an- 
Brown,  41  Iowa  650 ;  Black  v.  Cart-  cestors  of  his  mother.  Hogan  v.  Ho- 
mell,  10  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  188;  In  re  gan,  19  Ky.  L.  1960,  44  S.  W. 
Opdyke's  Appeal,  49  Pa.  St.  373.  953.    Rights  of  illegitimate  and  legit- 

67  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  imated  children.  Marionneau>r  v.  Du- 
in  appendix.  Illegitimate  child  inher-  puy,  48  La.  496,  19  So.  466.  Inher- 
its his  deceased  mother's  share  of  her  itance  by  illegitimate  children.  Mes- 
brother's  estate.  Mogre  v.  Moore,  ser  v.  Jones,  88  Maine  349,  34  Atl. 
169  Mo.  432,  69  S.  W.  278,  58  L.  R.  177.  Rights  of  illegitimates.  In  re 
A.  451.  Rights  of  widow  as  against  Scholl,  100  Wis.  650,  76  N.  W.  616 
deceased  husband's  grandchildren  by  "o  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  78  Ky.  .390, 
an  illegitimate  daughter.  Hope  v.  ,^9  Am.  Rep.  246;  Curtis  v.  Hewens, 
Hoover  (Miss.),  21  So.  134.  The  11  Mete.  (Mass.)  294;  In  re  Steckel, 
right    to    inherit    under   this    section  64  Pa.  St.  493. 


§  719 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


744 


and  sisters  is  denied. "''  In  a  majority  of  the  states,  the  mother 
of  an  illegitimate  child  inherits  from  it,  if  it  dies  unmarried,  and 
without  issue."  From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  the  right  of  ille- 
gitimates to  inherit,  or  to  transmit  inheritance  save  in  the  lineal 
descending  line,  is  entirely  statutory.  As  a  rule  statutes  giving 
illegitimates  the  right  to  inherit  from  the  mother  do  not  carry 
heritable  blood  generally  between  the  illegitimate  and  his  collat- 
eral maternal  relations,  but  the  taking  of  the  inheritance  is  lim- 
ited to  cases  of  lineal  ascent  or  descent.''  Such  statutes  confer 
upon  illegitimates  the  right  of  inheritance  by  representation 
through  the  mother,  both  in  the  lineal  and  in  the  collateral  line 
as  fully  as  if  they  were  legitimate;  and  they  will  take  as  heir  of 
the  mother  from  any  person  from  whom  the  mother  might  have 
taken  inheritance  had  she  been  living.'^ 

An  illegitimate  person  dying  without  issue,  his  or  her  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife  may  become  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the 
estate.'^*  The  right  of  illegitimate  children  born  of  the  same 
mother  to  inherit  from  each  other  is  recognized  in  some  of  the 
states. ^^  Statutes  enabling  illegitimates  to  inherit  property  their 
mother  would  have  taken  if  living,  do  not  grant  such  right  in 
case  the  mother  is  dead.^° 


'*>Doe  V.  Bates.  6  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
.S33:  Pratt  v.  Atwood,  108  Mass.  40; 
In  re  Woltemate's  Appeal.  86  Pa.  St. 
219:  BurliriRton  v.  Fosby.  6  Vt.  83, 
27  Am.  Dec.  535.  Right  of  illegiti- 
inate  child  to  inherit  from  its  parents 
does  not  extend  to  the  estates  of 
either  lineal  or  collateral  kindred  of 
either  parent.  Eddie  v.  Eddie.  8  N. 
Dak.  Tnd,  79  N.  W.  856,  1Z  Am.  St. 
765. 

71  In  re  Neil's  Appeal.  92  Pa.  St. 
193. 

72  Parks  V.  Kimes,  100  Ind.  148; 
Remmington  v.  Lewis.  8  B.  Mon. 
CKv.)  606;  Bent  v.  St.  Vrain,  30  Mo. 
268;   Bacon  v.   McBride.  32  Vt.  585. 

73  Parks  V.  Kimes.  100  Ind.  148. 
Children  of  an  illegitimate  who  is  en- 
titled to  inherit  may  inherit  through 
such  illegitimate.  Johnson  v.  Bodine, 
108  Iowa  594.  79  N.  W.  348.  An  H- 
legitimate  son  takes  under  a  devise 
to  his  mother  to  he  distributed  at  her 
death  to  her  "heirs  of  blood."  Hey- 
den  V.  Barrett,  172  Mass.  472,  52  N. 
E.  530,  70  Am.  St.  295. 


74  Southgate  v.  Annon,  31  Md.  113; 
Hawkins  v.  Jones.  19  Ohio  St.  22. 
Inheritance  of  property  from  illegiti- 
mates. McSurley  v.  Venters,  31  Ky. 
L.  963,  104  S.  W.  365. 

75  Brewer  v.  Blougher.  14  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  178.  10  L.  cd.  408;  In  re  Magee, 
63  Cal.  414;  In  re  Dickinson's  Appeal, 
42  Conn.  491.  19  Am.  Rep.  553;  Hous- 
ton V.  Davidson.  45  Ga.  574;  Miller 
V.  Williams.  66  111.  91 ;  Powers  v. 
Kite.  83  N.  Car.  156;  Briggs  v. 
Greene,  10  R.  I.  495.  A  legitimate 
child  will  inherit,  as  the  heir  of  his 
grandmother,  through  his  deceased  il- 
legitimate mother,  the  property  of 
another  illegitimate  daughter  by  such 
grandmother,  dj'ing  intestate  and 
without  issue,  and  subsequent  to  the 
death  of  such  mother  and  grand- 
mother. In  re  Magee,  63  Cal.  414. 
Descent  of  estate  of  illegitimate  in- 
testate dying  without  heirs.  Mead- 
owcroft  V.  Winnebago,  181  111.  504, 
54  N.  E.  949, 

7"  Truelove  v.  Truelove,  172  Ind. 
441,  86  N.  E.  1018,  88  N.  E.  516,  27 


'45 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


As  a  general  rule  the  father  is  not  considered  an  heir  of  his 
illegitimate  child  and  will  not  inherit  from  such  child,  unless  the 
child  be  made  legitimate  by  the  father.  But  in  most  states  ille- 
gitimates are  permitted  to  take  by  descent  from  the  father,  if 
some  formal  acknowledgment  of  the  relationship  has  been  made 
by  .the  father  in  his  lifetime. "^^ 

As  a  general  rule  the  law  of  the  state  of  the  father's  domicil 
determines  the  status  of  both  child  and  father  ;^^  but  there  are 
decisions  to  the  contrary."^. 

§  720.  Pretermitted  children. — If,  after  the  making  of  a 
will,  a  child  is  born  to  the  testator,  such  child  will  be  entitled  to 
participate  in  the  estate  of  its  ancestor  to  the  same  extent  as  if 
such  will  had  never  been  made,  though  the  testator  lives  suffi- 
ciently long  after  the  execution  of  the  will  to  have  revoked  it 
if  he  had  so  desired.-''  Though  children  be  living  at  the  time  of 
the  execution  of  a  will  they  will  generally  share  in  their  ances- 
tor's estate,  unless  his  omission  to  provide  for  them  in  the  will 
appears  to  have  been  intentional.^^  The  omitted  child  shall  take 
the  same  share  of  the  testator's  estate  that  it  would  have  been 
entitled  to  had  he  died  intestate,  unless  it  shall  have  been  pro- 
vided for  by  the  testator  in  his  lifetime,  or  unless  it  shall  appear 


L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   220n,  139  Am.  St. 
404. 

77Pina  V.   Peck,  31   Cal.  359;   Cox 
V.  Rash,  82  Ind.  519;  Crane  v.  Crane, 
31   Iowa  296 ;   Brown  v.  Belmarde,  3 
Kans.  41.     When   father  may  inherit 
from  illegitimate  children.     Alston  v. 
Alston,    114   Iowa  29,   86   N.   W.   55. 
Sufficiency  of   recognition  by   father. 
Markey  v.  Markey,  108  Iowa,  372>,  79 
N.   W.   258;    Watson   v.    Richardson, 
110  Iowa.  673,  80  N.  W.  407.     Rule 
confers  right  of  inheritance  on  child 
who    has    been    acknowledged    bj^   its 
father  before  passage  of  act,  though 
the    father   was   a   nonresident   alien. 
Moen   V.   Moen,    16   S.   Dak.   210,   92 
N.  W.  13.     A  general  and  notorious 
recognition  by  the   father  of  an  ille- 
gitimate child,   although   taking  place 
in  another  state  where  the  parties  re- 
sided  at  the   time   and   in   which   the 
child   may   have   no    right   to   inherit, 
i":  held   sufficient.     Van  Horn  v.  Van 
Horn,   107   Iowa  247.  17   N.   W.  846, 
45    L.    R.    A.   93.      Recognition    of    a 
child  by  a  man  as  his  son  is  not  alone 


sufficient  to  render  the  child  legiti- 
mate. It  must  appear  that  he  was 
the  father.  Stein's  A-dm'r  v.  Stein, 
32  Kv.  L.  664,  106  S.  W.  860. 

78  Scott  V.  Key,  11  La.  Ann.  232; 
Irving  V.  Ford.  183  Mass.  448,  67  N. 
E.  366,  65  L.  R.  A.  177.  97  Am.  St. 
447;  Miller  v.  Miller,  91  N.  Y.  315, 
43  Am.  Rep.  669 ;  Morris  v.  Williams, 
39  Ohio  St.  554. 

"Williams  v.  Kimball,  35  Fla.  49, 
16  So.  783,  26  L.  R.  A.  746,  48  Am. 
St.  238;  Smith  v.  Derr,  34  Pa.  126, 
75  Am.  Dec.  641. 

^^nVard  V.  Ward,  120  111..  Ill,  11 
N.  E.  336.  Rights  of  pretermitted 
child  or  issue  of  child.  Rowe  v.  Al- 
lison, 87  Ark.  206,  112  S.  W.  395.  A 
child  adopted  by  a  testator  after  the 
execution  of  his  will,  in  which  no 
provision  is  made  for  such  child,  has 
the  same  riglits  as  an  afterborn  child 
occupying  the  same  position.  Flanni- 
ean  v.  Howard,  200  111.  396,  65  N.  E. 
782,  59  L.  R.  A.  664,  93  Am.  St.  201. 
^1  In  re  Wardell,  57  Cal.  484. 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


746 


that  such  omission  was  intentional,  and  not  occasioned  by  any 
mistake  or  accident/" 

Statutes  generally  provide  that  if,  after  the  making  of  a  will, 
a  testator  shall  have  born  to  him  legitimate  issue,  then  such  will 
shall  be  deemed  revoked,  unless  provision  shall  have  been  made 
in  the  will  for  such  issue.  Under  such  statutes  the  pretermitted 
child  will  take  the  same  share  in  the  estate  and  hold  by  the  same 
title  as  though  the  testator  had  died  intestate,'^"*  unless  the  estate 
would  go  to  the  father  if  there  had  been  an  intestacy.**  Statutes 
containing  such  provisions  prevail  in  Connecticut,  Delaware, 
Georgia,  Indiana,  Kansas,  New  Jersey  and  Ohio.*^  Under  such 
statutes  a  pretermitted  child  born  after  the  execution  of  the  will 
and  before  the  death  of  the  testator,  or  a  pretermitted  posthu- 
mous child,  take  that  share  which  he  or  she  would  have  taken 
if  the  deceased  had  died  intestate.  In  many  states  it  is  provided 
by  statute  that  if  a  child  or  children  be  born  after  making  a  last 
will,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  context  to  show  that  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  testator  to  disinherit,  such  child  or  children,  the 
will  is  not  revoked  on  that  account,  but  the  devises  and  legacies 
will  be  abated  in  equal  proportions  to  raise  a  portion  for  such 
child  or  children  equal  to  that  which  such  child  or  children  would 
have  been  entitled  to  receive  if  the  testator  had  died  intestate."**^ 
Similar  provisions  will  be  found  in  the  statutes  of  Alabama,  Ar- 
kansas, California,  Colorado,  Delaware,  Iowa,  Maine,  Massachu- 
setts, Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New 
Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island, 
South  Carolina,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Utah,  Virginia,  Washington, 


^-  Hurley  v.  O'Sullivan,  137  Mass. 
86.  Where  a  testator  devised  lands 
to  a  daughter,  having  other  children 
whom  he  did  not  mention,  the  will 
providing  that  the  rest  of  his  estate 
other  than  the  devise  to  the  daughter 
be  disposed  of  as  the  law  directs,  it 
was  held  that  there  was  no  provision 
in  the  will  for  the  other  children  suf- 
ficient to  validate  the  devise  to  the 
daughter.  Williamson  v.  Roherts 
(Mo.),  187  S.  W.  19. 

s^Rowe  V.  Allison,  87  Ark.  206. 
112  S.  W.  395;  In  re  Callaghan,  119 
Cal.  571,  51  Pac.  860,  39  L.  R.  A.  689; 
Tavshanjian  v.  Abbott,  59  Misc.  642, 
112  N.  Y.  S.  583;  Lowery  v.  Hawker, 


22  N.  Dak.  318,  133  N.  W.  918,  2,7  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1143n;  In  re  Brown, 
22  Okla.  216,  97  Pact  613;  Neal  v. 
Davis,  53  Ore.  423,  99  Pac.  69,  101 
Pac.  212;  Roach  v.  Roach,  25  R.  I. 
454,  56  Atl.  684;  Mansfield  v.  Neff, 
43  Utah  258,  134  Pac.  1160;  Van 
Brocklin  v.  Wood,  38  Wash.  384.  80 
Pac.  530 ;  Sandon  v.  Sandon,  123  Wis. 
603,  101  N.  W.  1089. 

81  In  re  Witter,  15  N.  Y.  S.  133,  2 
Con.  Sur.  530. 

85  See  digest  of  statutes  of  wills  in 
appendix. 

'*"  Lowery  v.  Harlow.  22  Colo.  App. 
7?>,  123  Pac.  143;  Kidder's  Exrs.  v. 
Kidder   (N.  J.  Eq.),  56  Atl.  154. 


I 


747  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    721 

West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.^"  In  some  states  the  birth  of  a 
pretermitted  child  after  the  making  of  the  will  operates  to  make 
the  devises  and  bequests  of  the  will  contingent  upon  the  death  of 
such  child,  unmarried  and  without  issue,  before  it  reaches  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years.  Such  provisions  are  contained  in  the  stat- 
utes of  Kentucky,  Mississippi,  Texas,  Virginia,  and  West  Vir- 
ginia.^^  Marriage  and  birth  of  issue  after  the  making  of  a  will 
in  which  no  provision  is  made  for  the  children,  revokes  the  will 
pro  tanto  in  Pennsylvania.^^'-*  The  statutes  of  many  states  pro- 
vide that  whenever  a  devisee  or  legatee  in  any  last  will  and  tes- 
tament, being  a  child  or  grandchild  of  the  testator,  shall  die  be- 
fore such  testator,  and  no  provision  shall  be  made  for  such  con- 
tingency, the  issue,  if  any  there  be,  of  such  devisee  or  legatee, 
shall  take  the  estate  devised  or  bequeathed  as  the  devisee  or  lega- 
tee would  have  done  had  he  survived  the  testator,  and  if  there 
be  no  such  issue  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  such  testator,  the 
estate  disposed  of  by  such  devise  or  legacy  is  considered  and 
treated  in  all  respects  as  intestate  property.'*" 

§  721.  Posthumous  children. — A  child  born  after  the 
death  of  its  intestate  parent  is  regarded  as  in  being  at  the  time 
of  such  death  for  the  purpose  of  its  inheriting  real  property  at 
common  law."  Modern  statutes  generally  declare  that  if  a  child 
be  born  alive,  it  is  to  inherit  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  been 
born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate  and  had  outlived  him."-  The 
rule  may  be  said  to  be  practically  universal  in  this  country,  par- 
ticularly as  between  an  intestate  and  his  own  children,  that  pos- 
thumous children,  born  within  the  usual  period  or  gestation  after 
the  death  of  the  intestate,  will  be  entitled  to  share  in  the  estate 
of  the  intestate  father  as  if  they  were  born  during  his  lifetime 
and  had  survived  him.**^     For  the  purpose  of  inheritance,  a  pos- 

s''  See  digest  of  statute  of  wills  in  Stonestreet  v.  Doyle,  75  Va.  356,  40 

appendix.  Am.  Rep.  731. 

88  See  digest  of  statute  of  wills  in  »U    Bl.    Comm.    130;    Marsellis   v. 

appendix.  Thalhimer,   2    Paige    (N.   Y.)    35,   21 

s'J  See  digest  of  statute  of  wills  in  Am.  Dec.  66. 

appendix.  •'"  Barr  v.  Gardner,  259  111.  256,  102 

'JO  Beers    v.    Narramore,    61    Conn.  N.  E.  287;  Crisfield  v.  Storr,  36  Md. 

13  22  Atl.  1061 ;  Gill  V.  Grand  Tower  129,    11    Am.    Rep.    480;     Barker     v. 

Min.   &c.   Co..   92    111.   249;   Heald   v.  Pearce,  30  Pa.  St.  173,  72  Am.  Dec. 

Heaid,  56  I\Id.  300 ;  Hudson  v.  Grav,  691 ;   Pearson  v.   Carlton,   18  S.   Car. 

58    Miss.    882;    Yard    v.    Murray.    86  47. 

Pa     St.    113;    Kelly    v.    Nichols,    18  ^'^  Morrow  v.  Scott,  7  Ga.  535 ;  Cox 

R   I   62   25  Atl.  840,  19  L.  R.  A.  413 ;  v.  Matthews,  17  Ind.  367. 


§   7^1 


11 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


748 


thumous  child  is,  in  contemplation  of  law,  in  existence  from  the 
time  of  its  conception.  If  its  ancestor  dies  before  its  birth,  its 
share  of  the  inheritance  vests  in  it  at  the  moment  of  its  ances- 
tor's death,  and  can  not  be  divested  by  any  proceeding  to  which 
it  is  not  a  party.^* 

If  real  estate  of  the  ancestor  be  sold  in  ignorance  of  the  exist- 
ence of  such  child,  its  interest  can  not  be  affected  thereby,  and 
the  property  may  be  reclaimed  from  the  possession  of  an  inno- 
cent purchaser  thereof  in  good  faith  and  for  a  valuable  consid- 
eration."^ In  Tennessee,  the  right  of  posthumous  children  to 
inherit  is  dependent  on  their  birth  within  ten  months  after  the 
death  of  their  ancestor."^  Posthumous  relatives  other  than  chil- 
dren of  an  intestate  are  treated  as  not  in  being  in  his  lifetime, 
and  therefore  can  not  inherit  any  interest  in  his  estate.''^  A  pos- 
thumous child  may  be  excluded  from  an  inheritance  by  appro- 
priate words  in  a  will. 

§  722.  Property  subject  to  descent. — The  term  "descent," 
in  its  technical  legal  meaning,  applies  to  real  estate  only,****  but 
as  used  in  some  statutes,  it  includes  the  course  of  transmission, 
by  operation  of  law,  of  both  the  real  and  personal  property  of 
an  intestate. '■''■' 

Inasmuch  as  we  are  concerned  only  in  title  to  real  property 
by  descent,  our  inquiry  will  be  limited  to  such  property  as  de- 
scend to  heirs  as  real  estate  upon  the  death  of  the  intestate.  The 
term  "real  estate,"  as  used  in  this  connection  includes  all  lands, 
tenements,  and  hereditaments,  and  all  rights  thereto,  and  all  in- 
terests therein  possessed  and  claimed  in  fee  simple  or  for  the 
life  of  a  third  person.^     As  a  general  rule  all  vested  rights  and 


«•*  Bishop  V.  Hampton,  11  Ala.  254; 
Botsford  V.  O'Connor,  57  111.  72; 
Sansberry  v.  McKlroy,  6  Bush  (Ky.) 
440;  CathoHc  Mutual  Ben.  Assn.  v. 
Firnane,  50  Alich.  82,  14  N.  \V.  707. 

'■>'-  Dctrick  v.  Migatt,  19  111.  146,  68 
.A.m.  Dec.  584;  Massie  v.  Hiatt,  82 
Ky.  314,  6  Ky.  L.  176;  Pearson  v. 
Carlton,  18  S.  Car.  47. 

"•i  Melton  V.  Davidson,  86  Tenn. 
129.  5  S.  W.  530. 

°7Shriver  v.  State,  65  Md.  278,  4 
Atl.  679. 

osRudnall  v.  Ham.  172  111.  76.  49 
N.  E.  985;  Brower  v.  Hunt,  18  Ohio 
St.  311. 


99Hudnall  v.  Ham,  172  111.  16,  49 
N.  E.  985. 

1  Remington's  (Wash.)  Codes  and 
Statutes  (1915)  §  1354.  The  char- 
acter of  the  estate  at  the  death  of 
the  intestate,  as  impressed  upon  it  by 
his  act,  determines  the  course  of  its 
descent.  Zimmerer  v.  Stuart,  88 
Nebr.  530,  130  N.  W.  300.  In  de- 
termining questions  as  to  descent  of 
real  estate,  regard  is  had  to  the  legal 
title  only;  and  where  the  legal  title 
is  acquired  by  purchase,  and  equity 
in  the  property  bj^  inheritance,  the 
legal  title  and  equitable  interest  at 
once  unite,  and  upon  the  death  of  the 


749  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    722 

interests  in  real  estate,  and  all  contingent  interests  where  the 
person  is  certain,  descend  to  the  intestate's  heirs." 

It  has  been  held  that  the  interest  of  a  vendee  in  possession  of 
real  estate  under  a  contract  of  sale,  part  of  the  purchase  price 
of  the  land  having  been  paid,  at  his  death  descends  to  his  heirs.^ 
But  the  interest  of  a  vendor  who  retains  the  legal  title,  giving  a 
bond  for  a  deed,  or  delivering  the  deed  in  escrow,  descends  to 
the  heirs  of  the  intestate,  who  hold  it  only  as  security  for  the 
purchase  money,  subject  to  the  equitable  rights  of  the  purchaser, 
and  when  the  purchase  money  is  paid  it  goes  to  the  executor  or 
administrator/  The  holder  of  state  lands  under  certificates  of 
purchase  own  such  an  equitable  estate  as  descends  to  his  heirs. ^ 
Likewise  an  intestate's  interest  in  public  land  warrants  and  set- 
tlement claims  descends  to  his  heirs  the  same  as  other  lands.'' 
A  person  who  has  complied  with  all  the  requirements  necessary 
to  entitle  him  to  a  patent  of  lands  from  the  government  is  re- 
garded as  the  equitable  owner  thereof,  and  in  the  event  of  his 
death,  the  land  will  form  a  part  of  his  estate  and  will  descend 
to  his  heirs  in  accordance  with  state  laws.'^  Possessory  right 
of  a  locator  of  a  mining  claim  is  property,  and  on  the  death  of 
such  locator  descends  to  his  heirs.*  Where  an  ancestor  has  only 
an  equity  of  redemption  in  lands,  the  legal  estate  does  not  pass 

owner    the    descent    of    the    property  ^ Davie  v.  Davie   (Ark.),  18  S.  W. 

will  be  cast  as  an  estate  which  came  935;  Litsey  v.  Phelps,  5  Ky.  L.  513; 

by  purchase.     Higgins  v.  Higgins,  57  Flagg  v.  Teneick,  29  N.  J.  L.  25 ;  Mc- 

Ohio  St.  239,  48  N.  E.  943.  Cord   v.   Hames,   38   Tex.    Civ.    App. 

2  Murray  v.  Cazier,  23  Ind.  App.  239,  85  S.  W.  504.  Contra,  Bledsoe 
600,  53  N.  E.  476,  55  N.  E.  880 ;  Pot-  v.  Fitts,  47  Tex.  Civ.  App.  578,  105 
ter  V.  Worley,  57  Iowa  66,  7  N.  W.  S.  W.  1142. 

685,  10  N.  W.  298;  Moonev  v.  Olsen,  5  in  re  Grandjean's  Estate,  78  Nebr. 

21  Kans.  691;   Hicks  v.  Phillips,   148  349,  110  N.  W.  1108,  15  Ann.  Cas.  577. 

Ky.  670,  147  S.  W.  42,  47  L.  R.  A.  «  Atwood  v.  Beck,  21  Ala.  590 ;  Fil- 

(N.    S.)    882;    Codman    v.    Bradley,  more  v.  Reithman,  6  Colo.  120 ;  Coun- 

201  Mass.  361,  87  N.  E.  591 ;  Manners  oil    Improvement    Co.    v.    Draper,    16 

V.  Manners,  20  N.  J.  L.  142 ;  Robert-  Idaho  541,  102  Pac.  7 ;  Mauzv  v.  Hin- 

son    V.    Fleming,    57     N.     Car.     387;  richs,  90  Nebr.  735,   134  N.  W.  527; 

Midyette  v.  Grubbs,   145  N.  Car.  85,  Gould  v.  Tucker,  20  S.  Dak.  226.  105 

58   S.   E.  795,    13   L.   R.    A.    (N.    S.)  N.  W.  624 :  Fields  v.  Burnett,  49  Tex. 

278n;    Crist  v.    Cosbv,    11    Okla.  635,  Civ.  App.  446,  108  S.  W.  1048;  Hotch- 

69  Pac.  885;  Keller  v.  Auble,  58  Pa.  kin  v.   Bussell,  46  Wash.  7,  89   Pac. 

St.  410,  98  Am.  Dec.  297.  183. 

3  Flomerfelt  v.  Siglin,  155  Ala.  633,  7  Doran  v.  Kennedy,  122  Minn.  1, 
47  So.   106,   130  Am.   St.  67;  Hill  v.  141  N.  W.  851. 

Heard,   104  Ark.  23,   148  S.  W.  254 ;         «  O'Connell  v.  Pinnacle  Gold  Mines 
Wallace  v.  Hudson,  170  Cal.  596,  150     Co.,   140  Fed.  854,  72  C.   C.  A.  645, 
Pac.  988;  Cutler  v.  Meeker,  71  Nebr.     4  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  919n. 
732,  99  N.  W.  514;    Mauzy  v.   Hin- 
richs,  89  Nebr.  280,   131   N.  W.  218. 


§  '^^^ 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


750 


to  his  heirs,"  but  his  equity  or  rights  to  redeem  is  subject  to 
descent."'  When  the  equitable  and  legal  estate  in  land  unite  in 
the  same  person,  the  equitable  title  is  merged  in  the  legal  estate 
which  descends  according  to  the  rules  of  law ;  the  legal  title  only 
determining  the  course  of  descent  and  succession.^ ^  A  deceased 
partner's  interest  in  partnership  real  estate  descends  to  his  heirs 
at  law,  subject  to  the  equitable  rights  of  the  firm  and  its  cred- 
itors.^" The  law  of  descent  and  distribution  operates  upon  the 
property  of  the  individual,  and  not  upon  the  property  of  a  part- 
nership ;  and  there  is  no  individual  property  until  the  firm  prop- 
erty is  at  an  end,  which  does  not  occur  until  its  debts  are  paid, 
its  affairs  closed,  and  the  residue  of  the  assets  distributed.^^ 

Where  a  deed  conveyed  a  life  estate,  with  a  contingent  remain- 
der to  others,  the  fee  remained  in  the  grantor,  subject  to  be 
divested  by  the  happening  of  the  contingency  upon  which  the 
title  would  vest  in  the  remaindermen,  and  descended  to  the  heirs 
of  the  grantor  in  case  of  his  death  before  the  happening  of  the 
contingency.^*  If  a  remainder  is  vested  in  a  member  of  a  class, 
the  maximum  number  of  which  is  to  be  ascertained  in  the  future, 
and  therefore  will  open  to  let  in  new  members,  it  will  descend 
to  heirs. ^^  It  is  also  true  that  a  contingent  remainde;-  is  descend- 
ible where  the  contingency  is  not  as  to  the  persons  who  will  take 
the  ultimate  remainder  in  case  it  should  ever  vest.^*^  Where  a 
devise  is  to  one  and  his  children  forever,  and  the  first  taker 
dies  without  issue,  the  contingent  remainder  fails,  and  if  there 
is  no  residuary  clause  in  the  will,  the  share  to  which  the  remain- 
der pertained  descends  to  the  heirs-at-law  of  the  testator.^^ 

The  authorities  lay  down  the  rule  that  the  possibility  of  re- 
verter, while  it  can  not  be  alienated  or  devised  by  the  grantor, 
may  descend  to  his  heirs. ^® 

Franchises  of  indeterminate  and  unlimited  duration,  may  be 


9  Russell  V.  Roberts,  121  N.  Car. 
322,  28  S.  E.  406. 

1"  Bowery  Nat.  Bank  v.  Duncan,  12 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  405;  Avery  v.  Dufrees, 
9  Ohio  145 ;  Harvey  v.  Steptoe,  17 
Gratt.  (Va.)  289. 

"Howard  v.  Grant,  107  Ark.  594, 
156  S.  W.  433. 

i^Davidson  v.  Richmond,  24  Ky.  L. 
699,  69  S.  W.  794. 

i3Coolidge  v.  Burke,  69  Ark.  237, 
62  S.  W.  583. 


14  Collins  v.  Sanitary  Dist.  of  Chi- 
cago. 270  111.  108,  110  N.  E.  318. 

!■'  Drury  v.  Drury,  271  111.  Z2^,  111 
N.  E.  140. 

i«  Drury  v.  Drury,  271  111.  336,  111 
N.  E.  140. 

"Interior  &  W.  Va.  R.  Co.  v. 
Epling,  70  W.  Va.  6.  IZ  S.  E.  51. 

18  Church  v.  Venable.  159  111.  215, 
42  N.  E.  836,  50  Am.  St.  159;  North 
V.  Graham,  235  111.  178,  85  N.  E.  267. 


751  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    722i 

treated  as  incorporeal  hereditaments  capable  of  descending  to 
the  heirs  at  law  of  the  owner.^^ 

Such  rights  as  a  fee  conditional,""  the  unexpired  term  of  a 
deceased  lessee,"^  a  personal  right  to  use  land,"^  or  a  right  of  a 
person  interested  to  contest  a  will,^^  have  been  held  not  to  pass  by 
inheritance. 

§  723.  Devolution  of  real  property  to  heir. — The  title  to 
lands,  unless  otherwise  devised,  vests  eo  instante  upon  death  in 
the  heirs  of  the  decedent;  the  right  of  the  personal  representa- 
tive being  limited  to  selling  the  land  for  debts.-'*  The  heirs  take 
and  retain  such  title  with  all  the  rights  and  incidents  belonging 
thereto,  until  the  personal  representative  effectively  asserts  his 
right  thereto  for  the  purposes  provided  in  the  statute."^  The 
right  of  action  in  ejectment  and  for  waste  and  injury  to  the 
freehold  after  the  ancestor's  death  is  in  the  heirs  and  not  in  the 
administrator.'*'  The  administrator  is  not  entitled  to  the  pos- 
session of  the  real  estate  of  his  decedent  unless  it  becomes  neces- 
sary to  sell  it  to  pay  debts.  For  this  reason  he  can  not  main- 
tain an  action  for  possession,  or  in  any  manner  litigate  the  title ; 
nor  can  he  claim  the  right  to  possession  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
make  that  possession  adverse  to  the  heirs."'  Until  it  becomes 
necessary  to  sell  an  intestate's  land  to  pay  debts  his  adminis- 
trator's right  therein  is  a  mere  naked  power  resting  only  on  the 
contingency  that  the  personal  property  will  be  insufficient  to  pay 
such  debts. ^®    Until  the  happening  of  that  contingency  the  pos- 

19  Van  Dyck  v.  Bloede,  128  Md.  330.  25  Beckett   v.    Selover,   7   Cal.   215, 

97  Atl.  630.  68  Am.  Dec.  237 ;   Shaw  v.  Hoadley, 

20Owings  V.  Hunt,  53  S.  Car.  187,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  165;  Streeter  v.  Pat- 

31   S.  E.  237.  on,  7  Mich.  341  ;  Overturf  v.  Dugan, 

2iMcCormick    v.    Stephany,    57    N.  29  Ohio  St.  230;  Jones  v.  Billstein,  28 

J.  Eq.  257,  41  Atl.  840.  Wis.  221. 

22  Field  V.  Morris,  88  Ark.  148,  114  20  wilson  v.  Kirkland,  172  Ala.  12, 
S.  W.  206.  55  So.  174;  Mitchell  v.  State,  63  Ind. 

23  Selden  v.  Illinois  Trust  &  Sav-  574 ;  Brown  v.  Webster,  87  Nebr.  788, 
ings  Bank,  239  111.  67,  87  N.  E.  860,  128  N.  W.  635 ;  Marsh  v.  Waupaca 
130  Am.  St.   180n.  County,  38  Wis.  250. 

2*  Randolph   v.  Vails,    180  Ala.  82,  27  Hart  v.   Kendall,  82  Ala.   144,   3 

60  So.  159;  Rucker  V.  Tennessee  Coal,  So.  41;    Kidwell  v.   Kidwell,  84  Ind. 

&c.  R.  Co.,  176  Ala.  456,  58  So.  465 ;  224 ;    Noon    v.    Finnegan,    29    Minn. 

McMillan   v.   State,   160  Ala.   115,  49  418,  13  N.  W.  197;  King  v.  Boyd,  4 

So.   680;    Phelps   v.   Grady,    168   Cal.  Ore.  326;  Flood  v.  Pilgrim,  II  Wis. 

12>,   141    Pac.   926;    Raulet  v.    North-  Zld. 

western   Nat.   Ins.  Co.,   157   Cal.  213,  28  Harding  v.  LeMoyne,  114  111.  65, 

107    Pac.    292;    Parker    v.    Betts,    47  29    N.    E.    188;    Tippecanoe    Loan    & 

Colo.  428,  107  Pac.  816.  Trust  Co.  v.  Carr,  40  Ind.  App.  125, 


§  724 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


752 


session  belongs  to  the  heirs;  and  if  there  should  be  no  debts, 
or  sufficient  personal  property  to  pay  them,  the  administrator 
has  no  right  to  the  possession  of  the  real  estate.^" 

In  some  states,  however,  the  land  passes  to  the  heirs  of  the 
intestate,  subject  to  the  control  of  the  probate  court,  and  to  the 
possession  of  the  administrator  for  the  purpose  of  administra- 
tion.'*' 

§  724.  What  laws  govern. — The  law  in  force  at  the  time 
of  the  death  of  the  intestate  governs  and  regulates  the  descent 
of  his  estate.  Thus,  if,  at  the  time  descent  is  claimed  to  an 
estate,  it  appears  that  a  statutory  change  has  been  made  in  the 
laws  of  descent  since  the  death  of  the  ancestor  under  whom  the 
right  is  claimed,  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  such  death  must 
control,  rather  than  that  which  is  subsequently  enacted.'^  Hence, 
in  tracing  a  title  through  a  course  of  several  descents,  it  often 
becomes  necessary  to  refer  to  laws  long  repealed  or  modified. 
Upon  the  death  of  an  intestate  his  estate  immediately  vests  in 
those  who  by  the  laws  which  then  exist  are  declared  to  be  his 
heirs.  The  interest  which  they  thus  acquire  by  descent  is,  sub- 
ject to  the  payment  of  debts  of  their  ancestor  and  the  expenses 
of  administration,  assured  to  them  as  unalterably  as  if  it  had 
been  acquired  by  purchase,  and  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the 
legislature,  should  it  make  the  attempt,  to  divest  the  title  pre- 
viously acquired  by  descent."" 

The  descent  of  land  is  also  governed  by  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  land  is  situated,  or  as  some  times  expressed,  by  the 


78  N.  E.  1043;  Fike  v.  Green,  64  N. 
Car.  665 ;  Laidley  v.  Kline,  8  W.  Va. 
218. 

20  Stewart  v.  Smiley,  46  Ark.  Z7Z ; 
Phelps  V.  Funkhouser,  39  111.  401; 
Gladson  v.  Whitney,  9  Iowa  267  ;  Hill- 
man  V.  Stephens,  16  N.  Y.  278. 

3«  Banks  v.  Spcers,  97  Ala.  560,  11 
So.  841;  Oury  v.  Duffield,  1  Ariz. 
509,  25  Pac.  533 ;  Chowning  v.  Stan- 
field,  49  Ark.  87,  4  S.  W.  276 ;  Crosby 
V.  Dowd,  61  Cal.  557 ;  Doyle  v.  Wade, 
23  Fla.  90,  1  So.  516,  11  Am.  St.  334; 
State  V.  Prob.  Ct.,  25  Minn.  (Gil. 
85)  22;  Northcraft  v.  Oliver,  74  Tex. 
162,  11  S.  W.  1121;  Austin  v.  Bailey, 
27  Vt.  219.  86  Am.  Dec.  703 ;  Hazel- 
ton    V.    Bogardus,    8   Wash.    102,    35 


Pac.  602;  Jones  v.  Billstein,  28  Wis. 
221. 

2^  Kochersperger  v.  Drake,  167  111. 
122,  47  N.  E.  321,  41  L.  R.  A.  446; 
Stewart  v.  Wells,  47  Ind.  App.  228, 
94  N.  E.  235;  Brown  v.  Critchell,  110 
Ind.  31,  7  N.  E.  888,  11  N. 'E.  486; 
Succession  of  Davis,  126  La  178,  52 
So.  266;  Holmes  v.  Adams,  110 
Maine  167.  85  Atl.  492;  Messer  v. 
Jones,  88  Maine  349,  34  Atl.  177;  Hol- 
comb  V.  Lake,  24  N.  J.  L.  686;  Mat- 
ter of  Kiernan,  38  Misc.  394,  77  N. 
Y.  S.  924;  In  re  Wood's  Appeal,  18 
Pa.  St.  478. 

■  32  Hosack  V.  Rogers,  6  Paige  (N. 
Y.)  415;  Norman  v.  Heist,  5  Watts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  171,  40  Am.  Dec.  493. 


753  TITLE   BY    DESCENT  §    724 

lex  rei  sitae, "^  and  the  title  to  the  same  can  not  be  affected  by 
the  decree  of  a  court  of  another  state."*  The  lex  rei  sitae  gov- 
erns regardless  of  the  residence  of  the  intestate  or  claimant,^^ 
unless  some  rule  of  descent  makes  the  right  of  inheritance  to 
depend  upon  the  personal  status  of  the  heir,  then  only  is  such 
descent  governed  by  the  law  of  the  domicil,  and  such  personal 
status  is  determined  by  the  law  of  the  domicil.^'^  Also  Indians 
have  been  permitted  to  remain  in  a  state  without  being  subject 
to  its  laws,  but  owing  obedience  to  the  laws  of  their  own  tribe 
or  nation,  and  where  this  is  the  case  laws  to  which  such  persons 
are  subject  may  control  the  descent  of  their  property,  rather  than 
laws  of  the  state  in  which  they  and  it  are  situated.^'' 

The  lex  rei  sitae  applies  not  only  to  the  descent  and  disposi- 
tion of  real  estate,  but  to  all  contracts  and  instruments  affecting 
the  title  thereto,  together  with  all  immovable  property.  The  prin- 
ciple is  unquestioned  that  the  title  to  and  the  disposition  of  real 
property  must  be  subject  exclusively  to  the  law  of  the  country 
where  situated. ^^  The  state  in  which  any  real  estate  is  situated 
can  not  suffer  its  own  laws  to  be  changed  by  the  laws  of  for- 
eign states,  or  by  the  disposition  or  will  of  citizens  of  other 
states,  without  great  confusion  and  prejudice  to  its  own  inter- 
ests, and  for  this  reason  the  law  of  the  place  where  real  prop- 
erty is  situated  governs  exclusively  as  to  the  tenure,  the  title, 
and  the  descent  of  such  property. 

33  Wilson  V.  Storthz,  117  Ark.  418,  173  S.  W.  1129,  it  was  held  that  title 

175   S.  W.  45;   Crjssett  Lumber   Co.  to  property  left  in  trust  within   one 

V.  Files,  104  Ark.  600  149  S.  W.  908 ;  state  descended  according  to  the  laws 

Williams  v.   Kimball,   35   Fla.  49,    16  of   that   state,   although   the  intestate 

So.  783,  26  L.  R.  A.  746,  48  Am.  St.  resided  in  another  state  at  the  time 

238 ;  Putbrees  v.  James,  162  Iowa  618,  of  death. 

144  N.  W.  607 ;  McLean,  v.  McLean,  s*  Cooper  v.  Ives,  62  Kans.  395,  63 

92  Kans.  326,  140  Pac.  847 ;  Cooper  v.  Pac.  434. 

Ives,    62    Kans.    395,    63    Pac.    434;  ss  Boeing  v.  Owsley,  122  Minn.  190, 

Whitman  v.  Huefner.  221   Mass.  265,  142  N.  W.  129. 

108  N.  E.  1054 ;  Rackemann  v.  Tay-  ^r.  Harvey  v.  Ball.  32  Ind.  98. 

lor,  204  Mass.  394,  90  N.  E.  552 ;  Do-  s"  Brown   v.    Steele,   23   Kans.  672. 

ran   v.   Beale,    106   Miss.   305   63    So.  Indian  lands  descend  to  the  heirs  of 

647 ;   Pratt  v.  Douglas,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  the  deceased  owner  according  to  the 

516;   In   re  Majot,   199  N.  Y.  29,  92  laws   of   descent   and   distribution   of 

N.  E.  402,  29  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)  780n ;  the  Creek  Nation.  Irving  v.  Diamond, 

Bonati  v.  Welsch,  24  N.  Y.  157 ;  In  re  23  Okla.  325,  100  Pac.  557. 

Barnes'  Estate,  47  Okla.  117,  147  Pa.  ss  Darby  v.  Maver,  10  Wheat.    (U. 

504 ;  State  v.  McDonald.  59  Ore.  520,  S.^  465,  6  L.  ed.  367 ;  Kerr  v.  Moon, 

117  Pac.  281 ;  Hohn  v.  Bidwell,  27  S.  9  Wheat,   (U.  S.)   565,  6  L.  ed.  161 ; 

Dak.  249,  130  N.  W.  837;  Waterman  United    States    v.    Crosby,    7    Cranch 

V.  Carlton.   102  Tex.  510,   120  S.  W.  (U.  S.)   115,  3  L.  ed.  287;  Bethell  v. 

171.     In  Lee  v.  Belknap,  163  Ky.  418,  Bethell,  54  Ind.  428,  23  Am.  Rep.  650. 

48 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    725  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  754 

§  725.  Lines  of  descent. — Lines  of  descent  are  composed 
of  a  series  of  persons  who  have  descended  from  the  common 
ancestor,  placed  one  under  the  other  in  the  order  of  their  birth ; 
and  such  hne  of  descent  is  either  direct  or  collateral.  These  two 
lines  are  independent  and  have  no  connection  except  by  their 
union  in  the  person  of  the  common  ancestor.  It  is  at  this  point 
of  connection  that  the  relations  existing  between  the  persons 
composing  the  two  lines  is  formed.  Each  of  these  lines  may 
also  be  paternal  or  maternal,  according  as  the  line  of  descent  is 
traced  through  the  father  or  mother.^^  The  direct  line  of  de- 
scent is  composed  of  all  the  persons  who  are  descended  from 
each  other.  This  line  is  divided  into  two  parts,  a  descending  line 
and  an  ascending  line,  and  constitutes  lineal  descent.  The  term 
collateral  is  used  in  this  connection  in  opposition  to  lineal,  for 
the  collateral  line  of  descent,  considered  by  itself  and  in  rela- 
tion to  the  common  ancestor,  is  a  direct  Hne  of  descent,  and  can 
only  be  considered  as  collateral  when  placed  alongside  of  an- 
other line  of  descent,  below  the  common  ancestor,  in  whom  both 
lines  unite.  Those  who  descend  from  the  same  common  ances- 
tor and  not  from  one  another  compose  what  is  called  the  col- 
lateral line.  Collateral  kindred  descend  from  the  same  stock  but 
not  one  from  the  other. ^"^ 

§  726.  Computing  degrees  of  kindred. — In  computing  de- 
grees of  consanguinity,  according  to  the  common-law  canons  of 
descent,  it  is  necessary  to  begin  with  the  common  ancestor  and 
reckon  downward  to  the  most  remote  descendants  involved  in 
the  inquiry.  This  method  also  applies  in  computing  degrees 
in  the  ascending  line.  Each  step  in  the  line  from  the  common 
ancestor  constitutes  a  degree.  Thus  a  son  and  a  grandfather 
each  stand  in  the  same  degree  of  relationship  as  to  the  interme- 
diate ancestor.*^  Each  step  in  the  line  from  the  common  ances- 
tor constitutes  a  degree.  Collateral  relationship  is  reckoned  in 
the  same  manner.  By  this  method  an  uncle  and  a  nephew  are 
related  in  the  same  degree.  Two  brothers  are  related  to  each 
other  in  the  first  degree,  because  from  the  father  to  each  is  one 
degree.     An  uncle  and  nephew  are  related  to  each  other  in  the 

^^  Barnitz  v.  Casey,  7  Cranch    (U.     of     lineal     descendants.       Draper    v. 
S.)  456,  3  L.  ed.  403.  Bradley,  126  N.  Car.  72,  35  S.  E.  228. 

*"  Descent  to  collaterals  on  failure        •'^  2  Bl.  Comm.  203. 


755  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    726 

second  degree,  because  each  is  distant  from  the  common  ancestor 
two  degrees.*^ 

The  mode  of  computing  degrees  of  consanguinity  according 
to  the  civil  law,  which  is  the  one  generally  adopted  in  this  coun- 
try, differs  somewhat  from  the  common-law  method.  The  civil- 
law  method  of  computation  is  to  begin  at  either  of  the  persons 
to  be  reckoned  from  and  count  up  to  the  common  ancestor  and 
then  downward  to  the  other  person,  calling  it  a  degree  for  each 
person,  both  ascending  and  descending.  Computing  by  this 
method  two  brothers  would  be  related  in  the  second  degree;  an 
uncle  and  nephew  would  be  related  in  the  third  degree,  while 
a  cousin  would  be  in  the  fourth  degree  of  kindred.*^ 

Rules  of  canons  of  descent  should  not  be  confounded  with 
rules  for  ascertaining  the  degrees  of  kindred.  A  canon  of  de- 
scent is  one  thing,  and  a  rule  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  next 
of  kin  is  another."  The  degrees  of  affinity  are  computed  in  the 
same  way  as  are  those  of  consanguinity.*^  The  method  of  com- 
puting the  degrees  of  collateral  kindred  both  by  the  common 
and  canon  law  begins  with  the  common  ancestor,  reckoning 
downward,  and  in  whatever  degree  the  claimant  is  distant  from 
the  ancestor  common  to  him  and  the  intestate,  is  their  degree  of 
relationship.  But  the  civil  law  counts  upward  from  the  intes- 
tate to  the  common  ancestor,  and  from  him  downward  to  the 
heir,  reckoning  one  degree  for  each  step  taken,  and  the  sum  of 
the  two  shows  the  degree  in  which  they  are  related.*''  As  to 
which  of  the  decedent's  kindred  are  his  next  of  kin  is  to  be  de- 
termined by  a  computation  made  according  to  the  rules  either 
of  the  common  or  civil  law.  The  states  which  have  adopted  the 
civil  law  mode  of  computing  kindred  are,  Alabama,  Arizona,  Con- 
necticut, Delaware,  Idaho.  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Louisiana, 
Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Ne- 
braska, Nevada,  New  Jersey,  New  Mexico,  New  York,  Ohio, 
Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  Washington,  and  Wis- 
consin.*''  The  states  adopting  the  common-law  mode  of  compu- 
tation are  Georgia,  Maryland  and  North  Carolina.*^ 

42  2  Wash.  Real  Prop.  406.  ^r  jn  re  Sullivan's  Estate,  48  Wash. 

43  2  Bl.  Comtn.  206;  Cloud  v.  Bruce,     631,  94  Pac.  483,  95   Pac.  71. 

61   Ind.  171.  47  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

44  Cloud  V.  Bruce,  61  Ind.  171.  in  Appendix. 

45  Kelly  V.   Neely,   12  Ark.  657,   56         4s  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
Am.  Dec.  288n.  in  appendix. 


§  727 


TITLES   AND    ABSTRACTS 


756 


§  727.  Descent  of  estates  of  minors  not  having  been  mar- 
ried.— In  many  of  the  states  special  provision  has  been  made 
for  the  descent  of  estates  of  intestate  minors  not  having  been 
married.  The  general  tendency  of  these  statutes  is  to  direct  the 
reversion  of  the  property  of  such  a  minor  to  the  donor,  or  to 
the  parent  from  whom  it  came,  if  still  living,  or,  if  the  estate 
came  to  such  minor  by  inheritance  from  a  parent  to  the  brothers 
or  sisters  or  the  representatives  of  deceased  brothers  and  sis- 
ters, just  as  if  they  had  inherited  directly  from  such  deceased 
parent,  or  as  if  the  minor  had  predeceased  such  parent.*''  Such 
statutes  are  found  in  Arkansas,  California,  Connecticut,  Flor- 
ida, Kentucky,  ]V!|aine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Ne- 
braska, Nevada,  Oklahoma,  Oregon,  Virginia,  Washington,  and 
Wisconsin. ^*^  Under  such  statutes  the  inheritance  is  regarded  as 
coming,  not  from  the  deceased  child,  but  from  the  father  or 
other  parent  from  whom  the  child  inherited  it,  and  is  divided 
among  the  surviving  brothers  and  sisters,  or  their  issue,  as  though 
the  child  had  died  in  the  lifetime  of  its  ancestor.^^  If,  how- 
ever, under  the  provisions  of  these  statutes  a  minor  inherits 
property  from  his  deceased  minor  brother  or  sister,  and  subse- 
quently dies,  its  share  thus  acquired  is  not  controlled  by  the 
statute,  and  may  descend  to  its  heirs  other  than  its  brothers  and 
sisters.  Under  the  Maine  statute,  if  a  deceased  minor  left  no 
parent,  brother,  or  sister,  or  the  issue  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister,  his  property,  though  inherited  from  his  father,  de- 
scends to  his  next  of  kin,  whether  related  to  his  father  or  not."'" 


*^  In  re  North's  Estate,  48  Conn. 
583. 

^°  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix.  Persons  entitled  to  in- 
herit under  this  rule.  Carnes  v.  Bing- 
ham, 134  Ky.  96,  119  S.  W.  738. 
Where  an  infant  died  without  issue 
seised  of  real  estate  held  by  deeds 
from  others  than  a  parent,  but  the 
purchase  price  of  which  was  paid  by 
one  of  the  parents,  the  real  estate 
descends  to  both  parents  equally. 
Guier  v.  Bridges.  114  Ky.  148.  24  Kv. 
L.  945,  70  S.  W.  288.  Upon  the  death 
in  infancy  of  one  of  two  children, 
heirs  of  their  mother,  the  survivor 
takes  the  estate  of  the  mother,  sub- 
ject only  to  the  curtesy  of  the  surviv- 
ing   husband.      Veeder    v.    McKinley 


&c.  Trust  Co.,  61  Nebr.  892,  86  N.  W. 
982.  Under  such  statute  it  was  held 
that  where  parents  have  separated,  a 
parent  can  not  inherit  as  sole  heir 
from  a  minor  dying  without  issue, 
unless  shown  to  have  borne  practi- 
cally the  entire  burden  of  parental 
duty  and  maintenance  toward  such 
minor  at  his  death  and  during  practi- 
cally the  entire  period  of  separation. 
Bruce  v.  Mcintosh  (Okla.),  159  Pac. 
261. 

51  Nash  V.  Cutler,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
491  :  Burke  y.  Burke.  34  Mich.  451 ; 
Perkins  v.  Simonds,  28  Wis.  90. 

■'-  Albee  v.  Vose,  76  Maine  448 ; 
Decoster  v.  Wing,  76  Maine  450; 
Goodrich  v.  Adams,  138  Mass.  552. 


7^7  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    728 

Where  the  estate  of  the  deceased  minor  was  received  by  grant  in 
consideration  of  love  and  affection,  it  reverts  to  the  grantor.^^ 
Where  an  adopted  child  dies  intestate,  leaving  no  wife  or  issue, 
the  whole  of  his  estate  goes  to  his  adopting  parent. °* 

§728.  Brothers  and  sisters. — Brothers  and  sisters  of  an 
intestate  are  in  the  collateral  line  of  kindred,  and  are  usually 
placed  in  the  direct  ascending  line  of  descent  with  the  father 
and  mother.  In  the  absence  of  children  or  their  descendants, 
the  law  casts  on  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  the  de- 
scent of  the  property,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  if  any,  and  generally  in  connection  with  the  father 
and  mother,  or  both.  In  case  any  brother  or  sister  predeceased 
the  intestate,  leaving  descendants,  these  represent  the  deceased 
parent  and  take  the  share  of  such  parent  by  right  of  representa- 
tion.''^ Brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants  take,  in  de- 
fault of  children,  and  subject  to  the  rights  of  a  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  if  any,  to  the  exclusion  of  parents  and  more  re- 
mote kindred,  in  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Mississippi,  New  Jer- 
sey, North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  and  Tennessee. 
In  Florida,  Georgia,  Indiana,  Maine,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New 
Hampshire,  Oklahoma,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina, 
South  Dakota,  Texas,  Virginia,  and  West  Virginia,  brothers 
and  sisters  and  their  descendants  are  postponed  to  the  father, 
and  are  entitled  to  inherit  with  the  mother,  to  the  exclusion  of 
more  remote  kindred.^'''  In  Alabama  and  Arizona  brothers  and 
sisters  and  their  descendants  are  postponed  to  both  parents  if 
both  be  living,  but  they  take  together  with. the  survivor,  if  one  be 
dead ;  while  they  are  postponed  to  both  parents  in  Arkansas,  Cal- 
ifornia, Colorado,  Idaho,  Kentucky,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  New  York,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin."  In  Illi- 
nois, Missouri  and  Wyoming,  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  de- 
scendants, take,  in  default  of  issue,  and  subject  to  the  rights  of 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  if  any,  each  an  equal  part  with 

^3  Amos  V.   Amos,    117   Ind.  Zl ,   19  apply  to  legitimate  brothers  and  sis- 

N.  E.  539.  ters.    Truelove  v.  Truelove,   172  Ind. 

54Grav   V.   Holmes,   57   Kans.  217,  441,  86  N.  E.  1018.  88  N.  E.  516,  27 

45  Pac.  596,  ZZ  L.  R.  A.  207.  L.  R.  A.   (N.  S.)   220n,  139  Am.  St. 

55  De  Castro  v.  Barry,  18  Cal.  96.  404. 

5®  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent        ^7  ^ee  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

in    appendix.     The    terms    "brothers  in  appendix, 
and  sisters"  and  "their  descendants" 


§  729 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


758 


the  father  and  mother,''''  and  in  Louisiana  the  father  and  mother 
take  one-half  together,  and  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  their 
descendants  by  representation  the  other  half.^*  Where  the  es- 
tate came  through  the  intestate's  father,  and  he  leaves  brothers 
and  sisters,  but  no  issue,  the  estate  will  pass  to  his  brothers  and 
sisters  to  the  exclusion  of  his  mother.*"*  Under  a  statute  provid- 
ing that  where,  upon  the  descent  of  an  estate  to  children,  and 
one  of  them  dies  under  age,  not  having  been  married,  his  share 
of  the  inheritance  goes  to  the  surviving  brothers  and  sisters,  the 
share  of  such  deceased  minor  child  must  be  considered  as  de- 
scending from  the  parent  and  not  from  the  deceased  child. "^  It 
has  been  held  that  brothers  and  sisters  born  subsequent  to  the 
death  of  the  intestate  take  the  same  as  if  they  had  been  born  at 
the  time  of  such  death;"'-  but  there  are  cases  qualifying  this  rule 
so  as  to  include  only  those  subsequently  born  who  were  in  ventre 
sa  mere  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's  death. "^^ 

§  729.  Next  of  kin. — The  term  "next  of  kin"  is  limited  in 
legal  meaning,  as  in  common  use,  to  blood  relations,  and  it 
ordinarily  includes  ancestors  as  well  as  descendants  in  the  same 
degree  of  consanguinity.''*  The  term  does  not  include  all  those 
who  would  take  under  the  statutes  of  descent  and  distribution.**^ 
It  signifies  those  who  stand  in  the  nearest  relationship  to  the 
intestate  according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law  for  computing 
degrees  of  kinship. **°  So,  as  a  rule,  no  one  is  included  in  the 
term  "next  of  kin"  who  does  not  come  wnthin  the  statutes  of 
descent  and  distribution. *"■'     The  term  is  never  construed  so  as 


^®  Sec  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

5^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

«o  Wells  V.  Seeley,  47  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
109,  13  N.  Y.  St.  239;  Walker  v.  Dun- 
shee,  38  Pa.  St.  430.  Descent  of  prop- 
erty of  intestate  dying  without  de- 
scendants or  father  or  mother.  Bar- 
ber V.  Brundage,  169  N.  Y.  368,  62 
N.  E.  417. 

ci  Wiesner  v.  Zaun,  39  Wis.  188. 

f'S  Cutlar  V.  Cutlar.  9  N.  Car.  '324 ; 
Springer  v.  Fortune,  2  Handv  (Ohio) 
52,  12  Ohio  Dec.  (Reprint)  325;  Bak- 
er V.  Heiskell,  1  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  641. 
Contra,  Goodwin  v.  Keerl,  3  Harr.  & 
M.   (Aid.)  403. 


63  Grant  v.  Bustin,  21  N.  Car.  11; 
Melton  V.  Davidson,  86  Tenn.  129,  5 
S.  W.  530. 

«4  Clark  V.  Mack,  161  Mich.  545, 
126  N.  W.  632,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
479n ;  Bishop  v.  Rider,  31  Ohio  C.  C. 
332. 

n"' Fargo  V.  Miller,  150  Mass.  225, 
22  N.  E.  1003.  5  L.  R.  A.  690 ;  Swasey 
V.  Jaques,  144  Mass.  135,  10  N.  E. 
758,  59  Am.  Rep.  65;  Redmond  v. 
Burroughs,  63  N.  Car.  242. 

""Clark  V.  Mack,  161  Mich.  545. 
126  N.  W.  632,  28  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
479n. 

«7  0rr  V.  White,  106  Ind.  341,  6  N. 
E.  909. 


759  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  '  §    729 

to  include  representatives  of  next  of  kin,  and  while  the  term  is 
limited  in  legal  meaning  as  well  as  in  common  use,  to  blood  rela- 
tions, and  does  not  include  husband  and  wife,  who  are  not  con- 
nected by  consanguinity,"*  yet  in  many  states  they  inherit  from 
each  other  as  heirs  at  common  law  by  force  of  the  statute. ^'^ 
But  in  the  absence  of  such  a  statute,  a  surviving  husband  or  wife 
can  not  inherit  as  the  next  of  kin  of  the  deceased  spouse.^'' 
Where  the  intestate  leaves  no  parent,  husband,  wife,  child, 
brother,  or  sister,  or  the  descendants  of  any  deceased  child, 
brother,  or  sister,  his  estate  goes  to  his  next  of  kin,  according 
to  the  civil  law,  in  equal  degree,  except  that  when  there  are  two 
or  more  in  the  same  degree,  those  claiming  through  the  near- 
est ancestor  are  preferred  in  Alabama,  Arizona,  California,  Del- 
aware, Idaho,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Minnesota,  Montana,  Ne- 
braska, Nevada,  North  Dakota,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  South 
Dakota,  Utah,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin;^'  and  to  the  next 
of  kin  in  Illinois,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  New^  Hampshire,  and 
Vermont.'-  It  wnll  be  observed  that  the  statutes  of  many  states 
do  not  specify  who  shall  inherit  the  estate,  further  than  to  de- 
c-lare  that  it  shall  go  to  the  next  of  kin  of  the  decedent.  In  Ala- 
bama, Florida,  Rhode  Island,  Virginia  and  West  Virginia,  the 
estate  is  divided,  and  one-half  goes  to  the  paternal  and  the  other 
half  of  the  maternal  kindred,  in  the  order  as  follows:  (1)  To 
the  grandfather;  (2)  to  the  grandmother  and  uncles  and  aunts  on 
the  same  side,  and  their  descendants,  if  deceased,  in  equal  shares 
per  stirpes;  (3)  to  the  great-grandfathers  or  great-grandfather 
if  but  one;  (4)  to  the  great-grandmothers  or  great-grandmother, 
or  brothers  and  sisters  of  grandfathers  and  grandmothers,  and 
the  descendants  of  such  of  them  as  are  dead,  in  equal  shares, 
per  stirpes ;  ( 5 )  and  so  on,  passing  to  nearest  lineal  male  ances- 
tors, and  if  none  of  them,  to  nearest  lineal  female  ancestors  in 
the  same  degree,  and  descendants  of  such  male  and  female  an- 
cestors; (6)  if  no  such  maternal  or  paternal  kindred,  both  halves 
go  to  the  paternal  or  maternal  kindred  respectively;  (7)  if  no 
such  kindred,  to  the  husband  or  wife;  if  the  husband  or  wife 
be  dead,  to  his  or  her  kindred,  as  if  such  husband  or  wife  had 

P'SHaraden  v.  Larrabee,   113  Mass.         ^i  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

430.  in  appendix. 

fio  Gardner  v.  Gardner.  13  Ohio  St.         "  gee  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

426.  in  appendix. 

'oprather  v.  Prather,  58  Ind.   141. 


730 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


760 


survived  the  intestate,  and  died  entitled  to  the  estate."  In  Con- 
necticut, New  Jersey,  Ohio,  and  Pennsylvania,  if  the  intestate 
left  neither  parent,  child,  husband,  wife,  brother,  nor  sister,  nor 
the  descendants  of  any  deceased  child,  brother  or  sister,  the 
estate  goes  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood,  and  their 
issue;  if  none,  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree;"*  but  in  Arkan- 
sas, Colorado,  Missouri  and  Wyoming,  the  estate  goes  to  the 
grandfathers,  grandmothers,  uncles,  and  aunts  of  the  deceased, 
and  their  descendants,  if  deceased,  per  stirpes ;^^  and  in  New 
York  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  both  of  the  father  and  mother 
of  the  intestate  and  their  issue  in  equal  shares,  in  the  same  manner 
as  if  they  had  been  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate;  but  if 
none  such,  it  descends  according  to  the  common  law.^"  In  Iowa 
and  Kansas,  if  the  parents  are  dead,  the  estate  descends  as  if 
they  had  outlived  the  intestate,  and  died  seised,  and  so  on  through 
the  ascending  ancestors." 

§  730.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood. — The  common  law  did 
not  extend  collateral  inheritance  to  persons  of  the  half-blood.^® 
By  such  law,  if  a  man  died  intestate  seised  of  an  estate  of  inheri- 
tance, leaving  a  brother  of  the  half-blood,  but  no  heirs  of  the 
w^hole-blood.  the  estate  did  not  go  to  such  brother  of  the  half- 
blood,  but  escheated  to  the  lord  for  want  of  heirs. '^'^  But  by  the 
Statute  of  Descents,  364  Wm.  IV,  Chap.  106,  a  kinsman  of  the 
half-blood  shall  be  capable  of  being  heir;  and  that  such  kins- 
man shall  inherit  next  after  a  kinsman  in  the  same  degree  of  the 
whole-blood,  and  after  the  issue  of  such  kinsman,  when  the  com- 
mon ancestor  is  a  male,  and  next  after  the  common  ancestor 
when  such  ancestor  is  a  female.  In  this  country  the  matter  is 
regulated  by  statute,  and  is  therefore  dependent  upon  the  pro- 
visions of  the  various  statutes,  which,  with  very  few  exceptions, 
expressly  provide   for  the  descent  and   distribution  of  estates 


'3  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix.  Rucker  v.  Jackson,  180 
Ala.  109,  60  So.  139,  Ann.  Cas.  1915C, 
1058n  (holding  that  grandparents 
.take  before  uncles  and  aunts).     . 

^*  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

"•"'  Rule  of  descent  where  there  are 
no  children,  nor  descendants,  nor 
father,  mother,  brother,  sisters,  nor 
descendants  of  deceased  brothers  or 


Sisters,  nor  husband  nor  wife  living. 
Thatcher  v.  Thatcher,  17  Colo.  404, 
29  Pac.  800. 

'■'^'  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

''■'^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

7«  2  Bl.  Comin.  224. 

''^  Brown  v.  Brown,  1  D.  Chip. 
(Vt.)  360. 


761 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


§  730 


among  kindred  of  the  half-blood.  The  expression  "brothers  and 
sisters,"  as  used  in  statutes  of  descent,  have  been  held  to  include 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  as  well  as  those  of  the 
whole-blood.*"  Likewise,  the  expression  "next  of  kin,"  includes 
kindred  of  the  half-blood  as  well  as  those  of  the  whole-blood.^'- 
There  is  no  distinction  as  to  the  descent  of  real  or  personal 
property  between  kindred  of  the  half-blood  and  those  of  the 
whole-blood  in  Delaware,  Illinois,  Kansas,  Maryland,  Massa- 
chusetts, North  Carolina,  Oregon,  and  Washington.^-  In  Colo- 
rado, Florida,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Missouri,  Texas,  Virginia, 
West  Virginia  and  Wyoming,  collaterals  of  the  half-blood  in- 
herit only  half  as  much  as  those  of  the  whole-blood;*^  and  in 
Connecticut  and  Massachusetts,  kindred  of  the  half-blood  take 
after  kindred  of  the  whole-blood  of  the  same  degree.'* 

Most  of  the  statutes  make  a  distinction  in  the  case  of  real 
estate  when  the  estate  is  ancestral  in  character,  in  which  case 
those  of  the  whole-blood  of  the  ancestor  are  preferred.*^    The 


80  Cox  V.  Clark.  93  Ala.  400,  9  So. 
457;  In  re  L.vnch,  132  Cal.  214,  64 
Pac.  284 ;  Aldridge  v.  Montgomery,  9 
Ind.  302;  Clay  v.  Cousins,  1  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  75;  Sheffield  v.  Lover- 
ing,  12  Mass.  490 ;  Rowley  v.  Stray, 
32  Mich.  70;  Prescott  v.  Carr,  29  N. 
H.  453,  61  Am.  Dec.  652;  Beebee  v. 
Griffing,  14  N.  Y.  235;  Wood  v. 
Mitchell,  61  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  48; 
Shull  V.  Johnson,  55  N.  Car.  202; 
White  V.  White,  19  Ohio  St.  531; 
Stockton  V.  Frazier,  81  Ohio  St.  227, 
90  N.  E.  168,  26  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
603n ;  Luce  v.  Harris,  79  Pa.  St.  432 ; 
McNeal  v.  Sherwood,  24  R.  I.  314,  53 
Atl.  43;  Marlow  v.  King,  17  Tex. 
177;  State  v.  Wyman,  59  Vt.  527,  8 
Atl.  900,  59  Am.  Rep.  753. 

81  McKinney  v.  Mellon,  3  Houst. 
(Del.)  277;  Edwards  v.  Barksdale,  2 
Hill  Eq.   (S.  Car.)  416,  Riley  Eq.  16. 

S2  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix.  See  also  Carter  v.  Car- 
ter, 234  111.  507,  85  N.  E.  292;  Tays 
V.  Robinson,  68  Kans.  53,  74  Pac.  623. 

^3  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix.  See  also  King  v.  Mid- 
dlesboro  Town  &c.  Co.,  106  Ky.  73, 
20  Ky.  L._1859,  50  S.  W.  37,  1108. 

8*  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 
in  appendix. 

85  Johnson  v.  Phillips,  85  Ark.  86, 
107  S.  W.  170;  Kelly  v.  McGuire,  15 


Ark.  555;  In  re  Smith,  131  Cal.  433, 
63  Pac.  729,  82  Am.  St.  358;  Lynch 
V.  Lynch,  132  Cal.  214,  64  Pac.  284. 
Such  a  statute  has  no  application  to 
real  property  acquired  by  a  wife  by 
gift  from  her  husband,  who  was  the 
father  of  only  one  of  her  two  chil- 
dren, even  assuming  that  the  husband 
was  the  ancestor  of  the  wife,  since, 
while  the  children  were  kindred  of 
the  half  blood  as  to  each  other,  their 
mother  was,  as  to  both  of  them,  of 
the  whole  blood.  In  re  McKenna's 
Estate,  168  Cal.  339,  143  Pac.  605. 
The  exception  in  the  statute  has  no 
application  between  kindred  in  dif- 
ferent degrees.  In  re  Smith's  Estate, 
131  Cal.  433,  63  Pac.  729,  82  Am.  St. 
358 ;  Stevenson  v.  Grav,  46  Ind.  App. 
412,  89  N.  E.  509 ;  Neeley  v.  Wise,  44 
Iowa  544;  Mclntvre  v.  Gelvin,  77 
Kans.  779,  95  Pac.  389;  Lowe  v. 
Maccubbin,  1  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  550; 
Ryan  v.  Andrews,  21  Mich.  229 ;  Cut- 
ter v.  Waddingham,  22  Mo.  206 ;  Val- 
entine V.  Wetherill,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
655.  See  also  Stockton  v.  Frazier,  81 
Ohio  St.  227,  90  N.  E.  168.  26  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  603n;  In  re  Bell,  34  N.  Y. 
S.  191 ;  Henszey  v.  Gross,  185  Pa.  St. 
353,  39  Atl.  949 ;  In  re  Amy,  12  Utah 
278,  42  Pac.  1121;  Shuman  v.  Shu- 
man,  80  Wis.  479,  50  N.  W.  670. 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


762 


phrase  "blood  of  the  ancestor"  has  been  lield  to  include  those  of 
the  half-blood  as  well  as  those  of  the  whole-blood.***"'  If  the  half- 
blood  is  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  property 
came,  he  takes  the  same  to  the  exclusion  of  such  ancestor's  broth- 
ers and  sisters."  In  applying  such  statutes  it  must  not  be  con- 
fined to  cases  where  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate  came 
leaves  children  by  different  mothers,  for  those  who  are  children 
of  a  common  mother  but  have  different  fathers  are  no  less  broth- 
ers and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  than  those  who  are  children  of 
a  common  father  but  have  a  different  mother.*'**  A  half-blood 
relative  of  the  intestate,  though  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor 
through  whom  the  property  came,  who  stands  in  a  nearer  de- 
gree of  relationship  than  the  descendants  of  those  of  the  blood 
of  such  ancestor,  will  inherit  in  preference  to  them.^" 

Generally,  the  exclusion  of  kindred  of  the  half-blood  is  carried 
so  far  only  as  will  prevent  them  from  taking  an  estate  which 
their  ancestor  acquired  by  descent  from  an  ancestor  to  whom 
they  bore  no  relationship  by  consanguinity. °°  The  terms  "of 
the  blood"  and  "heir"  are  not  synonymous  nor  convertible  terms; 
and  w^hile  "next  of  blood"  and  "next  of  kin"  are  synonymous 
in  law,  the  phrases  "next  of  blood"  and  "of  the  blood"  are  not.°^ 

§  731.  Inheritance  by  parents  of  intestate. — At  common 
law  parents  and  all  lineal  ascendants  were  excluded  from  any 
share  in  the  lands  of  an  intestate,  though  an  uncle  might  take 
the  estate  and  it  might  pass  from  him  to  the  father  of  the  intes- 
tate.°-  But  this  rule  has  been  entirely  changed  in  this  country, 
and  the  statutes  now  generally  make  provision  for  the  surviving 
parent  or  parents.     Some  of  these  statutes  provide  that  where 


86  Gardner  v.  Collins,  2  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  58,  7  L.  ed.  347. 

**7  Banes  v.  Finney,  209  Pa.  191,  58 
Atl.  136. 

*^  Oglesby  Coal  Co.  v.  Pasco,  79 
111.  164;  Robertson  v.  Burrell,  40  Ind. 
328 

89  Coleman  v.  Foster,  112  Ala.  506, 
20  So.  509.  A  first  cousin  of  the  half 
blood  on  the  maternal  side  will  'take 
the  estate  in  preference  to  a  second 
cousin  of  the  whole  blood.  Ector  v. 
Grant,  112  Ga.  557,  2n  S.  E.  984,  53 
L.  R.  A.  723. 

ooEatman  v.  Eatman,  83  Ala.  478. 


In  Cox  V.  Clark,  93  Ala.  400,  9  So. 
457,  it  was  held  that  half-brothers, 
although  not  of  the  blood  of  the  an- 
cestor, are  entitled  to  inherit  in  pref- 
erence to  uncles  and  aunts.  Arming- 
ton  V.  Armington,  28  Ind.  74 ;  Van 
Sickle  V.  Gibson,  40  Mich.  170;  Mc- 
Cracken  v.  Rogers,  6  Wis.  278 ;  Den 
V.  Urison,  2  N.  J.  L.  212 ;  Prichitt  v. 
Kirkman,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  390;  Perkins 
V.  Simonds.  28  Wis.  90. 

91  Delaplaine  v.   Jones,  8  N.   J.  L. 
340;  Cooper  v.  Denison,  13  Sim.  290. 

92  2  Bl.  Comm.  211;  4  Kent  Comm. 
395. 


763  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    731 

the  intestate  leaves  no  child  or  descendants,  the  residue  of  the 
estate  after  the  payment  of  debts  and  expenses  of  administra- 
tion, and  subject  to  the  provisions  for  the  immediate  relief  of 
the  family  and  the  paramount  claims  of  husband  and  wife,  shall 
go  to  the  father,  and  if  he  be  dead  to  the  mother.  This  seems 
to  be  the  rule  in  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Minnesota,  New  York, 
North  Dakota,  and  South  Carolina/'''^  In  Florida,  Maine,  Ne- 
braska, Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  Oklahoma,  Oregon,  Rhode 
Island,  South  Dakota,  and  West  Virginia,  the  residue,  in  such 
case,  goes  to  the  father,  and  if  he  be  dead,  to  the  mother  together 
with  brothers  and  sisters  and  descendants  of  such  by  representa- 
tion.''* In  Alabama.  Arizona,  California,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Iowa, 
Kansas,  Kentucky,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Montana,  Pennsyl- 
vania, Texas,  Utah,  Vermont,  Washington,  Wisconsin,  and  Wyo- 
ming, such  residue  goes  to  the  father  and  mother  in  common.®^ 
In  Georgia,  if  the  intestate  leave  no  issue,  the  father  takes  equally 
with  brothers  and  sisters,  and  if  he  be  dead  the  mother,  subject 
to  the  rights  of  a  surviving  husband  or  wife,°"  and  in  Connecti- 
cut, Delaware,  Mississippi,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  Ohio, 
and  Tennessee,  the  father  is  postponed  to  brothers  and  sisters. ^^ 
In  Illinois,  Louisiana,  and  Missouri,  the  father,  mother,  brothers 
and  sisters  and  their  descendants  by  representation  take  in  equal 
shares.^^  In  Utah  the  father  is  postponed  to  the  mother.^"  Where 
the  intestate  leaves  neither  issue  nor  parents,  some  statutes  direct 
that  the  estate  shall  go  one-half  to  the  heirs  of  each  parent  the 
same  as  if  they  had  survived  the  intestate  and  died  in  possession 
of  the  portion  coming  to  them.  In  such  case  the  heirs  inherit 
directly  from  the  intestate,  and  not  from  the  parents,^  and  each 

^3  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  ^^  ggg  digest  of  statute  of  descent 

in  appendix.  in    appendix.     Property   inherited    bj' 

■'•*  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  an  intestate  must  remain  in  specie  in 

in  appendix.    See  also  descent  to  pa-  order  to  pass  to  maternal  or  paternal 

ternal    and    maternal    kindred.     Estes  heirs.    Grav  v.   Swerer,  47  Ind.  App. 

V.  Nicholson.  39  Fla.  759.  23  So.  490.  384,  94  N.  E.  725. 

Where  the  intestate  left  no  issue  nor  'Jg  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

father,  but  leaving  a  mother  and  half-  in  appendix. 

brothers  and  sisters  and  children  of  ""  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

a    deceased    half-sister,    the    mother,  in  appendix. 

takes  the  entire  estate  to  the  exclu-  ^^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

sion  of  such  half-brothers  and  sisters  in  appendix. 

and    the    children    of    such    deceased  ^"  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

half-sister.     Squint    Eve    v.    Crooked  in  anpendix. 

Arm    (Okla.),    155    Pac.    1147.     De-  ^  Lash  v.  Lash,  57  Iowa  88.   10  N 

scent   to   paternal   and   maternal   kin-  W.  302;   Lawley  v.   Keyes,   172   Iowa 

dred.   Cozzens  v.  Joslin,  1  R.  I.  122.  320,   154  N.  W.  940.    A  cousin  does 


J?  /.•>-' 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


764 


moiety  goes,  as  if  it  were  an  independent  estate,  to  the  next  of 
kin  of  each  parent,  without  regard  to  their  relative  nearness  to 
the  intestate."  In  states  where  the  canon  of  the  common  law 
forbidding  Hneal  ascendants  of  estates  has  been  al3oHshed,  though 
there  is  no  other  relationsliip  between  the  deceased  and  a  parent 
than  that  of  parent  and  child,  the  parent  may  inherit  as  next  of 
kin.  Hence  a  mother  inherits  the  estate  of  her  child,  though  not 
specially  named  in  the  statute  of  descent  and  distribution,  when 
she  is  the  next  of  kin,  and  no  person  is  living  to  whom  the  statute 
gives  precedence  over  her.^ 

§  732.  Inheritance  by  and  through  aliens. — At  common 
law  inheritance  is  understood  to  descend  through  the  channel 
of  blood  or  consanguinity,  and  as  an  alien  has  no  inheritable 
blood  he  is  prohibited  from  inheriting.'*  It  was  therefore  fatal 
to  one's  claim  to  an  inheritance  that  he  was  himself  an  alien,  or 
that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  trace  his  claim  through  an 
alien. ^  \\'here  an  alien  stands  in  such  a  position  that  he  would 
take  as  heir  but  for  his  alienage,  the  title  vests  in  the  next  of 
kin  to  the  intestate  w-ho  has  inheritable  blood  and  who  does  not 
claim  through  the  alien,  just  as  though  the  alien  were  not  in 
existence.^  He  can  neither  receive  nor  transmit  an  inheritance, 
and  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  derive  title  through  an  alien 
intestate,  such  title  fails,  even  though  it  is  sought  to  be  made  col- 
lateral from  one  who  is  not  an  alien. ^  In  a  majority  of  the 
states  statutes  have  been  enacted  under  which  the  rights  of  aliens 
to  hold  and  transmit  property  by  descent  has  been  conferred. 
This  is  true  in  Alabama,  Arkansas,  California,  Florida,  Iowa, 
Maine,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Nevada, 
New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  Oregon, 
Pennsylvania,  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota,  Ten- 


not  inherit  immediately  from  a 
cousin,  but  only  mediately  through 
the  parents  of  each.  Meier  v.  Lee, 
106  Iowa  303,  76  N.  W.  712. 

2  McKinny  v.  Abbott.  49  Tex.  371. 

sLoftis  V.  Glass.  15  Ark.  680;  Ma- 
comb V.  Miller.  9  Paige  (N.  Y.)  265; 
McCullough  V.  Lee,  7  Ohio  IS,  pt.  1. 

4  Harley  v.  State,  40  Ala.  689 ;  Far- 
rell  V.  Enright.  12  Cal.  450;  Wun- 
derle  v.  Wunderle,  144  111.  40.  33  N. 
E.   195,   19   L.   R.   A.   84;   Farrar  v. 


Dean,  24  Mo.  16;  AIcGregor  v.  Corn- 
stock.  3  N.  Y.  408. 

^  Orr  V.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat.  (U. 
S.)  453,  4  L.  ed.  613;  Mooers  v. 
White,  6  Johns.  Ch.   (.N.  Y.)   360. 

6  Orr  V.  Hodgson,  4  Wheat.  (U. 
S.)  453,  4  L.  ed.  613;  Doe  v.  La- 
zenby.  1  Ind.  2.34.  Smith  203. 

7  Levy  V.  McCartee.  6  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
102,  8  L.  ed.  334;  Jackson  v.  Fitz- 
Simmons,  10  Wend,  (N.  Y.)  9,  24 
Am.  Dec.  198. 


765  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    733 

nessee,  Washington,  and  Wisconsin.®  This  privilege  is,  how- 
ever, restricted  to  resident  aHens  in  Connecticut,  Indiana,  and 
New  Hampshire  f  and  in  Maryland,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
Virginia,  and  West  Virginia,  to  alien  friends. ^"^  In  Colorado, 
Montana,  and  Utah,  non-resident  aliens  must  appear  and  claim 
the  property  within  five  years  from  the  death  of  the  ancestor,  or 
be  barred. ^^  In  Kentucky,  aliens  may  take  and  hold  lands  by 
descent,  if  they  become  citizens  before  proceedings  for  escheat 
has  been  commenced.^"  In  some  states  it  seems  to  be  necessary 
for  alien  residents  to  make  declaration  of  their  intention  to  be- 
come citizens  in  order  to  retain  their  inheritance  of  real  estate. 
This  seems  to  be  the  rule  in  Delaware,  Indiana,  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  and  Texas. ^^ 

The  right  of  a  state  to  enact  laws  regulating  the  descent  of 
property  within  its  limits,  and  to  permit  inheritance  by  or  from 
an  alien,  is  well  established.^*  The  constitution  of  some  states 
provide  that  no  distinction  shall  ever  be  made  by  law  between 
resident  aliens  and  citizens  in  reference  to  the  possession,  enjoy- 
ment or  descent  of  property. ^^  Some  statutes  confer  upon 
aliens  the  right  to  inherit  and  transmit  inheritance,  but  specify 
a  time  during  which  the  land  inherited  must  be  conveyed  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  during  which  time  if  such  alien 
has  not  become  a  citizen,  and  if  the  land  is  not  so  conveyed,  it 
may  be  sold  and  the  proceeds  delivered  to  the  state.  ^"^  In  some 
states  an  alien's  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen,  will 
entitle  him  to  inherit,  but  if  such  alien  die  before  naturalization, 
it  has  been  held  that  his  children  do  not  succeed  to  the  inherit- 
ance as  his  heirs. ^' 

§  733.  Right  of  persons  causing  death  of  intestate  to  in- 
herit his  property. — Upon  the  question  as  to  whether  one 
who  has  caused  the  death  of  another  can  take  his  estate  by  descent 
the  authorities  are  not  in  harmony.   The  courts  of  Great  Britain 

s  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  ^^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent 

in  appendix.  in  appendix. 

^  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  i-*  Harley  v.  State,  40  Ala.  689;  In 

in  appendix.  re  Gill's   Estate,  79  Iowa  296,  44  N. 

10  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  W.  553,  9  L.  R.  A.  126. 

in  appendix.  ^"^  Nebr.  Const.,  art.  1,  §  25. 

"See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  i'' 111.  Kurd's  Rev.  Stats.  (1915-16), 

in  appendix.  ch.  6.  pp.  51,  52. 

1-  See  digest  of  statutes  of  descent  i"  State     v.     Beackmo,     6     Blackf. 

in  appendix.  (Ind.)  488. 


§  7^2, 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


766 


do  not  seem  to  have  been  called  upon  to  pass  upon  the  question 
until  in  very  recent  years,  doubtless  because  of  the  ancient  com- 
mon-law doctrine  of  attainder  and  corruption  of  blood.  Under 
the  civil  law  one  could  not  take  property  by  inheritance  or  will 
from  an  ancestor  or  testator  whom  he  had  murdered,  but  such  de- 
privation plainly  was  intended  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment,  as 
the  property  in  such  case,  escheated  to  the  exchequer."  In  most 
states  the  statutes  of  descent  are  based  upon  the  rules  of  the 
civil  law,  but  each  state  has  its  own  rules.  Some  cases  are  based 
on  the  ground  of  public  policy,  following  the  maxim  that  one 
can  not  take  advantage  of  his  own  wrong. ^''  On  the  other  hand, 
it  has  been  held,  where  there  are  explicit  rules  governing  descent 
of  property  by  statute  and  there  is  nothing  contained  therein  to 
justify  exclusion,  the  one  upon  whom  the  law  casts  the  prop- 
erty can  not,  because  of  the  murder  by  him  of  the  intestate,  be 
deprived  of  it  by  the  court."''  The  statutes  of  some  states  ex- 
pressly provide  that  such  person  shall  not  take  by  descent  or 
devise  the  property  of  the  person  murdered  by  him,  but  it  has 
been  held  that  such  statute  does  not  apply  to  a  wife  who  has 
murdered  her  husband,  as  the  wife  takes  her  distributive  share 
as  a  matter  of  contract  and  right  and  not  by  inheritance."^ 

The  person  who  murders  another  does  not  forfeit  his  own  es- 
tate, but  is  simply  prevented  from  inheriting  from  the  person 
whom  he  has  murdered.  His  act  does  not  prevent  his  heirs  from 
inheriting  through  him  property  rightfully  his  at  the  time  of  his 
demise.  The  state  can  not  by  law  take  a  criminal's  property,  but 
it  can  prevent  him  from  acquiring  property  in  an  unauthorized 
and  unlawful  way."" 


"Riggs  V.  Palmer,  115  N.  Y.  506, 
22  N.  E.  188,  5  L.  R.  A.  340,  12  Am. 
St.  819. 

10  >v[ew  York  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Armstrong,  117  U.  S.  591.  6  Sup. 
Ct.  877,  29  L.  ed.  997;  Perry  v. 
Strawbridge,  209  Mo.  621.  108  S.  W. 
641.  16  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  244.  123 
Am.  St.  510,  14  Ann.  Cas.  92 ;  Eller- 
son  V.  Wescott,  148  N.  Y.  149,  42  N. 
E.  540;  Riggs  v.  Palmer,  115  N!  Y. 
506,  22  N.  E.  188,  5  L.  R.  A.  340,  12 
Am.  St.  819;  Lundy  v.  Lundy,  24 
Can.  Sup.  Ct.  650. 

20  Wall    V.    Pfanschmidt,    265    111. 


180,  106  N.  E.  785,  L.  R.  A.  1915C, 
328n ;  Shellenbcrger  v.  Ransom,  41 
Nebr.  631,  59  N.  W.  935,  25  L.  R.  A. 
564;  Owens  v.  Owens,  100  N.  Car. 
240,  6  S.  E.  794 ;  Deem  v.  Millikin,  53 
Ohio  St.  668,  44  N.  E.  1134;  Hollo- 
way  V.  McCormick,  41  Okla.  1,  136 
Pac.  1111  ;  In  re  Carpenter's  Estate. 
170  Pa.  203,  32  Atl.  637,  29  L.  R.  A. 
145,  50  Am.  St.  765. 

21  In    re    Kuhn's    Estate,    125    Iowa 
449,  101  N.  W.  151,  2  Ann.  Cas.  607. 

22  Perry   v.    Strawbridge,    209    Mo. 
621,  108  N.  W.  641,  123  Am.  St.  510. 


i 


767 


TITLE    BY    DESCENT 


734 


§  734.  Descent  of  estate  of  devisee  who  dies  before  tes- 
tator.— Where  a  devisee  under  a  will  dies  before  the  testator 
the  devise  will  lapse;  but  the  statutes  of  most  states  prevent  the 
devise  from  lapsing  by  providing  that  in  such  case  it  vests  in  the 
heirs  of  the  devisee  as  if  he  had  survived  the  testator  and  died 
intestate. ^^  Some  of  these  statutes  apply  only  to  cases  in  which 
the  devisee  is  a  child,"*  or  other  descendant  of  the  testator."'^ 
The  statutes  of  other  states  include  gifts  to  a  child  or  other 
relative  by  consanguinity  of  the  testator,"'^  while  in  New  Jersey 
and  Pennsylvania  the  statutes  apply  to  gifts  to  children  or  other 
specified  relatives  of  the  testator.-^ 

Under  statutes  allowing  the  heirs  of  a  devisee  who  predeceased 
the  testator  to  take  the  property  devised,  it  has  been  held  not  to 
include  the  widow  of  the  deceased  devisee,"®  nor  the  widow  of 
the  testator  who  was  the  mother  of  the  devisee.^"  Under  a  stat- 
ute which  provides  that  the  devise  shall  descend  to  the  issue  or 
lineal  descendants  of  the  devisee  in  case  such  devisee  predeceases 
the  testator,  it  is  held  that  the  devise  may  go  to  the  legally 
adopted  child  of  the  deceased  devisee,^*  or,  in  case  the  devisee 
be  a  female  and  she  left  an  illegitimate  child,  to  such  child  ;^^  but 
the  devise  will  not  pass  to  the  husband^"  or  mother^^  of  the  de- 
ceased devisee. 


23  Ritch  V.  Talbot.  74  Conn.  137,  50 
Atl.  42;  Ellis  v.  Dumond,  259  111. 
483,  102  N.  E.  801 ;  Ballard  v.  Camp- 
lin,  161  Ind.  16,  67  N.  E.  505  :  Lind- 
say V.  Wilson,  103  Md.  252,  63  Atl. 
566,  2  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  408;  Loveren 
V.  Donaldson,  69  N.  H.  639,  45  Atl. 
715;  Canfield  v.  Canfield.  62  N.  J. 
Eq.  578.  50  Atl.  471  ;  Pimcl  v.  Betje- 
mann,  99  App.  Div.  559,  91  N.  Y.  S. 
49;  Larwill  v.  Ewing,  7Z  Ohio  St. 
177.  76  N.  E.  503;  Harrison's  Estate, 
18  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  588;  Howard  v. 
Harrington,  27  R.  I.  586,  65  Atl.  282; 
Watkins  v.  Blount,  43  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
460,  94  S.  W.  1116:  Wildberger  v. 
Cheek,  94  Va.  517,  27  S.  E.  441. 

24  Pratt  V.  McGhee,  17  S.  Car.  428. 

25  Jones  V.  Jones,  2)7  Ala.  646 ;  Ru- 
dolph V.  Rudolph,  207  111.  266,  69  N. 
E.  834,  99  Am.  St.  211;  Ballard  v. 
Camplin,  161  Ind.  16,  67  N.  E.  505; 
In  re  Wells,  113  N.  Y.  396,  21  N.  E. 
137,  10  Am.  St.  457:  Cox  v.  Ward, 
107  N.  Car.  507.  12  S.  E.  379;  Wat- 
kins  V.  Blount,  43  Tex.  Civ.  App.  460, 
94  S.  W.  1116. 


J''  In  re  Ross,  140  Cal.  282,  73  Pac. 
976;  Warren  v.  Prescott,  84  Maine 
483.  24  Atl.  948,  17  L.  R.  A.  435.  30 
Am.  St.  370;  Tilton  v.  Tilton,  196 
Mass.  562.  82  N.  E.  704;  Strong  v. 
Smith,  84  Mich.  567,  48  N.  W.  183; 
Jamison  v.  Hay,  46  Mo.  546; 
Schaefer  v.  Bernhardt,  76  Ohio  St. 
443.  81  N.  E.  640,  10  Ann.  Cas.  919; 
In  re  Renton,  10  Wash.  533,  39  Pac. 
145. 

27Reichle  v.  Steitz,  64  N.  J.  Eq. 
789,  56  Atl.  741;  In  re  Harrison's 
Estate,  18  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  588. 

2*  Blackman  v.  Wadworth,  65  Iowa 
80,  21  N.  W.  190. 

-'■'  In  re  Overdieck,  50  Iowa  244. 

^°  Warren  v.  Prescott,  84  Maine 
483,  24  Atl.  948,  17  L.  R.  A.  435,  30 
Am.  St.  370. 

31  Goodwin  v.  Colby,  64  N.  H.  401, 
13  Atl.  866. 

32  Norwood  v.  Mills,  3  Ohio  S.  & 
C.  P.  Dec.  356,  1  Ohio  (N.  P.)  314. 

33  Morse  v.  Hayden,  82  Maine  227, 
19  Atl.  443. 


§    735  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  768 

§  735.  Release  of  expectant  share  to  ancestor. — An  estate 
in  expectancy  is  an  appropriate  subject  of  contract,  and  agree- 
ments by  expectant  heirs  in  regard  to  their  future  contingent 
estates,  when  fairly  made  for  a  valuable  consideration  will  be 
enforced  in  equity,'*  and  sucli  heirs  will  be  estopped  from  assert- 
ing any  claim  to  the  estate  against  the  other  heirs  and  distrib- 
utees.^" Thus  where  a  son,  by  a  contract  with  his  father,  relin- 
quishes his  expectancy  in  the  latter's  estate,  the  contract  will  be 
enforced.'"'  A  release  to  the  ancestor,  by  an  heir,  of  his  expect- 
ancy as  heir,  operates  not  as  a  contract  or  as  a  transfer  or  a  con- 
veyance either  to  the  ancestor  or  to  other  heirs,  but  an  extin- 
guishment of  his  right  to  take  any  estate  by  descent.^^  The 
release  by  an  heir  of  his  interest  in  the  ancestor's  estate,  made  in 
consideration  of  an  advancement  of  his  share  in  the  estate,  is 
binding  on  such  heir.^*'  A  release,  w^hen  executed  between  par- 
ent and  child,  if  fair  and  for  a  present  advancement  of  money 
or  land  out  of  the  parent's  estate  w'ill  operate  as  a  release  of  all 
right  of  the  child  to  share  in  the  division  and  partition  of  the 
residue  of  the  estate  of  the  parent  dying  intestate.'*"  But  we  do 
not  find  that  the  law  of  advancements,  or  of  release  between 
parent  and  child,  has  ever  been  carried  to  the  extent  of  uphold- 
ing such  a  contract  or  release  between  grandparent  and  grand- 
child during  the  life  of  the  child's  parent,  so  as  to  cut  ofif  the 
right  of  the  child  to  inherit  or  participate  in  the  distribution  of 
his  parent's  estate. ''° 

§  736.  Inheritance  liable  for  debts  of  decedent. — By  the 
early  common  law  a  decedent's  debts  had  to  be  paid  out  of  his 
personal  estate.  His  lands  w^ere  inalienable  and  could  not  be 
sold  for  the  payment  of  his  debts.  This  doctrine  grew  out  of 
the  peculiar  manner  in  w'hich  real  estate  was  held  under  the 
feudal  system  but  the  growth  of  trade  and  commerce  made  it 
necessary  that  creditors  should  be  provided  with  some  means  for 

3*Bolin  V.  Bolin,  245  111.  613,  92  N.  •'5«  Felton   v.    Brown,   102  Ark.  658, 

E.  530;   Hudson  v.  Hudson,  222   111.  145  S.  W.  552. 

527.  78  N.  E.  917.  ^o  Quarles  v.  Quarles.  4  Mass.  680; 

■•^  Squires    v.    Squires,    65    W.    Va.  Pritchard  v.  Pritchard.  76  W.  Va.  91, 

611.  64  S.  E.  911.                           ■  85  S.  E.  29. 

3c  Longshore  v.  Longshore,  200  111.  ■lo  Davis  v.   Hayden,  9  Mass.   514; 

470.  65  N.  E.  1081.  In  re  Thompson's  Estate,  26  S.  Dak. 

"7  Mires  V.   Laubenheimer,  271   111.  576.  128  N.  W.  1127,  Ann.  Cas.  1913B, 

296,  111  N.  E.  106.  446n;   Pritchard  v.  Pritchard,  76  W. 

Va.  91,  85  S.  E.  29. 


769  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    7Z(i 

satisfying  their  claims  by  compulsory  process  against  a  debtor's 
land.  Hence  has  grown  the  right  of  execution,  attachment,  etc., 
against  a  debtor's  real  estate  in  his  lifetime,  and  the  right  of  his 
executor  or  administrator,  after  his  death,  to  sell  his  real  estate 
to  make  assets  with  which  to  pay  his  debts.  By  virtue  of  stat- 
ute in  all  the  states,  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate  is  as  com- 
pletely subject  to  his  debts  as  his  personal  estate,  and  even  though 
the  personal  estate  is  wasted  by  the  administrator,  the  purchaser 
of  the  real  estate  from  an  heir  is  not  protected.*^ 

While  the  wasting  of  the  personal  assets  of  the  decedent  by 
the  personal  representative  does  not  relieve  the  real  estate  from 
liability  for  debts,*-  if  such  wasting  on  the  part  of  the  adminis- 
trator be  wrongful,  he  will  be  liable  on  his  bond.'*^  But  if  the 
assets  are  wasted  or  destroyed  without  fault  of  the  personal 
representative;  or  by  reason  of  a  decrease  in  the  value  of  such 
assets,  or  the  insolvency  of  the  personal  representative  and  his 
sureties,  the  loss  falls  on  the  estate.*^ 

Both  the  real  and  personal  estate  of  the  intestate  are  equally 
chargeable  with  the  payment  of  his  debts,  with  the  exception  that 
the  personal  estate  must  be  exhausted  first.*^ 

Those  who  succeed  to  the  property  of  the  decedent  are  liable 
for  his  obligations  to  the  value  of  the  property  inherited.*^  But 
an  heir  is  not  personally  liable  for  the  promise  of  his  ancestor."*' 
Heirs  are  not  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  ancestor  unless  they  have 
received  property  from  his  estate.  \i  they  have  received  any 
portion  of  the  estate,  they  are  liable  to  the  extent  of  what  they 
have  received,  but  beyond  that  they  are  neither  liable  in  law  nor 
in  equity.*^    The  estate  of  an  intestate  wife  is  liable  for  her  debts 

41  Fiscus  V.  Moore,  121  Ind.  547,  23  Robinson,  17  Ohio  St.  242,  93  Am. 
N.  E.  362,  7  L.  R.  A.  235.    Lands  of     Dec.  617. 

deceased  wife  descend  subject  to  her  ^s  jsjeigQ^,  y_  Murphee,  69  Ala.  598; 

debts.    Miller  v.  Hanna,  89  Nebr.  224,  Fiscus  v.  Moore,  121  Ind.  547,  23  N. 

131  N.  W.  226,  Ann.  Cas.  1912C,  573n.  E.  362.  7  L.  R.  A.  235. 

42  Conger  v.  Cook,  56  Iowa  117,  8  ^n  phelps  v.  Grandy,  168  Cal.  IZ, 
N.  W.  782;  Van  Bibber  v.  Julian,  81  141  Pac.  926;  Cooper  v.  Ives,  62 
Mo.  618;  Smith  v.  Brown,  99  N.  Car.  Kans.  395,  63  Pac.  434.  In  the  ab- 
m.  6  S.  E.  667.  sence  of  personal  estate  each  child's 

43  Foley  V.  McDonald,  46  Miss,  share  in  the  realty  is  subject  to  the 
238;  Merritt  v.  Merritt,  62  Mo.  150;  debts  of  decedent.  Keever  v.  Hunter, 
Carlton  v.  Byers,  70  N.  Car.  691.  62  Ohio  St.  616,  57  N.  E.  454 

44  May  V.  Parham,  68  Ala.  253;  47  Dempsey  v.  Poorc,  75  W.  Va. 
Evans  v.  Fisher,  40  Miss.  643 ;  Lilly  107.  83  S.  E.  300. 

V.  Wooley,  94  N.  Car.  412;  Faran  v.        4s  Byrd   v.    Belding,    18   Ark.    118; 

49 — Thomp,  Abste. 


§  7^7 


TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS 


770 


only,  and  not  for  the  debts  of  her  husband/"  It  has  been  fre- 
quently held  that  a  creditor  can  proceed  in  equity  against  the 
heirs  who  have  received  the  ancestor's  estate  for  satisfaction 
of  his  claim  against  such  estate  which  has  accrued  after  the 
lapse  of  the  time  limited  for  authenticating  it  against  the  admin- 
istrator, or  after  the  close  of  his  administration. ^° 

§  737.  Advancements. — An  advancement  is  given  by  a 
party  to  his  child  or  heir,  by  way  of  anticipation,  the  whole  or 
a  part  of  what  it  is  supposed  the  donee  will  be  entitled  to  on 
the  death  of  the  donor.^^  To  constitute  an  advancement  the  gift 
must  have  been  made  by  the  intestate  in  his  lifetime,^^  and  he 
must  transfer  to  the  party  advanced  the  absolute  control  over 
the  property.^^  The  gift  must  take  effect  when  made  and  be 
absolutely  irrevocable.^*  Actual  delivery  or  transfer  of  posses- 
sion of  the  property  is  usually  required  in  order  to  constitute  a 
gift  an  advancement.^^ 

All  gifts  and  grants  are  made  as  advancements,  if  expressed 
in  the  gift  or  grant  to  be  so  made,  or  if  charged  in  writing  by 
the  decedent  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  as 
such  by  the  child  or  other  successor  or  heir.^" 

If  the  amount  of  the  advancement  is  in  excess  of  the  share  of 


Cutright  V.  Stanford,  81  111.  240; 
Walker  v.  Deaver,  79  Mo.  664 ; 
Schmidtke  v.  Miller,  71  Tex.  103,  8 
S.  W.  638;  Bacon  v.  Thornton,  16 
Utah  138.  51  Pac.  153. 

« People  V.  Rardin,  171  111.  App. 
226. 

so  Wallace  v.  Swepston,  74  Ark. 
520,  86  S.  W.  398,  100  Am.  St.  94; 
Chitty  V.  Gillett,  46  Okla.  724,  148 
Pac.  1048. 

s^  Cotton  V.  Citizens'  Bank,  97  Ark. 
568,  135  S.  W.  340;  Strasburger  v. 
Hoffman.  175  111.  App.  120. 

^~  Gavin  v.  Gaines,  5  Ky.  L.  247 ; 
Flower  v.  Myrick,  49  La.  Ann.  321,  21 
So.  542. 

S3  Crosby  v.  Covington,  24  Miss. 
619. 

s*  Herkimer  v.  McGregor,  126.  Ind. 
247,  25  N.  E.  145,  26  N.  E.  44.  But 
see  Lowe  v.  Wiseman.  46  Ind.  App. 
405.  91  N.  E.  364.  92  N.  E.  344. 

S5  Butler  V.  Merchants  Ins.  Co.,  14 
Ala.  Ill  \  Joyce  v.  Hamilton,  111  Ind. 
163,  12  N.  E.  294. 


5fi  Bolin  V.  Bolin,  245  111.  613.  92  N. 
E.  530 ;  Gary  v.  Newton.  201  111.  170, 
66  N.  E.  267;  Porter  v.  Porter.  51 
Maine  376;  Lodge  v.  Fitch,  12  Nebr. 
652,  101  N.  W.  338 ;  Fellows  v.  Little, 
46  N.  H.  27;  Law  v.  Smith,  2  R.  I. 
244 ;  Pomeroy  v.  Pomcroy,  93  Wis. 
262,  67  N.  W.  430.  The  support  and 
maintenance  of  a  helpless  adult  child 
is  not  to  be  considered  an  advance- 
ment. Grain  v.  Mallone,  130  Ky.  125, 
113  S.  W.  67.  132  Am.  St.  355.  22  L. 
R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1165n.  Where  an  heir 
of  lawful  age  accepts  from  his  an- 
cestor as  an  advancement  his  full 
share  of  such  ancestor's  estate  and  a 
receipt  given  by  him  to  such  effect 
such  receipt  will  bar  his  claim  of  any 
further  interest  in  the  estate.  Simon 
v.  Simon's  Estate.  158  Mich.  256.  122 
N.  W.  544.  17  Ann.  Cas.  IIZ.  Child 
receiving  a  portion  of  the  estate  in 
lifetime  of  testator  and  giving  receipt 
therefor  is  disregarded  in  distribu- 
tion. Callicott  V.  Callicott  (Miss.), 
43  So.  616. 


II 


771  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    Th7 

the  person  to  whom  made,  he  will  be  excluded  from  any  further 
portion,^^  but  will  not  ordinarily  be  required  to  refund  any  part 
of  the  advancement,  and  if  his  share  be  more  than  the  advance- 
ment, he  will  generally  be  entitled  to  so  much  more  as  will  give 
him  a  full  share  of  the  estate.^® 

If  the  person  to  whom  the  advancement  has  been  made,  dies 
before  the  decedent,  leaving  issue,  the  advancement  will  be  taken 
into  consideration  in  the  distribution  of  the  estate  in  like  manner 
as  if  the  advancement  had  been  made  to  such  issue. ^^ 

The  weight  of  authority  recognizes  the  right  of  the  heir  who 
has  attained  majority  to  accept  presently  in  advancement  his  full 
share  of  the  estate  of  the  parent.  Whether  the  arrangement  is 
called  a  contract  not  to  take  or  a  release  to  take  further  in  the 
future,  the  principle  is  the  same.  When  the  estate  is  cast  by 
the  death  of  the  ancestor,  it  operates  to  estop  the  heir  to  take 
what  he  has  agreed  he  will  not  claim. '^'^ 

The  doctrine  of  advancement  rests  wholly  upon  statute,  and 
applies  only  in  cases  of  intestacy."  A  gift,  or  conveyance  of 
land  by  a  parent  to  a  child,  from  a  consideration  of  love  and 
affection  only,  or  where  the  purchase-money  is  paid  by  the  par- 
ent and  the  land  conveyed  by  another  direct  to  the  child,  is,  in 
law,  presumed  to  be  an  advancement.  And  such  presumption, 
while  not  conclusive,  is  strong  enough  to  throw  the  burden  of 

"  Grattan  v.  Grattan,  18  111.  167,  65  114  111.  603,  4  N.  E.  137,  7  N.  E.  287. 

Am.  Dec.  726;   Nicholson  v.   Caress,  The  release  to  a   living  ancestor  by 

59  Ind.  39;  Scroggs  v.  Stevenson,  100  his    prospective    heir    of    such    heir's 

N.  Car.  354,  6  S.  E.  111.  expectancy    is    held    not    within    the 

58  McClave  v.  McClave,  60  Nebr.  terms  of  the  statute  relating  to  ad- 
464,  83  N.  W.  668;  Nesmith  v.  Dins-  vancements.  Donough  v.  Garland, 
more,  17  N.  H.  515;  Norwood  v.  269  111.  565,  109  N.  E.  1015,  Ann. 
Cobb,  Zl  Tex.  141  ;  Liginger  v.  Field,  Cas.  1916E,  1238n ;  Jones  v.  Jones, 
78  Wis.  367,  47  N.  W.  613.  Rule  ap-  46  Iowa  466;  Curtis  v.  Curtis,  40 
plies  to  advancements  made  to  grand-  Maine  24,  63  Am.  Dec.  651 ;  Quarles 
children  as  well  as  children.  John-  v.  Quarles,  4  Mass.  680;  Simon  v. 
son  V.  Antrikin,  205  Mo.  244,  103  S.  Simon's  Estate,  158  Mich.  256,  122  N. 
W.  936.  W.  544,  17  Am.  Cas.  723 ;  In  re  Pow- 

59  Brown  v.  Taylor,  62  Ind.  295 ;  er's  Appeal,  63  Pa.  St.  443 ;  Coffman 
Barber  v.  Taylor,  9  Dana  (Ky.)  84;  v.  Coffman,  41  W.  Va.  8.  23  S.  E. 
Succession    of    Meyer,    44    La.    Ann.  523 ;  In  re  Lewis,  29  Ont.  609. 

871,   11   So.  532;   In  re  Williams,  62  «i  Marshall    v.    Rencb,    3    Del.    Ch. 

Mo.    App.    339,     1     Mo.    App.    516;  239;  Huggins  v.  Huggins,  71  Ga.  66; 

Headen  v.  Headen,  42  N.  Car.   159;  Barnes  v.  Allen,  25   Ind.  222;   In   re 

Parsons  v.  Parsons,  52  Ohio  St.  470,  Turner's  Appeal,  48  Mich.  369.  12  N. 

40  N.  E.  165 ;  In  re  Person's  Appeal,  W.  493 ;   Clark  v.  Kingslev,   Zl  Hun 

74  Pa.  St.  121.  (N.   Y.)    246;   Allen  v.   Allen,   13  S. 

GO  Remmgton's     Codes     and     Stats.  Car.  512,  36  Am.  Rep.  716. 
(1915),  §  1366;    Simpson  v.  Simpson, 


§  738 


TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS 


772 


proof  upon  the  party  claiming  it  to  be  anything  else.""  Whether 
or  not  a  conveyance  of  land  or  a  transfer  of  money  or  other 
property  to  a  child,  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  advancement,  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  intention  of  the  parent  at  the  time  it  was 
made.  In  the  absence  of  anything  in  the  transaction  indicating 
a  contrary  intention,  the  law  presumes  it  to  be  an  advancement."* 

§  738.  Proof  of  heirship. — Title  by  descent  can  be  as- 
serted only  by  the  person  or  persons  who  can  establish  the  fact 
of  heirship  within  the  line  of  succession  provided  by  statute. 
Some  of  the  statutes  point  out  the  method  of  proof  with  great 
minuteness.  Generally,  however,  it  is  only  necessary  for  the 
heir  in  a  direct  line  to  prove:  (1)  The  death  of  the  ancestor, 
and  his  lawful  seisin  of  the  land  at  the  time  of  his  death;  (2) 
the  marriage  of  the  ancestor  with  the  heir's  other  parent;  and 
(3)  legitimacy  or  lawful  adoption.  But  where  the  claimant  is 
in  the  collateral  line  he  must  show  the  descent  of  himself  and 
the  person  last  seised  from  a  common  ancestor,  and  the  absence 
of  any  heirs  in  the  direct  line."* 

Decrees,  recitals  and  records  in  administration  proceedings  as 
to  who  are  the  next  of  kin  to  the  decedent  for  the  purpose  of  a 
distribution  of  personal  property,  are  not  necessarily  conclusive 


f 


"SDille  V.  Webb,  61  Ind.  85;  Mc- 
Caw  V.  Burk,  31  Ind.  56;  In  re 
Dutch's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  St.  461.  Heir 
estopped  to  take  what  he  has  agreed 
not  to  claim.  Jones  v.  Jones,  46 
Iowa  466.  Voluntary  conveyance 
from  parent  to  child  presumed  to 
be  an  advancement.  Finch  v.  Gar- 
rett, 102  Iowa  381,  71  N.  W.  429. 
Oral  testimony  incompetent  to  prove 
advancements.  Boden  v.  Mier,  71 
Nebr.  191,  98  N.  W.  701. 

•^3  Woolery  v.  Woolery,  29  Ind. 
249,  95  Am.  Dec.  629 ;  Ruch  v.  Biery, 
110  Ind.  444,  11  N.  E.  312.  Land  pur- 
chased by  father  who  caused  con- 
veyance to  be  made  to  his  minor 
sons,  considered  as  advancement. 
Rhea  v.  Bagky,  63  Ark.  374,  38  S. 
W.  1039,  36  L.  R.  A.  86.  A  voluntary 
conveyance  from  the  parent  to  the 
child  or  other  lineal  descendant,  or 
where  the  difference  between  the 
consideration  named  in  the  deed  and 
the  actual  value  of  the  land  is  great, 
will  be  presumed  to  be  an  advance- 


ment. Mossestad  v.  Gunderson,  140 
Iowa  290,  118  N.  W.  374.  Conveyance 
reciting  valuable  and  substantial  con- 
sideration near  the  full  value  of  the 
property,  not  presumed  to  be  an  ad- 
vancement. Kiger  v.  Terry,  119  N. 
Car.  456.  26  S.  E.  38.  Where  a  wife's 
father  grants  land  to  her  husband 
during  coverture,  reciting  no  consid- 
eration, it  is  presumptively  an  ad- 
vancement to  the  wife.  White  v. 
White,  72  W.  Va.  144,  11  S.  E.  911. 
A  conveyance  by  a  father  of  a  por- 
tion of  his  land  to  one  of  his  sons 
by  deed  reciting  no  consideration, 
practically  contemporaneous  with 
conveyances  to  other  children,  ad- 
mittedly made  by  way  of  advance- 
ment out  of  his  estate,  is  presump- 
tively an  advancement,  and  intended 
to  be  in  lieu  of  the  share  in  the  land 
such  son  would  have  taken  by  par- 
tition on  the  death  of  the  father  in- 
testate. White  V.  White,  64  W.  Va. 
30,  60  S.  E.  885. 

G4  Emerson  v.  White,  29  N.  H.  482. 


i 


77Z  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    739 

concerning  the  heirs'  title  to  real  estate,  but  these  are  frequently 
the  only  proof  available  in  the  compilation  of  an  abstract.  A 
subsequent  purchaser  must,  at  his  peril,  ascertain  whether  those 
claiming  as  heirs  are  really  such,  and,  if  so,  whether  they  are 
all  the  heirs.  As  time  goes  on  this  becomes  more  difficult  to 
ascertain.  The  statutes  of  limitation  may  in  time  remove  some 
difficulties  arising  from  this  cause,  but  owing  to  the  many  excep- 
tions made  in  them  a  defect  arising  from  uncertainty  as  to  heirs 
may  not  be  settled  for  a  long  time.  Statutes  in  some  states  exist 
for  determining  who  are  the  heirs  of  a  deceased  person,  by 
proper  petition  and  evidence ;  but  by  the  terms  of  some  such  stat- 
utes the  result  is  only  prima  facie  evidence  of  such  heirship."^ 
Where  title  by  inheritance  depends  upon  matters  in  pais,  or  facts 
resting  in  the  knowledge  of  witnesses,  and  such  facts  be  clearly 
sufficient  to  establish  the  right  of  a  vendor  as  heir,  it  is  appre- 
hended that  the  purchaser  can  not  object  to  the  title  simply  be- 
cause it  can  not  be  established  by  record  evidence.^''  But  a 
different  case  is  presented  where  the  fact  of  inheritance  itself 
is  in  doubt.  There  may  be  circumstances  to  show  that  the  ances-' 
tor  is  not  dead,  or  that  he  has  left  a  will,  or  that  the  vendor  is 
not  sole  heir.  Then  it  is  that  the  title  becomes  unmarketable 
from  the  necessity  of  parol  proof  to  remove  the  doubts  which 
surround  it. 

§  739.  Proof  of  death  of  ancestor. — Proof  of  some  kind 
must  be  made  that  the  person  upon  whose  estate  administration 
is  asked  is  dead.  This  is  a  jurisdictional  fact  about  which  the 
court  should  be  informed  for  there  can  be  no  valid  administra- 
tion upon  the  estate  of  a  living  person,  and  if  administration 
should  be  granted  in  such  a  case  it  would  be  invalid.  It  is  true 
that  an  unexplained  absence  for  a  period  of  years  may  justify 
an  administration  upon  the  estate  of  such  absentee,  but  authority 
for  such  proceeding  is  found  in  a  special  statute.  The  fact  of 
death,  may,  it  seems,  be  proved  by  hearsay  evidence;  for  if  a 
person  has  been  missing  at  a  particular  time,  accompanied  with 
a  report  and  general  belief  of  his  death,  must  be,  in  many  cases, 
not  only  the  best,  but  the  only  evidence  w^hich  can  support  the 
existence  of  death."     Entries  in  church  registers  of  the  date  of 

"^Lorimer  v.  Wayne  Circuit  Judge,         ««  Walton  v.  Meeks,   120  N.  Y    79 
116  Mich.  682,  75  N.  W.  133.  23  N.  E.  115. 

67  Primm  v.  Stewart,  7  Tex.  178. 


§  740 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


774 


burial  of  a  person  have  been  adniitled  to  show  by  way  of  infer- 
ence that  such  person  died  prior  to  the  date  of  burial,  of  which 
fact  they  seem  to  be  evidence.  Where  the  statutes  provide  that 
all  births,  marriages,  and  deaths  shall  be  registered  in  the  per- 
manent archives  of  the  county,  .such  registers,  or  a  certified  copy 
thereof,  may  be  admitted  in  evidence  to  show  the  fact  of  death. 

The  aftidavit  of  the  attending  physician,  the  undertaker,  or 
any  other  person  who  saw  the  remains,  are  often  resorted  to  in 
cases  where  no  better  evidence  is  obtainable. 

\Miere  the  fact  of  the  death  of  a  person  becomes  material  to 
show  title  in  another  claiming  through  descent  from  the  ances- 
tor, and  the  fact  of  the  ancestor's  death  is  a  matter  of  record, 
the  abstract  should  contain  a  synopsis  of  the  certificate  or  regis- 
ter, an  example  of  which  is  as  follows: 


Proof  of  Death 

of 

John  Jones 


Certificate  of  Geo.  W.  Wright, 

M.  D. 
Dated  July  1,  1893. 
Recorded  July  2.  1893. 
Register  of  Deaths  "B,"  Page 

75. 


Certifies  that  John  Jones,  white,  male,  age  seventy-five  years,  de- 
parted this  life  on  the  29th  day  of  June,  1893,  at  the  city  of  Indi- 
anapolis, Indiana,  of  dropsy,  and  was  buried  in  Crown  Hill  Cem- 
etery. 

§  740.  Proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy. — As  a  rule  the  one 
thing  required  of  one  who  is  to  inherit  is  that  he  shall  be  the 
legitimate  heir  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  inheritance  comes. 
In  a  civilized  community  every  child  is  presumed  to  be  legiti- 
mate where  the  mother  has  been  cohabited  with  and  recognized 
by  the  father  as  his  wife,  and  where  there  is  no  proof  to  the 
contrary  no  other  evidence  will  be  necessary  to  establish  the 
marriage  and  legitimatize  the  offspring  of  it.^^  The  legal  pre- 
sumption that  he  is  the  father  of  the  child  whom  the  nuptials 
show  to  be  so  is  the  foundation  of  every  man's  birth  or  status. 
The  legal  presumption  of  legitimacy  underlies  the  whole  social 
fabric. 


^s  Strode     v.     Magowan,     2     Bush     (Ky.)   621. 


775  TITLE    BY    DESCENT  §    741 

Birth  may  be  established  by  the  production  of  the  certificate 
of  marriage  of  the  parents  and  the  baptism  of  the  child  within 
a  reasonable  time  after  marriage.  For  want  of  better  evidence, 
the  affidavit  of  some  person  who  was  present  and  witnessed  the 
marriage  would  be  competent  evidence  of  the  marriage.*''*  Also 
proof  of  cohabitation,  admissions  and  declarations  would  be 
competent  to  establish  the  fact  of  marriage.^"  Where  it  does  not 
appear  that  there  is  any  other  higher  evidence  obtainable,  mar- 
riage and  birth  may  be  proved  by  parol  evidence,  such  as  repu- 
tation and  other  corroborating  facts. ^^  Declarations  of  deceased 
members  of  a  family  may  be  proved  to  show  the  fact  and  time 
of  the  birth  of  a  child  belonging  to  that  family,  although  there 
may  be  a  family  register  of  births  in  existence;  for  the  one  kind 
of  evidence  is  of  no  higher  dignity  than  the  other.'- 

§  741.  Abstract  of  descents. — Titles  depending  on  descent 
may  be  abstracted  by  setting  forth  the  probate  proceedings  or 
other  proceeding  of  a  judicial  nature  determining  the  rights  of 
heirs;  but  in  the  absence  of  probate  or  judicial  determination  of 
such  rights  the  abstracter  should  not  attempt  to  introduce  any 
matter  strictly  in  pais,  unless  requested  to  do  so  by  his  employer 
or  the  examining  counsel. 

Where  the  abstract  shows  conveyance  purporting  to  have  been 
executed  by  the  heirs  at  law  of  one  in  whom  the  title  is  shown  to 
have  been  vested,  and  no  probate  proceedings  appear  of  record, 
a  simple  notation  of  the  fact  on  the  abstract  immediately  after 
the  heirs'  deed  is  sufficient. 

A  judicial  determination  in  a  suit  between  adverse  claimants 
to  the  estate  of  an  intestate,  or  a  proceeding  in  rem  to  determine 
the  rights  and  interests  of  parties  before  the  court,  constitute 
record  evidence  of  descent  and  every  material  step  in  the  pro- 
ceedings should  be  noted  and  appropriately  exhibited.  Likewise, 
proceedings  in  probate  are  evidence  of  descent  if  they  disclose 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the  appointment  of  an  administra- 
tor, proof  of  heirship,  and  adjudication  in  final  settlement  of  the 
estate.  In  order  that  the  title  of  the  heirs  may  be  cleared  of  cred- 
itors' liens  the  proceedings  must  show  the  filing  of  an  inventory, 

G9  Brewer  v.   State.  59  Ala.   101.  7i  Guerin  v.  Bagneries,  18  La.  590. 

■^0  Illinois  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  '-  Clements  v.  Hunt,  46  N.  Car. 
Bonner,  75  111.  315.  400. 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


776 


payment  of  claims,  and  final  report  and  discharge  of  the  admin- 
istrator in  the  time  and  manner  prescribed  l)y  law.  The  follow- 
ing example  of  synopsis  of  probate  proceedings  is  submitted : 


In  the  Matter  of  the  Estate 

of 
James  C.  Yohn,  deceased. 


In  the  Circuit  Court  of  Marion 

County,  Indiana. 
Estate  No.  1127. 


James  C.  Yohn  died  intestate,  August  20,  1888.  Letters  is- 
sued to  Eliza  S.  Yohn,  administratrix,  August  31,  1888.  Order 
Book  84,  page  61.  Final  report  filed  and  approved,  and  estate  set- 
tled and  closed  April  29,  1895.  Order  Book  114,  page  288.  Jan- 
uary 16,  1896,  certificate  of  final  settlement  was  filed  in  the  Re- 
corder's office  of  Marion  County,  in  Land  Record  30,  page  263, 
which  shows  that  said  decedent  left  the  following  named  heirs- 
at-law :  His  widow,  Eliza  S.  Yohn ;  his  children,  Charles  G. 
Yohn,  Mary  E.  Yohn,  and  Kate  Y.  Vinnedge ;  his  grandchildren, 
Albert  F.  Yohn  and  Fred  C.  Yohn,  children  of  his  deceased  son, 
Albert  B.  Yohn,  and  Addie  F.  Yohn,  widow  of  said  Albert  B. 
Yohn,  deceased. 


J 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

PERUSAL  OF  ABSTRACT  AND  OPINION  OF  TITLE 
SEC.  SEC. 

745.  Precautionary   measures    against     759.  Deed   executed   under  power  of 
insertion   of  pages   after  exami-  attorney. 

nation.  760.  Dedications. 

746.  Perusing  abstract.  761.  Sale  under  foreclosure. 

747.  Making  memoranda.  762.  Judicial  sales. 

748.  Examining     the    muniments  of     763.  Tax  sales. 

title.  _  764.  Sales  by  executors,  administrat- 

749.  Beginning  point  of  examination.  ors,  and  guardians. 

750.  Printed  copies  of  abstracts.  765.  Wills. 

751.  Government  Land  Receiver's  re-  766.  Descents. 

ceipt.  767.  Contract  of  sale. 

752.  Patent  from  the  federal  govern-  768.  Judgment  liens, 
ment.  769.  Mechanic's  liens. 

753.  Patent  from  state  government.  770.  Miscellaneous  incumbrances. 

754.  Private  deeds.  771.  Examination  of  matters  in  pais. 

755.  Acknowledgments.  772.  Examination  of  abstracter's  cer- 

756.  Official  deeds.  tificate. 

757.  Trust  deeds  and  mortgages.  IIZ.  Opinion  of  title. 

758.  Deed  of  release. 

§  745.  Precautionary  measures  against  insertion  of  pages 
after  examination. — The  first  duty  of  counsel  upon  receipt  of 
the  abstract  for  perusal  is  to  number  each  page  of  the  abstract, 
give  the  date  of  perusal,  and  sign  his  name  or  initials  thereto.  A 
rubber  stamp  may  be  provided  for  this  purpose,  leaving  only  the 
page  number  and  date  to  be  filled  in  with  pen  and  ink.  This  is 
done  for  counsel's  own  protection.  It  sometimes  happens  that 
unscrupulous  persons  remove  a  sheet  of  the  abstract  and  insert 
another  in  its  place  after  counsel  has  rendered  his  opinion  of  the 
title.  If  the  inserted  page  contains  matter  that  would  show  a 
defect  in  the  title  the  fact  that  each  page  does  not  contain  coun- 
sel's initials,  the  date  of  his  perusal  and  the  page  number  relieves 
him  from  any  liability  in  connection  with  the  examination. 

The  page  number  when  consecutively  given  enables  counsel  to 
readily  refer  to  any  page  that  is  sought  during  the  examination. 

§  746.  Perusing  abstract. — Counsel  should  bear  in  mind 
that  the  abstract  presented  for  his  perusal  does  not  pretend  to 
indicate  what  effect  an  instrument,  lien,  judicial  proceeding  or 

777 


747 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


778 


ail}'  item  appearing  thereon,  has  upon  the  title.  He  is  presumed 
to  possess  such  a  knowledge  of  the  law  of  real  property  as  will 
enable  him  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  the  various  instruments  ap- 
pearing of  record  and  abstracted,  and  when  in  doubt,  he  must 
consult  the  statutes  and  the  law  applicable  to  the  particular  mat- 
ter in  hand. 

The  method  employed  in  perusing  an  abstract  will  be  gov- 
erned largely  by  the  professional  habits  of  the  individual  and  the 
apparent  complexity  of  the  title.  It  has  been  said  that,  "the 
perusal  should,  if  the  length  of  the  abstract  will  permit  it,  be 
finished  at  one  sitting,  although  any  difficult  point  of  law,  the 
whole  bearing  of  which  is  not  ascertained,  may  properly  be  re- 
served for  further  and  separate  consideration.  It  may  sometimes 
be  useful  to  glance  over  the  abstract  in  the  first  place,  in  order 
to  obtain  a  general  view  of  the  title,  and  experience  will  rapidly 
point  out  when  a  subsequent  part  of  the  abstract  may  be  looked 
into  advantageously  before  its  proper  turn;  but,  speaking  gener- 
ally, an  abstract  should  be  perused  but  once,  and  that  once  effect- 
ually. The  party  should  never  pass  on  until  he  thoroughly  com- 
prehends what  he  has  already  read;  the  advancing  in  a  difficult 
title,  in  order  to  comprehend  what  you  have  passed  and  do  not 
understand,  often  leads  to  insurmountable  difficulties."^ 

It  would  seem  that  the  better  plan  would  be  to  glance  through 
the  abstract  first,  noting  any  apparent  defects,  and  then  take  up 
each  entry  in  chronological  order  and  examine  it  carefully. 

§  747.  Making  memoranda. — The  practice  of  making 
memoranda  is  indulged  in  by  most  attorneys,  especially  where 
the  title  appears  to  be  complicated.  They  are  often  found  to  be 
an  important  aid  in  unraveling  a  tangled  chain  of  title  and  in 
framing  an  opinion  thereon.  The  practice,  however,  should 
never  be  carried  to  the  extent  of  distracting  attention  of  counsel 
from  the  salient  points  involved.  The  scope  of  their  use  will 
always  be  governed  by  the  length  of  the  abstract  and  the  appar- 
ent complexity  of  the  title.  A  great  diversity  of  methods  of 
note  making  have  been  suggested,  some  of  which  are  not  without 
merit,  but  each  individual  attorney  will  be  governed  in  the  mat- 
ter by  his  own  tastes  and  habits  of  thought.  Each  item  or  entry 
on  the  abstract  should  be  numbered,  and  the  memorandum  in 


1  Sugd.  on  Vendors,  10. 


779  PERUSAL    AND    OPINIONS  §    748 

respect  thereto  should  be  given  a  corresponding  number  as  well 
as  the  page  number  of  the  abstract  so  that  the  entry  may  be 
quickly  referred  to.  As  the  examination  progresses,  if  it  is  dis- 
covered that  the  matter  giving  rise  to  a  memorandum  has  been 
subsequently  cleared  up,  the  memorandum  should  be  canceled  in 
order  to  reduce  the  volume  of  the  memoranda  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  suggest  what  matters 
are  and  what  are  not  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  noted  during 
the  examination,  but  every  matter  which  counsel  deems  too  im- 
portant to  be  trusted  to  his  memory  should  be  noted.  When  the 
examination  is  completed  the  memoranda  taken  should  be  care- 
fully preserved  for -future  reference  should  occasion  require  it. 
Items  and  liens  remaining  as  a  cloud  when  the  examination  is 
completed  serve  as  a  skeleton  from  which  the  opinion  may  be 
prepared. 

§  748.  Examining  the  muniments  of  title. — Counsel  bases 
his  opinion  of  the  title  on  the  items  of  the  abstract.  The  abstract 
merely  sets  out  these  items  from  the  records,  and  their  legal 
effect  can  only  be  determined  from  a  careful  examination  of  the 
various  muniments  of  title  in  the  chain. 

Counsel  should  carefully  note  the  date  of  the  execution  as 
well  as  the  date  of  the  record  of  each  instrument,  and  in  com- 
paring such  dates,  see  that  they  harmonize  with  the  facts. 
He  should  carefully  read  and  examine  every  will  appearing 
in  the  chain  of  title,  especially  every  part  of  the  will  per- 
taining to  the  transfer  of  title  to  the  real  estate  in  c^ues- 
tion.  Every  judicial  proceeding  affecting  the  title  should  be  care- 
fully examined,  and  especially  when  pleadings  are  set  out  in 
full.  Where  the  title  depends  upon  a  decree  of  court,  such  decree 
should  be  analyzed  to  determine  whether  it  is  binding.  Where  a 
a  proceeding,  as  in  probate,  must  conform  to  statutory  require- 
ments, it  must  be  seen  to  that  all  such  requirements  have  been 
complied  with. 

Many  of  the  defects  that  will  appear  from  an  inspection  of 
the  original  instruments  through  which  title  is  claimed  will  be 
shown  also  from  the  records  of  those  instruments,  provided  the 
records  are  true  copies  of  the  originals.  But  there  are  matters 
that  may  affect  the  title  which  can  be  discovered  only  by  an  ex- 
amination of  the  original  instruments  themselves.    In  most  cases 


§  749 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


780 


persons  intending  to  purchase  land  rely  rather  on  copies  or  ab- 
stracts of  them  than  on  the  original  instruments,  but  it  is  not 
entirely  safe  to  do  so,  and  wherever  it  is  possible  all  original 
instruments  in  the  chain  of  a  vendor's  title  should  be  read  by 
counsel  of  the  proposing  purchaser. 

An  examination  of  the  original  instruments,  or  of  true  copies 
thereof,  may  disclose  insufficient  operative  words,  or  words  of 
conveyance ;  or  an  insufficient  description  which  may  be  so  de- 
fective as  to  make  the  conveyance  void,  or  so  defective  as  to 
make  the  record  ineffectual  as  notice.  The  title  may  be  incom- 
plete or  incumbered  by  reason  of  covenants  running  with  the 
land,  or  restrictions  of  various  kinds  by  way  of  condition,  or 
covenant,  or  reservation  appearing  in  instruments  directly  in  the 
chain  of  title,  or  there  may  be  insufficient  recitals  when  ful'  re- 
citals are  required  by  statute,  and  there  may  be  insufficient  sign- 
ing, sealing,  attestation  or  acknowledgment. 

§  749.  Beginning  point  of  examination. — The  examma- 
tion  should  begin  at  the  original  source  of  the  title,  unless  coun- 
sel has  been  directed  to  begin  from  a  particular  subdivision  or 
from  a  given  date.  The  original  source  of  title  is  generally  from 
the  government,  or  one  of  the  sovereign  states,  and  the  proper 
evidence  of  a  good  title  from  the  government  is  a  deed  called  a 
patent.  The  right  to  a  patent  from  the  government,  however, 
may  be  evidenced  by  a  receipt  which  has  been  duly  issued  by  the 
proper  official,  called  a  "receiver." 

It  will  be  assumed  that  the  original  source  of  the  title  to  the 
land  abstracted  is  from  the  government,  and  in  the  absence  of 
any  specific  directions  to  commence  the  examination  at  a  differ- 
ent point  or  date  the  examination  should  cover  the  entire  period 
from  the  time  the  title  passed  from  the  government  until  it  vested 
in  the  present  owner. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  presume  that  because  a  mortgage  or  trust 
deed  appears  in  the  chain  of  title  the  abstract  must  have  been 
carefully  examined  before,  and  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
examine  beyond  the  date  of  .such  instrument.  Many  attorneys 
have  later  come  to  grief  because  of  such  presumption. 

§  750.  Printed  copies  of  abstracts. — In  subdividing  large 
tracts  of  land  into  lots  for  the  purpose  of  sale  to  various  persons, 
that  part  of  the  abstract  covering  the  entire  tract  before  such  sub- 


781  PERUSAL    AND   OPINIONS  §    751 

division  is  usually  put  in  print  to  be  used  in  connection  with  a 
continuation  for  each  particular  lot  sold.  This  practice  saves 
much  labor  and  expense,  and  if  the  printing  is  an  exact  copy  of 
the  original  it  is  much  more  reliable  than  a  written  copy  made 
from  the  original.  Some  attorneys,  however,  refuse  to  render 
an  opinion  on  the  title  until  the  original  copy  is  produced  for 
comparison,  and  some  require  the  certificate  of  a  reliable  ab- 
stracter to  be  appended  to  the  printed  part  showing  that  the 
abstracter  has  compared  the  printed  abstract  with  the  original, 
and  found  them  to  be  exact  duplicates. 

Where  an  abstracter  is  employed  to  make  an  abstract  of  title 
to  certain  lands  and  to  certify  to  a  certain  number  of  printed 
copies,  in  the  absence  of  a  special  contract,  he  is  entitled,  as  com- 
pensation for  certifying  to  the  copies,  merely  to  the  reasonable 
value  of  his  services,  and  not  to  the  value  of  all  the  copies  regard- 
ing them  as  originals  and  not  according  to  their  value  to  his 
employer." 

§  751.  Government  land  receiver's  receipt. — Where  a  pat- 
ent from  the  government  has  been  issued  and  recorded  accord- 
ing to  law,  it  carries  with  it  the  presumption  that  all  the  pre- 
requisites of  the  law  have  been  complied  with,  and  little  or  no 
attention  need  be  given  to  the  receiver's  receipt,  although  it  be 
noted  in  the  abstract  together  with  the  patent.  But  in  many 
cases  a  patent  is  never  called  for  or  delivered,  the  receipt  being 
relied  upon  as  sufficient  evidence  of  title  in  the  claimant.  Where 
such  is  the  case  it  is  important  to  inquire  into  every  detail  con- 
cerning its  issue  or  any  subsequent  transfer  thereof.  For  the 
purpose  of  identification  the  receipt  should  contain  a  number, 
and  the  number  of  the  document  where  it  may  be  found  should 
appear.  See  that  the  grantee  is  properly  named,  identified  or 
described,  and  that  the  land  is  also  described  with  certainty.  As- 
certain the  amount  paid  for  the  land,  and  the  balance  due,  if  any. 
See  that  the  instrument  is  properly  dated,  signed,  and  recorded. 

While  the  receiver's  receipt  is  prima  facie  that  the  law  has 
been  complied  with,  and  operates  to  convey  the  entire  beneficial 
interest  in  the  land,  it  can  not  be  set  up  at  law  to  defeat  the  legal 
title  by  patent."     ^^'here  no  patent  appears  in  the  abstract,  and 

2  Kenyon    v.    Charlevoix    Improve-         s  Hooper  v.  Scheimer,  23  How.  (U. 
ment  Co.,   135   Mich.   103,  97  N.  W.     S.)  235,  16  L.  ed.  452. 
407. 


/o^ 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


782 


is  not  obtainable  from  the  records  of  the  county  where  the  land 
lies,  an  office  copy  can  and  should  be  procured  from  the  general 
land  office  at  Washington  upon  filing  there  the  affidavit  of  the 
owner,  stating  his  ownership  and  occupation  of  the  land,  and  the 
purpose  for  which  the  copy  is  wanted. 

§  752.  Patent  from  the  federal  government. — We  have 
said  that  the  most  common  source  of  title  to  real  estate  is  from 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  instrument  of 
transfer  is  usually  a  formal  grant  called  a  patent.  This  instru- 
ment must  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  signed  by 
the  President,  or  in  his  name  by  his  secretary  or  executive  clerk, 
countersigned  by  the  recorder  of  the  general  land  office,  sealed 
by  the  government  seal,  and  recorded  in  the  general  land  office 
books  kept  for  that  purpose. 

The  formal  execution  of  patents  or  grants  from  the  govern- 
ment must  conform  to  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  issue, 
and  the  rules  applying  to  defects  appearing  on  the  face  of  the 
instrument  are  the  same  as  those  which  apply  to  a  deed  exe- 
cuted by  an  individual.  Hence  it  is  important  in  examining  a 
patent  to  look  closely  to  the  description  of  the  land,  the  descrip- 
tion and  identification  of  the  grantor  and  grantee,  and  the  sig- 
natures and  execution.  The  words  of  conveyance  should  be 
analyzed  to  see  if  they  constitute  a  grant  in  praesenti.  Patents  of 
the  United  States  should  be  recorded  in  the  county  where  the 
property  is  situated.  But  title  is  transferred  without  delivery  of 
the  patent.   Title  to  the  land  passes  to  the  grantee  by  the  record.* 

The  statute  of  limitations  does  not  run  against  the  govern- 
ment; therefore,  a  patent  must  issue  to  divest  it  of  legal  title  and 
vest  it  in  the  person  entitled  thereto. 

§  753.  Patent  from  state  government. — ^^"here  the  source 
of  title  is  from  the  state  the  instrument  of  grant  is  sometimes 
called  a  patent.  These  grants  are  authorized  by  legislative  enact- 
ment setting  forth  the  purpose  of  the  grant  and  prescribing  the 
formalities  of  execution.  Hence,  if  the  source  of  title  is  from 
the  state,  care  should  be  exercised  in  examining  the  legislative 
act  under  which  the  grant  was  issued  in  order  to  determine  if 
all  the  conditions  have  been  complied  with.  However,  this  is 
necessary  only  where  a  very  technical  examination  is  required. 

4  United   States  v.   Schurz,   102  U.     S.  378,  26  L.  ed.  167. 


'  ^^-^  PERUSAL    AND   OPINIONS  §    754 

The  instrument  of  conveyance  from  the  state  should  recite  or 
contain  the  date  of  passage  of  the  act  authorizing  the  grant,  the 
purpose  for  which  the  grant  is  made,  the  name  of  the  grantor 
and  grantee,  and  should  be  signed  by  the  officer  authorized  by  the 
act  to  sign,  and  sealed  with  the  official  state  seal. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  every  purchaser  under  a  pat- 
ent or  grant  from  the  state  is  charged  with  notice  of  any  defect 
apparent  upon  its  face,  there  being  no  difference  in  that  respect 
between  patents  and  deeds  of  individuals.^ 

§  754.  Private  deeds. — Where  the  muniment  of  title  con- 
sists of  a  deed  executed  by  a  private  person  the  abstract  usually 
states  that  it  was  executed  and  acknowledged,  etc.,  setting  out 
the  bare  facts  without  further  comment,  unless  some  defect  is 
shown  on  the  face  of  the  instrument.  When  the  bare  facts  are 
noted  in  the  abstract  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  deed  contains 
all  the  necessary  requirements  prescribed  by  law,  together  with 
the  usual  terms  and  conditions.  It  is  only  when  a  deed,  or  some 
part  thereof,  is  set  out  in  full  for  the  purpose  of  calling  attention 
to  some  unusual  provision  or  defect  that  the  examiner  is  re- 
quired to  give  his  attention  in  order  to  determine  the  effect  of 
the  particular  part  noted. 

Particular  attention  must  be  given  to  restrictive  clauses  in  a 
deed,  and  if  cured,  complied  with,  or  subsequently  waived,  no 
further  attention  need  be  paid  to  them.  The  same  is  true  with 
regard  to  dedications  and  trusts. 

In  examining  the  synopsis  of  a  private  deed  counsel  should 
give  close  attention  to  the  description  of  the  land  attempted  to 
be  conveyed  to  see  that  it  harmonizes  with  the  particular  land 
involved.  He  should  see  that  both  the  grantor  and  grantee  are 
properly  described  or  identified.  Particular  attention  should  be 
given  to  the  words  of  the  grant  to  determine  their  sufficiency  and 
effect.  All  limitations,  restrictions,  conditions,  exceptions,  and 
reservations,  should  be  carefully  examined.  Particular  atten- 
tion should  be  paid  to  all  covenants  in  the  deed.  Counsel  should 
notice  what  the  consideration  was  for  the  conveyance.  He  should 
note  the  date  of  execution,  and  compare  all  dates  to  see  that  they 
harmonize  with  the  history  of  the  title  in  question.  He  should 
see  that  the  deed  was  signed  and  acknowledged  by  the  person 

5  Bell  V.  Duncan,  11  Ohio  192. 


§    755  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  784 

named  therein  as  grantor,  and  if  the  grantor  be  married  at  the 
time,  the  signature  and  acknowledgment  of  the  husband  or  wife 
should  be  inquired  into.  If  attesting  witnesses  are  required,  in- 
quiry should  be  made  relative  to  this  matter. 

Counsel  should  give  particular  attention  to  the  formal  execu- 
tion, certificate,  and  recitals  of  the  acknowledgment,  and  should 
see  that  the  officer's  signature,  his  seal,  and  the  fact  of  the  expira- 
tion of  his  commission  appears.  If  a  revenue  stamp  is  required, 
it  should  not  be  overlooked. 

The  delivery  of  the  deed  is  presumed  from  the  fact  that  the 
abstract  states  that  it  has  been  recorded.  The  date  of  the  record 
should  always  appear.  Deeds  of  assignment  for  the  benefit  of 
creditors  must  be  made  in  accordance  with  statutory  require- 
ments, and  the  examiner  should  see  that  the  requirements  in  this 
respect  have  been  complied  with.  He  should  note  carefully  the 
terms  and  conditions  under  which  the  property  was  conveyed  to 
the  assignee,  and  should  see  that  such  conditions  have  been  com- 
plied with. 

§755.  Acknowledgments.  —  The  statutory  requirements 
as  to  the  form  and  substance  of  an  acknowledgment  must  be  lit- 
erally complied  with,  and  great  care  must  be  exercised  to  deter- 
mine if  every  essential  has  been  included  in  the  certificate  of  the 
officer  taking  same.  The  most  important  of  these  are:  (1)  The 
venue  or  place  where  the  acknowledgment  was  taken;  (2)  the 
name,  official  title  and  jurisdiction  of  the  officer;  (3)  the  name 
of  the  grantor;  (4)  description  of  grantor  with  reference  to 
whether  married  or  single;  (5)  if  grantor  be  a  corporation,  a 
showing  that  the  acknowledgment  is  the  act  of  the  corporation 
and  not  of  the  person  signing  it;  (6)  if  deed  was  by  an  attorney 
in  fact,  a  statement  that  it  was  the  act  and  deed  of  the  principal; 
(7)  statement  that  grantor  was  personally  known  to  officer;  (8) 
statement  that  the  acknowledgment  was  made  by  the  grantor  vol- 
untarily; and  (9)  where  the  statute  requires  the  wife  to  be  ex- 
amined separate  and  apart  from  her  husband,  the  certificate  must 
state  that  this  was  done,  that  the  contents  of  the  instrument  was 
explained  to  her,  and  that  she  made  the  acknowledgment  of  her 
own  free  will. 

The  certificate  of  acknowledgment  must  also  be  dated,  signed 
by  the  officer,  his  official  title  designated,  sealed  by  the  officer's 
seal,  and  attached  to  the  deed. 


785    .  PERUSAL    OF    ABSTRACT    AND    OPINION  §    756 

§  756.  Official  deeds. — In  examining  official  deeds  such  as 
sheriff's  guardians',  assignees,  and  trustees'  deeds  in  bankruptcy, 
the  records  of  the  court  proceedings  or  instruments  authorizing 
the  deed  should  be  carefully  analyzed,  and  it  will  be  incumbent 
upon  counsel  from  such  examination  to  determine  whether  or 
not  all  legal  and  statutory  requirements  were  complied  with  and 
a  good  and  sufficient  title  was  obtained  through  such  source. 

A  trustee's  deed  should  contain  a  recital  of  the  trust  under 
which  the  trustee  was  appointed,  and  the  examiner  should  deter- 
mine if  there  has  been  a  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  trust. 

The  deed  of  an  executor  or  administrator  under  order  of  court 
should  be  made  in  compliance  with  the  court's  order,  and  to  as- 
certain this  an  analysis  of  the  court  proceedings  should  be  made. 

A  master's  deed  should  contain  a  recital  of  execution  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  decree  and  sale  by  court  proceedings,  and  such 
proceedings  must  be  examined  for  irregularities. 

Sheriff's  deeds  must  contain  a  recital  of  authority  to  make 
them,  and  in  order  to  ascertain  if  such  authority  existed  the  court 
proceedings  must  be  examined  for  irregularities.  The  deed  must 
be  made  to  the  person  named  in  the  certificate  of  sale  or  to  his 
assignee.  There  must  have  been  a  valid  judgment,  execution 
issued  thereon,  levy  and  sale. 

§  757.  Trust  deeds  and  mortgages. — A  trust  deed,  or  a 
deed  in  the  nature  of  a  mortgage  to  secure  the  payment  of  a  debt, 
should  contain  recitals  of  the  number,  the  amount  due,  date  and 
description  of  the  notes.  It  should  also  recite  the  rate  of  inter- 
est, when  principal  and  interest  due,  and  how  payable.  It  should 
recite  the  document  number,  book  and  page  where  recorded.  The 
name  of  the  trustee  and  successor  in  trust  should  be  given  in  a 
trust  deed. 

§  758.  Deed  of  release. — A  deed  of  release  should  describe 
the  mortgage  or  trust  deed  released  with  sufficient  clearness  to 
identify  the  particular  instrument  released.  A  careful  compari- 
son of  all  data  abstracted  in  relation  to  the  release  should  be 
made.  The  document  number  of  the  mortgage  or  trust  deed,  the 
record  book  number  and  number  of  page  thereof  help  out  in  this 
respect,  but  are  not  always  conclusive, 

§  759.     Deed  executed  under  power  of  attorney. — Where 


SO — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    760  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  786 

the  muniment  of  title  consists  of  a  deed  executed  under  a  power 
of  attorney,  the  power  must  be  analyzed  as  to  the  scope  of  the 
power  delegated,  unless  the  principal  has  subsequently  made  a 
conveyance  of  the  property,  in  which  case  the  subsequent  con- 
veyance nullifies  the  power.  If  a  power  of  attorney  is  set  out 
in  full  in  the  abstract,  this  is  notice  to  examine  it  for  defects. 

In  order  that  a  valid  conveyance  may  be  made  under  a  power 
of  attorney,  the  instrument  purporting  to  confer  power  should 
be  made  with  the  same  solemnity  as  the  conveyance  itself.  It 
must  be  made  under  the  seal  of  the  principal  or  owner.  It  must 
contain  words  of  authority  delegated  and  limited.  The  date  of 
execution  and  recording  must  appear.  The  property  as  well  as 
the  owner  thereof  must  be  sufficiently  described  or  identified. 
The  date,  signature,  jurisdiction  and  seal  of  the  officer  taking 
the  acknowledgment  must  be  given.  If  attesting  witnesses  are 
required,  their  signatures  must  appear. 

Care  must  be  exercised  to  see  that  the  power  was  not  revoked 
at  the  time  the  conveyance  w^as  made.  Such  revocation  may 
occur  by  death  of  the  principal,  prior  conveyance  by  the  princi- 
pal, prior  conveyance  by  the  act  of  a  second  attorney,  bank- 
ruptcy or  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  by  the  principal, 
by  marriage,  or  by  operation  of  law. 

§  760.  Dedications. — It  is  incumbent  upon  counsel  to  de- 
termine from  the  recitals  indicative  of  a  dedication  whether  there 
has  been  in  fact  a  dedication  to  public  uses,  or  simply  an  adjust- 
ment of  a  dispute  relative  to  a  common  right  of  way  in  connec- 
tion \vith  the  property.  Dedications  are  usually  made  by  map  or 
plat,  and  where  such  map  or  plat  does  not  appear  in  the  abstract, 
examination  should  be  made  of  the  map  or  plat  as  shown  in  the 
public  records.  Sometimes  the  map  is  omitted  because  it  is  fol- 
lowed by  a  vacation.  In  connection  with  the  examination  of  the 
map  the  examiner  should  note  the  execution  and  acknowledg- 
ment, the  date  of  recording,  the  surveyor's  certificate,  the  ap- 
proval by  examiner  of  subdivisions,  and  any  other  act  required  to 
constitute  a  valid  dedication  under  the  statute. 

§  761.  Sale  under  foreclosure. — Where  title  is  abased  on  a 
deed  made  in  pursuance  to  a  foreclosure  and  sale  under  a  mort- 
gage, all  the  proceedings  had  in  connection  therewith  must  l)e 
carefully  examined.     Care  must  be  exercised  to  see  that  process 


787  PERUSAL   OF   ABSTRACT    AND    OPINION  §    762 

was  served  on  all  parties  having  an  interest  in  or  lien  against  the 
property,  and  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  parties  and 
the  subject-matter.  The  pleadings  should  be  examined  to  deter- 
mine the  issues  joined  by  the  parties,  and  in  case  any  failed  to 
plead,  see  that  they  were  properly  defaulted.  The  decree  and 
order  of  sale  should  receive  due  attention,  and  the  sale  should 
be  made  in  strict  conformity  therewith.  Where  confirmation  of 
the  sale  is  required  this  matter  should  not  be  overlooked.  In 
fact  all  statutory  requirements  pertaining  to  the  foreclosure  and 
sale  should  be  carefully  examined  and  compared  with  the  record. 
Also,  inquire  if  the  equity  of  redemption  has  expired. 

§  762.  Judicial  sales. — In  all  judicial  sales  of  real  property 
the  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  applies,  except  in  cases  where  the 
court  had  no  jurisdiction  or  the  officer  making  the  sale  made 
false  or  fraudulent  statements  regarding  the  title.  Objection 
must  be  made  to  such  title  before  the  sale  is  confirmed.  The  sale 
is  not  completed  until  the  officer  making  it  has  reported  the  sale 
to  the  court  and  confirmation  thereof  has  been  made. 

The  most  common  objections  to  a  title  by  judicial  sale  are : 
(1)  Want  of  jurisdiction  of  the  court  as  to  the  subject-matter 
or  parties,  (2)  errors  or  irregularities  in  the  proceedings,  and 
(3)  want  of  title.  Care  must  be  exercised  to  see  that  the  inter- 
est or  property  sought  to  be  sold  has  been  reduced  to  the  control 
of  the  court. 

§  763.  Tax  sales. — Title  claimed  through  a  sale  for  non- 
payment of  taxes  must  be  carefully  scrutinized.  Their  validity 
depends  entirely  upon  a  strict  compliance  with  the  statute  of  the 
particular  state  where  the  land  is  situated,  and  all  the  proceed- 
ings should  be  carefully  examined  to  see  if  the  statutory  provi- 
sions have  been  complied  with. 

If  a  tax  deed  appears  in  the  chain  of  title,  it  is  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  inquire :  ( 1 )  Whether  the  tax  or  assessment  was  au- 
thorized by  law;  (2)  whether  the  tax  or  assessment  was  laid  or 
imposed  in  accordance  with  the  law,  and  (3)  whether  all  the 
requirements  of  the  law  preliminary  to  the  sale  and  execution 
of  the  deed  have  been  complied  with. 

§  764.  Sales  by  executors,  administrators,  and  guardians. 
— Sales  by  executors,   administrators,   or  guardians   are  made 


§  765 


TITLES    AND  ABSTRACTS 


788 


either  under  a  povver  of  sale  in  a  will  or  in  pursuance  of  an  or- 
der of  court.  In  either  case  a  strict  compliance  with  the  formali- 
ties of  the  statute  must  appear.  In  sales  under  power  given  in  a 
will,  the  admission  of  the  will  to  probate  is  usually  sufficient 
authority  to  sell  without  the  order  or  confirmation  of  the  court, 
while  in  a  sale  ordered  by  the  court,  the  court  must  ratify  and  con- 
firm the  sale. 

Sales  of  property  of  persons  under  legal  disability,  such  as 
infants,  drunkards,  spendthrifts,  or  persons  of  unsound  mind, 
must  be  made  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  statute.  Unless  the 
statute  is  complied  with  the  court  is  without  jurisdiction  and  an 
order  of  sale  is  void. 

§  765.  Wills. — Where  a  will  appears  in  the  chain  of  title, 
its  terms  must  be  compared  with  the  proceedings  had  in  the  pro- 
bate court  with  reference  to  the  real  estate  involved.  The  terms 
of  the  will  should  be  carefully  examined  to  see  that  it  contains 
no  legacy,  annuity  or  the  like  that  is  charged  on  the  land  in  the 
hands  of  the  devisees.  The  incompetency  of  the  testator  may 
often  be  determined  from  foolish  or  unnatural  provisions.  The 
devise  may  also  be  invalid  because  of  some  patent  ambiguity  in 
respect  to  the  person  whom  it  was  intended  should  take  under 
the  will,  or  in  respect  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  devise ;  or,  be- 
cause the  will  is  too  vague,  uncertain  and  indefinite  in  its  provi- 
sions or  because  its  provisions  are  unintelligible,  or  in  any 
respect  unlawful,  as  where  they  create  a  perpetuity.  The 
intention  of  the  testator  must  sometimes  be  extracted 
from  a  number  of  seemingly  repugnant  or  inconsistent 
provisions.  Hence,  the  question  of  what  interest  or  estate 
the  devisee  takes  is  often  a  matter  of  great  nicety  and  diffi- 
culty. Wherever  possible,  the  original  will  should  always  be 
inspected,  as  there  may  be  indications  upon  its  face  that  it  is  a' 
forgery.  It  seems  that  an  ex  parte  admission  of  a  will  to  pro- 
bate is  not  always  conclusive  upon  persons  in  interest,  and  the 
will  is  liable  to  be  avoided  upon  an  issue  devisavit  vel  non.  The 
examiner  should,  therefore,-  satisfy  himself  by  an  inspection  of 
the  instrument  that,  for  anything  that  appears  on  its  face,  it  has 
been  properly  admitted  to  probate. 

Counsel  should  satisfy  himself  that  the  time  for  filing  suit  to 
contest  the  will  has  expired,  and  that  all  claims  have  either  been 
paid  or  barred. 


789  PERUSAL    OF    ABSTRACT    AND    OPINION  §    766 

§  766.  Descents. — Where  the  owner  of  real  estate  dies  in- 
testate, and  probate  of  his  estate  has  been  had,  the  abstract  usu- 
ally sets  out  the  probate  proceedings  in  full.  These  should  be 
carefully  examined  to  determine  if  all  the  requirements  of  the 
law  have  been  complied  with.  When  title  runs  through  probate, 
it  involves  an  analysis  of  the  entire  proceedings. 

Counsel  must  ascertain  if  there  has  been  proper  proof  of  death 
and  heirship.  He  must  inquire  if  there  was  a  widow's  award, 
or  children's  award,  and  if  so,  were  they  satisfied.  The  question 
of  dower  or  curtesy,  and  their  relinquishment  must  receive  atten- 
tion. It  must  be  seen  to  that  all  debts  and  claims  have  been  either 
paid  or  barred,  and  that  there  are  no  taxes,  inheritance  or  other- 
wise, remaining  unpaid.  Also  that  the  estate  has  been  finally 
settled  and  the  administrator  discharged. 

§  767.  Contract  of  sale. — Where  the  abstract  contains  a 
full  copy  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  the  land  in  question,  the 
terms,  conditions  and  reservations  of  such  sale  must  be  analyzed. 
If  such  contract  has  been  recorded,  it  is  notice  to  subsequent 
purchasers  of  the  interest  held  by  the  prospective  vendee,  and 
some  record,  either  by  subsequent  conveyance  or  by  cancellation, 
should  appear  in  the  abstract.  A  deed  given  to  the  vendee  named 
in  the  contract  and  executed  by  the  vendor  will  suffice  to  cancel 
the  contract.  Sometimes  an  assignment  of  the  contract  will  be 
noted;  this  will  call  attention  to  the  change  of  name  of  the  party 
to  whom  the  deed  should  subsequently  be  made.  A  subsequent 
deed  may  show  that  a  contract  of  record  was  considered  for- 
feited by  a  failure  to  comply  with  its  terms,  nevertheless  it  is  a 
cloud  on  the  title  until  canceled  or  relinquished.  In  such  case 
it  is  well  to  object  to  such  condition  and  require  the  seller  to  pro- 
cure a  release  of  the  rights  of  the  person  under  such  contract. 

§  768.  Judgment  liens. — Unsatisfied  judgments  appearing 
in  the  abstract  constitute  a  valid  objection  to  the  title,  and  should 
be  noted  in  the  opinion.  Demand  should  be  made  that  the  judg- 
ment be  satisfied  of  record,  or  some  other  satisfactory  evidence 
should  be  required  in  order  to  clear  up  the  title.  Care  should  be 
exercised  to  see  that  the  lien  has  not  been  continued  in  favor  of 
a  surety  who  has  discharged  the  judgment  and  who  is  entitled 
to  be  subrogated  to  the  benefit  of  the  lien.    This  privilege  has 


§    769  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  790 

been  accorded  to  the  surety  in  some  of  the  states,  even  as  against 
a  purchaser  without  notice. 

§  769.  Mechanics'  liens. — Where  the  abstract  discloses  an 
unsatisfied  mechanic's  lien,  counsel  should  insist  upon  its  release, 
unless  the  record  shows  that  the  statute  has  not  been  complied 
with  in  attempting  to  create  the  lien,  or  unless  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations has  run  against  the  date  of  filing  the  statement  of  the 
claim  or  of  bringing  a  suit  to  foreclose.  Where  there  is  any 
doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  examiner  as  to  the  validity  of  the  lien 
he  should  require  the  record  cleared  of  the  cloud.  In  determin- 
ing the  validity  of  such  lien,  counsel  should  look  to  the  descrip- 
tion and  identity  of  the  property  in  question,  the  description  and 
identity  of  the  owner,  and  the  amount  due  thereon. 

Even  where  the  abstract  does  not  show  a  record  of  such  lien, 
inquiry  in  pais  respecting  possible  liens  should  always  be  made, 
and  the  attention  of  prospective  purchasers  directed  thereto. 

§  770.  Miscellaneous  incumbrances. — Aside  from  the  spe- 
cific incumbrances  mentioned  in  prior  sections  of  this  chapter, 
there  often  appears  such  defects  as  easements,  servitudes,  rights 
of  way,  reservations  of  minerals,  building  restrictions,  restric- 
tions as  to  uses,  charges  upon  property  for  the  support  of  par- 
ticular persons,  inchoate  rights  of  dower,  outstanding  life  inter- 
ests, leasehold  interests  and  the  like,  all  of  which  are  important, 
and  must  be  taken  into  account  in  making  up  the  opinion.  Some 
of  the  above  incumbrances  can  only  be  discovered  by  an  actual 
inspection  of  the  premises,  while  many  of  them  will  be  embodied 
in  instruments  set  out  in  the  chain.  The  effect  of  any  such  incum- 
brances on  the  title  should  be  made  clear  to  the  person  for  whom 
the  title  is  being  examined. 

§  771.  Examination  of  matters  in  pais. — Where  the  owner 
of  the  land  in  question  has  the  actual  legal  title  thereto  the  ex- 
aminer is  not  concerned  to  inquire  whether  any  equities  exist  in 
favor  of  third  parties  by  which  the  title  may  be  defeated  or  im- 
paired, unless  his  client  has  knowledge  of  facts  which  should  lead 
him  to  make  inquiry. 

Among  the  matters  that  are  not  apt  to  appear  on  the  records, 
and  about  which  it  might  be  well  for  the  examiner  to  make  in- 
quiry, may  be  mentioned:  (1)  Adverse  occupancy  of  the  prem- 


791  PERUSAL    OF    ABSTRACT    AND    OPINION  §    772 

ises,  (2)  incompetency  of  parties  to  deeds  or  wills,  (3)  non- 
performance of  conditions  antecedent  and  subsequent,  and  the 
happening  or  non-happening  of  contingencies  upon  which  an 
estate  depends,  (4)  the  occurrence  of  marriages,  births  and 
deaths,  wherever  they  would  affect  the  title,  (5)  forgeries  of 
deeds  or  wills,  and  fraudulent  alterations  or  insertions  therein, 
(6)  dower  and  curtesy  rights,  (7)  latent  ambiguities  in  the  de- 
scription of  the  property  or  persons,  (8)  insufficiency  of  the  evi- 
dence to  establish  title  by  inheritance,  (9)  insufficiency  of  evidence 
to  establish  title  by  adverse  possession,  (10)  want  of  jurisdiction 
of  the  person  in  judicial  proceedings,  (11)  the  existence  of  physi- 
cal encumbrances  upon  the  premises,  (12)  want  of  possession  un- 
der the  several  deeds  in  the  chain  of  title,  (13)  want  of  delivery  of 
deeds,  and  (14)  the  existence  of  an  unrecorded  deed  within  the 
period  during  which  such  a  deed  may  be  allowed  by  statute  to 
relate  back  and  bind  subsequent  purchasers  from  the  time  of 
acknowledgment, 

§  772.  Examination  of  abstracter's  certificate. — The  ab- 
stracter's certificate  should  show  that  he  has  examined  the  in- 
dexes to,  and  records  of  conveyances,  judgments,  tax  sales,  and 
confirmed  special  assessments  in  the  county  where  the  land  is 
situated,  and  that  there  are  no  conveyances,  judgments,  liens, 
tax  sales,  forfeitures,  confirmed  special  assessments  for  the  period 
covered  by  the  examination  except  as  noted  in  the  abstract.  The 
certificate  should  also  show  the  number  of  pages  of  the  abstract, 
should  be  dated  and  signed  by  the  abstracter.  Care  should  be 
exercised  to  see  that  the  abstracter  has  not  attempted  to  limit  his 
liability  by  a  vague  and  obscure  certificate. 

§  773.  Opinion  of  title. — Reports  which  are  given  by 
lawyers  who  have  examined  the  title  presented  in  the  abstract  are 
called  opinions.  These  are  rendered  only  after  a  thorough  ex- 
amination has  been  made,  the  inquiries  answered,  and  the  requisi- 
tions satisfactorily  supplied.  No  particular  form  of  opinion  is 
required ;  it  only  being  necessary  to  state  in  a  concise  manner  the 
result  of  the  investigation,  embodying  all  the  defects  and  irregu- 
larities which  counsel  may  deem  worthy  of  notice  as  affecting 
the  title. 

In  the  performance  of  his  duty  counsel  undertakes  to  act  with 
reasonable  care  and  ordinary  skill.    Good  faith  and  honest  serv- 


§    773  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  792 

ice  must  be  given,  but  questions  of  the  presence  or  absence  of 
reasonable  care  and  ordinary  skill  must  be  determined  by  the 
facts  in  each  case,"  a  mere  error  of  judgment  on  a  doubtful 
question  of  law  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  evidence  of  want  of 
competent  knowledge  or  skill,  or  of  negligence,  but  a  disregard  of 
a  plain  statute  is  so  to  be  regarded.'^ 

Counsel  must  carefully  examine  each  instrument  noted  in  the 
abstract  affecting  the  title,*"  and  it  is  not  negligence  in  him  to  omit 
looking  into  matters  outside  the  abstract,  where  his  client  has 
expressed  himself  as  being  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  outside 
the  record  that  in  any  way  would  affect  the  title.  But  it  has  been 
held  that  w^iere  an  attorney,  employed  to  examine  the  title  to 
land,  knew  that  a  building  was  being  built  on  the  premises,  it 
was  his  duty  to  ascertain  whether  there  were  liens  for  materials 
and  labor  furnished,  and  where  his  failure  to  do  so  resulted  in 
damages  to  his  client,  a  breach  of  his  contract  of  employment 
was  declared." 

In  framing  opinions  of  title  some  attorneys  simply  annex  to 
the  abstract  a  written  statement  of  the  condition  of  the  title  based 
upon  the  examination  of  the  abstract,  while  others  base  their 
statements  upon  their  personal  examination  of  the  original  rec- 
ords, placing  the  title  in  some  individual  named  subject  to  such 
defects  as  appear  from  the  records.  The  latter  method  is  some- 
times termed  "certifying  the  title."  The  certificates  thus  issued 
are  to  the  same  effect  as  certificates  issued  by  title  companies,  and 
are  governed  by  the  same  rules  of  law.^" 

«  Caverly    v.    McOwen,    123    Mass.  ^  Humboldt  Bldg.  Assn.  v.  Ducker, 

574.  26  Ky.  L.  931,  82  S.  W.  969. 

^  Caverly    v.    McOwen,    123    Mass.  i"  Ehmer     v.     Title     Guarantee     & 

574.  Trust  Co.,  156  N.  Y.  10,  50  N.  E.  420. 

*  Keuthan  v.   St.   Louis  Trust   Co., 
101  Mo.  App.  1,  73  S.  W.  334. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

DIGEST  OF  STATUTES  PERTAINING  TO  EXECUTION  AND  ACKNOWL- 
EDGMENT OF  DEEDS 


SEC. 

SEC. 

780.  Alabama. 

806. 

Montana. 

781.  Alaska. 

807. 

Nebraska. 

782.  Arizona. 

808. 

Nevada. 

783.  Arkansas. 

809. 

New  Hampshire. 

784.  California. 

810. 

New  Jersey. 

785.  Colorado. 

811. 

New  Mexico. 

786.  Connecticut. 

812. 

New  York. 

787.  Delaware. 

813. 

North  Carolina. 

788.  District  of  Columbia. 

814. 

North  Dakota. 

789.  Florida. 

815. 

Ohio. 

790.  Georgia. 

816. 

Oklahoma. 

791.  Hawaii. 

817. 

Oregon. 

792.  Idaho. 

818. 

Pennsylvania. 

793.  Illinois. 

819. 

Rhode  Island. 

794.  Indiana. 

820. 

South  Carolina. 

795.  Iowa. 

821. 

South  Dakota. 

796.  Kansas. 

822. 

Tennessee. 

797.  Kentucky. 

823. 

Texas. 

798.  Louisiana. 

824. 

Utah. 

799.  Maine. 

825. 

Vermont. 

800.  Maryland. 

826. 

Virginia. 

801.  Massachusetts. 

827. 

Washington. 

802.  Michigan. 

828. 

West  Virginia. 

803.  Minnesota. 

829. 

Wisconsin. 

804.  Mississippi. 

830. 

Wyoming. 

805.  Missouri. 

§  780.  Alabama. — Every  deed  must  be  in  writing  or 
printed,  and  on  parchment  or  paper. 

Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within  the  state  by  Supreme 
and  circuit  court  judges  or  their  clerks,  by  chancellors,  registers 
in  chancery,  probate  court  judges,  justices  of  the  peace,  and 
notaries  pubHc.^  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  judges  and  clerks  of  federal 
courts,  judges  and  clerks  of  any  court  of  record  in  any  state, 
notaries  public,  and  commissioners  appointed  by  the  governor  of 
this  state.^  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  by  the  judges  of  any  court  of  record,  by  mayor  or  chief 
magistrate  of  any  city,  town,  borough,  or  county,  by  notaries 


12  Civ.  Code  1907,  §  3358. 


2  2  Civ.  Code  1907,  §  3359. 


793 


781 


TITLES    AND    AHSTRACTS 


794 


public,  or  by  diploiricitic  consular,  or  commercial  agent  of  the 
United  States.^ 

Conveyances  by  married  women  must  be  acknowledged  or 
signed  by  two  witnesses  and  the  husband  must  join.*  No  other 
witnessing  to  an  acknowledged  instrument  is  required.  But 
where  instrument  is  not  acknowledged  one  witness  is  required, 
and  if  the  grantor  is  unable  to  write  two  are  required.^  A  wife 
over  eighteen  years  of  age  may  release  her  dower  by  joining  with 
her  husband  in  conveyance  or  power  of  attorney,  or  by  separate 
instrument  executed  by  her  alone.  In  either  case  her  signature 
must  be  witnessed  or  acknowledged  in  the  manner  prescribed  for 
other  conveyances. °  In  conveyance  of  homestead  husband  and 
wife  must  join  in  deed,  and  wife  must  make  separate  acknowledg- 
ment. The  certificate  of  the  officer  taking  the  acknowledgment 
must  accompany  the  conveyance.'^ 

Seals  are  not  required.  If  the  deed  purports  on  its  face  to  be  a 
sealed  instrument,  it  will  have  such  force. ^ 

The  husband  must  join  in  a  conveyance  by  his  wiffe  unless  he 
is  mentally  incapable,  or  is  a  nonresident,  or  has  abandoned  her, 
or  is  serving  a  sentence  of  two  years  or  more  for  crime.'"* 

The  registration  of  deeds  filed  later  than  the  prescribed  time  or 
lacking  proper  acknowledgment  or  probate  is  legalized  by  stat- 
ute.^'* 

§  781.  Alaska. — Acknowledgments  within  the  district  may 
be  taken  before  any  judge,  clerk  of  the  district  court,  notary 
public,  or  commissioner  within  the  district.  The  officer  taking 
the  same  shall  indorse  thereon  a  certificate  of  the  acknowledg- 
ment thereof  and  the  true  date  of  making  same  under  his  hand.^^ 

Within  any  state,  district,  or  territory  of  the  United  States 
deejds  may  be  executed  according  to  laws  of  such  state,  district, 
or  territory,  and  acknowledgments  made  before  any  judge  of  a 
court  of  record,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public,  or  other  officer 
authorized  by  laws  of  such  state,  district  or  territory  to  take 
acknowledgments  of  deeds  therein,  or  before  any  commissioner 


3  2  Civ.  Code  1907.  §  3359. 

4  2  Civ.   Code  1907,   §§   3355,  3357, 
4494. 

■•2   Civ.  Code   1907,   §§   3355,  3357, 
3375. 
c2  Civ.  Code  1907,  §  3818. 


7  2  Civ.  Code  1907,  §  4161. 

8  2  Civ.  Code  1907,  §§  3356,  3363. 
0  2  Civ.  Code  1907.  §  4494. 

10  Alabama  Stat.  1903,  No.  380. 
iiAnnot.   Codes   1900,   Part  V,  ch, 
11,  §  82. 


795  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    782 

appointed  for  such  purposes/"  Deeds  may  be  executed 
in  foreign  countries  according  to  the  laws  of  such 
countries,  and  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  any  notary 
public  therein,  minister  plenipotentiary,  minister  extraordinary, 
minister  resident,  charge  d'affaires,  commissioner,  or  consul  of 
the  United  States  appointed  to  reside  therein,  which  acknowledg- 
ment shall  be  certified  thereon  by  the  officer  taking  the  same  under 
his  hand;  and  if  taken  before  a  notary  public,  his  seal  of  office 
shall  be  affixed  to  such  certificate.^^ 

The  officer  taking  the  acknowledgment  must  know  the  grantor 
or  have  satisfactory  evidence  of  his  identity."  For  deeds  exe- 
cuted without  Alaska  and  within  the  United  States,  unless  the 
acknowledgment  be  taken  before  a  commissioner  appointed  for 
that  purpose,  or  before  a  notary  public  certified  under  his  notarial 
seal,  or  before  the  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  under  the  seal  of  the 
court,  such  deed  shall  have  attached  thereto  a  certificate  of  the 
clerk  or  other  proper  certifying  officer  of  a  court  of  record  of 
the  county  or  district  within  which  acknowledgment  was  taken, 
under  his  official  seal,  certifying  to  the  official  character  of  the 
officer  taking  the  acknowledgment,  the  authenticity  of  his  signa- 
ture, and  his  compliance  with  the  laws  of  such  state,  district,  or 
territory. ^^  When  a  resident  wife  joins  with  her  husband  in 
conveying  realty  situated  within  this  district,  she  shall  acknowl- 
edge that  she  executed  such  deed  freely  and  voluntarily.^"  When 
a  nonresident  married  woman  joins  with  her  husband  in  convey- 
ing realty  situated  within  this  district,  the  conveyance  shall  have 
the  same  eft"ect  as  if  she  were  sole,  and  the  acknowledgment  or 
proof  of  the  execution  thereof  may  be  the  same  as  if  she  were 
sole.^" 

Two  subscribing  witnesses  are  required  for  deeds  executed 
within  the  district. ^^ 

Private  seals  are  abolished.^'' 

§  782.  Arizona. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
Arizona  by  clerk  of  court  having  seal,  notary  public,   county 

i2Annot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch.  i'^  Annot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch. 
11,  §  83.  11,  §  86. 

isAnnot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch.  "  Annot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch. 
11,  §  85.  11,  §  82. 

i*Annot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch.  is  Annot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch. 
11,  §  88.  11,  §  82. 

isAnnot.  Codes  1900,  Part  V,  ch.  loAnnot.  Codes  1900,  Part  IV,  ch. 
11,  §  82.  101,  §  1041. 


§    7Sj  TITJ-ES    AND    ABSTRACTS  796 

recorder,  or  justice  of  the  peace.^''  Without  Arizona  and  within 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  clerk  of 
court  of  record  having  seal,  by  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed 
under  Arizona  law,  or  by  notary  public.-^  Without  the  United 
States,  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  minister,  commis- 
sioner, or  charge  d'affaires  resident  and  accredited  in  county; 
consul  general,  consul,  vice  consul,  commercial  agent,  vice  com- 
mercial agent,  deputy  consul,  or  consular  agent  of  the  United 
States,  resident  in  country  where  the  proof  or  acknowledgment 
is  made ;  or  notary  public."^  No  acknowledgment  shall  be  taken 
unless  the  officer  knows  or  has  satisfactory  evidence  on  the  oath 
or  affinnation  of  a  credible  witness,  which  shall  be  noted  in  his 
certificate,  that  person  acknowledging  is  one  who  executed  instru- 
ment.^^ By  act  of  1903,  all  defective  acknowledgments  already 
made  and  recorded  are  declared  valid,  provided  the}^  were  valid 
according  to  laws  of  place  where  executed.^* 

Officer  taking  acknowledgment  must  affix  his  official  seal  and 
state  when  his  commission  expires.-^ 

Property  acquired  during  marriage,  except  by  gift,  devise,  or 
descent  is  common  property  of  both' husband  and  wife,  and  both 
must  join  in  conveyance.""  Married  women  of  eighteen  years  or 
upwards  may  make  conveyances  of  their  separate  property  as 
though  sole."'^  A  married  woman's  acknowledgment  may  be 
taken  without  an  examination  apart  from  her  husband.^^ 

Homestead  shall  not  be  conveyed  without  consent  of  wife  of 
owner,  if  married.  Such  consent  shall  be  evidenced  by  wife 
joining  in  conveyance  and  signing  her  name  thereto ;  and  also  by 
her  separate  acknowledgment  thereof,  taken  and  certified  to  be- 
fore a  proper  officer.-^ 

§  783.  Arkansas. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Arkansas  before  Supreme  or  circuit  court,  either  of 
the  judges  thereof,  clerk  of  any  court  of  record,  justice  of  the 
peace,  or  notary  public.^"  Without  the  state  and  within  the 
United  States,  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  any  court 
of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  state,  territory,  Indian  territory, 

20  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2070,  p.  716.  ^'>Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2061,  p.  714. 

21  Rev.  Stats.  1913.  par.  2071,  p.  716.  27  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2058,  p.  714. 

22  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2072,  p.  716.  2s  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2069,  p.  716. 

23  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2074,  p.  717.  29  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2060.  p.  714. 

24  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2077,  p.  718.  3o  Dig.  of   Stats.   1904,   §  743;   Act 

25  Rev.  Stats.  1913,  par.  2075,  p.  717.  May  6,  1905. 


797  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    783 

colony,  possession,  or  dependency  having  a  seal,  or  the  clerk 
thereof,  mayor  of  incorporated  city  or  town,  chief  officer  of  town 
or  city  having  a  seal,  notary  public,  or  commissioner  appointed 
by  the  governor  of  this  state. ^^  Without  the  United  States  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  taken  before  any  United  States  consul, 
any  court  having  a  seal,  mayor  or  chief  officer  of  city  or  town 
having  an  official  seal,  or  before  any  officer  of  any  foreign  country 
authorized  by  its  laws  to  take  probate  of  conveyance  of  real 
estate  of  his  own  country,  if  he  have  an  official  seal.^" 

The  instrument  of  conveyance  must  be  subscribed  to  by  two 
witnesses. ^^  When  witnesses  do  not  subscribe  the  deed  or  instru- 
ment in  writing  at  the  time  of  the  execution  thereof,  date  of  their 
subscribing  must  be  stated  with  their  signatures.^* 

No  authentication  of  authority  of  the  officer  is  required.  The 
certificate  of  acknowledgment  must  be  under  officer's  seal,  if  he 
has  one ;  otherwise,  under  his  official  signature. ^^  Court  or  officer 
taking  proof  or  acknowledgment  of  married  woman  in  convey- 
ance of  husband's  realty,  must  grant  and  have  certificate  indorsed 
on  conveyance,  which  certificate  must  be  signed  by  clerk  of 
court  if  probate  is  taken  in  court,  or  by  officer  taking  same,  if  he 
have  an  official  seal.^*^ 

A  married  woman  may  make  conveyances  as  though  feme 
sole.^^ 

A  married  woman  may  relinquish  dower  by  joining  with  hus- 
band in  deed,  and  making  separate  acknowledgment."''  Right  of 
curtesy  exists  upon  the  death  of  v/ife,  but  during  her  life  husband 
has  no  marital  rights  in  wife's  private  property,  which  she  may 
dispose  of  as  if  she  were  a  feme  sole.^'*  Husband  whose  wife  has 
been  adjudged  permanently  insane  may  have  life  estate  set  apart 
for  her  in  lieu  of  dower. *°  No  conveyance,  mortgage,  or  other 
instrument  affecting  homestead  of  married  man  shall  be  valid 
except  for  taxes,  laborers'  and  mechanics'  liens,  and  purchase- 
money,  unless  his  wife  joins  in  execution  of  such  instrument  and 
acknowledges  same." 

SI  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  743.  ^7  Dig.  of  Stals.  1904,  §  740. 

32  Dig.  of  Stats.  19a4,  §  743.  ss  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  88  741,  751. 

33  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  742.  so  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  5213e. 
3*  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  742.  40  Act  Mav  23,  1907. 

35  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  744.  4i  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  3901. 

36  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904,  §  746. 


784 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


798 


§  784.  California.  —  Acknowledgments  may  1)e  taken 
within  the  state  of  California  by  a  justice  or  clerk  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  or  judge  of  superior  court  at  any  place  within  the  state, 
within  the  city,  county,  city  and  county  district,  or  township 
for  which  the  officer  was  elected  or  appointed,  before  a  clerk  of 
a  court  of  record,  court  commissioner,  county  recorder,  notary 
public,  or  justice  of  the  peace. *^  Without  the  state  but  within  the 
United  States,  and  within  jurisdiction  of  officer,  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  taken  by  a  justice,  judge,  or  clerk  of  a  court  of 
record  of  the  United  States  or  courts  of  record  of  any  state,  a 
notary  public,  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this 
state,  or  by  any  officer  authorized  by  law  of  the  state  in  which 
acknowledgment  is  taken."  Without  the  United  States  acknowl- 
edgments may  be  taken  by  a  minister,  commissioner,  or  charge 
d'affaires  of  the  United  States,  resident  and  accredited  in  the 
country  where  the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  made,  a  consul, 
vice  consul,  or  consular  agent  of  the  United  States,  resident  in 
the  country  where  the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  made,  a  judge 
of  a  court  of  record  of  the  country  where  proof  or  acknowledg- 
ment is  made,  a  commissioner  appointed  for  such  purposes  by 
the  governor  of  this  state,  or  a  notary  public.**  When  any  of 
the  officers  mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  are  authorized 
by  law  to  appoint  a  deputy,  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  may  be 
taken  by  such  deputy  in  the  name  of  his  principal.*^ 

A  subscribing  witness  may  prove  an  unacknowledged  deed.*" 

When  an  acknowledgment  is  taken  outside  of  this  state,  in 
accordance  with  laws  of  place  where  taken,  the  certificate  of  a 
clerk  of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district  where  such 
acknowledgment  is  taken,  that  the  officer  certifying  to  the  same 
is  authorized  by  law  so  to  do,  and  that  the  signature  of  said  officer 
to  such  certificate  is  genuine,  and  that  such  acknowledgment  is 
taken  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  place  where  made,  shall 
be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  facts  stated  in  the  certificate  of  said 
clerk.*^ 

All  distinctions  between  sealed  and  unsealed  instruments  abol- 
ished.*' 


42  Civ.  Code  1906,  §§  1180.  1181,  as 
amended  bv  Stats,  and  Amends,  to 
Codes  1911,"  ch.  247. 

43  Civ.  Code  1906,   §   1182. 

44  Civ.  Code  1906,  §   1183. 


4'5Civ.  Code  1906,  §  1184. 
4GCiv.  Code  1906.  §  1195. 

47  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  1189. 

48  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  1629. 


799  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    785 

Property  owned  by  husband  or  wife  before  marriage  and  that 
afterwards  acquired  by  gift,  bequest,  devise,  or  descent  is  the 
separate  property  of  the  husband  or  wife  who  owned  or  so  ac- 
quired it.  All  property  acquired  after  marriage  by  either  or  both 
is  community  property.'*" 

Married  woman's  conveyance  has  same  effect  as  if  she  were 
unmarried,  and  may  be  acknowledged  in  the  same  manner.'^" 

The  wife  may,  without  the  consent  of  her  husband,  convey 
her  separate  property.^^ 

Homestead  can  not  be  conveyed  or  incumbered,  unless  instru- 
ment is  executed  and  acknowledged  by  both  husband  and  wife.^'" 
The  homestead  consists  of  the  dwelling-house  in  which  the  claim- 
ant resides,  and  the  land  on  which  the  same  is  situated.^" 

§  785.  Colorado. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Colorado  by  any  judge,  clerk,  or  deputy  clerk  of  any 
court  of  record  under  seal  of  such  court,  by  clerk,  recorder,  or 
deputy  clerk  of  any  court,  such  clerk  or  deputy  clerk  certifying 
under  seal  of  county,  by  notary  public  under  his  seal,  or  a  justice 
of  the  peace  within  his  county.  When  the  land  conveyed  is  out- 
side the  county,  county  clerk  and  recorder  must  certify,  under  his 
hand  and  seal,  to  the  official  capacity  of  a  justice  of  the  peace 
and  to  the  authenticity  of  his  signature.^*  Without  the  state  and 
within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  the 
secretary  of  state  or  territory,  under  seal  of  state  or  territory; 
by  clerk  of  any  court  of  record  or  such  state  or  territory,  or  of 
United  States  within  such  state  or  territory,  having  a  seal,  such 
clerk  acknowledging  under  seal  of  court ;  by  a  notary  public  under 
his  seal;  by  a  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed  under  the  laws 
of  this  state,  he  certifying  such  acknowledgment  under  his  hand 
and  official  seal;  by  any  officer  legally  authorized  to  take  and 
certify  such  acknowledgment,  provided  there  shall  be  affixed  to 
his  certificate  a  certificate  under  seal  by  a  clerk  of  a  court  of 
record  of  the  county,  city,  or  district  wherein  such  officer  lives, 
stating  that  officer  is  the  person  he  assumes  to  be,  that  he  is 
legally  authorized  to  take  such  acknowledgment,  and  that  his  sig- 
nature thereto  is  genuine.^^    Without  the  United  States,  acknowl- 

49  Civ.  Code  1906.  §§  162-164.  53  qv.  Code  1Q06,  §  1237. 

50  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  1187.  54  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912.  §  825. 

51  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  162.  55  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  825. 

52  Civ.  Code  1906,  §  1242. 


§    786  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  800 

edgments  may  be  taken  before  any  court  of  record  of  any  foreign 
republic,  kingdom,  empire,  state,  principality,  or  province  having 
a  seal,  the  acknowledgment  being  certified  by  the  judge  or  justice 
of  such  court  to  have  been  made  before  such  court,  and  such 
certificate  to  be  attested  by  the  seal  of  such  court;  before  the 
mayor,  or  other  chief  officer,  of  any  city  or  town  having  a  seal, 
such  mayor  or  other  chief  officer  certifying  such  acknowledg- 
ment under  such  seal;  before  any  consul  of  the  United  States 
within  such  foreign  country,  under  his  consulate  seal.'^*^  By  law 
of  1903,  all  acknowledgments  which  had  then  been  taken  by  nota- 
ries holding  commissions  under  laws  of  Kansas  or  Colorado,  or 
by  any  judge  or  justice  of  any  organized  court  within  the  limits 
of  the  state  were  validated,  provided  they  were  otherwise  cor- 
rect." 

One  subscribing  witness  may  prove  unacknowledged  deed.^^ 
A  married  woman  may  convey  her  land  without  separate  ac- 
knowledgment.'^''* No  mortgage  or  conveyance  of  a  homestead  is 
binding  against  the  \xiie  unless  she  freely  and  voluntarily,  sep- 
arate and  apart  from  her  husband,  signs  and  acknowledges  the 
same  and  the  officer  taking  the  acknowledgment  informs  her  of 
her  rights  and  the  effect  of  signing  the  mortgage  or  conveyance. 
If  the  wife  owns  the  homestead,  no  mortgage  or  other  convey- 
ance shall  be  binding  against  the  husband  unless  he  sign  and 
acknowledge  said  mortgage  or  other  conveyance.""  To  entitle 
any  person  to  the  benefit  of  the  homestead  exemption  law,  he 
shall  cause  the  word  ''homestead"  to  be  entered  in  the  margin  of 
his  record  title  to  homestead,  which  entry  shall  be  signed  by 
owner  and  attested  by  the  clerk  and  recorder  of  county  where 
lands  lie,  together  with  the  date  and  time  of  day,  on  which  said 
entry  is  made.  Either  husband  or  wife  may  cause  such  entry  to 
be  made.'^^ 

§  786.  Connecticut.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Connecticut  l^efore  judge  of  court  of  record 
of  this  state  or  United  States ;  clerk  of  superior  court,  court  of 
common  pleas,  or  district  court;  justice  of  the  peace;  commis- 
sioner of  school  fund;  commissioner  of  superior  court;  notary 

56  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912.  §  825.  «»  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  §  3383. 

"Rev.  Supp.  1905,  §  3285.  "^  Mills  Ann.   Stats.   1912,  §§  3378, 

55  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912.  §  835.  3379. 
50  Mills  Ann.  Stats.  1912,  g  4748. 


801  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    786 

•public,  either  with  or  without  his  official  seal;  town  clerk,  or 
assistant  town  clerk. °-  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  of  this  state,  and  residing  therein  or 
before  any  officer  authorized  to  take  acknowledgments  of  deeds 
in  such  state  or  territory. ^^  Without  the  United  States  acknowl- 
edgments may  be  taken  before  any  ambassador,  minister,  charge 
d'affaires,  consul,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul,  consul  general,  vice 
consul  general,  deputy  consul  general,  consular  agent,  vice  consu- 
lar agent,  commercial  agent,  or  vice  commercial  agent  of  the 
United  States  representing  or  acting  as  agent  of  the  United  States 
in  such  foreign  country,  or  before  any  notary  public,  or  justice  of 
the  peace,  in  such  foreign  country;  but  no  officer  shall  have  power 
to  take  such  acknowledgment  except  within  territorial  limits  in 
which  he  may  perform  proper  duties  of  his  office. ''*  Conveyances 
of  real  estate  situated  in  this  state,  executed  and  acknowledged 
in  any  other  state  or  territory  in  conformity  with  its  laws,  are 
valid. ^^  By  Act  of  June  19,  1903,  the  following  deeds  heretofore 
made  were  declared  valid ;  deeds  acknowledged  without  the  state 
before  a  magistrate  using  form  of  acknowledgment  of  this  state 
instead  of  form  of  state  where  same  was  executed,  and  attested 
by  number  of  witnesses  required  in  such  state,  although  number 
be  less  than  that  required  by  laws  of  this  state;  where  acknowl- 
edgments were  taken  outside  Connecticut  before  magistrate  who 
did  not  affix  his  official  seal  or  certificate  of  his  official  charac- 
ter, or  where  they  had  but  one  witness,  or  were  acknowledged 
within  this  state  before  clerk  of  probate  court,  or  notary  public 
commissioned,  but  not  qualified  until  afterwards;  deeds  of  which 
acknowledgments  were  taken  by  husband  or  wife  of  the  grantor 
or  grantee  where  such  hi^sband  or  wife  was  an  attesting  witness; 
deeds  acknowledged  by  magistrate  who  was  a  minor;  deeds  ac- 
knowledged by  proper  officer  whose  term  of  office  had  expired  at 
time  of  acknowledgment;  where  grantor  was  acting  in  any  fidu- 
ciary capacity  and  signed  and  acknowledged  deed  individually; 
conveyances  of  real  estate  made  by  married  woman  directly  to 
husband,  or  by  husband  directly  to  her;  conveyances  of  realty 
made  by  married  woman  without  joinder  of  husband;  and  deeds 

62  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4029.  g*  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,   S  4029,  as 

63  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4029.  amended  by  Pub.  Stats.  1905,  ch.  63. 

c5  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4031. 

51 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    786  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  802 

executed  by  executor  of  will  of  nonresident,  or  by  trustee  of  such 
will,  by  virtue  of  power  of  sale  in  such  will  contained,  intending 
to  convey  lands  in  this  state,  in  case  said  will  has  not  at  time  of 
execution  of  such  deed  been  proved  in  this  state,  if  afterwards 
such  will  shall  have  been  duly  proved  and  established  in  this  state 
and  administration  had  thereon."''  By  the  Act  of  August  1,  1907, 
the  following  deeds  heretofore  made  were  declared  valid;  those 
otherwise  valid  but  attested  by  one  or  no  witness;  acknowledged 
by  interested  party;  acknowledged  by  proper  officer  but  outside 
of  territory  in  which  he  was  authorized  to  act ;  any  person  author- 
ized by  appointment,  election,  or  commission  to  act  but  who  qual- 
ified afterwards;  where  the  grantor  was  acting  as  duly  authorized 
agent  and  signed  or  acknowledged  individually;  where  acknowl- 
edgment was  taken  without  this  state  by  proper  person,  using 
acknowledgment  form  prescribed  by  laws  of  state  where  exe- 
cuted, and  attested  by  the  number  of  witnesses  required  by  law 
in  such  states  although  number  be  less  at  that  time  than  that 
required  in  this  state.  Deeds  heretofore  made  to  convey  Con- 
necticut realty  and  otherwise  valid  except  that  the  acknowledg- 
ment was  not  signed  by  magistrate  of  this  state  or  any  state  or 
territory  within  United  States  or  foreign  country  authorized  to 
take  acknowledgments,  but  where  acknowledged  by  an  ambassa- 
dor, minister,  charge  d'affaires,  consul,  vice  consul,  deputy 
consul,  consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  deputy  consul  general, 
consular  agent,  vice  consular  agent,  commercial  agent,  or  vice 
commercial  agent  of  the  United  States,  who  was  not  then  quali- 
fied to  take  such  acknowledgment,  but  has  since  been  qualified  by 
statute,  but  which  acknowledgment  is  complete  in  every  other 
respect;  where  acknowledgment  is  otherwise  legal  except  that  it 
was  taken  before  a  vice  consul  of  British  empire  located  in 
Jamaica ;  where  acknowledgment  is  signed  by  proper  magistrate, 
but  there  has  been  unintentionally  omitted  names  of  grantors, 
date  and  place  of  acknowledgment,  or  words  "personally  ap- 
peared before  me,"  but  which  acknowledgment  is  complete  in 
every  other  particular;  where  corporation  has  conveyed  Con- 
necticut realty  and  the  deed  thereof  was  not,  through  mistake, 
signed  by  officer  duly  authorized  to  sign  such  deeds,  are  hereby 
declared  valid." 

^^Acts  of  June  19,  1903,  §§  6,  9,  10.     same  section  concerning  trustees'  and 
67  Act  of   Aug.   1,   1907,   §   4.    See     administrators'  deeds. 


803  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    787 

Two  are  required."'^  Certificate  of  proper  authority  showing 
magistrate's  official  capacity  should  be  annexed  if  acknowledg- 
ment is  taken  by  justice  of  the  peace  or  officer  without  a  seal. 
The  official  seal  is  required  to  be  annexed.''^  By  Act  of  July  19, 
1905,  unsealed  deeds  made  before  that  time  are  validated/" 

In  case  of  marriages  on  or  after  April  20,  1877,  neither  hus- 
band nor  wife  shall  acquire,  by  force  of  marriage,  any  right  to  or 
interest  in  any  property  of  the  other,  except  as  to  survivor's 
share.'^^  All  conveyances  of  real  estate  of  wives  married  prior 
to  April  20,  1877,  executed  by  them  jointly  with  their  husbands, 
and  duly  acknowledged  and  recorded,  shall  be  valid  and  effectual 
to  transfer  such  estate;  and  all  conveyances,  by  husband  alone,  or 
real  estate  of  such  wife,  shall  be  ineffectual  to  convey  her  interest 
therein;  but  no  joinder  by  husband  shall  be  required  in  case  of 
wife  married  on  or  after  said  date."  Wife  married  prior  to 
April  20,  1877,  may  make  separate  conveyance  when  husband  has 
abandoned  her,  or  is  insane,  and  the  probate  court  has  authorized 
sale.'^  There  is  no  dower  or  curtesy  under  marriages  contracted 
since  april  20,  1877.  Under  marriages  contracted  before  that  date, 
husband  and  wife  must  join  to  release  dower.  On  the  death  of 
husband  or  wife  married  on  or  since  that  date  survivor  is  entitled 
to  use  for  life  of  one-third  decedent's  property,  after  debts  are 
paid.  The  right  to  such  third  can  not  be  defeated  by  will.  Where 
there  is  no  will,  survivor  takes  such  third  absolutely.^* 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  in  releasing  homestead.^^ 

§  787.  Delaware. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Delaware  in  superior  court,  before  chancellor, 
or  any  judge,  notary  public,  or  before  two  justices  of  the  peace 
for  same  county.  Such  deed  may  also  be  acknowledged  in  said 
superior  court  by  attorney,  by  virtue  of  power  contained  therein 
or  separate  from  it,  power  being  first  proved  in  said  court.'^*' 
Without  the  state  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  any  consul 
general,  consul,  vice  consul,  consular  agent,  or  commercial  agent 
of  the  United  States  duly  appointed  in  any  foreign  country,  at 
places  of  their  official  residences;  any  judge  of  district  court  of 

68  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4029.  "Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §§  246,  247. 

69  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902.  §  4029.  ^4  Qen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §§  386,  391. 

70  Act  of  July  9,  1905,  §  6.  "  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4065. 

71  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4545.  ^e  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3199. 

72  Gen.  Stat.  Rev.  1902,  §  4035. 


§    787  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  804 

the  United  States;  chancellor,  or  judge  of  any  court  of  record 
of  any  state,  territory,  or  country;  mayor  or  chief  officer  of  any 
city  or  borough,  and  certified  under  the  hand  of  such  chancellor, 
judge,  mayor  or  officer,  and  the  seal  of  his  office,  court,  city,  or 
borough  by  certificate  indorsed  upon  or  annexed  to  deed  ;or  before 
any  such  court,  and  certified  under  hand  of  clerk,  or  other  officer 
of  said  court,  and  seal  of  said  court,  in  like  manner.  In  case  of 
such  certificate  by  a  judge,  the  seal  of  his  court  may  be  affixed  to 
his  certificate,  or  to  a  certificate  of  attestation  of  the  clerk,  or 
keeper  of  the  seal.  Acknowledgments  may  also  be  taken  out  of 
this  state  by  any  commissioner  of  deeds,  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor in  any  of  the  states,  or  territories  of  the  United  States,  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  or  in  the  possessions  of  the  United 
States,  or  in  foreign  countries,  the  same  to  be  certified  under  com- 
missioner's hand  and  seal.^^  By  Act  of  April  28,  1898,  records  of 
deeds  prior  to  January  1,  1895,  duly  signed  and  sealed  by  the 
grantors,  notwithstanding  said  deed  had  not  been  properly  ac- 
knowledged, or  private  examination  of  any  married  woman  party 
thereto  had  not  been  taken  or  certified  in  conformity  with  require- 
ments of  laws  of  this  state  in  force  at  time  of  its  execution,  shall 
be  validated.  By  act  of  March  26,  1903,  deeds  for  lands  within 
this  state  which  were  acknowledged  before  any  consular  agent 
and  attested  under  seal  of  such  consular  agent  before  January  1, 
1903,  are  deemed  properly  acknowledged.^**  One  witness  neces- 
sary for  acknowledged  deed.'^° 

The  deed  of  a  wife  shall  be  as  valid  and  effectual  as  if  she  were 
sole,  if  she,  upon  private  examination,  apart  from  her  husband, 
shall  acknowledge  that  she  executed  said  deed  willingly,  without 
compulsion,  or  threats,  or  fear  of  her  husband's  displeasure. 
Such  conveyances  by  her  shall  not  divest,  abrogate,  or  in  any 
manner  interfere  with  the  husband's  estate  by  the  curtesy  should 
such  estate  attach.^"  Wife  of  an  insane  husband,  who  wishes  to 
convey  her  own  property,  may  join  with  a  trustee  for  husband  in 
a  deed  or  mortgage,  and  such  deed  shall  be  valid  to  bar  his 
estate  by  the  curtesy  if  he  survives  her.**^  Abandoned  married 
woman,  on  proving  fact  before  chancellor,  chief  justice,  or  resi- 

"Rev.  Code  1893.  ch.  83.  §  10.  as        ^o  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3199. 
amended  by  Laws  1901-1903,  ch.  82.  ^o  Rev.  Code  1915.  §  3200. 

78  Act  of  April  28,  1898,  §  3.  si  Laws  1901-1903,  ch.  444, 


805  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    788 

dent  judge  of  county,  may  convey  her  own  real  estate  without 
husband's  joining.-" 

§  788.  District  of  Columbia. — Acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  within  the  District  of  Columbia  before  any  judge  of  courts 
of  district,  clerk  of  Supreme  Court,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary 
public,  or  recorder  of  deeds.®^  Without  the  District  and  within 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  any 
judge  of  court  of  record  and  of  law,  chancellor  of  a  state,  any 
judge  or  justice  of  the  Supreme,  circuit,  or  territorial  courts  of 
the  United  States,  any  justice  of  the  peace,  or  notary  public. 
When  taken  out  of  District  by  officer  without  seal,  there  must  be 
certificate  of  register,  clerk,  or  other  public  officer,  that  at  that 
time  officer  was  what  he  professed  to  be.'**  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  any  judge,  notary 
public,  any  secretary  of  legation,  consular  officer,  or  acting  con- 
sular officer  of  the  United  States.  When  made  before  any  other 
than  a  secretary  of  legation,  consular  officer,  or  acting  consular 
officer,  the  official  character  of  the  officer  must  be  properly  certi- 
fied.'*^ Deeds  affecting  land  situate  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
or  any  territory  of  the  United  States  may  be  acknowledged  in 
the  islands  of  Guam  and  Samoa  or  in  the  Canal  Zone  before  any 
notary  public  or  judge,  appointed  therein  by  proper  authority, 
or  by  any  officer  therein  who  has  ex  officio  the  powers  of  a  notary 
public :  provided,  that  the  certificate  by  such  notary  in  Guam, 
Samoa,  or  the  Canal  Zone,  shall  be  accompanied  by  certificate 
of  governor  or  acting  governor  of  such  place  to  the  effect  that 
the  notary  taking  such  acknowledgment  was  in  fact  the  officer 
he  purported  to  be.*'^ 

I"Jo  separate  examination  for  conveyances  by  husband  and 
wife  made  since  April  10,  1869.'^^  Married  woman  over  twenty- 
one  may  dispose  of  property  as  though  unmarried.^®  Wife  over 
eighteen  years  of  age  may  release  dower  by  joining  in  same  deed 
with  her  husband,  or  by  separate  deed,  wherever  executed,  signed, 
sealed,  acknowledged,  and  certified  in  the  same  manner  as  other 
deeds.'''' 

^2  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3200.  ««  United   States   Statutes  at  Large 

S3  Garges  Code  1905,  §  493.  1905-1907,  Vol.  34,  Part  I,  §  3585. 

^*Garges  Code  1905,  §  495.  '^^  Garges  Code  1905,  §8  515,  516. 

«5  Garges  Code  1905,  §§  495,  496.  ««  Garges  Code  1905.  §  1154. 

89  Garges  Code  1905,  §  494. 


§  789 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


806 


§  789.  Florida. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Florida  before  any  judge,  clerk,  or  deputy  clerk  of  any 
court  of  record,  United  States  commissioner,  notary  public,  or 
justice  of  the  peace  of  this  state.  The  certificate  of  acknowledg- 
ment or  proof  shall  be  under  the  seal  of  the  court  or  of  officer.'"^"^ 
Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments 
may  be  taken  by  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  this  state,  judge  or  clerk  of  any  court  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  any  state,  district,  or  territory  having  seal,  notary 
public,  or  justice  of  the  peace  of  such  state,  territory,  or  district 
having  an  official  seal.  Certificate  of  acknowledgment  or  proof 
shall  be  under  seal  of  court  or  officer."^  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  commissioner  of 
deeds  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state  to  reside  in  such 
county,  notary  public  of  such  foreign  country  having  official 
seal,  minister,  charge  d'affaires,  consul  general,  consul,  vice  con- 
sul, commercial  agent,  or  vice  commercial  agent  of  the  United 
States  appointed  to  reside  in  such  country.  Certificate  of  ac- 
knowledgment or  proof  shall  be  under  seal  of  officer.""  The 
certificate  shall  set  forth  substantially  matter  required  to  be  done 
or  proved  to  make  such  acknowledgment  or  proof  effectual. "^  No 
officer  may  take  acknowledgment  without  knowledge  or  satisfac- 
tory proof  that  person  acknowledging  is  person  who  executed  in- 
strument, or  that  person  offering  to  make  proof  is  a  subscribing 
witness."*  A  conveyance  by  corporation  must  be  signed  by  presi- 
dent or  chief  executive  officer  of  corporation  and  must  bear  its 
common  seal."^  Two  witnesses  are  required  to  an  instrument  of 
conveyance.""  A  scrawl  or  scroll,  printed  or  written,  is  effectual 
as  a  seal."^ 

Husband  must  join  wife  in  conveying  her  property."^  Married 
woman  may  convey  her  property  as  if  unmarried,  providing  hus- 
band join  and  she  make  separate  acknowledgment  that  the  execu- 
tion was  voluntary.  The  officer's  certificate  must  set  forth  fore- 
going requirements.""  Married  woman  may  relinquish  dower  by 
joining  in  conveyance  or  mortgage  of  real  property,  or  by  sep- 
arate deed  executed  as  other  conveyances.^     Relinquishment  of 


so  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2481. 

91  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2481. 

92  Gen.  Stat.  1906.  §  2481. 

93  Gen.  Stat.  1906.  §  2481. 

94  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2486. 

95  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2459. 


96  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2448. 

97  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §§  2484,  2485. 

98  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2460. 

»9  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §§  2460,  2462. 
iGen.   Stat.   1906,   §  2461. 


807  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    790 

dower  executed  and  acknowledged  by  wife  shall  be  valid  not- 
withstanding her  minority  at  the  time  of  such  execution  and  ac- 
knowledgment.- 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  in  conveyance  of  homestead.^ 

§  790.  Georgia. — To  authorize  record  of  deed  within  the 
state  of  Georgia,  it  must  be  attested  by  a  judge  of  court  of  record 
of  this  state,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public,  or  clerk  of  the 
superior  court  in  county  in  which  three  last-mentioned  officers 
hold  their  appointments.  If,  subsequent  to  execution,  deed  is 
acknowledged  in  presence  of  these  officers,  that  fact,  certified  by 
him  on  deed,  shall  entitle  it  to  be  recorded.*  To  authorize  record 
of  deed  executed  without  the  state,  deed  must  be  attested  by  or 
acknowledged  before  commissioner  of  deeds  for  Georgia,  consul 
or  vice  consul  of  the  United  States  (the  certificate  of  these  officers 
under  their  seal  being  evidence  of  the  fact),  judge  of  court  of 
record  in  state  where  executed,  with  certificate  of  clerk  under 
seal  of  such  court  of  the  genuineness  of  such  clerk  of  court  of 
record  under  seal  of  court,  or  by  notary  public  of  state  and 
county  where  executed,  with  his  seal  of  office  attached,  and  if 
he  has  no  seal,  then  his  official  character  shall  be  certified  by 
clerk  of  any  court  of  record  in  county  of  his  residence.^ 

Two  required,  one  of  whom  may  be  officer  taking  acknowledg- 
ment.°  If  deed  is  neither  attested  by,  nor  acknowledged  before, 
either  of  officers  aforesaid,  it  may  be  admitted  to  record  upon 
affidavit  of  subscribing  witness,  before  either  of  above-named 
officers,  testifying  to  execution  of  deed  and  its  attestation  accord- 
ing to  law.  A  substantial  compliance  with  this  requisition  shall 
be  held  sufficient  in  absence  of  all  suspicion  of  fraud. ^ 

Seal  includes  impressions  on  paper  itself,  or  on  wax  or  wafers; 
a  scrawl  also  answers  for  seal.^ 

To  convey  lands  in  which  wife  has  interest,  she  must  join 
with  husband  in  conveyance,  sign  and  seal  before  proper  officer, 
and  make  prescribed  declarations,  which  shall  be  indorsed  upon 
deed  and  signed  by  officer.** 

Dower  may  be  barred  by  wife's  deed  with  her  husband  to  lands 
where  title  came  through  her.^** 

2  Gen.   Stat.   1906.    §   2463.  7  Code  1911,  §  4205. 

3  Const,  art.  9,  sM.  M   Code   1895,   §   5;   1   Code   1911, 

4  1   Code   1911,   §  4202.  §  261. 

5  Code  1911,  §  4203.  M  Code  1911,  §  4204. 

6  Code  1911,  §  4203.  lo  1  Code  1911,  §  5249. 


§  791 


TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS 


808 


The  homestead  right  is  released  for  reinvestment  by  husband 
and  wife  joining  in  the  conveyance  with  sanction  of  superior 
court  of  county  where  debtor  resides  or  land  is  situated,  proceeds 
to  be  reinvested  upon  same  uses/^ 

§  791.  Hawaii. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  territory  before  the  registrar  of  conveyances,  his  agent,  judge 
of  court  of  record,  or  notary  public.^"  Without  the  territory  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  taken  before  some  notary  public,  judge 
of  court  of  record,  minister,  commissioner,  or  consul  of  Hawaii/'* 
Person  offering  to  make  acknowledgment  must  be  personally 
known  to  officer  making  same  to  be  person  whose  name  is  sub- 
scribed to  such  instrument  as  a  party  thereto,  or  shall  be  proved 
so  by  oath  or  affirmation  of  credible  witness  known  to  officer.^* 

One  witness  is  required  if  deed  is  not  acknowledged.^^  An 
unacknowledged  deed  may  be  entered  for  record  on  proof  of  its 
execution  by  subscribing  witness  thereto,  before  any  judge  of 
court  of  record  of  Hawaii.  If  all  subscribing  witnesses  be  dead 
or  out  of  the  country,  conveyance  may  be  proved  before  any  court 
of  record  in  this  territory  by  proving  handwriting  of  grantor 
and  any  subscribing  witness.^" 

The  deed  must  be  stamped  with  a  seal  as  a  condition  to  record. ^^ 

A  wife,  unless  divorced,  must  join  in  conveyance  to  release 
dower  or  make  separate  release,  and  must  make  separate  ac- 
knowledgment that  she  voluntarily  signed  the  release. ^^ 

Married  woman  may  receive,  hold,  and  dispose  of  property, 
real  and  personal,  as  though  she  were  sole;  provided,  however, 
that  no  deed  or  mortgage  of  her  real  estate  shall  be  valid  without 
written  consent  of  her  husband. ^^ 

Wife  may  bar  her  right  of  dower,  in  estate  conveyed  by  hus- 
band, by  joining  in  his  conveyance  thereof,  and  thereby  releasing 
her  claim  to  dower,  or  by  separate  deed,  made  at  time  of  hus- 
band's conveyance,  or  subsequently,  or  she  may  delegate  to  at- 
torney in  fact  other  than  husband,  power  to  execute  such  release, 
either  by  general  or  special  power  of  attorney,  and  her  execution 
and  acknowledgment  of  the  power  of  attorney  may  be  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  she  were  sole."*' 


11  Const.  1877,  art.  9,  §  3 
1911,  §  3397. 

12  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2361. 

13  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2361. 

14  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2,362. 
13  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2361. 


1  Code        i«Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2361. 

17  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2360. 

18  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2367. 
13  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2251. 
20  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2280. 


I 


809  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    792 

§  792.  Idaho. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Idaho  by  a  justice  or  clerk  of  Supreme  Court,  and 
within  the  city,  county,  or  district  for  which  officer  was  elected  or 
appointed,  before  judge  or  clerk  of  court  of  record,  county  re- 
corder, notary  public,  or  justice  of  the  peace."^  Without  the  state 
and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by 
justice,  judge,  or  clerk  of  any  court  of  record  of  the  United  States 
or  any  state  or  territory,  commissioner  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  this  state  for  that  purpose,  notary  public,  or  any  officer 
of  the  state  or  territory  where  the  acknowledgment  is  made,  au- 
thorized by  its  laws  to  take  such  proof  or  acknowledgment.^^ 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a 
minister,  commissioner,  or  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States, 
resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  acknowledgment  is 
made;  a  consul  or  vice  consul  of  the  United  States  resident  in 
country  where  acknowledgment  is  made;  a  judge  of  court  of 
record  of  the  country;  commissioners  appointed  for  such  purpose 
by  the  governor  of  this  state  pursuant  to  statute;  a  notary  pub- 
lic.^^  When  any  of  the  officers  in  the  preceding  sections  are 
authorized  by  law  to  appoint  a  deputy,  the  acknowledgment  or 
proof  may  be  taken  by  such  deputy,  in  principal's  name.'^  Offi- 
cer taking  acknowledgment  must  know  that  person  making  it  is 
person  described  in  instrument,  or  he  must  have  satisfactory  evi- 
dence on  the  oath  or  affirmation  of  a  credible  witness.^" 

Without  acknowledgment,  proof  may  be  made  by  the  parties 
executing  instrument,  or  either  of  them,  or  a  subscribing  witness. 
The  identity  of  such  a  witness  must  be  known  or  proved."'' 

Officers  taking  or  certifying  acknowledgments  or  proof  of  in- 
struments must  authenticate  their  certificates  by  affixing  their 
signatures,  followed  by  names  of  offices;  also  their  official  seals, 
if  by  law  of  state,  territory,  or  country  where  acknowledgment 
is  taken,  or  by  authority  of  which  they  are  acting,  they  are  re- 
quired to  have  official  seals. "^  A  justice  of  the  peace,  acting  in 
county  other  than  that  of  his  residence,  must  have  a  certificate 
under  the  hand  and  seal  of  the  recorder  of  county  of  his  residence, 
setting  forth  that  justice  had  authority  to  take  acknowledgments 
and  that  his  signature  is  genuine."^ 

21  Rev.  Code  1908.  8§  3123,  3124.            =•' Rev.  Code  1908.  §  3128. 

2-  Rev.  Code  1908.  §  3125.  -''  Rev.  Code  1908,  §   §3136.  3137. 

23  Rev.  Code  1908.  §  3126.  27  Rev.  Code  1908,  §  3134. 

24  Rev.  Code  1908,  §  3127.  28  Rev.  Code  1908,  §  3135. 


§    793  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  810 

Distinction  between  sealed  and  unsealed  instruments  abolished, 
except  corporate  or  official  seal."" 

All  property  of  the  husband  or  wife  owned  by  him  or  her  be- 
fore marriage,  or  acquired  afterwards  by  gift,  bequest,  or  de- 
scent, shall  be  his  or  her  separate  property. ■'°  All  property  ac- 
quired after  marriage  by  either  husband  or  wife,  including  rents 
and  profits  of  separate  estates,  is  community  property,  unless  in- 
strument specially  provides  that  rents  and  profits  acquired  by 
wife  be  applied  to  her  separate  use;  in  which  case  the  wife  has 
management  and  disposal  of  same.  Otherwise,  husband  has  ab- 
solute power  of  disposition  other  than  testamentary.  This  ex- 
cludes that  part  of  common  property  used  by  husband  and  wife  as 
a  residence. ^^  A  married  woman,  during  marriage,  may  convey 
her  separate  estate  in  the  same  manner  as  a  married  man  can 
convey  his  estate,  provided,  that  the  husband  shall  be  bound  by 
such  contracts  to  no  greater  extent  or  effect  than  his  wife  under 
similar  circumstances  would  be  bound  by  his  contracts.""  The 
acknowledgment  of  a  married  woman  shall  be  taken  and  certified 
as  that  of  a  single  person.^" 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  convey  or  encumber  home- 
stead and  wife  must  acknowledge  in  the  same  manner  as  a  single 
person."*  The  homestead  in  which  claimant  resides,  and  the  land 
on  which  it  is  situated,  will  be  exempt  from  execution  or  forced 
sale  except  for  judgments  or  attachments  levied  before  declara- 
tion of  homestead  was  filed  for  record;  mechanics',  laborers',  or 
vendors'  liens;  debts  secured  by  mortgages  executed  by  husband 
and  wife  or  by  an  unmarried  claimant ;  or  debts  secured  by  mort- 
gages, executed  and  recorded  before  filing  of  declaration  of 
homestead."^ 

§  793.  Illinois. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Illinois  before  a  master  in  chancery,  notary  public, 
United  States  commissioner,  county  clerk,  justice  of  the  peace 
(the  official  character  of  the  latter,  if  he  be  without  the  county 
where  the  lands  lie,  to  be  certified  by  the  county  clerk),  or  any 
court  of  record  having  a  seal,  or  any  judge,  justice,  clerk  or 

29  Rev.  Code  1908,  §S  3318,  3319.  33  Rev.  Code  1908,  §  2129. 

30  Rev.  Code  1908,  8S  2676,  2679.  34  Rgy.  Code  1908,  §§  3106,  3129, 

31  Rev.  Code  1908.  §§  2680,  2686.  3178. 

32  Rev.  Code  1908,  §  2677.  35  Rev.  Code  1908,  §§  3173,  3176, 

3177. 


li 

I 


811  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    793 

deputy  clerk  of  any  such  court,  the  seal  to  be  affixed  when  taken 
before  a  court,  clerk,  or  deputy  clerk  of  such  court.  If  taken 
before  a  notary  public  or  United  States  commissioner,  acknowl- 
edgment must  be  attested  by  official  seal.^'  Without  the  state 
and  within  the  United  States  or  its  dependencies  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  taken  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  (his  official 
character  to  be  certified  as  above),  notary  public  under  his  seal, 
master  in  chancery  (to  be  certified  as  justice  of  the  peace) ,  United 
States  commissioner  and  commissioner  of  deeds  under  their  re- 
spective seals,  mayor  of  city  under  city  seal,  clerk  of  the  county 
under  his  official  seal,  any  judge,  justice,  clerk,  or  deputy  clerk  of 
Supreme,  circuit,  or  district  court  of  the  United  States,  or  any 
judge,  justice,  clerk,  deputy  clerk,  prothonotary,  surrogate,  or 
registrar  of  the  Supreme,  circuit,  superior,  district,  county,  com- 
mon pleas,  probate,  orphans',  or  surrogate's  court  of  any  state, 
territory,  or  dependency  of  the  United  States,  under  seal  of 
court  if  before  five  last-mentioned  officers.  Acknowledgments 
may  be  made  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  the  state  where 
made,  in  which  case  a  certificate  of  conformity  from  the  clerk  of 
a  court  of  record  should  be  annexed.  In  any  dependency  of  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  or  proof  may  be  made  before 
any  commissioned  officer  in  the  military  service  of  the  United 
States."  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  before  any  court  of  any  republic,  dominion,  state,  kingdom, 
empire,  colony,  territory,  or  dependency  having  a  seal,  or  before 
any  judge,  justice,  or  clerk  thereof,  any  mayor  or  chief  officer 
of  any  city  or  town  having  a  seal,  a  notary  public  or  commis- 
sioner of  deeds,  an  ambassador,  minister,  secretary  of  legation, 
or  consul  of  the  United  States,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul,  com- 
mercial agent,  or  consular  agent  of  the  United  States  in  any 
foreign  republic,  dominion,  state,  kingdom,  empire,  colony,  ter- 
ritory, or  dependency  attested  by  his  official  seal,  or  before  any 
officer  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  place  of  acknowledgment 
to  take  same  or  to  administer  oaths  in  proof  of  executions  of 
conveyances  of  real  estate.  Such  acknowledgments  to  be  attested 
by  the  official  seal,  if  any,  of  such  court  or  officer,  and  where 
court  or  officer  has  no  seal,  a  certificate  shall  be  added  by  some 
ambassador,  minister,  secretary  of  legation,  consul,  vice  consul, 
deputy  consul,  commercial  agent,  or  consular  agent  of  the  United 

sfi  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  20.  "  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  20. 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


812 


States,  residing  therein,  under  his  official  seal,  showing  that  such 
court  or  officer  was  duly  elected,  appointed,  or  created  and  acting 
at  the  time  acknowledgment  or  proof  was  made.^^ 

None  required  if  deed  is  acknowledged.  An  unacknowledged 
deed  may  l3e  proved  by  evidence  of  the  handwriting  of  the 
grantor,  and  at  least  one  subscribing  witness,  which  evidence 
must  consist  of  the  testimony  of  two  or  more  disinterested  per- 
sons swearing  to  each  signature.^" 

When  conveyances  are  executed  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  a 
county  other  than  the  one  in  which  the  lands  lie,  but  which  are 
recorded  in  county  where  lands  lie,  they  shall  be  regarded  as 
legally  executed  and  recorded,  notwithstanding  there  is  no  cer- 
tificate attached  thereto  certifying  the  official  character  of  the 
justice  of  the  peace,  provided  that  the  record  or  certified  trans- 
cript of  such  record  shall  not  l:)e  read  in  evidence,  unless  the  cer- 
tificate of  the  proper  county  clerk,  under  his  official  seal,  or 
other  competent  evidence  introduced,  certifies  to  the  official  char- 
acter of  the  justice  of  the  peace.^* 

Seal  is  required,  but  scroll  is  sufficient.*^  Unsealed  convey- 
ances made  without  state  in  a  state  or  country  where  seal  or  scroll 
is  not  required  at  time  of  execution  are  hereby  declared  valid. 
The  certificate  of  the  secretary  of  state,  under  his  seal  of  office, 
or  that  of  any  court  of  record,  certified  to  under  the  seal  of  the 
court,  or  that  of  any  judge  of  any  court  of  record  (his  official 
character  being  certified  to) ,  of  the  country  or  other  place,  outside 
of  this  state,  where  instrument  was  executed,  setting  forth  that 
according  to  usage  or  law  of  the  land  a  scroll  or  seal  was  not 
necessary,  shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  evidence  thereof,  provided 
that  any  other  legal  mode  of  proving  seal  unnecessary  may  be 
resorted  to  in  any  place  or  court  of  this  state  where  the  question 
may  arise*" 

A  married  woman  above  the  age  of  eighteen  years  may  join 
with  her  husband  to  convey  her  lands."  Married  women  may 
acknowledge  as  feme  sole.** 

Dower  exists.  \\'ife's  acknowledgment  to  release  dower  may 
be  made  as  if  she  were  feme  sole. *^     Wife  should  join  in  deed 


38  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30.  §  20. 

3"  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  25. 

40  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  21. 

41  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  29,  §  1. 


42  Laws  1909,  p.  145. 

43  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  18. 

44  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30.  §  19. 

45  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  19. 


813  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    794 

of  husband  to  release  dovver.*^'  The  estate  of  curtesy  does  not 
exist,  but  the  surviving  husband  has  the  same  estate  as  the  dower 
estate/' 

Every  householder  having  a  family  has  a  homestead  exemption 
to  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars  in  the  farm  or  lot  of  land 
owned  or  possessed  and  occupied  by  him  or  her.**  No  deed  or 
other  instrument  shall  be  construed  as  releasing  or  waiving  the 
right  of  homestead,  unless  the  same  shall  contain  a  clause  ex- 
pressly releasing  or  waiving  such  right.  In  such  case  the  certifi- 
cate of  acknowledgment  shall  contain  a  clause  substantially  as 
follows  : — "including  the  release  and  waiver  of  the  right  of  home- 
stead," or  other  words  which  shall  expressly  show  that  the  parties 
executing  the  deed  or  other  instrument  intended  to  release  such 
right. *'^  No  release  or  waiver  of  the  right  of  homestead  by  the 
husband  shall  bind  the  wife  unless  she  join  in  such  release  or 
waiver.''^ 

§  794.  Indiana. — To  entitle  deeds  and  mortgages  to  be 
recorded  within  the  state  of  Indiana,  they  must  be  acknowledged 
by  the  grantor  or  proved  before  a  judge  or  clerk  of  some  court 
of  record,  justice  of  the  peace,  auditor,  recorder,  notary  public, 
member  of  the  general  assembly  under  seal,  a  mayor  of  a  city  in 
this  or  any  other  state,  a  commissioner  appointed  by  governor  of 
this  state  residing  in  another  state,  or  before  a  minister,  charge 
d'affaires,  or  consul  of  the  United  States  in  a  foreign  country. 
When  any  conveyance,  mortgage,  or  instrument  required  to  be 
recorded  is  acknowledged  in  any  county  in  this  state  other  than 
the  one  in  which  the  same  is  required  to  be  recorded,  the  acknowl- 
edgment shall  be  certified  by  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the 
county  in  which  such  officer  resides,  and  attested  by  seal  of  said 
court;  but  an  acknowledgment  before  an  officer  having  an  official 
seal,  if  attested  by  such  seal,  shall  be  sufficient  without  such  cer- 
tificate.^^ By  Act  Approved  March  6.  1911,  acknowledgments 
of  notaries  who  are  officers,  stockholders,  or  employes  in  cor- 
porations which  were  parties  to  the  instrument  are  legalized.  All 
acknowledgments  of  deeds  by  notaries  within  or  without  Indiana, 
admitted  to  record  in  any  Indiana  recorder's  office,  and  the  record 

^fi  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  17.  ^o  Rev.  Stat.  1908.  ch.  30,  §  27. 

47  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  41,  S  1.  ^i  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914.  §§  3965, 

<8  Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  52,  §  1.  9464,  9544,  9535,  9522,  3966,  3967,  3970. 

*9Rev.  Stat.  1908,  ch.  30,  §  27. 


§  794 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


814 


failing  to  show  whether  official  seal  has  ])cen  attached,  shall  be 
deemed  sealed.  All  acts  of  notaries  done  in  good  faith  after  the 
expiration  of  their  commissions  or  while  they  held  any  other  lu- 
crative office  under  the  law,  or  which  were  done  in  good  faith 
and  are  invalid  from  any  cause,  are  legalized.  This  act  not  to 
apply  or  affect  any  i)ending  litigation.^-  Without  this  state  and 
within  the  United  States,  acknowledged  conveyances,  to  be  en- 
titled to  record,  must  be  certified  by  the  clerk  of  a  court  of  record 
of  the  county  in  which  the  officer  receiving  the  acknowledgment 
resides,  and  attested  by  the  seal  of  said  court;  but  an  acknowledg- 
ment before  an  officer  having  an  official  seal,  attested  by  his  offi- 
cial seal,  shall  be  sufficient  without  such  certificate.^'^  W^ithout 
the  United  States,  conveyances  shall  be  acknowledged  by  the 
grantor  or  person  executing  the  same,  or  proved  before  any  min- 
ister, charge  d'affaires,  or  consul  of  the  United  States  in  such 
foreign  country,  or  before  any  officer  of  such  country  who,  by 
the  laws  thereof,  is  authorized  to  take  acknowledgment  or  proof 
of  conveyances;  and  if  such  acknowledgment  or  proof  is  in  the 
English  language,  and  attested  by  the  official  seal  of  such  officer, 
it  shall  be  sufficient  to  admit  such  instrument  to  record;  but  if  in 
some  other  language  or  not  attested  by  such  official  seal,  then  such 
instrument  must  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  an  officer  of 
the  United  States,  as  aforesaid,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  duly  exe- 
cuted according  to  the  laws  of  such  foreign  country;  that  the 
officer  certifying  to  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  had  legal  au- 
thority so  to  do,  and  the  meaning  of  his  certificate,  if  the  same  is 
made  in  a  foreign  language.^*  No  witnesses  are  required  to  the 
instrument. '^^ 

Where  the  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  the  proper  county  is  re- 
quired to  accompany  the  acknowledgment,  this  certificate  shall 
declare  the  official  character  of  the  officer  taking  acknowledg- 
ment, and  the  genuineness  of  his  signature.'^"  The  certificate  of 
acknowledgment,  under  hand  and  seal  of  officer  taking  same, 
must  be  written  on  or  attached  to  deed." 

The  joint  deed  of  husband  and  wife  is  sufficient  to  convey  the 
lands  of  the  husband."*    Their  joint  deed  is  sufficient  to  convey 


52  Acts  1911.  ch.  248. 

"  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3967. 

5*  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3970. 

55  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3947. 


5«  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §§  3982, 
3985. 

"  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3985. 
5s  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3976. 


i 


815  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    795 

and  pass  the  lands  of  the  wife.''''  A  married  woman  acknowl- 
edges in  the  same  manner  as  an  unmarried  woman."*'  A  married 
woman  over  eighteen  and  under  twenty-one  years  of  age  may 
convey  her  right  in  land  of  her  husband,  previously  sold  and  con- 
veyed by  him,  by  executing  and  acknowledging  such  conveyance, 
if  her  father  (or,  if  none,  then  the  mother)  shall  declare  before 
the  officer  taking  the  acknowledgment  that  he  or  she  believes 
that  such  conveyance  is  for  the  benefit  of  such  married  woman, 
and  that  it  would  be  prejudicial  to  her  and  her  husband  to  be  pre- 
vented from  disposing  of  the  land;  which  declaration,  with  par- 
ent's name,  shall  be  a  part  of  the  officer's  certificate. °^  Any  such 
wife,  having  no  parent  living,  may  join  with  her  husband  in  a 
conveyance  of  his  real  estate  with  the  consent  of  the  judge  of 
the  circuit  court  of  the  judicial  circuit  where  such  husband  and 
wife  reside. ''-  A  married  woman  under  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years,  the  husband  being  of  age,  may  convey  or  mortgage  her 
separate  real  estate,  or  any  interest  therein,  with  the  consent  of 
the  judge  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  judicial  circuit  where  they 
reside,  provided  the  husband  joins  in  such  conveyance  or  mort- 
gage.°' 

§  795.  Iowa. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within  the 
state  of  Iowa  before  a  court  having  a  seal,  or  some  judge  or 
clerk  thereof,  a  county  auditor  or  his  deputy,  a  justice  of  the 
peace  within  the  county,  or  a  notary  public  within  his  county  or 
the  adjoining  county,  provided  he  has  filed  with  the  clerk  a  cer- 
tificate of  his  appointment.*'*  Acknowledgments  to  deeds  exe- 
cuted by  corporations  by  notary  who  was  at  time  of  acknowledg- 
ment a  stockholder  or  officer  of  corporation,  and  which  have  been 
recorded  in  office  of  any  Iowa  recorder,  are  declared  valid.  This 
does  not  affect  rights  of  parties  in  pending  litigation.''"  Without 
the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  before  a  judge  of  some  court  of  record,  or  officer  holding 
the  seal  thereof,  a  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  this  state,  a  notary  public,  or  a  justice  of  the  peace. ^^ 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before 
any  ambassador,  minister,  secretary  of  legation,  consul,  vice  con- 

59  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3952.  gs  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3977. 

60  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3971.  c*  Code  Supp.  1907,  §  2942. 

61  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3972.  65  Laws  1911,  ch.  151. 

62  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3973.  66  Code  Supp.  1907,  §  2943. 


§    795  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  816 

sul,  charge  d'affaires,  consular  agent,  or  any  other  United  States 
officer  in  any  foreign  country  who  is  authorized  to  issue  certifi- 
cates under  the  seal  of  the  United  States,  or  before  any  officer 
of  a  foreign  county  who  is  authorized  by  the  laws  thereof  to 
certify  to  the  acknowledgments  of  written  documents.^^  When 
acknowledgments  are  made  outside  the  state  and  within  the 
United  States  before  a  judge  or  justice  of  the  peace,  a  certificate 
under  the  official  seal  of  clerk  or  other  proper  certifying  officer 
of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district,  or  of  the  secretary 
of  state  or  territory  within  which  the  acknowledgment  was  taken, 
under  his  official  seal,  of  the  official  character  of  such  judge  or 
justice  and  of  the  genuineness  of  his  signature,  shall  accompany 
said  certificate  of  acknowledgment.  When  a  notary  attests  by 
his  official  seal,  no  certificate  is  required.*^^  When  acknowledg- 
ments are  taken  outside  the  United  States,  the  certificate  of  a 
foreign  officer  must  be  authenticated  by  one  of  the  above-named 
officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  certificate  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  the  qualification  of  the  officer  and  the  genuineness  of  his 
signature. '^^     Seal  not  required  except  in  case  of  corporations.'" 

Everv^  conveyance  by  a  husband  and  wife  passes  all  right  of 
either,  unless  the  contrary  appears  on  the  face  of  the  convey- 
ance.^^ A  married  woman  may  encumber  or  convey  her  real  estate 
in  the  same  manner  as  other  persons.'^^  A  married  woman's  ac- 
knowledgment is  taken  in  the  same  form  as  if  she  were  sole,  and 
without  any  separate  examination." 

Dower,  by  the  Code  of  1873.  is  abolished,  but  the  survivor  has 
a  fee  simple  title  to  one-third  of  all  estate  possessed  by  the  other 
during  the  marriage.''* 

No  conveyance  or  incumbrance  of  or  contract  to  convey  or  en- 
cumber the  homestead  is  valid  unless  the  husband  and  wife  join 
in  executing  the  instrument. ''■'''  The  homestead  of  every  family, 
whether  owned  by  the  husband  or  wife,  is  exempt  from  judicial 
sale,  where  there  is  no  special  declaration  of  statute  to  the  con- 
trary." 

G7  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2947.  7S  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2960. 

c8  Code  Supp.  1907.  §  2943.  .  ^4  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  3366. 

69  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2947.  "  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2974 ;  Code 

70  Code  Supp.   1907.   §  3068.  Supp.  1907,  §  2974. 

"  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2920.  '<■  Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2972. 

T2Code  Annot.  1897,  §  2919;  Code 
Supp.  1907,  §  2919. 


817  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    796 

§  796.  Kansas. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Kansas  before  a  court  having  a  seal,  a  judge,  jus- 
tice, or  clerk  thereof,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public,  county 
clerk,  register  of  deeds,  or  mayor  or  clerk  of  an  incorporated 
city.'^  Without  the  state  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before 
a  court  of  record,  or  clerk  or  officer  holding  the  seal  thereof,  a 
commissioner  appointed  for  the  purpose  by  the  governor  of  this 
state,  a  notary  public,  justice  of  the  peace,  or  a  consul  of  the 
United  States  resident  in  any  foreign  port  or  country.'^  Deeds 
executed,  acknowledged,  or  proved  in  any  other  state,  territory, 
or  country,  in  conformity  with  the  laws  thereof,  or  the  laws  of 
this  state,  shall  be  valid.^'*  Court  or  officer  taking  acknowledg- 
ment must  indorse  upon  the  deed  a  certificate,  showing  title  of 
court  or  officer  before  whom  taken ;  that  person  making  acknowl- 
edgment was  personally  known  to  court  or  officer  to  be  the  one 
who  executed  instrument;  and  that  such  person  duly  acknowl- 
edged the  same.^*' 

An  acknowledgment  taken  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  out  of 
the  state  must  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  his  official  char- 
acter under  the  hand  of  the  clerk  of  some  court  of  record  and 
seal  thereof.®^ 

Use  of  seals  is  abolished,  except  for  corporations.^^ 

A  married  woman,  while  the  marriage  relation  subsists,  may 
convey  her  real  estate  just  as  a  married  man  may  convey  his 
property.  ""^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  convey  or  encumber  home- 
rtead.®* 

§797.  Kentucky.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Kentucky  before  the  clerk  of  the  county  court 
or  a  notary  public.'*^  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  a  judge  under  seal 
of  his  court,  clerk  of  court  or  his  deputy,  notary  public,  mayor 
of  a  city,  secretary  of  state,  or  commissioner  of  deeds,  all  under 
official  seals.^*^    Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may 

"Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  1660.  83  Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  4873. 

78  Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  1661.  «*  Const,    §    235;    Gen.    Stat.    1905, 

'"Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  1676.  2522. 

^0  Gen.  Stat.  1909,  S  1662.  ss  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  501. 

81  Gen.  Stat.  1909.  §  1661.  86  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  502. 

82  Gen.  Stat.  1909,  §  1643. 

52 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    798  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  818 

l)e  taken  before  any  foreign  minister  or  consul,  secretary  of  lega- 
tion of  the  United  States,  secretary  of  foreign  affairs  under  his 
official  seal,  or  judge  of  a  superior  court  of  the  nation  where  the 
deed  is  executed.''^  If  acknowledged,  no  witnesses  are  required; 
otherwise,  two  subscribing  witnesses  may  prove  deed,  or  one  sub- 
scribing witness  may  prove  the  attestation  of  the  other.*** 

Officer  taking  the  acknowledgment  should  certify  it  under  his 
seal  of  office.*" 

The  conveyance  of  a  married  woman's  separate  estate  may  be 
by  the  joint  deed  of  husband  and  wife,  or  by  separate  instru- 
ment. In  the  latter  case,  the  husband  must  first  convey,  or  have 
theretofore  conveyed.  The  deed  as  to  both  husband  and  wife 
may  be  acknowledged  or  proved  and  recorded,  as  heretofore,  or 
by  this  act,  provided."" 

Any  married  woman,  resident  or  nonresident,  may,  by  agent, 
convey  any  interest  she  may  have  in  personal  or  real  estate,  situ- 
ated in  Kentucky,  and  wdiich  she  could  lawfully  convey  in  per- 
son. But  such  conveyance  must  be  made  in  virtue  of  a  power  of 
attorney,  executed  and  acknowledged  or  proved,  as  their  deeds 
are  by  law  required  to  be.°^ 

Husband  and  w4fe  must  join  to  release  dower.°"  Curtesy  does 
not  exist  in  name;  but  the  husband  has  the  same  interest  in  the 
wife's  real  estate  that  the  w'ife  has  in  that  of  the  husband."^ 

No  mortgage,  release,  or  waiver  of  homestead  is  valid  unless 
executed  by  husband  and  wife,  and  acknowledged  as  provided. "* 
Homestead  exemption  embraces  dwelling-house  and  appurte- 
nances not  exceeding  one  thousand  dollars  in  value.  Homestead 
is  not  exempt  from  mortgage  foreclosure,  for  purchase-money 
therefor,  or  sales  under  execution,  attachment,  or  judgment,  if 
debt  or  liability  existed  prior  to  purchase  of  land  or  erection  of 
improvements  thereon.'*'^ 

§798.  Louisiana.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Louisiana  before  a  notary  public,  parish  re- 
corder, or  clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  his  deputy. '"^    Without 

87  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  503.    '  03  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  2148. 

88  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  501.  »*  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  1706. 

89  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §S  502,  503.  "^^  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  1702. 

00  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  8  506.  ^'c  Rev.  Laws  1904,  §§  1926  (p.  921), 

91  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  508.  2492,  3066. 

82  Carroll's  Stats.  1915,  §  2136. 


819  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    798 

the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  before  any  Louisiana  commissioner  residing  in  the  state 
or  territory  in  which  person  taking  acknowledgment  lives,  and 
before  any  notary  pubHc  duly  appointed  in  such  state,  territory, 
or  district."  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may 
be  made  before  ambassadors,  ministers,  charges  d'affaires,  secre- 
taries of  legations,  consuls  general,  consuls,  vice  consuls,  and 
commercial  agents. '"'* 

Two  witnesses  are  required,  and  if  the  grantor  be  blind,  three. ^^ 
Notary  executing  an  authentic  act  within  this  state  shall  be  as- 
sisted by  two  witnesses.^  All  acts  passed  before  commissioner 
and  two  witnesses  shall  have  the  force  of  notarial  acts  within 
Louisiana." 

The  official  character  and  signature  of  the  person  before  whom 
an  acknowledgment  is  made  in  conformity  to  the  laws  of  another 
state  must  be  properly  verified  before  a  commissioner  of  the  state. 
Acknowledgments  out  of  the  state  and  within  any  other  state 
or  territory,  taken  before  a  notary  public,  are  to  be  certified  un- 
der his  hand  and  official  seal.  The  above-named  officers  in  for- 
eign countries  use  their  respective  seals  of  office.  An  acknowl- 
edgment taken  by  them,  when  duly  certified,  has  the  force  and  ef- 
fect of  an  authentic  act  executed  in  this  state.^ 

All  acts  may  be  executed  under  private  signature,  except  such 
as  positive  laws  have  ordained  to  be  passed  in  presence  of  no- 
tary.* 

The  wife,  even  when  she  is  separated  in  her  estate  from  her 
husband,  can  not  alienate,  grant,  mortgage,  acquire,  either  by 
gratuitous  or  encumbered  title,  unless  her  husband  concurs  in  the 
act  or  yields  his  consent  in  writing.^ 

A  married  woman  above  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  may,  by 
and  with  the  authorization  of  her  husband  and  with  the  sanction 
of  the  judge,  borrow  money  and  contract  debts  for  her  separate 
advantage  and  benefit,  and  to  secure  the  same,  grant  mortgages 
or  other  securities  affecting  her  separate  estate,  paraphernal,  or 
dotal. °   Married  women  above  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  may, 

"Acts  of  1896,  p.  219.  3  Rev.  Laws  1904,  §  598;  Acts  1896, 

98  Rev.  Laws   1904,   §  602.  p.  219;  Rev.  Laws  1904.  §§  602.  603. 
9»  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  art.  2234,  as        ^  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  art.  2240. 
amended  by  Acts  1908,  p.  82.  s  Rgy.  Civ.  Code  1900,  art.  122. 

1  Rev.  Laws  1904.  §  603.  6  Rgy.  Civ.  Code  1900,  art.  126. 

2  Rev.  Laws  1904,  §  603. 


§    799  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  820 

with  the  consent  of  their  husbands,  by  act  passed  before  a  notary 
piibhc,  renounce  in  favor  of  third  persons  their  matrimonial, 
dotal,  paraphernal,  and  other  rights.  But  the  notary,  before  re- 
ceiving her  signature,  shall  detail  in  the  act,  and  explain  verbally 
to  said  married  woman,  out  of  the  presence  of  her  husband,  the 
nature  of  her  rights  and  of  the  contract  she  agrees  to/ 

There  is  a  homestead  exemption  of  land  not  exceeding  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  acres,  buildings,  and  appurtenances,  rural  or  ur- 
ban, of  every  head  of  a  family,  not  exceeding  two  thousand  dol- 
lars in  value.  This  exemption  may  be  claimed  by  the  surviving 
spouse,  or  minor  child  or  children,  of  a  deceased  beneficiary.* 
Any  person  entitled  to  a  homestead  may  waive  the  same,  by  sign- 
ing with  his  wife,  if  she  be  not  separated  a  mensa  et  thoro,  and 
having  recorded  in  the  office  of  the  recorder  of  mortgages  of  his 
parish,  a  written  waiver  of  the  same,  in  whole  or  in  part.** 

§  799.  Maine. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  J\Iaine  by  a  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public  having 
an  official  seal,  or  woman  appointed  by  the  governor  for  the  pur- 
pose. ^^  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowl- 
edgments may  be  taken  by  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  having 
a  seal,  notary  public,  justice  of  the  peace  or  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  of  Maine  for  the  purpose. ^^  Without 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a  United 
States  minister  or  consul,  notary  public,  or  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  governor.^" 

A  subscribing  witness  is  necessary  to  prove  the  execution  of 
an  unacknowledged  deed  before  a  court  of  record  in  the  state. ^^ 

Seal  of  such  court,  or  the  seal  of  such  notary,  if  he  have  one, 
shall  be  affixed  to  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  but  if  such 
acknowledgment  is  taken  outside  the  state  of  Maine  before  a 
justice  of  the  peace,  or  a  notary  public  not  having  a  seal,  a  cer- 
tificate under  seal  from  the  secretary  of  state,  or  clerk  of  a  court 
of  record  in  the  county  where  the  officer  resides  or  took  the  ac- 
knowledgment, authenticating  the  authority  of  the  officer  taking 
such  acknowledgment  and  the  genuineness  of  his  signature,  must 
be  annexed  thereto.^*    A  commissioner  of  deeds  must  use  his  offi- 

7  Rev.  Civ.  Code  1900,  art.  129.  "  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  23. 

8  Const.,  art.  244.  12  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  23. 
0  Const.,  art.  246.  "  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  28. 
10  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  23.  "  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  23. 


821  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    800 

cial  seal.^^  The  seal  of  a  court  or  a  notary  taking  acknowledg- 
ments must  be  affixed.^*' 

A  married  woman  may  own  in  her  own  right  realty  and  per- 
sonalty acquired  by  descent,  gift,  or  purchase,  and  may  convey 
the  same  without  joinder  or  assent  of  husband;  but  such  con- 
veyance shall  not  bar  his  right  and  interest  by  descent  in  the 
estate  so  conveyed."  Real  estate  directly  conveyed  to  her  by 
her  husband  can  not  be  conveyed  by  her  without  the  joinder  of 
her  husband,  except  real  estate  conveyed  to  her  as  security  or  in 
payment  of  a  bona  fide  debt  actually  due  to  her  from  her  hus- 
band. ^^  Married  women  are  not  required  to  be  examined  apart 
from  their  husband.^^  If  married  since  April  21,  1844,  a  woman 
does  not  lose,  and  a  husband  does  not  acquire,  rights  to  her  prop- 
erty by  marriage."^ 

Dower  and  curtesy  are  abolished.  But  this  act  does  not  affect, 
modify,  enlarge,  or  limit  the  rights  and  interests  which  a  widower 
or  widow  married  before  May  1,  1895,  has  in  the  estate  of  a  wife 
or  husband  deceased  prior  to  January  1,  1897.-^  A  husband  or 
wife  may  bar  his  or  her  right  and  interest  by  descent,  in  an  es- 
tate conveyed  by  the  other,  by  joining  in  the  same,  or  a  subse- 
quent deed,  or  with  the  guardian  of  the  other,  or  by  sole  deed; 
but  he  or  she  shall  not  be  deprived  of  such  right  and  interest  by 
levy  or  sale  of  the  real  estate  on  execution,  but  may,  after  the 
right  of  redemption  has  expired,  release  such  right  and  interest 
by  sole  deed.^^  A  woman  may  be  barred  of  her  right  and  interest 
by  descent  in  her  husband's  lands  by  a  jointure  settled  on  her 
with  her  consent  before  marriage."^ 

§  800.  Maryland.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Maryland,  in  the  county  or  city  within  which 
the  real  estate  or  any  part  of  it  lies,  before  a  justice  of  the  peace 
for  said  county  or  city,  a  judge  of  the  orphans'  court  for  said 
county  or  city,  a  judge  of  the  circuit  court  for  the  county,  a 
judge  of  the  supreme  bench  of  Baltimore  city,  or  a  notary  pub- 
lic in  any  county  or  city.^*     Within  the  state,  but  out  of  the 

IS  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  7S,  §  25.  21  Rev.  Stats.  1916.  ch.  80,  §  8. 

i«  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78,  §  23.  22  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  80,  §  9. 

17  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  66,  §  1.  23  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  80,  §  10. 

IS  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  66,  §  1.  24  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    21, 

19  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  78.  §  23.  §  2;  Laws  1906,  ch.  398 

20  Rev.  Stats.  1916,  ch.  66,  §  2. 


§    800  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  822 

county  or  city  wherein  the  real  estate  or  any  part  of  it  lies, 
acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  a  notary  public,  a  judge 
of  the  circuit  court  for  the  circuit  in  which  the  grantor  may  be, 
a  judge  of  the  orphans'  court  for  the  county  in  which  the  grantor 
may  be,  a  judge  of  the  supreme  bench  of  Baltimore  city  or  of 
the  orphans'  court  of  said  city,  justice  of  the  peace  for  the  county 
or  city  where  the  grantor  may  acknowledge,  the  official  character 
of  the  justice  being  certified  to  by  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  or 
superior  court  under  his  official  seal."^  Without  the  state  and 
within  the  United  States,  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before 
a  notary  public,  a  judge  of  any  United  States  court  or  of  any 
state  or  territory  having  a  seal,  or  a  commissioner  of  deeds  of 
this  state. ""^  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may 
be  made  before  any  minister,  consul  general,  deputy  consul,  vice 
consul,  consular  agent,  consular  officer  of  the  United  States,  no- 
tary public,  or  commissioner  of  deeds  of  this  state. "^  A  corpora- 
tion may  acknowledge  instrument  by  attorney  appointed  under 
its  seal  (such  appointment  to  be  embodied  therein),  or  by  its 
president  or  vice  president  without  such  appointment.^^ 

Conveyances  must  be  attested  by  at  least  one  witness.^^ 

If  taken  wathout  the  state  before  a  judge  of  a  court  having  a 
seal,  seal  of  such  court  must  be  affixed. ^"^  Commissioners  of 
deeds  and  notaries  public  are  required  to  have  official  seals.^^ 

Every  deed  conveying  real  estate  shall  be  signed  and  sealed  by 
the  grantor  or  bargainor.^- 

Married  women  shall  hold  all  their  property  of  every  descrip- 
tion for  their  separate  use,  as  fully  as  if  they  were  unmarried, 
and  shall  have  all  the  power  to  dispose  of  by  deed,  mortgage, 
lease,  will,  or  any  other  instruments  that  husbands  have  to  dis- 
pose of  their  property,  and  no  more;  provided,  that  no  dispo- 
sition of  her  real  or  personal  property,  or  any  portion  thereof, 
by  deed,  mortgage,  bill  of  sale,  or  other  conveyance,  shall  be 
valid  if  made  by  a  married  woman  under  eighteen  years  of  age, 
unless  her  husband  shall  unite  therein. ^^  A  married  woman's 
acknowledgment   is  taken   without  separate   examination.^*      A 

25  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  21,  §  3.  si  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    18, 

2G  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904.  art.  21,  §  4.  §§  1,  3.  art.  68,  §  7. 

27  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904.  art.  21,  §  5.  32  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    21, 

28  Laws  1908,  art.  23,  §  74.  §  10. 

29  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904.    art.    21,  33  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art.  45,  §  4. 
§  10.  34  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    21, 

30  Pub.  Gen.  Laws  1904,  art  21,  §  7.  §  67,  art.  45,  §§  4,  12. 


823  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    801 

married  woman  may  relinquish  her  dower  in  any  real  estate  by 
joint  deed  of  herself  and  husband,  by  separate  deed,  or  by  power 
of  attorney  executed  jointly  with  her  husband  or  by  herself 
without  the  joinder  of  her  husband.  And  in  like  manner  any 
husband  may  relinquish  his  interest  in  the  real  estate  of  his  wife 
by  joint  or  separate  deed,  or  by  power  of  attorney  executed 
jointly  with  his  wife  or  by  himself  without  the  joinder  of  his 
wife.^^ 

§  801.  Massachusetts. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Massachusetts  before  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
special  commissioner,  or  notary  public.^®  Without  the  state,  and 
within  the  United  States,  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  any 
justice  of  the  peace,  magistrate,  notary  public,  or  commissioner 
appointed  for  that  purpose  by  the  governor  of  this  state,  or  offi- 
cer of  any  state  or  territory  who  is  authorized  by  the  laws  thereof 
to  take  acknowledgments.^^  Without  the  United  States  acknowl- 
edgments may  be  taken  by  a  justice,  notary,  magistrate,  or  com- 
missioner, an  ambassador,  minister,  consul,  vice  consul,  charge 
d'affaires,  or  consular  agent  of  the  United  States,  resident  in  any 
foreign  country  or  port,  certified  under  his  official  seal.^^ 

One  subscribing  witness  is  required  to  prove  an  unacknowl- 
edged deed."^ 

Instruments  made  without  the  state  must  be  accompanied  by 
a  certificate  of  the  secretary  of  state  in  which  officer  resides,  un- 
der seal  of  such  state,  or  of  the  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  of  the 
county  in  which  said  officer  resides  or  in  which  he  took  acknowl- 
edgment, under  the  seal  of  the  court,  stating  that  such  officer 
was,  at  the  time  of  taking  such  proof  or  acknowledgment,  duly 
authorized  thereto  in  said  state,  and  that  said  secretary  of  state 
or  clerk  of  court  is  well  acquainted  with  his  handwriting  and 
verily  believes  that  the  signature  affixed  to  such  certificate  or 
proof  or  acknowledment  is  genuine. ■*" 

A  seal  is  necessary,  but  several  may  use  same  seal.^^ 

A  wife  may  convey  her  separate  property  as  if  she  were  sole. 

35  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    45,  ^^Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §§   10- 

§  12.  15. 

3«  Rev.  Laws  1902.  ch.  127,  §  8.  as  ^o  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §  20. 

amended  bv   Supp.   Rev.   Laws   1908,  ''^  Proprietors       of       Mill        Dam 

ch.  127.  §  l".  Foundry    v.    Hovey,    38    Mass.     (21 

37  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §S  8,  19.  Pick.)    417;    Tasker    v.    Bartlett,    59 

38  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §§  8,  22.  Mass.  (5  Cush.)  359. 


§    802  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  824 

But  no  conveyance  of  realty  by  a  married  woman  shall  extin- 
guish or  impair  her  husband's  tenancy  by  the  curtesy  unless  he 
joins  in  the  conveyance  or  otherwise  releases  his  rights,  unless 
the  court  having  jurisdiction  has  entered  a  decree  that  she  has 
been  deserted  by  her  husband  or  is  living  apart  from  him  for  jus- 
tifiable cause.  In  the  latter  case  she  may  convey  as  if  sole.*"  If 
the  wife  deserts  her  husband  or  he  is  living  apart  from  her  for 
justifiable  cause,  he  may  likewise  convey  his  property  as  if  he 
were  sole.*^ 

The  acknowledgment  by  a  married  woman  may  be  taken  in 
the  same  form  as  if  she  were  sole,  and  without  any  separate 
examination.** 

A  wife  may  bar  her  right  of  dower  by  joining  in  her  hus- 
band's conveyance,  or  by  subsequent  deed  executed  either  sep- 
arately or  jointly  with  her  husband.*^  A  woman  may  also  be 
barred  of  dower  in  all  the  land  of  her  husband  by  a  jointure 
settled  on  her  with  her  assent  before  her  marriage.*"  A  pecuni- 
ary provision,  made  for  the  benefit  of  an  intended  wife  and  in 
lieu  of  dower,  shall  if  assented  to  as  above  provided  bar  her 
dower  in  all  the  land  of  her  husband.*^ 

Homestead  may  be  released  by  the  wife's  joining  in  the  deed 
of  husband  in  the  manner  in  which  she  may  release  her  dower.*^ 

§  802.  Michigan.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  made 
within  the  state  of  Michigan  before  a  judge,  clerk,  or  commis- 
sioner of  a  court  of  record,  notary  public  (he  must  give  date  of 
expiration  of  commission),  justice  of  the  peace,  or  master  in 
chancery  within  the  state,  the  officer  indorsing  a  certificate  on 
the  deed.*^  Deeds  acknowledged  before  a  county  clerk  or  clerk 
of  circuit  court  before  September  18,  1903,  are  legalized.^"  A 
notary  public  may  take  acknowledgment  of  instrument  executed 
by  a  corporation  of  which  he  is  a  stockholder,  director,  officer, 
or  employe,  provided  he  is  not  a  party  thereto,  either  individu- 
ally or  in  a  representative  capacity."'^  Executions  are  according 
to  the  laws  of  the  state,  territory,  or  district  in  which  they  are 

42  Rev.  Laws  1902.  ch.  153,  §§  1;  36.  ^s  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  131,  §  7. 

43Supp.   Rev.   Laws   1908,   ch.   153,  ^o  3   Comp.   Laws    1897.    §   8962   as 

§  1,  p.  1301.  amended  by  Pub.  Acts   1903,  pp.  23, 

«  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §  9.  137. 

«  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  132,  §  5.  =">  Pub.  Acts   1905,  p.   151. 

46  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  127,  §  21.  ^1  Pub.  Acts  1909,  p.  24. 

47  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  132,  §  6. 


11 


825  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    802 

made.  Without  the  United  States  executions  are  according  to 
the  laws  of  that  country,  and  acknowledgments  may  be  made  be- 
fore a  notary  public,  a  minister  plenipotentiary,  minister  extraor- 
dinary, minister  resident,  charge  d'affaires,  commissioner  or  con- 
sul of  the  United  States  appointed  to  reside  therein.  The  ac- 
knowledgment must  be  certified  by  the  officer  under  his  hand,  and, 
if  taken  before  a  notary  public,  his  seal  of  office  must  be  affixed 
thereto."  A  deed  so  executed  in  a  foreign  country  must  be  exe- 
cuted in  the  presence  of  two  subscribing  witnesses. ^^  Without 
the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
made  before  any  judge  of  a  court  of  record,  notary  public,  jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  master  in  chancery,  any  other  officer  these  au- 
thorized to  take  acknowledgments  of  deeds,  or  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  of  this  state  for  such  purpose.^* 

Deeds  must  be  executed  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses. °^ 

Unless  the  acknowledgment  of  deeds  made  elsewhere  in  the 
United  States  be  taken  before  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
governor,  the  officer  taking  acknowledgment  shall  attach  his 
official  seal,  and  if  taken  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  officer 
having  no  seal,  such  instrument  shall  have  attached  thereto 
a  certificate  of  the  clerk  or  other  proper  certifying  officer  of  a 
court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district,  or  of  the  secretary  of 
state  of  the  state  or  territory  within  which  such  acknowledgment 
was  taken  under  the  seal  of  his  office,  that  the  person  whose 
name  is  subscribed  to  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  was,  at 
the  date  thereof,  such  officer  as  he  is  therein  represented  to  be, 
and  that  he  believes  the  signature  of  such  person  to  such  certifi- 
cate of  acknowledgment  to  be  genuine,  and  that  the  deed  is  exe- 
cuted and  acknowledged  according  to  the  laws  of  such  state,  ter- 
ritory, or  district. ^'^ 

A  scroll  or  device  answers  for  a  seal,  but  lack  of  seal  shall  not 
invalidate  any  conveyance." 

A  married  woman  acknowledges  an  instrument  affecting  real 
property  as  if  she  were  sole.^^  When  any  married  woman,  not 
residing  in  the  state,  shall  join  with  her  husband  in  any  con- 
veyance of  realty  situated  within  this  state,  the  conveyance  shall 

523  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8965.  s"  3  Comp.  Laws  1897.  §  8964. 

•"  3  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8965.  573    Comp.    Laws    1897,    §§    8956, 

5*3  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8963.  9005,  10417. 

55  3  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8962 ;  Pub.  ^s  3  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8966. 
Acts  1903,  p.  137. 


803 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


826 


have  the  same  effect  as  if  she  were  sole,  and  her  acknowledgment 
or  proof  may  be  the  same  as  if  she  were  sole.^" 

A  married  woman  of  eighteen  years  may  bar  her  right  of 
dower  by  joining  in  the  deed  with  her  husband  and  acknowl- 
edging the  same,  or  by  joining  him  in  a  subsequent  deed  acknowl- 
edged in  like  manner,  or  by  separate  deed  to  one  who  holds  the 
husband's  title,  expressing  the  intent  to  bar  her  right  of  dower.'^'^ 
A  woman  may  also  be  barred  of  dower  by  a  jointure  settled  on 
her  with  her  assent  before  the  marriage.*^^ 

A  mortgage  or  other  alienation  of  a  homestead  is  not  valid 
without  wife's  signature,  unless  it  be  a  purchase-money  mort- 
gage." 

§  803.  Minnesota.  —  Acknowdedgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Minnesota  before  judges,  clerks,  and  deputy 
clerks  of  all  courts  of  record,  residing  within  the  state,  including 
those  of  circuit  and  district  courts  of  the  United  States,  and 
resident  United  States  commissioners,  notaries  public,  justices  of 
the  peace,  and  clerks  or  recorders  of  towns,  villages,  boroughs, 
and  cities;  court  commissioners,  registers  of  deeds,  county  audi- 
tors and  their  deputies,  and  county  commissioners,  all  within 
their  respective  counties;  or  before  a  member  of  the  legislature 
as  long  as  he  remains  such  and  continues  to  reside  in  the  district 
from  which  he  was  elected,  but  he  shall  receive  no  fee,  and  his 
signature  shall  be:  "A  B,  Representative  (or  Senator)  Dis- 
trict, Minnesota.  My  term  expires  January  1,  19 — .""^  Without 
the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
taken  by  any  judge  or  justice  of  the  Supreme,  circuit,  or  district 
court  of  the  United  States,  a  court  of  record  of  any  state,  ter- 
ritory, or  district  therein;  the  clerk  and  deputy  clerk  of  any 
of  said  courts;  any  notary  public  or  justice  of  the 
peace,  or  any  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor 
of  this  state  for  that  purpose.  But  no  acknowledgment 
so  certified  shall  be  valid  unless  taken  within  the  place 
or  territory  for  which  such  officer  was  chosen  or  to 
which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  of  which  he  is  an  officer  shall 
extend.  An  acknowledgment  may  be  made  according  to  laws  of 
other  state,  territory,  or  district,  and  so  certified  by  secretary  of 


593  Comp.  Laws  1897.  §  8968. 
GO 3  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  8930 ;  Pul) 
Acts  1899,  p.  284. 


"  3  Comp.  Laws  1897.  §  8931. 
623  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  10363. 
f'3  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  2687. 


827  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    803 

state  under  his  official  seal,  clerk  or  other  proper  certifying  offi- 
cer of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district  within  which 
acknowledgment  was  taken. "^^  Without  the  United  States  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  made  before  a  notary  public,  minister, 
charge  d'affaires,  commissioner,  consul,  commercial  agent,  or 
other  consular  or  diplomatic  officer  of  the  United  States  ap- 
pointed to  reside  in  such  country,  including  all  deputies  of  such 
officers  authorized  to  perform  their  duties.  Acknowledgments 
may  also  be  executed  according  to  the  laws  of  such  country,  if 
proved  by  a  proper  certifying  officer  of  the  United  States,  under 
his  seal  of  office. "^^  Any  person  authorized  to  take  acknowledg- 
ments, who  is  an  officer,  director,  or  stockholder  of  a  corpora- 
tion, may  acknowledge  instruments  wherein  corporation  is  inter- 
ested.''** All  instruments  conveying  lands  or  affecting  title  to, 
interest  in,  or  lien  upon  any  lands  in  this  state,  heretofore  exe- 
cuted anywhere  in  the  United  States  and  recorded  in  proper 
county,  in  which  any  of  the  following  defects  of  execution  or 
acknowledgment  exist,  either  in  instrument  or  record  thereof, 
viz. :  When  no  seal  is  affixed  to  signature  of  person  or  persons 
executing  same ;  where  there  is  no  subscribing  witness ;  where 
there  is  but  one  subscribing  witness ;  where  instrument  has  been 
acknowledged  before  notary  public  or  other  officer  required  to 
keep  official  seal,  to  whose  signature  his  official  seal  has  not  been 
affixed;  all  such  instruments  and  the  records  thereof  are  hereby 
legalized." 

All  conveyances  made  within  the  state  of  any  interest  in  lands 
therein  shall  be  executed  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses,  who 
shall  subscribe  their  names  as  such.  Out  of  the  state,  convey- 
ances may  be  executed  as  above  provided,  or  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  place  of  execution."® 

If  a  certificate  made  in  another  state  be  signed  by  a  commis- 
sioner appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state,  or  by  a  notary 
public,  clerk  of  court,  or  other  officer  having  a  seal  of  office,  an 
impression  whereof  is  affixed,  no  other  authentication  is  re- 
quired. If  by  officer  appointed  by  governor  of  such  other  state 
or  territory,  and  having  no  official  seal,  it  shall  be  accompanied 
by  a  declaration  of  the  secretary  of  said  state  or  territory,  or 

f'lRev.  Laws  1905.  §§  2688.  2691.  c- Laws  1911.  ch.  277. 

65  Rev.  Laws  1905,  §§  2690,  2691.  ^^Rev.  Laws  1905,  §  3346. 

6GLaws  1907,  ch.  406. 


804 


TITLE3    AND    ABSTRACTS 


828 


his  assistant  or  deputy,  under  the  seal  thereof,  of  the  official 
character  of  the  person  certifying.  Or  the  clerk  or  other  certi- 
fying officer  of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district  in 
which  the  acknowledgment  was  taken,  under  seal  of  said  court, 
may  declare  the  official  character  of  person  taking  acknowledg- 
ment, that  he  knows  his  handwriting,  and  believes  signature  to 
be  genuine.    This  declaration  shall  be  attached  to  the  certificate."^ 

Notaries  within  state  shall  affix  date  of  expiration  of  commis- 
sion.'" 

Private  seals  are  abolished.'^ 

A  husband  and  wife  may  convey  real  estate  of  either  by  mak- 
ing a  joint  deed.  Either  may,  by  separate  deed,  convey  his  or 
her  realty,  except  the  homestead,  subject  to  rights  of  spouse 
therein ;  either  may,  by  separate  conveyance,  relinquish  rights  in 
realty  conveyed  by  other ;  either  may  separately  appoint  an  attor- 
ney to  convey  his  or  her  realty,  or  join  in  conveyance  made  by 
other.    Minority  of  wife  shall  not  invalidate  her  conveyance.'^ 

No  separate  acknowledgment  by  a  married  woman  is  re- 
quired.'^ 

Wife  may,  by  separate  instrument,  release  dower  in  lands  of 
a  former  deceased  husband.'*  Where  husband  or  wife  con- 
veyed real  estate  on  or  prior  to  January  1,  1896,  no  action  for 
recovery  by  any  person  having  any  estate  in  dower  or  by  the 
curtesy,  or  in  lieu  thereof,  may  be  commenced  after  October  1, 
1911.''^  Wliena  husband  or  wife  purchases  land  during  cover- 
ture, and  mortgages  his  or  her  estate  in  such  land  to  secure  the 
payment  of  the  purchase-price  or  any  portion  thereof,  the  sur- 
viving spouse  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  inchoate  or  contingent 
right  in  such  land  as  against  the  mortgagee  or  those  claiming 
under  the  mortgage,  although  such  survivor  did  not  join  in  such 
mortgage.'" 

No  mortgage,  sale,  or  other  alienation  of  homestead  shall  be 
valid  without  the  signature  of  both  husband  and  wife.'' 

§  804.  Mississippi.  —  Acknow^ledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  ^Mississippi  before  any  judge  of  a  United 


«9  Rev.  Laws  1905.  §  2689. 
70  Rev.  Laws  1905,  ch.  48. 
■1  Rev.  Laws  1905.  §  2652. 
"Rev.     Laws     1905.     §     3335, 
amended  by  Laws  1907,  ch.  123. 


"3  Rev.  Laws  1905.  S  2686. 

7*  Rev.  Laws  1905.  §  3335. 

"Laws  1911,  ch.  328. 

"«  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  465. 

"Rev.  Laws  1905,  §§  3335,  3456. 


829  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    804 

States  court,  judge  of  the  Supreme  or  circuit  court,  chancellor 
or  clerk  of  a  court  of  record,  his  deputy  where  statute  author- 
izes him  to  perform  duties  of  principal,  notary  public  under  his 
official  seal,  justice  of  the  peace,  police  justice,  mayor  of  any 
city,  town,  or  village,  or  member  of  the  board  of  supervisors, 
whether  the  property  conveyed  be  within  his  county  or  not.'® 
Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments 
may  be  made  before  the  chief  justice  of  the  United  States,  asso- 
ciate justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  judge 
of  any  United  States  court,  any  judge  or  justice  of  the  Supreme 
or  superior  court  of  any  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States, 
justice  of  the  peace  of  such  state  or  territory  whose  official  char- 
acter shall  be  certified  under  the  seal  of  some  court  of  record  in 
his  county,  commissioner  residing  in  such  state  or  territory  who 
is  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state  for  such  purpose,  no- 
tary public,  or  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  having  a  seal  of  office.'" 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before 
any  court  of  record,  mayor  or  chief  magistrate  of  any  city,  bor- 
ough, or  corporation  of  such  foreign  country  in  which  the  party 
or  witness  resides  or  may  be ;  any  commissioner  residing  in  such 
country  who  may  be  appointed  by  the  governor ;  any  ambassador, 
foreign  minister,  secretary  of  legation,  or  consul  of  the  United 
States  to  the  foreign  country  in  which  the  party  or  witness  may 
reside  or  be ;  but  the  certificate  must  show  that  the  party,  or  the 
party  and  witness,  were  identified  before  the  officer,  that  the 
party  acknowledged  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  or  that 
witness  proved  execution,  and  it  shall  be  as  good  and  effectual 
as  if  made  and  certified  by  a  competent  officer  of  this  state.*** 

No  witnesses  are  necessary  if  acknowledged;  otherwise,  one 
or  more  subscribing  witnesses  must  prove  deed.^^ 

No  seal  is  required,  except  for  corporations.^" 

A  married  woman  may  convey  her  property  as  if  she  were 
unmarried.*^     No  separate  examination  of  wife  is  required.^* 

A  conveyance  or  mortgage  of  the  homestead  is  not  valid  un- 
less signed  by  both  husband  and  wife,  regardless  of  which  owns 
it  provided  they  are  living  together.®^ 

78  Code  1906.  §  2798.  82  Code  1906,  §  4631. 

79  Code  1906,  §  2800.  s3  Code  1906,  §  2517. 

80  Code  1906.  §  2801.  84  Code  1906,  §  2799. 

81  Code  1906,  §§  2762,  2784.  ss  Code  1906,  §§  2159-2161. 


805 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


830 


§  805.  Missouri. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Missouri  before  a  court  having  a  seal,  or  some  judge, 
justice,  or  clerk  thereof,  notary  public,  or  justice  of  the  peace  of 
the  county  where  the  estate  lies.*"  Without  the  state  and  within 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  any  notary 
public,  any  court  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  state  or  terri- 
tory having  a  seal,  the  clerk  of  any  such  court,  or  commissioner 
of  deeds  appointed  by  the  governor.^^  Without  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  any  court  of  any  state, 
kingdom,  or  empire  having  a  seal,  the  mayor  or  chief  officer  of 
any  city  or  town  having  an  official  seal,  a  minister  or  a  consular 
officer  of  the  United  States,  or  a  notary  public  having  a  seal.®® 

A  subscribing  witness  is  necessary  to  prove  a  deed.®° 

Officer  having  seal  must  affix  it.*"* 

Use  of  seals  by  grantors,  except  for  corporations,  is  abol- 
ished.°^ 

Husband  and  wife  may  join  to  convey  her  real  estate. °*  No 
separate  examination  of  wife  is  required. ^^  A  wife  may  relin- 
quish her  dower  by  joint  deed  with  husband,  acknowledged  and 
certified,  or  by  power  of  attorney  authorizing  its  conveyance, 
executed  and  acknowledged  by  her  jointly  with  her  husband.''* 

A  husband  and  wife  may  jointly  convey,  mortgage,  alienate, 
and  in  other  manner  dispose  of  a  homestead  or  any  part  thereof."' 

§  806.  Montana. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  at  any 
place  within  the  state  of  Montana  by  justice  or  clerk  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  or  a  judge  of  the  district  court.  They  may  be  taken 
in  this  state  within  the  city,  county,  or  district  for  which  the  offi- 
cer was  elected  or  appointed,  before  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  record, 
county  clerk,  notary  public,  or  justice  of  the  peace."*'  Without  the 
state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  mav  be  made 


8G1  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  908;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909,  «  2794. 

sn  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  908;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §  2794. 

88  1  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  908;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §  2794. 

89  1  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  914,  et 
seq. ;  1  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  2800,  et  seq. 

90  Code  1899,  §911;  1  Annot.  Stat. 
1906.  §  911;  1  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  2797. 

911  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  893;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  2773. 


92  1  Annot.  Stat.  1906.  §§  901,  902; 
1  Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §§  2788,  2789. 

93  1  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  913;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909,  S  2799. 

9*1  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §§  111,  901. 
902;  2  Annot.  Stat.  1906.  §  4373;  1 
Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §§  2788,  2789. 

•'•>2  Annot.  Stat.  1906,  §  3616;  2 
Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §  6704. 

9fil  Code  Annot.  1895  (Civ.), 
§§  1600,  1601. 


831  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    806 

by  a  justice,  judge,  or  clerk  of  any  court  of  record  of  the  United 
States;  a  justice,  judge,  or  clerk  of  any  court  of  record  of  any 
state  or  territory;  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  of 
this  state  for  that  purpose ;  a  notary  public ;  or  any  other  officer 
of  the  state  or  territory  where  the  acknowledgment  is  made  who 
is  authorized  by  its  laws  to  take  such  proof  or  acknowledgment.^^ 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a 
minister,  commissioner,  or  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States, 
resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  the  proof  or  ac- 
knowledgment is  made;  a  consul,  vice  consul,  or  consular  agent 
of  the  United  States  resident  in  the  country  where  the  proof  or 
acknowledgment  is  made;  a  judge  of  a  court  of  record  of  the 
country  where  the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  made;  commis- 
sioners appointed  for  such  purposes  by  the  governor  of  the  state, 
pursuant  to  special  statutes ;  or  a  notary  public.''^  A  notary  pub- 
lic may  take  acknowledgments  to  written  instruments  executed 
to  or  by  a  bank  or  corporation  of  which  he  is  a  stockholder, 
director,  officer,  or  employe,  provided  he  is  not  a  party  to  the 
instrument  nor  interested  therein. ^^ 

A  subscribing  witness  may  prove  an  unacknowledged  deed.^ 
Officers  taking  acknowledgments  or  proofs  must  affix  their 
signatures,  followed  by  the  names  of  their  offices;  also,  their 
seals  of  office,  if  they  are  required  to  have  them."  The  certifi- 
cate or  proof  of  acknowledgment,  if  made  before  a  justice  of  the 
peace  when  used  in  any  county  other  than  that  in  which  he  re- 
sides, must  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  under  the  hand  and 
seal  of  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which  the  justice  resides,  set- 
ting forth  that  such  justice,  at  the  time  of  making  such  proof 
or  acknowledgment,  was  authorized  to  take  the  same,  and  that 
the  clerk  is  acquainted  with  his  handwriting,  and  believes  that 
the  signature  to  the  original  certificate  is  genuine.^  A  notary 
must  authenticate  with  his  official  seal  all  his  official  acts.  He 
must  add  to  his  signature  the  words.  Notary  public  for  the  state 

of  Montana,  residing  at (stating  the  name  of  his  postoffice), 

and  must  indorse  upon  the  instrument  the  date  of  the  expiration 

"'1     Code     Annot.     1895  (Civ.),         M      Code     Annot.      1895      (Civ.), 

§  1602.  §§  1573.  1615. 

98  1     Code     Annot.     1895  (Civ.),         =1      Code      Annot.      1895      (Civ.), 
§  1603.  §  1613. 

99  Laws  1909,  ch.  77.  3  1      Code     Annot.      1895      (Civ.), 

§  1614. 


§  807 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


832 


of  his  commission.'*  No  seal  by  grantor  is  required,  except  in 
case  of  corporations. ° 

A  husband  and  wife  may  hold  real  or  personal  property  to- 
gether, jointly,  or  in  common."  A  married  woman's  acknowl-_ 
edgment  is  taken  in  the  same  manner  as  that  of  any  other  per- 
son.'' A  wife  may,  without  the  consent  of  her  husband,  convey 
her  separate  property  or  execute  a  power  of  attorney  for  the 
conveyance  thereof.^  Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  release 
dower,  and  she  will  acknowledge  in  the  manner  required  to  pass 
her  estate.'' 

Both  husband  and  wife  must  execute  and  acknowledge  an 
instrument  to  convey  or  encumber  the  homestead.^" 

§  807.  Nebraska.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Nebraska  by  judge  or  clerk  of  any  court,  jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  or  notary  public,  but  the  officer  can  not  act 
out  of  his  jurisdiction.^^  Without  the  state  and  within  the 
United  States  deeds  may  be  acknowledged  or  proved  either  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  such  state,  territory,  or  district,  or  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  this  state,  and  if  acknowledged  out 
of  this  state,  it  must  be  before  some  court  of  record  or  clerk  or 
officer  holding  the  seal  thereof,  or  before  some  commissioner  of 
deeds,  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state,  or  before  some 
notary  public,  or  justice  of  the  peace.  If  taken  before  a  justice 
of  the  peace,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  certificate  of  his  official 
character  under  the  hand  of  the  clerk  of  some  court  of  record, 
to  which  the  seal  of  said  court  shall  be  affixed.^-  Without  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  according  to  laws 
of  such  country,  before  any  notary  public  therein,  minister  pleni- 
potentiary, minister  extraordinary,  minister  resident,  charge  d'af- 
faires, commissioner,  commercial  agent,  or  consul  of  the  United 
States,  appointed  to  reside  therein.  Officer  shall  certify  same 
under  his  hand  and  notary  public  shall  affix  his  seal.^^ 

One  subscribing  witness  required.^* 


4  Laws  1909.  ch.  103,  S  6. 

5  1      Code     Annot.     1895      (Civ.),     § 
§  2191. 

«1  Code  Annot.  1895  (Civ.),  §  217. 

7  1      Code     Annot.     1895      (Civ.), 
§  1606. 

8  Code  Annot.  1895  (Civ.),  §  220. 

9  1      Code     Annot.      1895      (Civ.), 
§§  228,  243. 


"1     Code  Annot.     1895      (Civ.), 

1675. 

112  Annot.  Stat.   1903,   §   10202. 

12  2  Annot.  Stat.  1907,  §   10803,  as 
amended  by  Laws   1909. 

13  2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  10206. 
1*2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  10200. 


833  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    808 

When  acknowledgments  are  made  without  the  state  by  officer 
having  a  seal,  no  other  proof  of  his  capacity  is  needed.  But  any 
other  person  must  have  a  certificate  under  seal  of  a  clerk  of  a 
court  of  record,  or  other  proper  certifying  officer,  showing  the 
official  capacity  of  the  person  taking  the  acknowledgment,  his 
compliance  with  law  of  such  state,  territory,  or  district,  and  the 
genuineness  of  his  signature/^  If  taken  without  the  United 
States  before  a  notary  public,  he  must  use  his  seal.^*^ 

Private  seals  are  abolished/^ 

Covenant  in  joint  deed  of  husband  and  wife  does  not  bind 
wife.^^     No  separate  examination  of  wife  is  required/^ 

The  right  to  inherit  a  part  or  all  the  realty  of  spouse  may  be 
barred  by  a  conveyance  executed  by  both  husband  and  wife  if 
both  reside  in  this  state."" 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  encumber  or  convey  home- 
stead.-^ 

§  808.  Nevada. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Nevada  by  judge  or  clerk  of  court  having  seal, 
notary  public  anywhere  within  state,  or  justices  of  the  peace." 
Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  taken  by  judges  or  clerks  of  United  States,  state, 
or  territorial  courts,  having  a  seal,  commissioner  of  deeds  for 
this  state,  or  by  justice  of  the  peace  of  any  county,  accompanied 
with  certificate  of  clerk  of  court  of  record."^  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  a  judge  or  clerk 
of  court  of  any  state,  kingdom,  or  empire  having  a  seal;  notary 
public  therein,  minister,  commissioner  or  consul  of  the  United 
States  appointed  to  reside  therein.-* 

A  subscribing  witness  may  prove  the  execution  of  convey- 
ance.^^ If  grantor  can  not  write,  he  shall  make  his  mark,  his 
name  shall  be  written  near  it,  and  it  shall  be  witnessed  by  a  per- 
son who  writes  his  own  name  as  witness."" 

If  acknowledgment  is  made  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  in  a 
county  other  than  the  one  where  the  realty  is  situated,  it  shall 

15  2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  10205.  22  Comp.    Laws    1900,    §    2642,    as 

102  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  10206.  amended  by  Act  Feliruary  26.  1907. 

1^2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  11350.  23  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  2642. 

"2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  10251.  24  Comp.  Laws  1900.  8  2642. 

10  2  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  5318.  25  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  2649. 

20  Laws  1907,  p.  197.  26  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  2734. 

212  Annot.  Stat.  1903,  §  6203. 

53 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    809  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  834 

be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  district  court  of 
the  county  setting  forth  official  character  and  genuineness  of  the 
signature  of  said  justice.  The  same  applies  where  justices  make 
acknowledgments  in  other  states  and  territories."^  Officers  hav- 
ing seals  must  use  them  on  certificates.^^  A  private  seal  is  un- 
necessary.^" 

A  conveyance  by  a  married  woman  has  the  same  effect  as  if 
she  were  unmarried  and  may  be  acknowledged  in  the  same  man- 
ner.'"   Husband  controls  community  property. ^^ 

No  conveyance  or  mortgage  of  homestead  is  valid  unless  both 
husband  and  wife  execute  and  acknowledge  the  same  as  pro- 
vided by  law  for  conveyance  of  real  estate.'^ 

§  809.  New  Hampshire.  —  Acknowdedgments  may  be 
taken  within  the  United  States  by  a  justice,  notary  public,  or 
commissioner.^^  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments 
may  be  taken  by  ministers  and  consuls  of  the  United  States.'* 

Two  witnesses  are  necessary,'^ 

Grantor  is  required  to  affix  his  seal.'^ 

Realty  may  be  conveyed  directly  by  husband  to  wife,  or  wife  to 
husband,  whenever  it  might  lawfully  be  done  through  intervention 
of  third  person.'^ 

A  married  woman  controls  her  own  separate  property.'''  She 
has  same  rights  and  remedies  and  is  subject  to  same  liabilities  in 
relation  to  her  own  property,  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  provided, 
that  no  conveyance  by  her,  as  surety  or  guarantor  for  her  hus- 
band, nor  any  undertaking  by  her  for  him  or  in  his  behalf,  shall 
be  binding  on  her,  except  mortgage  releasing  dower  and  home- 
stead.'" 

Husband  and  wife  may  join  with  each  other  to  release  dower 
or  curtesy.''" 

Husband  and  wife  may  bar  homestead  right  by  joining  in 
deed." 

§  810.     Nev^^    Jersey. — Acknowledgments    may    be    made 

27Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  2642.  3^  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  137,  §  3. 

28  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  2644.     "  3g  p^b.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  137,  §  3. 

20  Comp.  Laws  1900.  §  2735.  37  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  176.  §  3. 

30  Laws  1909,  ch.  195,  §  2.  38  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  176.  §  1. 

31  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  515.  so  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  176,  §  2. 

32  Comp.  Laws  1900,  §  515.  4o  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  176,  §  3. 

33  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  137,  §  3.  4i  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  138,  §  4. 
3*  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  137,  §  3. 


835  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    810 

within  the  state  of  New  Jersey  before  the  chancellor,  a  justice 
of  Supreme  Court,  master  in  chancery  in  this  state,  attorney  at 
law  of  this  state,  judge  of  any  court  of  common  pleas  of  any 
county  in  this  state,  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed  for  any 
county  in  this  state,  clerk  of  court  of  common  pleas  of  any 
county,  deputy  county  clerk,  surrogate  or  deputy  surrogate  of  any 
county,  or  register  of  deeds  of  any  county  of  this  state,  whether 
he  was  appointed  for  or  is  in  county  where  lands  lie  or  acknowl- 
edgment is  taken.  Deed  shall  be  accompanied  by  officer's  ac- 
knowledgment/" Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  the  chief  justice  of  the 
United  States,  any  associate  justice  of  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  a  master  in  chancery  of  this  state,  attorney  at  law 
of  this  state,  circuit  or  district  judge  of  United  States,  judge  or 
justice  of  Supreme  or  superior  courts,  chancellor  of  any  state,  ter- 
ritory, or  district  in  the  union,  any  foreign  commissioner  of 
deeds  for  New  Jersey  duly  certified  under  his  official  seal,  mayor 
or  chief  magistrate  of  city,  borough,  or  corporation,  certified 
under  seal  of  such  city,  borough,  or  corporation.  Circuit  or  dis- 
trict judges,  judges  or  justices  of  Supreme  or  superior  courts, 
chancellors,  foreign  commissioners  of  deeds,  mayors  or  chief 
magistrates,  judges  of  courts  of  common  pleas  or  officers  of  other 
states  shall  act  within  the  limits  of  their  jurisdiction/^  Without 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a  master  in 
chancery  of  New  Jersey,  any  public  ambassador,  minister,  consul, 
vice  consul,  consular  agent,  charge  d'affaires,  or  other  representa- 
tive of  the  United  States  in  any  foreign  kingdom,  state,  nation, 
or  colony,  any  court  of  law  of  such  kingdom,  state,  nation,  or 
colony,  notary  public,  mayor  or  chief  magistrate  of  city,  borough, 
or  corporation  in  which  party  or  witnesses  happen  to  be/*  All 
deeds  duly  signed,  delivered,  and  recorded,  the  signing  thereof 
being  certified  to  by  an  officer  of  any  foreign  kingdom,  state,  or 
nation,  after  lapse  of  ten  years  from  date  of  signing,  notwith- 
standing certificate  of  official  fails  to  show  or  certify  deed  to  have 
been  acknowledged  by  person  signing  same,  shall  be  held  good 
and  effectual  in  law/^    The  foregoing  applies  to  conveyances  of 

42  Laws    1898,    ch.    232.    §    22,    as         "4  Laws  1898.  ch.  232,  §  24. 
amended  by  Laws  1906.  ch.  247,  §  22.         ^d  Laws  1911,  ch.  16,  §  1. 

«Laws    1898,    ch.    232,    §    23.    as 
amended  by  Laws  1906,  ch.  250,  §  23. 


§    810  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  836 

married  woman,  and  her  deed  so  executed  shall  be  sufficient  to 
convey  her  estate  in  lands  therein  described,  although  not  ac- 
knowledged according  to  law,  provided  every  deed  in  this  act 
described  shall  have  been  recorded  ten  years.'"^ 

One  or  more  subscribing  witnesses  necessary.*^ 

If  acknowledged  without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States 
before  circuit  or  district  judge,  judge  or  justice  of  Supreme  or 
superior  court,  chancellor  of  other  state,  foreign  commissioner  of 
deeds,  mayor  or  chief  magistrate,  or  judge  of  court  of  common 
pleas,  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  shall  be  accompanied  by 
certificate  under  great  seal  of  state,  territory,  or  district,  or  seal 
of  some  court  of  record  of  county  wherein  made,  attesting  official 
character  of  officer  taking  acknowledgment/**  If  acknowledged 
without  the  United  States  by  a  court  of  law,  notary  public,  mayor, 
or  chief  magistrate,  it  shall  be  certified  in  the  manner  in  which 
such  acts  are  usually  authenticated  by  them.*" 

Seal  necessary,  but  scroll  will  answer."^*^  Failure  to  seal  con- 
veyance does  not  invalidate  instrument,  provided  attestation 
clause  and  acknowledgment  or  proof  shall  recite  that  same  was 
signed  and  sealed  by  makers  thereof. ^^  Seal  necessary  for  cor- 
poration. But  an  unsealed  deed  by  corporation  shall  be  valid 
provided  the  attestation  clause  and  the  proof  or  acknowledgment 
shall  recite  that  deed  was  sealed  by  grantor."  If  the  certificate 
of  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  a  deed  omits  the  word  "sealed," 
it  shall  be  sufficient  in  law,  provided  such  deeds  have  been  re- 
corded more  than  one  year  before  adoption  of  this  act.^^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  in  conveyance  of  her  realty.^* 
Where  husband  and  wife  own  realty  in  this  state,  but  have  lived 
apart  for  seven  years,  chancellor  may  authorize  husband  or  wife 
to  convey  his  or  h<:r  property  or  interest  as  if  unmarried,  except- 
ing property  which  came  to  him  or  her  by  gift  through  or  from 
the  other.^^  Husband  may  join  with  wife  to  convey  her  lands  by 
power  of  attorney.^** 

A  wife  must  be  examined  apart  from  the  husband  in  order  to 

46  Laws  1911,  ch.  16.  §  2.  -  ^2  Laws    1904,    ch.   89;    Laws    1910, 

47  Laws  1898,  ch.  232,  §  22.  ch.  19. 

48  Laws  1906,  ch.  250.  §  23.  "  Laws  1909,  Act  of  April  15.  1909. 

49  Laws  1898,  ch.  232.  §  24.  '-^2  Gen.  Stat.  1895,  p.  2015,  §  14. 
so  Laws  1898,  ch.  232,  §  20.  ^^^  Laws  1896.  ch.  83. 

51  Laws   1897,   ch.   84;   Laws    1904,        so  Laws  1901,  cli.  100. 
ch.  89. 


837  EXECUTION    AND   ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    811 

convey  her  separate  estate."  The  court  of  chancery  may,  if  it 
sees  fit,  by  order  or  decree  with  her  consent,  bind  her  interest  in 
any  property,  or  authorize  her  or  her  trustees  to  assign  or  convey 
the  same.'^^  Married  woman  acting  as  trustee,  administratrix, 
executrix,  or  guardian  may  convey  without  the  joining  of  her 
husband.^'^  Married  woman  may  convey  life  estate  without  her 
husband  joining.*^''  A  married  woman  whose  husband  has  been 
a  fugitive  from  justice  for  more  than  three  years,  may  convey 
any  interest,  estate,  or  right  she  may  have  in  realty  as  if  she 
were  sole.''^ 

Husband  and  wife  may  join  to  bar  dower.*'^  If  a  woman  mar- 
ries after  becoming  entitled  to  dower  or  life  estate  in  lieu  thereof, 
she  may  release  such  dower  without  her  husband  joining.^^ 
Whenever  a  chancellor  is  satisfied  that  a  person  having  an  estate 
in  dower  assigned,  whether  in  possession  or  not,  is  incapacitated 
by  mental  infirmity  or  disease  from  executing  a  valid  release  or 
relinquishment  of  same,  and  that  it  is  to  the  interests  of  owners 
and  remaindermen  to  sell  same,  he  may  direct  that  release  or 
relinquishment  be  made  by  master  of  court  of  chancery,  whose 
deed  shall  bar  all  her  rights  and  interests.^* 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  alienate  homestead.®^ 

§811.  New  Mexico.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  New  Mexico  by  clerk  of  a  district  court,  judge  or  clerk 
of  probate  court  using  the  probate  seal,  notary  public,  or  justice 
of  the  peace."®  In  other  states  and  territories  of  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  clerk  of  any  court  of 
record  having  a  seal,  commissioner  of  deeds  duly  appointed  un- 
der laws  of  New  Mexico,  or  notary  public  having  a  seal.''^  With- 
out the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a  min- 
ister, commissioner,  or  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States, 
resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  the  acknowledgment 
is  made;  consul  general,  consul,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul,  consul, 
or  agent  of  the  United  States,  resident  in  the  country  where  the 
acknowledgment  is  made,  having  a  seal ;  or  a  notary  public  having 

"1  Gen.  Stat.  1895.  p.  854,  §  9.  ^^2  Gen.  Stat.  1895,  p.  1277,  §  10. 

s«Laws  1898,  ch.  158.  es  Laws  1902,  cli.  74. 

50  Laws    1901,    ch.   69;    Laws    1901,  C4  Laws  1911,  ch.  91.   §   1. 

ch.  165;  Laws  1904,  ch.  21.  es  3  Gen.  Stat.  1895.  p.  2998,  §  69. 

60  Laws  1901,  ch.  183.  ee  Laws  1901,  ch.  62,  §  14. 

"  Laws  1910,  ch.  197.  er  Laws  1901,  ch.  62,  §  15. 


§    812  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  838 

a  seal.""*  Acknowledgment  of  written  instrument  not  necessary  to 
its  execution  unless  expressly  so  provided  by  statute.'^'' 

All  seals,  except  for  corporations,  are  abolished/"  All  instru- 
ments heretofore  duly  executed  except  for  want  of  a  seal,  which 
was  required  at  time  of  execution,  shall  have  the  same  force  as 
if  sealed  at  time  of  execution/^  All  instruments  or  documents 
heretofore  made  in  good  faith  and  sealed  with  a  scroll,  are  hereby 
made  as  valid  as  if  seal  had  been  waxen  impression.'^ 

Neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  convey,  mortgage,  encumber, 
or  dispose  of  any  realty,  or  legal  or  equitable  interest  therein 
acquired  during  coverture  by  onerous  title,  unless  both  join  in 
the  execution  thereof/^  It  shall  not  be  necessary  for  husband  or 
wife  to  join  when  either  executes  a  power  of  attorney  for  him- 
self or  herself.'* 

No  separate  examination  of  married  woman  required,  and  she 
shall  be  described  in  the  acknowledgment  as  the  wife  of /'* 

No  sale  of  real  estate  made  under  a  mortgage  which  is  not 
executed  by  wife  of  debtor,  if  he  has  a  wife,  shall  affect  her  right 
fo  have  a  homestead  set  off/° 

§812.  New  York.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  New  York  before  a  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  anywhere  within  the  state;  or  within  the  district  where 
such  officer  is  authorized  to  act,  before  a  judge,  clerk,  deputy 
clerk,  or  special  deputy  clerk  of  a  court,  a  notary  public,  the 
mayor  or  recorder  of  a  city,  a  justice  of  the  peace,  surrogate, 
special  surrogate,  special  county  judge,  or  commissioner 
of  deeds."  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  the  following  offi- 
cers acting  within  their  jurisdiction,  or  the  court  to  which  they 
belong:  judges  of  Supreme,  circuit  court  of  appeals,  circuit  court, 
or  of  the  district  court  of  the  United  States;  judges  of  the  Su- 
preme, superior,  or  circuit  court  of  any  state,  mayors  of  cities; 
commissioners  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state ;  any  officer 
of  a  state  or  territory  authorized  by  its  laws  to  take  the  acknowl- 
edgment or  proof  of  deeds  to  be  recorded  therein;  any  officer  of 

G^Laws  1901,  ch.  62.  §  16.  ^4  Laws  1901,  ch.  62,  §  20. 

«oLavvs  1901,  ch.  62,  §  17.  t-- Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  3946. 

-oLaws  1901,  ch.  62.  §  11.  ^c  Comp.  Laws  1897,  §  1754. 

^1  Laws  1901,  ch.  62,  §  13.  "4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

"  Comp.  Laws   1897,   §   3933.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  298. 
"  Laws  1901,  ch.  62,  §  6. 


839  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    812 

the  District  of  Columbia  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  to  take  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  deeds  to  be  re- 
corded in  said  district.'^  Without  the  United  States  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  taken  before  an  ambassador,  minister  plenipoten- 
tiary, minister  extraordinary,  minister  resident,  or  charge  d'af- 
faires of  the  United  States  residing  in  and  accredited  to  the 
country;  consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  deputy  consul  gen- 
eral, consul,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul,  consular  or  vice  consular 
agent,  commercial  or  vice  commercial  agent  of  the  United  States 
residing  within  the  country,  or  a  secretary  of  legation  at  post, 
port,  place,  or  within  limits  of  legation;  a  commissioner  appointed 
for  the  purpose  by  the  governor  of  the  state  of  New  York  acting 
within  his  own  jurisdiction;  a  person  specially  authorized  by  a 
commission  issued  under  the  seal  of  the  Supreme  Court;  in  the 
Dominion  of  Canada,  also  before  any  judge  of  a  court  of  record, 
or  before  any  officer  of  a  province  or  territory  of  such  Dominion 
authorized  by  its  laws  to  take  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  of 
deeds  to  be  recorded  therein ;  in  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland  and  its  dominions,  also  before  the  mayor,  provost,  or 
other  chief  magistrate  of  a  city  or  town  therein,  under  his  hand 
and  the  seal  of  such  city  of  town;  in  the  Empire  of  Germany  also 
before  a  judge  of  a  court  of  record  under  the  seal  of  such  court, 
or  before  a  notary  public  under  the  seal  of  his  office  and  the  seal 
of  the  city  or  town  in  which  the  notary  resides.'^^  Acknowledg- 
ments in  Porto  Rico,  Philippine  Islands,  or  Cuba,  or  any_  other 
place  over  which  the  United  States  at  the  time  exercises  sover- 
eignty, control,  or  a  protectorate,  may  be  taken  by  the  following 
officers  acting  within  their  jurisdiction :  judge  or  clerk  of  a  court 
of  record;  mayor  or  other  chief  officer  of  a  city  acting  in  such 
city;  commissioner  appointed  for  the  purpose  by  governor  of 
this  state;  an  officer  of  the  United  States  regular  army  or  volun- 
teer service  of  rank  of  captain  or  higher,  or  of  United  States 
navy  of  rank  of  lieutenant  or  higher,  while  on  duty  at  place  where 
party  or  parties  are  or  reside.^"  When  a  certificate  of  acknowl- 
edgment or  proof  is  made  by  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
governor,  or  by  the  mayor  or  other  chief  magistrate  of  a  city  or 
town  without  the  United  States,  or  by  an  ambassador,  minister, 

''s  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.  Cons.         ^°  4    Birdsevc's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L..  §  299.         Laws  1909,  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  300. 

^■9  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.  Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot,  R.  P.  L.,  §  301. 


§    812  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  840 

charge  d'affaires,  consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  deputy  con- 
sul general,  consul,  vice  consul,  or  deputy  consul,  consular  or  vice 
consular  ageni.  commercial  or  vice  commercial  agent,  a  secretary 
of  legation,  of  the  United  States,  it  must  be  under  his  seal  of 
office,  or  the  seal  of  the  consulate  or  legation  to  which  he  is  at- 
tached. All  acknowledgments  or  proofs  of  deeds,  mortgages,  or 
other  instruments  relating  to  real  property,  the  certificates  of 
which  were  made  in  the  form  required  by  the  laws  of  this  state, 
by  a  consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  deputy  consul  general, 
consul,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul,  consular  agent,  vice  consular 
agent,  commercial  agent,  vice  commercial  agent,  or  a  secretary 
of  legation  of  the  United  States  prior  to  April  29,  1904,  are 
confirmed,  but  nothing  herein  contained  shall  aft'ect  any  action  or 
proceeding  now  pending  in  any  court,®^  Official  acts  of  notaries 
public  or  commissioner  of  deeds  within  the  state  of  New  York 
which  were  performed  since  January  1,  1885,  are  legalized,  not- 
withstanding certain  irregularities  and  omissions.®^ 

One  witness  is  necessary  to  prove  unacknowledged  convey- 
ance.*^ 

Certificate  of  acknowledgment  or  proof,  made  within  the  state, 
by  a  commissioner  of  deeds,  justice  of  the  peace,  or,  except  as 
otherwise  provided  by  law,  by  a  notary  public,  does  not  entitle 
the  conveyance  to  be  read  in  evidence  or  recorded,  except  within 
the  county  in  which  the  ofiicer  resides  at  the  time  of  making  such 
certificate,  unless  authenticated  by  a  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  the 
same  county;  provided,  however,  that  all  certificates  of  acknowl- 
edgment or  proof,  made  by  or  before  a  commissioner  of  deeds 
of  the  city  of  New  York  residing  in  any  part  therein,  shall  be 
authenticated  by  the  city  clerk  of  said  city,  that  the  said  commis- 
sioner of  deeds  was  duly  appointed  and  qualified  as  such,  and  no 
other  certificate  shall  be  required  from  any  other  officer  to  entitle 
said  conveyance  to  be  read  in  evidence  or  recorded  in  any  county 
or  part  of  a  county,  situated  within  the  limits,  confines,  or  boun- 
daries, of  the  city  of  New  York.  But  this  section  does  not  apply 
to  conveyance  executed  by  an  agent  for  the  Holland  Land  Com- 
pany, or  of  the  Pulteney  estate,  lawfully  authorized  to  convey 
real  property.**    In  the  following  cases  a  certificate  of  acknowl- 

"1 4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.  Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot..  R.  P.  L.,  §  308. 
^2  Laws  1910,  ch.  117. 

®3  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.  Cons. 


Laws 

1909  Annot.  R.  P.  L.,   §§  243 

304. 

fi  4 

Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons 

Laws 

1909  Annot,  R.  P.  L.,  §  310. 

I 


841  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    812 

edgment  or  proof  is  not  entitled  to  be  read  in  evidence  or  recorded 
unless  authenticated  by  the  following  officers  respectively:  (1) 
Where  original  certificate  is  made  by  commissioner  appointed  by 
the  governor,  by  the  secretary  of  state.  (2)  Where  made  by  a 
judge  of  court  of  record  in  Canada,  by  the  clerk  of  the  court.  (3) 
Where  made  by  an  officer  of  a  state  of  the  United  States,  or  of 
any  province  or  territory  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  authorized 
by  the  laws  thereof  to  take  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  deeds  to 
be  recorded  therein,  by  the  secretary  of  state  of  the  state,  the 
provincial  secretary,  deputy  provincial  secretary,  or  assistant 
provincial  secretary  of  the  province,  or  commissioner  of  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  or  the  clerk,  register,  recorder, 
or  prothonotary  of  the  county,  city,  or  parish  in  which  the  officer 
making  the  original  certificate  resided,  when  the  certificate  was 
made,  or  in  which  such  acknowledgment  or  proof  was  taken,  or 
by  the  clerk  of  any  court  in  or  of  that  county,  city,  or  parish, 
having  by  law  a  seal.  The  word  county  shall  be  deemed  to  apply 
to  and  include  the  District  of  Columbia  for  the  purpose  of  this 
section.  All  acknowledgments  or  proofs  of  deeds,  mortgages,  or 
other  instruments  relating  to  real  property  authenticated  prior  to 
April  16,  1908,  by  any  of  the  officers  above  referred  to  are  con- 
firmed, saving,  however,  the  rights  of  purchasers  in  good  faith 
and  for  a  valuable  consideration  whose  conveyance  shall  have 
been  duly  recorded  prior  to  said  date ;  this  subdivision  shall  not 
affect  any  action  or  legal  proceeding  pending  on  said  date.  (4) 
All  acts  of  the  secretary  of  state  of  any  state  or  territory  of  the 
United  States  in  authenticating  a  certificate  of  acknowledgment 
or  proof  of  a  conveyance  of  real  property  within  the  state,  per- 
formed before  October  1,  1896.  are  hereby  confirmed,  provided 
that  the  said  certificate  of  authentication  is  in  the  form  required 
by  the  laws  of  this  state.*^  An  officer  authenticating  a  certificate 
of  acknowledgment  or  proof  must  subjoin  or  attach  to  the  orig- 
inal certificate  a  certificate  under  his  hand,  and  if  he  has,  pursuant 
to  law,  an  official  seal,  under  such  seal.  Except  when  original 
certificate  is  made  by  judge  of  court  of  record  in  Canada,  such 
certificate  of  authentication  must  specify  that,  at  the  time  of  tak- 
ing the  acknowledgment  or  proof,  the  officer  taking  it  was  duly 
authorized  to  take  the  same ;  that  the  authenticating  officer  is  ac- 

S5  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons.     Laws  1909  Annot,  R.  P.  L.,  §  311. 


§    812  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  842 

quainted  with  the  former's  handwriting,  or  has  compared  the 
signature  to  the  original  certificate  with  that  deposited  in  his  office 
by  such  officer,  and  that  he  verily  believes  the  signature  to  the 
original  certificate  is  genuine;  and  if  the  original  certificate  is 
required  to  be  under  seal,  he  must  also  certify  that  he  has  com- 
pared the  impression  of  the  seal  affixed  thereto  with  the  impres- 
sion of  the  seal  of  the  officer  who  took  the  acknowledgment  or 
proof  deposited  in  his  office,  and  that  he  verily  believes  the  im- 
pression of  the  seal  upon  the  original  certificate  is  genuine.  A 
clerk's  certificate  authenticating  a  certificate  of  acknowledgment 
or  proof  taken  before  a  judge  of  a  court  of  record  in  Canada, 
must  specify  that  there  is  such  a  court;  that  the  judge  taking  the 
acknowledgment  or  proof  was,  when  it  was  taken,  a  judge 
thereof;  that  such  court  has  a  seal;  that  the  writer  authenticating 
is  clerk  thereof  ;that  he  is  well  acquainted  with  the  handwriting  of 
such  judge,  and  verily  believes  his  signature  is  genuine.*"  The  cer- 
tificate of  acknowledgment  taken  before  a  judge,  clerk,  mayor, 
chief  officer,  or  commissioner  in  Porto  Rico,  Philippine  Islands, 
Cuba,  or  any  place  controlled  by  the  United  States,  shall  have 
attached  thereto  the  seal  of  the  court  or  officer  if  he  have  a  seal, 
and  if  such  officer  have  no  seal,  then  a  statement  to  that  effect. 
If  taken  before  officer  of  army  or  navy,  he  shall  state  his  rank, 
the  name  of  the  city,  or  other  political  division  where  taken,  and 
the  fact  that  he  is  on  duty  there,  and  it  shall  be  authenticated  by 
the  secretary  of  war  or  secretary  of  the  navy,  as  the  case  may  be, 
of  the  United  States." 

Seal  required.  Private  seal  to  consist  of  wafer,  wax,  or  other 
similar  adhesive  substance,  or  of  paper  or  other  similar  substance 
affixed  thereto,  or  of  the  word  "seal,"  or  letters  "L.  S.,"  opposite 
the  signature.'''^ 

Husband  and  wife  may  convey  or  transfer  realty  directly,  the 
one  to  the  other,  without  the  intervention  of  a  third  person,*'' 

The  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  a  conveyance  of  realty, 
within  the  state,  or  any  other  written  instrument,  may  be  made 
by  a  married  woman  the  same  as  if  unmarried.'"'     A  married 

8"^  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons.  ^o  \    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  312.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  D.  R.  L..  §  56. 

^'^  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons.  ^04    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  300.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  302. 

^'^  2    Birdseve's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 
La-.vs  1909  A:inot.,  G.  C.  L.,  §  44. 


843  EXECUTION    AND   ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    813 

woman's  separate  property  is  not  subject  to  husband's  control  or 
disposal.''^  A  married  woman  has  all  the  rights  in  respect  to 
property,  and  the  acquisition,  use,  enjoyment,  and  disposition 
thereof,  as  if  she  were  unmarried.^- 

A  married  woman  of  full  age  may  release  her  inchoate  right  of 
dower  in  real  property  by  attorney  in  fact  in  any  case  where  she 
can  personally  release  the  same."^  A  jointure  may  bar  the  right 
of  dower  if  the  wife,  being  of  full  age,  evidences  her  assent  by 
becoming  a  party  to  the  conveyance  by  which  it  is  settled,  or  if 
she  be  a  minor,  by  her  joining  with  her  father  or  guardian  in 
that  conveyance."*  An  act,  deed,  or  conveyance,  executed  or  per- 
formed by  the  husband  without  the  assent  of  his  wife,  evidenced 
by  her  acknowledgment  thereof,  in  the  manner  required  by  law 
to  pass  the  contingent  right  of  dower  of  a  married  woman,  does 
not  prejudice  the  right  of  his  wife  to  her  dower  or  jointure,  or 
preclude  her  from  the  recovery  thereof."^  If  so  expressed  in  an 
instrument  making  partition  or  division  of  any  real  property  held 
by  husband  and  wife  as  tenants  in  common,  joint  tenants,  or 
tenants  by  the  entireties,  such  instrument  bars  the  wife's  right  to 
dower  in  such  property,  and  also,  if  so  expressed,  the  husband's 
tenancy  by  curtesy. ^'^ 

§  813.  North  Carolina. — The  execution  of  all  deeds  of  con- 
veyance may  be  proved  or  acknowledged  within  the  state  of 
North  Carolina  before  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court,  judges  of 
superior  court,  commissioners  of  affidavits  appointed  by  the  gov- 
ernor of  this  state,  clerk  of  Supreme  Court,  clerks  of  superior 
court,  deputy  clerks  of  superior  courts,  clerks  of  criminal  courts, 
notaries  public,  and  justices  of  the  peace. "^  Execution  of  instru- 
ments may  be  proved  or  acknowledged  before  any  one  of  the  fol- 
lowing officials  of  the  United  States,  of  the  District  of  Columbia, 
of  the  several  states  and  territories  of  the  United  States,  countries 
under  the  dominion  of  the  United  States,  and  of  foreign  coun- 
tries :  any  judge  or  clerk  of  a  court  of  record,  notary  public, 
mayor  or  chief  magistrate  of  an  incorporated  town  or  city,  am- 

91  1    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons.  ^^  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot,  D.  R.  L..  §  50.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  197. 

92 1    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons.  ^s  4    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot,  D.  R.  L.,  §  51.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  203. 

*^  4    Brdseye's    C    and    G.    Cons.  ^e  {    Birdseye's    C.    and    G.    Cons. 

Laws  1909  Annot.,  R.  P.  L.,  §  207.  Laws  1909  Annot.,  D.  R.  L.,  §  56. 

97 1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  989. 


§    813  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  844 

bassador,  minister,  consul,  vice  consul,  vice  consul  general,  or 
commercial  agent  of  the  United  States.  Execution  of  such  in- 
struments may  be  proved  or  acknowledged  before  any  justice  of 
the  peace  of  any  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States,  but  if 
taken  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  any  state  other  than  North 
Carolina,  or  of  any  territory  of  the  United  States,  his  certificate 
shall  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  some  court 
of  record  of  county  in  which  such  justice  of  the  peace  resides, 
under  hand  and  seal  of  said  clerk,  certifying  official  character  of 
justice  of  the  peace  and  the  genuineness  of  his  signature."^  No 
notary  public  shall  take  an  acknowledgment  or  private  examina- 
tion of  a  feme  covert  to  any  paper  in  which  he  is  interested  as 
attorney,  counsel,  or  otherwise. °^ 

Unacknowledged  deed  may  be  proved  by  one  or  more  sul> 
scribing  witnesses.^ 

Where  acknowledgment  is  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  any 
county  other  than  that  in  which  instrument  is  offered  for  regis- 
tration, his  certificate  of  acknowledgment  shall  be  accompanied 
by  a  certificate  of  clerk  of  superior  court  of  county  in  which  said 
justice  of  the  peace  resides,  certifying  official  character  and  gen- 
uineness of  signature  of  said  justice  of  the  peace.  Clerk's  cer- 
tificate shall  be  under  his  hand  and  official  seal.  By  an  amend- 
ment of  February  1,  1907,  certificates  of  justices  of  the  peace 
which  have  been  registered  prior  to  January  1,  1907,  in  county 
in  which  lands  lie,  without  the  proper  certificate  from  the  clerk 
of  superior  court  of  county  or  without  his  order  of  registration, 
are  validated,  provided  that  such  acknowledgment,  etc.,  shall  be 
valid  against  creditors  or  purchasers  from  donor  only  from  date 
of  ratification  of  this  act.^  Any  official  authorized  by  law  to  take 
acknowledgments  shall  use  his  official  seal,  and  if  he  have  none, 
he  shall  certify  under  his  hand.  If  instrument  is  proved  or  ac- 
knowledged before  clerk  or  deputy  clerk  of  the  superior  court  of 
the  county  in  which  the  instrument  is  to  be  registered,  the  official 
seal  shall  not  be  necessary.^  When  the  clerks  of  superior  court 
are  parties  to  or  are  interested  in  instruments,  they  may  be  ac- 
knowledged before  any  justice  of  the  peace  of  county  of  said 
clerk,  the  latter,  under  his  hand  and  official  seal,  certifying  to  the 

98  1  Revisal  of  1905.  §  990.  ^  i  Revisal  of  1905,  §  992. 

99  Act  March  11.  1907.  3i  Revisal  of  1905,  §  993. 
1  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §§  979,  996. 


845  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    814 

genuineness  thereof,  or  before  a  judge  of  the  superior  court  or 
justices  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  said  instrument  probated  and 
ordered  to  be  registered  by  such  judge  or  justice  as  provided  by 
law  for  probates  by  clerks  of  superior  court  in  other  cases.  By 
act  of  March  11,  1907,  when  acknowledgments  or  proofs  of  any 
conveyance  have  been  taken  before  a  clerk  of  superior  court, 
justice  of  the  peace,  or  notary  public,  who  was  at  that  time  a 
stockholder  or  officer  in  any  corporation,  bank,  or  other  institu- 
tion which  was  a  party  to  such  instrument,  certificates  of  such 
clerk  of  superior  court,  justice  of  the  peace,  or  notary  public,  shall 
be  held  valid,  and  are  so  declared.^  Where  proof  or  acknowledg- 
ment of  execution  of  an  instrument  is  taken  by  any  other  than 
the  clerk  or  deputy  clerk  of  the  superior  court  of  county  in  which 
instrument  is  offered  for  registration,  said  clerk  or  deputy  clerk 
shall  examine  certificates  of  proof  or  acknowledgment  and  if  in- 
strument appears  to  have  been  duly  acknowledged,  it  shall  be 
registered,  unless  clerk  is  a  party  to  or  interested  in  such  instru- 
ment.^ 

Seal  includes  impression  of  official  seal  made  upon  the  paper 
alone,  as  well  as  an  impression  made  by  means  of  a  wafer  or  of 
wax  affixed  thereto.^ 

Every  conveyance,  power  of  attorney,  or  other  instrument  af- 
fecting the  estate,  right,  or  title  of  any  married  woman  in  lands 
must  be  executed  by  such  married  woman  and  her  husband.^ 

Separate  examination  of  the  wife  is  required.^  Officials  au- 
tharized  by  law  to  take  proofs  and  acknowledgments  may  take 
the  private  examination  of  any  married  woman.''  A  wife  may 
alienate  her  right  of  dower  by  joining  with  her  husband  in  a 
deed,  and  having  private  examination.^**  A  mortgage  or  trust 
deed  by  husband  to  secure  the  purchase-money,  or  any  part 
thereof,  of  land  bought  by  him,  shall,  without  the  wife  executing 
the  deed,  be  effectual  to  bar  dower." 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  convey  homestead,  and  she 
must  have  private  examination. ^- 

§  814.  North  Dakota. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  North  Dakota,  at  any  place,  before  a  justice 

4  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  995.  »  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  955. 

^  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  999.  lo  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  3086. 

M  Revisal  of  1905,  §  2831,   (8).  n  1  Revisal  of  1905,  §  3085. 

n  Revisal  of  1905.  §  952.  12 Const,  art.  10,  §8. 
«1  Revisal  of  1905,  §§  952,  954. 


§    814  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  846 

or  clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  a  notary  public;  within  the 
judicial  district,  county,  subdivision,  or  city,  for  which  the  officer 
was  elected  or  appointed,  before  a  judge  or  clerk  of  court  of 
record,  mayor  of  a  city,  register  of  deeds,  justice  of  the  peace. 
United  States  circuit  or  district  court  commissioner,  or  county 
auditor."  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  made  before  a  justice,  judge,  or  clerk 
of  any  court  of  record  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  state  or 
territory;  a  notary  public,  or  any  other  officer  of  the  state  or 
territory  where  the  acknowledgment  is  made,  authorized  by  its 
laws  to  take  acknowledgments  or  proofs;  or  a  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  of  this  state  for  the  purpose.  These 
officers  to  act  within  their  several  jurisdictions.^*  Without  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  either  a 
minister,  commissioner,  or  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States, 
resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  the  proof  or  ac- 
knowledgment is  made;  a  secretary  of  legation,  consul,  vice  con- 
sul, or  consular  agent  of  the  United  States,  resident  in  the  country 
where  the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  made;  a  judge,  clerk,  reg- 
ister, or  commissioner  of  a  court  of  record  of  the  country  where 
the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  made ;  or  a  notary  pubHc  of  such 
country,  or  an  officer  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  country  where 
the  proof  or  acknowledgment  is  taken  to  take  proof  or  acknowl- 
edgment. When  any  of  these  officers  are  authorized  to  appoint 
a  deputy,  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  may  be  taken  by  such 
deputy  in  the  name  of  his  principal. ^^  By  act  of  March  15,  1909, 
acts  of  all  notaries  public  or  other  officers,  done  in  good  faith  in 
taking  or  certifying  to  acknowledgments  of  instruments  made 
prior  to  January  1,  1909,  whether  such  officers  were  qualified  or 
authorized  by  law  at  the  time  to  do  so  or  not,  are  hereby  declared 
legal  and  valid  for  all  purposes. 

If  unacknowledged,  one  subscribing  witness  may  prove  deed.^" 
Officers  taking  and  certifying  acknowledgments  or  proof  of 
instruments  for  record  must  authenticate  their  certificates  by 
affixing  thereto  their  signatures,  followed  by  the  names  of  their 
officers;  also  their  seals  of  office,  if  by  the  laws  of  the  state,  ter- 
ritory, or  county  where  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  is  taken, 
or  by  authority  of  which  they  are  acting,  they  are  required  to 

"Rev.  Codes  1905,  §§  5011,  5012.  "Rev.  Codes  1905,  §  5014. 

"  Rev.  Codes  1905,  §  5013.  ic  Rev.  Codes  1905,  §  4973. 


847  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    815 

have  official  seals.  Judges  and  clerks  of  courts  of  record  must 
authenticate  their  certificates  as  aforesaid,  by  affixing  thereto  the 
seal  of  their  proper  court,  and  mayors  of  cities  by  the  seal  thereof. 
Notaries  public  must  write  or  stamp  the  date  of  expiration  of 
their  commissions  after  their  signatures.  The  certificate  of  a 
justice  of  the  peace,  when  used  out  of  the  county  where  he  re- 
sides, must  be  authenticated  by  the  certificate  under  the  hand  and 
seal  of  the  clerk  of  the  district  court,  or  of  any  other  county 
court  of  record  in  his  county,  attesting  official  character  of  justice 
and  genuineness  of  signature."  Judgments  affecting  the  title  to 
or  the  possession  of  real  property,  authenticated  by  the  certificate 
of  the  clerk  of  court  in  which  such  judgments  were  rendered, 
may  be  recorded  without  acknowledgment  or  further  proof. ^^ 

A  private  seal  is  not  required. ^° 

Either-  husband  or  wife  may  enter  into  any  engagement  or 
transaction  with  the  other,  or  with  any  other  person,  respecting 
property,  which  either  might  if  unmarried.^"  Conveyance  of  a 
married  woman  has  same  effect  as  though  she  were  unmarried, 
and  she  acknowledges  in  same  manner."^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  convey  or  encumber  the  home- 
stead. Wife  acknowledges  as  if  she  were  sole.*"  By  Act  of 
March  6,  1905,  in  all  cases  where  a  husband  has  heretofore  con- 
veyed homestead  by  deed  duly  signed  and  acknowledged,  but  not 
signed  by  wife,  and  she  has  either  before  or  afterwards  conveyed 
same  by  deed  duly  signed  and  acknowledged,  but  not  signed  by 
her  husband,  to  husband's  grantee  or  a  subsequent  grantee  from 
him,  the  conveyance  by  such  separate  deeds  shall  be  valid  and 
effectual  to  pass  title. 

§  815.  Ohio. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within  the 
state  of  Ohio  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of  court  of  record,  county  au- 
ditor, county  surveyor,  notary  public,  mayor,  or  justice  of  the 
peace.  The  certificate  of  acknowledgment  must  be  on  the  same 
sheet  on  which  the  instrument  is  written  or  printed.^^  Without 
the  state  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  a  commissioner 
appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state  for  that  purpose,  a  consul, 
consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  commercial  agent,  consular 

"Rev.    Codes    1905,    §§   548,    5028,  20  Rev.  Codes  1905,  §  4079. 

5029.  21  Rev.  Codes  1905.  §  5016. 

18  Laws  1905,  ch.  159,  §  2.  22  Rev.  Codes  1905.  §§  5016,  5052. 

19  Rev.  Codes  1905,  §§  4973,  5338.  232  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8510. 


§    816  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  848 

agent,  deputy  consul  general,  vice  consul,  deputy  consul  of  the 
United  States,  resident  in  any  foreign  country.  All  conveyances 
executed,  acknowledged,  or  proved  in  any  other  state,  territory, 
or  country,  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  that  state,  territory, 
or  district  shall  be  as  valid  as  if  executed  in  this  state."*  The 
authority  of  a  person  taking  an  acknowledgment  is  not  confined 
to  his  territorial  jurisdiction.  A  federal  judge  may  take  an 
acknowdedgment  anywhere  within  the  United  States,  and  a  judge 
of  common  pleas  court  may  take  acknowledgments  without  his 
district.-'' 

Deeds  must  be  signed  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses.^" 
A  private  seal  is  not  required  except  for  a  corporation.^'^ 
A  married  person  may  take,  hold,  and  dispose  of  property,  real 
or  personal,  the  same  as  if  unmarried. ^^    No  separate  examina- 
tion of  a  married  woman  is  required."'* 

Curtesy  does  not  exist,  but  the  husband  receives  one-third  of 
his  deceased  wife's  property  for  a  life  estate.^" 

Wife  must  execute  deed  in  order  to  bar  homestead  rights.^^ 

§  816.  Oklahoma. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
W'ithin  the  state  of  Oklahoma  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  of  county 
w^here  land  is  situated,  or  any  notary  public,  county  clerk,  clerk 
of  district  court,  or  county  judge."  Without  the  state  and  within 
the  United  States  they  may  be  taken  before  any  notary  public, 
clerk  of  court  of  record,  commissioner  of  deeds  duly  appointed 
by  the  governor  of  the  state  for  the  county,  state,  or  territory 
where  same  is  taken. ^^  Without  the  United  States  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  made  before  any  court  of  record  or  clerk  thereof, 
or  before  any  United  States  consul.^*  Every  acknowledgment, 
except  when  taken  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  must  be  under  seal 
of  officer  taking  same.^^  Where  heretofore  any  county  judge, 
register  of  deeds.  United  States  commissioner  or  United  States 
court  commissioner  has  taken  acknowledgments  of  conveyances 
of  realty  in  their  respective  counties,  the  same  are  hereby  vali- 
dated.'" 

2*2  Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  8515.  8'516.        203  Gen.  Code  1910,  §§  8606,  8614. 
25  1    Ohio    1;    (14);    11    Ohio    475,        •''^3  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  11739. 

(480).  "2Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1222. 

2«  2  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8510.  ^^  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1222. 

27  1  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  32.  s*  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1222. 

28  2  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8001.  ss  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1222. 

29  2  Gen.  Code  1910,  §  8511.  sc  Act  approved  March  16,  1903. 


849  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    817 

No  subscribing  witness  is  required.'^' 

No  authentication  of  authority  of  officer  is  required  other  than 
his  official  seal.  Private  seals  are  not  required  except  for  cor- 
porations.^^ 

Husband  or  wife  may  convey  or  encumber  real  estate  belong- 
ing to  him  or  her,  except  the  homestead,  without  the  other  join- 
ing.^'' Married  women  retain  the  same  legal  existence  and  legal 
personality  after  marriage  as  before  marriage.  No  separate  ac- 
knowledgment required.*" 

No-  deed,  mortgage,  or  contract,  relating  to  exempted  home- 
stead, except  lease  for  no  longer  than  a  year,  shall  be  valid  unless 
signed  by  both  husband  and  wife  where  they  are  not  divorced." 
Where  homestead  title  is.  in  husband,  and  wife  voluntarily  aban- 
dons him  for  one  year  or  takes  up  her  residence  out  of  the  state, 
he  may  convey,  mortgage,  or  contract  relating  thereto  without 
being  joined  by  her;  likewise  wife  under  same  circumstances  may 
convey  alone. ^" 

§  817.  Oregon. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within 
the  state  of  Oregon  by  any  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  county 
judge,  justice  of  the  peace,  or  notary  public.*^  Without  the  state 
and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  ac- 
cording to  laws  of  such  state  or  of  Oregon  before  any  judge  of 
court  of  record,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public,  or  other 
officer  authorized  by  the  laws  of  such  state,  territory,  or  district, 
or  commissioner  of  deeds  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state 
for  that  purpose.**  Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments 
may  be  taken  by  a  notary  public  therein,  minister  plenipoten- 
tiary, minister  extraordinary,  minister  resident,  charge  d'affaires, 
commissioner,  consul,  vice  consul,  or  consul  general  of  the  United 
States  appointed  to  reside  therein  and  acknowledgment  shall  be 
certified  by  jfficer  taking  same,  under  his  hand,  and  if  taken 
before  a  notary  public,  his  seal  of  office  shall  be  affixed  to  such 
certificate.  Executions  may  be  made  according  to  the  laws  of 
Oregon  or  laws  of  such  foreign  country,  and  it  shall  not  be  neces- 
sary to  state  in  such  certificate  that  the  deed  or  instrument  is  exe- 

"Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1185.  43  2   Annot    Codes   and   Stat.    1901, 

3s  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §§  1093,  1094.     §  5342. 

°9Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  1193.  ^^2   Annot.   Codes   and   Stat.    1901, 

40  Comp.  Laws  1909,  §  3655.  §    5343,    as    amended    by    Gen.    Laws 

41  Comp.   Laws   1909,   §    1187.  1907,  ch.  169. 
4"  Comp.  Laws   1909,   §   1189. 

54 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    817  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  850 

cuted  according  to  the  laws  of  such  country/^  Deeds  affecting 
realty  heretofore  executed  anywhere  which  have  been  signed  by 
the  grantor,  shall  be- effective  according  to  the  terms  of  such  in- 
strument without  sealing  or  other  execution,  acknowledgment  or 
witnesses  thereto  whatever,  and  all  such  instruments  which  shall 
have  been  acknowledged  or  attempted  in  good  faith  to  be  ac- 
knowledged before  an  officer  having  a  seal  or  an  officer  without  a 
seal,  whose  official  character  shall  be  proved  by  certificate  of  clerk 
of  court  of  record  in  such  state,  shall  be  entitled  to  record/" 

Two  subscribing  witnesses  are  required  for  deeds  within  the 
state." 

When  acknowledgments  are-  taken  outside  of  this  state  and 
within  the  United  States,  unless  taken  by  a  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor  of  this  state  for  such  purposes,  or  before 
a  notary  public  certified  under  his  notarial  seal,  or  before  a  clerk 
of  a  court  of  record,  certified  under  the  seal  of  the  court,  such 
deed  shall  have- attached  thereto  a  certificate  of  the  clerk  or  other 
proper  certifying  officer  of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or 
district  within  which  the  acknowledgment  w'as  taken,  under  his 
seal  of  office,  that  the  person  whose  name  is  subscribed  to  the 
certificate  of  acknowledgment,  was  at  the  date  thereof  such  officer 
as  therein  represented  to  be,  and  that  he  believes  the  signature  of 
such  person  to  be  genuine,  and  that  the  deed  is  executed  and 
acknowledged  according  to  the  laws  of  such  state,  territory,  or 
district.^^ 

Public  seal  is  stamp  or  impression  made  upon  wax,  wafer, 
paper,  or  any  other  like  substance  upon  which  a  visible  and  per- 
manent impression  may  be  made.  A  private  seal  may  be  made  in 
the  same  manner,  or  without  an  impression  by  wafer  or  wax  at- 
tached to  instrument,  or  by  paper  attached  to  it  by  an  adhesive 
substance,  or  by  a  scroll  or  other  sign  made  with  a  pen  or  printed 
upon  the  paper,  and  any  printed  seal  or  scroll  on  instrument  at 
time  of  signing  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  adopted  by  person 
signing  his  name  before  it.  A  scroll  or  other  sign  made  else- 
where in  the  United  States,  or  in  a  foreign  country,  and  there 
recognized  as  a  seal,  shall.be  so  regarded  in  this  state,  and  any 
unsealed  instrument  valid  in  state  where  executed  shall  be  valid 

«2  Annot.   Codes   and   Stat.   1901,  ^7  2  Annot.   Codes  and   Stat.   1901, 

§  5345.  as  amended  by  act  approved  §  5342. 

February  25,  1907.  *»2  Annot.   Codes   and   Stat.    1901, 

46  Gen.  Laws  1907,  ch.  174.  §  5344. 


851  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    817 

in  this  state."  There  is  no  difference  between  sealed  and  unsealed 
writings,  except  as  to  the  time  of  commencing  actions  or  suits 
thereon.^** 

Husband  and  wife  may  convey  her  real  estate  by  joint  deed,  as 
she  might  do  by  separate  deed  if  unmarried,  but  any  covenant 
in  such  deed  shall  not  bind  her.^^  All  acknowledgments  of  mar- 
ried women  to  conveyances  of  realty  in  this  state  shall  be  taken 
in  the  same  manner  as  if  sole.^"  When  nonresident  wife  joins 
with  husband  to  convey  realty  situated  in  this  state,  conveyance 
has  same  effect  as  if  she  were  sole,  and  her  acknowledgment  or 
proof  may  be  as  if  sole.^^ 

A  married  woman  may  bar  dower  in  estate  conveyed  by  hus- 
band, or  his  guardian  if  he  be  a  minor,  by  joining  in  the  deed  of 
conveyance  thereto  with,  or  by  executing  a  deed  separately  from, 
her  husband  or  such  guardian,  with  or  without  mentioning  the 
barring  of  dower  therein;  provided,  that  such  separate  deed,  if 
barring  an  inchoate  right  of  dower,  shall  not  be  executed  to  a 
stranger  to  the  title,  but  shall  be  executed  to  the  grantee  of  said 
husband  or  to  such  grantee's  heirs  or  assigns.^*  A  woman  may 
also  be  barred  of  her  dower  in  husband's  lands  by  a  jointure 
settled  on  her  with  her  assent  before  marriage. ^^  Dower  and 
curtesy  consist  of  one-half  of  lands  of  decedent,  and  estates  by 
curtesy  may  be  barred  as  dower  is  barred,  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
all  other  laws  of  the  state  applicable  to  dower  shall  be  applicable 
to  estates  by  curtesy.^"  A  husband  or  wife  may  constitute  the 
other  his  or  her  attorney  in  fact  to  control,  sell  and  convey,  mort- 
gage, or  bar  dower  or  curtesy  in  his  or  her  property  for  their 
mutual  benefit,  and  may  revoke  the  same  to  the  same  extent  and 
manner  as  other  persons."  Conveyances  heretofore  executed  in 
this  state,  or  elsewhere  in  the  United  States  or  in  foreign  coun- 
tries, whether  sealed  or  not,  by  a  married  woman,  which  shall 
have  been  signed  by  her,  shall  be  sufficient  in  law  to  convey  her 

49  1  Codes  and  Stat.  1901.  §  764.  as  §    5527.   as    amended   by   Gen.   Laws 
amended  by  Gen.  Laws  1907,  ch.  173.  1907,  ch.  170. 

50  1   Annot.   Codes  and   Stat.   1901,        ■'■■5  2  Annot.   Codes  and   Stat.   1901, 
§  765.  §  5528. 

•-'12  Annot.  Codes  and   Stat.   1901,        ■""'2   Annot.   Codes  and   Stat.   1901, 
§  5334.  §    5515,    as    amended    by    Gen.    Laws 

■"2   Annot.  Codes   and   Stat.    1901,     1907,  ch.  87. 
§  5346.  •'■■"2   Annot.   Codes   and   Stat.   1901, 

53  2   Annot.  Codes   and   Stat.   1901,     §    5237,    as    amended   by   Gen.    Laws 
§  5348.  1907,  ch.  170. 

5^2  Annot.  Codes   and   Stat.   1901, 


§    818  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  852 

legal  title  to  premises  described  therein  to  grantee  named  therein, 
as  well  as  to  bar  her  dower  therein,  without  any  other  execution 
or  witness  thereto;  provided,  the  same  shall  have  been  properly 
acknowledged;  and  also  provided,  her  husband  shall  have  exe- 
cuted a  deed  to  said  real  property,  and  such  deed  or  conveyance 
shall  suffice  to  convey  her  title  or  bar  dower  therein,  even  if  exe- 
cuted without  her  husband  joining  therein,  and  shall  suffice  to 
bar  dower  even,  if  barring  of  dower  is  not  mentioned  therein. 
This  shall  not  apply  to  a  barring  or  relinquishment  of  an  inchoate 
right  to  a  stranger  to  the  title  by  deed  or  conveyance  separate 
from  her  husband,  but  to  grantee  of  her  husband,  or  such  gran- 
tee's heirs  or  assigns.^**  Conveyances  of  or  mortgages  upon  real 
property,  heretofore  executed  under  power  of  attorney  from  wife 
to  her  husband  or  any  other  person,  which  power  of  attorney 
shall  have  authorized  the  attorney  in  fact  named  therein  to  con- 
vey or  mortgage  realty,  and  shall  not  have  limited  same  to  said 
wife's  realty,  shall  suffice  to  bar  wife's  dower  in  said  realty,  not- 
withstanding fact  that  dower  was  not  mentioned  in  such  power  of 
attorney.^^ 

§  818.  Pennsylvania. — Acknowledgments  may  be  made 
within  the  state  of  Pennsylvania  by  judges  of  Supreme  Court; 
justices  of  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  county  where  lands  lie; 
presidents  of  common  pleas  for  lands  in  any  part  of  the  state ; 
assistant  or  associate  judges  of  courts  of  common  pleas  of  any 
county  within  this  state;  notary  public  for  lands  in  any  part  of 
this  state;  mayor  and  recorder  of  city  of  Philadelphia  in  any  part 
of  the  commonwealth ;  justices  of  the  pe'ace  of  this  common- 
wealth, acting  within  his  county;  aldermen  of  city  of  Philadel- 
phia; justices  of  the  peace  of  this  commonwealth  for  lands  in 
any  part  of  this  state;  recorders  of  deeds  for  lands  in  county  for 
which  they  were  appointed;  mayor  of  the  Northern  Liberties; 
mayor,  recorder,  and  alderman  of  Pittsburgh ;  mayor  and  alder- 
men of  Allegheny;  mayor,  recorder,  and  aldermen  of  Carbon- 
dale;  mayor,  recorder,  and  aldermen  of  Scranton;  mayor  and 
recorder  of  Williamsport;  and  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  Lock 
Haven.*'''  Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  taken  by  an  officer  or  magistrate  of  state, 

58  Gen.  Laws  1907,  ch.  170,  §  3.  1157,  §§  44-49.  notes  thereto,  p.  1158, 

50  Gen.  Laws  1907,  ch.  170,  §  4.  §  56,  p.  1164,  §  86. 

60  1   Purdon's   Dig.   1903,   pp.   1156, 


f 


i 


853  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    818 

territory,  or  District  of  Columbia,  wherein  such  deed  is  executed, 
authorized  by  laws  of  that  state,  territory,  or  District  of  Colum- 
bia, to  take  acknowledgments;  before  one  of  the  judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States;  judge  of  United  States 
district  court;  judge  or  justice  of  Supreme  or  superior  court  or 
courts  of  common  pleas  of  any  state  or  territory  within  the 
United  States;  judge  or  justice  of  a  court  of  probate,  or  judge 
of  any  court  of  record;  notary  public  according  to  laws 
of  this  state,  duly  certified  under  his  seal  of  office; 
person  holding  rank  of  major  or  higher  rank  in  mili- 
tary service  of  the  United  States  commissioned  by  gov- 
ernor, for  persons  actually  in  such  service ;  or  commissioners  of 
deeds  appointed  by  the  governor."  Without  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  ambassadors,  ministers  pleni- 
potentiary, charge  d'affaires,  or  other  persons  exercising  public 
ministerial  functions,  appointed  by  the  United  States;  consul  or 
vice  consul  of  United  States  appointed  for  and  exercising  consu- 
lar functions  in  state,  kingdom,  country,  or  place  where  convey- 
ance was  executed  and  certified  under  his  official  seal;  deputy 
consul,  commercial  agents,  vice  and  deputy  commercial  agents,  or 
consular  agents  of  United  States  appointed  for  and  exercising 
functions  of  office  at  place  where  acknowledgment  is  taken  and 
certified  under  their  official  seals ;  notary  public  according  to  laws 
of  this  state,  certified  under  his  seal  of  office;  person  holding 
rank  of  major  or  higher  for  any  person  actually  in  military  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States ;  commissioner  in  chancery  according  to 
laws  of  this  state  and  certified  under  his  seal  of  office;  or  com- 
missioner of  deeds  appointed  by  governor  of  this  state.^^  Ac- 
knowledgments may  be  made  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  Philippine 
Islands,  or  other  possessions  of  the  United  States  before  any 
person  holding  the  rank  of  major  or  any  higher  rank  in  the  mili- 
tary service  of  the  United  States,  whether  in  regular  or  volun- 
teer service,  or  before  any  civil  officer  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States. ^^  Commissioners  appointed  by  courts  of  this  common- 
wealth, in  cities  of  the  first  class,  shall  have  full  power  and  au- 

•■•11    Purdon's  Dig.    1903,    p.    1153,  §  31,  p.  1154,   §  32,  p.  1157,  §  51,  p. 

§  30,  p.  1155,  §  36,  p.  1157,  §  50,  p.  1158,  §§  53,  54,  p.  1159,  §  61,  p.  1161, 

1158,   §§  53,  54,  57,  p.  1159,  §  58,  p.  §  71. 

1160.  §  63.  '■■••^  1    Purdon's    Dig.    1903,    p.    1159, 

02  1    Purdon's  Dig.    1903,    p.    1153,  §62. 


§  818 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


854 


thority  to  take  acknowledgments  of  deeds  and  all  other  instru- 
ments to  be  recorded  within  the  commonwealth.''' 

One  witness  is  sufficient  to  prove  deed.*^^  Only  one  witness  is 
necessary  when  acknowledged  out  of  state."^  Two  subscribing 
witnesses  necessary  for  execution.''^ 

Judges  of  United  States  Supreme  Court,  judges  of  United 
States  district  courts,  judges  or  justices  of  Supreme  or  superior 
court  or  courts  of  common  pleas  of  any  state  or  territory  within 
the  United  States,  or  judge  or  justices  of  any  court  of  probate, 
or  court  of  record,  shall  certify  acknowledgments  w^hich  they 
make  under  their  hands  and  the  seals  of  their  respective  courts 
or  by  clerk's  certificate,  under  seal  of  court,  of  judge's  official 
character.*'^  Officers  or  magistrates  of  other  states  taking  ac- 
knowledgments shall  prove  their  authority  by  a  certificate  of  the 
clerk  or  prothonotary  of  any  court  of  record  in  such  state.*^" 
Commissioners  appointed  by  courts  of  this  commonwealth  in 
cities  of  the  first  class  shall  use  a  seal  of  office/"  Commissioners 
in  chancery  in  foreign  countries  shall  certify  under  their  seals 
of  office."^  The  proof  of  official  character  of  military  or  civil 
officer  taking  acknowledgments  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  Philippines, 
or  any  possession  of  the  United  States  shall  be  his  official  seal, 
if  he  have  one ;  if  not,  a  certificate  under  seal  of  any  officer  of  the 
United  States  who  has  an  official  seal,  in  any  of  said  places." 
Seal  of  officer  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  acknowledgment.'^^ 

Husband  and  wife  may  join  to  mortgage  or  convey  her  real 
property.^^  Conveyances  executed  by  non-resident  husband  and 
wife  and  brought  hither  to  be  recorded  where  lands  lie,  shall  have 
been  acknowledged  before  any  mayor,  chief  magistrate,  or  offi- 
cer of  cities,  towns,  or  places  where  such  conveyances  w^ere  exe- 
cuted, and  certified  under  the  common  or  public  seal  of  such 
cities,  towns,  or  places."    Acknowledgments  by  married  woman 


G4  1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1159, 
§  59. 

05 1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1150 
(w). 

<5ci  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1151 
(e). 

"1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1168, 
§  101. 

«8  1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1153, 
§  30  (w).  p.  1155.  §  35. 

f'M  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p.  1157, 
§  50. 


Toi  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  59. 

•1  1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  61. 

'M  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  62. 

■3  1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  34. 

'M  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  24   (1). 

'•"'  1  Purdon's  Dig.  1903,  p 
§  25. 


1159, 
1159, 
1160, 
1154, 
1151, 
1152. 


855  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    819 

may  be  taken  by  any  judge,  justice  of  the  peace,  notary  public, 
or  other  officer  authorized  to  take  acknowledgments,  in  same 
manner  as  if  she  were  feme  sole.'*' 

Dower  is  barred  by  a  conveyance  in  which  the  wife  joins/^ 

§  819.  Rhode  Island. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Rhode  Island  by  a  state  senator,  judge,  justice 
of  the  peace,  mayor,  notary  public,  town  clerk,  or  recorder  of 
deeds,  acting  within  their  several  jurisdictions. ''*  Without  the 
state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
made  before  a  judge,  or  justice  of  a  court  of  record  or  other 
court,  justice  of  the  peace,  mayor,  or  notary  public  in  the  state, 
territory,  or  district  where  the  deed  is  acknowledged,  or  before  a 
Rhode  Island  commissioner  within  their  respective  jurisdictions. 
Instrument  may  be  acknowledged  according  to  laws  of  such  state, 
territory,  or  district."  Without  the  United  States  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  made  before  any  ambassador,  minister,  charge 
d'affaires,  consul  general,  vice  consul  general,  consul,  vice  consul, 
consular  agent,  or  commercial  agent  of  the  United  States,  or  be- 
fore any  qualified  Rhode  Island  commissioner,  all  within  their 
respective  jurisdictions. *'°  Acknowledgments  may  be  made  within 
or  without  state  by  person  actually  engaged  in  military  or  naval 
service  of  the  United  States,  before  any  colonel,  lieutenant- 
colonel,  or  major  in  the  army,  or  before  any  officer  in  the  navy 
not  below  the  grade  and  rank  of  lieutenant-commander.^^ 

Any  instrument  executed  without  the  United  States  by  any  offi- 
cer legally  authorized  to  take  acknowledgments  (see  above)  as 
grantor,  may  be  executed  in  presence  of  two  witnesses  and  certi- 
fied under  the  hand  and  official  seal  of  grantor.''" 

A  private  seal  is  not  required.^^ 

A  married  woman  controls  her  separate  property.^*  A  married 
woman  may  convey  any  estate  or  interest  in  any  real  property  as 
if  she  were  unmarried.'*'^  She  acknowledges  as  if  unmarried.***"' 
A  married  woman  may  bar  her  right  of  dower  by  joining  with 


"'"'  1    Purdon's 

Dig. 

1903, 

P- 

1153, 

^0  Gen. 

Laws    1909, 

pp.    876,    877, 

§  26. 

§§  8  (3), 

9. 

''■"  1    Purdon's 

Dig. 

190o, 

P- 

1276 

«i  Gen. 

Laws  1909,  p. 

876,  §  8  (4). 

(h),   2   Purdon's 

Dig. 

1903 

.  P- 

1996, 

^-  Gen. 

Laws  1909,  p. 

877,  §  10. 

4,  III. 

^^  Gen. 

Laws   1909,  p 

.  875,   §  4;  p. 

"^^  Gen.    Laws 

1909, 

pp. 

876, 

877, 

877,  §  12. 

§§  8  (1)   and  9. 

s*  Gen. 

Laws  1909,  p. 

854,  §  1. 

"■'  Gen.    Laws 

1909, 

pp. 

876, 

877, 

^^  Gen. 

Laws  1909,  p. 

855,  §  4. 

§§  8  (2)  and  9. 

8s  Gen. 

Laws  1909,  p. 

855,  §  5. 

§    820  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  856 

husband  in  his  conveyance  and  therein  releasing  her  claim  to 
dower,  or  by  separate  deed,  acknowledged  as  if  she  were  sole." 

§  820.  South  Carolina. — Deeds  in  South  Carolina  must  be 
proved  by  the  afhdavit,  in  writing,  of  a  subscribing  witness  to 
such  instrument,  taken  before  some  officer,  within  the  state,  com- 
petent to  administer  an  oath.'''*  Without  the  state  affidavits  may 
be  taken  before  commissioner  or  commissioners  appointed  by 
dedimus  issued  by  clerk  of  court  of  common  pleas  of  county  in 
which  the  instrument  is  to  be  recorded;  before  commissioner  of 
deeds  of  this  state,  clerk  of  court  of  record  certified  under  his 
official  seal;  justice  of  the  peace,  who  must  append  to  certificate 
his  official  seal ;  a  notary  public,  w'ho  shall  affix  thereto  his  offi- 
cial seal  wnthin  state  of  his  appointment,  which  seal  shall  be  a 
sufficient  authentication  of  his  or  her  signature,  residence,  and 
official  character;  or  before  a  minister,  ambassador,  consul  gen- 
eral, consul,  vice  consul,  or  consular  agent,  of  the  United  States  of 
America.**^  Where  the  affidavit  of  a  subscribing  witness  can  not  be 
had  by  reason  of  the  death,  insanity,  or  absence  from  the  state  of 
such  witness  then  the  instrument  may  be  recorded  upon  proof  of 
such  fact,  and  of  the  handwriting  of  the  parties  who  signed  the 
instrument,  and  of  the  subscribing  witnesses  by  proper  affidavit 
— the  proof  in  every  case  to  be  recorded  with  instrument."" 

Two  or  more  credible  witnesses  are  necessary. °^ 

If  attestation  clause  shows  that  parties  intended  to  seal  instru- 
ment, it  shall  be  regarded  as  sealed.®^ 

The  real  and  personal  property  of  a  woman  held  at  the  time  of 
her  marriage  or  that  which  she  may  thereafter  acquire,  whether 
by  gift,  grant,  inheritance,  devise,  or  otherwise,  shall  be  her  sep- 
arate property,  and  she  shall  have  all  the  rights  incident  to  the 
same  to  which  an  unmarried  woman  or  man  is  entitled. °^ 

When  any  feme  covert  shall  relinquish  her  right  of  dower  in 
any  real  estate  and  acknowledge  the  same  in  writing,  if  she  be 
within  this  state  in  open  court,  or  before  any  judge  of  the  court 
of  common  pleas,  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  judge  of  pro- 
bate, clerk  of  the  court  of  common  pleas,  or  master,  magistrate, 

"  Gen.  Laws  1909,  p.  855,  §  6.  o"  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  948. 

8s  Civ.  Code  1902,   §  948.  ''i  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  2367. 

«3  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  948,  as  amend-  "2  civ.  Code  1902,  §  2367. 

ed   by   Acts   February  24,   1908,   and  »3  Const,  art.  17,  §  9. 
March  1,  1909. 


857  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    821 

or  notary  public;  or,  if  she  be  without  this  state,  before  a  com- 
missioner of  deeds  of  this  state,  of  before  a  commissioner  duly 
appointed  by  dedimus,  or  before  any  consul,  vice  consul,  deputy 
consul,  consular  agent,  commercial  agent  of  the  United  States, 
or  any  other  officer  appointed  by  the  United  States  in  foreign 
countries  with  the  power  to  administer  oaths  and  having  an  offi- 
cial seal,  or  clerk  of  a  court  of  record,  or  before  a  notary  public, 
who  must  append  to  the  certificate  the  official  seal  used  by  him, 
and  such  acknowledgment  shall  be  recorded,  the  same  shall  be 
effectual  in  law  to  convey  and  pass  away  the  right  of  such  feme 
covert,  although  she  has  not  executed  or  acknowledged  any  deed 
of  conveyance  for  that  purpose."*  The  wife  of  any  grantor  con- 
veying real  estate  by  deed  of  release,  may,  whether  she  be  of 
lawful  age  or  a  minor,  release,  renounce,  and  bar  herself  of  her 
dower  in  all  the  premises  so  conveyed,  by  acknowledging  (as 
above),  upon  a  private  and  separate  examination,  that  she  did 
freely  and  voluntarily,  without  any  compulsion,  dread,  or  fear 
of  any  person  whomsoever,  renounce  and  release  her  dower  to 
the  grantee,  and  his  heirs  and  assigns,  in  the  premises  mentioned 
in  such  deed;  such  renunciation  to  be  recorded  within  forty 
days."^  A  certificate,  under  the  hand  of  the  woman  and  the 
hand  and  seal  of  officer,  shall  be  endorsed  upon  such  release.'"^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  both  execute  conveyance  in  order  to 
waive  homestead."^ 

§  821.  South  Dakota — Acknowledgments  may  be  made  at 
any  place  within  the  state  of  South  Dakota  before  a  justice  or 
clerk  of  the  Supreme  Court,  or  notary  public."*  Acknowledg- 
ments may  be  made  in  this  state  within  judicial  circuit,  county, 
subdivision,  or  city,  for  which  officer  was  elected  or  appointed, 
before  judge  or  clerk  of  court  of  record,  mayor  of  city,  register 
of  deeds,  justice  of  the  peace.  United  States  circuit  or  district 
court  commissioner,  or  county  auditor.""  Without  the  state  and 
within  the  United  States,  and  within  officer's  jurisdiction,  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  made  before  a  justice,  judge,  or  clerk 
of  a  court  of  record  of  the  United  States,  or  any  state  or  terri- 

9*  Civ.     Code     1902,     §     2383,     as  "-  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  2630. 

amended  by  Act  of  Alarch  1,  1909.  »**  Civ.  Code  1903,  §  970. 

95  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  2384.  ««  Civ.  Code  1903,  §  971,  as  amend- 

9«  Civ.  Code  1902,  §  2385.  ed  by  Sess.  Laws  1907,  ch.  3., 


§    821  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  858 

tory,  notary  public,  any  officer  of  state  where  taken,  authorized 
by  its  laws  to  take  such  acknowledgments,  or  commissioner  of 
deeds  appointed  by  governor  of  this  state.*  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  an  ambassador, 
minister,  commissioner,  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States 
resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  the  proof  of  ac- 
knowledgment is  made ;  a  consul,  vice  consul,  or  consular  agent 
of  the  United  States  resident  in  country  where  the  acknowledg- 
ment is  made ;  a  judge,  clerk,  register,  or  commissioner  of  a  court 
of  record  of  the  country  where  the  proof  of  acknowledgment  is 
made;  a  notary  public  of  such  country;  an  officer  authorized  by 
the  laws  of  the  country  where  the  proof  of  acknowledgment  is 
taken  to  take  proof  or  acknowledgments;  or  a  deputy  of  any 
of  these  officers  who  are  authorized  to  appoint  deputies.^  Indian 
agents  or  superintendents  are  hereby  authorized  to  take  acknowl- 
edgments of  deeds  or  other  instruments  in  writing,  in  Indian 
country,  and  acknowledgments  so  taken  shall  have  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  if  taken  before  a  notary  public.  Provided,  that 
such  Indian  agent  or  superintendent  shall  file  for  record  in  the 
office  of  the  register  of  deeds  of  the  county  in  which  he  is  sta- 
tioned, or  the  county  to  which  said  county  is  attached  for  judi- 
cial purposes,  a  certificate  signed  by  the  secretary  of  the  interior 
of  the  United  States  showing  his  appointment  and  authority  as 
such  Indian  agent  or  superintendent.^  A  notary  public  may  take 
acknowledgment  to  an  instrument  executed  by  or  to  banks  or 
other  corporations  when  he  is  a  stockholder,  director,  officer,  or 
employe  thereof,  provided  he  is  not  a  party  thereto.* 

No  witnesses  are  required  if  the  deed  is  acknowledged;  other- 
wise one  is  required. ° 

Officers  taking  and  certifying  acknowledgments  or  proof  of 
instruments  for  record  must  authenticate  their  certificates  by 
affixing  thereto  their  signatures,  followed  by  the  names  of  their 
offices;  also  their  seals  of  office,  if  by  the  laws  of  the  state,  terri- 
tory, or  country  where  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  is  taken, 
or  by  authority  of  which  they  are  acting,  they  are  required  to 
have  official  seals.  Judges  and  clerks  of  courts  of  record  must 
authenticate  their  certificates  as  aforesaid  by  affixing  thereto  the 

iCiv.  Code  190,1,  §  972.  4  Sess.  Laws  1911.  ch.  197. 

2  Civ.  Code  1903.  §  973.  =  Civ.  Code  1903,  §  962. 

sScss.  Laws  1911.  ch.  197. 


859  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    822 

seal  of  their  proper  court;  and  mayors  of  cities  by  the  seal 
thereof.*'  The  certificate  of  proof  or  acknowledgment,  if  made 
before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  when  used  in  any  county  other 
than  that  in  which  he  resides,  must  be  accompanied  by  a  certifi- 
cate under  the  hand  and  seal  of  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court, 
or  of  any  other  county  court  of  record  of  the  county  in  which 
the  justice  resides,  setting  forth  that  such  justice,  at  the  time  of 
taking  such  proof  or  acknowledgment,  was  authorized  to  take 
the  same  and  that  the  clerk  is  acquainted  with  his  handwriting, 
and  believes  that  the  signature  to  the  original  certificate  is  genu- 
ine/ 

Neither  husband  nor  wife  has  any  interest  in  the  property  of 
the  other.®  A  married  woman  may,  without  husband's  consent, 
convey  her  property  and  acknowledge  as  though  she  were  unmar- 
ried.^ 

Homestead  may  be  incumbered  or  conveyed  by  joint  instru- 
ment of  husband  and  wife,  or  by  execution  of  separate  instru- 
ment by  each.^° 

§  822.  Tennessee. — Acknowledgments  may  be  made 
within  the  state  of  Tennessee  by  clerk  or  legally  appointed  deputy 
clerk  of  the  county  court  of  some  county  in  the  state  or  notary 
public  under  his  official  seal."  Without  the  state  and  within  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  any  court 
of  record  or  its  clerk  in  any  of  the  states  of  the  union,  a  com- 
missioner for  Tennessee,  or  notary  public  of  any  state  or  terri- 
tory.^- Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be 
made  before  a  commissioner  for  Tennessee  appointed  in  the 
country  where  the  acknowledgment  is  made,  notary  public  of 
such  country,  consul,  minister,  or  ambassador  of  the  United 
States  in  such  country.^^ 

If  deed  is  not  acknowledged,  two  subscribing  witnesses  are 
necessary  to  prove  it.^* 

If  acknowledgment  be  before  a  notary,  commissioner  of  the 
state,  or  consul,  minister,  or  ambassador,  he  shall  certify  under 

«Civ.  Code  1903,  §  981,  4.  12  Annot.    Code    1896.    Supp.    1903, 

7  Civ.  Code  1903,  S  981,  5.  §  3715. 

8  Civ.  Code  1903,  §  97.  is  Annot.    Code    1896,    Supn.    1903, 
0  Civ.  Code  1903.  §8  101.  105,  975.  §  3716. 

10  Pol.  Code  1903,  S§  3217,  3219.  1*  Annot.    Code    1896,    Supp.    1903, 

"Annot.    Code    1S96,    Supp.    1903,     S§  3671,  3712. 
§§  3713,  3714. 


§    823  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  860 

his  seal  of  office.^''  If  it  be  made  before  a  judge,  he  shall  make 
the  certificate,  under  his  hand,  and  thereupon  the  clerk  of  his 
court  shall  certify,  under  his  seal  of  office,  if  there  be  a  seal,  or 
under  his  private  seal,  if  there  be  none,  as  to  the  official  charac- 
ter of  the  judge;  or  the  official  character  of  the  judge  may  be 
certified  by  the  governor  of  the  state  or  territory,  under  the  great 
seal  of  the  state  or  territory.^''  If  it  be  made  before  a  court  of 
record,  a  copy  of  the  entry  of  the  acknowledgment  on  the  record 
shall  be  certified  by  the  clerk,  under  his  seal  of  office,  if  there 
be  a  seal,  or  if  there  be  none,  under  his  private  seal;  and  the 
judge,  chief  justice,  or  presiding  magistrate  of  the  court  shall 
certify  as  to  the  official  character  of  the  clerk. ^^  If  the  acknowl- 
edgment or  probate  be  before  a  clerk  of  some  court  of  record  of 
another  state  of  the  union,  and  certified  by  him  under  his  seal 
of  office,  the  judge,  chief  justice,  or  presiding  magistrate  of 
the  court  shall  certify  to  the  official  character  of  the  clerk.^^ 
Seals,  except  for  corporations,  are  abolished." 
Husband  need  not  join  in  wife's  deed  of  her  separate  prop- 
erty.^**  A  married  woman  must  have  private  examination  and 
make  separate  acknowledgment.^^  Husband  and  wife  may  join 
to  release  dower.'" 

Homestead  may  be  alienated  by  the  joint  consent  of  husband 
and  wife  evidenced  by  conveyance  executed  by  the  wife  as  pro- 
vided." 

§  823.  Texas.  —  Acknowledgments  within  the  state  of 
Texas  may  be  made  before  a  clerk  of  the  district  court,  judge  or 
clerk  of  county  court,  or  notary  public."'  \\' ithout  the  state  and 
within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a 
clerk  of  a  court  of  record  having  a  seal,  notary  public,  or  commis- 
sioner of  deeds  duly  appointed  under  the  laws  of  this  state."'' 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a 
notary  public,  a  minister,  commissioner,  or  charge  d'affaires  of 

15  Annot.  Code  1896,  Supp.  1903,  20  Robinson  v.  Queen,  3  Pickle  445. 
§  3718.  21  Code  1896.  Supp.  1903,  §  3753. 

i«  Annot.  Code  1896,  Supp.  1903,  22  Annot.  Code  1896,  Supp.  1903, 
§  3719.  •  §  4140.  40,  §  3679.  5. 

"Annot.  Code  1896,  Supp.  1903,  23  Annot.  Code  1896,  Supp.  1903, 
§  3720.  §  3798. 

1'*  Annot.  Code    1896,    Supp.    1903,        243  Civ.  Stat.  1897,  art.  4613. 
§  3721.  2.5  2  Civ.  Stat.  1897,  art.  4614. 

i»  Annot.  Code    1896,    Supp.    1903, 
§  3213. 


861  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    824 

the  United  States  resident  and  accredited  in  the  country  where  the 
acknowledgment  is  taken;  or  any  consul  general,  consul,  vice 
consul,  commercial  agent,  vice  commercial  agent,  deputy  consul, 
or  consular  agent  of  the  United  States  resident  in  such  country.-'^ 

Where  deed  is  not  acknowledged,  two  credible  subscribing  wit- 
nesses are  necessary,*' 

Officer  taking  acknowledgment  shall  make  a  certificate,  and 
sign  and  seal  the  same  with  his  seal  of  office."^  Private  seal  is 
not  necessary,  except  for  corporations.^^ 

The  husband  and  wife  must  join  in  a  conveyance  of  the  wife's 
separate  property,  and  she  must  make  separate  acknowledg- 
ment.^'' Officer  taking  acknowledgment  of  married  woman  shall 
examine  her  privily  and  apart  from  her  husband  and  she  must 
acknowledge  that  she  has  willingly  signed  deed  before  officer  cer- 
tifies same.^^ 

The  wife  must  consent  to  and  join  in  the  conveyance  of  a 
homestead,  and  acknowledge  as  in  a  conveyance  of  her  separate 
p  roper  ty.''- 

§  824.  Utah. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  within  the 
state  of  Utah  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of  court  having  seal,  notary 
public,  county  clerk,  or  county  recorder."^  Without  the  state  and 
within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  a 
judge  or  clerk  of  any  court  in  the  United  States,  or  of  any  state 
or  territory  having  seal,  notary  public,  or  commissioner  appointed 
by  governor  of  this  state  for  that  purpose.^*  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of 
any  court  of  any  state,  kingdom,  or  empire  having  seal,  any 
notary  public  therein,  an  ambassador,  minister,  commissioner, 
or  consul  of  the  United  States  appointed  to  reside  therein.^' 
When  any  of  the  officers  above  mentioned  are  authorized  by  law 
to  appoint  a  deputy,  such  acknowledgment  or  proof  may  be 
taken  by  any  such  deputy  in  the  name  of  his  principal.^*' 

20  2  Civ.  Stat.  1897.  art.  4615.  so  i  civ.  Stat.  1897,  Supp.  1903,  art. 

27  1  Civ.  Stat.  1897,  Supp.  1903,  art.     635. 

630.  31  2  Civ.  Stat.  1897,  art.  4618. 

28  2    Civ.    Stat.    1897,    Supp.    1903,         ^2 1   Qv.   Stat.  1897,  art.  636. 
§§  4616.  4619.  "3  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  1985. 

20  2    Civ.    Stat.    1897,    Supp.    1903,        ^4  Comp.  Laws  1907.  §  1985. 
§  4862.  35  Comp.  Laws  1907.  §  1985. 

36  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  1986. 


§    825  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  862 

A  subscribing  witness  may  prove  the  execution  of  unacknowl- 
edged deed." 

When  a  certificate  of  acknowledgment  is  granted  by  any  judge 
or  clerk,  he  shall  certify  under  his  hand  and  the  seal  of  the  court. 
When  granted  by  any  other  officer,  he  shall  certify  under  the 
hand  and  official  seal  of  such  officer.^^  A  notary  public  shall 
affix  the  date  of  expiration  of  commission  as  well  as  his  seal.^'"* 
Private  seal  is  not  required.^" 

A  conveyance,  transfer,  or  lien  executed  by  either  husband  or 
wife,  to  or  in  favor  of  the  other,  shall  be  valid  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  between  other  persons.*^  A  married  woman  may  convey 
her  separate  estate  as  if  unmarried.^-  One-third  of  the  real  prop- 
erty possessed  by  husband  at  any  time  during  marriage  to  which 
the  wife  has  made  no  relinquishment  of  her  rights  shall  be  set 
apart  as  her  property  in  fee  simple  if  she  survive  him;  provided, 
she  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  interest  in  any  estate  of  which 
the  husband  has  made  r..  conveyance  when  she,  at  time  of  con- 
veyance, is  not  or  never  has  been  a  resident  of  Utah.*^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  incumber  or  convey  home- 
stead.** 

§  825.  Vermont. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken  in  the 
state  of  Vermont  by  a  justice  of  the  peace,  town  clerk,  notary 
public  without  his  official  seal,  master  in  chancery,  county  clerk, 
or  judge  or  register  of  probate.*^  Without  the  state  and  within 
the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  before  a  jus- 
tice, magistrate,  or  notary  public  and  they  may  be  certified  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  the  state  where  taken. **^  Without  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  before  a  commis- 
sioner appointed  by  the  governor  for  that  purpose,  minister, 
charge  d'affaires,  consul,  or  vice  consul  of  the  United  States  in 
a  foreign  country.  Acknowledgments  so  taken  may  be  certified 
according  to  the  laws  of  the  state,  province,  or  kingdom  where 
taken.*' 

Two  subscribing  witnesses  arc  required  to  prove  deed.** 

"  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  1984,  1991.  «  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  2826. 

38Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  1987.  «*  Comp.  Laws  1907.  §  1155. 

39  Comp.  Laws  1907.  §§  1671,  1672.  «  Pu^.  stat.  1906.  §  2577. 

40  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  1976.  3399.  4c  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2598. 

41  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  1200.  47  p^b.  Stat.  1906.  §  2598. 

42  Const.,  art.  22,  §  2 ;  Comp.  Laws  48  Pub.  Stat.  1906.  §  2597. 
1907,  §  1198. 


863  EXECUTION    AND   ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    826 

Seal  is  necessary/^  Seal  of  court,  public  officer,  or  corpora- 
tion shall  include  an  impression  of  official  seal  upon  paper  alone, 
or  by  means  of  a  wafer  or  wax  affixed  thereto/^  Private  seal 
shall  consist  of  a  wafer,  wax,  or  other  adhesive  substance  affixed 
to  writing,  or  the  word  "seal,"  or  the  letters  "L.  S."  opposite  the 
signature. ^^ 

A  husband  and  wife  may,  by  their  joint  deed,  convey  the  real 
estate  of  the  wife  as  she  might  do  by  her  separate  deed,  if  unmar- 
ried.^"   No  separate  acknowledgment  of  wife  is  required. ^^ 

No  homestead,  nor  interest  therein,  shall  be  conveyed  by  mar- 
ried owner,  except  by  way  of  mortgage  for  purchase-price,  un- 
less wife  joins  in  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  such  con- 
veyance; but  conveyance  thereof  not  so  made  and  acknowledged, 
or  of  an  interest  therein,  shall  be  inoperative  so  far  only  as 
relates  to  the  homestead  provided  for  in  this  chapter.^* 

§  826.  Virginia. — Acknowledgments  may  be  made  within 
the  state  of  Virginia  before  the  circuit  court  of  any  county,  the 
corporation  court  of  any  city  other  than  Richmond,  in  which 
the  writing  is  to  be  recorded,  and  the  chancery  court  of  the  city 
of  Richmond  when  the  writing  may  be  recorded  in  that  city,  the 
clerk  of  any  such  court,  his  deputy,  notary  public,  justice  of  the 
peace,  or  the  clerk  of  any  court  of  record  of  this  state.^^  With- 
out the  state  and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may 
be  made  before  clerks  of  any  courts,  justices,  commissioners  in 
chancery  of  a  court  of  record,  or  notaries  public.  This  includes 
the  Philippines,  Porto  Rico,  or  any  other  territory,  possession, 
or  dependency  of  the  United  States.^®  Without  the  United 
States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken  by  an  ambassador,  min- 
ister plenipotentiary,  minister  resident,  charge  d'affaires,  consul 
general,  consul,  vice  consul,  or  commercial  agent  appointed  by 
the  government  of  the  United  States  to  such  foreign  country, 
before  the  proper  officer  of  any  court  of  such  country,  or  the 
mayor  or  other  chief  magistrate  of  any  city,  town,  or  corpora- 
tion therein.^'' 

Two  witnesses  are  necessary  when  deed  is  not  acknowledged.^® 

4«Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2577.  •-■'2   Code   1904.    §§   2500,   2501,    as 

50  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  20.  amended    by   Laws    1906,    p.   81,    and 

■■^1  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  S  21.  Laws  1908.  p.  126. 

f>2Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2573.  ^g?  Code  1904,  §  2501. 

'■'SPub.  Stat.  1906,  §§  2921,  2934.              ••'2  Code  1904,  §  2501. 

54  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2553.  58  2  Code  1904,  §§  2500,  2501. 


§    827  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  864 

If  an  acknowledgment  is  taken  without  the  United  States,  the 
officer  shall  affix  his  official  seal.''^  Notary  public  shall  affix  date 
of  expiration  of  term  when  making  certificate  within  this  state, 
and  it  shall  be  as  follows:    "My  term  of  office  expires  on  the 

day  of  ,"  or  words  plainly  showing  when  his  term 

shall  expire.  If  a  woman  appointed  as  notary  legally  changes 
her  name,  by  marriage  or  otherwise,  during  term  of  office,  her 

certificate  shall  say,  "I  was  commissioned  as  notary  as ,"  or 

words  plainly  showing  name  in  which  commission  was  issued."" 

A  scroll  will  answer  the  purpose  of  a  private  seal."^ 

When  husband  and  wife  join  in  a  conveyance,  such  writing 
shall  operate  to  convey  wife's  right  of  dower,  but  shall  not  oper- 
ate any  further  upon  the  wife  or  her  representatives  by  means 
of  any  covenant  or  warranty  contained  therein  which  is  not  made 
with  reference  to  her  separate  estate  as  a  source  of  credit  or 
which,  if  it  relate  to  her  said  right  of  dower  or  to  estate  or  inter- 
est conveyed  other  than  her  own,  is  not  made  with  reference  to 
her  separate  estate  as  a  source  of  credit.*'" 

Separate  examination  of  married  women  is  no  longer  re- 
quired."^ 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  to  mortgage,  incumber,  or  alien- 
ate homestead,  unless  for  purchase-money  or  erection  or  repair 
of  buildings  thereon."* 

§  827.  Washington. — Acknowledgments  may  be  made 
within  the  state  of  Washington  by  a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
clerk  thereof,  or  deputy  of  such  clerk;  by  a  judge,  clerk,  or  dep- 
uty clerk  of  superior  court;  justice  of  the  peace,  county  auditor 
or  his  deputy,  or  qualified  notary  public."^  Without  the  state 
and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
by  any  person  authorized  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  territory 
where  taken,  but  in  form  prescribed  for  acknowledgments  within 
the  state  of  Washington,  or  by  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
governor  of  this  state.""  Without  the  United  States  acknowledg- 
ments may  be  made  before  a  minister  plenipotentiary,  secretary 
of  legation,  charge  d'afifaires,  consul  general,  consul,  vice  consul, 

59  2  Code  1904,  §  2501.  p.  1264.  «4  2  Code  1904,  §  3634. 

60  2  Code  1904,  §  2501e.  as  amended  '^■'2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910, 
by  Act  of  March  4,  1910.  §  8754. 

«i2  Code  1904,  §  2841.  «''2   Annot.    Codes   and   Stat.   1910, 

"2  2  Code  1904.  §  2502.  §  8755. 

63  2  Code  1904,  §  2501,  p.  1269. 


865  EXECUTION    AND   ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    828 

consular-  agent,  or  commercial  agent  appointed  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  any  notary  public,  any  proper  officer 
of  any  court  of  said  country,  or  before  the  mayor  or  other  chief 
magistrate  of  any  city,  town,  or  other  municipal  corporation 
therein." 

By  the  laws  of  1890,  all  conveyances  executed  before  then, 
having  no  subscribing  witness  nor  witnesses  thereto,  were  made 
valid/'^ 

When  acknowledgments  taken  without  state  are  not  made  be- 
fore a  commissioner  o-f  this  state,  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  record 
of  said  state  or  territory,  notary  public  or  other  officer  having 
a  seal,  such  acknowledgments  shall  have  attached  thereto  a  cer- 
tificate of  clerk  of  court  o-f  record  or  other  certifying  officer 
of  said  district  or  county  wherein  acknowledgment  was  taken, 
attesting  the  official  character  of  officer  and  genuineness  of  his 
signature.*'^  An  officer  acknowledging  without  the  United  States 
must  use  his  seal,  if  he  has  one.'*"    Private  seals  are  abolished." 

All  property  acquired  after  marriage,  except  by  gift,  bequest, 
devise,  or  descent,  is  community  property.  The  husband  man- 
ages and  controls  it  but  can  not  sell  or  incumber  it  unless  wife 
joins  and  acknowledges.'"  Property  held  by  husband  or  wife  at 
marriage,  or  afterward  acquired  by  gift,  bequest,  devise,  or  de- 
scent, is  his  or  her  separate  property,  and  either  may  incumber 
or  convey  as  though  unmarried.'^  A  married  woman  acknowl- 
edges a  conveyance  between  herself  and  husband  as  if  unmar- 
ried.^* 

Husband  and  wife  must  join  in  execution  and  acknowledgment 
of  instrument  to  convey  or  mortgage  homestead." 

§  828.  West  Virginia, — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  West  Virginia  and  other  states  of  the  United 
States  by  clerk  of  county  court,  president  of  county  court  within 
his  county,  justice  of  the  peace  and  notary  public  within  county, 

G7  2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910,  '2 2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910, 
§  8758.  §§  5917,  5918. 

•58  2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910,  '-'-l  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910. 
§  8764.  §§  5915,  5916. 

69  2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910,  '*2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910, 
§  8756.  §  8766. 

70  2  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910,  -M  Annot.  Codes  and  Stat.  1910, 
§  8759.  §  534. 

712   Annot.    Codes   and    Stat.    1910, 
§  8751. 

55 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    829  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  866 

recorder,  prothonotary  or  clerk  of  any  court  within  the  United 
States,  or  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state 
and  certified  under  his  official  signature  and  seal.'"  Without  the 
United  States  acknowledgments  may  be  made  l>efore  a  minister 
plenipotentiary,  charge  d'affaires,  consul  general,  consul,  deputy 
consul,  vice  consul,  consular  agent,  vice  consular  agent,  commer- 
cial agent,  or  vice  commercial  agent,  appointed  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  to  any  foreign  country,  proper  officer 
of  any  court  of  such  country,  or  the  mayor  or  other  chief  magis- 
trate of  any  city,  town,  or  corporation  therein."  Two  witnesses 
are  required  if  the  deed  is  not  acknowledged.'* 

A  notary  of  this  state  need  not  affix  his  notarial  seal  to  a  cer- 
tificate.''^  Deeds  executed  out  of  this  state  by  a  notary  shall  be 
certified  under  his  official  seal.^*  All  officers  taking  acknowledg- 
ments without  the  United  States  shall  certify  under  their  official 
seals.^^  Every  deed  or  power  of  attorney  executed  out  of  this 
state,  the  acknowledgment  or  proof  of  which  is  properly  certified, 
if  it  be  attested  by  a  notary  public,  under  his  seal  of  office,  that 
such  instrument  was  made,  entered,  or  kept  in  due  form  accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  the  place  where  it  was  made,  entered,  or  kept, 
and  the  official  character  of  such  notary  be  certified  to  by  any 
court  of  record,  or  the  mayor  or  other  chief  magistrate  of  any 
county,  city,  town,  or  borough,  or  under  the  great  seal  of  the 
state,  kingdom,  province,  island,  or  colony  in  w'hich  such  notary 
may  reside,  shall  be  evidence  in  any  court  in  this  state.*^  A  pri- 
vate seal  is  required,  but  a  scroll  will  answer  the  purpose.®^ 

Unless  living  apart,  husband  must  join  in  wife's  deed.**  When 
husband  and  wife  have  signed  writing  purporting  to  convey  real 
estate,  the  wife  may  acknowledge  the  same  together  with,  or  sep- 
arately from,  her  husband.*^  When  married  woman  acknowl- 
edges conveyance,  such  writing  shall  operate  to  convey  her  right 
of  dower  in  real  estate  embraced  therein.*" 

§  829.  Wisconsin. — Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Wisconsin  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of  a  court  of 

■"-■  1    Code    Annot.    1906,    §§    1200,  «'  2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3076. 

1956,  2194.  2203.  2205;  2  Code  Annot.  822  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3943. 

1906.  §§  .3075,  3076.  S3  1    Code    Annot.    1906,    §    291 ;    2 

"  2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3076.  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3048. 

"2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3075.  ''**2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  2952. 

"1  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  2195.  ^^^2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3077. 

'^»2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §§  3076,  86  2  Code  Annot.  1906,  §  3079, 
3077. 


867  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    829 

record,  court  commissioner,  county  clerk,  notary  public  under 
official  seal  and  with  date  of  expiration  of  commission,  justice 
of  the  peace,  police  justice,  or  United  States  court  commis- 
sioner." Without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States  ac- 
knowledgments may  be  made  before  any  judge  or  clerk  of  a  court 
of  record,  notary  public,  justice  of  the  peace,  master  in  chancery, 
or  other  officer  authorized  by  the  laws  of  such  state,  territory, 
o.r  district  to  take  acknowledgments  of  deeds  therein,  or  before 
any  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this  state  for 
such  purpose;  and,  if  executed  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any 
military  post  of  the  United  States  not  within  this  state,  it  may 
be  acknowledged  before  the  commanding  officer  thereof.  Ac- 
knowledgments may  be  according  to  laws  of  Wisconsin,  or  state, 
territory,  or  district  where  taken.^^  Without  the  United  States 
acknowledgments  may  be  taken  according  to  laws  of  Wisconsin 
or  laws,  of  country  where  taken  by  a  notary  public,  or  other  offi- 
cer authorized  by  the  laws  of  such  country  to  take  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  deeds  therein,  commissioner  of  deeds  for  Wisconsin, 
or  before  any  minister  plenipotentiary,  minister  extraordinary, 
minister  resident,  charge  d'affaires,  commissioner,  or  consul  of 
the  United  States,  appointed  to  reside  therein,  under  his  hand, 
and  if  taken  before  a  notary  public,  his  seal  of  office  shall  be 
affixed  thereto;  and  if  such  conveyance  be  executed  and  acknowl- 
edged according  to  the  laws  of  such  country,  the  certificate  of 
acknowledgment  shall  certify  the  fact.^'^  Chief  clerk  of  commis- 
sioners of  public  lands  may  take  the  acknowledgment  of  said 
commissioners  to  all  certificates  and  patents,  and  no  fees  shall 
be  charged  therefor.**"  All  deeds  heretofore  acknowledged  before 
a  register  of  deeds  are  hereby  declared  valid. °^ 

Two  subscribing  witnesses  are  required.^"  United  States  court 
commissioner  taking  acknowledgments  within  the  state  shall  file 
with  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court  of  the  county  in  which  he  re- 
sides his  certificate  of  appointment  as  such  commissioner  or  a 
copy  thereof  certified  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  which  appointed 
him.**^    Unless  acknowledgments  taken  without  the  state  are  ta- 

871  Stat.  1898,  §  2216,  as  amended  "<>  1    Stat.   1898,   §   189,   as  amended 

by  Laws  1901,  ch.  38,  §  1,  and  Laws  In'  Laws  1901.  ch.  432.  §  5. 

1907,  ch.  568.  p.  552.  "i  Act  April  24,  1911. 

88 1  Stat.  1898,  §  2218.  ='- 1  Stat.  1898,  §  2216,  as  amended 

8»  1  Stat.   1898,  §  2220 ;  Laws  1905,  bv  Laws  1907.  p.  552. 

ch.  201.  "■•^3  1  Stat.  1898,  §  2216. 


§    830  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  868 

ken  before  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the  governor  of  this 
state  for  that  purpose,  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  with  its  seal 
attached,  a  notary  public  with  his  seal  attached,  or  the  command- 
ing officer  of  a  military  post,  such  conveyance  shall  have  attached 
thereto  a  certificate  of  the  clerk  or  other  proper  certifying  officer 
of  a  court  of  record  of  the  county  or  district  within  which  such 
acknowledgment  was  taken,  under  the  seal  of  his  office,  setting 
forth  official  character  of  acknowledgment  officer,  genuineness 
of  his  signature,  and  his  compliance  with  laws  of  such  state,  ter- 
ritory, or  district,  if  not  taken  according  to  laws  of  Wisconsin.^* 

Seal  required,  but  scroll,  device,  word  "seal,"  or  letters  "L.  S." 
will  answer  for  deeds  executed  by  any  person,  or  private  corpo- 
ration not  having  a  corporate  seal.  This  does  not  apply  to  offi- 
cial or  corporate  seals  provided  by  law.  An  instrument  duly 
executed  in  corporate  name  of  corporation,  which  has  no  cor- 
porate seal,  by  proper  officers  of  corporation  under  any  seal,  shall 
be  sufficient.  Such  conveyance  shall  be  countersigned  by  secre- 
tary or  clerk  of  corporation. '■'^  Every  written  instrument  convey- 
ing realty,  acknowledged  or  proved  according  to  laws  of  this 
state  in  force  at  time  of  execution,  if  made  prior  to  March  1, 
1911,  will  be  valid  although  not  sealed.^*^ 

I'f  wife  is  of  full  age,  she  may,  by  joint  or  separate  deed,  con- 
vey her  lands  in  this  state  or  any  interest  therein,  and  she  shall 
acknowledge  sarne."^  A  married  woman  acknowledges  a  convey- 
ance executed  by  her  alone,  or  in  conjunction  with  her  husband, 
as  if  unmarried."®  A  wife  of  eighteen  years  or  upwards  may  bar 
her  dower  by  joining  in  deed  with  her  husband  or  by  executing  a 
separate  deed,  and  acknowledging  in  either  case."''  Husband  and 
wife  must  join  to  mortgage  or  alienate  homestead  or  any  interest 
therein.^ 

§  830.  Wyoming.  —  Acknowledgments  may  be  taken 
within  the  state  of  Wyoming  by  a  judge  or  clerk  of  court  of 
record.  United  States  commissioner  appointed  under  and  by  au- 
thority of  the  United  States,  county  clerk,  justice  of  the  peace, 
notary  public,   or  clerks  of  United   States  circuit  and  district 

04  1  Stat.  1898,  §  2219.  »«  1  Stat.  1898.  §  2224.                               jl 

»5 1  Stat.  1898,  §  2215,  as  amended  ■'•'  1  Stat.  1898,  §§  2221,  2222.                   " 

by  Laws  1907,  p.  552.  1 1   Stat.  1898.  §  2203,  as  amended 

90  Laws  1911,  ch.  215.  by  Laws  1905,  ch.  45,  §  1. 

97 1  Stat.  1898,  §  2221.  , 

f 

i 


1 


869  EXECUTION    AND    ACKNOWLEDGMENT  §    830 

courts  within  and  for  Wyoming.  The  officer  shall  indorse  on 
the  acknowledgment  a  certificate,  and  the  date  of  taking  same, 
under  his  hand  and  official  seal,  if  he  has  one."  Without  the  state 
and  within  the  United  States  acknowledgments  of  deeds  executed 
according  to  the  laws  of  this  state  may  be  taken  before  the  clerk 
of  a  court  of  record,  county  clerk,  commissioner  of  deeds,  or 
officer  authorized  by  law  to  take  acknowledgments  where  taken. ^ 
Without  the  United  States  acknowledgments  of  deeds  executed 
according  to  Wyoming  laws  may  be  taken  by  a  consul  general, 
consul,  or  vice  consul  of  the  United  States,  and  certified  under 
his  hand  and  official  seal  or  the  consulate  seal;  and  if  there  be  no 
such  seal,  it  should  be  so  stated  in  the  certificate,* 

One  witness  is  required.^ 

If  a  deed  is  executed  in  another  state  according  to  the  laws  of 
this  state,  no  other  authentication  beyond  official  seal  is  necessary. 
Otherwise,  the  clerk  of  a  court  of  record  or  county  clerk  of  the 
same  place,  having  a  seal,  must  certify  to  the  official  character 
and  genuineness  of  signature  of  officer.*' 

Private  seals  are  abolished.^ 

The  separate  deed  of  the  husband  shall  convey  no  interest  in 
wife's  lands. ^  A  married  woman  may  convey  her  real  estate  as 
if  she  were  unmarried.'*  A  nonresident  wife  shall  join  husband 
in  conveying  real  estate  situated  within  this  state,  and  convey- 
ance shall  have  same  effect  as  if  she  were  sole.  Acknowledgment 
or  proof  of  execution  may  be  as  if  sole.^° 

No  homestead  may  be  sold,  mortgaged,  encumbered,  or  dis- 
posed of  unless  the  wife  of  owner  shall,  separate  and  apart  from 
her  husband,  freely  and  voluntarily  sign  and  acknowledge  the 
instrument  after  officer  taking  acknowledgment  has  apprised  her 
of  her  rights  and  of  the  effect  of  signing  such  instrument.  No 
deed  shall  be  construed  as  releasing  homestead  unless  it  contains 
a  clause  expressly  releasing  such  right.  In  such  case,  certificate 
of  acknowledgment  shall  contain  a  clause  substantially  as  follows, 
"Including  the  release  and  waiver  of  the  right  of  homestead."^^ 

2Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §§  3631  3635.  7  Comp.  Stat.  1910.  §  3641. 

s  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §§  3636,  3637.  «  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  3916. 

4Coi-np.  Stat.  1910,   §  3638.  9  Comp.  Stat.  1910.  §  3624. 

5  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  3633.  lo  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  3639. 

eComp.  Stat.  1910,  §§  3633,  3636.  "Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  3662. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 


DIGEST   OF    STATUTES    OF    DESCENT 


SEC. 

SEC. 

835.  Alabama. 

860. 

Montana. 

836.  Alaska. 

861. 

Nebraska. 

837.  Arizona. 

862. 

Nevada. 

838.  Arkansas. 

863. 

New  Hampshire. 

839.  California. 

864. 

New  Jersey. 

840.  Colorado. 

865. 

New  Mexico. 

841.  Connecticut. 

866. 

New  York. 

842.  Delaware. 

867. 

North  Carolina. 

843.  District  of  Columbia. 

868. 

North  Dakota. 

844.  Florida. 

869. 

Ohio. 

845.  Georgia. 

870. 

Oklahoma. 

846.  Idaho. 

871. 

Oregon. 

847.  Illinois. 

872. 

Pennsylvania. 

848.  Indiana. 

873. 

Rhode  Island. 

849.  Iowa. 

874. 

South  Carolina. 

850.  Kansas. 

875. 

South  Dakota. 

851.  Kentucky. 

876. 

Tennessee. 

852.  Louisiana. 

877. 

Texas. 

853.  Maine. 

878. 

Utah. 

854.  Maryland. 

879. 

Vermont. 

855.  Massachusetts. 

880. 

Virginia. 

856.  Michigan. 

881. 

Washington. 

857.  Minnesota. 

882. 

West  Virginia. 

858.  Mississippi. 

883. 

Wisconsin. 

859.  Missouri. 

884. 

Wyoming. 

§  835.  Alabama. — In  Alabama  the  real  estate  of  an  in- 
testate descends,  subject  to  dower  and  payment  of  debts,  as  fol- 
lows: 1.  To  the  children  and  their  descendants  per  stirpes  in 
equal  shares.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants, 
then  the  estate  goes  to  the  father  and  mother  of  the  intestate  in 
equal  shares.  3.  When  only  one  parent,  the  other  half  goes  to 
the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  and  their  descendants. 
4.  If  there  be  but  one  surviving  parent,  and  no  children  or  their 
descendants,  nor  brothers  and  sisters  or  their  descendants,  the 
entire  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  parent.  5.  If  there  be  no  chil- 
dren or  their  descendants,  and  no  father  or  mother,  then  to  the 
brothers  and  sisters  and  the  descendants  of  such  as  are  dead,  in 
equal  parts.  6.  If  there  are  no  descendants,  nor  parents,  nor 
brothers  or  sisters  or  their  descendants,  the  whole  estate  shall 
go  to  the  surviving  spouse.     7.  If  there  are  no  children  and  no 

870 


871  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    835 

father  or  mother  nor  brothers  or  sisters  and  their  descendants, 
or  surviving  spouse,  then  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree  in 
equal  shares.  8.  If  there  be  none  of  the  above  mentioned  kin- 
dred, or  husband  or  wife  surviving,  the  property  escheats  to  the 
state/  9.  There  is  no  representation  among  collateral  kindred 
except  with  the  descendants  of  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
intestate.^  10.  No  distinction  is  made  between  the  whole  and 
the  half-blood  of  the  same  degree,  unless  the  inheritance  came  to 
the  intestate  by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  or  of  some  one  of 
his  ancestors ;  in  which  case  all  those  who  are  not  of  the  blood 
of  such  ancestor  are  excluded  from  the  inheritance,  as  against 
those  of  the  same  degree.^  11.  Posthumous  children  inherit 
as  if  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate;  but  no  right  of  inherit- 
ance accrues  to  any  other  person  than  the  children  of  the  intes- 
tate unless  born  at  his  death.^  12.  An  illegitimate  child  inherits 
from  its  mother  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  and  the  mother  or 
kindred  of  an  illegitimate  child  on  the  part  of  the  mother  which, 
in  default  of  children  of  such  illegitimate  child,  or  their  descend- 
ants, is  entitled  to  inherit  his  estate.^  13.  Children  legally 
adopted,  inherit  from  their  adopted  parents.*^  14.  Degrees  of 
kindred  are  computed  according  to  the- rules  of  civil  law.''  15. 
Any  estate,  real  or  personal,  which  has  been  given  by  an  intestate 
in  his  lifetime,  as  an  advancement  to  any  child  or  other  lineal 
descendant  must  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  of  such 
intestate  so  far  as  regards  the  division  and  distribution  thereof, 
and  must  be  taken  by  such  child  or  descendant  towards  his  or 
her  share  of  the  estate.  In  no  case  is  such  child  or  descendant 
compelled  to  refund  any  part  of  such  advancement.  When  such 
advancement  is  made  in  real  estate  it  is  to  be  considered  a  part 
of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided ;  when  in  personal  property,  as 
part  of  the  personal  estate.  If  in  either  case  it  exceeds  his  share 
of  the  real  or  personal  property,  he  receives  so  much  less  of  the 
other  as  will  make  his  whole  share  equal.  The  value  of  the  ad- 
vancement is  to  be  taken  as  expressed  in  the  conveyance  or  charge 
thereof  by  the  intestate  or  in  the  receipt  given  by  the  person  re- 
ceiving the  advancement;  in  default  of  such  expression  or  receipt 
the  value  is  to  be  estimated  as  of  the  time  when  given.^    16.  An 

iCode  1907,  §  3754.  s  Code  1907,  §  3760. 

2  Code  1907,  §  3756.  6  Code  1907,  §  5202. 

3  Code  1907,  §  3758.  7  Code  1907.  §  3757. 

4  Code  1907,  §  3759.  s  Code  1907,  §§  Z767-2>777. 


§    836  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  872 

alien  has  the  same  rights  of  inheritance  in  intestate  property  as 
a  citizen.''  17.  A  surviving  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  in  all 
the  lands  of  her  deceased  husband  of  which  he  was  seised  at  any 
time  during  coverture.  The  quantity  of  her  interest  is  as  fol- 
lows :  ( 1 )  When  the  husband  dies  leaving  no  lineal  descendants 
and  his  estate  is  solvent  she  is  entitled  to  be  endowed  of  one-half 
of  his  lands.  (2)  When  his  estate  is  insolvent,  to  one-third  part 
thereof.  (3)  When  there  are  lineal  descendants,  one-third  part 
whether  the  estate  be  solvent  or  not.  But  if  a  married  woman  is 
possessed  of  a  separate  estate  at  the  death  of  her  husband,  and 
if  such  estate  is  greater  than  her  dower  interest,  she  shall  have 
no  dower;  but  if  less,  she  shall  have  so  much  dower  as  wdll  make 
her  separate  estate  equal  to  the  whole  dower  interest.^"  18. 
Where  the  w'lie  dies  intestate  the  husband  is  entitled  to  one-half 
of  her  personalty  absolutely  and  life  estate  in  the  realty  by  right 
of  curtesy." 

§  836.  Alaska. — In  Alaska  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate 
owner  descends  as  follows:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  his  or  her 
children  and  to  the  issue  of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  rep- 
resentation ;  if  there  be  no  child  of  the  intestate  living  at  the  time 
of  his  or  her  death,  to  all  his  or  her  other  lineal  descendants ; 
and  if  all  such  descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred 
to  the  intestate,  they  shall  take  such  realty  equally ;  or  otherwise, 
according  to  the  right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  intestate  leave 
no  lineal  descendants,  to  his  wife,  or  in  case  the  intestate  be  a 
married  woman  and  leave  no  lineal  descendants,  to  her  husband ; 
and  if  the  intestate  leave  no  wife  or  husband,  then  to  his  or  her 
father.  3.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  lineal  descendants,  nor  hus- 
band, nor  wife,  nor  father,  such  realty  shall  descend  in  equal 
shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and  to  the 
issue  of  any  deceased  brothers  or  sisters  by  right  of  representa- 
tion; but  if.  intestate  leave  a  mother  also,  she  takes  an  equal 
share  with  such  brothers  and  sisters.  4.  If  the  intestate  leave 
no  lineal  descendants,  nor  husband,  nor  wife,  nor  father,  brother, 
nor  sister,  living  at  his  or  her  death,  such  realty  descends  to  his 
mother  to  the  exclusion  of  issue  of  the  deceased  brothers  or  sis- 
ters of  the  intestate.     5.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  lineal  descend- 

9  Code  1907,  §  2831.  "Code  1907,  §§  3763,  3765. 

10  Code  1907,  §§  3813,  3814. 


I 


873  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    836 

ants,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor  father,  mother,  brothers,  nor 
sisters,  such  realty  descends  to  his  or  her  next  of  kin  in  equal 
degree,  provided,  however,  that  when  there  are  two  or  more  col- 
lateral kindred  in  equal  degree,  but  claiming  through  different 
ancestors,  those  who  claim  through  the  nearest  ancestor  shall  be 
preferred  to  those  claiming  through  a  more  remote  ancestor.  6. 
If  the  intestate  shall  leave  one  or  more  children,  and  the  issue  of 
one  or  more  deceased  child  or  children,  and  any  of  such  surviv- 
ing children  shall  die  under  age  without  having  been  married,  all 
such  realty  that  came  to  such  deceased  child  by  inheritance  from 
such  intestate  shall  descend  in  equal  shares  to  the  other  children 
of  such  intestate,  and  to  the  issue  of  any  other  children  of  such 
intestate  who  shall  have  died,  by  right  of  representation;  but  if 
all  the  other  children  of  such  intestate  shall  be  also  dead,  and  any 
of  them  shall  have  left  issue,  such  realty  so  inherited  by  such  de- 
ceased child  shall  descend  to  all  the  issue  of  such  other  children 
of  the  intestate  in  equal  shares,  if  they  are  in  the  same  degree 
of  kindred  to  such  deceased  child;  otherwise  they  shall  take  by 
right  of  representation.  7.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  lineal  de- 
scendants or  kindred,  such  real  estate  shall  escheat  to  the  United 
States.'-  8.  An  adopted  child  shall  be  deemed,  for  the  purposes 
of  inheritance,  the  same  as  if  he  had  been  born  in  lawful  wed- 
lock, except  that  he  shall  not  be  capable  of  inheriting  property 
expressly  limited  to  heirs  of  the  body  or  bodies  of  the  adoptive 
parent  or  parents,  nor  shall  he  inherit  property  from  the  lineal 
or  collateral  kindred  of  such  parent  or  parents  by  right  of  rep- 
resentation." 9.  An  alien  may  acquire  lands  by  inheritance,  but 
such  lands  must  be  sold  within  ten  years  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
for  value.  10.  When  any  man  and  his  wife  shall  be  seised  in 
her  right  of  any  estate  of  inheritance  in  lands,  the  husband  shall, 
on  the  death  of  his  wife,  hold  the  lands  for  his  life  as  tenant 
thereof  by  curtesy,  although  such  husband  and  wife  may  not 
have  had  issue  born  alive."  11.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from 
the  mother  but  not  through  her.  The  mother  inherits  from  her 
illegitimate  child  who  dies  without  leaving  a  widow,  husband,  or 
lawful  issue.  Illegitimate  children  are  legitimatized  by  the  mar- 
riage of  their  parents.''^    12.  Posthumous  children  are  considered 

12  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  §  168.  i"'  Carter's   Ann.   Code   1900,   ch.  5, 

13  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  4.         §§  171,  172. 
"  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  8. 


§    837  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  874 

as  living  at  the  death  of  their  parent."  13.  Kindred  of  the  half- 
blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the  same 
degree.^^  14.  Degrees  of  kindred  are  computed  according  to  the 
civil  law.^^  15.  The  widow  is  entitled  to  the  use  during  her  life 
of  one-third  part  in  value  of  all  the  lands  whereof  her  husband 
died  seised  of  an  estate  of  inheritance.  Dower  may  be  barred 
by  jointure  settled  on  her  with  her  assent  before  marriage,  pro- 
viding such  jointure  consists  of  a  freehold  estate  in  lands,  for  at 
least  the  life  of  the  wife,  to  take  effect  in  possession  or  profit 
immediately  upon  the  death  of  the  husband.^"  16.  Any  estate, 
real  or  personal,  that  may  have  been  given  by  the  intestate  in  his 
lifetime,  as  an  advancement  to  any  child  or  other  lineal  descend- 
ant, shall  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate, 
so  far  as  regards  the  division  and  distribution  thereof  among  his 
issue,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or  other  descendant  to- 
ward his  share  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate.  If  the  amount  of 
such  advancement  shall  exceed  the  share  of  the  heir  so  advanced, 
he  shall  be  excluded  from  any  further  portion  in  the  division  and 
distribution  of  the  estate,  but  he  may  not  be  required  to  refund 
any  part  of  such  advancement;  and  if  the  amount  so  received 
shall  be  less  than  his  share,  he  shall  be  entitled  to  as  much  more 
as  will  give  him  his  full  share  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased.  If 
such  advancement  be  made  in  real  estate,  the  value  thereof  shall, 
for  the  purposes  mentioned  herein,  be  considered  a  part  of  the 
real  estate  to  be  divided;  and  if  it  be  personal  estate,  it  shall  be 
considered  a  part  of  the  personal  estate;  and  if  in  either  case  it 
shall  exceed  the  share  of  real  estate  and  personal  estate  respect- 
ively, that  would  have  come  to  the  heir  so  advanced,  he  shall 
not  refund  any  part  of  it,  but  shall  receive  so  much  less  out  of 
the  other  part  of  the  estate  as  will  make  his  whole  share  equal 
to  those  of  the  other  heirs  who  are  in  the  same  degree  with 
him.^'' 

§  837.  Arizona. — In  Arizona,  a  person  dying  intestate, 
and  leaving  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  his  estate  shall  descend 
and  pass  in  parcenary  to  his  kindred,  male  and  female,  in  the  fol- 
lowing course :     1.  To  his  children  and  descendants.    2.  If  there 

i*"' Carter's  Ann.    Code   1900,   ch.   5,         is  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  18, 
§  181.  §  173. 

17  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  18,         i9  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  7. 
§  173.  20  Carter's  Ann.  Code  1900,  ch.  5. 


875  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    837 

be  no  children  nor  their  descendants,  then  to  his  father  and 
mother  in  equal  portions.  But  if  only  the  father  or  mother  sur- 
vive the  intestate,  then  his  estate  shall  be  divided  into  two  equal 
portions,  one  of  which  shall  pass  to  such  survivor,  and  the  other 
half  shall  pass  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased  and  to 
their  descendants;  but  if  there  be  none  then  the  whole  estate 
shall  be  inherited  by  the  surviving  father  or  mother.  3.  If  there 
be  neither  father  nor  mother,  then  the  whole  of  such  estate  shall 
pass  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  and  to  their  de- 
scendants. 4.  If  without  kindred  then  the  whole  estate  shall  be 
divided  into  two  moieties,  one  of  which  shall  go  to  the  paternal 
and  the  other  to  the  maternal  kindred;  and  if  only  one  of  these 
be  living  then  the  estate  shall  be  divided  into  two  equal  parts,  one 
of  which  shall  go  to  the  survivor  and  the  other  to  the  descend- 
ants of  such  deceased's  grandfather  or  grandmother.  If  there 
be  no  surviving  grandfather  or  grandmother,  then  the  whole 
estate  shall  go  to  their  descendants."'  5.  Where  any  person  shall 
die  intestate  and  shall  leave  a  husband  or  wife,  the  estate  shall 
descend  in  the  following  course:  (1)  If  the  deceased  have  a 
child  or  children,  or  their  descendants,  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  shall  be  entitled  for  life  to  one-third  of  the  land  of  the 
intestate,  with  remainder  to  the  child  or  children,  or  their  de- 
scendants. (2)  If  deceased  have  no  child  or  children,  or  their 
descendants,  then  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  shall  be  entitled 
to  one-half  of  the  land  of  the  intestate  without  remainder  to  any 
person,  and  the  other  half  shall  pass  and  be  inherited  according 
to  the  rules  of  descent  and  distribution;  provided,  however,  that 
if  the  deceased  have  neither  father  nor  mother,  then  the  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife  shall  be  entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  estate.^^ 
6.  On  the  death  of  the  husband  one-half  of  the  community  prop- 
erty shall  go  to  the  surviving  wife,  the  other  half  is  subject  to 
testamentary  disposition  by  the  husband,  but  in  the  absence  of 
such  disposition,  that  half  goes  to  the  descendants  equally  if  such 
descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  decedent, 
otherwise  it  goes  according  to  the  right  of  representation ;  in  the 
absence  of  such  disposition  and  descendants,  it  is  subject  to  dis- 
tribution in  the  same  manner  as  his  separate  property.  On  the 
death  of  the  wife  one-half  of  the  community  property  goes  to 

21  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1091.  22  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1092. 


838 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


876 


the  surviving  husband,  the  other  half  is  subject  to  testamentary 
disposition  by  the  wife,  and  in  the  aljsence  of  such  disposition 
that  half  goes  to  the  descendants  equally  if  such  descendants  are 
of  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  decedent,  otherwise  it  goes 
according  to  the  right  of  representation.  In  the  absence  of  such 
disposition  by  the  wife,  and  descendants,  it  is  distributed  in  the 
same  manner  as  separate  property  of  the  husband. ■•"'  7.  Aliens 
can  not  acquire  property  by  descent,  except  mineral  lands. ^*  8. 
Ancestral  property  not  recognized,  except  that  if  the  intestate 
was  the  legally  adopted  heir  of  another  and  leave  no  husband, 
wife,  or  children,  the  property  derived  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent 
from  the  person  who  adopted  him  shall  descend  to  the  heirs  of 
such  person. ^^  9.  Collaterals  of  the  half-blood  take  half  portions 
when  they  share  with  the  whole-blood.  \A'hen  there  are  no  heirs  of 
the  whole-blood  to  share  with  they  take  the  whole  portion.-"  10. 
Only  posthumous  children  who  are  lineal  descendants  of  the  in- 
testate can  inherit  his  property. "^  11.  Illegitimate  children  in- 
herit from  and  through  their  mother.  Marriage  of  the  parents 
of  an  illegitimate  child  and  the  subsequent  recognition  of  such 
child  by  the  father,  renders  such  child  legitimated^  12.  Children 
or  their  descendants  to  whom  advancements  have  been  made, 
must  bring  such  advancements  into  hotchpot,  and  account  there- 
for in  value  as  of  the  date  of  the  advancement.*^  13.  All  heirs 
in  the  same  degree  take  per  capita;  but  where  some  of  those  in 
the  same  degree  are  dead  and  their  issue  are  enttiled  to  partition, 
such  issue  shall  take  per  stirpes. ^° 

§  838.  Arkansas. — In  Arkansas,  upon  the  death  of  an  in- 
testate, his  real  and  personal  property  shall  be  distributed  in  par- 
cenary to  his  male  and  female  kindred,  subject  to  his  debts  and 
widow's  dower,  as  follows:  1.  To  children  and  their  descend- 
ants in  equal  parts.  2.  If  there  be  no  children,  then  to  the  father, 
then  to  the  mother.  3.  To  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  their 
descendants  in  equal  parts.  4.  To  the  grandfather,  grandmother, 
uncles,  and  aunts,  and  their  descendants,  in  equal  parts,  and  so 
on  without  end,  passing  to  the  nearest  lineal  ancestor  and  their 
children  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts. ^^     5.  If  there  are 


23  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1100. 

2*  Rev.  Stat.  1913.  §  4716. 

25  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1093. 

2"  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1095. 

27  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1097. 


28  Rev.  Stat.  1913.  §  1104. 

2»Rev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1098. 

"ORev.  Stat.  1913,  §  1099. 
•''iKirbi^'s  Dig.  of  Stats.  1904, 
§  2636. 


877  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    838 

no  paternal  or  maternal  kindred  the  whole  shall  go  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife,  and  in  default  of  these,  it  shall  escheat 
to  the  state.^-  6.  In  case  there  be  no  descendants,  and  the  estate 
came  from  the  father  of  the  intestate,  it  shall  descend  to  the 
father  and  his  heirs;  if  it  came  from  the  mother,  it  shall  de- 
scend to  her  and  her  heirs.  But  if  the  estate  be  a  new  acquisi- 
tion it  shall  ascend  to  the  father  for  his  lifetime,  and  then  in 
remainder  to  the  collateral  kindred  as  above  stated.  In  default 
of  a  father,  then  to  the  mother  for  her  lifetime,  then  to  the  col- 
lateral heirs,  the  brothers  and  sisters ;  and  the  descendants  of  the 
father  are  preferred  to  those  of  the  mother.^^  7.  If  a  husband 
die,  leaving  a  widow  and  no  children,  such  widow  shall  be  en- 
dowed in  fee  simple  of  one-half  of  the  real  estate  of  which  such 
husband  died  seised,  where  said  estate  is  a  new  acquisition,  and 
not  an  ancestral  estate;  and  one-half  of  the  personal  estate,  absp- 
lutely  and  in  her  own  right,  as  against  collateral  heirs,  but,  as 
against  creditors,  she  shall  be  endowed  with  one-third  of  the  real 
estate  in  fee  simple  if  a  new  acquisition  and  not  ancestral,  and 
one-third  of  the  personal  property  absolutely.  Provided,  if  the 
real  estate  of  the  husband  be  an  ancestral  estate  she  shall  be  en- 
dowed in  a  life  estate  of  one-half  of  said  estate  as  against  col- 
lateral heirs,  and  one-third  as  against  creditors.^*  8.  Posthumous 
children  of  the  intestate  inherit  as  if  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
intestate ;  but  no  right  of  inheritance  accrues  to  any  other  heirs 
unless  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate.^^  9.  Illegitimate  chil- 
dren may  inherit  from  the  mother.^''  10.  Relatives  of  the  half 
and  whole-blood  share  alike ;  but  where  the  inheritance  comes 
from  an  ancestor,  those  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  are  ex- 
cluded." 11.  In  cases  not  provided  for,  the  inheritance  de- 
scends according  to  the  course  of  the  common  law.^^  12.  A  per- 
son may  make  another  his  heir-at-law  by  a  declaration  in  writ- 
ing, acknowledged  by  any  proper  officer  and  recorded.^^  13. 
When  the  inheritance  descends  to  several,  they  inherit  as  tenants 

•'•^Kirby's  Dig.     of     Stats.     1904,         sn  KJrby's     Dig.     of     Stats.     1904, 

§  3642.  §  2638. 

33Kirby's  Dig.     of     Stats.     1904,         ^7  Kirby's     Dig.     of     Stats.     1904, 

§  2645.  §  2647. 

s^Kirby's  Dig.    of    Stats.    1904,   ch.        38  Kirby's     Dig.     of     Stats.     1904, 

55.  §  2648. 

35  Kirby's  Dig.     of     Stats.     1904,        so  Kirby's     Dig.     of     Stats.     1904, 

§  2637.  §  2658. 


§    839  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  878 

in  common/"  14.  Advancements  made  to  any  child  or  other 
lineal  descendant  must  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  so 
far  as  regards  the  division  and  distribution  thereof,  and  must  be 
taken  by  such  child  or  descendant  toward  his  share  of  the  estate. 
In  no  case  is  he  compelled  to  refund  any  part  of  the  advance- 
ment. When  such  advancement  is  made  in  real  estate  it  is  to  be* 
considered  part  of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided;  \vhen  in  per- 
sonal estate,  as  part  of  the  personal  estate.  If  in  either  case  it 
exceeds  his  share  of  the  realty  or  personalty,  he  receives  so  much 
less  of  the  other  as  will  make  his  whole  share  equal.  The  value 
of  the  advancement  is  to  be  taken  as  expressed  in  the  convey- 
ance or  charge  thereof  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  receipt  given  by 
the  person  advanced;  failing  such  expression  it  is  estimated  ac- 
cording to  the  value  when  given." 

§  839.  California. — In  California  the  separate  property  of 
an  intestate  descends  to  his  heirs  in  the  following  course:  1.  If 
the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  only  one 
child,  or  the  lawful  issue  of  one  child,  in  equal  shares  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife  and  child,  or  issue  of  such  child.  2.  If 
a  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  more  than  one  child,  or  one 
child  living  and  the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  chil- 
dren, one-third  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  the  remain- 
der in  equal  shares  to  the  children  and  to  the  lawful  issue  of  any 
deceased  child,  by  right  of  representation;  but  if  there  be  no 
child  living,  the  remainder  goes  to  all  the  lineal  descendants,  and 
if  they  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kinship  to  the  decedent,  they 
share  equally,  otherwise  by  right  of  representation.  3.  If  the  de- 
cedent leaves  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  the  whole  estate 
goes  to  the  children  and  their  issue  by  right  of  representation, 
share  and  share  alike.  4.  If  there  be  no  issue,  the  estate  goes 
one-half  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  the  other  half  to 
the  father  and  mother  in  equal  shares;  or,  if  one  be  dead,  to  the 
survivor.  5.  If  there  be  no  father  or  mother,  then  their  one- 
half  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  to  the 
children  or  grandchildren  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by 
right  of  representation.  6.  If  there  be  no  issue,  or  husband  or 
wife,  the  estate  goes  to  the  father  and  mother,  or  the  survivor, 

40Kirby's     Dig.     of     Stats.     1904,        4i  Kirby's     Dig.     of     Stats.      1904, 
§  2649.  §§  2650-2653. 


879  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    839 

or  if  both  be  dead,  then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sis- 
ters and  to  the  children  or  grandchildren  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  7.  If  a  decedent  leave  a 
surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  neither  issue,  father,  mother, 
brother,  or  sister,  nor  children  nor  grandchildren  of  brother  or 
sister,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife. 
8.  If  the  decedent  leave  neither  issue,  husband,  wife,  father, 
mother,  brother,  or  sister,  the  estate  must  go  to  the  next  of  kin 
in  equal  shares,  except  those  claiming  through  nearest  ancestors 
preferred.  9.  If  the  decedent  leaves  several  children,  or  one 
child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more  children,  and  any  such  surviv- 
ing child  dies  under  age,  and  not  having  been  married,  all  the 
estate  that  came  to  the  deceased  child  by  inheritance  from  such 
decedent  descends  in  equal  shares  to  the  other  children  of  the 
same  parent,  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such  other  children,  who  are 
dead,  by  right  of  representation.  10.  If  at  the  death  of  such 
child,  who  dies  under  age,  not  having  been  married,  all  the  other 
children  of  his  parents  are  also  dead,  and  any  of  them  have  left 
issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  such  child  by  inheritance  from  his 
parents  descends  to  the  issue  of  all  other  children  of  the  same 
parent;  and  if  all  the  issue  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to 
the  child,  they  share  the  estate  equally,  otherwise  they  take  ac- 
cording to  the  right  of  representation.  11.  If  the  deceased  is  a 
widow,  or  widower,  and  leave  no  issue,  and  the  estate,  or  any 
portion  thereof,  was  common  property  of  such  decedent  and  his 
or  her  deceased  spouse,  while  such  spouse  was  living,  such  prop- 
erty goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  of  such  deceased  spouse 
and  to  the  descendants  of  such  children  by  right  of  representa- 
tion, and  if  none,  then  one-half  of  such  common  property  goes 
to  the  father  and  mother  of  such  decedent  in  equal  shares,  or  to 
the  survivor  of  them  if  either  be  dead,  or  if  both  be  dead,  then 
in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  such  decedent  and 
to  the  descendants  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister  by  right  of 
representation,  and  the  other  half  goes  to  the  father  and  mother 
of  such  deceased  spouse  in  equal  shares,  or  to  the  surv'ivor  of 
them  if  either  be  dead,  or  if  both  be  dead  then  in  equal  shares 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  such  deceased  spouse  and  to  the 
descendants  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister  by  right  of  rep- 
resentation. 12.  If  the  estate,  or  any  portion  thereof,  was  sep- 
arate property  of  such  deceased  spouse,  while  living,  and  came 


§    839  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  880 

to  such  decedent  from  such  spouse  by  descent,  devise,  or  bequest, 
such  property  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  of  such  spouse 
and  to  the  descendants  of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  repre- 
sentation, and  if  none,  then  to  the  father  and  mother  of  such 
spouse,  in  equal  shares,  or  to  the  survivor  of  them  if  either  be 
dead,  or  if  both  be  dead,  then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and 
sisters  of  such  spouse  and  to  the  descendants  of  any  deceased 
brother  or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  13.  If  the  decedent 
leave  no  husband,  wife,  or  kindred,  and  therAe  no  heirs  to  take 
his  estate,  or  any  portion  thereof,  under  the  foreign  rules,  the 
same  escheats  to  the  state.^^  14.  The  community  property  is  dis- 
tributed as  follows:  Upon  the  death  of  the  husband,  one-half 
goes  to  the  surviving  wife,  and  if  the  husband  dies  intestate,  the 
other  half  is  distributed  as  separate  property,  except  that  the 
widow  does  not  share  in  that  with  descendants.  Upon  the  death 
of  the  wife  the  entire  community  property,  without  administra- 
tion, belongs  to  the  surviving  husband.^^  15.  An  adopted  child 
and  its  adoptive  parent  sustain  toward  each  other  the  legal  rela- 
tions of  parent  and  child,  and  inherit  from  each  other.**  16. 
Every  illegitimate  child  is  in  all  cases  an  heir  of  his  mother,  and 
inherits  in  the  same  manner  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  but 
does  not  represent  father  or  mother  to  inherit  from  any  kindred, 
unless  the  parents  have  married,  and  the  father,  after  such  mar- 
riage, has  acknowledged  him  or  adopted  him.  And  the  issue  of 
marriages  null  in  law  are  legitimate.  If  an  illegitimate  child,  un- 
acknowledged and  unadopted  by  the  father,  die  intestate  without 
issue,  his  estate  descends  to  his  mother  or  her  heirs.  17.  Kin- 
dred of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole- 
blood  in  the  same  degree,  unless  the  inheritance  came  to  the  intes- 
tate by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  of  some  one  of  his  ancestors,  in 
which  case  all  those  who  are  not  out  of  the  blood  of  such  ances- 
tors must  be  excluded  from  such  inheritance.*^  18.  Advance- 
ments made  to  children  or  other  lineal  descendants  must  be  ac- 
counted for,  but  need  not  be  refunded.  All  gifts  and  grants  are 
advancements,  if  so  expressed  in  the  instrument  of  advancement 
or  acknowledged  as  such  -by  the  person  to  whom  the  gift  has 
been  made.     If  the  value  of  the  gift  be  expressed  it  will  be  so 

42  Civ.  Code  1915.  §  1386.  "4  civ.  Code  1915.  §  228. 

«Civ.    Code    1915,    §§    1384,    1386,        ^^  civ.  Code  1915,  §  1394. 
1401,  1402. 


881  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    840 

held  in  the  distribution ;  otherwise  the  vaUie  of  the  advancement 
is  taken  as  of  the  date  of  the  gift.**' 

§  840.  Colorado. — In  Colorado,  where  the  intestate  leave 
a  husband  or  wife  surviving  the  estate  descends  as  follows:  1. 
If  there  are  no  children  or  their  descendants  the  whole  estate  goes 
to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  2.  If  there  be  surviving  chil- 
dren or  descendants  of  children,  then  one-half  goes  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife  and  the  other  half  to  the  children 
or  descendants  of  children.  3.  If  there  be  no  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife  the  estate  descends  as  follows:  (1)  To  the 
surviving  children  or  descendants  of  children  who  are  dead,  such 
descendants  collectively  taking  the  share  which  the  parents, 
if  living,  would  have  taken.  (2)  If  there  be  no  children 
nor  their  descendants,  then  to  the  father  and  mother,  share  and 
share  alike;  if  there  be  no  father,  then  to  the  mother;  if  no 
mother,  then  to  the  father;  and  if  neither  father  nor  mother,  then 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters,  and  to  the  descendants  of  brothers 
and  sisters  who  are  dead,  the  descendants  collectively  taking  the 
share  of  their  immediate  ancestors  in  equal  parts.  (3)  If  none 
of  the  relatives  above  enumerated  are  living,  then  to  the  grand- 
father, grandmother,  uncles,  aunts,  and  their  descendants,  the 
descendants  taking  collectively  the  share  of  their  immediate  an- 
cestors in  equal  parts.  (4)  If  none  of  the  above  enumerated  rela- 
tives be  living,  then  to  the  nearest  lineal  ancestors  and  their  de- 
scendants, the  descendants  taking  collectively  the  share  of  their 
immediate  ancestors  in  equal  parts.  *'  4.  Posthumous  children 
inherit  in  like  manner  as  if  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate.'*- 

5.  Children  of  the  half-blood  inherit  the  same  as  children  of  the 
whole-blood ;  but  collateral  relatives  of  the  half-blood  inherit  only 
half  the  measure   of  collateral   relatives  of  the  whole-blood.*'' 

6.  Adopted  children  inherit  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  but 
upon  the  decease  of  the  foster-parent  or  parents  and  the  subse- 
quent decease  of  the  adopted  child  or  children  without  issue,  the 
property  of  such  adopting  parents  descends  to  his  or  her  next  of 
kin,  and  not  to  the  next  of  kin  of  such  adopted  child. ^°  7.  Illegit- 
imate children  inherit  the  same  as  those  born  in  wedlock  if  the 

4"  Civ.  Code  1915,  §§  1395-1399.  4d  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912.  §  7840. 

4-  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §  7838.  so  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §  7840. 

48  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912,  §  7839. 

56 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    841  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  882 

parents  subsequently  intermarry  and  such  children  be  recognized 
after  such  intermarriage  by  the  father  to  be  his.^^ 

§  841.  Connecticut. — In  Connecticut  the  estate  of  the  in- 
testate descends  in  the  following  course:  1.  To  the  children  of 
the  intestate  and  the  legal  representatives  of  those  who  may  be 
dead.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  any  legal  representatives  of 
children,  then  to  the  parent  or  parents  of  the  intestate.  3.  If 
there  be  no  children  or  any  representatives  of  children,  nor  par- 
ent, then  equally  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  of 
the  whole-blood  and  those  who  legally  represent  them.  4.  If 
there  be  none  of  the  above,  then  equally  to  the  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  half-blood  and  those  who  equally  represent  them.  5. 
If  there  be  none  of  the  above  mentioned  kindred,  then  equally  to 
the  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree,  kindred  of  the  whole-blood  to 
take  in  preference  to  kindred  of  the  half-blood  in  equal  degree, 
and  no  representatives  to  be  admitted  among  collaterals  after  the 
representatives  of  brothers  and  sisters.  6.  All  the  real  estate  of 
the  intestate  which  came  to  him  by  descent,  gift  or  devise  from 
any  kinsman  shall  go :  ( 1 )  Equally  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of 
the  intestate  and  those  who  legally  represent  them  of  the  blood 
of  the  person  or  ancestor  from  whom  such  estate  came  or  de- 
scended; and  (2)  in  case  there  be  no  brothers  and  sisters  or  legal 
representatives  as  aforesaid,  then  equally  to  the  children  of  such 
person  or  ancestor  and  those  who  legally  represent  them ;  and  (3) 
if  there  be  no  such  children  or  their  representatives,  then  equally 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  such  person  or  ancestor  and  those 
who  legally  represent  them;  and  (4)  if  there  be  none  such,  then 
it  shall  1)e  divided  in  the  same  manner  as  other  real  estate;  pro- 
vided that  when  such  intestate  shall  be  a  minor,  and  shall  not 
leave  any  lineal  descendants  or  brother  or  sister  of  the  whole- 
blood,  or  any  descendants  of  such  brother  or  sister,  or  any  parent, 
such  estate  shall  be  distributed  equally  to  the  next  of  kin  to  the 
intestate  of  the  blood  of  the  person  or  ancestor  from  whom  such 
estate  came  or  descended ;  and  if  there  be  no  such  kindred  then  to 
the  next  of  kin  of  the  intestate  generally.^"  7.  Illegitimate  chil- 
dren are  legitimatized  by  the  subsequent  marriage"  of  their  par- 
ents and  recognition  of  them  as  their  own.^^    8.  The  right  of  in- 

51  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.  1912.  §  7844.  53  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  §  396. 

=2  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  §§  396-398. 


8S3  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    842 

heritance  of  nonresident  aliens  is  limited.^"*  9.  An  adopted  child 
inherits  from  its  adoptive  parents  and  their  relatives  and  not 
from  its  natural  parents  and  their  relatives,  and  the  adopting  par- 
ent inherits  from  such  child.  When  a  surviving  parent  of  a 
minor  child  shall  remarry,  or  when  a  single  person  who  has  an 
adopted  minor  child  shall  marry,  the  other  party  to  such  marriage 
or  remarriage  may  adopt  such  minor  child,  and  such  child  shall 
then  inherit  from  such  adopting  parent  and  relatives  instead  of 
from  relatives  of  any  parent  deceased  at  the  time  of  such  adop- 
tion.^^  10.  When  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  has  re- 
ceived an  advancement,  he,  Or  his  representative  shall  receive  only 
so  much  of  the  estate  as  will,  together  with  the  advancement, 
make  his  share  equal  to  what  he  would  have  received  had  no 
advancement  been  made.^^ 

§  842.  Delaware. — In  Delaware,  when  any  person  dies  in- 
testate, having  title  or  right,  legal  or  equitable,  in  fee  simple,  to 
any  lands,  tenements  or  hereditaments,  such  estate  descends,  sub- 
ject to  dower  or  curtesy,  in  coparcenary  as  follows:  1.  To  the 
children  of  the  intestate;  and  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased 
child,  by  right  of  representation.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or 
lawful  issue  of  deceased  children,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  intestate  of  the  whole-blood  and  their  issue,  by  right 
of  representation.  3.  Where  the  estate  came  to  the  intestate  by 
descent  or  devise  from  his  parent  or  ancestor,  and  there  be  no 
issue  of  the  intestate,  then  to  his  brothers  and  sisters  and  their 
issue  by  right  of  representation,  provided  that  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  whole-blood  and  their  issue,  shall  be  preferred  to 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  and  their  issue.  4.  If  the 
intestate  left  no  issue  or  their  descendants,  nor  brothers  or  sisters 
or  the  issue  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  then  the  estate  goes 
to  the  intestate's  father.  5.  If  there  be  neither  children  or  their 
issue,  brothers  or  sisters  or  their  issue,  nor  father,  the  estate  goes 
to  the  mother  of  the  intestate.  6.  If  there  be  no  such  kindred  as 
above  mentioned,  then  the  estate  goes  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal 
degree,  and  their  issue  by  right  of  representation;  provided  that 
collateral  kindred,  claiming  through  a  nearer  common  ancestor, 
shall  be  preferred  to  those  claiming  through  one  more  remote. ^^ 

54  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  §§  4410,  4411.      so  Qen.  Stat.  1902,  §  396. 

55  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  §  234.  "  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3267. 


§    843  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  884 

7.  Posthumous  cliildren  arc  considered  as  though  hving  at  the 
death  of  the  intestate. ^^  8.  When  an  illegitimate  child  dies  in- 
testate and  without  lawful  issue,  the  mother,  if  living,  inherits  the 
estate,  and  if  she  be  dead,  it  goes  to  her  lawful  issue,  share  and 
share  alike. ^"  9.  Aliens  take  title  to  real  estate  by  inheritance 
the  same  as  citizens.'^'*  10.  Children  legally  adopted  have  the 
same  rights  of  inheritance  as  natural  children.*'^ 

§  843.  District  of  Columbia. — In  the  District  of  Columbia 
the  lands,  tenements,  and  hereditaments  of  an  intestate  descends 
as  follows :  1.  To  the  child  or  children  and  their  descendants,  if 
any,  equally.  2.  If  there  be  no  child  or  children  or  their  de- 
scendants, and  the  estate  descended  to  the  intestate  on  the  part 
of  the  father,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  of 
the  blood  of  the  father  and  their  descendants  equally.  3.  If 
there  be  no  brother  or  sister  as  aforesaid,  or  a  descendant  from 
such  brother  or  sister,  then  to  the  grandfather  on  the  part  of  the 
father.  4.  If  the  estate  descended  to  the  intestate  on  the  part 
of  the  mother,  then  it  follows  the  mother's  line.  5.  If  the  estate 
vested  in  the  intestate  by  purchase,  it  descends :  ( 1 )  To  the  chil- 
dren or  their  descendants,  (2)  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
whole-blood  of  the  intestate  and  their  descendants  in  equal  de- 
gree, equally,  (3)  to  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  and 
their  descendants,  (4)  to  the  father,  (5)  to  the  mother,  (6)  to 
the  grandfather  and  his  descendants.  6.  If  there  be  no  descend- 
ants or  kindred,  then  it  goes  to  the  husband  or  wife,  or  his  or  her 
kindred.     7.  Aliens  may  inherit  real  estate  the  same  as  citizens. 

8.  Advancements  made  to  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant 
must  be  brought  into  hotchpot,  if  there  be  another  child  or  chil- 
dren unprovided  for.  9.  Illegitimate  children  are  legitimatized 
by  the  subsequent  marriage  of  their  parents  and  acknowledgment 
of  such  children  as  legitimate  by  the  father.  10.  Posthumous 
children  of  the  intestate  and  their  descendants  inherit  as  if  born 
at  the  death  of  the  intestate. 

§  844.  Florida. — In  Florida,  whenever  any  person  having 
title  to  real  estate  of  inheritance  shall  die  intestate  as  to  such 
estate,  it  shall  descend  in  parcenary  to  the  male  and  female  kin- 
dred as  follows  :    1.  To  the  children  or  their  descendants  and  the 

58  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3268.  co  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3194. 

59  Rev.  Code  1915,  ch.  28,  §  27.  "  Rev.  Code  1915,  §  3067. 


885  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    844 

husband,  if  the  decedent  be  a  married  woman  and  the  husband 
survive  her.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants,  and 
the  decedent  be  a  married  woman,  and  her  husband  survive  her, 
all  the  property,  real  and  personal,  shall  go  to  the  husband.  3.  If 
there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants,  and  the  decedent  be  a 
married  man  and  his  wife  survive  him,  all  his  property,  real  and 
personal,  shall  go  to  the  wife.  4.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their 
descendants,  and  no  husband  or  wife,  then  to  the  father  and 
mother  in  equal  parts  or  all  to  the  survivor.  5.  If  there  be  no 
children  or  their  descendants,  nor  husband  or  wife,  nor  father  or 
mother,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants,  or 
such  of  them  as  there  may  be.  6.  If  there  be  none  of  the  afore- 
said, the  inheritance  shall  be  divided  into  moieties,  one  of  which 
shall  go  to  the  paternal,  the  other  to  the  maternal  kindred  in  the 
following  course,  namely:  (1)  To  the  grandfather.  (2)  If  no 
grandfather,  then  to  the  grandmother,  uncles  and  aunts  on  the 
same  side,  and  their  descendants,  or  such  of  them  as  there  be. 
(3)  If  there  be  no  grandmother,  uncle  or  aunt,  or  their  descend- 
ants, then  to  the  great-grandfathers,  or  great-grandfather  if  there 
be  but  one.  (4)  If  there  be  no  great-grandfathers,  then  to  the 
great-grandmothers,  or  great-grandmother  if  there  be  but  one; 
and  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  great-grandfathers  and  great- 
grandmothers  and  their  descendants,  or  such  of  them  as  there  be. 
(5)  And  so  in  other  cases  without  end,  passing  to  the  nearest 
lineal  male  ancestors,  and  for  want  of  them,  to  the  lineal  female 
ancestors,  in  the  same  degree,  and  the  descendants  of  such  male 
and  female  ancestors,  or  such  of  them  as  there  may  be.*^" 
7.  Adopted  children  inherit  as  heirs  at  law.''^  8.  Aliens  have  the 
same  rights  to  inheritance  as  citizens."^  9.  The  homestead  de- 
scends to  the  widow  if  there  be  no  children;  but  if  there  be  a 
child  or  children,  she  shall  be  entitled  to  dower  or  a  child's  part 
as  she  may  elect.*^^  10.  Posthumous  children  of  the  intestate  in- 
herit the  same  as  if  born  at  the  death  of  the  intestate. "^"^  11.  Ille- 
gitimate children  are  capable  of  inheriting  or  transmitting  inheri- 
t-ance  on  the  part  of  the  mother.^'^  12.  Advancements  made  to 
children  must  be  brought  into  hotchpot,  and  the  advancement 
must  be  valued  as  of  the  date  when  made  and  not  at  the  death  of 

62  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2295.  bs  Gen.  Stat.  1906.  §  2297. 

«3Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2301.  cg  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2290. 

64  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2291.  «7  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2292. 


§    845  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  886 

the  intestate.''^  13.  Collaterals  of  the  half-blood  inherit  only 
half  as  much  as  collaterals  of  the  whole-blood. '*'•' 

§  845.  Georgia. — In  Georgia  the  estate  of  an  intestate  de- 
scends as  follows:  1,  If  the  intestate  leave  a  husband  surviving 
he  takes  the  entire  estate,  unless  she  leave  children  or  descendants 
of  children,  in  which  event  he  and  the  children  take  share  and 
share  alike,  but  descendants  of  children  take  per  stirpes.  2.  If 
the  intestate  leave  a  wife  surviving  she  takes  the  entire  estate, 
unless  there  are  children,  or  those  representing  children  deceased, 
in  which  event  the  wife  shall  have  a  child's  part,  but  if  there  are 
more  than  five  children  or  their  descendants,  the  wife  shall  have 
one-fifth  part  of  the  estate.  If  the  wife  elect  to  take  dower,  she 
has  no  further  interest  in  the  realty,  3.  Children  and  their  de- 
scendants stand  in  the  first  degree  from  the  intestate  and  inherit 
equally,  accounting  for  advancements.  The  lineal  descendants 
of  children  stand  in  the  place  of  their  deceased  parents,  and  in  all 
cases  of  inheritance  from  a  lineal  ancestor,  the  distribution  is  per 
stirpes.  4.  Brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  stand  in  the 
second  degree,  and  inherit,  if  there  be  no  widow  or  surviving 
husband,  nor  children  or  their  descendants.  The  half-blood  on 
the  paternal  side  inherit  equally  with  the  whole-blood.  If  there 
be  no  brother  or  sister  of  the  whole  or  half-blood  on  the  paternal 
side,  then  those  of  the  half-blood  on  the  maternal  side  inherit. 
Children  or  grandchildren  of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters  stand 
in  the  place  of  their  parents;  but  there  is  no  representation  fur- 
ther than  this  among  collaterals.  5.  The  father  inherits  equally 
with  brothers  and  sisters  and  stands  in  the  same  degree.  If  there 
be  no  father,  but  a  mother  alive,  she  inherits  as  the  father  would. 
6.  In  all  degrees  more  remote  than  the  foregoing  the  paternal 
and  maternal  next  of  kin  stand  on  equal  footing.  7.  First 
cousins,  uncles  and  aunts  stand  next  in  degree  and  inherit  equally. 

8.  The  more  remote  degrees  are  determined  by  the  rules  of  the 
canon  law,  as  in  force  in  the  English  courts  prior  to  July  4,  1776."° 

9.  An  adopted  child  inherits  from  its  adoptive  parents,  but  such 
parent  does  not  inherit  from  such  child. '^  10.  Where  any  per- 
sons who  could  inherit  from  each  other  are  killed  or  lost,  and  it 
is  impossible  to  determine  which  died  first,  the  property  of  each 

6SGen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2302.  ^o  Code  1911,  §§  3930,  3931. 

CO  Gen.  Stat.  1906,  §  2299.  "Code  1911,  §  3016. 


887  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    846 

shall  descend  to  their  respective  heirs,  excluding-  each  as  heir  of 
the  other,  but  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  held  to  prevent 
children  of  either  from  inheriting  as  heirs  of  the  other." 
11.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  their  mother  and  from  each 
other,  children  of  the  same  mother,  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
legitimate.  If  a  mother  have  both  legitimate  and  illegitimate 
children,  they  shall  inherit  alike  the  estate  of  their  mother.  If 
an  illegitimate  child  die,  leaving  no  issue,  his  mother,  brothers 
and  sisters  inherit  his  estate  equally.  If  an  illegitimate  child  die 
intestate,  leaving  no  widow,  or  any  lineal  descendants,  or  illegiti- 
mate brother  or  sister,  or  descendant  of  a  brother  or  sister,  or 
mother,  but  shall  leave  a  brother  or  sister  of  legitimate  blood, 
such  brother  or  sister,  or  descendant  of  such  brother  or  sister  in- 
herits the  estate ;  in  default  of  any  such  person,  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  mother  of  such  illegitimate  child,  or  their  descendants, 
or  the  maternal  grandparents  of  such  illegitimate  inherits  the 
estate.^^ 

§  846.  Idaho. — The  real  and  personal  property  of  an  in- 
testate passes  to  and  is  distributed  among  his  heirs,  subject  to  the 
payment  of  his  debts,  as  follows:  1.  If  decedent  leave  a  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife  and  only  one  child,  in  equal  shares  to  such 
surviving  husband  or  wife  and  child  or  the  issue  of  such  child. 
2.  If  more  than  one  child,  one-third  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  his  children  or  their 
lawful  issue  by  right  of  representation,  but  if  no  child  is  living 
at  the  time  of  death  of  the  decedent,  the  remainder  goes  to  his 
lineal  descendants.  3.  If  not  survived  by  husband  or  wife,  the 
real  estate  goes  to  the  children  in  equal  shares.  4.  If  decedent 
leaves  no  issue,  one-half  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife 
and  the  other  half  to  the  decedent's  father  and  mother  in  equal 
shares,  and  if  either  be  dead  the  whole  of  said  half  goes  to  the 
other.  5.  If  decedent  leaves  neither  issue,  husband  nor  wife, 
the  estate  goes  to  his  father  and  mother  in  equal  shares,  or  if 
either  be  dead,  then  to  the  other.  6.  If  neither  issue,  husband, 
wife,  father  nor  mother,  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  decedent.  7.  If  the  decedent  leave 
husband  or  wife,  but  neither  issue,  father,  nor  mother,  the  whole 
estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.    8.   If  neither  issue, 

^-Code  1911,  §  3932.  *  "Code  1911,  §§  3029,  3030. 


§    847  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  888 

husband,  wife,  father,  mother,  brother,  nor  sister,  the  estate  goes 
to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree.  9.  If  the  decedent  leaves  no 
heir  or  person  entitled  to  take  the  estate  under  the  statute,  the 
same  escheats  to  the  state/* 

§  847.  Illinois. — In  Illinois,  estates,  both  real  and  per- 
sonal, of  residents  and  nonresident  proprietors  dying  intestate,  or 
whose  estates  or  any  part  thereof  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  as 
intestate  estate,  after  all  just  debts  and  claims  against  such 
estates  are  fully  paid,  shall  descend  to  and  be  distributed  in  man- 
ner following,  to  wit:  1.  To  his  or  her  children  and  their  de- 
scendants, in  equal  parts;  the  descendants  of  the  deceased  child  or 
grandchild  taking  the  share  of  their  deceased  parents  in  erpal 
parts  among  them.  2.  When  there  is  no  child  of  the  intestate, 
nor  descendant  of  such  child,  and  no  widow  or  surviving  husband, 
then  to  the  parents,  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased  and  their 
descendants,  in  equal  parts  among  them,  allowing  to  each  of  the 
parents,  if  living,  a  child's  part,  or  to  the  survivor  of  them  if  one 
l:)e  dead,  a  double  portion;  and  if  there  is  no  parent  living,  then 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and  their  descendants. 
3.  When  there  is  a  widow  or  surviving  husband,  and  no  child  or 
children,  or  descendants  of  a  child  or  children  of  the  intestate, 
then  (after  the  payment  of  all  just  debts)  one-half  of  the  real 
estate  and  the  whole  of  the  personal  estate  shall  descend  to  such 
widow  or  surviving  husband  as  an  absolute  estate  forever,  and 
the  other  half  of  the  real  estate  shall  descend  as  in  other  cases, 
where  there  is  no  child  or  children  or  descendants  of  a  child  or 
children.  4.  When  there  is  a  widow  or  a  surviving  husband,  and 
also  a  child  or  children  or  descendants  of  such  child  or  children  of 
the  intestate,  the  widow  or  surviving  husband  shall  receive,  as  his 
or  her  absolute  personal  estate,  one-third  of  all  the  personal  estate 
of  the  intestate.  5.  If  there  is  no  child  of  the  intestate  or  de- 
scendants of  such  child,  and  no  parent,  brother  or  sister  or  de- 
scendant of  such  parent,  brother  or  sister,  and  no  widow  or  sur- 
viving husband,  then  such  estate  shall  descend  in  equal  parts  to 
the  next  of  kin  to  the  intestate  in  equal  degrees,  (computing  by 
the  rules  of  the  civil  law)  and  there  shall  be  no  representation 
among  collaterals,  except  with  the  descendants  of  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  intestate;  and  in  no  case  shall  there  be  any  distinc- 

74  Rev.  Code  1908,  ch.  14. 


889  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    847 

tion  between  the  kindred  of  the  whole  and  the  half-blood.  6.  If 
any  intestate  leaves  a  widow  or  surviving  husband,  his  or  her 
estate  shall  descend  to  such  widow  or  surviving  husband.  7.  If 
the  intestate  leaves  no  kindred,  and  no  widow  or  husband,  his  or 
her  estate  shall  escheat  to  and  vest  in  the  county  in  which  said 
real  estate  or  personalt}^  or  the  greater  part  thereof,  is  situated."^ 
8.  An  illegitimate  child  shall  be  heir  of  its  mother  and  any  ma- 
ternal ancestor,  and  of  any  person  from  whom  its  mother  might 
have  inherited,  if  living;  and  the  lawful  issue  of  an  illegitimate 
person  shall  represent  such  person,  and  take,  by  descent,  any 
estate  which  the  parent  would  have  taken,  if  living.  The  estate, 
real  and  personal,  of  an  illegitimate  person,  shall  descend  to  and 
vest  in  the  widow  or  surviving  husband  and  children,  as  the 
estate  of  other  persons  in  like  cases.  In  case  of  the  death  of  an 
illegitimate  intestate  leaving  no  child  or  descendant  of  a  child, 
the  whole  estate,  personal  and  real,  shall  descend  to  and  abso- 
lutely vest  in  the  widow  or  surviving  husband.  When  there  is  no 
widow  or  surviving  husband,  and  no  child  or  descendants  of  a 
child,  the  estate  of  such  person  shall  descend  to  and  vest  in  the 
mother  and  her  children,  and  their  descendants — one-half  to  the 
mother,  and  the  other  half  to  be  equally  divided  between  her  chil- 
dren and  their  descendants,  the  descendants  of  a  child  taking  the 
share  of  their  deceased  parent  or  ancestor.  In  case  there  is  no 
heir  as  above  provided,  the  estate  of  such  person  shall  descend 
to  and  vest  in  the  next  of  kin  to  the  mother  of  such  intestate, 
according  to  the  rule  of  the  civil  law.  When  there  is  no  heirs  or 
kindred,  the  estate  of  such  person  shall  escheat  to  the  state,  and 
not  otherwise.'^"  An  illegitimate  child,  whose  parents  have  inter- 
married, and  whose  father  has  acknowledged  him  or  her  as  his 
child,  shall  be  considered  legitimate."  9.  Any  real  or  personal 
estate  given  by  an  intestate  in  his  lifetime  as  an  advancement  to 
any  child  or  lineal  descendant,  shall  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
intestate's  estate,  so  far  as  it  regards  the  divisions  and  distribu- 
tion thereof  among  his  issue,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or 
other  descendant  towards  his  share  of  the  intestate's  estate;  but 
he  shall  not  be  required  to  refund  any  part  thereof,  although  it 
exceeds  his  share.     If  such  advancement  is  made  in  real  estate, 

'5  Kurd's  Rev.   Stat.   1915-1916,  ch.         "  Hurd's  Rev.   Stat.   1915-1916,  ch. 
39,  §  1.  39,  §  3. 

76  Kurd's  Rev.   Stat.   1915-1916,  ch. 
39,  §  2. 


§    847  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  890 

and  the  value  thereof  is  expressed  in  the  conveyance  or  in  the 
charge  thereof  made  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  written  acknowl- 
edgment thereof  by  the  party  receiving  it,  it  shall  be  considered 
as  of  that  value  in  the  divisions  and  distribution  of  the  estate; 
otherwise,  it  shall  be  estimated  according  to  the  value  when 
given. '^^  No  gift  or  grant  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  made  in 
advancement  unless  so  expressed  in  writing  or  charged  in  writing, 
by  the  intestate,  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing 
by  the  child  or  other  descendant.''^  If  a  child  or  other  descendant 
so  advanced,  dies  before  the  intestate,  leaving  issue,  the  advance- 
ment shall  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  division  or  distribu- 
tion of  the  estate  of  the  intestate,  and  the  amount  thereof  shall 
be  allowed  accordingly  by  the  representatives  of  the  heirs  so  ad- 
vanced, as  so  much  received  towards  their  share  of  the  estate, 
in  like  manner  as  if  the  advancement  had  been  made  directly  to 
them.^°  10.  A  posthumous  child  of  an  intestate  shall  receive  its 
just  proportion  of  its  ancestor's  estate,  in  all  respects,  as  if  it  had 
been  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  father. ^^  If,  after  making  a  last 
will  and  testament,  a  child  shall  be  born  to  any  testator,  and  no 
provision  be  made  in  such  will  for  such  child,  the  will  shall  not 
on  that  account  be  revoked ;  but  unless  it  shall  appear  by  such  will 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  testator  to  disinherit  such  child, 
the  devises  or  legacies  by  such  will  granted  and  given,  shall  be 
abated  in  equal  proportions  to  raise  a  portion  for  such  child  equal 
to  that  which  such  child  would  have  been  entitled  to  receive  out 
of  the  estate  of  such  testator  if  he  had  died  intestate.^"  11. 
Whenever  a  devisee  or  legatee  in  any  last  will  and  testament,  be- 
ing a  child  or  grandchild  of  the  testator,  shall  die  before  such 
testator,  and  no  provision  shall  be  made  for  such  contingency,  the 
issue,  if  any  there  be,  of  such  devisee  or  legatee,  shall  take  the 
estate  devised  or  becjueathed  as  the  devisee  or  legatee  would  have 
done  had  he  survived  the  testator,  and  i.f  there  be  no  such  issue 
at  the  time  of  the  death  of  such  testator,  the  estate  disposed  of 
by  such  devise  or  legacy  shall  be  considered  and  treated  as  in- 
testate estate. ^^    12.  An  adopted  child  is  deemed,  for  the  purposes 

-5  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch.  si  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch. 
39,  §  4.  39,  §  9. 

"»  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch.  §2  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch. 
39.  §  7.  39,  §  10. 

so  Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch.  »- Kurd's  Rev.  Stat.  1915-1916,  ch. 
39,  §  8.  39,  §  11. 


A 


891  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    848 

of  inheritance,  the  child  of  the  adoptive  parents,  the  same  as  if  he 
had  been  born  to  them  in  lawful  wedlock,  except  that  he  shall 
not  be  capable  of  taking  property  expressly  limited  to  the  body 
or  bodies  of  the  adoptive  parents,  nor  property  from  the  lineal  or 
C9llateral  kindred  of  such  parents  by  right  of  representation.** 
The  parents  by  adoption  and  their  heirs  shall  take  by  descent, 
from  the  adopted  child,  and  the  descendants  and  husband  or  wife, 
'>f  such  child,  only  such  property  as  he  has  taken  from  or  through 
the  adoptive  parents.*^ 

§  848.  Indiana. — In  Indiana  the  real  and  personal  prop- 
erty of  an  intestate  descends,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife,  and  decedent's  debts,  in  the  following  man- 
ner: 1.  To  the  children  in  equal  portions.  2.  If  any  child  or 
children  of  such  intestate  shall  die  intestate,  leaving  a  child  or 
children,  such  child  or  children  shall  inherit  the  share  which 
would  have  descended  to  the  father  or  mother;  and  the  grand- 
children and  more  remote  descendants  and  all  other  relatives  of 
the  intestate,  whether  lineal  or  collateral,  shall  inherit  by  the 
same  rule;  providing,  that  if  the  intestate  shall  have  left  at  his 
death  grandchildren  only,  alive,  they  shall  inherit  equally.  3.  If 
there  be  no  lawful  issue  or  their  descendants  alive,  one-half  the 
estate  goes  to  the  father  and  mother  of  such  intestate,  as  joint 
tenants,  or  if  either  be  dead,  to  the  survivor,  and  the  other  half 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  to  the  descendants  of  such  as  are 
dead,  as  tenants  in  common.  4.  If  there  be  neither  issue,  or 
their  descendants,  nor  father  nor  mother,  the  brothers  and  sisters 
of  the  intestate  living,  and  the  descendants  of  such  as  are  dead, 
shall  take  the  inheritance  as  tenants  in  common.  If  there  be  no 
brothers  or  sisters  of  the  intestate  or  their  descendants,  the  father 
or  mother  shall  take  the  inheritance  as  joint  tenants;  and  if 
either  be  dead  the  other  shall  take  the  estate.  5.  If  there  be  no 
person  entitled  to  take  the  inheritance  according  to  the  preceding 
rules  it  shall  descend  in  the  following  way :  ( 1 )  If  the  inheritance 
came  to  the  intestate  by  gift,  devise,  or  descended  from  the  pa- 
ternal line  it  shall  go  to  the  paternal  grandfather  and  grand- 
mother, and  the  survivor  of  them;  if  neither  of  them  be  living  it 
shall  go  to  the  uncles  and  aunts  in  the  paternal  line,  and  their 

^^Hnrd's   Rev.    Stat.    1915-1916,    p.        «■•  Kurd's   Rev.   Stat.    1915-1916,   p. 
36,  §  5.  36,  §  6. 


§    848  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  892 

descendants,  if  any  of  them  be  dead;  and  if  no  such  relatives  be 
Hving.  it  shall  go  to  the  next  of  kin,  in  equal  degree  of  consan- 
guinity among  the  paternal  kindred;  and  if  there  be  none  of  the 
paternal  kindred  entitled  to  take  the  inheritance  as  above  de- 
scribed, it  shall  go  to  the  maternal  kindred  in  the  same  way. 
(2)  If  the  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  gift,  devise,  or 
descent  from  the  maternal  line,  it  shall  go  to  the  maternal  kindred 
in  the  same  way;  and  if  there  be  none  of  the  maternal  kindred 
entitled  to  take  the  inheritance,  it  shall  go  to  the  paternal  kindred 
in  the  same  way.     (3)  If  the  estate  came  to  the  intestate  other- 
wise than  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent  it  shall  be  divided  into  two 
equal  parts,  one  of  which  shall  go  to  the  paternal  and  the  other 
to  the  maternal  kindred,  in  the  way  above  described ;  and  on  the 
failure  of  either  line  the  other  shall  take  the  whole.    6.  Kindred 
of  the  half-blood  shall  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole- 
blood;  but  if  the  estate  shall  have  come  to  the  intestate  by  gift, 
devise,  or  descent  from  any  ancestor,  those  only  who  are  of  the 
blood  of  such  ancestor  shall  inherit;  provided,  that  on  failure  of 
such  kindred,  other  kindred  of  the  half-blood  shall  inherit  as  if 
they  were  the  whole-blood.    7.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from 
the  mother  as  if  they  were  legitimate,  and  through  the  mother,  if 
dead,  any  property  or  estate  which  she  would,  if  living,  have  taken 
by  gift,  devise,  or  descent  from  any  other  person.    8.  An  illegiti- 
mate child  or  children  of  a  man  dying  intestate  and  having  ac- 
knowledged such  child  or  children  during  his  lifetime  as  his  own, 
shall  inherit  his  estate,  the  same  as  if  legitimate.     9.    If  a  man 
shall  marry  the  mother  of  an  illegitimate  child,  and  acknowledge 
it  as  his  own,  such  child  shall  be  deemed  legitimate.     10.  The 
mother  of  an  illegitimate  intestate  child,  inherits  his  estate,  in  the 
absence  of  issue  or  other  descendants  of  such  child;  and  if  such 
mother  l^e  dead,  her  descendants  or  collateral  kindred  shall  take 
the  inheritance  in  the  order  hereinbefore  prescribed.     11.  In  the 
absence  of  kindred  capable  of  inheriting  the  property  of  an  in- 
testate, it  escheats  to  the  state.     12.  Posthumous  children  in- 
herit equally  with  those  born  before  the  death  of  the  intestate. 
13.  No  person  who  unlawfully  causes  the  death  of  another,  and 
shall  have  been  convicted  thereof,  or  aids  or  abets  in  such  unlaw- 
ful killing  of  another,  shall  inherit  the  estate  of  the  person  so 
unlawfully  killed.     14.  An  estate  which  shall  have  come  to  the 
intestate  by  gift  or  conveyance  in  consideration  of  love  and  af- 


I 


893  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    848 

fection,  shall,  if  the  intestate  die  without  children  or  their  de- 
scendants revert  to  the  donor,  if  living  at  the  intestate's  death, 
saving  to  the  widow  or  widower,  however,  his  or  her  rights 
therein.  15.  Curtesy  and  dower  are  abolished,  and  the  widow 
takes  one-third  of  the  estate  in  fee  simple,  free  from  debts;  pro- 
vided that,  when  the  estate  exceeds  in  value  $10,000,  she  takes 
one- fourth  only;  and  when  it  exceeds  $20,000,  one-fifth  only. 
16.  If  a  widow  marry  a  second  or  subsequent  time,  holding  real 
estate  in  virtue  of  any  previous  marriage,  and  there  be  a  child  or 
children  or  their  descendants  alive  by  such  marriage,  she  can  not 
alienate  the  estate;  and  if  during  such  subsequent  marriage  she 
die,  the  estate  goes  to  her  children  by  the  former  marriage,  if 
any  there  be.  17.  If  a  wife  die  testate  or  intestate  leaving  a  wid- 
ower, one-third  of  her  real  estate  descends  to  him  subject  to  its 
proportion  of  the  debts  of  the  wife  contracted  before  her  mar- 
riage. 18.  If  a  husband  die  intestate,  leaving  a  widow  and  one 
child  only,  his  real  estate  shall  descend  one-half  to  his  widow  and 
one-half  to  his  child.  19.  If  a  man  die  intestate  leaving  surviving 
a  second  or  subsequent  wife  without  child  by  him,  but  leaving  a 
child  or  children  or  their  descendants  alive,  by  a  previous  wife, 
such  surviving,  childless,  second  or  subsequent  wife,  shall  take 
only  a  life  estate  in  one-third  of  the  lands  of  her  deceased  hus- 
band, and  the  fee  thereof  shall  at  the  death  of  such  husband  vest 
at  once  in  such  child  or  children  or  the  descendants  of  such  as  may 
l^e  dead.^*'  20.  If  a  husband  or  wife  die  intestate,  leaving  no 
child,  but  a  father  or  mother,  of  either  of  them,  then  three- 
fourths  of  the  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  wife  or  husband,  and 
one-fourth  to  the  father  and  mother  jointly,  or  to  the  survivor  of 
them;  but  if  the  estate  does  not  exceed  $1,000,  the  whole  goes  to 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  21.  If  a  husband  or  wife  die 
intestate,  leaving  no  child  and  no  father  or  mother,  the  whole  of 
his  or  her  property,  real  and  personal,  shall  go  to  the  survivor. 
22.  If  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  of  an  intestate  shall 
have  been  advanced  by  deceased,  by  settlement  or  portion  of  real 
or  personal  property,  the  value  thereof  shall  be  reckoned  with 
that  part  of  the  surplus  of  the  personal  estate  which  shall  remain 
to  be  distributed  among  the  children;  and  if  such  advancement 
be  equal  or  superior  to  the  amovmt  which  would  be  distributed 
to  such  child  as  his  share  of  such  surplus  of  advancements,  then 

86  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  3019. 


§    849  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  894 

such  child  or  descendant,  or  those  representing  either  of  them, 
shall  be  excluded  from  any  share  in  the  distribution  of  such  sur- 
plus. But  if  such  advancement  be  not  equal  to  such  amount,  such 
child  or  descendant,  or  those  taking  as  their  representatives,  shall 
be  entitled  to  receive  so  much  only  as  shall  be  sufficient  to  make 
all  the  shares  of  all  those  entitled  to  be  equal,  as  near  as  can  be 
estimated. ^'^  23.  An  adopted  child  shall  receive  all  the  rights 
and  interests  in  the  estate  of  the  adopting  father  or  mother,  by 
descent  or  otherwise,  that  such  child  would  take  if  it  was  the 
natural  heir  of  the  adopting  father  or  mother.^^ 

§  849.  Iowa. — In  Iowa  the  property  of  an  intestate  de- 
scends, subject  to  rights  of  dower,  and  debts  against  the  estate, 
in  the  following  course:  1.  To  the  children  and  their  issue,  by 
right  of  representation.®^  2.  If  the  intestate  leaves  no  issue,  the 
whole  of  the  estate  to  the  amount  of  $7,500  after  the  payment 
of  the  debts  and  expenses  of  administration,  and  one-half  of  all 
the  estate  in  excess  of  $7,500,  goes  to  the  surviving  spouse,  and 
the  other  one-half  of  said  excess  goes  to  the  parents. °°  3.  If 
there  be  no  surviving  spouse,  the  entire  estate  goes  to  the  parent 
or  parents  of  the  intestate. ^^  4.  If  both  parents  be  dead,  the  por- 
tion that  would  have  fallen  to  them  is  disposed  of  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  they  had  outlived  the  intestate  and  died  in  the  pos- 
session thereof,  and  so  on  through  the  ascending  ancestors  and 
their  issue. °^  5.  If  the  heirs  are  not  thus  found,  the  uninherited 
portion  shall  go  to  the  wife  of  the  intestate,  or  to  her  heirs  if  she 
be  dead,  according  to  like  rule;  and  if  the  intestate  had  more 
than  one  wife,  who  either  died  or  survived  the  lawful  wedlock, 
such  uninherited  portion  shall  be  equally  divided  between  the  one 
who  is  living  and  of  the  heirs  of  those  who  are  dead,  or  between 
the  heirs  of  all,  if  all  are  dead,  such  heirs  taking  by  right  of  rep- 
resentation."^ 6.  If  there  be  no  heirs  the  estate  escheats  to  the 
state. ^*  7.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  their  mother  and 
she  from  them.  They  also  inherit  from  the  father  when  the 
paternity  is  established  during  his  lifetime  or  they  have  been 
recognized  by  him  as  his  children,  but  such  recognition  must  have 

"  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.   1914,  §§  2990-  "i  Supp.  Code  1913,  §  3379. 

3055.  «2Ann.  Code  1897.  §  3381. 

8«  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §  870.  "^  Ann.  Code  1897,  §  3382. 

»»Ann.  Code  1897,   §  3378.  s^Ann,  Code  1897,  §  3387. 
00  Supp.  Code  1913,  §  3379. 


895  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    850 

been  in  writing  or  general  and  notorious.  Under  such  circum- 
stances if  the  recognition  has  been  mutual  between  such  children 
and  their  father  he  may  inherit  from  them.^^  8.  Adopted  chil- 
dren inherit  from  their  adoptive  parent  the  same  as  if  born  in 
lawful  wedlock."*^  9.  Nonresident  aliens  are  prohibited  from 
acquiring  title  to  real  estate  by  descent,  except  that  the  widow 
and  heirs  of  naturalized  citizens,  and  of  aliens  who  have  acquired 
lands  in  this  state,  may  hold  such  lands  acquired  by  descent  for  a 
period  of  twenty  years,  at  the  end  of  which  time  they  shall  revert 
to  the  state  unless  they  have  been  sold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
for  value. ^^  10.  Any  real  or  personal  property  given  by  way  of 
advancement  to  an  heir  must  be  brought  into  hotchpot  and  is  to 
be  valued  as  of  the  time  of  the  gift,  but  if  such  advancement 
exceeds  the  amount  to  which  he  would  be  entitled  on  distribution 
he  can  not  be  required  to  refund  the  excess. °^ 

§  850.  Kansas. — In  Kansas  the  real  and  personal  property 
of  an  intestate  descends,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  surviving 
husband  or  wife  and  the  debts  of  the  decedent,  in  the  following 
course:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  the  surviving  children  and  the 
living  issue,  if  any,  of  prior  deceased  children;  but  such  issue 
shall  collectively  inherit  only  that  share  which  his  parent  would 
have  been  entitled  to  if  living.^^  2.  If  no  child  or  issue  of  child 
are  living,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  widow  or  widower.^  3. 
If  he  leave  no  issue  or  wife,  the  whole  of  his  estate  goes  to  his 
parents  or  to  the  survivor.^  4.  If  both  parents  are  dead  it  shall 
be  disposed  of  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  or  either  of  them 
had  outlived  the  intestate,  and  died  in  the  possession  and  owner- 
ship of  the  portion  thus  falling  to  them,  and  so  through  ascending 
ancestors  and  their  issue. ^  5.  Posthumous  children  inherit  as  if 
they  had  been  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate."^  6.  Illegiti- 
mate children  inherit  from  the  mother,  and  the  mother  from  such 
children.  They  inherit  from  the  father  when  recognized  by  him 
generally  and  notoriously,  or  in  writing.  The  father  of  an  ille- 
gitimate child  inherits  from  such  child  when  the  relationship  is 
mutual.     When  thus  inheriting  from  an  illegitimate  child,  the 

»5Ann.  Code  1897,  §§  3384,  3385.  i  Gen.  Stat.  1915.  §  3842. 

96  Ann.  Code  1897,  §  3253.  2  Qen.  Stat.  1915,  §  3843. 

s7Ann.  Code  1897.  §S  2889,  2890.  3  Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §  3843. 

98  Ann.  Code  1897,  §  3383.  ^Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §  3852. 

99  Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §  3841. 


§    851  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  896 

mother  and  her  heirs  take  preference  to  the  father  and  his  heirs.'^ 
7.  Children  of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  children  of  the 
whole-blood.*^  8.  Aliens  can  not  inherit  unless  the  right  is  con- 
ferred by  treaty  with  the  United  States.^  9.  Property  given  by 
way  of  advancement  to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  must 
be  brought  into  hotchpot  as  of  its  value  when  given  to  him,  but 
if  such  advancement  exceeds  the  amount  to  which  he  would  be 
entitled  he  can  not  be  jequired  to  refund  such  excess.^  10.  One- 
half  in  value  of  all  the  real  estate  in  which  a  husband  or  wife  at 
any  time  during  the  marriage  had  a  legal  or  equitable  interest, 
which  has  not  been  sold  on  execution  or  other  judicial  sale,  and 
not  necessary  for  the  payment  of  debts,  shall  be  set  apart  as  the 
property  of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  to  be  held  by  him  or 
her  in  fee  simple. °  11.  When  a  child  has  been  legally  adopted, 
the  relation  between  the  adoptive  parent  and  the  child  adopted 
shall  be  as  to  their  legal  rights  and  liabilities  the  same  as  if  the 
relation  of  parent  and  child  existed  between  them,  except  that  the 
adoptive  father  or  mother  shall  never  inherit  from  the  child ;  but 
to  all  other  persons  the  adopted  child  shall  stand  related  as  if  no 
such  act  of  adoption  had  been  taken. ^"^ 

§  851.  Kentucky. — In  Kentucky,  when  a  person  having 
right  or  title  to  real  estate  of  inheritance  shall  die  intestate  as 
to  such  estate  it  shall  descend,  subject  to  the  rights  of  husband 
or  wife,  in  parcenary  to  his  kindred,  male  and  female,  in  the  fol- 
lowing order:  1.  To  his  children  and  their  descendants.  2.  If 
there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants,  then  to  his  father  and 
mother,  if  both  are  living,  one  moiety  to  each;  but  if  the  father 
be  dead,  then  the  mother,  if  living,  shall  inherit  the  whole  estate; 
if  the  mother  be  dead,  then  the  whole  estate  shall  pass  to  the 
father.  3.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants,  nor 
father  nor  mother,  the  estate  goes  to  the  intestate's  brothers  and 
sisters  and  their  descendants.  4,  If  there  be  none  of  the  above 
mentioned,  one  moiety  shall  pass  to  the  paternal,  and  the  other 
to  the  maternal  kindred  in  the  following  order :  ( 1 )  To  the 
grandfather  and  grandmother  equally  if  living,  but  if  one  be  dead 
then  the  entire  moiety  shall  go  to  the  survivor.     (2)  If  no  grand- 

■"^Gen.  Stat.  1915.  §§  3844,  3845,    « Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §§  3848,  3849. 
3846.  3847.  "Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §  3831. 

cGen.  Stat.  1915.  §  3851.  lo  Gen.  Stat.  1915,  §  6362. 

^  Const,  of  Iowa,  §  121. 


897  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    851 

father  or  grandmother,  then  to  the  uncles  and  aunts  and  their 
descendants.  (3)  If  none,  then  to  the  great-grandfather  and 
great-grandmother  in  the  same  manner  prescribed  for  grand- 
father and  grandmother  as  in  subdivision  (1)  above.  (4)  If 
none,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  grandfather  and 
grandmother  and  their  descendants  and  so  on  with  other  cases 
without  end  passing  to  the  nearest  Hneal  ancestors  and  their  de- 
scendants as  herein  prescribed.  5.  If  there  is  no  such  kindred  of 
one  of  the  parents,  the  whole  shall  go  to  the  kindred  of  the  other. 
If  there  is  neither  paternal  nor  maternal  kindred,  the  whole  shall 
go  to  the  husband  or  wife  of  the  intestate,  or,  if  the  husband  or 
wife  is  dead,  to  his  or  her  kindred,  as  if  he  or  she  had  survived 
the  intestate,  and  died  entitled  to  the  estate. ^^  6.  When  any  or  all 
of  a  class  first  entitled  to  inherit  are  dead,  leaving  descendants, 
such  descendants  shall  take  by  stock,  i.  e.,  by  representation  the 
share  of  their  respective  parents.^"  7.  When  a  person  dies  in- 
testate without  issue  having  real  estate  of  inheritance,  the  gift  of 
either  of  his  parents,  such  parent,  if  living,  shall  inherit  the  whole 
of  such  estate."  8.  If  an  infant  dies  without  issue  having  title 
to  real  estate  derived  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent  from  one  of  his 
parents,  the  whole  shall  descend  to  that  parent  and  his  or  her 
kindred,  as  hereinbefore  directed,  if  there  are  any;  if  there  are 
none,  then  in  like  manner  to  the  other  parent  and  his  or  her  kin- 
dred; but  the  kindred  of  one  shall  not  be  excluded  by  the  kindred 
of  the  other  parent  if  the  latter  is  more  remote  than  the  grand- 
father, grandmother,  uncle  or  aunt  of  the  intestate  and  their  de- 
scendants." 9.  Collaterals  of  the  half-blood  inherit  only  one-half 
as  much  as  those  of  the  whole-blood,  or  as  ascending  kindred 
when  they  take  with  them."  10.  In  taking  title  by  descent,  it  shall 
be  no  bar  to  a  party  that  any  ancestor  from  whom  he  derives  his 
descent  from  the  intestate  is  or  has  been  an  alien.^''  11,  Illegiti- 
mate children  shall  be  capable  of  inheriting  and  transmitting  an 
inheritance  on  the  part  of  or  to  the  mother;  and  illegitimates  of 
the  same  mother  shall  be  capable  of  inheriting  and  transmitting 
an  inheritance  on  the  part  of  each  other  as  if  such  illegitimates 
were  born  in  lawful  wedlock  of  the  same  parents..  If  a  man  hav- 
ing a  child  by  a  woman,  shall  afterward  marry  her,  such  child, 

.  "Carroll's  Stat.  1915.  §  1393.       "Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  1401. 

12  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  1394.       !•' Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  1395. 

13  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  1400.       ic  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  1396. 

57 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


^    SS2  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  898 

(ir  its  descendants,  being  recognized  by  him  before  or  after  mar- 
riage, shall  be  deemed  legitimate.  The  issue  of  an  illegitimate  or 
void  marriage  shall  be  legitimate."  12.  A  child  born  of  the 
widow  within  ten  months  after  the  death  of  the  intestate  shall 
inherit  from  him  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  in  being  at  the 
time  of  such  death. ^^  13.  Any  property  or  money  given  by  a 
parent  or  grandparent  to  a  descendant  shall  be  charged  to  the 
descendant  and  those  claiming  through  him  on  distribution  of  the 
estate  of  the  parent  or  grandparent,  except  that  the  maintaining 
or  educating  or  the  giving  of  money  to  a  child  or  grandchild 
without  any  view  to  a  portion  or  settlement  in  life  shall  not  be 
deemed  an  advancement."  14.  After  the  death  of  either  the  hus- 
band or  wife,  the  survivor  shall  have  an  estate  for  his  or  her  life 
in  one-third  of  all  the  real  estate  of  which  he  or  she  or  any  one 
for  his  or  her  use,  was  seized  of  an  estate  in  fee  simple  during 
the  coverture.^"  15.  Adopted  children  are  the  legal  children  of 
their  adoptive  parents."^ 

§  852.  Louisiana. — In  Louisiana  the  estate  of  an  intestate 
descends  in  the  following  order:  1.  To  the  legitimate  children, 
without  distinction  of  sex  or  primogeniture,  and  though  they  be 
born  from  different  marriages,  they  inherit  equally  and  by  heads, 
when  in  the  same  degree,  and  inherit  by  their  own  right ;  they 
inherit  by  roots,  when  all  or  part  of  them  inherit  by  representa- 
tion.-" 2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  descendants,  but  a  father 
and  mother,  and  brothers  and  sisters,  or  descendants  of  these 
last,  one-half  of  the  estate  goes  to  the  father  and  mother  and  the 
other  to  the  brothers  and  sisters,  or  their  descendants.  If  either 
parent  of  the  person  who  has  died  without  issue  has  died  before 
him,  the  portion  which  would  have  l>een  inherited  by  such  de- 
ceased parent  goes  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased,  or 
their  descendants.^^  3.  If  the  deceased  has  left  neither  descend- 
ants nor  brothers  nor  sisters,  nor  descendants  from  them,  or 
father  or  mother,  but  only  other  ascendants,  these  ascendants  in- 
herit to  the  exclusion  of  all  collaterals,  as  follows:  if  there  be 
ascendants  in  the  paternal  and  maternal  line  in  the  same  degree 

"  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §§  1397,  1398.         22  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 

"  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §   1399.  art.  902. 

JO  Carroll's   Stat.  1915,  §   1407.  "Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 

20  Carroll's  Stat.  1915,  §  2132.  art.  903. 

2iCarroll's  Stat.   1915,  §  2071. 


899  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    852 

the  estate  is  divided  into  two  equal  shares,  one  going  to  the  as- 
cendants on  the  paternal,  and  the  other  to  the  ascendants  on  the 
maternal  side,  whether  the  number  of  ascendants  on  each  side  be 
equal  or  not,  the  ascendants  in  each  line  inheriting  by  heads ;  but 
if  there  is  in  the  nearest  degree  but  one  ascendant  in  the  two 
lines,  such  ascendant  excludes  all  other  ascendants  of  a  more  re- 
mote degree  and  alone  takes  the  succession."*  4.  If  there  be  no 
issue  or  their  descendants,  nor  brothers  or  sisters,  nor  their  de- 
scendants, nor  father  or  mother,  the  inheritance  goes  to  the  col- 
lateral relations  of  the  intestate,  those  in  the  nearest  degree  of 
kindred  to  the  intestate  taking  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  If 
there  are  several  persons  in  the  same  degree,  they  take  per  cap- 
ita."^ 5.  Representation  takes  place  ad  infinitum  in  the  direct 
descending  line,  but  does  not  take  place  in  favor  of  ascendants, 
the  nearest  ascendant  in  any  degree  always  excluding  those  more 
remote. ^*^  6.  In  the  collateral  line,  representation  is  admitted  in 
favor  of  the  children  and  descendants  of  brothers  and  sisters  of 
the  deceased,  whether  they  inherit  in  concurrence  with  uncles 
and  aunts,  or,  whether  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased 
having  died,  the  estate  devolves  on  their  descendants  in  equal  or 
unequal  degrees. ^'^  7.  In  all  cases  of  representation  the  parti- 
tion is  made  by  roots;  and  if  one  root  has  several  branches,  a 
subdivision  is  also  made  by  roots  in  each  branch  and  the  members 
of  the  branch  take  between  them  by  heads. '^  8.  When  the  in- 
testate has  left  neither  descendants,  ascendants,  nor  collateral 
relations,  the  surviving  wife  who  has  not  been  separated  from 
her  husband  shall  inherit  from  him.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  wife 
died  intestate  without  leaving  lawful  ascendants,  descendants,  or 
collateral  relations,  the  surviving  husband  who  has  not  been  sep- 
arated from  her  shall  not  inherit  from  her  except  in  case  she  shall 
leave  no  natural  children  by  her  duly  acknowledged.^^  9.  In  all 
cases  when  either  husband  or  wife  dies,  leaving  no  ascendants  or 
descendants,  and  without  having  disposed  by  wmII  of  his  or  her 
share  in  the  community  property,  such  undisposed  of  shares  shall 
be  inherited  by  the  survivor  in  full  ownership.^"     10.  Illegitimate 

2*  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         2s  Merrick's    Rev,    Civ.    Code    1913, 

arts.  905,  906,  907.                                        art.  898. 

25  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         -'•)  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 
art.  914.  art.  924. 

26  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         3o  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ,    Code    1913, 
art.  895.  art.  915, 

27  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 
art.  897. 


^  853  TITLES  and''abstracts  900 

children  inherit  from  their  mother  when  they  have  l)een  duly 
acknowledged  by  her,  if  she  has  left  no  legitimate  child  or  de- 
scendants, to  the  exclusion  of  her  father  and  mother  and  their 
descendants  or  collaterals  of  lawful  kindred.'^  11.  Illegitimate 
children  inherit  from  their  father  who  has  duly  acknowledged 
them,  when  he  has  left  no  descendants,  ascendants,  nor  collateral 
relations,  nor  surviving  wife,  and  to  the  exclusion  only  of  the 
state. ^"  12.  The  law  does  not  grant  any  right  of  inheritance  to 
illegitimate  children  to  the  estate  of  legitimate  relations  of  their 
father  or  mother.^^  13.  The  estate  of  an  illegitimate  child  de- 
ceased without  posterity  belongs  to  the  father  or  mother  who  has 
acknowledged  him,  or  in  equal  proportions  to  both  when  both 
have  acknowledged  him.^*  14.  If  the  father  and  mother  of  an 
illegitimate  child  die  before  him  the  estate  of  such  child  shall 
pass  to  his  illegitimate  brothers  and  sisters,  or  their  descendants.^" 
15.  In  default  of  lawful  relations  or  of  surviving  husband  or 
wife,  or  acknowledged  illegitimate  child,  the  estate  goes  to  the 
state.^^  16.  The  children  or  grandchildren,  coming  to  the  suc- 
cession of  their  fathers,  mothers,  or  other  ascendants,  must  col- 
late what  they  have  received  from  them  inter  vivos,  directly  or 
indirectly,  and  they  can  not  claim  legacies  made  to  them  by  such 
ascendants  unless  the  donations  and  legacies  have  been  made  to 
them  expressly  as  an  advantage  over  their  co-heirs  and  besides 
their  portion.  This  rule  takes  place  where  the  children  or  their 
descendants  succeed  to  their  ascendants  as  legal  or  as  testamen- 
tary heirs,  and  whether  they  have  accepted  the  succession  uncon- 
ditionally, or  with  the  benefit  of  inventory.  17.  Children  legally 
adopted  are  given  the  same  rights  of  inheritance  as  natural  chil- 
dren. 

§  853.  Maine. — In  Maine  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate, 
subject  to  the  payment  of  debts,  of  which  he  dies  seised,  descends 
as  follows:  1.  If  he  leaves  a  widow  and  issue,  one-third  to  the 
widow.  If  no  issue,  one-half  to  the  widow.  And' if  no  kindred, 
the  whole  to  the  widow.  To  a  widower,  the  same  shares  in  the 
wife's  realty.    In  any  event  one-third  shall  descend  to  the  widow 

31  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         34  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 
art.  918.  art.  922. 

32  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         35  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 
art.  919.  art.  923. 

33  Merrick's  Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913,         3r>  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code    1913, 
art.  920.  art.  929. 


A 


901  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    853 

or  widower  free  from  debts.  2.  The  remainder  of  intestate's 
property,  if  no  widow  or  widower,  descends  in  equal  shares  to  his 
children,  and  to  the  lawful  issue  of  a  deceased  child  by  right  of 
representation.  If  no  child  is  living,  to  all  his  lineal  descendants 
equally  if  of  the  same  degree;  if  not,  according  to  the  right  of 
representation.  3.  If  no  such  issue,  to  the  father  and  mother  in 
equal  shares.  4.  If  no  such  issue  or  father,  one-half  to  the 
mother.  If  no  such  issue  or  mother,  one-half  to  the  father.  In 
either  case  the  remainder  descends  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  or  their  children  or  grandchildren  according  to  the 
right  of  representation.  5.  If  no  such  issue,  father,  brother  or 
sister,  then  to  the  mother.  If  no  such  issue,  mother,  brother  or 
sister,  then  to  the  father;  in  either  case  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
issue  of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters.  6.  If  no  such  issue, 
father,  mother,  brother  or  sister,  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  de- 
gree; when  they  claim  through  different  ancestors,  to  those  claim- 
ing through  nearest  ancestor.  7.  When  a  minor  dies  unmarried, 
leaving  property  inherited  from  either  of  his  parents,  it  descends 
to  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  the  issue  of  those 
deceased;  in  equal  shares,  if  all  are  of  the  same  degree,  otherwise 
according  to  the  right  of  representation.  8.  If  the  intestate  leaves 
no  widower,  widow,  or  kindred,  the  property  escheats  to  the  state. 
9.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the 
whole-blood  of  the  same  degree.^''  10.  An  illegitimate  child  born 
since  March  24,  1864,  is  the  heir  of  his  parents  who  intermarry. 
Such  child  born  at  any  time  is  the  heir  of  his  mother.  If  the 
father  of  an  illegitimate  child  adopts  him  or  her  into  his  family 
or  in  writing  acknowledges  him  or  her  before  some  justice  of 
the  peace  or  notary  public  that  he  is  the  father  such  child  is  also 
the  heir  of  his  or  her  father.  In  either  of  such  cases,  such  child 
and  its  issue  shall  inherit  from  its  parents  respectively,  and  from 
their  lineal  and  collateral  kindred,  and  those  from  such  child  and 
its  issue  the  same  as  if  legitimate. ^^  11.  Degrees  of  kindred  are 
computed  by  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.  12.  Gifts  of  real  estate 
to  a  child  or  grandchild  are  deemed  advancements  when  so  ex- 
pressed in  the  gift,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  to  be  such.  Such 
advancements  must  be  brought  into  hotchpot  as  of  the  value  ex- 
pressed in  the  gift  or  acknowledgment  be  foresaid,  otherwise  as 
of  the  time  when  given.     When  the  advancement  exceeds  the 

"  Rev.  Stat.  1916,  ch.  80,  §  1.        38  Rev.  Stat.  1916,  ch.  80,  §  3. 


§    854  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  902 

share  of  sncli  child  or  grandchild  he  is  excluded  from  distribu- 
tion, but  he  shall  not  be  required  to  refund  the  excess.  If  an 
advancement  of  personal  estate  exceeds  his  share  of  the  personal 
estate,  he  receives  so  much  less  of  the  real  estate  as  will  make 
his  whole  share  equal.  If  such  child  or  grandchild  die  before  the 
intestate,  leaving  issue,  the  advancement  made  to  him  shall  be 
regarded  as  made  to  the  issue. ^"  13.  Aliens  may  take  property 
by  descent  the  same  as  citizens.'*"  14.  An  adopted  child  becomes, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  child  of  his  adopters,  the  same 
as  if  born  to  them  in  lawful  wedlock,  except  that  he  shall  not 
inherit  property  expressly  limited  to  heirs  of  the  body  of  the 
adopters,  nor  shall  he  inherit  property  from  the  lineal  or  col- 
lateral kindred  of  such  adopters. ^^ 

§  854.  Maryland. — In  Maryland  estates  in  lands,  tene- 
ments, or  hereditaments,  held  in  fee  simple,  or  in  fee  simple  con- 
ditional or  in  fee  tail  generally  descends  from  an  ancestor  in  fee 
simple  as  follows:  1.  To  the  child  and  children  and  their  de- 
scendants, if  any,  equally,  2.  If  no  child  or  descendant,  and  the 
estate  descended  to  the  intestate  on  the  part  of  the  father,  then 
to  the  father.  3.  If  no  father  living  then  to  the  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  intestate  of  the  blood  of  the  father  and  their  de- 
scendants equally.  4.  If  no  brother  or  sister  as  aforesaid,  child 
or  children,  grandchild  or  grandchildren,  or  other  descendants 
from  such  brothers  or  sisters,  then  to  the  grandfather  on  the  part 
of  the  father.  5.  If  no  such  grandfather  be  living,  then  to  the 
descendants  of  such  grandfather,  and  their  descendants  in  equal 
degree  equally.  6.  If  no  descendant  of  such  grandfather,  then  to 
the  father  of  such  grandfather,  and  if  none  such  living  then  to 
the  descendants  of  the  father  of  such  grandfather  in  equal  de- 
gree ;  and  so  on,  passing  to  the  next  lineal  male  paternal  ancestor ; 
and  if  none  such  to  his  descendants  in  equal  degree  without  end. 
7.  If  no  paternal  ancestor  or  descendants  from  such  ancestor 
then  to  the  mother  of  the  intestate.  8.  If  no  mother  living  then 
to  her  descendants  in  equal  degree  equally,  9.  If  no  such  mother 
be  living,  or  descendants  from  such  mother,  then  to  the  maternal 
ancestors  and  their  descendants  in  the  same  manner  as  above  di- 
rected as  to  the  paternal  ancestors  and  their  descendants.    10.  If 


39  Rev.   Stat.   1916,   ch.  80,  §§  4,  5,        40Rev.  Stat.  1916.  ch.  78,  §  2. 
6,  7.  41  Rev.  Stat.  1916,  ch.  12,  §  38. 


903  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    854 

the  estate  descended  to  the  intestate  on  the  part  of  the  mother,  and 
the  intestate  shall  die  without  any  children  or  descendants,  then 
the  estate  shall  go  to  the  mother.  11.  If  no  mother  hving, 
then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  of  the 
blood  of  the  mother  and  their  descendants  in  equal  degree 
equally.  12.  If  no  such  brothers  or  sisters  or  descendants 
of  such  brothers  or  sisters  then  to  the  grandfather  on  the  part 
of  the  mother.  13.  If  no  such  grandfather  living  then  to  his  de- 
scendants in  equal  degree  equally.  14.  If  no  such  descendants 
of  such  grandfather  then  to  the  father  of  such  grandfather,  and 
if  none  such  living  then  to  his  descendants  in  equal  degree,  and 
so  on,  passing  to  the  next  male  maternal  ancestor;  and  if  none 
such  living,  to  his  descendants  in  equal  degree.  15.  If  no  such 
maternal  ancestor  or  descendants  from  such  maternal  ancestor 
then  to  the  father  of  the  intestate.  16.  If  no  father  living,  to  his 
descendants  in  equal  degree  equally.  17.  If  no  father  living  or 
descendants  from  the  father  then  to  the  paternal  ancestors  and 
their  descendants,  in  the  same  manner  as  hereinbefore  directed 
as  to  the  maternal  ancestors.  18.  If  the  estate  be  vested  in  the 
intestate  by  purchase  or  shall  descend  to  or  be  vested  in  the  in- 
testate in  any  other  manner  as  hereinbefore  mentioned,  and  there 
be  no  child  or  descendant  of  such  intestate,  then  the  estate  shall 
descend  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  of  the  whole- 
blood  and  their  children,  grandchild  or  grandchildren,  and  their 
other  descendants  in  equal  degree  equally.  19.  If  no  brother  or 
sister  of  the  whole-blood  or  child  or  children,  grandchild  or 
grandchildren,  or  descendants  from  such  brother  or  sister,  then 
to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  and  their  descend- 
ants in  equal  degree  equally.  20.  If  no  brother  or  sister  of  the 
whole-blood  or  half-blood  or  any  descendant  from  such  brother 
or  sister,  then  to  the  father,  and  if  no  father  living  then  to  the 
mother,  and  if  no  mother  living  then  to  the  grandfather  on  the 
part  of  the  father,  and  if  no  such  grandfather  living  then  to  the 
descendants  of  such  grandfather  in  equal  degree  equally.  21.  If 
no  such  grandfather,  or  any  descendants  from  him,  then  to  the 
grandfather  on  the  part  of  the  mother,  and  if  no  such  grand- 
father then  to  his  descendants  in  equal  degree  equally,  and 
so  on  without  end,  alternating  the  nearest  male  paternal  an- 
cestor, and  his  descendants,  and  the  nearest  maternal  an- 
cestor and  her  descendants,  giving  preference  to  the  paternal  an- 


§    855  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  904 

cestor  and  his  descendants.  22.  If  there  be  no  descendants  or 
kindred  of  the  intestate  as  aforesaid  to  take  the  estate  then  the 
same  shall  go  to  the  husband  or  wife,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  if 
the  husband  or  wife  be  dead  then  to  his  or  her  kindred  in  like 
course,  as  if  such  had  survived  the  intestate  and  then  had  died 
entitled  to  an  estate  by  purchase,  and  if  the  intestate  has  had 
more  husbands  and  wives  than  one,  and  shall  die  before  such  in- 
testate, then  the  estate  shall  be  equally  divided  among  the  kin- 
dred of  the  several  husbands  and  wives  in  equal  degree  equally. 
23.  Representation  per  stirpes  is  admitted  in  descending  or  col- 
lateral line,  but  among  collaterals  not  after  brother's  and  sister's 
grandchildren.  24.  Subsequent  marriage  and  acknowledgment 
by  a  father  legitimizes  and  such  children  inherit  and  transmit  as 
if  born  in  lawful  wedlock.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  their 
mother  and  from  each  other  and  from  descendants  of  each 
other.^"  25.  An  adopted  child  has  the  same  rights  of  inheritance 
in  the  estate  of  the  adoptive  parent  as  natural  children.  26.  Aliens 
not  enemies  may  take  and  hold  lands  by  descent  the  same  as  citi- 
zens.^^  27.  Any  child  or  descendant  of  an  intestate,  born  after 
the  death  of  the  decedent,  but  none  others,  shall  have  the  same 
right  of  inheritance  as  if  born  before  such  death.**  28.  Advance- 
ments of  real  estate  made  to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descendant 
must  be  brought  into  hotchpot.*^ 

§  855.  Massachusetts. — In  Massachusetts  the  lands,  tene- 
ments, or  hereditaments,  of  an  intestate,  or  any  right  or  interest 
therein  in  fee  simple  or  for  the  life  of  another,  descends,  subject 
to  his  debts,  in  the  following  course:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  the 
issue  of  the  intestate  in  the  same  degree,  otherwise  by  right  of 
representation.  And  if  there  be  no  issue  of  the  intestate  living  at 
his  death,  then  to  all  his  other  lineal  descendants;  equally,  if  they 
are  all  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  intestate;  otherwise 
according  to  the  right  of  representation.  2.  If  there  be  no  issue, 
then  equally  to  the  father  and  mother  or  the  survivor  of  them. 
3.  If  there  be  no  issue,  father  or  mother,  then  to  brothers  and 
sisters  and  their  issue  equally  if  of  the  same  degree,  otherwise  by 
right  of  representation.     4.  If  no  issue,  father  or  mother,  or  is- 

42  Pub.  Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.  46,         •'*  Pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    46, 
§§  1-31.  §  25. 

43  Pub.  Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.  16,         4.^/pub.    Gen.    Laws    1904,    art.    46, 
§  70.                                             -  §  31. 


905  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    856 

sue  of  father  or  mother,  then  to  nearest  of  kin  in  equal  degree 
according  to  the  civil  law  through  the  nearest  ancestor.  5.  If 
the  intestate  is  a  married  woman,  and  leaves  a  husband  and  no 
issue,  he  takes  the  real  estate  in  fee  not  exceeding  $5,000 
in  value.  If  the  intestate  is  a  married  man  and  leaves  a  wife  and 
no  issue,  she  takes  the  real  estate  in  fee  not  exceeding  $5,000  in 
value,  in  addition  to  her  dower.  If  the  intestate  leaves  a  widow 
and  no  kindred  all  of  his  estate  descends  to  the  surviving  wife; 
and  if  the  intestate  is  a  married  woman  and  leaves  no  kindred  all 
of  her  estate  descends  to  the  surviving  husband. ^*^  6.  If  there  be 
no  kindred,  nor  surviving  husband  or  wife,  then  the  estate  escheats 
to  the  state. *^  7.  Degrees  of  kindred  are  computed  according 
to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.**  8.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  in- 
herit equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the  same  degree.*^ 
9.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  their  mother  and  from  any 
maternal  ancestor,  and  the  lawful  issue  of  an  illegitimate  child 
shall  take  by  representation.  If  an  illegitimate  child  die  with- 
out issue  entitled  to  inherit,  the  estate  goes  to  his  mother.  An 
illegitimate  child  is  made  legitimate  by  a  subsequent  marriage  of 
its  parents  and  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of  the  father.^" 
10'  Posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of 
their  parents. ^^  11.  An  alien  has  substantially  the  same  rights 
as  a  citizen  whether  he  be  resident  or  nonresident.^"  12.  An 
adopted  child  shall  take  the  same  share  of  the  property  which  the 
adopting  parent  could  dispose  of  by  will  as  the  child  would  have 
taken  if  born  to  such  parent  in  lawful  wedlock. 

§  856.  Michigan. — In  Michigan  the  real  estate  of  an  in- 
testate descends,  subject  to  his  debts,  as  follows:  1.  One-third 
to  the  surviving  wife  or  husband,  and  the  remaining  two-thirds 
to  the  issue,  and  if  the  intestate  leaves  no  surviving  wife  or  hus- 
band, then  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  issue,  and  if  all  the 
said  issue  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  intestate, 
they  shall  share  the  estate  equally,  otherwise  they  shall  take 
according  to  the  right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  intestate 
shall   leave   a   widow   or   widower   and   no   issue,    one-half    of 

4^^  Rule    construed     in    Holmes    v.  ^^  Rev.   Laws    1902,    ch.    133,    §§    3, 

Holmes,  194  Mass.  552,  80  N.  E.  614.  4,  5. 

47  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  133,  §  1.  ^i  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  133,  §  6. 

48  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  133,  §  2.  "  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  134,  §  1. 

49  Rev.  Laws  1902,  ch.  133,  §  2. 


§    856  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  906 

the  estate  shall  descend  to  such  widow  or  widower  and  the 
remainder  to  the  father  and  mother  of  the  intestate  in  equal 
shares,  and  if  there  be  but  one  of  the  parents  living,  then 
to  the  survivor  alone;  and  if  the  intestate  shall  leave  no 
issue,  husband  or  wife,  his  or  her  estate  shall  descend  to  the 
father  and  mother  in  equal  shares,  and  if  there  be  but  one  of  the 
parents  living,  then  to  the  survivor  alone;  and  if  the  intestate 
shall  leave  no  issue,  father  or  mother,  his  or  her  estate  shall  de- 
scend, subject  to  the  provisions  herein  made  for  the  widow  or 
widower,  if  a  widow  or  widower  survive  the  deceased,  to  his  or 
her  brothers  and  sisters  and  the  children  of  deceased  brothers  and 
sisters,  if  such  persons  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the 
intestate,  they  shall  take  equally,  otherwise  they  shall  take  by  right 
of  representation.  Provided,  however,  if  such  intestate  shall  die 
under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  and  not  having  been  married, 
all  the  estate  that  came  to  such  intestate  by  inheritance  from  a 
parent  which  has  not  been  lawfully  disposed  of,  shall  descend  to 
the  other  children  and  the  issue  of  deceased  children  of  the  same 
parent,  if  there  be  such  children  or  issue,  and  if  such  persons  are 
in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  said  intestate  they  shajl  take 
equally,  otherwise  they  shall  take  by  right  of  representation. 
3.  If  the  intestate  shall  leave  no  issue,  husband,  wife,  father, 
mother,  brother,  sister,  nor  children  of  brother  or  sister,  his  es- 
tate shall  descend  to  his  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree  excepting 
that  when  there  are  two  or  more  collateral  kindred  of  equal  de- 
gree  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  who  claim 
through  the  nearest  ancestors  shall  be  preferred  to  those  claiming 
through  an  ancestor  more  remote.  4.  If  the  intestate  shall  leave 
a  husband  or  wife  and  no  issue  or  father,  mother,  brother,  nor 
sister,  and  there  shall  be  no  children  or  brother  or  sister,  the  estate 
of  such  intestate  shall  descend  to  the  husband  or  wife  of  such 
intestate,  as  the  case  may  be.  5.  A  provision  herein  made  for 
the  widow  shall  be  in  lieu  of  dower  and  homestead  rights.  6.  If 
the  intestate  shall  leave  no  wife  nor  husband  nor  any  kindred,  his 
or  her  estate  shall  escheat  to  the  state."  7.  Children  legally 
adopted  shall  become  and  be  the  heirs  at  law  of  their  adoptive 
parents.^*  8.  Aliens  have  substantially  the  same  rights  of  in- 
heritance as  citizens.  9.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  inherit 
equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood,  in  the  same  degree,  unless 

53  Howell's  Stat.  1913,  §  10959.  s*  Howell's  Stat.  1913,  §  10972. 


907  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    857 

the  inheritance  be  ancestral;  in  such  case  those  who  are  not  of  the 
blood  of  such  ancestor  are  excluded."  10.  Degrees  of  kindred 
are  computed  according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law."'*^  11.  An 
illegitimate  child  inherits  from  its  mother  but  not  through  her. 
If  an  illegitimate  child  die  intestate  without  issue,  his  estate  shall 
descend  to  his  mother,  or  to  his  relatives  on  the  part  of  his  mother. 
Illegitimate  children  are  legitimatized  by  the  subsequent  mar- 
riage of  the  parents,  or  by  the  written  acknowledgment  by  the 
father  of  paternity."  12.  Advancements  to  a  child  or  other 
lineal  descendant  must  be  brought  into  hotchpot.  If  the  amount 
of  such  advancement  exceeds  the  share  of  an  heir  the  person  so 
advanced  shall  be  excluded  from  any  portion  of  the  distribution 
of  the  estate,  and,  if  the  amount  thereof  shall  be  less  than  his 
share,  he  shall  be  entitled  to  as  much  more  as  will  give  him  his 
full  share  of  the  estate. ^^ 

§  857.  Minnesota. — In  Minnesota  the  estate  of  an  intes- 
tate descends  as  follows:  1.  The  surviving  husband  or  wife 
takes  the  homestead  for  life  discharged  of  debts,  except  debts 
which  were  valid  charges  thereon  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the 
intestate.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  issue  or  issue  of  issue,  the 
homestead  becomes  absolute  in  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.'"^" 
2.  One-third  of  all  other  lands  of  which  deceased  was,  during 
coverture,  seised  or  possessed  by  fee  simple  or  inferior  tenure, 
descends  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  subject  in  just  propor- 
tion with  the  other  real  estate  to  the  payment  of  deceased's  debts 
not  paid  from  the  personal  estate.  3.  The  residue  of  said  other 
lands  and  if  no  surviving  consort,  the  whole  of  said  other  lands, 
subject  to  the  debts  of  the  intestate,  descends  to  the  children  in 
equal  shares  and  the  lawful  issue  of  deceased  children  by  right  of 
representation.  4.  If  no  child  nor  issue  of  any  deceased  child 
the  whole  of  said  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  consort.  5.  If 
none  of  the  above,  to  the  intestate's  father  and  mother  in  equal 
shares;  if  but  one  surviving,  then  to  such  survivor.  6.  If  none 
of  the  foregoing,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  the  lawful  issue 
of  deceased  brother  or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  7.  If 
none  of  the  foregoing  nor  living  issue  of  any  collateral  kindred 

•'■'■>  Howell's  Stat.  1913,  §  10963.  •■«  Howell's    Stat.    1913,    §§     10964- 

•'«  Howell's  Stat.  1913,  §  10963.  10969. 

•■-Howell's  Stat.    1913,  §§    10960-  s'' Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7237. 
10962. 


§    858  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  908 

in  equal  degree,  claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  claim- 
ing through  the  nearest  ancestor  preferred  to  those  more  remote. 
8.  If  any  person  die  leaving  several  surviving  children  or  one 
child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more  children,  and  any  such  sur- 
viving child  dies  under  age  and  not  having  been  married  all  the 
estate  that  came  to  the  deceased  child  by  inheritance  from  such 
deceased  parent  shall  descend  in  equal  shares  to  the  other  chil- 
dren of  the  same  parent  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such  children  who 
have  died,  by  right  of  representation.  9.  If,  at  the  death  of  such 
child,  who  dies  under  age  and  not  having  been  married,  all  the 
other  children  of  said  parent  being  also  dead,  and  any  of  them 
having  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  such  child  by  inheritance 
by  his  said  parent  shall  descend  to  all  the  issue  of  the  other  children 
of  the  said  parent,  according  to  the  right  of  representation. 
10.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  spouse  nor  kindred  his  estate  shall 
escheat  to  the  state.'^''  11.  Degrees  of  kindred  are  computed  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.''^  12.  Kindred  of  the  half- 
blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the  same 
degree,  unless  the  inheritance  comes  to  the  intestate  by  descent, 
devise,  or  gift  of  some  one  of  his  ancestors,  in  which  case  all 
those  who  are  not  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor  shall  be  excluded 
from  such  inheritance. °^  13.  Adopted  children  inherit  from 
their  adoptive  parents  the  same  as  natural  children.''^  14.  Aliens 
may  acquire  real  estate  by  inheritance  the  same  as  citizens.'"'* 
15.  Posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of 
their  parent. °^  16.  Every  illegitimate  child  is  the  heir  of  the 
person  who  shall,  in  writing,  duly  signed  and  witnessed,  acknowl- 
edge the  paternity  of  such  child.  An  illegitimate  child  is  always 
the  heir  of  his  mother;  but  he  can  not  inherit  through  his  father  | 
or  mother  unless  before  his  death  his  parents  intermarry,  and 
his  father,  after  such  marriage,  acknowledges  him  as  his  child, 
or  adopts  him  in  his  family.  If  any  illegitimate  child  dies  in- 
testate without  issue,  his  estate  goes  to  his  mother  or  her  heirs  at 
law."' 

§  858.     Mississippi. — In  Mississippi,  when  any  person  dies 
seised  of  an  estate  of  inheritance  of  lands,  tenements,  and  hered- 

''oGen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7238.  ''■*Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §§  6696,  6697, 

ci  Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7242.  6699,  6700. 

"2  Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7242.  "Gen.  Stat.  1913.  §  7236. 

"  Gen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7156.  ^c  Qen.  Stat.  1913,  §  7240,  7241. 


i 


909  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    858 

itaments  not  disposed  of  by  will,  the  same  descends  as  follows: 

1.  To  the  children  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts,  the  de- 
scendants of  the  deceased  children  or  grandchildren  to  take  the 
same  share  of  the  deceased  parent  in  equal  parts  among  them. 

2.  And  when  there  shall  not  be  a  child  or  children  of  the  intestate, 
nor  descendants  of  such  children,  then  the  estate  goes  to  the  father 
and  mother  and  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and 
their  descendants  in  equal  parts,  the  descendants  of  a  sister  or 
brother  of  the  intestate  to  have,  in  equal  parts  among  them,  their 
deceased  parent's  share.  3.  And  if  there  shall  not  be  a  child  or 
children  of  the  intestate,  or  descendants  of  such  children,  or  broth- 
ers or  sisters,  or  descendants  of  them,  or  father  or  mother,  then 
such  estate  shall  descend,  in  ecjual  parts,  to  the  next  of  kin  of  the 
intestate  in  equal  degree,  computing  by  the  rules  of  the  civil  law. 
4.  There  shall  not  be  any  representation  among  collaterals,  except 
among  the  descendants  of  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  in- 
testate.""^  5.  There  is  no  distinction  between  the  kindred  of  the 
whole  and  the  half-blood,  except  that  the  kindred  of  the  w^hole- 
blood,  in  equal  degree,  shall  be  preferred  to  the  kindred  of  the 
half-blood,  in  the  same  degree. '^®  6.  Illegitimate  children,  if  their 
parents  afterward  marry,  inherit  as  legitimate  children  of  the 
father,  if  their  father  acknowledge  them  as  his  children.  They 
inherit  from  their  mother  and  her  kindred  according  to  the  stat- 
ute of  descent  and  distribution  as  above  set  out.*^^  7.  If  the  in- 
testate leave  a  husband  or  wife  surviving,  and  no  issue,  the  whole 
estate  goes  to  such  survivor;  but  if  there  are  children,  or  their 
issue,  such  surviving  spouse  takes  a  child's  part.'"  8.  If  there 
is  no  person  capable  of  inheriting  the  estate,  it  escheats  to  the 
state. '^^  9.  Residing  aliens  take  by  inheritance  the  same  as  citi- 
zens, but  nonresident  aliens  are  not  permitted  to  inherit  from  an 
intestate.''^  10.  Where  advancements  have  been  made  to  a  child 
or  other  lineal  descendant,  such  advancement  must  be  brought  into 
hotchpot  with  the  whole  estate,  real  and  personal.  And  such 
advancement  shall  be  valued  as  of  the  time  it  was  made."     11. 

'^''  Hemingway's  Ann.    Code    1917,         "i  Hemingway's    Ann.     Code    1917, 
§  1381.     _  §  1521. 

6*  Hemingway's  Ann.    Code    1917,         ''2  Hemingway's    Ann.    Code    1917, 
§  1382.  §  2272. 

'''^  Hemingway's  Ann.    Code    1917,         "•■*  Hemingway's    Ann.    Code    1917, 
§  1387.  §  1388. 

'■^  Hemingway's  Ann.    Code    1917, 
§  1383. 


?5  859 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


910 


The  property,  real  and  personal,  exempted  by  law  from  sale 
under  execution  or  attachment,  shall,  on  the  death  of  the  husband 
or  wife  owning  it,  descend  to  the  survivor  of  them,  and  the  chil- 
dren and  grandchildren  of  the  decedent,  as  tenants  in  common; 
but  such  property  is  not  subject  to  partition,  or  sale  for  partition, 
during  her  widowhood,  so  long  as  it  is  occupied  or  used  by  the 
widow,  unless  by  her  consent/*  12.  The  adoption  of  a  child  does 
not  entitle  it  to  inherit  from  the  adoptive  parent  unless  the  right 
is  specifically  conferred/"' 

§  859.  Missouri. — In  Missouri,  when  a  person,  having 
title  to  real  or  personal  property,  shall  die  intestate,  it  shall  de- 
scend and  be  distributed,  male  and  female,  subject  to  the  payment 
of  his  debts  and  widow's  dower,  in  the  following  course:  1.  In 
the  case  of  an  unmarried  man  it  descends:  (1)  To  the  father, 
mother,  brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts. 

(2)  If  there  be  but  one  parent  or  brother  or  sister  living,  then 
to  the  survivor  alone.  (3)  If  there  be  neither  father,  mother, 
brother,  sister,  nor  descendants  of  such,  then  to  the  grandfather, 
grandmother,  uncles,  aunts,  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts. 
(4)  If  there  be  neither  father,  mother,  brother,  sister,  nor  de- 
scendants of  such,  nor  grandfather,  grandmother,  uncles,  aunts, 
nor  their  descendants,  then  to  the  great-grandfather,  great-grand- 
mother, and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts ;  and  so  on  in  other 
cases  without  end,  passing  to  the  nearest  lineal  ancestor  and  their 
children  in  equal  parts.  2.  In  case  the  intestate  be  an  unmarried 
woman  the  same  rules  govern  as  are  mentioned  in  rule  "one" 
above.  3.  In  case  the  intestate  be  a  widower,  ( 1 )  and  there  be 
neither  children  nor  other  lineal  descendants,  the  same  rules  gov- 
ern as  are  mentioned  in  rule  "one."  2.  If  there  be  but  one 
child,  the  entire  estate  goes  to  such  child  or  its  descendants. 

(3)  If  there  be  more  than  one  child  it  goes  to  his  children  or  their 
descendants  in  equal  parts.  (4)  If  there  be  no  child  or  their  de- 
scendants then  to  his  father,  mother,  brothers  and  sistors  or  their 
descendants  in  equal  parts.  ( 5 )  If  there  be  neither  father,  mother, 
brothers  or  sisters,  or  their  descendants,  then  to  the  grandfather, 
grandmother,  uncles  and  aunts  and  their  descendants  in  equal 
parts  and  so  on  as  in  "subdivision  (4)  of  rule  one."     4.    The 


''*  Hemingway's    Ann.    Code 
§  1389. 


1917, 


■^•^  Hemingway's    Ann. 
§  299. 


Code    1917, 


911  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    859 

estate  of  an  intestate  widow  descends  according  to  the  rules  men- 
tioned in  rule  "three"  above.  5.  In  case  the  intestate  be  a  mar- 
ried man,  who  dies  without  issue  :  ( 1 )  If  the  husband  die  leaving 
no  issue  or  other  descendants  in  being,  the  widow  is  entitled  to  all 
the  real  and  personal  estate  which  came  to  the  husband  in  right 
of  the  marriage,  and  to  all  the  personal  estate  of  the  husband 
which  came  to  his  possession  with  the  written  assent  of  the  wife, 
remaining  undisposed  of  absolutely,  not  subject  to  the  payment 
of  the  husband's  debts,  and  to  one-half  of  the  real  and  personal 
estate  belonging  to  the  husband  at  the  time  of  his  death  abso- 
lutely, subject  to  the  payment  of  the  husband's  debts.  (2)  The 
other  one-half  of  the  real  and  personal  estate  belonging  to  the 
husband  at  the  time  of  his  death,  descends  to  his  father,  mother, 
brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts;  and  if 
there  be  no  father,  mother,  brothers  or  sisters,  nor  their  descend- 
ants, then  to  the  wife.  6.  In  the  case  of  a  married  woman  leav- 
ing no  issue  :  ( 1 )  The  husband  is  entitled  to  one-half  of  the  real 
and  personal  estate  belonging  to  the  wife  at  the  time  of  her 
death,  absolutely  subject  to  the  payment  of  the  wife's  debts. 
(2)  The  other  one-half  of  her  estate  goes  to  her  father,  mother, 
brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts;  if  there 
are  none  of  these  it  goes  to  the  surviving  husband.^''  7.  In  the 
case  of  a  married  man  with  issue :  (1)  The  widow  may  take  her 
dower  interest,  or  she  may  elect  to  take  the  share  equal  to  a 
child's  part  in  the  real  estate  of  her  husband  in  lieu  of  dower. 
(2)  Subject  to  the  widow's  dower  the  real  estate  goes  to  his  child 
or  children  or  their  descendants  in  equal  parts."  8.  In  the  case 
of  a  married  woman  leaving  issue:  (1)  The  husband  takes  an 
estate  for  life  in  the  real  estate  of  the  wife.  (2)  Subject  to  the 
surviving  husband's  life  estate  the  real  and  personal  property 
passes  to  her  children  and  their  descendants  in  equal  parts." 
9.  When  the  inheritance  is  directed  to  pass  to  ascending  and  col- 
lateral kindred  of  the  intestate,  if  part  of  such  collateral  be  of  the 
whole-blood  and  the  other  part  of  the  half-blood  only,  those  of 
the  half-blood  inherit  only  one-half  as  much  as  those  of  the  whole- 
blood;  but  if  all  such  collaterals  be  of  the  half-blood,  they  take 
whole  portions,  except  as  to  descendants  who  take  double  por- 
tions."    10.  A  legally  adopted  child  inherits  from  its  adoptive 

76  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  332.  78  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §§  120,  332. 

"Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  356.  "Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  335. 


§    860  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  912 

parents  in  like  manner  as  a  natural  child. ^^  11.  All  posthumous 
children  or  descentlants  of  the  intestate  shall  inherit  in  like  man- 
ner as  if  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate;  but  no  right  of  in- 
heritance shall  accrue  to  any  person,  other  than  the  children  or  de- 
scendants of  the  intestate,  unless  they  are  in  being  and  capable  in 
law  as  taking  as  heirs  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's  death.^^ 
12.  When  all  persons  entitled  to  inherit  are  of  equal  degree  of 
consanguinity  to  the  intestate,  they  take  per  capita;  if  of  dif- 
ferent degrees,  they  take  per  stirpes.*"  13.  Illegitimate  children 
shall  be  capable  of  inheriting  and  transmitting  inheritance  on  the 
part  of  their  mother,  and  such  mother  may  inherit  from  her 
illegitimate  children.  Illegitimates  are  made  legitimate  by  the 
subsequent  marriage  of  the  parents  and  recognition  on  the  part 
of  the  father.®^  14.  Aliens  may  acquire  real  or  personal  prop- 
erty by  descent  within  certain  limitations  and  conditions.^* 
15.  When  the  intestate  in  his  lifetime  has  advanced  to  a  child 
its  share,  or  part  thereof,  the  advancement  so  made  must  be 
brought  into  hotchpot. ^^ 

§  860.  Montana. — In  Montana  the  real  and  personal  prop- 
erty of  one  who  dies  intestate  descends  as  follows:  1.  If  the 
decedent  leave  a  husband  or  wife  and  one  child,  or  the  lawful  is- 
sue of  one  child,  it  is  divided  equally  between  the  surviving  spouse 
and  child,  or  the  issue  of  such  child.  2.  If  more  than  one  child, 
or  one  child  living  and  the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased 
children,  one-third  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and 
the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  the  child  and  to  the  lawful  issue 
of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  representation.  3.  But  if  there 
be  no  children  of  the  decedent  living  at  his  death,  or  issue  of  a 
child,  such  remainder  goes  to  all  of  intestate's  lineal  descendants. 
4.  If  there  be  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  but  issue,  the  whole 
of  the  estate  goes  to  such  issue.  5.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  is- 
sue, then  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  husband  or  wife 
and  to  the  decedent's  father  or  mother,  or  if  either  of  the  latter 
be  dead,  the  whole  moiety  to  the  survivor.  6.  If  the  intestate 
leave  no  father  or  mother,  then  one-half  of  the  estate  goes  in 
equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  to  the  children  of 
such  as  are  dead.     7.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband 

80  Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §§  1673,  1675.  ^3 -Rev.  Stat.  1909.  §§  340,  341. 

81  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  333.  ^4  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  339. 

82  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  336.  ss  Rev.  Stat.  1909,  §  337. 


i 


913  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    861 

or  wife  and  no  Issue,  and  no  father  nor  mother,  nor  brother  nor 
sister,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife. 
8.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  no  is- 
sue, nor  father  nor  mother,  nor  brother  nor  sister,  the  estate 
must  go  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree,  taking  then  as  they 
claim  their  ancestor  according  to  the  remoteness.  9.  If  the  de- 
cedent leave  no  husband,  nor  wife,  nor  kindred,  the  estate  escheats 
to  the  state.®*'  10.  Illegitimate  children  share  equally  in  the 
estate  of  their  mother,  the  same  as  legitimate  children,  and  are 
heirs  of  the  person  who,  in  writing,  signed  in  the  presence  of  a 
competent  witness,  acknowledges  himself  to  be  the  father  of 
such  children.  If  an  illegitimate  child  dies  intestate  without  law- 
ful issue,  who  has  not  been  acknowledged  or  adopted  by  his 
father,  the  estate  goes  to  his  mother,  or  in  case  of  her  decease, 
to  her  heirs  at  law."  11.  Any  property  given  by  the  decedent  in 
his  lifetime  as  an  advancement  to  any  child,  or  other  lineal  de- 
scendant, is  a  part  of  the  estate  of  the  decedent  for  the  purpose 
of  division  and  distribution  thereof  among  his  issue,  and  must  be 
taken  by  such  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  towards  his  share 
of  the  estate  of  the  decedent.®^  12.  Resident  aliens  can  take  by 
succession  as  citizens,  but  nonresident  aliens  must  appear  and 
claim  the  succession  within  five  years  after  the  death  of  the  de- 
cedent.®'-' 13.  An  adopted  child  and  his  adoptive  parent  sustain 
towards  each  other  the  legal  relation  of  parent  and  child,  and 
have  all  the  rights  and  are  subject  to  all  the  duties  of  that  rela- 
tion.^*' 14.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those 
of  the  whole-blood  in  the  same  degree,  unless  the  inheritance  came 
to  the  intestate  by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  of  some  one  of  his  an- 
cestors, in  which  case  all  those  who  are  not  of  the  blood  of  such 
ancestor  must  be  excluded  from  such  inheritance. °^ 

§861.  Nebraska.  —  In  Nebraska,  when  any  person  shall 
die,  leaving  a  husband  or  wife  surviving,  all  the  real  estate  which 
the  deceased  was  seised  of  an  estate  of  inheritance  at  any  time 
during  the  marriage,  or  in  which  the  deceased  was  possessed  of 
an  interest  either  legal  or  equitable  at  the  time  of  his  or  her 
death,  which  has  not  been  lawfully  conveyed  by  the  husband  and 
wife  while  residents  of  this  state,  or  by  the  deceased  while  the 

so  Rev.  Code  1907,  §  4820.  89  Rev.  Code  1907.  §  4835. 

87  Rev.  Code  1907,  §  4821.  »o  Rev.  Code  1907,  §  3768. 

ssRev.  Code  1907,  §  4829.  9i  Rev.  Code  1907,  §  4828. 

58 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


5    861  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  914 

husband  or  wife  was  a  nonresident  of  this  state,  which  has  not 
been  sold  under  execution  or  judicial  sale,  and  which  has  not 
been  lawfully  devised,  shall  descend  subject  to  his  or  her  debts 
and  the  rights  of  homestead  in  the  manner  following:  1.  One- 
fourth  part  to  the  husband  or  wife,  if  the  survivor  is  not  the 
parent  of  all  the  children  of  the  deceased  and  there  be  one  or 
more  children,  or  the  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children, 
surviving.  2.  One-third  part  to  the  husband  or  wife  if  the  sur- 
vivor is  the  parent  of  all  the  children  of  the  deceased  and  there 
be  two  or  more  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more 
deceased  children  surviving.  3.  One-half  to  the  husband  or  wife, 
if  the  survivor  is  the  parent  of  all  the  children  of  the  deceased 
and  there  be  only  one  child  or  the  issue  of  a  deceased  child  sur- 
viving. 4.  One-half  to  the  husband  or  wife,  if  there  be  no  chil- 
dren nor  the  issue  of  any  deceased  child  or  children  surviving. 
5.  If  the  deceased  leave  relatives  of  his  or  her  blood,  the  residue 
of  the  real  estate  of  which  he  or  she  shall  die  seized,  in  the  cases 
above  named,  when  not  lawfully  devised,  shall  descend  subject 
to  the  rights  of  homestead,  in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same 
persons  as  hereinafter  provided  for  the  descent  of  real  estate  of 
deceased  persons  leaving  no  husband  or  wife  surviving;  and  in 
the  event  the  deceased  leave  no  relatives  of  his  or  her  blood,  the 
residue  of  the  real  estate  herein  provided  for  shall  also  descend 
to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.'*"  6.  When  any  person  leaving 
no  husband  or  wife  surviving  shall  die,  seised  of  any  real  estate, 
or  any  right  thereto,  or  entitled  to  any  interest  therein  in  fee 
simple,  or  for  the  life  of  another,  not  having  lawfully  devised  the 
same,  it  shall  descend,  subject  to  his  debts,  in  the  manner  follow- 
ing: (1)  In  equal  shares  to  his  children,  and  to  the  lawful  issue 
of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  representation;  and  if  there  be 
no  child  of  the  deceased  living  at  his  death,  the  estate  shall  de- 
scend to  all  his  other  lineal  descendants;  and  if  all  the  said  de- 
scendants are  in  the  same  degree* of  kindred  to  the  deceased,  they 
shall  have  the  estate  equally ;  otherwise  they  shall  take  according 
to  the  right  of  representation.  (2)  If  the  deceased  shall  leave 
no  issue,  the  estate  shall  descend  to  the  father  and  mother  of  the 
deceased,  or  to  the  survivor  of  them.  (3)  If  the  deceased  shall 
leave  no  issue,  nor  father  nor  mother,  the  estate  shall  descend  in 
equal  shares  to  his  brothers  and  sisters,  and  to  the  children  of 

»2  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,  art.  1,  §  1265. 


915  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    861 

any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by  right  of  representation.  (4) 
If  the  deceased  shall  leave  no  issue,  nor  father  nor  mother,  nor 
sister  nor  brother,  the  estate  shall  descend  to  his  next  of  kin  in 
equal  degree,  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  who 
claim  through  the  nearest  ancestor  shall  be  preferred  to  those 
claiming  through  an  ancestor  more  remote.  (5)  If  any  person 
shall  die  leaving  several  children,  or  leaving  one  child  and  the  issue 
of  one  or  more  other  children,  and  any  such  surviving  child  shall 
die  under  age,  and  not  having  been  married,  all  the  estate  that 
came  to  the  deceased  child  by  inheritance  from  such  deceased 
parent,  shall  descend  in  ec^ual  shares  to  the  other  children  of  the 
same  parents  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such  children  who  shall 
have  died  by  right  of  representation.  (6)  If  at  the  death  of  such 
child  who  shall  die  under  age  and  not  having  been  married,  all 
the  other  children  of  said  parent  shall  also  be  dead,  and  any  of 
them  shall  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  the  said  child,  by 
inheritance,  from  his  or  said  parent,  shall  descend  to  the  issue 
of  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent;  and  if  all  the  said  issue 
are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  said  child,  they  shall  take 
the  estate  equally ;  otherwise  they  shall  take  according  to  the  right 
of  representation.  (7)  If  the  deceased  shall  leave  no  kindred 
nor  husband  nor  wife,  the  estate  shall  escheat  to  the  state. °^  7. 
Every  illegitimate  child  shall  be  considered  as  an  heir  of  the  per- 
son who  shall,  in  writing,  signed  in  the  presence  of  a  competent 
witness,  have  acknowledged  himself  to  be  the  father  of  such 
child,  and  shall  in  all  cases  be  considered  as  an  heir  of  his  mother, 
and  shall  inherit  his  or  her  estate  in  whole  or  in  part  as  the  case 
may  be,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  had  been  born  in  lawful  wed- 
lock; but  he  shall  not  be  allowed  to  claim,  as  representing  his 
father  or  mother,  any  part  of  the  estate  of  his  or  her  kindred, 
either  lineal  or  collateral,  unless,  before  his  death,  his  parents 
shall  have  intermarried  and  had  other  children,  and  his  father, 
after  such  marriage,  shall  have  acknowledged  him,  as  aforesaid, 
or  adopted  him  into  his  family,  in  which  case  such  child  and  all 
legitimate  children  shall  be  considered  as  brothers  and  sisters, 
and  on  the  death  of  either  of  them  intestate  and  without  issue, 
the  other  shall  inherit  his  estate,  and  he  theirs,  as  hereinbefore 
provided,  in  like  manner  as  if  all  the  children  had  been  legitimate, 
saving  to  the  father  and  mother  respectively  their  rights  in  the 

93  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,     art.  1,  §  1266. 


861 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


916 


estate  of  all  the  said  children  as  provided  hereinbefore,  in  like 
manner  as  if  all  had  been  legitimate.^*  If  an  illegitimate  child 
shall  die  intestate,  without  lawful  issue,  his  estate  shall  descend  to 
his  mother,  or  in  case  of  her  decease,  to  her  heirs  at  law.^^  8. 
The  degrees  of  kindred  shall  be  computed  according  to  the  rule 
of  the  civil  law;  and  kindred  of  the  half-blood  shall  inherit 
equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood,  unless  the  inheritance 
came  to  the  intestate  by  descent,  devise  or  gift  of  some  one  of 
his  ancestors,  in  which  case  all  those  who  are  not  of  the  blood 
of  such  ancestor  shall  be  excluded  from  such  inheritance.^'''  9. 
Any  estate,  real  or  personal,  that  may  have  been  given  by  the 
intestate  in  his  lifetime,  as  an  advancement  to  any  child  or  other 
lineal  descendant,  shall  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  of 
the  intestate,  so  far  as  regards  the  division  and  distribution 
thereof  among  his  issue,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or  other 
descendant  towards  his  share  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate."^  If 
the  amount  of  such  advancement  shall  exceed  the  share  of  the  heir 
so  advanced,  he  shall  be  excluded  from  any  further  portion  in  the 
division  and  distribution  of  the  estate,  but  he  may  not  be  required 
to  refund  any  part  of  such  advancement;  and  if  the  amount  so 
received  shall  be  less  than  his  share,  he  shall  be  entitled  to  as 
much  more  as  will  give  him  his  full  share  of  the  estate  of  the 
deceased. °®  If  such  advancement  be  made  in  real  estate,  the 
value  thereof  shall,  for  the  purposes  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
section,  be  considered  a  part  of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided ;  and 
if  it  be  in  personal  estate,  it  shall  be  considered  a  part  of  the 
personal  estate;  and  if  in  either  case  it  shall  exceed  the  share  of 
real  estate  and  personal  estate  respectively,  that  would  have  come 
to  the  heir  so  advanced,  he  shall  not  refund  any  part  of  it,  but 
shall  receive  so  much  less  out  of  the  other  part  of  the  estate  as  will 
make  his  whole  share  equal  to  those  of  the  other  heirs  who  are 
in  the  same  degree  with  him."^  All  gifts  and  grants  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  been  made  in  advancement,  if  they  are  expressed 
in  the  gift  or  grant  to  be  so  made,  or  if  charged  in  writing  by 
the  intestate  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  as 


84  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17.        f'' Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913.  ch.  17. 
art.  1,  §  1273.  art.  1.  §  1276. 

05  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,         f's  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17, 
art.  1.  §  1274.  art.  1.  §  1277. 

06  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,         '■'^  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17, 
art.  1,  §  1275.  art.  1,  §  1278. 


917  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    862 

such  by  the  child  or  other  descendant/  If  the  value  of  the  estate 
so  advanced  shall  be  expressed  in  the  conveyance,  or  in  the 
charge  thereof  made  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  party  receiving  it,  it  shall  be  considered  as  of  that  value 
in  the  division  and  distribution  of  the  estate;  otherwise  it  shall  be 
estimated  according  to  its  value  when  given,  as  nearly  as  the  same 
can  be  ascertained."  If  any  child  or  lineal  descendant  so  advanced 
shall  die  before  the  intestate,  bearing  issue,  the  advancement 
shall  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  division  and  distribution 
of  the  estate  and  the  amount  thereof  shall  be  allowed  accordingly 
by  the  representatives  of  the  heirs  so  advanced,  in  like  manner 
as  if  the  advancement  had  been  made  directly  to  them.^  10. 
Posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of  their 
parents.*  11.  An  adopted  child,  and  the  person  or  persons  adopt- 
ing it,  sustain  toward  each  other  the  usual  relation  and  the 
adopted  child  has  bestowed  upon  him  or  her  equal  rights,  privi- 
leges and  immunities  of  children  born  in  lawful  wedlock,  of  par- 
ent and  child. ^  12.  No  distinction  is  made  by  law  between  resi- 
dent aliens  and  citizens  in  reference  to  the  possession,  enjoyment 
or  descent  of  property.'^ 

§  862.  Nevada. — In  Nevada  the  estate  of  an  intestate, 
when  not  limited  by  the  marriage  contract,  shall  descend:  1.  If 
there  be  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  one  child  or  its  issue, 
one-half  to  such  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  the  other  half  to 
such  child  or  its  issue.  If  there  be  a  surviving  husband  or  wife 
and  more  than  one  child,  one-third  to  such  survivor  and  the  re- 
mainder in  equal  shares  to  the  children.  If  there  be  lineal  descend- 
ants, but  no  living  children,  the  remainder  shall  go  to  such  de- 
scendants. 2.  If  he  or  she  leave  no  issue,  the  estate  shall  go  in 
equal  shares  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  to  the  in- 
testate's father,  and  if  he  or  she  shall  leave  no  father,  it  shall  go 
in  equal  shares  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  to  the  in- 
testate's mother.  If  he  or  she  shall  leave  no  issue  nor  father  nor 
mother,  the  whole  community  property  of  the  estate  shall  go  to 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  one-half  of  the  separate  prop- 

1  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,  i  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17, 
art.  1,  §  1279.  art.  1,  §  1282. 

2  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17,  ^Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.  1913,  ch.  17, 
art.  1,  §  1280.  art,  1.  §  1623. 

3  Nebraska  Rev.  Stat.   1913,  ch.  17,         c  Const,  of  Nebraska,  art,  1,  §  25. 
art.  1,  §  1281. 


§    862  TITLES   AND   ABSTRACTS  918 

erty  of  the  intestate  shall  go  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife, 
and  the  other  half  thereof  shall  go  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased 
brother  or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  If  he  or  she  shall 
leave  no  issue,  nor  husband  or  wife,  the  estate  shall  go  to  his  or 
her  father  if  living,  if  not  to  his  or  her  mother,  if  Hving.  3.  If 
there  be  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor  father,  nor  mother, 
then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate 
and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister  by  right  of 
representation.  4.  If  the  intestate  shall  leave  no  issue,  nor  hus- 
band, nor  wife,  nor  father,  nor  mother,  and  no  brother  or  sister 
living  at  his  death,  the  estate  shall  go  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal 
degree,  excepting  that  when  there  are  two  or  more  collateral 
kindred  in  equal  degree,  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors, 
those  who  claim  through  the  nearest  ancestors  shall  be  preferred 
to  those  who  claim  through  ancestors  more  remote;  provided, 
however,  that  if  any  person  shall  die  leaving  children,  or  one 
child  and  issue  of  one  or  more  children  and  any  such  surviving 
child  shall  die  under  age  and  not  having  been  married,  all  the 
estate  that  come  to  such  deceased  child  by  inheritance  from  such 
deceased  parent  shall  descend  in  equal  shares  to  the  other  children 
of  the  same  parent,  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such  other  children 
who  may  have  died,  by  right  of  representation.  5.  If  at  the 
death  of  such  child,  who  shall  die  under  age,  and  not  having  been 
married,  all  the  other  children  of  his  said  parent  being  also  dead, 
and  any  of  them  having  left  issue,  the  estate  that  come  to  such 
child  by  inheritance  from  his  or  her  said  parent,  shall  descend 
to  all  of  the  other  issue  of  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent, 
and  if  all  the  said  issue  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  said 
child,  they  shall  share  the  said  estate  equally;  otherwise,  they 
shall  take  according  to  the  right  of  representation.  6.  If  the 
intestate  shall  leave  no  husband  nor  wife  nor  kindred,  the  estate 
shall  escheat  to  the  state. ^  7.  An  illegitimate  child  is  the  heir 
of  its  mother  andvof  its  father  if  he  acknowledge  it  as  his  child 
by  a  writing  signed  before  a  competent  witness.  If  the  parents 
of  such  illegitimate  intermarry  and  acknowledge  him  he  shall 
inherit  as  a  legitimate  child.  The  issue  of  all  marriages  deemed 
null  in  law  or  dissolved  by  divorce  shall  be  legitimate.^  8.  Chil- 
dren legally  adopted  have  all  the  rights  of  inheritance  as  natural 

7  Rev.  Laws  1912.  §  6116.  ' «  Rev.  Laws  1912.  §  6117. 


919  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    863 

children."  9.  Nonresident  aliens,  except  Chinese,  have  the  same 
rights  of  inheritance  as  resident  citizens.'"  10.  Degrees  of  kin- 
dred are  computed  according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law."  11. 
Children  of  the  whole-blood  inherit  estates  which  descend  from 
their  ancestor  to  the  exclusion  of  children  of  the  half-blood.'"  12. 
Posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of  the 
intestate.'^  13.  Advancements  made  to  a  child  or  other  lineal 
descendants  are  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate,  so  far  as  re- 
gards a  division  and  distribution  thereof  among  the  issue  of  the 
intestate,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or  other  descendant  to- 
wards his  share  of  the  estate.  If  the  amount  of  such  advance- 
ment shall  exceed  the  share  of  the  heir  so  advanced,  he  shall  be 
excluded  from  any  further  portion  in  the  division  and  distribu- 
tion of  the  estate,  but  he  shall  not  be  required  to  refund  any 
excess;  and  if  the  amount  so  refunded  be  less  than  his  share,  he 
shall  be  entitled  to  as  much  more  as  would  give  him  his  full  share 
of  the  estate  of  the  deceased." 

§  863.  New  Hampshire. — In  New  Hampshire  the  real 
estate  of  an  intestate  descends,  subject  to  the  right  of  dower  and 
curtesy,  to  homestead  rights,  and  to  the  debts  of  the  intestate,  as 
follows:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  the  children  of  the  deceased  and 
the  legal  representatives  of  such  of  them  as  are  dead.  2.  If 
there  be  no  issue,  to  the  father  and  mother  in  equal  shares,  or  if 
one  is  deceased  to  the  survivor.  3.  If  there  be  no  issue,  nor 
father  or  mother,  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters,  or 
their  representatives.  4.  If  there  be  no  issue,  nor  father  nor 
mother,  nor  brothers  nor  sisters  of  their  representatives,  then  to 
the  next  of  kin  in  equal  shares.  5.  If  there  be  a  child  or  children, 
and  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  then  the  whole  estate  goes  to 
the  children  of  the  deceased  in  equal  shares.  6.  An  illegitimate 
child  inherits  from  its  mother,  and  the  mother  inherits  from  such 
children.  The  real  estate  of  the  mother  descends  in  equal  shares 
to  her  legitimate  and  illegitimate  children  and  their  issue.  7.  No 
representation  shall  be  allowed  beyond  the  degree  of  brothers' 
and  sisters'  grandchildren.  8.  If  any  person  be  under  age  and 
unmarried,  his  estate,  derived  by  descent  or  devise  from  his 
father  or  mother,  descends  to  his  brothers  and  sisters,  or  their 

9  Rev.  Laws  1912.  §  5829.  12  Rev.  Laws  1912,  §  6119. 

If  Nev.  Const.,  art.  1,  §  16.  "  Rev.  Laws  1912,  S  6129. 

11  Rev.  Laws  1912,  §  6119.  "Rev.  Laws  1912,  §§  6120,  6121. 


§    864  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  920 

lineal  representatives,  if  any,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other  parent. 
9.  In  default  of  heirs,  the  estate  escheats  to  the  state.^^  10.  An 
adopted  child  is  the  child  of  its  adopting  parent  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  except  he  shall  not  take  property  expressly  limited  to 
the  heirs  of  the  body  of  its  adopting  parent,  and  if  such  adopted 
child  die  under  age  leaving  property  received  by  gift  or  inheri- 
tance from  his  natural  kindred,  his  parents  by  adoption  have  no 
share  therein.^"  1 1 .  Resident  aliens  inherit  the  same  as  other 
citizens,  and  at  their  decease  their  property  descends  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  the  case  of  citizens."  12.  An  advancement  made 
to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descendant,  shall  be  accounted  for,  ac- 
cording to  its  value,  as  part  or  the  whole  of  the  share  of  the  per- 
son to  whom*  the  advancement  has  been  made.  Such  advance- 
ment, or  indebtedness  of  an  heir,  may  be  taken  into  consideration 
in  the  division  of  the  real  estate;  or  it  may  be  considered  and 
adjusted  in  the  distribution  of  the  personal  estate.  No  deed  of 
real  estate  shall  be  deemed  an  advancement  unless  the  same  is 
expressed  to  be  made  for  love  or  affection,  or  unless  it  is  provided 
to  be  an  advancement  by  some  acknowledgment  signed  by  the 
party  receiving  it.^^ 

§  864.  New  Jersey. — In  Ne\v  Jersey,  when  a  person  dies 
intestate,  seised  of  any  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments  in  his 
or  her  own  right,  in  fee  simple,  they  descend  as  follows:  1.  To 
the  children,  and  if  any  be  dead,  to  their  issue,  by  right  of  repre- 
sentation to  the  remotest  degree.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or 
issue  of  any,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole-blood, 
and  if  any  be  dead  to  their  issue,  by  right  of  representation.  And 
the  same  law  of  inheritance  applies  in  case  of  the  death  of  any 
brother  or  sister  before  the  person  was  seised,  leaving  issue.  3. 
If  no  lawful  issue,  or  brothers  or  sisters,  or  any  lawful  issue  of 
such  brothers  or  sisters,  then  to  the  father,  unless  the  inheritance 
came  from  the  part  of  the  mother;  in  which  case  it  descends  as  if 
the  father  had  previously  died.  4.  If  no  lawful  issue,  brothers 
or  sisters,  or  lawful  issue  of  them,  or  father,  then  to  the  mother 
in  fee  unless  the  inheritance  came  from  the  part  of  the  father  by 
descent,  gift,  or  devise,  in  which  case  it  descends  as  if  the  mother 
had  predeceased  the  person  seised.    5.  If  there  be  no  such  kindred 

"  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  196.  i7  Pub.  Stat.  1901.  ch.  137,  §  16. 

i«  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  181.  is  Pub.  Stat.  1901,  ch.  196,  §  9. 


921  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    865 

as  above,  then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  and 
their  issue  by  right  of  representation;  unless  the  inheritance  came 
to  the  intestate  by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  one  of  his  or  her 
ancestors,  in  which  case  only  those  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor, 
if  any  be  living,  shall  take,  6.  If  there  be  none  of  these  then 
to  all  persons  of  equal  degree  of  consanguinity,  either  of  the 
whole  or  the  half-blood;  however  remote  from  the  person  seised 
the  common  degree  of  consanguinity  may  be.  Those  not  of  the 
blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  land  may  come  are  ex- 
cluded, and  if  there  is  any  person  in  being,  although  more  remote 
of  the  whole  or  half-blood  of  the  ancestor  he  is  capable  of  in- 
heriting. 7.  Posthumous  children  inherit  as  though  born  in  the 
, life-time  of  the  intestate.  8.  The  real  estate  of  an  illegitimate 
child  dying  intestate  without  lawful  issue  goes  to  the  mother  of 
such  child,  and  if  she  predecease  such  child,  then  to  her  heirs  at 
law.  Any  child  born  out  of  lawful  wedlock  becomes  legitimate 
and  entitled  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  child  born  within 
lawful  wedlock,  whenever  the  lawful  parents  of  such  child  shall 
have  married  the  one  with  the  other,  or  shall  hereafter  so  marry 
and  such  child  shall  have  been  or  be  recognized  and  treated  by 
such  parents  as  their  child.  9.  The  common-law  right  of  rep- 
resentation does  not  exist  in  the  cases  covered  by  rule  six 
above,  so  that  first  cousins  take  in  preference  to  cousins  of  a 
more  distant  degree.  10.  In  calculating  the  degrees  of  consan- 
guinity the  civil  and  not  the  canon  law  rule  is  to  be  resorted  to. 
11.  Resident  and  nonresident  aliens  take  property  by  descent  the 
same  as  citizens.^"  12.  An  adopted  child  becomes  the  heir  of  the 
person  adopting  it,  except  that  such  child  does  not  inherit  estates 
tail  or  property  coming  from  the  collateral  kindred  of  such 
adopting  parent  and  the  subsequent  death  of  the  adopted  child 
without  issue,  the  property  of  such  adopting  parent  goes  to  the 
next  of  kin  of  said  parent,  and  if  such  adopting  parent  shall  have 
natural  children,  the  adopted  child  shall  share  in  the  inheritance ; 
and  such  children  shall  respectfully  inherit  from  and  through 
each  other.-" 

§  865.     New  Mexico, — In  New  Mexico  the  real  estate  of  an 
intestate  descends  as  follows:     1.  One- fourth  to  the  surviving 

i^Comp.  Stat.   1909-1910,  pp.  1917-        20  Comp.  Stat.   1909-1910,  pp.  2807- 
1923,  2809. 


866 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


922 


husband  or  wife,  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  the  chil- 
dren, and  their  heirs  by  right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  in- 
testate leaves  no  issue  the  whole  of  his  estate  shall  go  to  the  sur- 
viving wife  or  husband,  and  if  there  is  no  surviving  wife  or  hus- 
band, the  portion  which  would  have  gone  to  such  survivor  shall 
go  to  the  parents  of, the  decedent;  and  if  one  of  the  parents  be 
dead,  then  to  the  surviving  parent.  3.  If  both  parents  be  dead, 
the  property  is  distributed  as  if  such  parents  had  outlived  the 
decedent  and  died  in  possession  of  the  property;  and  so  on 
through  the  ascending  ancestors  and  their  issue.  If  heirs  are  not 
thus  found,  the  portion  uninherited  goes  to  the  husband  or  wife 
of  the  deceased  according  to  like  rules.  4.  If  there  be  no  heirs 
of  the  intestate,  the  portion  uninherited  shall  go  to  the  heirs  of 
his  wife,  if  dead,  according  to  like  rules,  and  if  he  has  more  than 
one  wife  dead  it  shall  be  equally  divided  among  the  heirs  of  all 
such  wives  taking  by  right  of  representation.  5.  If  there  be  no 
heirs  nor  kindred,  husband  or  wife,  then  the  estate  escheats  to  the 
state.  6.  Upon  the  death  of  the  wife,  the  entire  community 
property,  without  administration,  belongs  to  the  husband.  And 
upon  the  death  of  the  husband,  half  of  the  community  property 
goes  to  the  surviving  wife  and  the  other  half  is  subject  to  the 
testamentary  disposition  of  the  husband;  and  in  the  absence  of 
such  disposition  goes  one- fourth  to  the  surviving  wife  and  the 
remainder  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  of  the  deceased.  7. 
Posthumous  children  unprovided  for  by  the  father's  will  shall 
inherit  the  same  interest  as  though  no  will  had  been  made.  8. 
Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  the  mother  and  the  mother^ 
from  the  children,  and  they  inherit  from  the  father  when  they 
have  been  recognized  by  him  as  his  children;  but  such  recognition 
must  have  been  general  and  notorious  or  else  in  writing,  and  then 
only  when  the  father  has  no  legitimate  children.  If  the  recogni- 
tion has  been  mutual  the  father  may  inherit  from  his  illegitimate 
children,  but  the  mother  and  her  heirs  take  preference  to  the 
father  and  his  heirs.  Illegitimate  children  become  legitimate  by 
the  marriage  of  their  parents. ^^  9.  Aliens  inherit  property  the 
same  as  citizens. 

§  866.     Nev^^  York. — In  Xew  York  the  real  estate  of  an  in- 
testate remaining  after  ])ayment  of  debts,  goes  by  descent  as  fol- 


I 


21  Ann.  Stat.  1915,  ch.  29. 


923  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    866 

lows,  subject  to  dower  and  curtesy  :  1.  To  the  lineal  descendants 
of  the  intestate.  2.  To  the  intestate's  father.  3.  To  the  mother 
of  the  intestate.  4.  To  the  collateral  relatives  of  the  intestate. ^^ 
The  above  course  of  descent  is  subject  to  the  following  rules :  ( 1 ) 
If  lineal  descendants  are  all  of  equal  degree  of  consanguinity  to 
intestate  they  share  equally;  (2)  if  of  unequal  degree  they  take 
the  shares  which  their  parents,  if  living,  would  have  taken;  (3) 
in  default  of  lawful  descendants,  the  father  takes  the  fee  unless 
the  inheritance  came  on  the  part  of  the  mother,  in  which  case,  if 
the  mother  is  dead,  he  takes  the  life  estate,  with  reversion  to 
such  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  as  may  be  living,  and 
descendants  of  those  dead.  If  none  are  living  to  take  the  rever- 
sion he  takes  the  fee."^  5.  If  there  are  no  descendants  and  no 
father,  or  the  inheritance  came  on  the  part  of  the  mother,  she 
takes  a  life  estate  with  reversion  to  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
intestate  and  their  descendants.  If  there  are  no  such  reversioners 
she  takes  the  fee."*  6.  If  there  are  no  descendants,  and  no  father 
or  mother  capable  of  inheriting  the  estate,  it  descends  to  collat- 
erals, in  the  following  order:  (1 )  To  the  brothers  and  sisters  of 
the  intestate  and  their  descendants;  (2)  if  the  estate  came  on  the 
part  of  the  father  to  the  father's  brothers  and  sisters  and  their 
descendants,  and  if  none  such,  to  the  mother's  brothers  and  sis- 
ters and  their  descendants;  (3)  if  the  estate  came  on  the  part  of 
the  mother  to  the  mother's  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  de- 
scendants; if  none  such,  to  the  father's  brothers  and  sisters  and 
their  descendants;  (4)  if  the  estate  did  not  come  on  the  part  of 
either  father  or  mother,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  both  of  father 
and  mother  and  their  descendants;  (5)  if  there  be  no  brothers  or 
sisters  or  descendants  of  them,  to  the  father's  parents  if  the  in- 
heritance came  through  the  father;  if  they  be  dead,  to  the  moth- 
er's parents;  if  the  inheritance  came  through  the  mother,  to  the 
mother's  parents;  if  the  inheritance  did  not  come  through  either 
father  or  mother,  then  to  living  grandparents."^  7.  Collaterals, 
when  all  are  equal  degree  of  consanguinity  to  the  intestate,  take 
per  capita;  if  of  unequal  degree,  they  take  per  stirpes. ^"^  8.  The 
estate  of  an  illegitimate  intestate,  dying  without  issue,  descends 
to  the  mother,  if  living;  if  she  be  dead,  to  his  relative  entitled 

22Consol.  Laws  1909,  S  81.  2r,  Consol.  Laws  1909,  §  88. 

2^'Consol.  Laws  1909,  §§  82,  83,  84.        2g  Consol.  Laws  1909,  §§  86,  87. 
2*Consol.  Laws  1909,  §  85. 


§    867  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  924 

to  take  on  her  part,  as  if  he  had  been  legitimate.  Illegitimate 
children  inherit  both  real  and  personal  property  from  the  mother, 
as  if  legitimate,  if  the  mother  has  no  lawful  descendants."^  9. 
Relatives  of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole- 
blood,  unless  the  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  descent, 
devise,  or  gift  of  an  ancestor,  in  which  case  all  those  not  of  the 
blood  of  such  ancestor  are  excluded."*  10.  In  cases  not  provided 
for,  the  estate  descends  according  to  the  course  of  the  common 
law.^^  11.  Posthumous  children  inherit  as  if  born  in  the  lifetime 
of  the  intestate.^"  12.  The  alienism  of  an  intestate  does  not  pre- 
clude inheritance  by  any  person  otherwise  capable  of  inheriting.^^ 
13.  A  legally  adopted  child  of  an  intestate  shares  in  the  real  and 
personal  estate  as  if  his  legitimate  child,  and  the  foster  parent 
stands  in  the  same  relation  as  a  natural  parent  in  respect  to  in- 
heritance from  the  adopted  child.  But  adoption  does  not  deprive 
the  child  of  his  rights  of  inheritance  and  succession  from  his 
natural  parents.  A  husband  can  not  adopt  a  child  without  his 
wife's  consent.  14.  Any  advancement  of  real  or  personal  prop- 
erty by  a  decedent  to  a  child  shall  be  charged  to  him  on  the  divis- 
ion or  distribution  of  the  estate,  but  the  maintenance  or  educating 
or  the  giving  money  to  a  child  without  a  view  to  a  portion  or  set- 
tlement in  life  shall  not  be  deemed  an  advancement.^' 

§  867.  North  Carolina. — In  North  Carolina  the  property 
of  an  intestate  descends  according  to  the  following  rules:  1.  The 
inheritance  lineally  descends  to  the  issue  of  the  person  who  died 
last  seised ;  but  does  not  lineally  ascend  except  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided. 2.  Females  inherit  equally  with  males  and  younger  chil- 
dren with  older  children.  3.  The  lineal  descendants  of  any  de- 
ceased person  shall  represent  their  ancestor  and  stand  in  the  same 
place  as  the  person  himself  would  have  stood,  had  he  been  living. 
4.  On  failure  of  lineal  descendants  and  where  the  inheritance 
has  been  transmitted  by  descent  from  an  ancestor  or  has  been 
derived  by  gift,  or  settlement,  from  an  ancestor,  to  whom  the 
person  thus  advanced  would,  in  the  event  of  such  ancestor's  death, 
have  been  the  heir,  or  one  of  his  heirs,  the  inheritance  shall  de- 
scend to  the  next  collateral  relations  capable  of  inheriting  of  the 
person  last  seised,  who  were  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor,  sub- 

27Consol.  Laws  1909,  §  89.  so  Consol.  Laws  1909.  §  93. 

28  Consol.  Laws  1909.  §  91.  3i  Consol.  Laws  1909,  §  95. 

29ConsoI.  Laws  1909,  §  92.  32  Consol.  Laws  1909,  §  96. 


925  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    867 

ject  to  the  two  preceding  rules.  5.  On  failure  of  lineal  descend- 
ants, and  where  the  inheritance  has  not  been  transmitted  by  de- 
scent or  derived  as  aforesaid  from  the  ancestor  or  where,  if  so 
transmitted  or  derived,  the  blood  of  such  ancestor  is  extinct,  the 
inheritance  shall  descend  to  the  next  collateral  relation,  capable 
of  inheriting  of  the  person  last  seised,  whether  of  the  paternal  or 
maternal  line,  subject  to  rules  two  and  three.  6.  Collateral  re- 
lations of  the  half-blood  shall  inherit  equally  with  those  of 
the  whole-blood,  and  the  degrees  of  relationship  shall  be 
computed  according  to  the  rules  which  prevail  in  descents  at 
common  law ;  provided,  that  in  all  cases  where  the  person  last 
seised  shall  have  left  no  issue  capable  of  inheriting,  nor  brother, 
nor  sister,  nor  issue  of  such,  the  inheritance  shall  vest  in  the 
father  if  living,  and  if  not,  then  in  the  mother  if  living.  7.  No 
inheritance  shall  descend  to  any  person  as  heir  of  the  person  last 
seised  unless  such  person  shall  be  in  life  at  the  death  of  the  person 
last  seised,  or  shall  be  born  within  ten  lunar  months  after  the 
death  of  the  person  last  seised.  8.  When  any  person  shall  die 
leaving  none  who  can  claim  as  heir  to  him,  his  widow  shall  be 
deemed  his  heir,  and  as  such,  shall  inherit  his  estate.  9.  When 
there  shall  be  no  legitimate  issue,  every  illegitimate  child  of  the 
mother,  and  the  descendant  of  any  such  child  deceased,  shall  be 
considered  an  heir,  and  as  such,  shall  inherit  her  estate,  but  such 
child  or  descendant  shall  not  be  allowed  to  claim,  as  representing 
the  mother,  any  part  of  the  estate  of  her  kindred,  either  lineally 
or  collaterally.  Illegitimate  children  shall  be  considered  legiti- 
mate as  between  themselves  and  their  representatives,  and  their 
estates  shall  descend  accordingly  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they 
had  been  born  in  lawful  wedlock,  and  in  the  case  of  the  death  of 
any  such  child  or  his  issue  without  legal  issue,  his  estate  shall 
descend  to  such  person  as  would  inherit  it  if  all  such  children  had 
been  born  in  wedlock ;  provided,  that  when  any  illegitimate  child 
shall  die  without  issue,  his  inheritance  shall  vest  in  the  mother  in 
the  same  manner  as  provided  hereinbefore.  10.  Every  estate 
for  the  life  of  another  not  divided  shall  be  deemed  an  inheritance 
of  the  deceased  owner  within  the  meaning  and  operation  of  the 
foregoing  rules.  11.  Every  person  in  whom  a  seising  is  re- 
quired by  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  rules  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  been  seised  if  he  had  any  right,  title,  or  interest 
in  the  inheritance.     12.  The  children  of  colored  parents,  born  at 


§    868  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  926 

any  time  before  the  first  of  January,  1868,  or  persons  living  to- 
gether as  man  and  wife,  are  hereby  declared  legitimate  children 
of  such  parents  or  either  one  of  them,  with  all  the  rights  of  heirs 
at  law,  and  next  of  kin,  with  respect  to  the  estate  or  estates  of 
any  such  parents  or  either  one  of  them.  13.  The  adoption  of  a 
child  establishes  reciprocal  rights  of  inheritance  between  such 
child  and  its  adoptive  parents.  14.  Aliens  take  by  descent  the 
same  as  citizens.  15.  Whenever  a  parent  shall  die  intestate,  hav- 
ing in  his  or  her  lifetime  settled  upon  or  advanced  to  any  of  his 
or  her  children  any  real  or  personal  estate,  such  child  so  ad- 
vanced in  real  estate  shall  be  utterly  excluded  from  any  share  in 
the  real  estate  descended  from  such  parent,  except  so  much 
thereof  as  will,  when  added  to  the  real  estate  advanced,  make  the 
share  of  him  who  is  advanced  equal  to  the  share  of  those  who  may 
not  have  been  advanced,  or  not  equally  advanced.  And  any  child 
so  advanced  in  personal  estate  shall  be  utterly  excluded  from  any 
share  in  the  personal  estate  of  which  the  parent  died  possessed, 
except  so  much  thereof  as  will,  when  added  to  the  personal  estate 
advanced  make  the  share  of  him  who  is  advanced  equal  to  the 
share  of  those  who  may  not  have  been  advanced,  or  not  equally 
advanced;  and  in  case  any  one  of  the  children  shall  have  been 
advanced  in  real  estate  in  greater  value  than  an  equal  share 
thereof  which  may  come  to  the  other  children,  he  or  his  legal 
representatives  shall  l)e  charged  in  the  distribution  of  the  per- 
sonal estate  of  such  deceased  parent  with  the  excess  in  value  of 
such  real  estate  so  advanced  as  aforesaid  over  and  above  an  equal 
share  as  aforesaid.  And  in  case  any  of  the  children  shall  have 
been  advanced  in  personal  estate  of  greater  share  than  an  equal 
share  thereof  which  goes  to  the  other  children,  he  or  his  legal 
representatives  shall  be  charged  in  the  division  of  the  real  estate, 
if  there  be  any,  with  the  excess  in  value  which  he  may  have  re- 
ceived, as  aforesaid,  over  and  above  an  equal  distributive  share 
of  the  personal  estate.^^ 

§  868.  North  Dakota. — In  North  Dakota,  when  any  per- 
son having  title  to  an  estate  not  limited  by  a  marriage  contract 
dies  intestate,  it  descends  in  the  following  manner:  1.  If  de- 
cedent leaves  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  only  one  child,  or 
lawful  issue  of  one  child,  in  equal  shares  to  the  surviving  husband 

33  Pell's  Revisal  1908,  §  1556. 


927  STATUTES  OF  DESCENT  §  868 

or  wife,  and  such  child  or  issue;  and  if  there  be  not  more  than 
one  child  living,  or  one  child  and  the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more 
deceased  children,  one-third  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  and  to 
the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  representation. 
But  if  there  is  no  child  of  the  deceased  living  at  his  death,  the 
remainder  goes  to  all  of  his  lineal  descendants,  and  if  in  the  same 
degree  of  kindred  equally,  otherwise  according  to  right  of  repre- 
sentation. If  there  be  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  but  de- 
cedent leaves  issue,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  such  issue,  and  if 
it  consists  of  more  than  one  child  living,  or  one  child  and  the 
lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children,  then  the  estate 
goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  living,  or  to  the  child  living 
and  the  issue  of  the  deceased  child  or  children  by  right  of  repre- 
sentation. 2.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue  and  the  estate  does 
not  exceed  $10,000,  all  of  the  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  and  of  all  property  in  excess  of  $10,000,  one- 
half  thereof  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  the  other 
half  to  the  decedent's  father  and  mother  in  equal  shares,  or  if 
one  is  dead  to  the  survivor,  and  if  the  father  and  mother  are 
dead  and  decedent  leaves  any  brothers  or  sisters,  then  in  equal 
shares  to  the  decedent,  or  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  If  decedent  leaves  no  issue, 
nor  husband,  or  wife,  the  estate  must  go  to  the  father  and  mother 
in  equal  shares  or  the  survivor  of  them.  If  the  decedent  leaves 
a  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  no  issue,  and  no  father  or 
mother,  brother,  sister,  or  children  of  a  deceased  brother  or  sis- 
ter, then  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife. 
3.  If  there  be  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor  father  nor 
mother,  then  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  deceased,  and  to  the  children  of  such  deceased 
brother  or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  4.  If  the  decedent 
leaves  no  issue,  nor  husband,  nor  wife,  nor  father  nor  mother, 
nor  brothers  or  sisters,  the  whole  estate  must  go  to  the  next  of 
kin  in  equal  degree,  excepting  where  there  are  two  or  more  col- 
lateral degrees,  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those 
who  claim  through  the  nearest  ancestor  must  be  preferred  to 
those  claiming  through  an  ancestor  more  remote.  However,  if 
the  decedent  leave  several  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of 
one  or  more,  and  any  such  surviving  child  die  under  age  and  not 


§  868 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


928 


having  married,  all  the  estate  that  came  to  the  deceased  child  by 
inheritance  from  such  decedent,  descends  in  equar  shares  to  the 
other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such 
other  children  who  are  dead,  by  right  of  representation.  5.  If 
at  the  death  of  such  child,  who  dies  under  age,  not  having  been 
married,  and  all  the  other  children  of  the  parents  are  also  dead, 
and  -iny  of  them  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  comes  to  such 
child  by  inheritance  from  his  parents  descends  to  the  issue  of  all 
other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  if  all  issue  are  in  the  same 
degree  of  kindred  to  the  deceased,  they  share  the  estate  equally, 
otherwise  according  to  the  right  of  representation.  6.  If  the 
decedent  leave  no  husband,  wife,  or  kindred,  the  estate  escheats  to 
the  state.  7.  I  f  the  decedent  be  an  infant  and  leave  no  parent,  nor 
brother  nor  sister,  but  leaving  any  person  of  kin  acting  in  the 
capacity  of  a  foster  parent  who  may  have  assumed  or  had  im- 
posed upon  him,  the  duty  or  obligation  of  the  personal  care,  cus- 
tody, support  or  maintenance  of  such  infant  after  the  decease  of 
its  natural  parents,  and  until  its  decease,  but  where  such  relation- 
ship was  not  created  by  a  guardianship  of  the  estate  of  such 
infant,  then  its  estate  shall  descend  to  such  foster  parent.^* 
8.  The  degree  of  kindred  is  established  by  the  number  of  genera- 
tions and  each  generation  is  termed  a  degree. ^^  9.  Kindred  of 
the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood,  un- 
less the  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  descent,  devise,  or 
gift  of  some  one  of  his  ancestors,  when  those  of  the  half-blood 
are  excluded. "''  10.  Upon  the  death  of  a  person  in  whom  the 
title  to  real  property  constituting  a  homestead  is  vested,  such 
homestead  descends  (1)  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  for 
life;  or,  (2)  if  there  be  no  surviving  husband  or  wife  to  the  de- 
cedent's minor  child  or  children  until  the  youngest  attains  major- 
ity, or  through  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  dying  before,  then 
thereafter  to  the  decedent's  minor  child  or  children  until  the 
youngest  attains  majority. ^^  11.  An  adopted  child  shall  be 
deemed  as  respects  inheritance,  the  child  of  its  adoptive  parents. ^^ 
12.  Aliens  acquire  real  estate  by  inheritance  the  same  as  citi- 
zens.^°  13.  Posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the 
death  of  their  parents.*"     14.  If  there  be  no  surviving  husband 


stComp.  Laws  1913,  §  574.1 

35  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5747. 

3«Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5752. 

37  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5627. 


35  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  4448. 

39  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5759. 

40  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5276. 


929  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  '     §    869 

or  wife  or  heirs  capable  of  inheriting  the  estate,  it  escheats  to  the 
state. *^  15.  Advancements  made  to  any  child  or  other  lineal  de- 
scendant must  be  brought  into  hotchpot,  but  such  person  ad- 
vanced shall  in  no  case  be  required  to  refund  gifts  or  advance- 
ments if  so  expressed  in  the  instrument  or  charged  in  writing  by 
the  intestate  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  as 
such  by  the  person  advanced.  The  value  of  the  advancement  is 
taken  as  expressed  in  the  conveyance ;  otherwise  according  to  its 
value  when  given.  When  the  issue  of  a  person  to  whom  an  ad- 
vancement has  been  made  inherit,  they  must  account  for  the 
advancement.*"  16.  Every  illegitimate  child  is  an  heir  of  the 
person  who,  in  writing  signed  in  the  presence  of  a  competent 
witness,  acknowledges  himself  to  be  the  father  of  such  child ;  and 
in  all  cases  is  an  heir  of  his  mother,  and  inherits  his  or  her  estate 
in  whole  or  in  part,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
he  had  been  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  but  he  does  not  represent 
his  father  or  mother  by  inheriting  any  part  of  the  estate  of  his  or 
her  kindred,  either  lineal  or  collateral,  unless  before  his  death  his 
parents  shall  have  intermarried,  and  his  father,  after  such  mar- 
riage, acknowledges  him  as  his  child  or  adopts  him  into  his 
family.^^ 

§  869.  Ohio. — In  Ohio  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate 
which  came  by  descent,  devise,  or  deed  of  gift  from  an  intestate, 
passes  by  descent  as  follows:  1.  To  the  children  or  their  lineal 
representatives.  2.  To  the  husband  or  wife,  relict  of  such  intes- 
tate, during  natural  life.  3.  To  the  brothers  or  sisters  of  the 
intestate,  who  are  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the 
estate  came.  4.  If  there  be  no  brothers  or  sisters  of  the  intes- 
tate of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate  came,  or 
their  legal  representatives,  and  the  estate  came  by  deed  of  gift 
from  an  ancestor  who  is  living,  the  estate  shall  ascend  to  such 
ancestor.  5.  If  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate  came  is  de- 
ceased, it  shall  pass  to  the  children  of  such  ancestor,  or  their  legal 
representatives;  if  there  are  no  such  children,  or  their  legal  rep- 
resentatives, the  estate  shall  pass  to  and  vest  in  the  husband  or 
wife,  relict  of  such  ancestor,  if  the  parent  of  the  decedent,  during 
the  life  of  such  relict;  and  on  the  death  of  such  husband  or  wife, 

41  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5743.  «  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  5745. 

42  Comp.  Laws  1913,  §§  5753-5757. 

59 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    869  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  930 

or  if  there  is  no  such  hiisl)and  or  wife,  the  estate  shall  pass  to  the 
brothers  and  sisters  of  such  ancestor  or  their  legal  represent- 
atives, and  for  want  of  such  brothers  and  sisters,  or  their  legal 
representatives,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  of 
the  intestate,  or  their  legal  representatives,  though  such  brother 
or  sister  be  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  the  estate 
came.  6.  If  there  are  no  such  half-brothers  or  sisters  of  the  in- 
testate, or  their  legal  representatives,  the  estate  shall  pass  to  the 
next  of  kin  to  the  intestate  of  the  blood  of  the  intestate  from 
whom  the  estate  came,  or  their  legal  representatives.**  7.  If  the 
estate  came  not  by  descent,  devise,  or  deed  of  gift,  it  shall  pass  as 
follows:  (1)  To  the  children  of  the  intestate  and  their  legal  rep- 
resentatives. (2)  To  the  husband  or  wife,  relict  of  such  intes- 
tate. (3)  To  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  of  the 
whole-blood,  or  their  legal  representatives.  (4)  To  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  half-blood  or  their  legal  representatives. 
(5)  To  the  father,  or  if  he  be  dead  to  the  mother.  (6)  To  the 
next  of  kin  or  their  legal  representatives  of  the  blood  of  the  in- 
testate.*^ 8.  If  there  are  no  kindred  capable  of  inheriting,  then 
the  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  as  an  estate  of 
inheritance;  and  if  there  be  no  such  relict,  it  escheats  to  the 
state.***  9.  When  the  relict  of  a  deceased  husband  or  w^ife  shall 
die  intestate  and  without  issue  possessed  of  any  real  or  personal 
property  which  came  to  such  intestate  from  any  former  deceased 
husband  or  wife  by  deed  of  gift,  devise,  or  bequest,  or  under  the 
provisions  of  rule  seven,  then  such  estate  real  and  personal 
shall  pass  to  and  vest  in  the  children  of  such  deceased  husband  or 
wife  or  the  legal  representatives  of  such  children.  If  there  are 
no  children  or  their  legal  representatives  living,  then  such  estate, 
real  and  personal,  shall  pass  and  descend,  one-half  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  such  intestate,  or  their  legal  representatives,  and 
one-half  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  such  deceased  husband  or 
wife  from  whom  such  personal  or  real  estate  came  or  their  per- 
sonal representatives.*'  10.  Illegitimate  children  shall  inherit  or 
transmit  inheritance  from  and  to  the  mother,  and  from  and  to 
those  from  w^hom  she  may  inherit,  or  to  w^hom  she  may  transmit 
the  inheritance  in  like  manner  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock. 
When  a  man  has  by  a  woman  one  or  more  children,  and  after- 

"Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §  6855.        "o  Lining's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §  6857. 
«  Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §  6856.        ^^  Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §  6859. 


931  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    870 

wards  marries  her,  such  child  or  children,  if  acknowledged  by  him 
as  his  child  or  children,  shall  be  deemed  legitimate ;  and  the  issue 
of  parents  whose  marriage  is  deemed  null  at  law  shall  neverthe- 
less be  deemed  legitimate.*^  11.  Aliens  take  real  property  by 
inheritance  the  same  as  citizens.*^  12.  Advancements  made  by 
an  intestate  during  his  lifetime  to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descend- 
ant must  be  brought  into  hotchpot,  but  in  no  case  can  the  person 
advanced  be  required  to  refund.  If  any  such  advancement  be  made 
in  real  estate,  the  value  thereof  shall  be  considered  and  taken  as  a 
part  of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided,  and  if  in  money  or  other  per- 
sonal estate,  it  shall  be  considered  and  taken  as  a  part  of  the  per- 
sonal estate  to  be  distributed;  and  if,  in  either  case,  it  exceeds  the 
value  of  the  real  or  personal  estate  that  would  have  come  to  the 
heir  to  whom  such  advancement  was  made,  he  or  she  shall  not 
refund  any  part  of  it,  but  shall  receive  so  much  less  out  of  the 
other  part  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate  as  will  make  his  or  her 
whole  share,  as  near  as  can  be  estimated,  equal  to  that  of  either 
of  the  other  heirs  who  are  not  in  the  same  degree  of  consan- 
guinity with  him  or  her.  If  the  value  of  the  estate,  real  or  per- 
sonal, so  advanced  is  expressed  in  the  deed  of  conveyance,  or  in 
the  charge  thereof  made  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  receipt  in  wait- 
ing, given  by  the  person  receiving  such  advancement,  it  shall  be 
considered  and  taken  to  be  of  that  value,  in  the  division  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  estate,  otherwise  it  shall  be  estimated  as  of  its 
value  when  advanced.^''  13.  An  adopted  child  inherits  from  its 
adoptive  parent  or  parents,  but  not  through  them,  from  their 
ancestors. 

§  870.  Oklahoma. — When  any  person  having  title  to  any 
estate  not  otherwise  limited  by  marriage  contract,  dies  without 
disposing  of  the  estate  by  will,  it  descends  and  must  be  distrib- 
uted in  the  following  manner:  1.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife,  or  the  lawful  issue  of  one  child,  in  equal 
shares  to  the  surviving  husband,  or  wife  and  child,  or  issue  of 
such  child.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or  wife, 
and  more  than  one  child  living,  or  one  child  living  and  the  law- 
ful issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children,  one-third  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife,  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  his 

48Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §§  6871,  ^o  Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §§  6866- 
6872.  6869. 

*9Laning's  Rev.  Stat.  1905,  §  6870. 


§    870  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  932 

children,  and  to  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child,  by  right 
of  representation;  but  if  there  be  no  child  of  the  decedent  living 
at  his  death,  the  remainder  goes  to  all  his  lineal  descendants ;  and 
if  all  the  descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the 
decedent  they  share  equally,  otherwise  they  take  according  to  the 
right  of  representation:  Provided,  that  if  the  decedent  shall  have 
been  married  more  than  once,  the  spouse  at  the  time  of  death 
shall  inherit  the  property  not  acquired  during  covertures  with 
such  spouse  only  an  equal  part  with  each  of  the  living  children  of 
decedent,  and  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of 
representation.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  surviving  husband  or 
wife,  but  leave  issue,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  such  issue,  and  if 
such  issue  consists  of  more  than  one  child  living  or  one  child 
living,  and  the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children, 
then  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  children  living,  or  to 
the  child  living,  and  the  issue  of  the  deceased  child  or  children  by 
right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue,  the 
estate  goes  one-half  to  the  surviving  husband  or  w'lie,  and  the 
remaining  one-half  to  the  decedent's  father  or  mother,  to  them 
in  equal  shares;  but  if  there  be  no  father  or  mother,  then  said 
remaining  one-half  goes,  in  equal  shares,  to  the  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  decedent,  and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased 
^brother  or  sister,  by  right  of  representation.  If  decedent  leave 
no  issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  the  estate  must  go  to  the  father 
or  mother,  or  if  he  leave  both  father  and  mother,  to  them  in 
equal  shares :  Provided,  that  in  all  cases  where  the  property  is 
acquired  by  the  joint  industry  of  husband  and  wife  during  cover- 
ture, and  there  is  no  issue,  the  whole  estate  shall  go  to  the  sur- 
vivor, at  whose  death,  if  any  of  the  said  real  property  remain, 
one-half  of  such  property  shall  go  to  the  heirs  of  the  husband  and 
one-half  to  the  heirs  of  the  wife,  according  to  the  right  of  repre- 
sentation. 3.  If  there  be  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor 
father,  nor  mother,  then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  decedent,  and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister,  by  right  of  representation;  if  the  deceased,  being  a 
minor,  leave  no  issue,  the  estate  must  go  to  the  parents  equally,  if 
living  together;  if  not  living  together,  to  the  parent  having  had 
the  care  of  said  deceased  minor.  4.  If  the  decedent  leave  no 
issue  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor  father  and  no  brother  or  sister  is 
living  at  the  time  of  his  death,  the  estate  goes  to  his  mother,  to 


933  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    870 

the  exclusion  of  the  issue,  if  any,  of  deceased  brothers  or  sisters. 
5.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  no 
issue,  and  no  father,  nor  mother,  nor  brother,  nor  sister,  the 
whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  6.  If  the 
decedent  leave  no  issue,  nor  husband  or  wife,  and  no  father  or 
mother,  nor  brother  nor  sister,  the  estate  must  go  to  the  next  of 
kin,  in  equal  degree,  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors, 
those  who  claimed  through  the  nearest  ancestors  must  be  pre- 
ferred to  those  claiming  through  an  ancestor  more  remote.  7.  If 
the  decedent  leave  several  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of 
one  or  more  children,  and  any  such  surviving  child  dies  under 
age,  and  not  having  been  married,  all  the  estate  that  came  to  the 
deceased  child  by  inheritance  from  such  decedent,  descends  in 
equal  shares  to  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  to  the 
issue  of  any  such  other  children  who  are  dead,  by  right  of  repre- 
sentation. 8.  If,  at  the  death  of  such  child  who  dies  under  age, 
not  having  been  married,  all  the  other  children  of  his  parents  are 
also  dead,  and  any  of  them  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came 
to  such  child  by  inheritance  from  his  parent  descends  to  the  issue 
of  all  other  children  of  the  same  parent;  and  if  all  issue  are  in 
the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  child,  they  share  the  estate 
equally;  otherwise  they  take  according  to  the  right  of  representa- 
tion. 9.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  husband,  wife,  or  kindred,  the 
estate  escheats  to  the  state  for  the  support  of  common  schools. ^^ 
Every  illegitimate  child  is  an  heir  of  the  person  Who  in  writing, 
signed  in  the  presence  of  a  competent  witness,  acknowledges  him- 
self to  be  the  father  of  such  child;  and  in  all  cases  is  an  heir  of 
his  mother;  and  inherits  his  or  her  estate,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
as  the  case  may  be,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  had  been  born  in 
lawful  wedlock;  but  he  does  not  represent  his  father  or  mother 
by  inheriting  any  part  of  the  estate  of  his  or  her  kindred,  either 
lineal  or  collateral,  unless  before  his  death  his  parents  shall  have 
intermarried,  and  his  father  after  such  marriage,  acknowledges 
him  as  his  child,  or  adopts  him  into  his  family ;  in  which  case 
such  child  and  all  the  legitimate  children  are  considered  brothers 
and  sisters,  and  on  the  death  of  either  of  them,  intestate,  and 
without  issue,  the  others  inherit  his  estate,  and  are  heirs,  as  here- 
inbefore provided,  in  like  manner  as  if  all  the  children  had  been 

=1  Oklahoma      Rev.      Laws      1910,     §  8418. 


871 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


934 


legitimate ;  saving  to  the  father  and  mother,  respectively,  their 
rights  in  the  estate  of  all  the  children  in  like  manner  as  if  all  had 
been  legitimate.  The  issue  of  all  marriages  null  in  law,  or  dis- 
solved by  divorce,  are  legitimate.''"  If  an  illegitimate  child,  who 
has  not  been  acknowledged  or  adopted  by  his  father,  dies  intes- 
tate, without  lawful  issue,  his  estate  goes  to  his  mother,  or,  in 
case  of  her  decease,  to  her  heirs  at  law.'"'^  Any  estate,  real  or  per- 
sonal, given  by  the  decedent  in  his  lifetime,  as  an  advancement  to 
any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant,  is  a  part  of  the  estate  of  the 
decedent  for  the  purpose  of  division  and  distribution  thereof 
among  his  issue,  and  must  be  taken  by  such  child,  or  other  lineal 
descendant,  toward  his  share  of  the  estate  of  the  decedent.^^ 

V 

§  871.  Oregon. — In  Oregon  the  real  estate  of  an  intestate 
descends  as  follows:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  the  children  and  the 
issue  of  deceased  children  by  right  of  representation.  If  no  chil- 
dren living,  to  the  lineal  descendants.  2.  If  no  lineal  descend- 
ants, to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife;  and  if  no  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  then  equally  to  the  father  and  mother  of  the  in- 
testate. 3.  If  there  be  no  lineal  descendants,  nor  husband,  nor 
wife,  nor  father,  then  to  the  mother;  or  if  there  be  no  lineal  de- 
scendants, nor  wife,  nor  husband,  nor  mother,  then  to  the  father. 
If  there  be  no  lineal  descendants,  husband,  wife,  father,  or 
mother,  then  equally  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  the  issue  of 
the  deceased  brothers  and  sisters  by  representation.  4.  If  there 
be  no  lineal  descendants,  husband,  wife,  father,  mother,  brothers 
or  sisters,  then  to  the  next  of  kin.  5.  If  a  child  die  under  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years,  leaving  no  husband,  wife,  or  children, 
then  to  the  heirs  of  the  ancestor  from  whom  such  real  estate  de- 
scended, the  same  as  if  such  child  died  before  the  death  of  such 
ancestor.  6.  If  there  be  no  lineal  descendants  or  kindred,  or 
husband  or  wife,  the  estate  escheats  to  the  state.^^  7.  An  adopted 
child  has  the  same  rights  as  a  child  born-  to  the  adopted  parents 
in  lawful  wedlock,  except  that  he  can  not  inherit  as  an  heir  of  the 
body  or  as  a  child  of  a  deceased  child  by  right  of  representation.^" 
8.  Aliens   have   the   same   rights   of   inheritance   as    citizens." 


^■2  Oklahoma      Rev.      Laws      1910,         "^  Oklahoma      Rev.      Laws      1910, 
§  8420.  §  8795. 

^3  Oklahoma      Rev.      Laws      1910,        •"■'■'  Lord's  Laws  1909.  §  7348. 
§  8421.  5G  Lord's  Laws  1909,  §  7089. 

67  Lord's  Laws  1909,  §  7172. 


i 


935  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    871 

9.  Illegitimates  inherit  from  the  mother  but  not  through  her. 
When  an  illegitimate  child  dies  intestate  without  leaving  hus- 
band or  wife  or  lawful  issue,  the  estate  passes  to  the  mother. 
Illegitimate  children  are  made  legitimate  by  the  marriage  of  their 
parents. ^^  10.  Degrees  of  kindred  are  computed  according  to 
the  rules  of  the  civil  law.^^  11.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  in- 
herit equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the  same  degree.'''' 
12.  Any  estate,  real  or  personal,  that  may  have  been  given  by  the 
intestate  in  his  lifetime,  as  an  advancement  to  any  child  or  other 
lineal  descendant,  shall  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  of 
the  intestate,  so  far  as  regards  the  division  and  distribution 
thereof  among  his  issue,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or  other 
descendant  toward  his  share  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate.  If  the 
amount  of  such  advancement  shall  exceed  the  share  of  the  heir 
so  advanced,  he  shall  be  excluded  from  any  further  portion  in 
the  division  and  distribution  of  the  estate,  but  he  shall  not  be 
required  to  refund  any  part  of  such  advancement;  and  if  the 
amount  so  received  shall  be  less  than  his  share,  he  shall  be  entitled 
to  as  much  more  as  will  give  him  his  full  share  of  the  estate  of 
the  deceased.  If  such  advancement  be  made  in  real  estate,  the 
value  thereof  shall,  for  the  purposes  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
section,  be  considered  a  part  of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided;  and 
if  it  be  in  personal  estate,  it  shall  be  considered  a  part  of  the  per- 
sonal estate ;  and  if  in  either  case  it  shall  exceed  the  share  of  real 
and  personal  estate  respectively,  that  would  have  come  to  the 
heir  so  advanced,  he  shall  not  refund  any  part  of  it,  but  shall 
receive  so  much  less  out  of  the  other  part  of  the  estate  as  will 
make  his  whole  share  equal  to  those  of  the  other  heirs  who  are 
in  the  same  degree  with  him.  All  gifts  and  grants  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  been  made  in  advancement,  if  they  are  expressed 
in  the  gift  or  grant  to  be  so  made,  or  if  charged  in  writing  by  the 
intestate  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  as  such 
by  the  child  or  other  descendant.  If  the  value  of  the  estate  so 
advanced  shall  be  expressed  in  the  conveyance,  or  in  the  charge 
thereof  made  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
party  receiving  it,  it  shall  be  considered  as  of  that  value  in  the 
division  and  distribution  of  the  estate;  otherwise  it  shall  be  esti- 
mated according  to  its  value  when  given,  as  nearly  as  the  same 

es  Lord's  Laws  1909,  §§  7351,  7352.        eo  Lord's  Laws  1909,  §  7353. 
59  Lord's  Laws  1909,  §  7353. 


§    S72  TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS  936 

can  be  ascertained.  If  any  child  or  lineal  descendant  so  advanced 
shall  die  before  the  intestate,  bearing  issue,  the  advancement  shall 
be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  division  and  distribution  of  the 
estate,  and  the  amount  thereof  shall  be  allowed  accordingly  by 
the  representatives  of  their  heirs  so  advanced,  in  like  mannet  as 
if  the  advancement  had  been  made  directly  to  them.^^ 

§  872.  Pennsylvania. — In  Pennsylvania  the  real  estate  of  a 
person  dying  intestate  descends  as  follows:  1.  If  the  intestate 
leave  a  surviving  wife  and  issue,  the  wife  takes  one-third  for 
life;  but  if  there  be  no  issue,  she  takes  the  sum  of  $5,000  payable 
out  of  the  real  or  personal  estate  or  both  as  she  may  elect,  and 
in  addition  thereto  shall  be  entitled  to  one-half  of  the  remaining  real 
estate  forlife;if  he  leaves  no  known  heirs  she  takes  all  in  fee.  2.  If 
the  intestate  leave  a  surviving  husband,  he  has  a  life  estate  in  the 
real  estate,  as  tenant  by  the  curtesy,  whether  there  be  issue  of  the 
marriage  or  not.  3.  Subject  to  these  estates,  the  children  and 
issue  of  deceased  children  take  the  estate  in  equal  shares.  If  they 
stand  in  different  degrees  of  consanguinity,  they  take  by  repre- 
sentation. If  in  the  same  degree,  they  take  per  capita.  4.  In 
default  of  issue,  and  subject  to  estates  of  widow  and  surviving 
husband,  the  real  estate  goes  to  the  father  and  mother  jointly, 
and  to  the  survivor  for  life,  and  subject  to  their  estates,  or,  if 
they  both  be  dead,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  intestate  of 
the  whole-blood,  and  the  children  and  grandchildren  of  any  de- 
ceased brothers  and  sisters,  in  fee,  in  equal  shares.  5.  If  there 
be  no  issue  of  the  intestate,  nor  brother,  nor  sister,  nor  nephew 
or  niece  of  the  whole-blood,  the  real  estate  goes,  subject  to  the 
life  estates  aforesaid,  to  the  next  of  kin  of  the  intestate,  being 
descendants  of  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole-blood.  6.  In 
default  of  issue  and  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole-blood  and 
their  descendants,  and  subject  to  the  life  estates  of  the  widow  or 
surviving  husband,  the  real  estate  is  vested  in  the  father  and 
mother,  or  whichever  of  them  is  living,  for  such  estate  as  the 
intestate  had  therein.  7.  Subject  to  all  the  estates  above  men- 
tioned, the  real  estate  descends  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
half-blood  and  their  descendants  in  like  manner.  8.  If  the  in- 
testate left  no  kindred  related  to  him  as  above,  the  real  estate  de- 
scends to  his  next  of  kin  who  is  of  the  blood  of  the  last  pur- 


"  Lord's  Laws   1909,   §§  7354-7359. 


i 


937  STATUTES   OF   DESCENT  §    873 

chaser.  If  there  be  none,  then  to  the  next  of  kin  generally.  If 
there  be  kindred  of  the  blood  of  the  last  purchaser,  none  other 
can  take  an  estate  of  inheritance.  9.  Degrees  of  consanguinity 
are  reckoned  according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.  10.  Chil- 
dren and  descendants  of  deceased  grandparents  shall  represent 
such  deceased  grandparents  whenever  grandparents  are  entitled 
as  next  of  kin  to  intestate's  real  or  personal  estate.  11.  Minors, 
and  since  the  act  of  June  1,  1911,  adult  persons  may  be  adopted 
as  heirs  of  the  adopting  parents.  12.  In  default  of  all  known 
kindred,  widow,  or  surviving  husband,  the  real  and  personal 
estate  of  an  intestate  escheats  to  the  state.  13.  Illegitimate  chil- 
dren and  their  mother  may  inherit  from  each  other,  and  illegiti- 
mates born  of  the  same  mother  may  inherit  from  each  other. 
14.  Advancements  to  children  in  the  intestate's  lifetime  are  de- 
ducted from  their  shares. *^^ 

§  873.  Rhode  Island. — In  Rhode  Island  the  rules  of  de- 
scent are  as  follows:  1.  To  the  intestate's  children  and  their 
descendants.  2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  descendants, 
then  to  the  parents  in  equal  shares  or  to  the  surviving  parent  of 
such  intestate.  3.  If  there  be  no  parent,  then  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and  to  their  descendants.^"  4.  If 
there  be  none  of  the  foregoing  then  the  estate  passes  in  equal 
moiety  to  the  paternal  and  maternal  kindred :  ( 1 )  To  the  grand- 
parents, in  equal  shares,  if  any  there  be;  (2)  if  there  be  no 
grandparent  then  to  the  uncles  and  aunts,  or  their  descendants ; 
(3)  if  there  be  no  grandparents,  uncles  or  aunts,  or  their  de- 
scendants, then  to  the  great-grandparents  in  equal  shares;  (4)  if 
there  be  no  great  grandparents  then  to  the  granduncles  and 
grandaunts,  and  their  descendants.*^*  5.  When  the  title  to  any 
real  estate  of  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  gift  or  devise 
from  intestate's  parents  or  their  kindred,  and  intestate  shall  be 
without  children,  such  estate  shall  go  to  the  kin  nearest  to  the 
intestate,  of  the  blood  of  the  person  from  whom  such  estate  came 
or  descended,  if  there  be  any  such  kin.*'^  6.  An  alien  has  the 
same  right  of  inheritance  as  a  citizen.'^*'  7.  No  right  of  inheri- 
tance accrues  to  any  person  whatever,  other  than  to  the  children 

cspruden's  Digest   (13th  ed.)   1905,         "^^  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316,  §  2. 

pp.  1994-2006.  '"'^  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316,  §  6. 

03  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316,  §  1.  ««  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  252,  §  4. 


§  874 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


938 


of  the  intestate,  unless  such  person  be  in  l)eing,  and  capable  in 
law,  to  take  as  heir  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's  death. "^ 
8.  When  the  inheritance  is  directed  to  go  by  moieties,  as  in  rule 
four  to  the  paternal  and  maternal  kindred,  if  there  be  no 
such  kindred  on  the  one  part,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  other 
part;  and  if  there  be  none  of  either  part,  the  whole  goes  to  the 
husband  or  wife  of  the  intestate;  and  if  the  wife  or  husband  be 
dead,  it  goes  to  his  or  her  kindred  in  the  like  course  as  if  such 
husband  or  wife  had  survived  the  intestate,  and  then  died,  en- 
titled to  the  estate.**^  9.  The  descendants  of  any  person  deceased 
inherit  the  estate  which  such  person  would  have  inherited  had  he 
survived  the  intestate.*'"  10.  Illegitimate  children  and  their 
mother  inherit  from  each  other. ^°  11.  Advancements  made  to 
any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  must  be  deducted  from  the 
share  of  the  person  so  advanced.  If  real  estate  shall  be  conveyed 
by  deed  of  gift  or  personal  estate  shall  be  delivered  to  a  child  or 
other  lineal  descendant,  and  charged,  or  a  memorandum  thereof 
in  writing  made  by  the  intestate  or  by  his  order,  or  shall  be  de- 
livered expressly  for  that  purpose  in  the  presence  of  two  wit- 
nesses, who  were  requested  to  take  notice  thereof,  the  same  shall 
be  deemed  an  advancement  to  such  child  to  the  value  of  such  real 
or  personal  estate. '^^ 

§  874.  South  Carolina. — In  South  Carolina  the  real  estate 
of  an  intestate  descends  as  follows:  1.  One-third  in  fee  to  the 
surviving  wife ;  and  the  remainder  to  the  children  equally  if  more 
than  one;  but  if  only  one  the  remainder  shall  be  vested  in  that 
one  absolutely  forever.  2.  If  intestate  leave  no  children  or 
other  lineal  descendant  but  shall  leave  a  widow,  and  father  or 
mother,  or  brothers  and  sisters,  or  brother  or  sister  of  the  whole- 
blood,  the  widow  is  entitled  to  one-half  and  the  other  one-half 
shall  be  equally  divided  between  the  father,  or  if  he  be  dead,  the 
mother  and  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole-blood.  3.  If 
intestate  leave  no  father  or  mother,  or  issue,  but  shall  leave  a 
widow  and  brothers  and  sisters,  or  brother  or  sister  of  the  whole- 
blood,  the  widow  shall  be  entitled  to  one-half  and  the  brothers 
and  sisters  to  the  other  half  as  tenants  in  common.     Where  the 


"Gen.  Laws  1909.  ch.  316,  p.  1148. 

68  Gen.  Laws  1909.  ch.  316.  §  4. 

69  Gen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316.  p.  1148. 


'OGen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316,  p.  1148 
'iGen.  Laws  1909,  ch.  316,  p.  1151 


J 


939  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    874 

intestate  leaves  a  widow  and  a  brother  or  sister  of  the  half-blood 
and  a  child  or  children  of  a  brother  or  sister  of  the  whole-blood, 
the  widow  takes  one-half  of  the  estate  and  the  other  half  is  to  be 
equally  divided  between  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half- 
blood,  and  the  children  of  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole- 
blood.  4.  If  there  be  none  of  the  above  kindred,  the  widow 
takes  one-half  of  the  estate,  and  the  other  one-half  goes  to  lineal 
ancestors.  5.  If  there  be  none  of  the  latter,  then  the  widow  takes 
two-thirds,  and  the  residue  goes  to  the  next  of  kin  to  the  intes- 
tate. 6.  Degrees  of  kindred  are  computed  by  beginning  with  the 
ancestor,  reckoning  up  to  the  common  ancestor  and  down  to  the 
claimant,  exclusively,  each  step  representing  a  single  degree. 
7.  Where  the  intestate  leaves  no  surviving  widow,  the  share  that 
would  have  gone  to  her  had  she  survived  goes  as  provided  for  in 
the  preceding  clauses  for  the  rest  of  the  estate.  8.  On  the  death 
of  an  intestate  wife,  the  husband  takes  the  same  share  in  his 
wife's  estate  that  she  would  have  taken  in  his  had  she  survived 
him ;  and  the  remainder  goes  in  the  same  course  as  described  in 
the  case  of  intestacy  of  the  husband.  9.  If  there  is  no  husband 
surviving,  his  share  goes  as  is  provided  in  the  preceding  rules  for 
the  rest  of  the  estate.  10.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  issue,  parent, 
nor  brother  nor  sister  of  the  whole-blood,  nor  their  children,  nor 
brothers  nor  sisters  of  the  half-blood,  nor  lineal  ancestor,  nor 
next  of  kin,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife.^"  11.  Alien  widows  are  entitled  to  dower,  and  descent  can 
be  traced  through  aliens."  12.  Adopted  children  inherit  through 
their  adoptive  parents.  But  no  person  who  adopts  an  illegitimate 
child  can  give  to  such  child  by  deed,  will,  or  otherwise,  any 
greater  portion  of  his  estate  than  is  now  allowed  by  law.  unless 
such  person  has  no  lawful  wife  or  issue  living  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  and  in  case  of  the  adoptive  parent  dying  intestate,  such 
illegitimate  child  can  inherit  from  such  parent  no  greater  portion 
of  his  estate  than  may  be  given  such  child  by  deed  or  will  when 
such  intestate  leaves  a  widow  or  lawful  issue  surviving.'^ 
13.  Advancements  made  to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descendant 
must  be  l^rought  into  hotchpot  by  the  person  advanced  or  his 
legal  representatives,  and  the  value  of  the  advancement  is  to  be 
estimated  at  the  death  of  the  intestate,  so  that  neither  the  im- 

72  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §  3555.  ^4  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §  3798. 

73  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §  3556. 


§    875  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  940 

provements  of  the  real  estate  by  such  child  or  children,  or  the  in- 
crease of  personal  property  shall  be  taken  into  computation/^ 

i^  875.  South  Dakota. — In  South  Dakota  the  property  of 
an  intestate,  after  the  debts  of  the  decedent,  and  the  expenses  of 
the  administration  have  been  paid,  must  be  distributed  as  fol- 
lows:  1.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  survivinj^  husband  or  wife,  and 
only  one  child,  or  the  lawful  issue  of  one  child,  in  equal  shares 
to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  child,  or  issue  of  such 
child.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving-  husband  or  wife,  and 
more  than  one  child  living,  or  one  child  living,  and  the  lawful 
issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children,  one-third  to  the  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife,  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  his 
children,  and  to  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child,  by  right 
of  representation;  but  if  there  be  no  child  of  the  decedent  living 
at  his  death,  the  remainder  goes  to  all  of  his  lineal  descendants; 
and  if  all  the  descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to 
the  decedent,  they  share  equally,  otherwise  they  take  according 
to  the  right  of  representation.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  surviving 
husband  or  wife,  but  leave  issue,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  such 
issue,  and  if  such  issue  consists  of  more  than  one  child  living  or 
one  child  living  and  the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased 
children,  then  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  children 
living,  or  to  the  child  living,  and  the  issue  of  the  deceased  child 
or  children  by  right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  decedent  leave 
no  issue  and  the  estate  does  not  exceed  in  value  the  sum  of  five 
thousand  dollars,  all  the  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife;  if  the  estate  exceeds  five  thousand  dollars  then  the  first  five 
thousand  dollars  to  the  survivor,  and  all  the  property  in  excess 
of  five  thousand  dollars  in  value,  one-half  goes  to  the  surviving 
husband  or  wife,  and  tlie  other  half  goes  to  the  decedent's  father 
and  mother  in  equal  shares,  and  if  either  is  dead  the  whole  goes 
to  the  other,  but  if  neither  survive  then  such  portion  goes  in 
equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  decedent  and  to 
the  children  or  grandchildren  of  any  deceased  brother  and  sister 
by  right  of  representation.  -If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue,  nor 
husband,  nor  wife,  the  estate  must  go  to  his  father  and  mother 
in  equal  shares,  or,  if  either  is  dead,  then  to  the  other.  3.  If 
there  be  no  issue,  nor  husband,  nor  wife,  nor  father,  nor  mother, 

"=  Code  of  Laws  1912,  §  3558. 


941  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    875 

then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  decedent, 
and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by  right 
of  representation.     4.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband 
or  wife,  and  no  issue,  and  no  father,  nor  mother,  nor  brother, 
nor  sister,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife.     5.   If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue,  nor  husband,  nor  wife, 
and  no  father,  nor  mother,  nor  brother,  nor  sister,  the  estate 
must  go  to  the  next  of  kin,  in  equal  degree,  excepting  that  when 
there  are  two  or  more  collateral  kindred,  in  equal  degree,  but 
claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  claiming  through  the 
nearest  ancestors  must  be  preferred  to  those  claiming  through  an 
ancestor    more    remote.       However,     (see  six).       6.      If    the 
decedent  leave  several  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of  one 
or  more  children,  and  any  such  surviving  child  dies  under  age, 
and  not  having  been  married,  all  the  estate  that  came  to  the  de- 
ceased child  by  right  of  inheritance  from  such  decedent  descends 
in  equal  shares  to  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  to 
the  issue  of  any  such  other  children  who  are  dead,  by  right  of 
representation.     7.  If,  at  the  death  of  such  child  who  dies  under 
age,  not  having  been  married,  all  the  other  children  of  his  parents 
are  also  dead,  and  any  of  them  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that 
came  to  such  child  by  inheritance  from  his  parent  descends  to  the 
issue  of  all  other  children  of  the  same  parent;  and  if  all  the  issue 
are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  the  child  they  share  the 
estate  equally;  otherwise,  they  take  according  to  the  right  of  rep- 
resentation.    8.  If   the    decedent    leave    no    husband,    wife,    or 
kindred,  the  estate  escheats  to  the  state.'°     9.  The  degree  of  kin- 
dred is  established  by  the  number  of  generations,  and  each  gen- 
eration is  termed  a  degree."     10.  Kindred  of  the  half-blood  in- 
herit equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood,  unless  the  inheritance 
came  to  the  intestate  by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  of  some  one  of 
his    ancestors,    when    those    of    the    half-blood    are    excluded." 
11.  An  adopted  child  shall  be  deemed  as  respects  inheritance  the 
child  of  its  adoptive  parents."     12.  Aliens  acquire  real  estate  by 
inheritance  the  same  as  citizens.'"     13.  Posthumous  children  are 
considered  as  living  at  the  death  of  the  intestate.''     14.  Ad- 
vancements made  to  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  must  be 

"Comp.  Laws   1913,    §   1094.  "  Comp.   Laws   1913,   §    136. 

^' Comp.  Laws   1913.   §    1098.  so  Comp.   Laws   1913,   §   1110. 

78Comp.  Laws   1913,   §   1103.  si  Comp.   Laws   1913,   §  213. 


^  876 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


942 


brought  into  hotchpot,  but  such  person  advanced  shall  in  no  case 
be  required  to  refund  gifts  or  advancements  if  so  expressed  in 
the  instrument  or  charged  in  writing  1:>y  the  intestate  as  an  ad- 
vancement, or  acknowledged  in  writing  as  such  by  the  person 
advanced.  The  value  of  an  advancement  is  taken  as  expressed 
in  the  conveyance ;  otherwise,  according  to  its  value  when  given. 
When  the  issue  of  the  person  to  whom  an  advancement  has 
been  made  inherit,  they  must  account  for  the  advancement.^^ 
15.  Every  illegitimate  child  is  the  heir  of  the  person,  who,  in 
writing,  signed  in  the  presence  of  a  competent  witness,  acknowl- 
edges himself  to  be  the  father  of  such  child.^^ 

§  876.  Tennessee, — In  Tennessee  the  real  estate  of  an  in- 
testate owner  is  inherited  by  his  lineal  descendants,  collateral 
kindred,  or  ascendants  in  the  following  order:  1.  By  all  the  sons 
and  daughters  of  the  intestate  equally;  and  if  any  child  of  the 
intestate  shall  die  during  the  intestate's  lifetime  his  lineal  de- 
scendants shall  take  the  parent's  share.  2.  If  there  be  no  issue, 
nor  brothers  and  sisters,  nor  other  issue,  then  by  their  parents, 
if  they  be  living.  3.  If  the  estate  was  acquired  by  intestate,  and 
he  died  without  issue,  then  it  goes  to  his  brothers  and  sisters  of 
the  whole  and  half-blood,  and  if  any  such  brothers  or  sisters  die 
during  intestate's  lifetime,  leaving  issue,  then  the  issue  shall  rep- 
resent the  parent.  4.  In  default  of  brothers  and  sisters  and 
their  issue,  then  to  the  father  and  mother  as  tenants  in  common ; 
and  if  both  are  dead,  in  equal  moieties  to  the  heirs  of  the  father 
and  mother  in  equal  degree.  5.  Where  the  land  came  to  the  in- 
testate by  gift,  devise,  or  descent,  from  a  parent  or  the  ancestor 
of  a  parent  and  he  die  without  issue,  leaving  brothers  or  sisters 
of  the  paternal  or  maternal  line  of  the  half-blood,  then  the  land 
goes  to  such  brothers  and  sisters  on  the  part  of  the  parent  from 
whom  the  land  came,  in  the  same  manner  as  to  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  whole-blood,  until  the  line  of  such  parent  is  exhausted 
of  the  half-blood,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other  line.  6.  If  he 
leave  no  brothers  or  sisters,  then  it  shall  go  to  the  parent,  if 
living,  from  whom  or  whose  ancestor  it  came,  in  preference  to 
the  other  parent.  7.  If  both  parents  be  dead,  then  to  the  heirs 
of  the  parent  from  whose  ancestor  it  came.**     8.  In  respect  to 


82Comp.  Laws  1913,  §§  1104,  1105. 
83Comp.  Laws  1913,  §  1096,  1097. 


84  Ann.  Code  1917,  §  4163. 


943  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    877 

inheritance  by  grandchildren  and  nephews,  the  same  rules  apply.®^ 
9.  In  case  of  no  heirs,  then  the  husband  or  wife  take  in  fee  sim- 
ple. 10.  There  is  no  representation  among  collateral  for 
brothers'  and  sisters'  children.^*'  11.  There  is  no  distinction 
made  between  children  of  the  whole  and  half-blood.^'  12.  Ille- 
gitimate children  inherit  equally  with  legitimates  from  their 
mother  and  from  each  other.^^  13.  Adoption,  unless  specially 
restrained  by  decree  of  court,  confers  all  of  the  rights  and  privi- 
leges of  a  legitimate  child,  including  capacity  to  inherit,  but  gives 
to  the  person  obtaining  the  adoption  no  mutual  rights  of  inheri- 
tance or  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  person  adopted.*^  14.  An 
alien,  resident  or  nonresident,  may  take  real  property  by  descent. 
15.  All  advancements,  whether  by  settlement  or  otherwise,  in  the 
lifetime  of  the  deceased,  or  by  testamentary  provision  shall  be 
collated  and  brought  into  contribution  in  the  partition  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  real  and  personal  estate  of  the  deceased;  those  in 
real  estate,  first  in  the  partition  of  the  real  estate,  and  those  in 
personal  estate  in  the  distribution  of  the  personal  estate.  And 
should  the  value  of  the  advancement  in  real  estate  exceed  the 
child's  share,  the  overplus  shall  be  collated  and  brought  into  con- 
tribution in  the  distribution  of  the  personal  estate ;  and  should  the 
value  of  such  advancement  in  personal  estate  exceed  the  share  of 
such  child  in  the  personal  estate,  then  the  excess  shall  be  brought 
into  contribution  in  the  partition  of  the  real  estate.''"^ 

§  877.  Texas. — In  Texas,  when  any  person  having  title  to 
any  estate  of  inheritance,  real,  personal,  or  mixed,  shall  die  in- 
testate as  to  such  estate,  and  shall  leave  no  surviving  husband  or 
wife,  it  shall  descend  and  pass  in  parcenary  to  his  or  her  kindred, 
male  and  female,  in  the  following  course :  1.  To  his  or  her  chil- 
dren and  their  descendants,  if  any  there  be.  2.  If  there  be  no 
children  or  their  descendants,  then  to  his  or  her  father  or  mother 
in  equal  portions.  But  if  only  the  father  or  mother  survive  the 
intestate,  then  his  or  her  estate  shall  be  divided  into  two  equal 
portions,  one  of  w^hich  shall  pass  to  such  survivor,  and  the  other 
one-half  shall  pass  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased, 

85  Ann.  Code  1917,  §  4164.  Crocker  v.  Balch,  104  Tenn.  6,  55  S. 

86  Ann.  Code  1917,  §  4165.  W.  307. 

87  Ann.  Code  1917,  §  4163,  Part  3,  a.  so  Ann.   Code   1917,   §§   4174,   4175, 

88  Ann.  Code  1917.  §  4169.  4176. 

89  Statute    construed    and    applied. 


§    877  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  944 

and  to  their  descendants,  or  to  such  of  them  as  there  be;  but  if 
there  be  none  such,  then  the  whole  estate  shall  be  inherited  by  the 
surviving  father  or  mother.  3.  If  there  be  neither  father  nor 
mother,  then  the  whole  of  such  estate  shall  pass  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  intestate,  and  to  their  descendants  or  to  such  of 
them  as  there  be.  4.  If  there  be  none  of  the  kindred  aforesaid, 
then  the  inheritance  shall  be  divided  into  two  moieties,  one  of 
which  shall  go  to  the  paternal  and  the  other  to  the  maternal  kin- 
dred, in  the  following  course,  that  is  to  say:  to  the  grandfather 
and  grandmother,  in  equal  portions;  but  if  only  one  of  these  l)e 
living,  then  the  estate  shall  be  divided  into  two  equal  parts,  one 
of  w'hich  shall  go  to  such  survivor  and  the  other  shall  go  to  the 
descendant  or  descendants  of  such  deceased  grandfather  or 
grandmother.  If  there  be  no  such  descendants,  then  the  whole 
estate  shall  be  inherited  by  the  surviving  grandfather  or  grand- 
mother. If  there  be  no  surviving  grandfather  or  grandmother 
then  tlie  whole  of  such  estate  shall  go  to  their  descendants 
or  to  such  of  them  as  there  may  be,  and  so  on  without  end,  pass- 
ing in  like  manner  to  the  nearest  lineal  ancestors  and  their  de- 
scendants, or  to  such  of  them  as  there  be.^^  5.  When  any  per- 
son, having  title  to  any  estate  of  inheritance,  real,  personal,  or 
mixed,  shall  die  intestate  as  to  such  estate,  and  shall  leave  a  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife,  the  estate  of  such  intestate  shall  descend 
and  pass  as  follows:  (1)  If  the  deceased  have  a  child  or  chil- 
dren, or  their  descendants,  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  shall 
take  one-third  of  the  personal  estate,  and  the  balance  of  such 
personal  estate  shall  go  to  the  child  or  children  of  the  deceased, 
and  their  descendants;  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  shall  also 
be  entitled  to  an  estate  for  life  in  one-third  of  the  land  of  the 
intestate,  with  remainder  to  the  child  or  children  of  the  intestate 
and  their  descendants.  (2)  If  the  deceased  have  no  child  or 
children,  or  their  descendants,  then  the  surviving  husband  or  wife 
shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  personal  estate,  and  to  one-half  of  the 
lands  of  the  intestate,  without  remainder  to  any  person  or  per- 
sons, and  the  other  one-half  shall  pass  and  be  inherited  according 
to  the  rules  of  descent  and  distribution,  as  prescril^ed  in  the  fore- 
going rules;  provided,  however,  that  if  the  deceased  have  neither 
surviving  father  nor  mother,  nor  surviving  brothers  or  sisters, 

91  Vernon's   Sayles  Civ.   Stat.   1912,     tit.  45,  art.  2461. 


I 


945  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    877 

or  their  descendants,  then  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  shall  be 
entitled  to  the  whole  of  the  estate  of  such  intestate,  real,  personal, 
and  mixed. ^-  6.  The  community  property  all  goes  to  the  sur- 
viving husband  or  wife,  if  the  deceased  have  no  children.''^ 
7.  No  right  of  inheritance  shall  accrue  to  any  person  whatsoever 
other  than  to  children  of  the  intestate,  unless  they  be  in  being 
and  capable  in  law  to  take  as  heirs  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's 
death. °*  8.  Collateral  kindred  of  the  half-blood  inherit  only  one- 
half  so  much  as  those  of  the  whole-blood;  but  if  all  be  of  the 
half-blood,  they  shall  have  whole  portions. °^  9.  Where  the  chil- 
dren of  the  intestate's  brothers  and  sisters,  uncles  and  aunts,  or 
any  other  relations  of  the  deceased  standing  in  the  same  degree, 
come  into  partition,  they  shall  take  per  capita ;  and  where  a  part 
of  them  be  dead,  and  a  part  living,  the  issue  of  those  dead,  have 
right  to  partition,  such  issue  shall  take  per  stirpes.^^  10.  Where 
a  man,  having  by  a  woman  a  child  or  children,  shall  afterward 
intermarry  with  such  woman,  such  child  or  children,  if  recog- 
nized by  him,  shall  thereby  be  legitimate  and  made  capable  of 
inheriting  his  estate.  The  issue,  also,  in  marriages  deemed  null 
in  law  shall  nevertheless  be  deemed  legitimate."^  11.  Illegiti- 
mate children  shall  be  capable  of  inheriting  from  and  through 
their  mother,  and  of  transmitting  estates,  and  shall  also  be  en- 
titled to  distributive  shares  of  the  personal  estate  of  any  of  their 
kindred,  on  the  part  of  their  mother,  in  like  manner  as  if  they 
had  been  lawfully  begotten  of  such  mother.^^  12.  Homesteads 
descend  as  other  real  property,  but  no  partition  can  be  had  of 
same  during  the  lifetime  of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  or  so 
long  as  the  survivor  may  elect  to  use  or  occupy  the  same  as  a 
homestead,  or  so  long  as  the  guardian  of  minor  children  may  be 
permitted  to  occupy  same  by  order  of  court.""  13.  An  adopted 
child  is  entitled  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges,  both  in  law  and 
equity,  of  legal  heirs;  provided,  however,  that  if  the  party  adopt- 
ing such  heir  has,  at  the  time  of  such  adoption,  or  shall  there- 
after have  a  child  begotten  in  lawful  wedlock,  such  adopted  child 

92  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912,  og  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912, 
tit.  45.  art.  2462.  tit.  45.  art.  2468. 

93  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912,  9' Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912, 
tit.  45,  art.  2469.  tit.  45,  art.  2472. 

9*  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912,  "s  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912, 
tit.  45,  art.  2466.  tit.  45,  art.  2473. 

95  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912,  99  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912, 
tit.  45,  art.  2464.  tit.  52,  ch.  18. 

60 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    878  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  946 

shall  in  no  case  inherit  more  than  one- fourth  of  the  estate  of  the 
party  adopting  him.^  14.  Aliens  may  take  real  property  by  de- 
scent, but  unless  they  become  inhabitants  or  declare  their  inten- 
tion of  becoming  citizens  they  must  alienate  the  land  within  ten 
years,  or  same  will  be  subject  to  escheat."  15.  Advancements 
made  to  children  or  other  lineal  descendants  will   be  charged 


against  the  share  of  the  person  so  advanced.^ 

§  878.  Utah. — In  Utah,  when  any  person  having  title  to 
any  estate  not  otherwise  limited  by  marriage  contract  dies  with- 
out disposing  of  the  estate  by  will,  it  descends  in  the  following 
manner:  1.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or  wife, 
and  only  one  child,  or  the  issue  of  one  child,  in  equal  shares  to 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  child  or  issue  of  such  child. 
If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  more  than 
one  child  living,  or  one  child  living  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more 
deceased  children,  one-third  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife, 
and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares  to  his  children,  and  to  the 
issue  of  any  deceased  child,  by  right  of  representation;  but  if 
there  be  no  child  of  the  decedent  living  at  his  death,  the  re- 
mainder goes  to  all  of  his  lineal  descendants;  and  if  all  of  the 
descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred,  they  share 
equally;  otherwise,  they  take  according  to  the  right  of  repre- 
sentation; provided,  that  the  share  in  the  legal  and  equitable 
estates  and  real  property  of  which  a  deceased  husband  dies  pos- 
sessed, secured  by  this  section  to  his  widow,  shall  not  be  addi- 
tional to  the  interest  in  such  estates  provided  for  in  lieu  of  dower. 

2.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  surviving  husband  or  wife,  but  leave 
issue,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  such  issue,  and  if  such  issue  con- 
sists of  more  than  one  child  living,  or  one  child  living,  and  the 
issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  child,  then  the  estate  goes  in  equal 
shares  to  the  children  living,  or  to  the  child  living,  and  the  issue 
of  the  deceased  child  or  children  by  right  of   representation. 

3.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue,  all  of  the  estate,  real  and  per- 
sonal, of  which  the  decedent  die  seised  or  possessed,  if  not  over 
five  thousand  dollars  in  value,  exclusive  of  debts  and  expenses, 
goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife;  and  if  over  that  value, 

1  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912,  ^  Vernon's  Sayles  Civ.  Stat.  1912, 
tit.  45,  art.  2463.  tit.  45,  art.  2467. 

-  Vernon's    Sayles   Civ.    Stat.    1912, 
tit.  45,  art.  2474. 


947  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    878 

five  thousand  dollars  in  value  thereof  goes  to  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  and  the  excess  goes  one-half  to  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  and  the  other  one-half  to  the  decedent's  father  and 
mother  in  equal  shares,  and  if  either  be  dead  the  whole  said  one- 
half  goes  to  the  other.  If  there  be  no  father  or  mother,  then  one- 
half  of  such  excess  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sis- 
ters of  the  decedent,  and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  If  the  decedent  leave  no 
issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  the  estate  must  go  to  his  father  and 
mother  in  equal  shares,  or  if  either  be  dead,  then  to  the  other. 
4.  If  there  be  neither  issue,  husband,  wife,  father,  nor  mother, 
then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  decedent, 
and  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by  right  of 
representation.  5.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving  husband  or 
wife,  and  neither  issue,  father,  mother,  brother,  nor  sister,  the 
whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  6.  If  the 
decedent  leave  neither  issue,  husband,  wife,  father,  mother, 
brother,  or  sister,  the  estate  goes  to  the  next  of  kin  in  equal  de- 
gree, excepting  when  there  are  two  or  more  collateral  kindred,  in 
equal  degree,  but  claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  who 
claim  through  the  nearest  ancestors  must  be  preferred  to  those 
claiming  through  an  ancestor  more  remote.  7.  If  the  decedent 
leave  several  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more 
children,  and  any  surviving  child  dies  under  age,  and  not  having 
been  married,  all  the  estate  that  came  to  the  deceased  child  by 
inheritance  from  such  decedent  descends  in  equal  shares  to  the 
other  children  of  the  same  parents  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such 
other  children  who  are  dead,  by  right  of  representation.  8.  If, 
at  the  death  of  such  child,  who  dies  under  age,  not  having  been 
married,  all  the  other  children  of  his  parents  are  also  dead,  and 
any  of  them  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  such  child 
by  inheritance  from  his  parents  descends  to  the  issue  of  all  their 
children  of  the  same  parent;  and  if  all  the  issue  are  in  the  same 
degree  of  kindred  to  the  child,  they  share  the  estate  equally ; 
otherwise,  they  take  according  to  the  right  of  representation. 
9.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  husband,  wife,  nor  kindred,  and  there 
be  no  heirs  to  take  the  estate  or  any  portion  thereof  the  same 
shall  escheat  to  the  state.*     10.  An  adopted  child  has  all  the 

^Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  2828. 


§    879  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  948 

rights  of  the  legal  relation  of  parent  and  child."'  11.  Aliens  may 
take  in  all  cases  by  succession  as  well  as  citizens."  12.  An  illegiti- 
mate child  is  the  heir  of  the  person  who  acknowledges  himself  to 
be  the  father  of  such  child;  and  in  all  cases  such  child  inherits 
from  the  mother,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  born  in  lawful  wed- 
lock. The  issue  of  all  marriages  null  in  law,  or  dissolved  by  the 
decree  of  divorce,  are  legitimate.  If  an  illegitimate  child  dies 
intestate,  without  lawful  issue,  his  estate  goes  to  the  mother,  or 
in  case  of  her  decease  to  her  lawful  heirs.''  13.  Kindred  of  the 
half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the 
same  degree,  unless  the  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  de- 
scent, devise,  or  gift  of  some  one  of  his  ancestors,  in  which  case 
all  those  who  are  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  will  be  excluded 
from  the  inheritance.^  14.  Posthumous  children  are  considered 
as  living  at  the  death  of  the  intestate. °  15.  Advancements  made 
to  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  must  be  brought  into 
hotchpot,  but  in  no  case  can  the  heir  be  required  to  refund.  All 
gifts  and  grants  are  made  in  advancement  if  expressed  in  the 
gift  or  grant  to  be  so  made,  or  if  charged  in  writing  by  the 
intestate  as  an  advancement,  or  acknowledged  in  writing  to  be 
such  by  the  person  advanced.  If  the  value  of  the  estate  so  ad- 
vanced is  expressed  in  the  conveyance,  or  in  the  charge  thereof 
made  by  the  decedent,  or  in  the  acknowledgment  of  the  party  re- 
ceiving it,  it  must  be  held  as  of  that  value  in  the  division  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  estate;  otherwise  it  must  be  estimated  according 
to  its  value  when  given,  as  nearly  as  the  same  can  be  ascertained. 
If  any  child  or  other  lineal  descendant  receiving  an  advancement, 
dies  before  the  decedent,  leaving  issue,  the  advancement  must  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  the  division  and  distribution  of  the 
estate,  and  the  amount  thereof  must  be  allotted  accordingly  by 
the  representatives  of  the  heirs  receiving  the  advancements,  in 
like  manner  as  if  the  advancement  had  been  made  directly  to 
them.'" 

§  879.  Vermont. — In  Vermont  the  real  estate  of  an  intes- 
tate descends  as  follows:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  the  children  of 
the  intestate  or  the  legal  representatives  of  deceased  children. 
2.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  legal  representatives,  one- 

'■  Comp.  Laws  1907,  tit.  2.  §  8.  »  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  2840. 

«  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §  2847.  "  Comp.  Laws  1907,  S  2846. 

7  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  2833,  2834.  lo  Comp.  Laws  1907,  §§  2841-2845. 


949  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    879 

third  to  the  surviving  wife.  3.  If  the  husband  leave  no  issue, 
the  surviving  wife  is  entitled  to  the  whole  of  his  estate  if  it  does 
not  exceed  $2,000.  If  the  estate  exceeds  $2,000  then  the  widow 
is  entitled  to  $2,000  and  one-half  of  the  remainder,  and  the  re- 
maining part  of  the  estate  shall  descend  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  whole  would  if  no  widow  survived.  4.  If  the  wife  leaves 
no  issue,  the  husband  has  the  same  share  as  the  vv'ife  would  have 
in  the  estate  if  he  left  no  issue.  5.  If  the  intestate  leave  no  issue, 
nor  surviving  husband  nor  wife,  the  estate  descends  in  equal 
shares  to  his  father  and  mother,  and  if  the  mother  is  not  living 
the  estate  descends  to  the  father,  or  if  the  father  is  not  living, 
and  the  mother  survives,  the  estate  descends  to  the  mother.  6.  If 
the  intestate  leave  no  issue,  nor  wife,  nor  husband,  nor  father, 
nor  mother,  the  estate  descends  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  of  such  deceased  person,  and  to  the  lineal  represent- 
atives of  a  deceased  brother  or  sister.  7.  If  none  of  the  rela- 
tives above  named  shall  survive,  his  estate  shall  descend  in  equal 
shares  to  the  next  of  kin,  in  equal  degrees;  but  no  person  shall 
be  entitled  by  right  of  representation,  to  the  share  of  such  next 
of  kin  who  shall  have  died."  8.  The  degrees  of  kindred  are 
computed  according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law.^"  9.  Kindred 
of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood 
in  the  same  degree. ^^  10.  If  there  be  no  kindred,  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  the  estate  escheats  to  the  town  for  the  use  of 
schools."  11.  Illegitimate  children  inherit  from  their  mother  as 
if  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  and  the  estate  of  an  illegitimate  per- 
son dying  intestate,  and  leaving  no  issue,  nor  husband,  nor  wife, 
shall  descend  to  the  mother,  and  if  the  mother  be  dead,  through 
the  line  of  the  mother  as  if  the  person  so  dying  were  legitimate. 
When  the  parents  of  an  illegitimate  child  intermarry,  and  such 
child  be  recognized  by  the  father  as  his  child,  it  shall  be  con- 
sidered legitimate,  and  be  capable  of  inheriting.^^  12.  Advance- 
ments made  by  the  intestate  to  a  child  or  other  lineal  descendant 
must  be  brought  into  hotchpot,  but  in  no  case  can  the  heir  be  re- 
quired to  refund.  Only  such  gifts  are  advancements  as  are  so 
expressed,  or  are  for  the  consideration  of  love  and  affection,  or 
when  the  estate  so  given  is  charged  as  such  by  the  deceased  in 

11  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2936.  "  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2940. 

12  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2937.  is  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §§  2938,  2939. 

13  Pub.  Stat.  1906,  §  2936. 


§    880  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  950 

writing,  or  is  acknowledged  as  such  by  the  heir  in  writing,  or 
when  personal  estate  is  delivered  expressly  as  an  advancement 
before  two  witnesses  requested  to  take  notice  of  it.  If  the 
amount  so  advanced  is  in  real  property,  the  same  shall  be  set  of¥, 
first,  toward  the  heir's  share  of  the  real  estate,  and  if  it  is  more 
than  his  share,  the  balance  shall  be  set  off  toward  his  share  of  the 
personal  estate;  and  if  the  advancement  is  in  personal  estate,  the 
same  shall  be  set  off,  first,  toward  the  heir's  share  in  the  personal 
estate,  and  then  toward  his  share  in  the  real  estate.  But  if  all 
the  heirs  consent,  a  different  application  of  the  advancement  may 
be  made.  If  the  child,  or  other  lineal  descendant,  to  whom  such 
advancement  is  made,  dies  before  the  intestate,  the  advancement 
shall  be  reckoned  toward  the  share  of  the  representative,  as  it 
would  be  reckoned  toward  the  share  of  the  heir,  if  living.  Where 
the  value  of  an  advancement  is  expressed  in  the  conveyance,  or 
in  the  charge  of  the  same,  or  in  the  acknowledgment  of  the  per- 
son receiving  it,  or  by  the  intestate  at  the  time  of  its  delivery 
before  two  witnesses,  such  advancement  shall  be  taken  to  be  of 
the  value  so  expressed ;  otherwise  it  shall  be  estimated  according 
to  the  value  at  the  time  of  making  it.^" 

§  880.  Virginia. — In  Virginia  the  real  estate  of  an  intes- 
tate descends  as  follows:  1.  To  the  decedent's  children  and 
their  descendants.  2.  If  no  children  nor  the  descendants  of  any 
children,  to  the  father.  3.  If  no  father,  to  his  mother,  brothers 
and  sisters,  and  their  descendants.  4.  If  none  of  these  nor  their 
descendants,  then  one  moiety  to  the  paternal  and  the  other  to  the 
maternal  kindred,  in  the  following  order :  ( 1 )  To  the  grand- 
father. (2)  If  none,  to  the  grandmother,  uncles  and  aunts  on 
the  same  side,  and  their  descendants.  (3)  If  none  such,  then  to 
the  great-grandfather.  (4)  If  none,  to  the  great-grandmothers, 
and  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  great-grandmothers  and 
grandfather,  and  their  descendants  and  so  on,  passing  to  the 
nearest  lineal  male  ancestors;  if  none,  to  the  female  ancestors  in 
the  same  degree,  and  the  descendants  of  such  male  and  female 
ancestors.  5.  If  there  be  no  father,  mother,  brother  or  sister,  or 
any  descendant  of  either,  fior  any  paternal  kindred,  the  whole 
shall  go  to  the  maternal  kindred;  if  no  paternal  or  maternal  kin- 
dred, then  to  the  husband  or  wife,  and  if  the  husband  or  wife  be 

icPub.  Stat.  1906,  §§  2951-2956. 


I 


951  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    881 

dead,  then  to  his  or  her  kindred  in  hke  manner  as  if  the  husband 
or  wife  had  survived  the  intestate  and  died  entitled  to  the 
estate/'  6.  Collaterals  of  the  half-blood  inherit  only  one-half 
so  much  as  those  of  the  whole-blood,  but  if  all  the  collaterals  be 
of  the  half-blood,  then  the  ascending  kindred,  if  any,  shall  have 
double  portions.'®  7.  Where  those  entitled  are  in  the  same  de- 
gree, they  take  per  capita,  but  where  some  in  that  degree  are 
dead,  leaving  descendants,  these  descendants  take  per  stirpes.'^ 
8.  The  fact  that  any  party  derives  title  through  an  alien  ancestor 
shall  be  no  bar  to  his  claim.-°  9.  Illegitimate  children  inherit 
from  their  mother  as  if  legitimate.  If  a  man  marry  the  mother 
of  his  illegitimate  child,  and  recognize  the  child  before  or  after 
the  marriage,  it  shall  be  deemed  legitimate.  Though  a  marriage 
be  deemed  null  or  be  dissolved  by  law,  the  issue  shall  be  deemed 
legitimate.-'  10.  A  child  born  within  ten  months  after  the  death 
of  the  intestate  shall  inherit  as  though  it  was  in  being  at  the  time 
of  the  death."  11.  The  real  estate  of  an  infant  dying  without 
issue  shall  descend  and  pass  to  the  kindred  on  the  side  of  that 
parent  from  whom  it  was  derived;  if  none  then  to  those  on  the 
side  of  the  other  parent. ^^  12.  An  adopted  child  shall  be  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  the  child  and  heir  at  law  of  the  person 
adopting  it.  Property  inherited  by  such  child  from  its  parents 
by  adoption,  shall,  upon  its  death  without  issue,  pass  to  the  next 
of  kin  of  its  adoptive  parents.^*  13.  Advancements  made  to  a 
child  or  other  lineal  descendant,  must  be  brought  into  hotchpot 
with  the  whole  estate,  real  and  personal.^^ 

§  881.  Washington. — When  any  person  shall  die  seised  of 
any  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  or  any  right  thereto,  or 
entitled  to  any  interest  therein,  in  fee  simple,  or  for  the  life  of 
another,  not  having  devised  the  same,  they  shall  descend  subject 
to  the  debts  as  follows:  1.  If  the  descendant  leaves  a  surviving 
husband  or  wife,  and  only  one  child,  or  the  lawful  issue  of  one 
child,  in  equal  shares  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  child, 
or  issue  of  such  child;  if  the  decedent  leaves  a  surviving  husband 
or  wife,  and  more  than  one  child  living,  or  one  child  living  and 

17  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2548.  22  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2555. 

IS  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2549.  23  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2556. 

19  Ann.  Code  1904.  §  2550.  21  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2614a. 

20  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2551.  25  Ann.  Code  1904,  §  2561. 

21  Ann.  Code  1904,  §§  2553,  2554. 


§    881  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  952 

the  lawful  issue  of  one  or  more  deceased  children,  one-third  to 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  the  remainder  in  equal  shares 
to  his  children  and  to  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child  Ijy 
right  of  representation;  if  there  be  no  child  or  the  descendant 
living  at  his  death,  the  remainder  goes  to  all  his  lineal  descen- 
dants; and  if  all  the  descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kin- 
dred to  the  decedent,  they  share  equally ;  otherwise,  they  take  ac- 
cording to  the  right  of  representation.  2.  If  the  decedent  leave 
no  issue,  the  estate  goes  in  equal  shares  to  the  surviving  husband 
or  wife,  and  to  the  decedent's  father  and  mother  if  both  sur- 
vive. If  there  be  no  father  nor  mother,  then  one-half  goes 
in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  decedent, 
and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brothers  or  sisters,  by  right 
of  representation.  If  decedent  leave  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor 
wife,  the  estate  must  go  to  his  father  and  mother.  3.  If  there 
be  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor  wife,  nor  father  and  mother,  nor 
either,  then  in  equal  shares  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  de- 
cedent, and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by 
right  of  representation.  4.  If  the  decedent  leave  a  surviving 
husband  or  wife  and  no  issue,  and  no  father  nor  mother,  nor 
brother  nor  sister,  the  whole  estate  goes  to  the  surviving  husband 
or  wife.  5.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  issue,  nor  husband  nor 
wife,  and  no  father  nor  mother,  nor  brother  nor  sister,  the  estate 
must  go  to  the  next  of  kin,  in  equal  degree,  excepting  that  when 
there  are  two  or  more  collateral  kindred  in  equal  degree,  but 
claiming  through  different  ancestors,  those  who  claim  through 
the  nearest  ancestor  must  be  preferred  to  those  claiming  through 
an  ancestor  more  remote.  6.  However,  if  the  decedent  leave 
several  children,  or  one  child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more  other 
children,  and  any  such  surviving  child  dies  under  age,  and  not 
having  been  married,  all  of  the  estate  that  comes  to  the  deceased 
child  by  inheritance  from  such  decedent  descends  in  equal  shares 
to  the  other  children  of  the  same  parent,  and  to  the  issue  of  any 
such  other  children  who  are  dead,  by  right  of  representation. 
7.  If,  at  the  death  of  such  child,  who  dies  under  age,  not  having 
been  married,  all  the  other  children  of  his  parents  are  also  dead, 
and  any  of  them  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  such  child 
by  inheritance  from  his  parent  descends  to  the  issue  of  all  other 
children  of  the  same  parent  and  if  all  the  issue  are  in  the  same 
degree  of  kindred  to  the  child,  they  share  the  estate  equally; 


953  STATUTES   OF    DESCENT  §    882 

Otherwise  they  take  according  to  the  right  of  representation. 
8.  If  the  decedent  leave  no  husband,  wife,  or  kindred,  the  estate 
escheats  to  the  state.^*^  9.  Upon  the  death  of  either  husband  or 
wife,  one-half  of  the  community  property  shall  go  to  the  sur- 
vivor, subject  to  the  community  debts,  and  the  other  half  shall  be 
subject  to  the  testamentary  disposition  of  the  deceased  husband 
or  wife,  subject  also  to  the  community  debts.  In  case  no  testa- 
mentary disposition  shall  have  been  made  by  the  deceased  hus- 
band or  wife  of  his  or  her  half  of  the  community  property,  it 
shall  descend  equally  to  the  legitimate  issue  of  his,  her,  or  their 
bodies.  If  there  be  no  issue  of  said  deceased  living,  or  none  of 
their  representatives  living,  then  the  said  community  property 
shall  pass  to  the  survivor,  to  the  exclusion  of  collateral  heirs, 
subject  to  the  community  debts,  the  family  allowance,  and  the 
charges  and  expenses  of  administration.^^ 

§  882.  West  Virginia. — In  West  Virginia,  when  any  per- 
son having  title  to  any  real  estate  of  inheritance,  shall  die  intes- 
tate as  to  such  estate,  it  shall  descend  and  pass  in  parcenary  to  his 
kindred,  male  and  female,  in  the  following  course:  1.  To  his 
children  and  their  descendants.  2.  If  there  be  no  child,  nor  the 
descendants  of  any  child,  then  to  his  father.  3.  If  there  be  no 
father,  then  to  his  mother,  brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  de- 
scendants. 4.  If  there  be  no  mother,  nor  brother,  nor  sister,  nor 
any  descendant  of  either,  then  one  moiety  shall  go  to  the  paternal, 
the  other  to  the  maternal  kindred  in  the  following  course : 
5.  First  to  the  grandfather.  6.  If  none,  then  to  the  grand- 
mother, uncles  and  aunts  on  the  same  side,  and  their  descendants. 
7.  If  none  such,  then  to  the  great-grandfathers,  or  great-grand- 
father, if  there  be  but  one.  8.  If  none,  then  to  the  great- 
grandmothers,  or  great-grandmother,  if  there  be  but  one,  and  the 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  grandfathers  and  grandmothers,  and 
their  descendants.  9.  And  so  on  in  other  cases  without  end, 
passing  to  the  nearest  lineal  male  ancestors,  and  for  want  of 
them,  to  the  nearest  female  ancestors  in  the  same  degree,  and  to 
the  descendants  of  such  male  and  female  ancestors.  10.  If  there 
be  no  father,  mother,  brother,  or  sister,  nor  any  descendants  of 
either,  nor  any  paternal  kindred,  the  whole  shall  go  to  the  ma- 

26  Remington's  Codes  and  Statutes        27  Remington's  Codes  and  Statutes 
1915,  §  1341.  1915,  §  1342. 


§    882  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  954 

ternal  kindred;  and  if  there  be  no  maternal  kindred,  the  whole 
shall  go  to  the  paternal  kindred.  If  there  be  neither  maternal  nor 
paternal  kindred,  the  whole  shall  go  to  the  husband  or  wife  of 
the  intestate;  or  if  the  husband  or  wife  l^e  dead,  to  his  or  her 
kindred  in  the  like  course  as  if  such  husband  or  wife  had  sur- 
vived the  intestate  and  died  entitled  to  the  estate."^  11.  Collat- 
erals of  the  half-blood  shall  inherit  one-half  so  much  as  those  of 
the  whole-blood.  But  if  all  the  collaterals  be  of  the  half-blood, 
the  ascending  kindred,  if  any,  shall  have  double  portions.^'* 
12.  When  the  children  of  the  intestate,  or  his  mother,  brothers 
and  sisters,  or  his  grandmother,  uncles  and  aunts,  or  any  of  his 
female  lineal  ancestors,  living  with  the  children  of  his  deceased 
lineal  ancestors,  male  and  female,  in  the  same  degree,  come  into 
the  partition,  they  shall  take  per  capita  or  by  person ;  and  where, 
a  part  of  them  being  dead  and  a  part  living,  the  issue  of  those 
dead  have  right  to  partition,  such  issue  shall  take  per  stirpes,  or 
by  stocks,  that  is  to  say,  the  shares  of  their  deceased  parents; 
but  whenever  those  entitled  to  partition  are  all  in  the  same  degree 
of  kindred  to  the  intestate,  they  shall  take  per  capita  or  by  per- 
son.^°  13.  Bastards  shall  be  capable  of  inheriting  and  transmit- 
ting inheritance  on  the  part  of  their  mother;  and  if  a  man,  having 
had  a  child  or  children  by  a  woman,  shall  afterward  intermarry 
with  her,  such  child  or  children,  or  their  descendants,  if  recog- 
nized by  him  before  or  after  the  marriage,  shall  be  deemed  legiti- 
mate.^^ 14.  Any  person  in  ventre  sa  mere  who  may  be  lx)rn  in 
ten  months  after  the  death  of  the  intestate,  shall  be  capable  of 
taking  by  inheritance  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were  in  being 
at  the  time  of  such  death. ^^  15.  Where  any  descendant  of  a  per- 
son dying  intestate  as  to  his  estate  or  any  part  thereof,  shall  have 
received  from  such  intestate  in  his  lifetime,  or  under  his  will,  any 
estate,  real  or  personal,  by  way  of  advancement,  and  he  or  any 
descendant  of  his,  shall  come  into  the  partition  and  distribution 
of  the  estate  with  the  other  parceners  and  distributees,  such  ad- 
vancement shall  be  brought  into  hotchpot  with  the  whole  estate, 
real  and  personal,  descended  or  distributable,  and  thereupon  such 

2s  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  78,  si  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  79, 

§  1.  §§  5,  6. 

23  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  78.  32  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  79, 

§  2.  §  8. 

3"  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  79, 
§  3. 


955  STATUTES    OF   DESCENT  §    883 

party  shall  be  entitled  to  his  proper  portion  of  the  estate,  real  and 
personal. ^^ 

§  883.  Wisconsin. — In  Wisconsin,  when  any  person  shall 
die  seised  of  any  lands,  tenements  or  hereditaments  or  any  right 
thereto  or  entitled  to  any  interest  therein,  in  fee  simple  or  for  the 
life  of  another,  not  having  lawfully  devised  the  same,  they  shall 
descend,  subject  to  his  debts,  except  as  provided  in  the  next  sec- 
tion, in  the  manner  following:  1.  In  equal  shares  to  his  children 
and  the  lawful  issue  of  any  deceased  child  by  right  of  representa- 
tion; and  if  there  be  no  children  of  the  intestate  living  at  his 
death  his  estate  shall  descend  to  all  his  other  lineal  descendants ; 
and  if  all  the  said  descendants  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kindred 
to  the  intestate  they  shall  share  the  estate  equally,  otherwise  they 
shall  take  according  to  the  right  of  representation.  2.  If  he 
shall  leave  no  lawful  issue,  to  his  widow ;  if  he  shall  leave  no  such 
issue  or  widow,  to  his  parents,  if  living,  and  if  either  shall  not 
be  living,  the  survivor  shall  inherit  his  said  estate.  If  a  woman" 
shall  die  leaving  no  issue  her  estate  shall  descend  to  her  husband, 
if  she  shall  have  one  at  the  time  of  her  decease,  and  if  she  shall 
leave  surviving  her  neither  issue  or  husband,  to  her  parents,  if 
living,  and  if  either  shall  not  be  living,  the  survivor  shall  inherit 
her  estate.  3.  If  he  shall  leave  no  lawful  issue  nor  widow  nor 
father  nor  mother  his  estate  shall  descend  in  equal  shares  to  his 
brothers  and  sisters  and  to  the  children  of  any  deceased  brother 
or  sister  by  right  of  representation.  4.  If  the  intestate  shall 
leave  no  lawful  issue,  widow,  father,  mother,  brother  nor  sister, 
his  estate  shall  descend  to  his  next  of  kin  in  equal  degree,  except 
that  when  there  are  two  or  more  collateral  kindred  in  equal  de- 
gree, but  claiming  through  an  ancestor  more  remote;  provided, 
however:  5.  If  any  person  shall  die  leaving  several  children  or 
leaving  one  child  and  the  issue  of  one  or  more  other  children, 
and  any  such  surviving  child  shall  die  under  age,  not  having  been 
married,  all  the  estate  that  came  to  the  deceased  child  by  inheri- 
tance as  by  testamentary  gift  from  such  deceased  parent  and  all 
personal  property  which  belongs  to  such  deceased  child  by  reason 
of  distribution  under  subdivision  6  of  section  3935  shall  descend 
and  be  distributed  in  equal  shares  to  his  other  children  of  the 
same  parent  and  to  the  issue  of  any  such  other  children  who  shall 

33  West  Virginia  Code  1916,  ch.  79,     §  13. 


§    883  TITLES    AXD   ABSTRACTS  956 

have  died,  by  right  of  representation.  6.  If  at  the  death  of  such 
child  who  shall  die  under  age  and  not  having  been  married  all  the 
other  children  of  his  said  parent  shall  also  be  dead  and  any  of 
them  shall  have  left  issue,  the  estate  that  came  to  said  child  by 
inheritance  from  his  said  parent  shall  descend  to  all  the  issue  of 
the  other  children  of  the  same  parent ;  and  if  all  the  said  issue  are 
in  the  same  degree  of  kindred  to  said  child  they  shall  share  the 
said  estate  equally;  otherwise  they  shall  take  according  to  the 
right  of  representation.  7.  If  the  intestate  shall  have  no  widow 
nor  kindred  his  estate  shall  escheat  to  the  state."*  8.  When  the 
owner  of  any  homestead  shall  die,  not  having  lawfully  devised 
the  same,  such  homestead  shall  descend  free  of  all  judgments 
and  claims  against  such  deceased  owner  or  his  estate  except  mort- 
gages lawfully  executed  thereon  and  laborer's  and  mechanics' 
liens,  in  the  manner  following:  (1)  If  he  shall  have  no  lawful 
issue,  to  his  widow.  (2)  If  he  shall  leave  a  widow  and  issue,  to 
his  widow  during  her  widowhood,  and  upon  her  marriage  or 
death  to  his  heirs  according  to  the  next  preceding  section.  (3)  If 
he  shall  leave  issue  and  no  widow,  to  such  issue  according  to  the 
preceding  section.  (4)  If  he  shall  leave  no  issue  or  widow,  such 
homestead  shall  descend  under  the  next  preceding  section,  subject 
to  lawful  liens  thereon;  provided,  however,  if  there  be  no  widow 
or  minor  child  of  such  deceased  owner  of  any  homestead  living 
at  the  time  of  his  death  such  homestead  shall  be  subject  to  and 
charged  with  the  expenses  of  his  last  sickness  and  his  funeral  and 
the  costs  and  charges  of  administration;  and  provided  further, 
that  if  there  be  no  widow  and  no  child  and  no  child  of  any  de- 
ceased child  of  such  deceased  owner  of  any  homestead  such 
homestead  shall  be  subject  to  all  the  debts  and  liabilities  of  such 
deceased  owner.^^  9.  The  degree  of  kindred  shall  be  computed 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law;  and  kindred  of  the  half- 
blood  shall  inherit  equally  with  those  of  the  whole-blood  in  the 
same  degree,  unless  the  inheritance  came  to  the  intestate  by  de- 
scent, devise  or  gift  of  some  one  of  his  ancestors;  in  which  case 
all  those  who  are  not  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestors  shall  be  ex- 
cluded from  such  inheritance.^"  10.  When  any  adopted  child 
shall  die  seised  or  possessed  of  any  estate  which  came  to  such 
child  by  inheritance  from  or  upon  distribution  of  the  estate  of 

34  Stats.  1915.  cli.  102,  §  2270.        s^  stats.  1915,  ch.  102,  §  2272. 

35  Stats.  1915,  ch.  102,  §  2271. 


i 


957  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    883 

any  parent  by  adoption,  not  having  lawfully  devised  the  same, 
and  leaving  no  surviving  wife,  husband,  issue  or  descendants, 
the  same  shall  not  go  to  the  kindred  of  the  blood  or  next  of  kin 
of  such  adopted  child,  but  shall  descend  to  the  heirs  or  be  dis- 
tributed to  the  next  of  kin  of  such  parents  by  adoption.^^  11.  If 
any  illegitimate  child  shall  die  intestate,  without  lawful  issue,  his 
estate  shall  descend  to  his  mother;  or  in  case  of  her  decease,  to 
her  heirs  at  law.  Every  legitimate  child  shall  be  considered  as 
heir  of  the  person  who  shall,  in  writing  signed  in  the  presence  of 
a  competent  witness,  have  acknowledged  himself  to  be  the  father 
of  such  child  or  who  shall  be  adjudged  to  be  such  father  under 
the  provisions  of  sections  1530  to  1542,  inclusive,  of  the  statutes 
or  who  shall  admit  in  open  court  that  he  is  such  father,  and  shall 
in  all  cases  be  considered  as  heir  of  his  mother,  and  shall  inherit 
his  or  her  estate,  in  whole  or  in  part,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  he  had  been  born  in  lawful  wedlock;  but  he 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  claim,  as  representing  his  father  or 
mother,  any  part  of  the  estate  of  his  or  her  kindred,  either  lineal 
or  collateral,  unless  before  his  death  his  parents  shall  have  inter- 
married and  his  father,  after  such  marriage,  shall  have  recog- 
nized him  as  his  child,  in  which  case  such  child  shall  be  thereby 
legitimatized  and  he  and  the  legitimate  children  shall  be  consid- 
ered as  brothers  and  sisters,  and  on  the  death  of  either  of  them, 
intestate  and  without  issue,  the  others  shall  inherit  his  estate,  and 
he  theirs,  as  hereinbefore  provided,  in  like  manner  as  if  all  the 
children  had  been  legitimate,  saving  to  the  father  and  mother, 
respectively,  their  rights  in  the  estate  of  all  the  said  children,  as 
provided  hereinbefore  in  like  manner  as  if  all  had  been  legiti- 
mate. The  issue  of  all  marriages  declared  null  in  law  shall, 
nevertheless,  be  legitimated^  12.  Inheritance,  or  succession  by 
right  of  representation,  takes  place  when  the  descendants  of  any 
deceased  heir  take  the  same  share  or  right  in  the  estate  of  another 
person  that  their  parent  would  have  taken  if  living;  posthumous 
children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of  their  parents. ^^ 
13.  Any  estate,  real  or  personal,  that  may  have  been  given  by  the 
intestate  in  his  lifetime  as  an  advancement  to  any  child  or  other 
lineal  descendant  shall  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  estate  of 
the  intestate,  so  far  as  it  regards  the  division  and  distribution 

37  Stats.  1915.  §  2272a.  39  stats.  1915,  §  2275. 

38  Stats.  1915,  §§  2273,  2274. 


§    884  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  958 

thereof  among  his  issue,  and  shall  be  taken  by  such  child  or  other 
descendant  toward  his  share  of  the  estate  of  the  intestate.  If  the 
amount  of  such  advancement  shall  exceed  the  share  of  the  heir  so 
advanced  he  shall  be  excluded  from  any  further  portion  in  the 
division  and  distribution  of  the  estate,  but  he  shall  not  be  re- 
quired to  refund  any  part  of  such  advancement;  and  if  the 
amount  so  received  shall  be  less  than  his  share  he  shall  be  en- 
titled to  as  much  more  as  will  give  him  his  full  share  of  the  estate 
of  the  deceased.  If  such  advancement  be  made  in  real  estate,  the 
value  thereof  shall,  for  the  purposes  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
section,  be  considered  a  part  of  the  real  estate  to  be  divided;  and 
if  it  be  in  personal  estate  it  shall  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the 
personal  estate;  if  in  either  case  it  shall  exceed  the  share  of  real 
or  personal  estate  respectively  that  would  have  come  to  the  heir 
so  advanced,  he  shall  not  be  required  to  refund  any  part  of  it ;  but 
shall  receive  so  much  less  out  of  the  other  part  of  the  estate  as 
will  make  his  whole  share  equal  to  those  of  the  other  heirs  who 
are  in  the  same  degree  with  him.  All  gifts  and  grants  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  been  made  in  advancement  if  they  are  expressed 
in  the  gift  or  grant  to  be  so  made  or  if  charged  in  writing  by  the 
intestate  as  an  advancement  or  acknowledged  in  writing  as  such 
by  the  child  or  other  descendant.  If  the  value  of  the  estate  so 
advanced  shall  be  expressed  in  the  conveyance  or  in  the  charge 
thereof  made  by  the  intestate,  or  in  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
party  receiving  it,  such  value  shall  govern  in  the  division  and 
distribution  of  the  estate ;  otherwise  it  shall  be  estimated  accord- 
ing to  its  value  when  given,  as  nearly  as  the  same  can  be  ascer- 
tained.■"* 

§  884.  Wyoming. — In  Wyoming  the  real  estate  of  an  in- 
testate descends  in  parcenary  to  his  kindred,  male  and  female,  as 
follows:  1.  If  there  be  a  husband  or  wife  and  children,  or  the 
descendants  of  any  children,  surviving,  one-half  to  the  surviving 
husband  or  wife,  and  the  residue  to  the  surviving  children  or 
descendants  of  children.  2.  If  there  are  no  children  or  descen- 
dants of  children  then  three-fourths  to  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  and  one-fourth  to  the'  father  and  mother  of  the  intestate  or 
the  survivor  of  them,  3.  If  there  be  no  children  or  their  de- 
scendants, and  the  estate  does  not  exceed  $20,000,  the  whole  vests 

40  Stats.   1915,   §§   3956,   3957,  3958,     3959. 


959  STATUTES    OF    DESCENT  §    884 

in  the  surviving  husband  or  wife.  4.  To  the  children  and  their 
descendants  by  right  of  representation.  5.  To  the  father, 
mother,  brothers,  and  sisters,  and  to  the  descendants  of  brothers 
and  sisters  who  are  dead,  by  right  of  representation,  in  equal 
parts.  6.  To  the  grandfather,  grandmother,  uncles,  aunts,  and 
their  descendants,  by  right  of  representation,  in  equal  parts.^^ 
7.  Posthumous  children  or  descendants  of  the  intestate  shall  in- 
herit in  like  manner  as  if  born  in  the  lifetime  of  the  intestate; 
but  no  right  of  inheritance  shall  accrue  to  any  person  other  than 
the  child  or  descendants  of  the  intestate,  unless  they  are  in  being 
and  capable  in  law  as  taking  as  heirs  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's 
death.*-  8.  Descendants  of  the  half-blood  inherit  equally  with 
descendants  of  the  whole-blood;  but  collateral  relations  of  the 
half-blood  shall  inherit  only  one-half  the  measure  of  collateral 
relatives  of  the  half-blood,  if  there  be  any  of  the  last  named  class 
living.*^  9.  Illegitimate  inherit  the  same  as  children  born  in 
lawful  wedlock,  if  the  parents  subsequently  marry,  and  such  chil- 
dren be  afterward  recognized  by  the  father  to  be  his  legitimate 
children.  Illegitimates  inherit  from  and  through  the  mother. 
The  property  of  an  intestate  illegitimate  descends:  (1)  To  the 
widow  or  surviving  husband  and  children  as  in  other  cases; 
(2)  to  the  widow  or  surviving  husband;  (3)  to  the  mother  and 
children  and  their  descendants;  to  the  mother  one-half,  and  the 
other  one-half  to  be  equally  divided  between  her  children  and 
their  descendants,  by  right  of  representation;  (4)  to  the  next 
of  kin  of  the  mother.^*  10.  Aliens  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  citi- 
zens as  to  descent  of  property.*^ 

41  Ann.  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  5727.  **  Ann.  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  5733. 

42  Ann.  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  5728.  «  Ann.  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  5730. 

43  Ann.  Comp.  Stat.  1910,  §  5729. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 


DIGEST  OF  STATUTES  OF  WILLS 


SEC. 

SEC. 

890. 

Alabama. 

917. 

Nebraska. 

891. 

Alaska. 

918. 

Nevada. 

892. 

Arizona. 

919. 

New  Hampshire. 

893. 

Arkansas. 

920. 

New  Jersey. 

894. 

California. 

921. 

New  Mexico. 

895. 

Colorado. 

922. 

New  York. 

896. 

Connecticut. 

923. 

North  Carolina. 

897. 

Delaware. 

924. 

North  Dakota. 

898. 

District  of  Columbia. 

925. 

Ohio. 

899. 

Florida. 

926. 

Oklahoma. 

900. 

Georgia. 

927. 

Oregon. 

901. 

Hawaii. 

928. 

Pennsylvania. 

902. 

Idaho. 

929. 

Philippine  Islands. 

903. 

Illinois. 

930. 

Porto  Rico. 

904. 

Indiana. 

931. 

Rhode  Island. 

905. 

Iowa. 

932. 

South  Carolina. 

906. 

Kansas. 

933. 

South  Dakota. 

907. 

Kentucky. 

934. 

Tennessee. 

908. 

Louisiana. 

935. 

Texas. 

909. 

Maine. 

936. 

Utah. 

910. 

Maryland. 

937. 

Vermont. 

911. 

Massachusetts. 

938. 

Virginia. 

912. 

Michigan. 

939. 

Washington. 

913. 

Minnesota. 

940. 

West  Virginia. 

914. 

Mississippi. 

941. 

Wisconsin. 

915. 

Missouri. 

942. 

Wyoming. 

916. 

Montana. 

§  890.  Alabama. — All  persons  of  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years  and  of  sound  mind  may,  by  last  will,  devise  lands,  tene- 
ments or  hereditaments,  or  any  interest  therein  to  any  person  or 
corporation  capable  by  law  of  holding  the  same.  If  the  devisee 
is  incapable  of  taking,  the  devise  descends,  as  in  case  of  intestacy, 
or,  if  the  testator  has  no  heirs  competent  to  take,  to  the  residuary 
devisee  if  one  be  named  in  the  will  capable  of  holding  and  if  not 
to  the  state.  All  persons  over  the  age  of  eighteen  years  and  of 
sound  mind,  and  no  others,  may  bequeath  their  personalty. 
Every  devise  which  a  testator  makes,  in  express  terms  or  any 
other  terms  denoting  his  intention  to  devise  all  his  real  property 
must  be  construed  to  pass  all  the  real  estate  he  was  entitled  to 
devise  at  the  time  of  his  de'ath.  A  will  to  be  effectual  to  pass  real 
or  personal  property  must  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator 
or  some  person  in  his  presence,  and  by  his  direction,  and  attested 

960 


i 


961  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    891 

by  at  least  two  witnesses  who  must  subscribe  their  names  thereto 
in  the  presence  of  the  testator.  This  provision  does  not  apply  to 
wills  of  soldiers  or  mariners  at  sea;  nor  to  wills  of  personal 
property  not  exceeding  $500,  made  during  testator's  last  sickness 
at  his  dwelling,  or  where  he  has  resided  ten  days  or  more,  except 
when  he  was  taken  sick  when  away  from  home  and  died  before 
his  return;  such  wills  are  valid  though  unwritten.  The  subse- 
quent incompetency  of  witnesses,  from  whatever  cause  it  may 
arise,  must  not  prevent  the  probate  of  a  will  if  the  witnesses  are 
competent  at  the  time  of  their  attestation.  A  probated  foreign 
will  may  be  proved  by  bringing  into  probate  court  a  copy  of  the 
will  and  of  the  probate,  certified  by  the  clerk  or  officer  of  court 
and  judge  before  whom  probated.^ 

§  891.  Alaska. — Every  person  of  sound  mind  and  over  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years  may  at  last  will  devise  all  of  his.  or  her 
property,  except  dower  and  curtesy.  The  will  must  be  in  writ- 
ing, signed  by  the  testator  or  some  other  person  in  his  presence 
and  under  his  direction,  and  must  be  attested  by  at  least  two  wit- 
nesses, subscribing  their  names  thereto  in  the  presence  of  the 
testator.  The  subsequent  marriage  of  the  testator  revokes  the 
will.  If  a  testator  die  leaving  a  child  or  children  or  descendants 
thereof  not  provided  for  in  his  will,  he  is  deemed  to  have  died 
intestate  as  to  them,  and  all  heirs,  devisees,  and  legatees  shall 
refund  proportional  part.  But  if  such  child  or  children,  or  their 
descendants,  shall  have  an  equal  portion  of  the  testator's  estate 
bestowed  upon  them  by  way  of  an  advancement,  they  take  noth- 
ing under  the  will.  Any  mariner  at  sea  or  soldier  in  the  military 
service  may  dispose  of  his  wages  or  other  personal  property  as 
by  common  law  or  by  reducing  the  same  to  writing.  Nun- 
cupative wills  are  allowed  if  the  testamentary  words  or  the 
substance  thereof  is  reduced  to  writing  within  thirty  days 
after  they  were  spoken,  and  the  writing  probated  within 
six  months  after  such  words  were  spoken.  Where  the 
beneficiary  under  a  will  attests  the  instrument  as  a  witness, 
he  thereby  forfeits  the  devise  or  bequest  made  to  him. 
If  any  such  witness  would  be  entitled  to  any  share  in  the  tes- 
tator's estate  in  case  the  will  should  not  be  established,  then  so 
much  of  the  estate  as  would  have  descended  to  him  as  will  not 

lAla.    Civ.    Code    1907,    ch.    150,     §§6172-6191. 
61 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    892  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  962 

exceed  the  value  of  the  devise  or  bequest  made  to  him  in  the  will 
is  given  him;  and  he  may  recover  the  same  from  the  devisees  or 
legatees  named  in  the  will  in  proportion  to  and  out  of  the  parts 
devised  and  bequeathed  to  him.  If  the  execution  of  such  will  be 
attested  by  a  sufficient  number  of  other  competent  witnesses,  as 
required  by  code,  then  such  devise  shall  be  valid. ^  If  a  will  by  a 
person  owning  property  in  Alaska  be  probated  in  any  state,  ter- 
ritory or  district  of  the  United  States  or  in  any  foreign  country, 
copies  of  the  will  and  probate  certified  by  the  clerk  of  court  and 
judge  may  be  recorded  in  the  same  manner  as  w-ills  executed  in 
Alaska  and  be  of  the  same  effect.  Any  such  will  may  be  con- 
tested in  Alaska.  A  last  will  and  testament,  written  and  sub- 
scribed by  the  testator  without  the  territory,  and  executed  in  the 
mode  prescribed  by  the  law  of  either  the  testator's  domicil  or  the 
place  where  executed,  is  deemed  to  be  legally  executed,  and  is  of 
the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  executed  in  the  mode  prescribed 
by  the  laws  of  the  territory.^ 

§  892.  Arizona. — Every  person  of  sound  mind  and  over 
the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  or  who  may  be  or  may  have  been 
lawfully  married,  shall  have  power  to  make  a  will.  Such  will 
shall  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator  or  some  other  per- 
son, by  his  direction  and  in  his  presence,  and  shall,  if  not  wholly 
written  by  himself,  be  attested  by  two  or  more  credible  witnesses 
above  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  subscribing  their  names  to  the 
will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator.  Where  the  will  is  wholly 
in  the  handwriting  of  the  testator  no  witnesses  are  required. 
Nuncupative  wills  are  allowed  if  made  in  the  last  sickness  of  the 
deceased,  and  where  the  property  does  not  exceed  fifty  dollars  in 
value.  But  it  must  be  shown  by  the  testimony  of  three  compe- 
tent witnesses  that  the  testator  called  on  some  person  to  take 
notice  and  bear  testimony  that  such  is  his  will,  and  that  the  testi- 
mony or  substance  thereof  was  committed  to  writing  within  six 
days  after  the  making  of  such  will;  in  such  case  the  amount  is 
not  limited.  Any  soldier  in  actual  military  service,  or  any 
mariner  or  seaman  l:)eing  at  sea,  may  dispose  of  his  personal 
property  without  regard  to' the  provisions  of  the  statute.  After- 
born  or  pretermitted  children  take  as  though  there  had  been  no 

2  Carter's  Ann.  Civ.  Code,  Alaska,        '  Alaska,  Session  Laws  1913,  ch.  61. 
ch.  15,  §§  137-155. 


963  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    893 

will.  Legacies  to  subscribing  witnesses  are  void  unless  they  were 
otherwise  entitled  to  share  in  the  estate.  Spendthrift  trusts  are 
provided  for.* 

§  893.  Arkansas. — Every  person  of  sound  mind  and  over 
the  age  of  twenty-one  may,  by  will,  devise  all  his  estate,  both  real 
and  personal  and  all  interest  therein.  All  persons  over  the  age 
of  eighteen  and  of  sound  mind  may  bequeath  by  will  personalty. 
A  will  to  be  effectual  must  be  subscribed  at  the  end  by  the  tes- 
tator, or  some  other  person  at  his  request,  and  the  subscription 
shall  be  made  in  the  presence  of  each  of  the  attesting  witnesses 
or  shall  be  acknowledged  by  him  to  have  been  so  made  to  each  of 
the  attesting  witnesses.  At  the  time  of  such  subscription  or  at 
the  time  of  acknowledging  the  same,  the  testator  shall  declare  the 
instrument  so  subscribed  to  be  his  last  will  and  testament.  There 
shall  be  at  least  two  attesting  witnesses  each  of  whom  shall,  at 
the  request  of  the  testator,  sign  his  name  as  witness  at  the  end  of 
the  will.  (The  attestation  clause  must  contain  the  above  facts.) 
Where  the  entire  body  of  the  will  and  the  signature  thereto  shall 
be  written  in  the  proper  handwriting  of  the  testator  or  testatrix 
it  may  be  established  by  the  evidence  of  at  least  three  disinter- 
ested witnesses  to  the  handwriting  and  signature  of  the  testator 
without  attesting  witnesses  to  such  will.  No  will  without  such 
subscribing  witnesses  shall  be  pleaded  in  bar  of  a  will  subscribed 
in  due  form.  Nuncupative  wills  are  effectual  if  made  at  the 
time  of  the  last  sickness  and  at  the  dwelling  of  the  deceased  in 
the  presence  of  at  least  two  witnesses  and  if  the  estate  bequeathed 
does  not  exceed  $500.  It  must  also  be  proved  that  the  testator 
called  on  some  person  present  to  witness  that  such  was  his  will. 
Wills  are  probated  in  the  county  of  the  testator's  residence  at 
time  of  death.  If  he  had  no  known  place  of  residence  in  this 
state,  and  land  is  devised,  then  in  the  county  where  the  land,  or 
the  greater  part  of  it,  lies.  When  a  foreign  will  relative  to  an 
estate  within  this  state,  has  been  proved  without  the  same,  a  copy 
thereof  and  certificate  of  probate  may  be  offered  for  probate  in 
this  state  if  it  was  so  executed  as  to  be  a  valid  will  of  lands  in 
this  state  by  the  law  thereof.  All  mariners  at  sea  or  soldiers  in 
the  military  service  may  dispose  of  their  wages  and  other  per- 
sonal property  as  at  common  law.    Citizens  of  any  of  the  United 

4  Arizona   Civ.   Code   1913,   ch.    19,     §§  1204-1225. 


894 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


964 


States  or  territories  thereof,  owning  real  or  personal  property 
in  this  state,  may  devise  and  bequeath  the  same  by  will,  executed 
and  proved  according  to  the  laws  of  this  state  or  the  place  where 
made.^ 

§  894.  California. — Every  person  over  the  age  of  eighteen 
years,  of  sound  mind,  may  dispose  of  real  and  personal  estate  by 
will.  A  married  woman  may  dispose  of  all  her  separate  estate 
by  will,  without  the  consent  of  her  husband.  Corporations  other 
than  counties,  municipal  corporations,  and  corporations  formed 
for  scientific,  literary,  or  solely  educational  or  hospital  purposes, 
can  not  take  under  a  will,  unless  expressed  by  statute.  Every 
will,  other  than  a  nuncupative  will,  must  be  in  writing,  and  every 
will,  other  than  an  olographic  will,  and  a  nuncupative  will,  must 
be  executed  and  attested  as  follows:  1.  It  must  be  subscribed  at 
the  end  thereof  by  the  testator  himself,  or  some  person  in  his 
presence  and  by  his  direction  must  subscribe  his  name  thereto. 
2.  The  subscription  must  be  made  in  the  presence  of  the  attesting 
witnesses,  or  be  acknowledged  by  the  testator  to  them  to  have 
been  made  by  him  or  by  his  authority.  3.  The  testator  must,  at 
the  time  of  subscribing  or  acknowledging  the  same,  declare  to 
the  attesting  witnesses  that  the  instrument  is  his  will.  4. 
There  must  be  two  attesting  witnesses,  each  of  whom  must 
sign  the  same  as  a  witness,  at  the  end  of  the  will,  at  the  testator's 
request  and  in  his  presence.  An  olographic  will  is  one  that  is 
entirely  written,  dated  and  signed  by  the  hand  of  the  testator 
himself.  It  is  subject  to  no  other  form,  and  may  be  made  in  or 
out  of  the  state,  and  need  not  be  witnessed.  A  witness  to  a 
written  will  must  write,  with  his  name,  his  place  of  residence; 
and  a  person  who  subscribes  the  testator's  name,  by  his  direction, 
must  write  his  own  name  as  a  witness  to  the  will.  But  a  violation 
of  this  section  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  will.  A  conjoint 
or  mutual  will  is  valid,  but  it  may  be  revoked  by  any  of  the  tes- 
tators, in  like  manner  as  any  other  will.  If  the  witnesses  are 
competent  when  the  will  is  executed,  their  subsequent  incompe- 
tency from  any  cause,  does  not  prevent  the  probate  of  the  will. 
Gifts  to  subscribing  witnesses  are  void,  unless  there  are  two 
other  competent  witnesses  to  the  same,  but  a  mere  charge  on  the 
estate  of  the  testator  for  the  payment  of  debts  does  not  prevent 

B  Arkansas,   Kirby's   Dig.   of   Stats.     1904,  ch.  160,  §§  8010-8050. 


965  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    895 

his  creditors  ffom  being  competent  witnesses  to  his  will.  No  will 
made  out  of  the  state  is  valid  as  a  will  in  the  state,  unless  exe- 
cuted according  to  the  California  laws,  except  that  a  will  made 
in  a  state  or  country  in  which  the  testator  is  domiciled  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  and  valid  as  a  will  under  the  laws  of  such  state 
or  country,  is  valid  in  this  state  so  far  as  the  same  relates  to  per- 
sonal property,  subject  to  restrictions  on  devises  for  charitable 
uses.  No  estate,  real  or  personal,  shall  be  bequeathed  or  devised 
to  any  charitable  or  benevolent  society  or  corporation,  or  to  any 
person  or  persons  in  trust  for  charitable  uses,  except  the  same  be 
done  by  will  duly  executed  at  least  thirty  days  before  the  de- 
cease of  the  testator;  and  no  such  devises  or  bequests  shall  col- 
lectively exceed  one-third  of  the  estate  of  the  testator,  having 
legal  heirs.  A  will  is  revoked  by  marriage  of  a  man  and  birth  of 
issue,  or  by  the  survival  of  his  wife,  unless  otherwise  provided 
for,  and  the  will  of  a  woman  is  revoked  by  her  subsequent  mar- 
riage, and  is  not  revived  by  the  death  of  her  husband.  After- 
born  children,  or  unintentionally  omitted  children,  take  the  same 
share  as  if  the  testator  had  died  intestate.  A  will  passes  after- 
acquired  rights,  unless  the  contrary  intention  plainly  appears.  A 
nuncupative  will  may  be  valid,  if  the  estate  bequeathed  does  not 
exceed  in  value  one  thousand  dollars,  but  it  must  be  proved  by 
two  witnesses  who  were  present  at  the  making  thereof,  one  of 
whom  was  asked  by  the  testator  at  the  time,  to  bear  witness  that 
such  was  his  will,  or  to  that  effect.  The  decedent  must,  at  the 
time,  have  been  in  actual  military  service  in  the  field,  or  doing 
duty  on  shipboard  at  sea,  and  in  either  case  in  actual  contempla- 
tion, fear,  or  peril  of  death,  or  the  decedent  must  have  been,  at 
the  time,  in  expectation  of  immediate  death  from  an  injury  re- 
ceived the  same  day.  There  can  be  no  proof  of  any  nuncupative 
will,  unless  offered  after  speaking  the  testamentary  words,  nor 
unless  the  words,  or  the  substance  thereof,  were  reduced  to  writ- 
ing within  thirty  days  after  making.*^ 

§  895.  Colorado. — All  wills  by  which  any  property,  real 
or  personal,  is  devised  or  bequeathed,  shall  be  reduced  to  writing 
and  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  one  in  his  presence  and  by 
his  direction,  and  attested  in  the  presence  of  the  testator  by  two 
or  more  credible  witnesses.     Males  aged  twenty-one  years  and 

6  Cal.  Civ.  Code  1915,  1270-1313. 


§    896  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  966 

females  aged  eighteen  years,  being  of  sound  mind  and  memory, 
may  devise  real  property  l)y  will.  All  persons  aged  seventeen 
years,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  may  dispose  of  personal  prop- 
erty by  will.  The  consent  of  the  husband  or  wife,  in  writing,  is 
necessary  to  the  devise  or  bequest  by  a  married  person  of  more 
than  one-half  his  or  her  estate  away  from  the  other  spouse.  Any 
will,  concerning  realty  in  Colorado,  which  has  been  admitted  to 
probate  before  a  court  in  another  state  or  territory  may  be  ad- 
mitted to  probate  without  further  formality  if  accompanied  by  a 
certificate  by  the  proper  officer  as  to  the  former  probate.  The 
marriage  of  testator  revokes  his  will,  but  the  subsequent  birth  of 
child  does  not.  Devises  to  witnesses  are  void  unless  they  arc 
otherwise  entitled  to  share  in  the  estate.  Gifts  to  a  child  or 
grandchild  who  died  before  the  testator  do  not  lapse  but  go  to  his 
issue  if  there  Ije  any,  otherwise  such  portion  of  the  estate  is  con- 
sidered as  intestate  estate. '^ 

§  896.  Connecticut.  —  All  persons  of  sound  mind  aged 
eighteen  years  may  dispose  of  their  estate  by  will.  A  will  must 
be  written,  subscribed  by  the  testator,  and  attested  by  three  wit- 
nesses, each  of  whom  subscribes  in  the  testator's  presence.  De- 
vises to  witnesses  are  void  unless  such  witness  is  an  heir,  or  the 
will  is  otherwise  legally  attested.  If  a  devisee  or  legatee  being  a 
child,  grandchild,  brother  or  sister  of  the  testator,  die  before  him, 
his  issue  take  such  estate  if  no  other  provision  is  made.  And  any 
will  executed  according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  where 
it  was  executed  may  be  admitted  to  probate  in  Connecticut,  and 
is  effectual  to  pass  any  estate  of  the  testator  situated  in  Connecti- 
cut. A  will  is  revoked  by  subsequent  marriage  of  testator  or 
birth  of  a  child  unprovided  for.  A  will  proved  without  the  state 
may  be  proved  within  it  by  authenticated  and  exemplified  copy  of 
the  will  and  record  of  probate  proceedings.* 

^  897.  Delaware. — Any  person  of  sound  and  disposing 
mind  or  memory,  aged  twenty-one  or  upward,  may  make  a  will 
of  real  as  well  as  personal  estate.  Every  will  must  be  in  writing, 
signed  by  the  testator,  or -some  person  subscribing  the  testator's 
name  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  and  must  be 
attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  or  more  credible 

7  Mills'  Ann.  Stat.,  Colo.  1912,  8  Conn.  Gen.  Stat.  1902,  §§  292- 
§§  7867-7892.  305. 


967  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    898 

witnesses.  After-acquired  land  passes  by  a  will,  unless  a  con- 
trary intention  appears.  Afterborn  children  unprovided  for  take 
as  though  the  parent  died  intestate.  The  birth  of  a  child  to  a 
testator  having  no  issue  at  the  time  the  will  was  made  revokes  his 
will.  A  widow  unprovided  for  by  a  will  made  before  marriage 
takes  as  though  her  husband  died  intestate.  A  nuncupative  will 
of  personal  estate  to  the  extent  of  $200  is  valid  if  pronounced 
before  at  least  two  witnesses  requested  to  take  notice  of  such  will 
and  reduced  to  writing  within  three  days  afterward.  The  last 
will  and  testament  of  a  person  not  residing  in  the  state  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  if  properly  executed  and  probated  without  the 
state  may  be  proved  in  the  state  provided  a  copy  of  the  same,  duly 
verified,  shall  be  presented  for  probate  and  filed  of  record  in  the 
office  of  the  register  of  wills  in  the  county  where  there  are  any 
lands,  tenements  or  hereditaments  of  the  testator.^ 

§  898.  District  of  Columbia. — Wills  may  be  made  by 
males  aged  twenty-one  and  females  aged  eighteen,  if  of  sound 
and  disposing  mind  and  capable  of  executing  a  valid  deed  or  con- 
tract. All  wills  must  be  in  writing,  and  signed  by  the  testator 
or  some  other  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  direction.  They 
must  be  attested  and  subscribed  in  the  presence  of  the  testator 
by  two  credible  witnesses.  If  it  appears  that  such  was  the  tes- 
tator's intention  after-acquired  real  estate  will  pass  by  will.  Nun- 
cupative wills  to  the  amount  of  one  hundred  fifty  dollars  are 
valid  if  proved  by  three  witnesses  and  made  in  the  testator's  last 
illness  at  his  habitation.^" 

§  899.  Florida. — Every  person  of  sound  mind  of  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years  may  dispose  of  real  and  personal  property  by 
will.  A  married  woman  may  dispose  by  will  of  her  property  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  not  married,  even  though  she  be  a  minor. 
All  general  or  residuary  devises  or  bequests  are  construed  to  apply 
to  the  property  owned  by  the  testator  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
unless  otherwise  restricted.  Every  will  disposing  of  real  estate 
must  be  signed  by  the  testator  or  some  other  person  in  his  pres- 
ence and  by  his  express  directions,  and  must  be  attested  and  sub- 
scribed in  his  presence  by  two  or  more  witnesses.  All  wills  of 
personal  property  must  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator 

oDel.  Rev   Code  1915,  §§  3239-3263.        lo  D.  C.  Code  1910,   §§   1625,   1626, 

1634. 


§    900  TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS  968 

or  some  other  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction. 
A  nuncupative  will  must  be  proved  by  the  oath  of  three  witnesses 
present  at  its  making,  and  it  must  also  be  proved  by  them  that  the 
testator  at  the  time  of  pronouncing  such  will  desired  them  to  bear 
witness  that  it  was  his  last  will,  or  to  such  effect,  and  that  such 
will  was  made  during  his  last  sickness.  Nor  can  any  testimony 
be  received  to  prove  such  will  after  six  months  from  the  date  of 
such  w^ill,  unless  it  was  reduced  to  writing  and  sworn  to  before 
some  judicial  officer  of  the  state  within  six  days  from  making. 
Foreign  wills  having  been  granted  by  a  foreign  court,  may  be 
admitted  to  record  in  the  county  judge's  court,  and  when  re- 
corded, have  the  same  effect  as  the  probate  of  wills  made  in  the 
state.  An  alien  may  devise  and  bequeath  property  as  though  a 
citizen. ^^ 

§  900.  Georgia. — No  particular  form  of  words  are  neces- 
sary to  make  a  will.  All  persons  of  sound  mind  over  fourteen 
years  of  age  may  make  wills.  All  wills  (except  nuncupative 
wills)  must  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  party  making  the  same, 
or  by  some  other  person  in  his  presence  at  his  direction,  and 
attested  and  subscribed  in  the  presence  of  the  testator  by  three 
competent  witnesses.  A  witness  may  attest  by  his  mark  if  he  can 
swear  to  it.  One  witness  can  not  sign  for  another.  If  a  witness 
is  a  legatee,  the  will  is  valid,  but  the  legacy  is  void.  Mutual  wills 
may  be  made  either  separately  or  jointly.  A  deaf,  dumb,  and 
blind  person  may  make  a  will  provided  both  interpreter  and 
scrivener  are  made  attesting  witnesses.  If  a  person  has  a  wife 
or  child  he  can  not  leave  more  than  one-third  of  his  estate  to  a 
religious,  charitable  or  educational  association,  to  the  exclusion 
of  his  wife  or  child.  A  devise  or  bequest  to  charity  must  be 
made  at  least  ninety  days  before  the  testator's  death.  Marriage 
of  a  testator  or  birth  of  a  child,  unprovided  for,  revokes  a  will. 
Foreign  wills  may  be  admitted  to  probate  in  the  same  manner  as 
domestic.  If  probate  has  been  had  in  the  foreign  jurisdiction,  a 
certified  copy  of  the  will  and  an  authenticated  copy  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, under  seal  of  the  court,  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  due 
execution.  Nuncupative  wills  may  bf  proved  by  the  oaths  of 
three  competent  witnesses,  present  at  the  time  of  making,  whom 

"Gen.    Stats.    Fla.    1906,    §§   2269-2287,2891. 


969  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    901 

the  testator  bade  bear  witness  to  his  will  if  made  during  his  last 
sickness/^ 

§  901.  Hawaii. — Every  person  of  the  age  of  eighteen 
years,  of  sound  mind,  may  dispose  of  both  real  and  personal 
estate  by  will.  This  includes  married  women.  A  will  to  be  valid 
must  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  person 
in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  and  attested  by  two 
or  more  competent  witnesses  subscribing  their  names  to  the  will 
in  the  presence  of  the  testator.  Marriage  of  a  woman  revokes 
her  will.  Marriage  of  a  man  followed  by  birth  of  a  child  to  him, 
will  revoke  a  will,  if  such  contingency  is  not  provided  for.  Gifts 
to  witnesses  who  are  not  heirs  are  void,  unless  there  are  two  other 
competent  witnesses. ^^ 

§  902.  Idaho. — Same  as  California,  except  no  limitations 
on  devises  and  bequests  to  charities  and  corporations.^* 

§  903.  Illinois. — Males  aged  twenty-one  and  females  aged 
eighteen  of  sound  mind  and  memory  have  the  power  to  dispose 
of  real  or  personal  estate  by  will.  All  wills  must  be  in  writing 
and  signed  by  the  testator  or  testatrix,  or  by  some  person  in  his 
or  her  presence  and  by  his  or  her  direction,  and  attested  in  the 
presence  of  the  testator  or  testatrix  by  two  or  more  credible  wit- 
nesses, two  of  whom  declaring  on  oath  or  affirmation  before  the 
county  court  of  the  proper  county  that  they  were  present  and  saw 
the  testator  or  testatrix  sign  said  will,  testament,  or  codicil  in 
their  presence,  or  acknowledged  the  same  to  be  his  or  her  act  and 
deed,  and  that  they  believed  the  testator  or  testatrix  to  be  of 
sound  mind  and  memory  at  the  time  of  signing  or  acknowledging 
the  same,  shall  be  sufficient  proof  of  the  execution  of  said  will. 
A  will  executed  out  of  the  state  is  admitted  to  probate  in  the 
same  manner  as  a  will  executed  in  the  state.  Any  will  probated 
according  to  law  outside  the  state,  concerning  estates  in  Illinois, 
is  good  as  wills  made  and  executed  in  the  state.  Devises  or 
legacies  to  witnesses,  or  to  their  wives  or  husbands,  are  void,  un- 
less they  were  otherwise  entitled  to  share  in  the  estate.  Personal 
property  may  be  bequeathed  by  nuncupative  wills,  if  committed 
to  writing  within  twenty  days  after  making  and  proved  by  two 

12  Ga.  Code  1911,  §§  3827-3925.  ^^  Idaho  Rev.  Codes  1908,  §§  5725- 

13  Rev.  Laws  Hawaii  1915,  §§  3258-     5760.- 
3267. 


§  904 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


970 


credible  disinterested  witnesses  present  at  the  time  the  will  was 
spoken  and  published  as  such.  And  also  it  must  be  proved  by 
two  other  witnesses  that  the  will  was  committed  to  writing  within 
ten  days  after  the  testator's  death.  A  creditor  whose  debt  is  se- 
cured by  the  will  is  a  competent  witness/^ 

§  904.  Indiana. — All  persons,  except  infants  and  those  of 
unsound  mind,  may  pass  by  will  real  or  personal  property.  This 
includes  married  women.  Birth  to  a  man  of  a  child  unprovided 
for  in  his  will  revokes  the  will.  1.  The  marriage  of  a  person  re- 
vokes his  will.  No  will  except  a  nuncupative  will  shall  affect  any 
estate,  unless  it  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some 
one  in  his  presence,  with  his  consent,  and  attested  and  subscribed 
in  his  presence  by  two  or  more  competent  witnesses.  Nuncupa- 
tive wills  attested  by  two  competent  witnesses,  made  in  the 
testator's  last  sickness,  reduced  to  writing  within  fifteen  days, 
are  valid  to  the  extent  of  one  hundred  dollars.  Soldiers  in  actual 
military  service  and  mariners  at  sea  may  dispose  of  personal 
estate  in  possession  and  of  wages  by  nuncupative  will.  A  devise 
to  a  descendant  of  the  testator  who  dies  in  the  testator's  lifetime, 
vests  in  the  surviving  descendant  of  the  devisee.  Wills  probated 
in  a  foreign  state  or  country  may  be  recorded  on  production  of 
a  duly  certified  cop}^  in  a  county  where  the  testator  had  estate, 
and  if  the  court  is  satisfied,  the  will  is  of  the  same  effect  as  if 
originally  probated  in  the  state.  Bequests  to  subscribing  wit- 
nesses are  void  unless  they  were  otherwise  entitled  to  share  in 
the  estate.  A  wife  may  elect  as  to  taking  under  her  husband's  will, 
or  under  statute.^"    2.   Such  election  is  also  given  the  husband.^"'' 

§  905.  Iowa. — Any  person  of  full  age  and  sound  mind 
may  dispose  of  his  property  by  will,  subject  to  rights  of  the  sur- 
viving six)use,  given  by  law.  But  if  a  spouse,  parent  or  child 
survive  the  testator,  no  devise  to  a  corporation  not  organized  for 
pecuniary  profit  shall  l)e  valid  in  excess  of  one-fourth  the  tes- 
tator's estate.  After-acquired  property  may  be  devised,  if  the 
intention  is  clear.  Personal  property  to  the  extent  of  three  hun- 
dred dollars  may  be  disposed  of  by  nuncupative  will  witnessed  by 
two  competent  persons.  A  soldier  in  actual  service,  or  mariner 
at  sea,  may  disix»se  of  all  his  personal  estate,  by  such  nuncupa- 


15  111.    Rev. 
2695-2699. 


Stats.    1915-1916,    pp. 


if=  Burns'  Rev.   Stat.   1914,   §§  3112, 
3131. 

i«a  Burns'  Rev.  Stat.  1914,  §§  345-347. 


971  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    906 

tive  will.  All  other  wills  must  be  in  writing  signed  by  the  tes- 
tator, or  by  some  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direc- 
tion writing  his  name  thereto,  and  witnessed  by  two  competent 
persons.  A  subscribing  witness  can  not  receive  any  benefit  from 
the  will  unless  there  are  two  additional  competent  witnesses,  or 
unless,  by  law,  without  a  will,  he  would  receive  it.  The  subse- 
quent birth  of  a  legitimate  child  before  testator's  death  revokes 
a  will,  but  not  the  birth  of  a  posthumous  child.  Posthumous  chil- 
dren take  as  if  the  testator  had  died  intestate.  Heirs  of  a  devisee 
who  dies  before  the  testator  inherit  his  property,  unless  a  con- 
trary intent  is  manifest.  A  will  may  be  deposited  with  the  clerk 
of  the  court.  A  foreign  will  already  probated  is  admitted  to  pro- 
bate on  production  of  a  copy  thereof  and  of  the  original  record 
of  probate,  authenticated  by  the  clerk  of  court  where  probation 
was  made.^^ 

§  906.  Kansas. — Any  person  twenty-one  years  old,  of 
sound  mind  and  memory,  may  make  a  will,  of  real  or  personal 
property.  There  may  be  a  valid  verbal  will  as  to  personal  estate, 
if  reduced  to  writing  and  subscribed  by  two  disinterested  com- 
petent witnesses,  within  ten  days  after  its  speaking.  All  other 
wills  shall  be  in  writing  signed  at  the  end  thereof  by  the  testator 
or  some  other  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction, 
and  shall  be  attested  and  subscribed  in  the  presence  of  the  testator 
by  two  or  more  competent  witnesses,  who  saw  him  subscribe,  or 
heard  him  acknowledge  the  same.  A  devise  to  a  witness  is  void 
unless  the  will  can  otherwise  be  proved.  A  married  person  can 
not  bequeath  away  from  the  other  spouse  more  than  half  his  or 
her  property,  without  the  consent  in  writing  of  such  spouse. 
Authenticated  copies  of  wills  executed  and  proved  according  to 
the  laws  of  any  other  state  or  territory  or  foreign  country  rela- 
tive to  any  property  in  Kansas  may  be  admitted  to  record  in  the 
probate  court  of  any  county  where  any  part  of  such  property  may 
be  situated ;  and  such  authenticated  copies  so  recorded  shall  have 
the  same  validity  as  wills  made  in  Kansas  in  conformity  with 
the  laws  thereof.  The  subsequent  birth  of  a  child  to  the  testator 
revokes  the  will,  unless  provision  was  made  for  such  child.  A 
widow  may  elect  to  take  under  the  law  of  descents,  and  not  under 
her  husband's  will.    A  foreign  will  can  not  be  contested  in  this 

"Iowa  Code  1907,  §§  3270-3295. 


907 


TITLES    AND  ABSTRACTS 


972 


State.  The  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case  applies  to  devises  of  lands. 
An  after-acquired  property  will  pass  if  such  was  the  intention. 
Afterborn  children  take  as  though  there  had  been  no  will.^^ 

§  907.  Kentucky.  —  Every  person  of  sound  mind  and 
twenty-one  years  of  age  can  make  a  will  which  will  dispose  of 
any  interest  he  might  be  entitled  to  at  his  or  her  death,  which 
would  descend  to  his  heirs  or  pass  to  his  personal  representatives, 
even  if  acquired  after  the  w^ill  was  made.  This  includes  a  mar- 
ried woman,  but  she  can  not  by  will  affect  her  husband's  interest 
against  his  consent.  A  will  must  be  in  writing  and  the  name  of 
the  testator  must  be  subscribed  to  it  by  himself,  or  some  other 
person  in  his  presence  at  his  direction.  If  not  entirely  written 
by  the  testator  the  subscription  must  be  made  or  the  will  acknowl- 
edged by  the  testator  in  the  presence  of  at  least  two  credible  wit- 
nesses, who  shall  subscribe  their  names  to  the  will  in  the  testator's 
presence  and  in  the  presence  of  each  other.  A  person  under 
twenty-one  years  of  age  may  make  a  will  in  pursuance  of  a  power 
expressly  given  to  that  effect  and  a  father  under  that  age  may  by 
will  appoint  a  guardian  for  his  child.  The  will  of  a  person  domi- 
ciled out  of  the  state  at  the  time  of  death  is  valid  as  to  his  per- 
sonalty in  the  state,  if  executed  according  to  the  law  of  the  domi- 
cil.  The  will  of  a  nonresident  relative  to  estate  in  the  state, 
which  has  been  probated  elsewhere,  may  be  probated  in  Kentucky 
by  producing  an  authenticated  copy  and  a  certificate  of  probate. 
Wills  must  1)e  probated  before  the  county  court  of  the  county  of 
the  testator's  residence,  or  if  he  had  no  residence,  where  his 
estate  or  part  of  it,  is  situated.  A  soldier  in  actual  service  or 
mariner  at  sea  may  dispose  of  personal  effects  by  verbal  will 
made  ten  days  before  death  in  the  presence  of  two  competent 
witnesses,  and  if  reduced  to  writing  within  sixty  days  after  they 
were  spoken.  Marriage  of  either  a  man  or  woman  revokes  his 
or  her  will,  unless  made  in  the  exercise  of  a  power  of  appoint- 
ment. Incompetency  of  an  attesting  witness  does  not  make  the 
will  void.  A  creditor  of  the  testator  or  an  executor,  is  a  com- 
petent witness.  A  will  speaks  from  the  testator's  death.  The 
issue  of  a  devisee  or  legatee  who  dies  before  the  testator  take  his 
share.  A  pretermitted  child  takes  as  though  there  were  no  will. 
A  void  or  lapsed  devise  passes  as  in  case  of  intestacy.^" 


i«Kans.  Gen.  Stats.  1909,   §§  9776- 
9847. 


"Carroll  Kv.  Stats.  1915,  §§  4825- 
4855. 


973  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    908 

§  908.     Louisiana. — As  the  civil  law  obtains  in  Louisiana, 
the  provisions  of  its  laws  respecting  wills  are  very  different  from 
those  of  other  states.     All  dispositions  mortis  causa  must  be 
made  by  last  will  or  testament,  of  which  there  are  many  forms. 
Mutual  wills  are  prohibited,  and  the  testator  can  not  commit  the 
power  of  disposing  to  another.    There  are  three  classes  of  wills: 
1.  Nuncupative  or  open  testament.     2.  Mystic  or  sealed  testa- 
ments.   3.   Olographic  testaments.     Either  nuncupative  or  mys- 
tic wills  must  be  drawn  up  in  writing,   and  mere  verbal  tes- 
taments are  abolished.     There  are  nuncupative  testaments  by 
public  act  aiid  under  private  signature.    Such  testaments  by  pub- 
lic act  must  be  received  by  a  notary  In  the  presence  of  three  wit- 
nesses residing  In  the  place  where  the  will  is  executed,  or  of  five 
witnesses  not  residing  in  the  place,  and  must  be  dictated  by  the 
testator,  and  written  by  the  notary  as  it  Is  dictated,  then  be  read 
to  the  testator  In  presence  of  the  witnesses.     Express  mention  at 
one  time  made  of  the  whole,  observing  that  all  those  formalities 
must  be   fulfilled  is  without  interruption  and  without  turning 
aside  to  other  acts.    The  testament  must  be  signed  by  the  testator 
if  he  declares  that  he  does  not  know  how  or  Is  not  able  to  sign, 
express  mention  of  his  declaration  and  of  the  cause  which  hin- 
ders him  to  sign  must  be  made  in  the  act.     The  testament  must 
also  be  signed  by  the  witnesses  or  at  least  one  of  them  for  all  if 
the  others  can  not  write.    A  nuncupative  testament  under  private 
signature  must  be  written  by  the  testator  himself,  or  by  any  other 
person  from  his  dictation,  or  even  by  one  of  the  witnesses,  in  the 
presence  of  five  witnesses  residing  In  the  place  where  the  will  is 
received  or  of  seven  witnesses  residing  out  of  that  place;  or  it 
will  suffice  If  in  the  presence  of  the  same  number  of  witnesses  the 
testator  present  the  paper  on  which  he  has  written  his  testament 
or  caused  it  to  be  written  out  of  their  presence,  and  declare  to 
them  that  that  paper  contains  his  last  will  and  testament.     In 
either  case  the  testament  must  be  read  by  the  testator  to  the  wit- 
nesses, or  by  one  of  the  witnesses  to  the  rest  in  the  presence  of 
the  testator.    It  must  be  signed  by  the  testator,  if  he  knows  how 
or  is  able  to  sign,  and  by  the  witnesses,  or  at  least  by  two  of  them 
in  case  the  others  know  not  how  to  sign,  and  those  of  the  wit- 
nesses who  do  not  know  how  to  sign  must  affix  their  mark.     In 
the  country  it  suffices  for  the  validity  of  the  nuncupative  testa- 
ments under  private  signature  if  the  testament  be  passed  In  the 


§    90S  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  974 

presence  of  three  witnesses  residing  in  the  place  where  the  testa- 
ment is  received,  or  of  five  witnesses  residing  out  of  that  place, 
provided  that  in  this  case  a  greater  number  of  witnesses  can  not 
be  had.  The  mystic,  secret  or  closed  testament  is  made  in  the 
following  manner:  The  testator  must  sign  his  dispositions, 
whether  he  has  written  them  himself  or  has  caused  them  to  be 
written  by  another  person.  The  paper  containing  those  disposi- 
tions, or  the  paper  serving  as  their  envelope,  must  be  closed  and 
sealed.  The  testator  shall  present  it,  thus  closed  and  sealed 
to  the  notary  and  to  three  witnesses,  or  he  shall  cause  it 
to  be  closed  and  sealed  in  their  presence.  Then  he  shall  declare 
to  the  notary,  in  the  presence  of  the  witnesses,  that  the  paper 
contains  his  testament,  written  by  himself,  or  by  another  by  his 
direction,  and  signed  by  him,  the  testator.  The  notary  shall  then 
draw  up  the  act  of  superscription  w^hich  shall  be  written  on  that 
paper  or  the  sheet  which  serves  as  its  envelope,  and  that  act  shall 
be  signed  by  the  testator,  and  by  the  notary  and  the  witnesses. 
All  that  is  above  prescribed  shall  be  done  without  interruption  or 
turning  aside  to  other  acts ;  and  in  case  that  the  testator,  by  rea- 
son of  any  hindrance  which  has  happened  since  the  signing  of  the 
testament,  can  not  sign  the  act  of  superscription,  mention  shall 
be  made  of  the  declaration  made  by  him  thereof,  without  its 
being  necessary  in  that  case  to  increase  the  number  of  witnesses. 
Those  who  know  not  how  or  are  not  aljle  to  write  or  sign  their 
names  can  not  make  dispositions  in  the  form  of  a  mystic  testa- 
ment. If  any  witness  to  the  act  of  superscription  knows  not  how 
to  sign,  express  mention  shall  be  made  thereof.  The  following 
persons  are  absolutely  incapable  of  being  witnesses  to  testaments : 
1.  Women  of  whatever  age  to  the  testaments  of  their  hus- 
bands. 2.  Children  who  have  not  atttained  the  age  of  sixteen 
years  complete.  3.  Persons  insane,  deaf,  dumb  or  blind.  4,  Per- 
sons whom  the  criminal  laws  declare  incapable  of  exercising  civil 
functions.  Neither  can  testaments  be  witnessed  by  those  who 
are  constituted  heirs  or  named  legatees,  under  whatsoever  title  it 
may  be,  provided  that  this  qualification  does  not  apply  to  the 
mystic  testament.  The  olographic  testament  is  that  which  is 
written  by  the  testator  himself.  In  order  to  be  valid  it  must  be 
entirely  written,  dated  and  signed  by  the  testator  without  its 
being  subject  to  any  other  formality,  and  may  be  made  any- 
where, even  out  of  the  state.    A  testament  intended  to  be  in  one 


975  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    908 

form  may  be  valid  in  another.  Witnessses  must  reside  in  the 
parish  where  the  testament  is  executed,  when  it  is  required  that 
they  reside  in  the  place.  The  minor  above  the  age  of  sixteen 
can  dispose  of  property  by  donation  mortis  causa.  Testaments 
made  in  other  states  or  countries  take  effect  in  this  state,  provided 
they  are  clothed  with  all  the  formalities  prescribed  for  the  valid- 
ity of  testaments  in  the  place  where  they  are  made.  Soldiers' 
wills  may  be  received  by  a  commissioned  officer  before  two  wit- 
nesses or  if  sick  or  wounded,  before  a  physician  or  surgeon  at- 
tending him,  assisted  by  two  witnesses.  Such  wills  need  only  be 
reduced  to  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator  or  the  person  re- 
ceiving them  and  by  the  witnesses.  Such  testament  is  null  six 
months  after  the  testator's  return  to  a  place  where  he  can  use  the 
ordinary  forms.  The  captain  or  master  of  a  vessel  in  the  pres- 
ence of  three  witnesses  may  receive  testaments  at  sea,  the  only 
formality  being  that  they  should  be  reduced  to  writing,  signed 
by  the  testator,  the  receiver,  and  the  witnesses,  but  such  testa- 
ment can  pass  nothing  to  any  person  employed  on  the  vessel, 
unless  a  relative  of  the  testator.  It  is  not  valid  unless  the  testator 
die  at  sea  or  within  three  months  after  he  landed  in  a  place  where 
he  can  use  the  ordinary  forms.  Donations  inter  vivos  or  mortis 
causa  can  not  exceed  two-thirds  of  the  property  of  the  disposer, 
if  he  leaves  at  his  decease,  a  legitimate  child,  one-half  if  he  leaves 
two  children;  and  one-third  if  he  leaves  three  or  a  greater  num- 
ber. Under  the  name  of  children  are  included  descendants  of 
whatever  degree,  it  being  understood  that  they  are  only  counted 
for  the  child  they  represent.  Donations  inter  vivos  or  causa 
mortis  can  not  exceed  two-thirds  of  the  property  if  the  disposer, 
having  no  children,  leave  a  father,  mother,  or  both,  A  disherison 
must  be  made  by  name  expressly  and  for  a  just  cause  recognized 
by  law.  The  following  ten  causes  for  the  disherison  of  children 
are  recognized:  1.  If  the  child  has  raised  his  or  her  hand  to 
strike  the  parent,  or  if  he  or  she  has  actually  struck  the  parent; 
but  a  mere  threat  is  not  sufficient.  2.  If  the  child  has  been 
guilty,  toward  a  parent,  of  cruelty,  of  a  crime  or  grievous  injury. 

3.  If  the  child  has  attempted  to  take  the  life  of  either  parent. 

4.  If  the  child  has  accused  a  parent  of  any  capital  crime,  except, 
however,  that  of  high  treason.  5.  If  the  child  has  refused  sus- 
tenance to  a  parent,  having  means  to  afford  it.  6.  If  the  child 
has  neglected  to  take  care  of  a  parent  become  insane.     7.  If  the 


§    909  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  976 

child  refused  to  ransom  them,  when  detained  in  captivity.  8.  If 
he  used  an}^  act  of  violence  or  coercion  to  hinder  a  parent  from 
making  a  will.  9.  If  the  child  has  refused  to  become  security 
for  a  parent,  having  the  means  in  order  to  take  him  out  of  prison. 
10.  If  the  son  or  daughter,  being  a  minor,  marries  without  the 
consent  of  his  or  her  parents.  Ascendants  other  than  parents 
may  disinherit  their  descendants  for  the  first  nine  causes  above 
enumerated,  when  the  acts  there  mentioned  have  been  committed 
toward  them  instead  of  toward  their  parents.  Legitimate  chil- 
dren dying  without  issue  and  leaving  a  parent  can  not  disinherit 
him  or  her  unless  for  the  following  seven  causes:  1.  If  the  par- 
ent has  accused  the  child  of  a  capital  crime,  except,  however,  the 
crime  of  high  treason.  2,  If  the  parent  has  attempted  to  take 
the  child's  life.  3.  If  the  parent  has,  by  any  violence  or  force, 
hindered  the  child  from  making  a  will.  4.  If  the  parent  has 
refused  sustenance  to  the  child  in  necessity,  having  the  means  of 
affording  it.  5.  If  the  parent  has  neglected  to  take  care  of  the 
child  while  in  a  state  of  insanity.  6.  If  the  parent  has  neglected 
to  ransom  the  child  in  captivity.  7.  If  the  father  or  mother  have 
attempted  the  life,  the  one  or  the  other,  in  which  case  the  child 
or  descendant  who  makes  a  will  may  disinherit  the  one  who  has 
attempted  the  life  of  the  other,  A  disinherison  to  be  valid  must 
be  made  in  one  of  the  forms  prescribed  for  testaments,  and  the 
testator  must  express  for  what  reasons  he  disinherits  the  heir  in 
question.  And  the  other  heirs  of  the  testator  are,  moreover, 
obliged  to  prove  the  facts  on  which  the  disinherison  is  founded. 
A  testament  is  annulled  by  operation  of  law  by  the  birth  of  legiti- 
mate children  prior  to  its  date.'*^ 

§  909.  Maine.  —  A  person  of  sound  mind,  twenty-one 
years  old  may  dispose  of  his  real  and  personal  estate  by  will,  in 
writing,  signed  by  him  or  by  some  person  for  him  at  his  request 
and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  three  credible  witnesses  not 
beneficially  interested  thereunder.  Subsequently  acquired  real 
estate  passes  if  such  was  the  testator's  intention,  and  a  devise  of 
land  conveys  all  the  estate  of  the  testator.  A  nuncupative  will 
may  be  made  during  the  last  sickness  of  the  testator,  if  made  at 
home,  unless  he  is  taken  sick  suddenly  away  from  home.     Such 

20  Merrick's    Rev.    Civ.    Code,    La.     1913,    ch.   6.    arts.    1570-1624;    ch.    3, 

arts.  1493-1495. 


i 


977  STATUTES  OF  WILLS.  §  910 

will  is  effective  only  as  to  personal  property  under  $300  in  value, 
unless  proved  by  the  oath  of  three  witnesses  who  were  present  at 
its  making  and  requested  by  the  testator  to  bear  witness  to  his 
will.  The  nuncupative  will  must  be  proved  within  six  months, 
unless  reduced  to  writing  within  six  days  after  they  were  spoken. 
Soldiers  in  service  or  mariners  at  sea,  may  dispose  of  personal 
estate  and  wages,  by  nuncupative  will,  without  regard  to  the 
place  of  its  making.  An  omitted  o-r  posthumous  child  takes  as 
though  there  were  no  will.  Wills  executed  and  proved  in  another 
state  according  to  its  laws,  may  be  proved  in  Maine,  and  one 
proved  in  another  state  may  be  allowed  in  Maine  by  producing  an 
authenticated  copy  of  the  will  and  probate,  and  filing  and  record- 
ing after  hearing."^ 

§  910.  Maryland.  —  No  will  can  create  a  perpetuity.  No 
will  will  pass  real  estate  unless  the  testator  was  at  the  time  of 
acknowledging  or  executing  same  of  sound  and  disposing  mind 
and  capable  of  executing  a  valid  deed  or  contract,  and  if  a  male, 
aged  twenty-one,  if  a  female,  aged  eighteen.  By  the  common 
law  males  over  fourteen  and  females  over  twelve  years  of 
age  may  make  valid  wills  of  personal  property.  Wills  of  real 
and  of  personal  property  must  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  tes- 
tator or  by  some  one  for  him,  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express 
direction,  and  attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  or 
more  credible  witnesses.  Although  no  nuncupative  will  is  valid, 
a  soldier  in  active  serv^ice  or  mariner  at  sea,  may  by  verbal  will 
before  witnesses,  dispose  of  his  wages,  movables  and  personal 
property.  A  devise  or  legacy  shall  not  fail  because  of  the  death 
of  the  legatee  in  the  testator's  lifetime,  but  shall  pass  as  if  the 
devisee  or  legatee  survived  the  testator.  A  will  made  out  of  the 
state  will  be  held  valid  in  Maryland,  if  made  according  to  the 
forms  required  by  the  law  of  the  place  where  made,  or  by  the 
law  of  the  place  where  the  testator  was  domiciled  when  made,  or 
according  to  the  forms  required  by  the  law  of  Maryland.  A  copy 
certified  as  prescribed  by  law  of  the  record  of  a  will  recorded  in  a 
foreign  country  is  good  evidence  to  prove  such  will  in  Mary- 
land.-" 

§  911.     Massachusetts. — A  will  may  be  made  by  any  per- 

21  Maine  Rev.  Stat.  1916,  title  7,  22  Bagby  Ann.  Code,  Md.  1911,  art. 
ch.  79.  93,  §§  316-343. 

62 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    912  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  978 

son  of  sound  mind  of  the  legal  age  of  twenty-one  years.  Wills 
must  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator  or  by  some  one  in  his 
presence  and  by  his  express  direction  and  must  be  attested  and 
subscribed  in  the  testator's  presence  ])y  three  or  more  competent 
witnesses.  A  married  woman  may  make  a  valid  will.  Soldiers 
in  service  or  mariners  at  sea  may  dispose  of  personal  property 
by  a  nuncupative  will.  Marriage  acts  as  a  revocation  of  a  will, 
unless  it  appears  from  the  will  that  it  was  made  in  contemplation 
of  marriage,  or  unless  it  was  made  in  the  exercise  of  a  power  of 
appointment.  A  testator  may  keep  a  will  in  his  custody  or  de- 
posit it  in  that  of  the  probate  court.  A  person  other  than  the 
register  of  probate,  who  has  custody  of  a  will,  must  produce  it 
within  thirty  days  from  notice  of  the  testator's  death,  and  one 
who  conceals  or  retains  a  will  may  be  examined  and  imprisoned. 
Devises  to  watnesses  or  their  husbands  or  w'ives  are  void  unless 
there  are  three  other  competent  witnesses.  The  surviving  hus- 
band or  widow  may  elect  to  take  under  the  statute  instead  of 
under  the  will.  Pretermitted  or  posthumous  children  take  as  if 
there  w^ere  no  will.  The  issue  of  a  legatee  who  is  a  child  or 
relative  of  the  testator  and  dies  before  the  testator,  takes  his 
share.  A  will  which  is  made  out  of  the  commonwealth,  valid 
according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  in  w^hich  it  was 
made,  may  be  proved  and  allowed  in  Massachusetts,  and  shall 
have  the  same  effect  as  if  it  had  been  executed  according  to  Mas- 
sachusetts laws.  A  foreign  wnll  may  be  proved  by  producing  an 
authenticated  copy  and  a  certificate  of  probate. ^^ 

§912.  Michigan.  —  ^Vny  person  of  sound  mind,  over 
twenty-one,  may  make  a  will  disposing  of  lands  or  personalty, 
and  every  devise  conveys  all  the  testator's  interest,  including 
after-acquired  lands,  unless  a  contrary  intention  appears.  All 
wills  made  in  the  state  must  be  in  wTiting,  signed  by  the  testator, 
or  by  some  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction, 
and  attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  or  more  com- 
petent witnesses.  There  is  an  exception  as  to  nuncupative  wills 
which  are  valid  where  the  value  of  the  estate  does  not  exceed 
$300,  or  if  made  by  a  soldier  in  service  or  mariner  on  shipboard, 
relative  to  wages  and  personal  property.     Bequests  to  subscrib- 

-^2  Rev.  Laws  of  Mass.,  title  2,  ch.     135.  §§  1,  6,  9,  5,  10,  14,  15,  ch.  136, 

§  10. 


i 


979  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    913 

ing  witnesses  are  void  unless  there  are  two  other  competent  wit- 
nesses, or  unless  such  witness  was  entitled  to  a  share  by  law,  and 
a  creditor  secured  by  will  is  a  competent  witness.  The  provisions 
as  to  custody  of  a  will  are  very  similar  to  those  of  Massachusetts. 
A  will  may  be  placed  in  the  custody  of  the  judge  of  probate. 
Foreign  wills  may  be  proved  by  filing  an  exemplified  copy  of  the 
will  and  the  record  of  probate.  Afterborn  children  take  as  if 
the  parent  had  died  intestate,  their  share  first  being  taken  from 
estate  undisposed  of  by  will,  if  any,  then  proportionally  from  all 
legatees  and  devisees.  The  widow  may  choose  between  dower 
and  the  provision  for  her  in  the  will.  A  foreign  will,  made  where 
probate  is  not  required,  may  be  proved  in  Michigan  by  producing 
the  original  or  a  full  and  complete  copy.  A  will  executed  with- 
out the  state,  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  law,  is  valid  in  Michigan 
if  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator.  The  issue  of  a  legatee, 
who  is  a  child  or  other  relation  and  dies  before  the  testator,  takes 
his  share.'* 

§913.  Minnesota.  —  Every  person  of  full  age  (males 
twenty-one  years,  females  eighteen  years)  and  sound  mind  may 
make  a  will,  including  married  women.  Nuncupative  wills  are 
valid  only  as  to  personal  estate,- when  made  by  a  soldier  in  serv- 
ice, or  mariner  at  sea.  Other  wills  must  be  in  writing,  signed  by 
the  testator  or  by  some  person  in  his  presence  by  his  express 
direction,  and  must  be  attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by 
two  or  more  competent  witnesses.  A  creditor  whose  debt  is 
secured  by  the  will  is  a  competent  witness.  A  legacy  to  a  witness 
is  void,  unless  there  are  two  other  competent  subscribing  wit- 
nesses who  are  not  beneficiaries  or  unless  the  witness  was  entitled 
to  share  in  the  estate  in  absence  of  a  will.  Marriage  of  a  testator 
revokes  a  will,  and  divorce  of  the  testator  revokes  provisions  in 
favor  of  the  testator's  spouse.  Afterborn  children  take  as  if  the 
testator  had  died  intestate,  first  from  an  undisposed  portion  of 
the  estate,  then  from  the  shares  of  all  devisees  and  legatees  pro- 
portionally. After-acquired  property  will  pass  by  the  will.  A 
will  may  be  deposited  with  the  judge  of  the  county  where  the 
testator  lives.  The  surviving  issue  of  a  child  or  relative  of  the 
testator  who  was  a  devisee  or  legatee  and  died  before  the  tes- 
tator, take  the  parent's  share.    A  will  made  out  of  the  state  valid 

24  Howell's      Ann.      Alich.      Stats.     §§  10975-11015,  11025. 


§  914 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


980 


according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  in  which  it  was 
made,  or  of  the  testator's  domicil,  if  in  writing  and  signed  by 
the  testator,  may  be  proved  and  allowed  in  Michigan,  and  have 
the  same  effect  as  if  it  had  been  executed  according  to  the  laws 
of  Alichigan.  Every  will  proved  outside  of  the  state  in  accord- 
ance with  law,  may  be  allowed,  filed  and  recorded  in  any  county 
in  this  state  w-here  the  testator  left  property.  A  duly  authenti- 
cated copy  of  the  will  and  of  its  probate  must  be  presented  to  the 
court.  A  surviving  spouse  may  elect  betw^een  the  provisions  of 
one  will  and  the  statutory  provisions  for  such  spouse.  Nuncu- 
pative wills  must  have  two  credible  disinterested  witnesses  and 
must  have  been  put  in  writing  within  thirty  days  after  making.^° 

§  914.  Mississippi. — Every  person  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years,  male  or  female,  married  or  unmarried,  has  the  power 
by  will  in  writing  to  dispose  of  real  and  personal  property,  so  as 
such  will  be  signed  by  the  testator  or  testatrix,  or  by  some  other 
person  in  his  or  her  presence  and  by  his  or  her  express  direction ; 
and,  if  not  wholly  written  and  subscribed  by  himself  or  herself 
shall  be  attested  by  two  or  more  credible  witnesses  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  testator  or  testatrix.  A  w\\\  is  void  if  the  testator 
had  no  child  when  it  was  made,  and  a  child  is  later  born  to  him. 
If  the  testator  had  children  when  the  will  was  made,  later-born 
children  take  as  if  he  had  died  intestate,  devisees  and  legatees 
contributing  proportionally.  Nuncupative  wills  are  valid  only 
when  made  in  last  sickness,  at  home,  except  where  deceased  was 
taken  sick  away  from  home,  and  died  before  return,  nor  are  they 
valid  to  bequeath  a  value  exceeding  one  hundred  dollars  unless  it 
is  proved  by  two  witnesses  that  testator  called  them  to  bear  wit- 
ness to  his  wilU  Such  will  can  not  be  proved  after  six  months 
from  making,  unless  reduced  to  writing  within  six  days  from 
speaking.  Soldiers  in  actual  service  or  mariners  at  sea,  may  dis- 
pose of  goods  and  chattels  in  the  manner  permitted  by  common 
law.  A  wife  or  husband  may  renounce  the  provisions  of  the 
spouse's  will  and  take  under  the  law.  Any  provision  in  a  will 
for  a  husband  or  wife  is  in  bar  of  a  statutory  share.  The  stat- 
utes of  mortmain  are  in  force.  One  who  kills  another  shall  not 
take  under  his  will.  The  issue  of  a  child  or  descendant  who  dies 
before  the  testator  take   anv   srifts   made   to   him   in   the   will. 


25  Gen.  Stats.  Minn.  1913,  §§  7250-     7275,  7282. 


981  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    915 

Authenticated  copies  of  foreign  wills  proved  according  to  the 
laws  of  any  foreign  jurisdiction,  may  be  admitted  to  probate  in 
Mississippi,  but  are  subject  to  contest  as  the  original  might  have 
been."*' 

§  915.  Missouri. — Every  male  person,  twenty-one  years 
of  age  and  upward,  of  sound  mind,  may  by  last  will,  devise  all 
his  estate,  real,  personal  and  mixed,  and  all  interest  therein,  sav- 
ing the  widow  her  dower.  And  every  male  person  over  the  age 
of  eighteen  years,  and  of  sound  mind,  may,  by  last  will,  bequeath 
all  his  personal  estate,  saving  the  widow  her  dower.  Any  mar- 
ried or  unmarried  woman,  of  eighteen  years  of  age  and  upward, 
of  sound  mind,  may  devise  her  land,  tenements,  or  any  descend- 
able interests  therein,  or  bequeath  her  personal  property  held  in 
her  own  right,  in  possession  or  expectancy,  by  her  last  will  and 
testament  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  husband,  if  any,  to  his  cur- 
tesy therein.  Every  will  shall  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  tes- 
tator, or  by  some  person,  by  his  direction,  in  his  presence ;  and 
shall  be  attested  by  two  or  more  competent  witnesses  subscribing 
their  names  to  the  will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator,  and  in  the 
presence  of  each  other.  The  husband's  rights  in  the  deceased 
wife's  property  are  the  same  as  those  of  a  widow  in  the  deceased 
husband's  property.  A  will  executed  by  an  unmarried  woman 
shall  be  deemed  revoked  by  her  subsequent  marriage.  If  a  tes- 
tator after  making  a  will  disposing  of  his  whole  estate,  marries 
and  dies  leaving  issue  of  such  marriage  unprovided  for,  such  will 
shall  be  deemed  revoked.  A  testator  is  deemed  to  have  died  in- 
testate as  to  children  not  named  in  the  will.  Where  any  estate 
shall  be  devised  to  any  child  or  grandchild  or  other  relative  of 
the  testator  and  such  devisee  shall  die  before  the  testator  leaving 
lineal  descendants,  such  descendants  shall  take  the  estate,  real  or 
personal,  as  such  devisee  would  have  done  in  case  he  had  sur- 
vived the  testator.  Nuncupative  wills  are  not  good  where  the 
estate  exceeds  two  hundred  dollars,  or  unless  proved  by  two  wit- 
nesses, and  that  the  testator,  in  his  last  sickness,  at  his  home,  or 
taken  sick  away  from  home,  called  some  person  to  witness  the 
will.  Proof  of  such  will  must  be  given  within  six  months  after 
speaking,  or  the  substance  reduced  to  writing  within  thirty  days. 
Wills  of  mariners  and  soldiers,  as  to  wages  and  personal  prop- 

20  Miss.    Code    1906,    §§    5078-5092,    2004. 


916 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


982 


erty,  are  governed  by  the  common  law.  A  legacy  to  an  attesting 
witness  is  void  unless  there  are  sufficient  other  witnesses.  A  de- 
vise omitting  the  words  "heirs  and  assigns"  or  "heirs  and 
assigns  forever,"  containing  no  words  by  which  it  appears  a  life 
estate  was  intended,  passes  a  fee  simple.^^ 

§  916.  Montana. — Same  as  California,  except  no  provision 
as  to  married  woman  and,  "a.  will  of  real  or  personal  property, 
or  both,  or  a  revocation  thereof,  made  out  of  this  state  by  a  per- 
son not  having  his  domicil  in  this  state,  is  as  valid  when  executed 
according  to  the  law  of  the  place  in  which  the  same  was  made, 
or  in  which  the  testator  was  at  the  time  domiciled,  as  if  it  were 
made  in  this  state,  and  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  chap- 
ter."=^* 

§917.  Nebraska.  —  Every  person  of  full  age  (males, 
twenty-one;  unmarried  females,  eighteen;  married  females,  six- 
teen) may  dispose  of  real  and  personal  property  by  will.  The 
will  must  be  in  writing  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  person 
in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  attested  and  sub- 
scribed in  the  presence  of  the  testator  by  two  or  more  competent 
witnesses.  Nuncupative  wills  are  not  good,  where  the  value  of 
the  estate  exceeds  one  hundred  fifty  dollars,  and  unless  proved  by 
three  witnesses  present  at  the  making,  and  that  the  testator  called 
them  to  bear  witness  it  was  his  will,  and  that  it  was  made  during 
the  testator's  last  sickness  at  his  home,  or  while  taken  sick  away 
from  home.  Unless  reduced  to  writing  within  six  days  after 
speaking,  proof  of  such  w'ills  will  not  be  allowed  after  six 
months.  These  rules  do  not  apply  to  wills  by  soldiers  in  service 
and  mariners  on  ships,  disposing  of  wages  and  personal  estate. 
Bequests  to  subscribing  witnesses  are  void,  unless  there  are  two 
others  competent,  or  such  witness  w^ould  take  by  law  without  a 
will.  A  will  may  be  deposited  wath  the  probate  judge.  After- 
acquired  estate  passes  by  will  if  such  appears  to  have  been  the 
intention.  Afterborn  children  take  as  if  the  testator  had  died 
intestate.  All  wills  duly  proved  and  allowed  in  a  foreign  state 
or  country,  according  to  law,  may  be  filed  in  the  probate  court 
of  any  county  where  the  testator  has  estate  on  which  the  will 


27  Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1909,  §§  535-584. 


2«Rev.   Code  Mont.  1907,  §§  4723- 
4762. 


983  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    918 

may  operate,  by  producing  a  duly  authenticated  copy  of  the  will 
and  its  probate."" 

§  918.  Nevada. — Every  person  over  eighteen  years  of  age, 
of  sound  mind,  may  dispose  of  his  or  her  estate,  real  or  personal, 
by  will.  Married  women  may  dispose  of  their  separate  property 
as  though  under  no  disability.  No  will  except  a  holographic  or 
nuncupative  will  is  valid  unless  in  writing  "signed  by  the  testator 
and  sealed  with  his  seal,  or  by  some  person  in  his  presence  and 
by  his  express  direction,  and  attested  by  at  least  two  competent 
witnesses  subscribing  their  names  to  the  will  in  the  presence  of 
the  testator."  A  nuncupative  or  verbal  will  is  valid  where  the 
estate  bequeathed  does  not  exceed  in  value  one  thousand  dollars, 
when  proved  by  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  who  were  present 
at  the  making  thereof,  and  the  testator  at  the  making  of  the  same 
bade  some  one  present  bear  witness  that  such  was  his  will,  at  the 
time  of  his  last  sickness.  It  must  be  proved  not  more  than  three 
months  after  it  is  made.  Provisions  in  favor  of  subscribing  wit- 
nesses are  void  unless  there  are  sufficient  other  witnesses.  Mar- 
riage of  an  unmarried  woman  revokes  her  will  previously  made, 
likewise  marriage  of  a  man,  unless  provision  is  made  for  his  wife. 
Afterborn  or  unintentionally  omitted  chlidren  take  as  if  no  will 
had  been  made.  After-acquired  property  passes  if  such  was  the 
testator's  intention.  Property  may  be  disposed  of  and  taken 
under  holographic  wills.  Such  wills  shall  be  valid  and  have  full 
efifect  for  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  intended.  A  holo- 
graphic will  is  subject  to  no  other  form  than  that  it  be  written 
entirely  by  the  hand  of  the  testator  himself.  It  may  be  made  in 
or  out  of  this  state,  and  need  not  be  witnessed,  and  may  be 
proved  in  the  same  manner  as  other  private  writings  are  proved. 
"All  wills  which  shall  have  been  duly  proved  and  allowed  in  any 
other  of  the  United  States,  or  any  territory  thereof,  or  in  any 
foreign  country  or  state,  may  be  admitted  to  probate  by  the  dis- 
trict court  of  any  county  in  which  the  deceased  shall  have  left 
any  estate,  provided  it  has  been  executed  in  conformity  with  the 
laws  of  the  place  where  made,"  and  proceedings  shall  be  had  as 
in  case  of  an  original  will  for  probate,  with  like  force  and  effect.^" 

§  919.     New  Hampshire. — Every  person  of  sane  mind  aged 

29Cobbev's  Ann.  Stats.  Nebr.  1911,  so  Rev.  Laws  Nev.  1912,  §§  5878. 
§§  4988-5014.  6202-6222. 


§    920  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  984 

twenty-one  may  dispose  by  will  of  real  and  personal  property. 
This  includes  a  married  woman.  Wills  must  be  made  in  writing, 
signed  by  the  testator  or  some  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his 
express  direction,  and  attested  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by 
three  or  more  credible  witnesses.  A  will  not  under  seal  is  as  effec- 
tual as  though  sealed.  A  legacy  to  a  witness  is  void,  unless  there 
are  three  other  subscribing  witnesses,  but  a  gift  to  a  corporation 
of  which  witnesses  are  members,  does  not  make  the  will  void  or 
disqualify  the  witnesses.  Afterborn  or  omitted  children  take  as  if 
there  were  no  w'ill.  The  surviving  spouse  may  waive  provisions 
in  the  deceased  spouse's  will,  and  take  under  the  statute.  A 
soldier  in  actual  service,  or  a  seaman  at  sea,  may  dispose  of 
movables  or  personal  estate  as  at  common  law.  A  will  may  be 
deposited  for  safe-keeping  w^ith  the  register  of  probate.  Nuncu- 
pative \vills  shall  not  be  "valid  where  the  personal  estate  be- 
queathed exceeds  in  value  one  hundred  dollars,  unless  declared  in 
the  presence  of  three  w^itnesses  who  are  requested  by  the  testator 
to  bear  witness  thereto,  in  his  last  sickness  and  in  his  usual  dwell- 
ing; except  when  he  was  taken  sick  from  home  and  died  before 
his  return,  nor  unless  a  memorandum  thereof  was  reduced  to 
writing  within  six  days,  and  presented  to  the  probate  court  within 
six  months  after  the  making.  A  will  made  out  of  the  state,  valid 
according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  or  countr}'-  where  it  was  exe- 
cuted, may  be  proved  and  allowed  in  New  Hampshire,  and  shall 
be  as  effective  as  it  would  have  been  if  executed  according  to 
New  Hampshire  "laws.  No  donatio  causa  mortis  shall  be  valid 
unless  the  actual  delivery  of  the  property  to  the  donee  be  proved 
by  two  indifferent  witnesses  upon  proceedings  in  the  probate 
court  to  establish  such  gift  commenced  within  sixty  days  after 
the  death  of  the  donor.^'- 

§  920.  New  Jersey. — A  will  by  a  person  under  twenty- 
one,  or  idiot,  lunatic,  or  person  of  unsound  mind,  is  not  good. 
A  witness  to  a  will  can  not  take  as  devisee,  except  to  pay  debts, 
but  may  prove  the  will.  Estates  pur  autre  vie  may  be  devised. 
A  nuncupative  will  is  not  valid  except  where  the  estate  does  not 
exceed  eighty  dollars,  unless  proved  by  three  witnesses  present 
at  the  making,  and  unless  the  testator  asked  persons  present  to 
bear  witness  to  the  will,  and  unless  made  in  time  of  last  sickness, 

31  Pub.  Stats.  N.  H.  1901,  ch.   186,     §§  1-22. 


985  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    921 

at  home,  or  taken  sick  while  away  from  home,  dying  before  re- 
turning, and  unless  reduced  to  writing  within  six  days  from 
making,  such  will  must  be  proved  within  six  months.  These  rules 
do  not  apply  to  soldiers  in  service  or  mariners  at  sea.  A  written 
will  can  not  be  altered  by  an  oral  will.  Afterborn  children  make 
void  a  will  made  Avhen  the  testator  had  no  children.  Where  a 
testator  had  children  when  the  will  was  made,  afterborn  children 
take  as  though  he  died  intestate.  All  wills  except  nuncupative 
wills  must  be  in  writing  signed  by  the  testator,  and  the  signature 
shall  be  made  by  the  testator,  or  the  making  thereof  acknowl- 
edged by  him,  and  such  writing  declared  to  be  his  last  will,  in  the 
presence  of  two  witnesses  present  at  the  same  time,  who  shall 
subscribe  their  names  thereto,  as  witnesses,  in  the  presence  of  the 
testator.  Unless  intended  clearly  to  convey  an  estate  for  life, 
all  devises  in  which  the  words  "heirs  and  assigns"  are  omitted, 
pass  an  estate  in  fee  simple.  A  foreign  will  may  be  admitted  to 
probate,  by  presenting  a  copy  of  the  will,  or  a  record  of  it,  and 
the  certificate  of  probate,  all  properly  attested,  to  the  surrogate, 
if  executed  in  conformity  with  New  Jersey  law,  and  shall  have 
the  same  force  as  if  executed  in  New  Jersey.^" 

§  921.  New  Mexico. — Any  person  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years  or  upward,  in  sound  mind,  may  make  a  will,  disposing 
of  all  property  save  what  is  sufficient  to  pay  his  debts,  and  what 
is  given  by  law  as  privileged  property  to  his  wife  or  family.  An 
agent  may  be  empowered  to  make  a  will.  A  verbal  will  may  be 
valid.  A  will  in  writing  should  be  signed  by  the  testator,  who,  if 
unable  or  not  knowing  how  to  sign,  shall  request  some  reliable 
person  to  sign  for  him,  and  attested  by  two  or  more  able  and 
qualified  witnesses,  who  must  be  present  and  see  the  testator  sign 
the  will,  or  some  one  sign  it  for  him  at  his  request  as  and  for  his 
last  will  and  testament,  and  must  sign  as  witnesses  at  his  request 
in  his  presence  and  in  the  presence  of  each  other.  Two  witnesses 
to  a  will  are  sufficient,  but  in  case  of  a  verbal  will  there  must  also 
be  two  witnesses  to  testify  as  to  the  testator's  soundness  of  mind. 
Heirs  or  beneficiaries  can  not  be  witnesses  to  a  will.  Charitable 
bequests  must  be  in  writing.  Children  not  named  or  after-bom 
take  as  if  no  will  had  been  made.  "Any  will  executed  in  any 
foreign  jurisdiction,  sufficient  to  convey  the  title  of  real  estate 

32  Comp.  Stats.  N.  J.  1910,  pp.  5862-5871,  §§  1-27,  p.  3820,  §  23. 


§  922 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


986 


in  such  jurisdiction,  shall  be  valid  in  this  state  to  the  same  extent 
as  in  the  jurisdiction  where  made."'^^ 

§  922.  New  York. — All  persons,  except  idiots,  persons  of 
unsound  mind  and  infants,  may  devise  real  estate,  and  males  of 
the  age  of  eighteen  or  upward,  and  females  of  the  age  of  sixteen 
or  upward,  if  of  sound  mind,  may  bequeath  personal  estate  by 
written  wills.  Only  soldiers  in  service  or  mariners  at  sea  may 
bequeath  personal  property  by  nuncupative  will.  Real  property 
can  not  be  devised  to  an  alien,  nor  to  a  corporation  unless  it  is 
empowered  by  charter  or  statute,  to  take  by  devise.  No  person 
having  a  husband,  wife,  child,  or  parent,  can  will  more  than  half 
his  property  to  a  religious  or  charitable  society  or  corporation. 
Every  last  will  and  testament  shall  be  executed  and  attested  in 
the  following  manner:  "1.  It  shall  be  subscribed  by  the  testator 
at  the  end  of  the  will.  2.  Such  subscription  shall  be  made  by  the 
testator  in  the  presence  of  each  of  the  attesting  witnesses,  or  shall 
be  acknowledged  by  him,  to  have  been  so  made,  to  each  of  the 
attesting  witnesses.  3.  The  testator,  at  the  time  of  making  such 
subscription,  or  at  the  time  of  acknowledging  the  same,  shall  de- 
clare the  instrument  so  subscribed  to  be  his  last  will  and  testa- 
ment. 4.  There  shall  be  at  least  two  attesting  witnesses,  each  of 
whom  shall  sign  his  name  as  a  witness,  at  the  end  of  the  w'ill,  at 
the  request  of  the  testator."  "The  witnesses  to  any  will  shall  write 
opposite  to  their  names  their  respective  places  of  residence ;  and 
every  person  w^ho  shall  sign  the  testator's  name  to  any  will,  by 
his  direction,  shall  write  his  own  name  as  a  witness  to  the  will. 
Whoever  shall  neglect  to  comply  with  either  of  these  provisions 
shall  forfeit  fifty  dollars,  to  be  recovered  by  any  person  inter- 
ested in  the  property  devised  or  bequeathed  who  will  sue  for  the 
same.  Such  omission  shall  not  afTect  the  validity  of  any  will; 
nor  shall  any  person  liable  to  the  penalty  aforesaid  be  excused  or 
incapacitated  on  that  account  from  testifying  respecting  the  exe- 
cution of  such  will."  Devises  or  bequests  to  subscribing  witnesses 
are  void  where  the  will  can  not  be  proved  without  them,  unless 
such  witness  would  have  been  entitled  by  law  to  share  in  the 
testator's  estate.  A  will  is  revoked  by  marriage  of  the  testator 
and  the  birth  of  issue,  or  by  the  marriage  of  an  unmarried  female 
testatrix.  "A  will  of  real  or  personal  property,  executed  as  pre- 
ss N.     Mex.     Stats.     Ann.      1915,     §§5857-5870. 


987  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    923 

scribed  by  the  laws  of  the  state,  or  a  will  of  personal  property 
executed  without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States,  the 
Dominion  of  Canada,  or  the  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, as  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  where  it 
is  or  was  executed,  or  a  will  of  personal  property,  executed  by 
a  person  not  a  resident  of  the  state,  according  to  the  laws  of  the 
testator's  residence,  may  be  proved  as  prescribed  in  this  article. 
The  right  to  have  a  will  admitted  to  probate,  the  validity  of  the 
execution  thereof,  of  the  validity  or  construction  of  any  pro- 
vision contained  therein,  is  not  affected  by  a  change  of  the  tes- 
tator's residence  made  since  the  execution  of  the  will."  A  for- 
eign will  may  be  proved  by  filing  a  duly  authenticated  copy  of 
the  will  and  the  proof  with  the  surrogate  of  the  county  in  New 
York  where  property  disposed  of  by  the  will  is  situated.  Wills 
may  be  deposited  with  the  clerk  of  every  county,  the  register  of 
deeds  in  the  city  and  county  of  New  York,  and  the  surrogate  of 
every  county,  A  testator,  who  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
wherever  resident,  may  declare  that  he  elects  his  disposition  by 
his  will  to  be  construed  and  regulated  by  the  laws  of  New  York."* 

§  923.  North  Carolina.  —  No  person  under  the  age  of 
twenty-one  is  capable  of  disposing  of  propeMy  by  will.  Married 
women  may  make  wills.  "No  last  will  or  testament  shall  be  good 
or  sufficient  in  law  to  convey  or  give  any  estate,  real  or  personal, 
unless  such  last  will  shall  have  been  written  in  the  testator's  life- 
time and  signed  by  him,  or  by  some  other  person  in  his  presence 
and  by  his  direction,  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  wit- 
nesses at  least.  *  *  *  Or,  unless  such  last  will  and  testa- 
ment be  found  among  the  valuable  papers  and  effects  of  any 
deceased  person,  or  shall  have  been  lodged  in  the  hands  of  any 
person  for  safe-keeping,  and  the  same  shall  be  in  the  handwriting 
of  such  deceased  person  with  his  name  subscribed  thereto,  or 
inserted  in  some  part  of  such  will,  and  if  such  handwriting  shall 
be  proved  by  three  credible  witnesses,  who  verily  believe  such 
M'ill  and  every  part  thereof  is  in  the  handwriting  of  the  person 
whose  will  it  appears  to  be,  then  such  will  shall  be  sufficient  to 
give  and  convey  real  and  personal  estate."  Wills,  unless  made  in 
exercise  of  a  power  of  appointment,  are  revoked  by  the  testator's 

3*Consol.  Laws  N.  Y.  1909,  D.,  ch.     244.    E.   Law,  ch.   18,   §§   1048;   Acts 

1911. 


924 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


988 


subsequent  marriage.  "No  person,  on  account  of  being  an  ex- 
ecutor of  a  will,  shall  be  incompetent  to  be  admitted  as  a  witness 
to  prove  the  execution  of  such  will,  or  to  prove  the  validity  or 
invalidity  thereof.  If  any  person  shall  attest  the  execution  of 
any  will,  to  whom  or  to  whose  wife  or  husband  any  beneficial 
devise,  estate,  interest,  legacy  or  appointment  of  or  affecting  any 
real  or  personal  estate  shall  be  thereby  given  or  made,  such  de- 
vise, estate,  interest,  legacy  or  appointment  shall,  so  far  as  only 
concerns  such  person  attesting  the  execution  of  such  wall,  or  the 
wife  or  husband  of  such  person,  or  any  person  claiming  under 
such  person  or  wife  or  husband,  be  void;  and  such  person  so 
attesting  shall  be  admitted  as  a  witness  to  prove  the  execution  of 
such  will,  or  the  validity  or  invalidity  thereof."  Any  nuncu- 
pative will  must  be  proved  by  at  least  two  witnesses  who  were 
present  when  it  was  made,  and  who  state  that  they  were  espe- 
cially requested  to  bear  witness  thereto  by  the  testator  himself. 
It  must  also  be  proved  that  such  will  was  made  in  the  testator's 
last  sickness  in  his  own  house,  or  where  he  had  previously  re- 
sided for  at  least  ten  days,  unless  he  die  on  a  jouf'ney  or  from 
home.  No  nuncupative  will  shall  be  proved  by  the  witnesses  after 
six  months  from  the  making  thereof,  unless  it  was  put  in  writing 
within  ten  days  from  such  making.  Afterborn  children,  unpro- 
vided for,  take  as  if  there  had  been  no  will.  A  foreign  will  may 
be  proved  by  exemplified  copy,  but  will  not  pass  real  estate  in 
North  Carolina  unless  executed  in  conformity  with  its  laws.^'' 

§  924.  North  Dakota. — Practically  same  as  California  ex- 
cept, no  corporation  can  take  by  will,  unless  expressly  authorized 
by  statute,  and  no  restrictions  on  devise  for  charitable  use. 
After-acquired  property  passes  by  will.  Foreign  wills  may  be 
probated  by  filing  in  county  court  the  duly  authenticated  copies 
of  the  will  and  the  probate,  and  they  are  valid  in  North  Dakota, 
if  executed  either  according  to  the  laws  of  the  place  w^here  made, 
of  the  testator's  domicil,  or  of  North  Dakota.^*^ 


S  925.     Ohio.  —  Males 


aged 


tw^enty-one,    females    aged 


eighteen,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  under  no  restraint,  may 
make  wills.  All  except  nuncupative  w'ills  must  be  in  writing,  but 
may  be  handwritten  or  typewritten,  and  must  be  signed  at  the 


35  Pell's   Rev.   N.   Car.   Stats. 
§§  3111-3146. 


1908, 


^'^  Comp.     Laws 
§§  5640-5684,  8672. 


N.     Dak.     1913, 


989  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    926 

end  by  the  party  executing  or  some  other  person  in  his  presence 
and  by  his  express  direction,  and  attested  and  subscribed  in  the 
testator's  presence,  by  two  or  more  competent  witnesses,  who 
saw  him  subscribe  or  heard  him  acknowledge  it.  A  devise  or 
bequest  to  a  witness,  without  whose  testimony  the  will  can  not  be 
proved,  is  void,  unless  he  was  by  law  entitled  to  share  in  the 
estate.  A  widow  or  widower  may  elect  to  take  under  the  will  of 
a  deceased  consort  or  take  under  the  provisions  made  by  law  for 
her  or  him.  The  will  of  an  unmarried  woman  is  not  revoked  by 
her  marriage.  The  birth  to  a  testator,  who  had  no  children,  of 
a  child  unprovided  for  revokes  the  will.  Subsequently  acquired 
property  passes  if  such  was  the  testator's  intention.  A  bequest 
to  charity  is  void,  unless  executed  at  least  one  year  prior  to  the 
testator's  death.  A  verbal  will,  made  in  the  last  sickness,  is 
valid  as  to  personal  estate,  if  reduced  to  writing,  and  subscribed 
by  two  competent  disinterested  witnesses  within  ten  days  after 
the  speaking  of  the  testamentary  words;  if  it  is  also  proved  by 
such  witnesses  the  testator  was  of  sound  mind  and  memory  and 
not  under  any  restraint,  and  called  upon  some  person  present  to 
bear  testimony  to  said  deposition  as  his  will,  such  a  will  must  be 
offered  for  probate  within  six  months  after  his  death.  A  duly 
executed  written  will  can  not  be  revoked  by  a  nuncupative  will. 
Authenticated  copies  of  wills,  executed  and  proved  according  to 
the  laws  of  any  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States  relative  to 
any  property  in  the  state  of  Ohio,  may  be  admitted  to  record  in 
the  probate  court  of  a  county  where  a  part  of  such  property  is 
situated.  Such  authenticated  copies  so  recorded  shall  have  the 
same  validity  in  law  as  wills  duly  made  in  Ohio,  in  conformity 
with  the  laws  thereof,  are  declared  to  have.  Foreign  wills  can 
not  be  contested  in  Ohio.^'' 

§  926.  Oklahoma. — Same  as  North  Dakota,  except  no 
married  person  can  bequeath  more  than  two-thirds  of  his  or  her 
property  away  from  the  other  spouse,  and  no  person  who  is  in- 
capable of  alienating,  conveying  or  incumbering  real  property 
while  living  may  bequeath  the  same  by  will.^^ 

§  927.     Oregon. — "Every  person  of  twenty-one  years   of 

37  Ohio  Gen.  Code  1910.  §§  10503,    •''«  Okla.  Rev.  Laws  1910,  §§  8317- 
10504,  10515,  10536,  10560,  10561,  8337. 
10566,  10577,  10579,  10601. 


§    927  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  990 

age  and  upward,  of  sound  mind,  may,  hy  last  will,  devise  all 
his  estate,  real  and  personal,  saving  to  the  widow  her  dower. 
Every  person  over  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  of  sound  mind, 
may  by  last  will,  dispose  of  his  goods  and  chattels.  A  married 
\voman  may,  by  will,  dispose  of  any  real  estate  held  in  her  own 
right,  subject  to  any  rights  which  her  husband  may  have  as 
tenant  by  the  curtesy.  Every  will  shall  be  in  writing,  signed 
by  the  testator,  or  by  some  other  person  under  his  direction,  in 
his  presence,  and  shall  be  attested  by  two  or  more  competent 
u^itnesses,  subscribing  their  names  to  the  will  in  the  presence 
of  the  testator.  Every  person  who  shall  sign  the  testator's  name 
to  any  w'ill  by  his  direction  shall  subscribe  his  own  name  as  a 
witness  to  such  will,  and  state  that  he  subscribed  the  testator's 
name  at  his  request.  If,  after  making  a  will  disposing  of  the 
whole  estate  of  the  testator,  such  testator  shall  marry  and  die, 
leaving  issue  by  such  marriage  living  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
or  shall  leave  issue  of  such  marriage  born  to  him  after  his  death, 
such  will  shall  be  deemed  revoked,  unless  provisions  shall  have 
been  made  for  such  issue  by  some  settlement,  or  unless  such  issue 
shall  be  provided  for  in  the  will,  and  no  evidence  shall  be  re- 
ceived to  rebut  the  presumption  of  such  revocation.  A  will  made 
by  an  unmarried  person  shall  be  deemed  revoked  b}'  subsequent 
marriage."  Children  unprovided  for  take  as  though  no  will  had 
been  made.  A  mariner  at  sea  or  soldier  in  service  may  dispose 
of  wages  or  personal  property  as  at  common  law.  "No  proof 
shall  be  received  of  any  nuncupative  will  unless  it  be  offered 
wn'thin  six  months  after  speaking  the  testamentary  words,  nor 
unless  the  words,  or  the  substance  thereof,  were  reduced  to 
writing  within  thirty  days  after  they  were  spoken."  "No  pro- 
Ijate  of  any  nuncupative  will  shall  be  granted  for  fourteen  days 
after  the  death  of  the  testator;  nor  shall  any  nuncupative  will 
be  at  any  time  proved  unless  the  testamentary  words,  or  the  sub- 
stance thereof,  l)e  first  committed  to  writing,  and  a  citation 
issued,  accompanied  by  a  copy  thereof,  to  call  the  widow  or  next 
of  kin  of  the  deceased,  that  they  may  contest  the  will  if  they 
think  proper."  "Any  person  not  an  inhabitant,  but  owning 
property,  real  or  personal,  in  this  state,  may  devise  or  bequeath 
such  property  by  last  wall,  executed  and  proved  (if  real  estate 
be  devised)  according  to  the  laws  of  this  state,  or  (if  personal 
estate  be  bequeathed)  according  to  the  laws  of  this  state  or  of 


991  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    928 

the  country,  state  or  territory  in  which  the  will  may  be  exe- 
cuted." If  such  will  be  probated  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction,  duly 
certified  copies  of  such  will  and  the  probate  may  be  recorded,  and 
be  of  the  same  effect  as  wills  executed  in  Oregon,  and  if  probate 
is  not  required  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction  a  will  there  made  may 
be  probated  in  Oregon.  A  foreign  will  may  l)e  contested  in  Ore- 
gon. A  subscribing  witness  can  not  take  unless  there  are  suffi- 
cient other  witnesses  or  he  is  entitled  to  a  share  by  law.  A 
legatee  who  has  rejected  a  legacy  or  has  been  paid,  is  a  com- 
petent witness.^" 

§  928.  Pennsylvania. — Every  person  of  sound  mind  over 
twenty-one  years  of  age  may  mal:e  a  will  of  realty  or  personalty. 
A  will  must  be  in  writing,  and  unless  the  person  making  the 
same  shall  be  prevented  by  the  extremity  of  his  last  sickness, 
must  be  signed  by  him  at  the  end  thereof,  or  by  some  person 
in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  and  in  all  cases 
shall  be  proved  by  the  oaths  or  affirmations  of  two  or  more 
competent  witnesses.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  will  be  proved 
by  subscribing  witnesses,  and  acknowledgment  by  the  testator  be- 
fore subscribing  witnesses  is  not  necessary  except  where  there 
is  a  devise  or  bequest  to  a  charitable  or  religious  use,  when  the- 
will  must  be  attested  by  two  credible  and  disinterested  witnesses, 
and  executed  at  least  one  calendar  month  before  the  death  of  the 
testator.  The  signature  may  be  made  by  mark.  Personal  estate 
may  be  bequeathed  by  nuncupative  wills,  if  made  during  the 
last  sickness  of  the  testator  in  the  house  of  his  habitation,  or 
where  he  has  resided  for  the  space  of  ten  days  or  more  next 
before  the  making  of  such  will ;  except  where  the  testator  was 
surprised  by  sickness,  being  from  his  own  house,  and  shall  die 
before  returning.  If  a  value  of  more  than  one  hundred  dollars 
is  bequeathed  by  such  will,  it  must  be  proved  by  some  of  the 
persons  present,  that  he  requested  some  of  them  to  bear  witness 
that  such  was  his  will,  or  to  that  effect,  and  the  requisites  of  the 
will  must  be  proved  by  two  or  more  witnesses  who  were  present 
at  the  making.  Mariners  at  sea,  or  soldiers  in  actual  military 
service,  may  dispose  of  movables,  wages,  and  personal  estate  by 
a  nuncupative  will.  After-acquired  realty  passes  by  a  will  unless 
a  contrary   intention  appears.     Words  of   inheritance  are  not 

3»  Lord's  Ore.  Laws,   §§   7316-7341. 


§    929  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  992 

necessary  to  pass  the  testator's  entire  estate.  The  birth  of  chil- 
dren after  the  execution  of  wills,  revokes  the  will  pro  tanto. 
Alarriage  of  a  single  woman  revokes  her  will.  A  will  speaks  as 
of  the  date  of  the  death  of  the  testator.  Lapsed  and  void  de- 
vises go  to  the  residuary  devisees,  and  not  by  the  intestate  law. 
A  will  may  be  written  in  pencil  or  typewritten.  A  will  and  codi- 
cil may  be  written  on  separate  pieces  of  paper.^  A  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife  may  elect  to  take  under  or  contrary  to  the  wills  of 
decedents.  Any  person  competent  to  make  a  will  may  by  testa- 
ment appoint  a  guardian  for  his  or  her  minor  child.  Wills  of 
personal  property  made  by  persons  whose  domicil  is  out  of  the 
state  may  be  executed  as  required  by  the  law  of  the  state  of  their 
domicil.  All  wills  offered  for  probate  in  Pennsylvania  require 
the  same  evidence,  no  matter  where  executed;  and  should  be 
proved  and  registered  in  the  office  of  the  register  of  wills  in  the 
country  where  the  testator  had  his  domicil.  Copies  of  wills  duly 
proved  in  any  other  state  or  country  may  be  registered  in  Penn- 
sylvania if  duly  authenticated,  and  letters  testamentary  or  of 
administration  granted  thereon,  as  if  the  original  had  been  pro- 
duced ;  also  there  must  be  produced  and  filed  a  copy  of  the  record 
of  the  probate  of  the  original  and  the  letters  granted  thereon, 
attested  by  the  person  having  power  to  receive  the  probate  of 
such  original  in  the  place  where  it  was  proved,  with  his  seal  of 
office,  if  any,  annexed,  together  with  the  certificate  of  the  chief 
judge  or  presiding  magistrate  of  the  state,  country,  county  or 
district  where  the  original  was  proved,  that  the  same  appears  to 
have  been  duly  proved  and  to  be  of  force,  and  that  the  attestation 
is  in  due  form.^° 

§  929.  Philippine  Islands. — Every  person,  including  mar- 
*ried  women,  of  age  and  sound  mind  may  make  a  will  of  real  and 
personal  property,  except  that  no  person  can  by  will  deprive  a 
husband,  wife  or  heir,  of  his  interest  in  an  estate  which  apper- 
tains by  law.  After-acquired  real  estate  may  pass  by  will,  if 
such  was  the  intention.  No  will  is  valid  unless  it  he  in  writing 
and  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  the  testator's  name  written  by 
some  other  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction, 
and  attested  and  subscribed  by  three  or  more  credible  witnesses 
in  the  presence  of  the  testator  and  of  each  other.    The  attestation 

40Purdon's     Dig.     Pa.     Laws     (13     ed.),  vol.  4,  pp.  5109-5151. 


993  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    930 

shall  state  the  fact  that  the  testator  signed  the  will,  or  caused  it  to 
be  signed  by  some  other  person  at  his  express  direction,  in  the 
presence  of  three  witnesses,  and  that  they  attested  and  subscribed 
it  in  his  presence  and  in  the  presence  of  each  other.  But  the  ab- 
sence of  such  form  of  attestation  shall  not  render  the  will  invalid 
if  it  is  proved  that  the  will  was  in  fact  signed  and  attested  as  in 
this  section  provided.  Any  person  of  sound  mind,  not  blind, 
aged  eighteen  or  more,  is  a  competent  witness.  A  devise  to  a 
witness  is  void  unless  there  are  three  other  competent  witnesses, 
"A  will  made  out  of  the  Philippine  Islands  which  might  be  proved 
and  allowed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  in  which  it  was 
made,  may  be  proved,  allowed,  and  recorded  in  the  Philippine 
Islands,  and  shall  have  the  same  effect  as  if  executed  according 
to  the  law  of  these  Islands."  "A  will  made  within  the  Philippine 
Islands  by  a  citizen  or  subject  of  another  state  or  country,  which 
is  executed  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  state  or  country  of 
which  he  is  a  citizen  or  subject,  and  which  might  be  proved  and 
allowed  by  the  law  of  his  own  state  or  country,  may  be  proved, 
allowed,  and  recorded  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  shall  have 
the  same  effect  as  if  executed  according  to  the  laws  of  these 
islands."  Wills  proved  and  allowed  in  the  United  States,  or  any 
state  or  territory  thereof,  or  in  a  foreign  state  or  country  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  thereof,  may  be  allowed,  filed  and  recorded  in 
the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  the  Province  in  which  the  tes- 
tator has  estate  on  which  it  may  operate.  A  duly  authenticated 
copy  of  the  will  and  of  the  probate  and  allowance,  must  be  pro- 
duced and  a  hearing  had,  and  if  allowed,  the  will  has  the  same 
effect  as  if  originally  proved  in  the  same  court.*'- 

§  930.  Porto  Rico. — All  persons  over  fourteen  years  of 
age,  not  permanently  or  temporarily  of  unsound  mind,  may  make 
wills.  A  will  is  absolutely  a  personal  act  and  can  not  be  made 
through  a  third  person,  trustee  or  agent.  There  are  ordinary 
and  special  wills.  Military  and  maritime  wills  and  those  exe- 
cuted in  foreign  countries  are  special  wills.  Ordinary  wills  are 
holographic,  open  and  closed.  The  two  latter  kinds  must  be 
executed  before  a  local  notary,  with  many  formalities  and  wit- 
nesses, and  are  not  of  general  interest.  Foreigners  can  probably 
only  make  the  holographic  will  with  any  practical  effect.    Holo- 

41  P.   I.   Code   Proc.   1901,   §§   614-640. 
63 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


§    931  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  994 

graphic  wills  may  l)e  executed  only  by  persons  of  full  age  and  to 
be  valid,  must  be  written  in  entirety  and  signed  Ijy  the  testator, 
who  shall  state  the  year,  month,  and  day  in  which  it  is  executed. 
If  it  contains  words  erased,  corrected,  or  interlined  the  testator 
shall  make  a  note  thereof  under  his  signature.  Holographic 
wills  may  be  executed  at  any  place,  within  or  outside  of  Porto 
Rico  and  foreigners  may  execute  such  wills  in  their  own  lan- 
guage. Such  wills  must  be  placed  in  a  protocol  being  presented 
for  this  purpose  to  the  district  court  of  the  last  domicil  of  the 
testator,  or  the  court  of  the  district  in  which  the  testator  dies,  if 
he  dies  in  Porto  Rico,  within  five  years  from  the  date  of  death. 
Citizens  of  Porto  Rico  may  make  wills  abroad  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  country  where  they  are  sojourning,  or  wills  on  the 
high  seas,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  state  or  nation  to 
which  the  ship  belongs,  or  holographic  wills  anywhere,  but  can 
not  make  a  mutual  will  valid  in  Porto  Rico  even  though  it  woidd 
be  valid  where  made.  Children  and  their  descendants,  or  parents 
if  there  are  no  children,  are  forced  heirs.  The  children  are  en- 
titled as  such  to  two-thirds  of  the  property,  the  parents  to  one- 
half.  There  can  be  disinheritance  of  children,  parents  or  spouses 
only  for  certain  statutory  causes,  which  must  be  mentioned  in 
the  will.  The  surviving  spouse  may  take  independently  of  the 
will." 

§  931.  Rhode  Island. — Any  person  of  sane  mind  aged 
twenty-one  years  may  by  will  dispose  of  any  real  and  personal 
estate  to  which  in  law  or  in  equity,  he  shall  be  entitled  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  except  an  estate-tail.  A  minor  eighteen  years 
old  or  more  may  bequeath  personal  estate.  Lapsed  and  void  de- 
vises go  to  the  residuary  devisee.  Wills  must  be  signed  by  the 
testator,  or  by  some  other  person  for  him  in  his  presence  and  by 
his  express  direction,  and  such  signature  shall  be  made  or 
acknowledged  by  the  testator  in  the  presence  of  two  or  more 
witnesses  present  at  the  same  time,  and  such  witnesses  shall  attest 
and  shall  subscribe  the  will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator,  but  no 
form  of  attestation  shall  be  necessary  and  no  other  publication 
shall  be  necessary.  "A  will  of  real  or  personal  property,  or  both, 
executed  without  the  state  and  within  the  United  States,  if  exe- 
cuted in  the  mode  prescril^ed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  or  territory 

«Rev.  Stats,  and  Codes  P.  R.  1913,  §§  3748-3811. 


995  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    932 

or  District  of  Columbia,  where  executed,  or  in  which  the  testator 
was  then  domiciled,  and  any  will  of  personal  property  executed 
in  any  other  country,  if  executed  according  to  the  laws  of  such 
country,  shall  be  deemed  to  be  legally  executed,  and  shall  have 
the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  executed  in  the  mode  prescribed 
by  the  laws  of  this  state,"  provided  it  is  in  writing  and  susbcribed 
by  the  testator.  The  will  of  a  married  woman  can  not  impair 
her  husband's  rights  as  tenant  by  curtesy.  Marriage  revokes  a 
will,  unless  made  in  exercise  of  a  power  of  appointment.  Sol- 
diers in  service  or  seamen  at  sea,  may  dispose  of  personal  estate 
as  at  common  law.  A  child  afterbom  or  unintentionally  omitted 
takes  as  though  there  were  no  will.  A  devise  or  legacy  to  a  wit- 
ness is  void,  but  he  is  competent  to  prove  the  will.  An  executor 
or  trustee  is  a  competent  witness.  An  exemplified  copy  of  a  for- 
eign will  and  probate  may  be  presented  for  filing  and  record,  and 
after  notice  and  hearing  will  be  of  the  same  effect  as  if  originally 
probated  in  Rhode  Island.  A  foreign  will  operative  without 
probate  where  made,  may  be  proved  in  Rhode  Island.*^ 

§  932.  South  Carolina. — "All  wills  and  testaments  of  real 
and  personal  property  shall  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the 
party  so  devising  the  same,  or  by  some  other  person  in  his  pres- 
ence and  by  his  express  directions,  and  shall  be  attested  and  sub- 
scribed in  the  presence  of  the  said  devisor,  and  of  each  other, 
by  three  or  more  credible  witnesses."  Any  person  of  sound  mind 
of  the  age  of  twenty-one  may  devise  real  property  by  will.  As 
at  common  law,  males  over  fourteen  and  females  over  twelve 
may  make  a  will  of  personalty."  Estates  pur  autre  vie  are  de- 
visable. Devises  or  bequests  to  subscribing  witnesses  are  valid, 
so  far  as  such  legacy  does  not  exceed  the  amount  to  which  the 
witness  would  be  entitled  upon  a  failure  of  the  will.  A  creditor 
secured  by  the  will  is  a  competent  witness.  Marriage  of  a  tes- 
tator revokes  a  will,  if  the  wife  and  issue  are  not  provided  for. 
Words  of  limitation  are  unnecessary  to  convey  a  fee  by  devise. 
Posthumous  or  other  afterborn  children  take  equally  with  the 
other  children,  who  must  contribute  to  their  share.  Legacies  to 
a  bastard  child  or  to  a  woman  with  whom  the  testator  lives  in 
adultery  are,  if  the  testator  has  a  wife  or  lawful  children,  void 

43  Gen.  Laws  R.  I.  1909,  ch.  254.  167;  Major  v.  Hunt,  64  S.  Car.  97,  41 
§§  11-36;  ch.  310,  §  10-14.  S.  E.  816. 

44  Posey  V.  Posey,  3  Strob.  S.  Car. 


§    933  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  996 

if  they  exceed  one-fourth  of  his  estate.  If  a  will  has  been  regu- 
larly proved  in  a  foreign  court,  an  exemplification  of  such  will 
may  be  admitted  to  probate  in  this  state  upon  exemplification 
and  certificate  of  the  judge  of  the  court  of  probate.  Nuncupative 
wills  where  the  estate  exceeds  fifty  dollars  are  not  valid  unless 
proved  by  the  oaths  of  three  witnesses  present  at  the  making 
called  upon  by  the  testator  to  witness  his  will,  and  unless  made 
in  the  house  where  the  testator  lived,  and  in  his  last  sickness.  If 
committed  to  writing  within  six  days,  such  will  may  l)e  proved 
in  twelve  months,  otherwise  only  in  six  months.  Soldiers  and 
mariners  may  make  wills  as  at  common  law.  Typewritten  wills 
are  good.  Wills  may  be  probated  either  in  common  form  or  in 
due  form  of  law.*'^ 

§  933.  South  Dakota. — Same  as  North  Dakota,  which  is 
practically  same  as  California. *° 

§  934.  Tennessee. — Wills  of  real  estate  may  be  made  only 
by  persons  aged  twenty-one  or  more,  but  males  aged  fourteen 
and  females  aged  twelve  may  make  wills  of  personalty.  "No 
last  will  or  testament  shall  be  good  or  sufficient  to  convey  or 
give  any  estate  in  lands  unless  written  in  the  testator's  lifetime 
and  signed  by  him,  or  by  some  other  person  in  his  presence  and 
by  his  direction,  and  subscribed  in  his  presence  by  two  witnesses 
at  least,  neither  of  whom  is  interested  in  the  devise  of  the  said 
lands.  But  a  paper  writing  appearing  to  be  the  will  of  a  deceased 
person,  written  wholly  by  him,  having  his  name  subscribed  to  it 
or  inserted  in  some  part  of  it,  and  found  after  his  death  among 
his  valuable  papers  or  lodged  in  the  hands  of  another  for  safe- 
keeping, shall  be  good  and  sufficient  to  give  and  convey  lands, 
if  the  handwriting  is  generall}^  known  by  his  acquaintances  and 
is  proved  by  at  least  three  credible  witnesses  that  they  verily  be- 
lieve the  writing  to  be  in  his  hand."  A  nuncupative  will  is  not 
good  as  to  an  estate  exceeding  two  hundred  fifty  dollars,  unless 
proved  by  two  disinterested  persons  who  were  present  when  it 
was  made.  A  written  will  may  not  be  revoked  by  an  oral  will. 
No  subscribing  witnesses  are  necessary  to  a  will  of  personalty. 
A  married  woman  may  dispose  of  her  realty  or  personalty  by 
will  but  not  so  as  to  affect  her  husband's  right  of  curtesy.     A 

«S.  Car.  Code  1912,  §§  3563-3589.     1035;   Rev.   Code   S.   Dak.    1903,   pp. 
"Civ.  Code  S.  Dak.  1913,  §§  998-     735-739. 


1 


997  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    935 

foreign  will  may  be  proved  by  presenting  a  duly  authenticated 
copy  to  the  county  court.  The  certificate  of  a  consul  or  anv 
United  States  agent  at  the  place  of  execution  is  sufficient  authen- 
tication of  a  foreign  will  of  personalty.  A  pretermitted  child 
takes  as  though  there  were  no  will.  The  will  speaks  from  the 
testator's  death. *^ 

§  935.  Texas. — Every  person  aged  twenty-one  years  or 
upward,  or  who  may  be  or  may  have  been  lawfully  married, 
being  of  sound  mind,  shall  have  power  to  make  a  last  will  and 
testament.  Every  will,  except  where  otherwise  provided  by  law, 
shall  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  testator  or  by  some  other 
person  by  his  direction  and  in  his  presence,  and  shall,  if  not 
wholly  written  by  himself,  be  attested  by  two  or  more  credible 
witnesses  above  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  subscribing  their 
names  thereto  in  presence  of  the  testator.  In  case  of  a  holo- 
graphic will,  wholly  written  by  the  testator,  attestation  is  unnec- 
essary. A  nuncupative  will  is  valid  if  made  in  the  time  of  the 
last  sickness  of  the  deceased,  at  his  habitation,  unless  taken  sick 
from  home  and  he  dies  before  returning;  but  not  when  the  value 
exceeds  $30,  unless  proved  by  three  competent  witnesses  that 
the  testator  called  on  some  person  to  take  notice  of  his  will. 
Such  will  can  not  be  proved  within  fourteen  days  from  the  tes- 
tator's death,  and  not  after  six  months  from  date  of  speaking, 
unless  committed  to  writing  within  six  days  therefrom.  These 
provisions  do  not  apply  to  mariners  at  sea  or  soldiers  in  service. 
Afterborn  or  posthumous  children,  unprovided  for,  take  as  if 
there  were  no  will.  If  the  testator  had  no  child,  when  the  will 
was  made,  his  will  is  void  if  he  die  leaving  a  child.  Bequests  to 
subscribing  witnesses  are  void,  unless  they  were  entitled  to  share 
under  the  law.  When  any  will  disposing  of  lands  in  this  state 
has  been  duly  probated  according  to  the  laws  of  any  of  the 
United  States  or  territories,  a  copy  thereof  and  its  probate  may 
be  filed  and  recorded  in  the  same  manner  as  deeds  and  convey- 
ances and  will  have  the  same  force  and  effect,  but  the  validity  of 
such  will  may  be  contested  within  four  years.'** 

§  936.     Utah. — Same  as  California,  except  no  restrictions 

"  Shannon's      Code      Tenn.      1896,         ^^  Vernon's      Sayles'     Tex.      Stats. 
§§    3895-3932;    Supp.    Shannon    Code    Ann.  1914,  §§  7855-7878. 
Tenn.  1897-1903,  §  3921. 


§  937 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


998 


that  devises  to  charity  must  be  made  thirty  days  before  death 
and  can  not  exceed  one-third  the  estate.  "A  will  of  real  or  per- 
sonal property,  or  both,  or  a  revocation  thereof,  made  out  of  this 
state  by  a  person  not  having  his  domicil  in  this  state,  is  as  valid 
when  executed  according  to  the  law  of  the  place  in  which  the 
same  was  made,  or  in  which  the  testator  was  at  the  time  domi- 
ciled, as  if  it  were  made  in  this  state  and  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  chapter."*" 

§  937.  Vermont. — Every  person  of  age  (males  twenty- 
one,  females  eighteen)  and  sound  mind  may  devise,  bequeath 
and  dispose  of  real  and  personal  property  by  will.  After- 
acquired  real  estate  passes  by  will  if  such  was  the  testator's  in- 
tention. No  will,  except  nuncupative  wills,  is  valid  unless  in 
writing,  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  the  testator's  name  written 
by  some  other  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction, 
and  attested  and  subscribed  by  three  or  more  credible  witnesses 
in  the  presence  of  the  testator  and  of  each  other.  No  nuncupa- 
tive will  is  valid  where  the  estate  exceeds  two  hundred  dollars, 
nor  unless  a  memorandum  was  made  in  writing  by  a  person  pres- 
ent within  six  days  from  the  time  of  making,  and  presented  for 
probate  within  six  months.  A  soldier  or  seaman  may  make  a  will 
of  wages  or  personal  estate  as  at  common  law.  A  devise  to  wit- 
nesses is  void  unless  there  are  three  other  competent  witnesses. 
A  secured  creditor  is  a  competent  witness.  "A  will  made  out  of 
the  state,  which  might  be  proved  and  allowed  by  the  laws  of  the 
state  or  country  in  which  it  was  made,  may  be  proved,  allowed, 
and  recorded  in  this  state,  and  shall  then  have  the  same  effect 
as  if  executed  according  to  the  laws  of  this  state."  Wills  proved 
and  allowed  in  any  other  state  or  in  a  foreign  country  may  be 
allowed,  filed  and  recorded  in  the  probate  court  of  a  district  in 
which  the  testator  has  property  on  which  it  may  operate.  A  duly 
authenticated  copy  of  such  will  and  its  probate  is  required. ^° 

§  938.  Virginia. — No  person  of  unsound  mind,  or  under 
the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  shall  be  capable  of  making  a  will, 
except  that  minors  eighteen  years  of  age  or  upward  may,  by 
will,  dispose  of  personal  estate.  No  will  is  valid  unless  in  writ- 
ing and  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  other  person  in  his 
presence  and  by  his  direction,  in  such  manner  as  to  make  it  mani- 


4»  Comp.  Laws  Utah  1907,  §1 
2766. 


2731- 


•"■"  Pub. 
2755. 


Stats.  Vt.  1906,  §§  2731- 


999  STATUTES    OF    WILLS  §    939 

fest  that  the  name  is  intended  as  a  signature;  and,  unless  it  be 
wholly  written  by  the  testator,  the  signature  shall  be  made  or 
the  will  acknowledged  by  him  in  the  presence  of  at  least  two  com- 
petent witnesses  present  at  the  same  time,  and  such  witnesses 
shall  subscribe  the  will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator,  but  no 
form  of  attestation  shall  be  necessary.  A  soldier  in  actual  serv- 
ice or  seaman  at  sea  may  dispose  of  personal  estate  as  at  common 
law.  The  will  of  a  person  domiciled  out  of  the  state  at  the  time 
of  his  death  is  valid  as  to  personal  property  in  the  state,  if  exe- 
cuted according  to  the  laws  of  the  place  of  domicil.  Wills  made 
by  either  a  man  or  woman  are  revoked  by  marriage,  except 
where  made  in  exercise  of  a  power  of  appointment.  A  will 
speaks  as  of  the  date  of  testator's  death.  Lapsed  devises  are  in- 
cluded in  the  residuary  devise.  If  a  child  is  born  to  a  testator 
who  had  no  child  living  when  his  will  was  made,  the  will  is  con- 
strued as  if  limited  to  take  effect  in  the  event  the  child  shall  die 
under  the  age  of  twenty-one,  unmarried  without  issue.  After- 
born  or  pretermitted  children  take  as  if  no  will  had  been  made. 
Devisees  and  legatees  are  competent  witnesses,  but  a  bequest  to 
them  is  void,  except  so  far  as  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  absence  of 
a  will.  A  creditor  secured  by  will,  or  an  executor,  is  a  competent 
witness.  Where  a  will  relative  to  estate  within  this  state  has 
been  proved  without  the  same,  an  authenticated  copy  thereof  and 
the  certificate  of  probate  thereof  may  be  offered  for  probate  in 
this  state.  If  valid  as  a  will  of  personalty  where  executed,  it  is 
valid  in  Virginia,  and  if  so  executed  as  to  be  a  valid  will  of 
lands  by  the  law  of  Virginia,  it  may  be  admitted  to  probate  as 
a  will  of  real  estate. ^^ 

§  939.  Washington. — Every  person  having  attained  ma- 
jority (males,  twenty-one  years;  females,  eighteen  years,  or  law- 
fully married  with  consent  of  parents  or  guardian)  may  by  last 
will  dispose  of  all  his  or  her  real  and  personal  estate.  Every 
will  shall  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator  or  some  other  per-, 
son  under  his  direction  in  his  presence,  and  shall  be  attested  by: 
two  or  more  competent  witnesses,  subscribing  their  names  to  the' 
will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator.  Every  person  who  shall  sign 
the  testator's  name  to  any  will  by  his  direction  shall  subscribe  his 
own  name  as  a  witness  to  such  will,  and  state  that  he  subscribed 

51  Pollard's  Va.  Code  1904,  §§  2513-2536. 


§  940 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


1000 


the  testator's  name  at  his  request.  A  subsequent  marriage  re- 
vokes a  will,  unless  the  spouse  is  provided  for.  Children  un- 
provided for  take  as  if  the  testator  had  died  intestate.  A  nuncu- 
pative will  is  not  good  as  to  an  estate  of  value  exceeding  two 
hundred  dollars,  unless  proved  by  two  witnesses  who  were  pres- 
ent at  its  making,  and  unless  the  testator  bid  some  person  present 
to  bear  witness  to  his  will,  and  unless  made  at  the  time  of  the 
testator's  last  sickness  in  his  dwelling  house  or  place  of  residence 
for  ten  days  prior,  unless  he  was  taken  sick  from  home  and  died 
before  return.  Any  soldier  in  service  or  sailor  at  sea  may  dis- 
pose of  wages  or  personal  property  by  will  without  regard  to 
these  provisions.  A  nuncupative  will  must  be  committed  to 
writing  and  offered  for  probate  within  six  months  after  speaking. 
Devises  to  witnesses  are  void  except  as  to  a  share  which  would 
have  descended  to  them  by  law.  A  devise  of  land  conveys  the 
testator's  entire  estate  therein,  unless  it  clearly  appears  other- 
wise. After-acquired  lands  pass  by  will  if  such  was  the  tes- 
tator's intention.  Probated  foreign  wills  are  admitted  to  pro- 
bate on  production  of  a  copy  of  such  will,  and  of  the  original 
probate  record  authenticated  by  the  clerk  of  court,  or  if  there  be 
no  such  ofBcer,  of  the  judge,  where  probation  was  made.  Such 
will  is  carried  into  effect  after  probate  as  a  domestic  will  is. 
Where  it  is  provided  in  the  will  that  the  estate  shall  be  settled 
in  a  manner  provided  in  such  will  and  that  letters  testamentary 
or  of  administration  shall  not  be  required,  and  where  it  also 
duly  appears  to  the  court  by  the  inventory  filed  and  other  proof, 
that  the  estate  is  fully  solvent,  which  fact  may  be  established 
by  an  order  of  the  court  in  the  coming  in  of  the  inventory,  it 
shall  not  be  necessary  to  take  out  letters  testamentary  or  of 
administration,  except  to  admit  to  probate  such  will  and  to  file 
a  true  inventory  of  all  property  of  such  estate  in  the  manner 
required  by  existing  laws.  After  the  probate  of  such  will  and 
the  filing  of  such  inventory  all  such  estates  may  be  managed  and 
settled  without  the  intervention  of  the  court  if  the  will  so  pro- 
vide.^^ 

§  940.     West  Virginia. — Same  as  Virginia.^^ 

§  941.     Wisconsin. — F-very  person  of  the  age  of  twenty- 


52  Rem.   &   Bal.    Code  Wash.    1910, 
1319-1339,  1317,  1631,  1444. 


53  W.  Va.  Code  1916,  pp.  968-973. 


1001  STATUTES  OF  WILLS  §  942 

one  and  any  married  woman  of  the  age  of  eighteen,  of  sound 
mind,  may  make  a  will  of  real  or  personal  property.     After- 
acquired  estate  passes  by  will  if  so  intended.     No  wills  made  in 
the  state  after  January  1,  1896,  except  nuncupative  wills,  shall 
be  effectual  unless  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator,  or  by  some 
person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  and  attested 
and  subscribed  in  the  presence  of  the  testator  by  two  or  more 
competent  witnesses  in  the  presence  of  each  other.    "A  last  will 
and  testament  executed  without  this  state  in  the  mode  prescribed 
by  the  law  either  of  the  place  where  executed  or  of  the  testator's 
domicil  shall  be  deemed  to  be  legally  executed,  and  shall  be  of  the 
same  force  and  effect  as  if  executed  in  the  mode  prescribed  by 
the  laws  of  this  state,  provided  said  last  will  and  testament  is  in 
writing  and  subscribed  by  the  testator,"    Devises  or  gifts  to  wit- 
nesses are  void  unless  they  were  entitled  to  share  in  the  estate 
without  a  will,  or  unless  there  are  sufficient  other  competent  wit- 
nesses.   An  afterborn  child  unprovided  for  and  not  intentionally 
omitted,  or  pretermitted  children  take  as  if  the  testator  had  died 
intestate.    The  issue  of  a  legatee  who  is  a  child  or  relative  and 
dies  before  the  testator,  take  the  parent's  share.     A  nuncupative 
will  where  the  estate  exceeds  one  hundred  fifty  dollars  is  not 
good  unless  proved  l)y  the  oath  of  three  witnesses  present  at  the 
making,  and  some  of  the  persons  present  were  bid  by  the  testator 
to  witness  the  will,  and  unless  made  at  the  time  of  last  sickness, 
in  the  testator's  habitation  or  dwelling  house  unless  he  was  un- 
expectedly taken  sick  and  died  before  return.     Such  will  must 
be  proved  within  six  months  unless  reduced  to  writing  within  six 
days  from  making.     These  provisions  are  not  applicable  to  a 
soldier  in  service  or  mariner  at  sea.     A  duly  authenticated  copy 
of  a  probated  foreign  will  and  of  the  probate  thereof  may  be  re- 
corded in  the  office  of  the  register  of  deeds  of  any  county  in 
which  lands  in  this  state  devised  by  it  are  situated,  and  shall  be 
as  valid  to  pass  title  as  if  proved  in  this  state.^* 

§  942.  Wyoming. — Any  person  of  full  age  and  sound  mind 
may  dispose  by  will  of  all  his  property,  except  what  is  sufficient 
to  pay  his  debts,  or  is  allowed  by  law  to  husband  and  family  or 
wife  and  family.  A  married  woman  may  make  a  will  as  if  sole. 
After-acquired  property  passes  by  will,  if  such  appears  to  have 

s*Wis.  Stats.  1915,  §§  2277-2295. 


§  942 


TITLES    AND   ABSTRACTS 


1002 


been  the  intention.  All  wills  to  be  valid  must  be  in  writing,  or 
typewritten,  witnessed  by  two  competent  witnesses  and  signed 
by  the  testator  or  by  some  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  ex- 
press direction.  No  subscribing  witness  can  derive  any  benefit 
from  a  will  unless  without  the  will  he  would  have  shared  in  the 
estate,  or  there  are  two  other  competent  witnesses.  All  wills 
duly  proved  and  allowed  in  any  other  state  of  the  United  States, 
or  in  any  foreign  country  or  state,  may  l^e  allowed  and  recorded 
in  the  district  court  of  any  county  in  which  the  testator  shall  have 
left  any  estate.  "If,  on  the  hearing,  it  appears  upon  the  face  of 
the  record  that  the  last  will  has  been  proved,  allowed  and  ad- 
mitted to  probate  in  any  other  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any 
foreign  country,  and  that  it  was  executed  according  to  the  law  of 
the  place  in  which  the  same  was  made,  or  in  which  the  testator 
was  at  the  time  domiciled,  or  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  this 
state,  it  must  be  admitted  to  probate,  and  have  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  a  will  first  admitted  to  probate  in  this  state  and 
letters  testamentary  or  of  administration  issued  thereon."  Nun- 
cupative wills  may  be  probated  within  six  months  from  speaking, 
on  petition  and  notice,  as  provided  for  other  wills.  They  must 
have  been  reduced  to  writing  within  thirty  days  from  speaking.^^ 

55Wyo.  Comp.  Stats.  1910,  §§  3911,  5394-5422,  5436,  5437. 


I 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

REGISTRATION  OF  TITLE  UNDER  TORRENS  SYSTEM 
SEC.  SEC. 

950.  Origin  and  adoption  of  Torrens     956.  Notice  and  hearing. 

System.  _  957.  Decree  and  certificate  of  title  and 

951.  Miscellaneous     provisions     com-  incumbrances. 

mon  to  all  statutes.  958.  Conclusiveness  of  certificates. 

952.  Provisions  as  to  which   statutes  959.  Subsequent     dealings     with     the 
vary.  land  appear  on  the  registry. 

953.  Purpose  and  advantages  of  title  960.  Acquiring  title  to  registered  land 
registration.  by  adverse  possession. 

954.  General    principles    of    registra-  961.  Transmission    of    title   on    death 
tion.  of  owner  of  registered  land. 

955.  Procedure  for  registration.  962.  Constitutionality  of  acts. 

§  950.  Origin  and  adoption  of  Torrens  System. — The 
system  of  judicial  registration  of  land  titles  commonly  known 
as  the  Torrens  System  was  formulated  by  Sir  Robert  Torrens, 
an  Irish  emigrant  to  Australia,  where  the  system  was  first 
adopted  in  1857.  It  is  frequently  said  that  the  system  was  orig- 
inated by  Torrens,  but  records,  showing  systems  of  registration 
of  title  to  lands  in  portions  of  Europe,  are  extant,  dating  back 
as  far  as  1836,  and  there  is  nothing  new  about  the  fundamental 
principles  involved.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  the  registration 
system,  as  applied  in  England  and  generally  throughout  British 
dependencies,  is  the  result  of  the  work  of  Torrens.  His  idea  was 
to  apply  the  principles  of  registration  of  ownership  in  ships  to 
registration  in  titles  to  land — that  is,  to  have  land  ownership 
conclusively  evidenced  by  certificate  and  thereby  made  determin- 
able and  trans ferrable  quickly,  cheaply,  and  safely. 

The  Torrens  law,  as  originally  drawn,  has  been  greatly  modi- 
fied in  the  statutes  enacted  in  the  United  States,  yet  the  salient 
features  of  registration  have  been  retained  and  the  law  is  usually 
referred  to  as  the  Torrens  law  wherever  a  statute  providing  for 
the  registration  of  land  has  been  enacted  in  this  country.  Acts 
embodying  the  basic  principles  of  title  registration  by  certificate 
have  been  passed  in  nineteen  states  of  the  United  States,  in 
Hawaii,  the  Philippine  Islands,  Guam  and  Porto  Rico.  The  states 

1003 


S    951  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  1004 


in  which  land  title  registration  acts  exist  and  the  year  of  their 
passage  are  as  follows:  Illinois,  1897;  California,  1897;  Massa- 
chusetts, 1898;  Minnesota,  1901 ;  Oregon,  1901 ;  Colorado,  1903 
Washington,  1907;  New  York,  1908;  North  Carolina,  1913 
Mississippi,  1913;  Ohio,  1913;  Nebraska,  1915;  Virginia,  1916 
South  Carolina,  1916;  Georgia,  1917;  Tennessee,  1917;  North 
Dakota,  1917;  South  Dakota,  1917;  and  Utah,  1917.  While  the 
principles  involved  in  the  acts  of  the  several  states  and  islands 
are  the  same  and  the  objects  to  be  accomplished  by  them  are 
identical,  such  acts  differ  widely  in  many  respects.  Some  such 
differences  are  due,  of  course,  to  the  necessity  of  conforming 
t6  existing  state  laws  of  procedure  or  to  the  planning  of  or  dis- 
tribution of  judicial  and  ministerial  duties,  and  do  not  go  to  the 
merits  of  the  system  as  such  or  its  success  in  operation.  There 
are  other  matters,  however,  as  to  which  dift'erences  exist,  which 
are  more  important. 

§  951.     Miscellaneous  provisions  common  to  all  statutes. 

— Among  the  provisions  common  to  all  the  acts  are:  1.  A  non- 
resident applicant  shall  appoint  a  resident  agent  upon  w'hom 
process  and  notice  shall  be  served.  2.  Any  number  of  adjoining 
parcels  of  land  in  the  same  county  and  owned  by  the  same  per- 
sons and  in  the  same  right,  or  any  number  of  parcels  in  the  same 
county  having  the  same  chain  of  title  and  belonging  to  the  same 
person,  may  be  included  in  the  one  application.  3.  Registered 
lands  shall  be  subject  to  the  same  rights  and  burdens,  may  be 
dealt  with  by  the  owner  and  shall  be  subject  to  jurisdiction  of 
the  courts  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  had  not  been  registered, 
but  no  voluntary  or  involuntary  transactions  shall  affect  title 
until  registered.  4.  No  title  to  registered  land  in  derogation 
of  that  of  the  registered  owner  shall  be  acquired  by  prescription 
or  adverse  possession,  except  under  the  act  of  Nebraska,  in  which 
no  such  exemption  exists.  5.  An  owner  of  registered  land  may 
convey,  mortgage,  lease,  charge,  or  otherwise  deal  with  the  same 
as  fully  as  if  it  had  not  been  registered.  He  may  use  any  form 
of  deed,  mortgage,  lease,  or  other  voluntary  instrument  sufficient 
in  law  for  the  purpose  intended.  6.  Every  voluntary  or  invol- 
untary transaction,  which,  if  recorded,  filed,  or  entered  in  any 
clerk's  office,  would  affect  unregistered  land,  shall,  if  duly  regis- 
tered in  the  office  of  the  proper  registrar,  and  not  otherwise,  be 


1005  TORRENS    SYSTEM  §    952 

notice  to  all  persons  from  the  time  of  such  registration,  and  op- 
erate in  accordance  with  law  and  with  the  provisions  of  the  act 
upon  any  registered  land  in  the  county  or  city  of  such  registrar 
to  which  it  relates. 

§  952.  Provisions  as  to  which  statutes  vary. — It  is  not 
to  be  understood  that  the  procedure  is  uniform  in  all  states;  on 
the  contrary  it  can  not  be  said  that  the  procedure  in  any  one  of 
the  successive  steps,  from  the  form  in  which  the  proceeding  is 
instituted  until  the  final  decree,  is  identical  in  all  the  acts.  The 
general  plan,  however,  is  present  in  .all.  Matters  more  or  less 
substantial  as  to  which  the  several  acts  differ  are  embraced  in  a 
consideration  of  the  following  questions : 

1.  Should  a  proceeding  to  register  title  be  maintainable  by 
persons  claiming  to  own  the  equitable  estate  as  well  as  those 
claiming  to  own  the  legal  estate  in  land  ?  In  Massachusetts  and 
New  York  owners  of  the  legal  estate  only  may  maintain  a  pro- 
ceeding to  register  title.  Illinois,  California,  and  perhaps  other 
states  expressly  or  impliedly  provide  that  the  owner  of  the  legal 
or  equitable  estate  may  maintain  the  proceeding. 

2.  Should  persons  out  of  possession  before  claiming  to  be 
owners  of  land  in  fee  simple  be  permitted  to  apply  to  register 
title?  The  acts  of  Massachusetts  and  New  York  limit  the  right 
to  owners  in  possession  only,  but  the  acts  in  all  other  states  con- 
fer the  right  upon  all  owners  in  fee  simple,  whether  in  possession 
or  not. 

3.  Should  the  application  be  made  in  the  form  of  petition  or 
complaint?  In  New  York  the  proceeding  is  instituted  by  a  com- 
plaint, whereas  in  all  other  states  a  petition  is  required  as  is  done 
in  the  oritjinal  and  other  Torrens  laws  in  Australia  and  all  other 
British  dependencies. 

4.  Should  all  applicants  be  required  to  file  an  abstract  of 
title?  The  Minnesota  act  requires  the  filing  of  an  abstract  of 
title,  satisfactory  to  the  title  examiners;  and  a  like  provision  is 
found  in  the  acts  of  Washington,  California,  Colorado,  Missis- 
sippi, North  Carolina,  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  The  Illinois 
act  commits  an  examiner  to  an  exercise  of  discretion  as  to  the 
means  to  be  employed  by  him  in  examining  the  title. 

5.  Is  provision  for  trial  by  jury  necessary?  The  Massachu- 
setts act  requires  that  the  cause  be  tried  by  jury  upon  motion  of 


§  953 


TITLES    AXD    ABSTRACTS 


1006 


either  party;  likewise  in  New  York,  California,  Georgia,  Missis- 
sippi, Virginia,  South  Carolina  and  North  Carolina.  In  Minne- 
sota the  act  contains  no  provision  for  trial  by  jury,  and  it  is 
held  that  there  is  no  constitutional  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  in 
such  a  proceeding,  since  it  is  a  proceeding  in  equity  of  the  nature 
of  a  suit  to  quiet  title/ 

Colorado,  Illinois,  Nebraska,  Ohio,  Oregon  and  Washington 
follow  Minnesota  in  this  regard. 

6.  Is  notice  served  by  mail  only  sufficient?  The  Massachu- 
setts act  provides  that  notice  may  be  served  by  mail,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  of  that  state  has  held  that  such  notice  is  suffi- 
cient." 

The  acts  of  all  other  states  require  service  to  be  made  in  the 
manner  provided  to  apply  in  suits  of  a  similar  character,  that  is, 
by  messenger. 

7.  Should  posting  upon  the  land  be  required?  The  acts  of 
Minnesota,  California,  Colorado,  Illinois  and  Washington  do  not 
require  posting  notice  of  the  proceeding  upon  the  land;  the  acts 
of  other  states  require  such  posting. 

8.  Should  it  be  provided  that  title  once  registered  should  for- 
ever remain  registered?  All  statutes  excepting  those  in  Nebraska 
and  Georgia  provide  that  a  title  once  registered  shall  forever 
remain  registered.  In  the  two  states  named  land  may  be  with- 
drawn from  registration  at  any  time  by  the  owner. 

§  953.  Purpose  and  advantages  of  title  registration. — 
Torrens  stated  that  the  purposes  of  the  law  which  he  advocated 
are  "to  simplify,  quicken,  and  cheaj^en  the  transfer  of  real  estate 
and  to  render  titles  safe  and  indefeasible."  These  objects,  he 
planned,  should  be  accomplished  by  means  of  registration  of  title 
and  the  use  of  certificates  which  conclusively  show  the  state  of 
the  title  at  all  times;  the  effect  of  such  registration  being  to 
make  a  certificate  of  title  issued  by  the  official  designated  in  the 
statute  conclusive  as  to  the  character  of  the  title  of  the  person 
to  whom  it  is  issued,  and  as  to  all  the  rights,  liens  and  incum- 
brances of  other  persons,  in  connection  with  the  title.  The  ob- 
jects of  the  system  are  the  creation  of  an  indefeasible  title  in  the 
registered  owner,  simplification  in  the  transfer  of  land,  certainty 


1  Peters  v.  Duluth,  119  Minn.  96, 
137  N.  W.  390,  41  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.) 
1044n. 


2  Tyler  v.  Judges.  175  Mass.  71,  55 
N.  E.  812,  51  L.  R.  A.  433. 


1007  TORRENS    SYSTEM  §    954 

and  facility  in  the  proof  of  title  by  reference  to  a  certificate  is- 
sued by  a  government  official  made  conclusive  by  law  and  finally 
the  saving  to  the  community  of  the  cost  of  a  new  examination 
of  title  in  connection  with  each  transfer  or  transaction  affecting 
the  land. 

Among  the  advantages  claimed  for  the  system  of  registering 
the  title  itself,  upon  consummation  of  each  transaction,  over  the 
prevailing  system  of  recording  instruments  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  notice  and  perpetuating  evidence  of  title,  are  the  follow- 
ing-: 1.  It  substitutes  an  official  adjudication  of  titles  for  an 
unofficial  examination  and  gives  greater  certainty.  2.  It  provides 
for  insurance  against  loss  by  a  registered  owner  from  any  cause 
except  fraud  to  which  such  owner  has  been  a  party.  3.  It  avoids 
the  necessity  of  repeated  examinations  of  the  same  title,  thus 
cheapening  the  cost  of  transfer.  4.  It  obviates  the  necessity  of 
going  back  to  the  registry,  since,  it  is  claimed,  each  certificate 
is  conclusive,  it  being  made  possible  thereby  to  effect  loans  and 
transfers  with  ease  and  expedition.  5.  It  renders  real  estate  assets 
more  available,  thereby  causing  them  to  become  more  useful  and 
valuable.  6.  Its  advantages  are  effected  without  sacrifice  of  any 
advantage  which  the  prevailing  system  offers  and  with  stability 
of  title  and  the  utmost  security  to  incumbrancers.  7.  It  provides 
against  the  time  when  the  records  of  transactions  affecting  land 
titles  under  a  continuance  of  the  prevailing  custom  will  have  be- 
come so  voluminous  as  to  make  the  cost  of  determxination  of  title 
prohibitive  in  real  estate  mortgages  of  small  amounts.  8.  And 
it  will  aim  to  correct  a  prevailing  condition  under  which  the  pub- 
lic records  affecting  titles  to  land  are,  without  regulation,  coming 
into  private  control  for  all  practical  purposes. 

§  954.  General  principles  of  registration. — The  details 
of  American  statutes  vary,  but  the  underlying  principles  are  the 
same.  The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Torrens  System  is  the 
registration  of  the  title  itself  instead  of  the  evidence  of  title.^  It 
provides  not  merely  for  the  recording  of  deeds  or  instruments 
affecting  the  title,  but  for  an  official  registration,  under  .which 
the  title  to  the  land  passes  by  entry  of  the  transfer,  and  'not  by 
the  execution  and  delivery  of  the  deed.     It  is  intended  that  the 

3  State  V.  Westfall,  85   Minn.  437,     89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A.  297,  89  Am. 

St.  571. 


§  955 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


1008 


register  shall  show  the  exact  condition  of  the  title  to  real  prop- 
erty upon  a  single  page  or  folio,  and  all  dealings  with  the  land 
must  be  entered  thereon.  Registration  under  the  Torrens  Sys- 
tem is  a  purely  voluntary  act  on  the  part  of  the  applicant,*  and 
he  may  withdraw  his  application  at  any  time  before  the  final 
decree.*^  A  formal  document,  called  a  certificate  of  title,  is  is- 
sued after  a  judicial  proceeding  in  the  nature  of  a  suit  to  quiet 
title  and  all  subsequent  transactions  affecting  the  title  are  noted 
on  this  certificate  or  on  a  new  one  substituted  therefor.  In  the 
law  of  each  of  the  states  a  decree  entered  in  pursuance  of  such 
a  proceeding  becomes  the  foundation  title,  and  upon  the  strength 
of  such  decree  a  title  is  entered  in  a  book  designated  "Register 
of  Titles,"  kept  by  an  official  called  a  registrar. 

§  955.  Procedure  for  registration. — In  order  to  meet  the 
constitutional  requirements  of  due  process  of  law,  and  to  estab- 
lish a  starting  point  binding  upon  all  the  world,  the  initial  regis- 
tration of  a  title,  upon  which  the  certificate  is  issued,  must  be 
the  result  of  judicial  proceedings.^  There  must  be  notice  to  all 
having  interests  adverse  to  those  of  the  applicant  for  registra- 
tion; and  only  judicial  officers  may  exercise  judicial  functions, 
whether  as  to  the  initial  registration  or  subsequent  transactions 
concerning  the  title.  The  statutes  usually  provide  all  details  of 
procedure  for  registration.^ 

Ordinarily  the  first  step  under  the  acts  is  a  written  application 
for  registration  by  the  person  claiming  ownership  of  the  land 
in  fee  simple,  fully  describing  the  land  and  showing  the  source 
of  title  and  the  existence  of  adverse  claims,  liens  and  incum- 
brances.^    Several  lots  of  land  included  in  one  application  must 


•*  Tyler  v.  Judges,  175  Mass.  71,  55 
N.  E.  812,  51  L.  R.  A.  433. 

•''  McQuestcn  v.  Commcnwealth, 
198  Mass.  172.  83  N.  E.  1037 ;  Foss  v. 
Atkins.  204  Mass.  i?,7,  90  N.  E.  578. 

«  State  V.  Westfall,  85   Minn.  437, 

89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A.  297,  89  Am. 
St.  571.  But  see  Loewenstein  v. 
Page,  16  Philippine  84. 

">  Robinson  v.  Kerrigan,  151  Cal.  40. 

90  Pac.  129,  121  Am.  St.  90,  12  -Ann. 
Cas.  829;  People  v.  Crissman,  41 
Colo.  450,  92  Pac.  949;  People  v.  Si- 
mon, 176  111.  165.  52  N.  E.  910,  44  L. 
R.  A.  801,  68  Am.  St.  175;  Tyler  v. 
Judges,  175  Mass.  71,  55  N.  E.  812,  51 


L.  R.  A.  433 :  McQuesten  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 198  Mass.  172,  83  N.  E. 
1037 ;  State  v.  Westfall,  85  Minn.  437. 

89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A.  297,  89  Am. 
St.  571;  Kuby  v.  Ryder,  114  Minn. 
217,  130  N.  W.  1100._ 

8  Robinson  v.  Kerrigan,  151  Cal.  40, 

90  Pr.c.  129,  121  Am.  St.  90,  12  Ann. 
Cas.  829 ;  People  v.  Crissman,  41 
Colo.  450,  92  Pac.  949;  Tyler  v. 
Judges,  175  Mass.  71.  55  N.  E.  812. 
51  L.  R.  A.  433 ;  State  v.  Westfall,  85 
Minn.  437,  89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A. 
297,  89  Am.  St.  571 ;  Baart  v.  Martin. 
99  Minn.  197,  108  N.  W.  945,  116 
Am.  St.  394;  Duffy  v.  Shirden,  139 


1009 


TORRENS    SYSTEM 


956 


be  contiguous  or  be  related  by  chain  of  title.^  The  application 
is  signed  and  sworn  to  by  the  appHcant  and  addressed  to  the 
court  having  jurisdiction  under  the  statute.  In  Ilhnois  the  ap- 
plication is  addressed  to  the  judges  of  the  circuit  court  for  the 
county  in  chancery.  In  Massachusetts  it  is  addressed  to  the 
court  of  land  registration,  a  court  specially  constituted  by  the 
registration  act  with  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  such  applications. 
In  Colorado  and  Minnesota  it  is  made  to  the  district  court  of 
the  county  in  which  the  land  is  situated. 

Upon  the  filing  of  the  application  it  is  referred  to  the  official 
examiners  of  titles,  who  make  a  thorough  examination  and  re- 
port to  the  court."  Under  the  Massachusetts  statute  the  exam- 
iner deals  with  the  application,  merely  as  a  conveyancer  at  com- 
mon law  examining  a  title;"  but  under  the  Illinois  statute  the 
examiner  is  analogous  to  a  master  in  chancery.^^  The  ordinary 
rules  of  evidence,  and  objection  thereto,  apply."  Ex  parte  ex- 
aminations of  abstracts  are  improper.^*  Objections  to  the  re- 
port of  the  examiner,  in  the  nature  of  a  special  demurrer,  may 
be  filed,  and  should  specily  the  grounds  therefor  with  clearness 
and  certainty."  The  court,  however,  may  require  further  proof 
to  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties,  and  is  not  bound  by  the 
opinion  of  the  examiner." 

§  956.  Notice  and  hearing. — The  next  step  is  the  service 
of  personal  process,  or  notice  by  publication,  upon  all  persons 
interested  in  the  property,"  and  any  one  claiming  an  interest  in 


App.  Div.  755,  124  N.  Y.  S.  529; 
Lachman  v.  People,  127  N.  Y.  S.  912. 

9  Culver  V.  Waters,  248  111.  163,  93 
N.  E.  747. 

^0  People  V.  Crissman,  41  Colo.  450, 
92  Pac.  949 ;  Glos  v.  Holberg,  220  111. 
167,  n  N.  E.  80;  Tyler  v.  Judges, 
175  Mass.  71,  55  N.  E.  812,  51  L.^  R. 
A.  433 ;  McQuesten  v.  Common- 
wealth, 198  Mass.  172,  83  N.  E.  1037; 
State  V.  Westfall,  85  Minn.  437,  89  N. 
\V.  175,  57  L.  R.  A.  297,  89  Am.  St. 
571 ;  Dewev  v.  Kimball,  89  Minn.  454, 
95  N.  W.  317,  895,  96  N.  W.  704. 

11  McQuesten  v.  Commonwealth, 
198  Mass.  172.  83  N.  E.  1037. 

1-  Gage  V.  Consumers'  Elec.  Light 
Co.,  194  111.  30,  64  N.  E.  653 ;  Glos  v. 
Holberg,  220  111.  167,  11  N.  E.  80. 

12  Glos  V.  Cessna,  207  111.  69,  69  N. 

64 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


E.  634;  Glos  v.  Holberg.  220  111.  167. 
11  N.  E.  80;  Glos  v.  Grant  Bldg.  &c. 
Assn..  229  111.  387,  82  N.  E.  304. 

"Glos  V.  Holberg,  220  III.  167,  11 
.N.    E.   80;    Glos   v.   Grant   Bldg.   &c. 
Assn.,  229  111.  387,  82  N.  E.  304. 

15  Glos  V.  Hoban,  212  111.  222.  72 
N.  E.  1. 

16  People  V.  Crissman.  41  Colo.  450. 
92  Pac.  949;  Duffy  v.  Shirden.  139 
App.  Div.  755.  124  N.  Y.  S.  529. 

1"  Robinson  v.  Kerrigan,  151  Cal. 
40,  90  Pac.  129,  121  Am.  St.  90,  12 
Ann.  Cas.  829;  People  v.  Crissman. 
41  Colo.  450.  92  Pac.  949;  Tvler  v. 
Judges,  175  Mass.  71,  55  N.  E.  812.  51 
L.  R.  K  433;  State  v.  Westfall,  85 
Minn.  437,  89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A. 
297,  89  Am.  St.  571 ;  Reed  v.  Siddall. 
89  Minn.  417,  95  N.  W.  303;  Dewey 


§  957 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


1010 


or  lien  upon  the  propert}^  may  appear  and  answer,  whether  named 
in  the  summons  or  not.^®  All  persons  known  to  claim  an  in- 
terest in  or  lien  upon  the  property  must  be  made  defendants,^'"* 
but  persons  unknown  who  have  such  interests  may  be  included 
under  a  general  designation. '°  After  due  notice  to  all  parties, 
the  court  orders  and  determines  all  transfers  in  regard  to  the 
property,  and  the  existence  and  validity  of  all  claims,  liens  and 
incumbrances.^^  The  court  may  determine  the  existence  and 
priority  of  conflicting  liens,  but  a  lien  can  not  be  foreclosed  in 
a  proceeding  to  register  title. ^" 

§  957.     Decree  and  certificate  of  title  and  incumbrances. 

— If  the  applicant  for  registration  establishes  a  title  entitled  to 
registration,  a  decree  is  entered  to  that  effect  and  the  claims  of 
defendants  are  set  aside  as  mere  clouds  upon  his  title.  If  the 
applicant  fails  to  prove  a  title,  entitled  to  registration,  the  pro- 
ceedings are  dismissed  and  no  decree  is  entered  against  the  ad- 
verse claimants. ^^ 

The  statutes  usually  provide  for  an  appeal  from  the  decree, 
as  in  other  civil  actions,"*  and  only  questions  raised  by  objection 
and  exception  before  the  examiner  or  the  lower  court  can  be 
urged  on  appeal."^     In  Massachusetts  the  appeal  is  taken  from 

Minn.  437,  89  N.  W.  175.  57  L.  R.  A. 
297,  89  Am.  St.  571. 

21  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Woburn,  192 
Mass.  220,  78  N.  E.  307 ;  Reed  v.  Sid- 
dall,  94  Minn.  216,  102  N.  W.  453; 
Cral)1)e  v.  Hardy,  11  Misc.  1,  135  N. 
Y.  S.  119;  Barkenthien  v.  People,  11 
Alisc.  395,  136  N.  Y.  S.  178. 

22  Reed  v.  Siddall,  94  Minn.  216, 
102  N.  W.  453. 

23Glos  V.  Kingman.  207  111.  26,  69 
N.  E.  632 ;  Glos  v.  Cessna,  207  111.  69. 
69  N.  E.  634 ;  Magsocay  v.  Fernando, 
17  Pliilippine  120. 

2-*  Robinson  v.  Kerrigan,  151  Cal. 
40.  90  Pac.  129.  121  Am.  St.  90,  12 
Ann.  Cas.  829 ;  Luce  v.  Parsons.  192 
Mass.  8,  11  N.  E.  1032;  State  v. 
Westfall,  85  Minn.  437,  89  N.  W.  175. 
57  L.  R.  A.  297.  89  Am.  St.  571  ;  Pe- 
ters V.  Duluth,  119  Minn.  96,  137  N. 
W.  390,  41  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  1044n  ; 
People  V.  O'Loughlin.  136  N.  Y.  S. 
339 ;  Lewis  v.  Chamberlain.  61  Ore. 
150.  121  Pac.  430. 

-■'  McMahon  v.  Rowley,  238  111.  31, 
87  N.  E.  66. 


V.  Kimball,  89  Minn.  454,  95  N.  W. 
317,  895.  96  N.  W.  704;  Baart  v 
Martin.  99  Minn.  197.  108  N.  W.  945, 
116  Am.  St.  394;  Lachman  v.  People, 
127  N.  Y.  S.  912. 

1®  People  V.  Crissman,  41  Colo.  450. 
92  Pac.  949;  State  v.  Westfall.  85 
Minn.  437.  89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A. 
297,  89  Am.  St.  571  ;  Hawes  v.  United 
States  Trust  Co.,  142  App.  Div.  789 
127  N.  Y.  S.  632 ;  Sundermann  v. 
People,  143  App.  Div.  124,  132  X.  Y. 
S.  68. 

1''  Dewey  v.  Kimball.  89  Minn.  454, 
95  N.  W.  317.  895,  96  N.  W.  704; 
Baart  v.  Martin,  99  Minn.  197.  108  N. 
W.  945,  116  Am.  St.  394;  Duffy  v. 
Shirden,  139  App.  Div.  755,  124  N. 
Y.  S.  529;  Hawes  v.  United  States 
Trust  Co..  142  App.  Div.  789,  127  N. 
^  .  S.  632 ;  Sundermann  v.  People, 
148  App.  Div.  124,  132  N.  Y._S.  68. 

2"  People  V.  Crissman,  41  v„olo.  450, 
92  Pac.  949;  People  v.  Simon  176  111. 
165,  52  N.  E.  910,  44  L.  R.  A.  801,  68 
Am.    St.   175;    State   v.    Westfall,   85 


1011  TORRENS  SYSTEM  §  957 

the  land  court  to  the  superior  court  with  the  right  to  claim  a 
jury,  or  to  the  supreme  judicial  court  upon  questions  of  law.^^ 

When  the  decree  for  registration  has  been  entered  and  the 
record  duly  made,  the  certificate  is  issued,  completing  the  reg- 
istry,^^  and  although  the  original  registration  was  voluntary,  the 
proceedings  for  registration  constitute  an  agreement  running 
with  the  land  that  it  shall  remain  registered  land  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  statute. ^^ 

The  certificate  of  title  is  held  conclusive  that  no  outstanding 
interest  or  incumbrances  exist  in  other  persons,  with  certain  ex- 
ceptions specified  in  the  statutes  such  as  liens  for  taxes,  short 
term  leases  and  certain  easements,  ascertained  by  inspection  of 
the  premises. ^^  All  other  existing  liens  and  incumbrances,  equi- 
table or  statutory,  are  noted  upon  the  record  and  the  certificate, 
and  the  holder  thereof  acquires  an  indefeasible  title  to  the  prop- 
erty, free  from  all  incumbrances  except  those  so  noted.^** 

The  statutes  usually  provide  a  short  period  within  which  per- 
sons having  an  adverse  claim  or  lien  upon  the  property,  who 
were  not  served  with  process,  may  come  in  and  assert  their 
claims,^^  and  contain  special  exceptions  in  regard  to  fraud.^" 

Where  a  conveyance  is  executed,  a  new  certificate  is  generally 
issued  to  the  grantee,  the  deed  being  considered  merely  as  a 
contract  between  the  parties  conferring  authority  for  the  trans- 
fer of  the  registered  title  to  the  grantee.^^ 

An  indemnity  fund  provided  by  the  statute  is  raised  by  a  fee 
for  registration  based  upon  the  assessed  value  of  the  property,^* 
and  set  aside  for  compensation  of  parties  having  an  interest  or 
lien  against  the  property,  whose  rights  have  been  cut  off  by  the 
decree  without  their  fault. ^'^ 

26  Tyler  v.  Judges,  175  Mass.  71,  55  •''i  Robinson  v.  Kerrigan,  151  Cal. 
N.  E.  812,  51  L.  R.  A.  433 ;  Weeks  v.  40,  90  Pac.  129,  121  Am.  St.  90,  12 
Brooks,  205  Mass.  458,  92  N.  E.  45.  Ann.   Cas.   829 ;    Reed   v.    Siddall,   89 

27  Robinson   v.    Kerrigan,    151    Cal.  Minn.  417,  95  N.  W.  303. 

40,  90   Pac.   129,   121   Am.    St.  90,   12  «^  Baart   v.    Martin,    99    Minn.    198, 

Ann.  Cas.  829.  108  N.  W.  945,  116  Am.  St.  394. 

28  Tyler  v.  Judges,  175  Mass.  71,  55  "-^  Buzon  v.  Licauco,  13  Philippine 
N.  E.  812,  51  L.  R.  A.  433.  354. 

29Baart   v.    Martin,   99   Minn.    197,  34  State  v.  Westfall,  85  Minn.  437, 

108  N.  W.  945,  116  Am.  St.  394.  89  N.   W.   175,  57  L.  R.  A.  297,  89 

30  Robinson    v.    Kerrigan,    151    Cal.  Am.  St.  571. 

40,  90  Pac.   129,   121   Am.   St.   90.   12  ■'-  People  v.  Simon,  176  111.  165,  52 

Ann.  Cas.  829 ;  State  v.  Westfall,  85  N.  E.  910,  44  L.  R.  A.  801,  68  Am.  St. 

Minn.  437,  89  N.  W.  175,  57  L.  R.  A.  175. 
297,  89  Am.  St.  571. 


§    958  TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS  1012 

§  958.  Conclusiveness  of  certificates. — In  all  states  the 
statutory  proceeding  leading  to  initial  registration  seems  clearly 
sufficient  to  support  a  decree  which  becomes  conclusive  against 
the  whole  world  upon  expiration  of  the  time  within  which  an 
appeal  may  be  taken,  provided  the  statute  has  l^een  followed. 
It  does  not  result,  however,  that  such  decrees  or  certificates  based 
upon  them  may  be  accepted  as  conclusive,  for  conclusiveness  de- 
pends upon  whether  in  the  proceeding  the  statute  has  been  fol- 
lowed. In  the  event  of  a  failure  to  follow  the  statute  in  respect 
to  a  jurisdictional  requirement  or  to  serve  with  process  all  parties 
entitled  to  actual  notice,  the  authorities  show  that  such  a  decree 
would  not  be  conclusive,  notwithstanding  the  acts  provide  that 
it  shall  be  so;  hence  the  registry  of  such  decree  can  not  imme- 
diately be  accepted  as  conclusive  of  the  state  of  the  title  or  at 
all  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  of  limitations,  running  for  a  rea- 
sonable length  of  time  after  entry  of  the  decree  of  registration. 
Such  statutes  of  limitations  are  provided  in  a  majority  of  the 
states  and  range  in  duration  from  thirty  days  to  two  years.  But 
it  is  most  doubtful  whether  the  time  required  from  the  filing  of 
the  petition  for  registration  to  obtaining  a  conclusive  decree  can 
l>e  made  shorter  than  the  time  provided  in  these  acts.  Since  the 
registration  system  contemplates  no  examination  of  records,  and 
certificates  do  not  disclose  through  what  proceedings  the  title 
has  passed  or  in  what  manner  it  has  devolved,  thereby  affording 
no  opportunity  to  discover  irregularities,  whether  in  judicial  pro- 
ceedings or  construction  of  deeds,  trust  instruments  or  other 
writings,  it  follows  that  no  certificate  involving  transactions 
subsequent  to  the  original  registration  can  be  accepted  as  im- 
mediately conclusive,  or  at  all  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  of  lim- 
itations running  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time  after  entry  of 
such  subsequent  transactions.  In  a  bulletin  recently  issued  by 
the  Federal  Farm  Loan  Bureau  the  subject  of  land  title  regis- 
tration by  certificate  is  ably  discussed,  and  valuable  suggestions 
are  made  for  simplifying  the  Torrens  System  and  adapting  it  to 
constitutional  requirements,  along  lines  approved  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  decisions. 

§  959.  Subsequent  dealings  v^^ith  the  land  appear  on  the 
registry. — The  acts  uniformly  provide  that  the  obtaining  of 
a  decree  of  registration  and  the  entry  of  the  certificate  of  title 


1013  TORRENS    SYSTEM  §    960 

shall  be  recorded  as  an  agreement  running  with  the  land,  and 
binding  upon  the  applicant  and  all  his  successors  in  title,  that 
the  land  shall  be  and  always  remain  registered  land,  and  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  act  and  all  amendments  thereof.  An 
owner  of  registered  land  may  convey  or  mortgage  or  lease  it 
as  if  it  were  not  registered,  and  he  may  use  for  these  purposes 
the  same  forms  of  instruments  that  he  w.ould  use  had  his  land  not 
been  registered;  but  none  of  these  instruments  (except  a  lease 
for  a  short  term)  shall  take  effect  as  conveyances,  but  shall  op- 
erate only  as  a  contract  between  the  parties  and  as  evidence  of 
authority  to  the  recorder  to  make  registration,  when  accompa- 
nied by  the  owner's  certificate  of  title.  This  certificate  on  a 
conveyance  of  an  estate  in  fee  is  surrendered  and  canceled, 
though  not  necessarily  always  so  when  a  lesser  estate  is  con- 
veyed. The  act  of  registration  is  the  operative  act  to  convey 
or  effect  a  title,  not  the  delivery  of  the  deed,  as  is  now  the  case. 
These  features  are  all  important  and  are  essential  to  the  proper 
working  of  the  system.  The  subsequent  dealing  with  the  land 
in  this  way  is  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  upon  which 
registration  of  title  is  based.  Provision  is  made  in  the  acts  for 
notification  to  the  recorder  by  the  owner  of  loss  or  theft  of  his 
certificate,  and  for  the  issuance  of  a  certificate  in  place  of  the 
one  lost,  on  proper  proof, 

§  960.  Acquiring  title  to  registered  land  by  adverse  pos- 
session.— In  adherence  to  the  principle  that  title  shall  be 
acquired  to  registered  land  only  through  the  transfer  on  the 
books,  is  a  provision  of  each  act  relating  to  adverse  possession : 
that  no  title  to  registered  land  in  derogation  to  that  of  the  reg- 
istered owner  shall  be  acquired  by  prescription  or  adverse  pos- 
session. Mere  possession,  therefore,  becomes  no  notice  of  rights, 
and  all  rights  appear  as  entered  on  the  original  certificate  of 
title.     No  adverse  possession  can  ever  ripen  into  title. 

This  feature  is  considered  by  the  advocates  of  the  system  as 
one  of  the  most  admirable  features — for,  they  say,  the  more 
wrongful  the  "squatter's"  acts  are  in  gaining  and  keeping  pos- 
session, the  more  sure  he  is  to  acquire  the  title  in  fee  simple  under 
our  present  recording  system.  Its  opponents,  on  the  other  hand, 
argue  that  title  by  limitation  of  time  is  a  most  reasonable  and 
proper  basis  of  ownership,  and  that  a  law  which  abolishes  it  is 


§  961 


TITLES    AND    ABSTRACTS 


1014 


opposed  to  the  l>est  interests  of  society.  That  when  we  surrender 
our  present  recording  system  we  surrender  the  right  to  acquire 
and  perfect  title  by  adverse  possession,  of  such  proved  vakie  in 
giving  security  to  titles  and  in  doing  justice  to  those  who  have 
improved  and  developed  the  land. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  provisions  of  these  acts  will  work 
a  radical  change  in  the  law  in  this  respect,  and  if  all  land  should 
be  registered  the  owners  might  remain  out  of  possession  and 
leave  the  land  unimproved  for  any  length  of  time,  without  the 
possibility  of  any  one's  acquiring  the  title.  Statutes  of  limita- 
tion have  been  said  to  rest  on  the  policy  of  compelling  those  who 
have  the  right  of  entry  to  take  possession  of  the  land  and  settle 
the  country,  at  the  peril  of  being  ousted  by  those  who  will  settle 
the  land  and  improve  the  country.^''  This  provision  of  these 
acts,  therefore,  not  only  makes  a  radical  change  in  our  present 
law,  but  opens  up  an  important  question  of  public  policy. 

§  961.  Transmission  of  title  on  death  of  owner  of  regis- 
tered land. — Under  our  present  recording  system  certain  dif- 
ficulties arise  when  title  to  real  property  is  transmitted  on  the 
death  of  the  owner  in  fee.  Uncertainty  and  doubt  must  exist 
in  many  cases  because  of  the  difficulties  of  ascertaining  who  are 
the  successors  to  the  title.  Many  difficulties  would  be  removed 
by  letting  the  property  pass  at  the  owner's  death  to  his  executor 
or  administrator,  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  manner  in  which  per- 
sonal estate  is  dealt  with  under  such  circumstances. 

Under  the  Illinois  Torrens  Law,  and  perhaps  some  others, 
provision  is  made  that  in  case  of  the  death  of  the  owner  of  reg- 
istered land  the  title  thereto  goes  to  the  personal  representative 
of  such  deceased  owner  in  like  manner  as  personal  estate,  whether 
the  owner  dies  testate  or  intestate,  and  is  subject  to  the  same 
rules  of  administration  as  if  the  same  were  personalty,  except 
that  the  rule  of  division  shall  be  the  same  as  in  the  descent  of 
real  property,  or  as  shall  be  provided  by  will ;  and  the  acts  usually 
provide  for  filing  in  the  registration  office  proof  of  heirship  be- 
fore the  distribution  of  undevised  registered  land,  which  shall 
be  conclusive  evidence  in  favor  of  all  persons  subsequently  deal- 
ing with  the  land  that  certain  persons  named  as  the  only  heirs 
at  law  of  the  deceased  owner  are  such  heirs.     That  is,  the  ex- 


3"  Kinney  v.  Vinson,  32  Tex.  125. 


1015  TORRENS    SYSTEM  §    962 

ecutor  or  administrator  will  be  registered  on  production  of  evi- 
dence of  his  authority,  and  the  rights  of  those  beneficially  in- 
terested will  be  ascertained  and  enforced,  and  it  may  be  settled 
definitely  and  without  great  delay  what  persons  are  the  succes- 
sors to  the  title.  Questions  concerning  ownership,  dower,  home- 
stead, and  creditors'  rights,  may  be  conclusively  settled  once  and 
for  all,  and  can  not  arise  some  time  afterwards,  as  possible  de- 
fects of  title,  needing  investigation  at  each  later  transfer. 

It  seems  that  a  reform  of  this  nature  shoMd  be  made  without 
adopting  the  whole  plan  of  registering  title,  and  it  further  seems 
desirable  whether  or  not  the  general  plan  is  adopted.  If,  how- 
ever, the  general  scheme  of  registering  titles  is  adopted,  this 
part  of  it  appears  almost  essential  to  the  proper  working  of  the 
system. 

Provision  is  made  in  the  later  acts  for  more  direct  transmis- 
sion to  the  heirs  or  devisees,  who  themselves  may  make  applica- 
tion for  the  entry  of  a  new  certificate;  upon  which  application 
the  court  issues  notice  to  the  executor  or  administrator  and  others 
interested,  and,  after  hearing,  directs  the  entry  of  a  new  certifi- 
cate or  certificates,  to  the  persons  entitled  as  heirs  or  devisees. 
These  later  acts  do  not,  it  seems,  expressly  provide  for  conclu- 
sively establishing  the  matter  of  heirship,  but  the  provisions  as 
to  transfer  on  death  are  such  that  they  will  probably  be  construed 
to  have  that  effect. 

§  962.  Constitutionality  of  acts. — Objections  have  been 
raised  on  constitutional  grounds  to  the  methods  of  giving  notice 
to  all  who  may  have  interest  in  the  land  adverse  to  those  of  the 
applicant.  Under  our  constitutional  provisions  that  no  man  shall 
be  deprived  of  his  property  without  due  process  of  law,  it  has 
been  maintained  by  many  that  each  American  statute  is  uncon- 
stitutional in  that  there  is  no  sufficient  notice  required  to  be 
given  to,  and  no  sufficient  process  against,  persons  having  claims 
adverse  to  the  applicant.  It  appears  to  be  further  claimed  by 
some  that  no  scheme  can  be  devised  which  will  fully  meet  this 
constitutional  objection.  In  this  connection  it  is  well  to  keep 
in  mind  that  the  constitutionality  of  statutes  will  be  tested  by 
what  may  be  done  under  them  and  not  by  what  has  been  done  in 
a  specific  case.  If  a  statute  authorizes  in  any  manner  a  proce- 
dure that  does  not  constitute  due  process  of  law,  it  is  to  that 


§    962  TITLES    AXn    ABSTRACTS  1016 

extent  at  least  unconstitutional.  The  specific  objection  made  to 
the  various  American  acts  is  that  they  do  not  provide  for  due 
process  of  law.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  held  that 
the  phrase  "due  process  of  law"  does  not  always  mean  proceed- 
ings in  court.  That  this  fundamental  requirement  is  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  hearing  and  defense,  but  no  fixed  procedure  is  de- 
manded.^'^  In  another  case  the  same  court  said :  "Due  process 
requires  that  the  court  which  assumes  to  determine  the  rights  of 
parties  shall  have  jurisdiction;  and  that  there  shall  be  notice 
and  opportunity  for  hearing  given  the  parties.  Subject  to  these 
two  fundamental  conditions  which  seem  to  be  universally  pre- 
scribed in  all  systems  of  law  established  by  civilized  countries, 
this  court  has,  up  to  this  time,  sustained  all  state  laws,  statutory 
or  judicially  declared,  regulating  procedure,  evidence,  and  meth- 
ods of  trials,  and  held  them  to  be  consistent  with  due  process  of 
law."^^  While  the  manner  of  service  of  process  is  found  to  dif- 
fer, it  is  at  least  required  in  all  statutes  that  notice  of  the  pro- 
ceeding be  served  upon  all  resident  and  nonresident  known  de- 
fendants in  a  manner  customary  in  other  civil  actions  in  the  state 
and  held  to  l^e  sufficient  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state  in- 
volved; and  the  same  is  true  of  all  known  resident  defendants 
who  can  not  be  found.  The  most  serious  question  arising  in 
this  connection  is,  can  binding  service  be  made  upon  unknown 
persons,  whether  in  being  or  not,  whether  minor  or  under  other 
disability,  and  whether  residents  or  nonresidents  of  the  state? 
All  states  providing  for  registration  of  title  require  that  notice 
be  given  to  such  persons  by  publication.  A  review  of  the  de- 
cisions bearing  upon  this  question  leads  us  to  conclude  that  pro- 
ceedings in  which  a  decree  may  be  made  confirming  the  title  to 
land  against  the  whole  world,  without  exception,  may  be  provided 
by  statute. ^^ 

37  Ballard  v.  Hunter,  204  U.  S.  241,  Sup.  Ct.  261,  51  L.  ed.  461 ;  American 
27  Sup.  Ct.  261,  51  L.  ed.  461.  Land   Co.   v.  Zeiss,  219  U.   S.  47,  31 

38  Twining  v.   New  Jersey.  211   U.  Sup.  Ct.  200,  55  L.  ed.  95;  Title  &c. 
S.  78,  29  Sup.  Ct.  14,  53  L.  ed.  97.  Co.  v.  Kerrigan,  150  Cal.  289,  88  Pac. 

3»Arndt  V.  Griggs,   134  U.   S.  316,     356,  8  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  682,  119  Am. 
10  Sup.  Ct.  557,  33  L.  ed.  918.    See     St.  199. 
Ballard  v.  Hunter,  204  U.  S.  241,.  27 


INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

A 

ABANDONMENT, 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  108. 

affecting  right  to  convey  property  in  New  Jersey,  810. 

as  divestiture  of  title,  699. 

title  by,  92. 

ABATEMENT, 

death  of  party  pending  judgment,  570. 

ABBREVIATIONS, 

measurements,  251. 

use  in  books  and  compiling,  172. 

ABSENCE, 

proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

ABSTRACT  BOOKS, 

should  preserve  copy  of  abstract,  173. 
taxation,  36. 

ABSTRACT  COMPANY, 

implied  w^arranty  of  competent  employes,  9. 

ABSTRACTERS, 
bond,  14. 

book  abbreviations  used,   174. 
certificate,  174. 
compensation,  13. 

determination  of  formal  parts  of  deed,  260. 
duties  in  examination  of  wills.  487-490. 
examination  of  certificates,  722. 

judgment  record,   569. 
indexes  and  reference  books,  145-154. 
limiting  liability,  20. 
measure  of  damages  against,  18. 
nature  of  liability,   15. 
negligence  or  mistake,  liability,  16,  17,  20,  22. 

damages,    19. 
pleadings  in  actions  against,  24. 
qualifications,   9. 

relation  of  trust  and  confidence,  11. 
right  to  use  public  records,  137. 
scope  of  undertaking  limited  by  contract,  10. 
should  attach  certificate  to  abstract,  174. 
to  whom  liable,  22. 

tract  indexes  and  reference  books,  145. 
when  right  of  action  for  damages  accrues,  23. 
work  not  guaranteed,  10. 

1017 


1018  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ABSTRACTS. 

abstracters'  certificates,   174. 

acknowledgment  of  deed,  285. 

administrator's  deed,  360. 

adoption  of  Torrens'  system,  2. 

affidavits,  509. 

agreements   to    furnish,   25. 

American  and  English  methods  distinguished,  4. 

arrangement,  165. 

attachment,  553. 

bankruptcy  proceedings,  383. 

caption,    164. 

certificate  of  proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

release  or  waiver  of  homestead  in  Illinois,  793. 
sale  on  execution,  621. 
tax  sale,  641. 
commissioner's  deed,  353. 
compilation,  160-174. 
condemnation   proceedings,  677. 
contents  sliould  be  full,  3. 
contract  for  conveyances,  396. 
declarations  of  trust,  339. 
decree,  579. 

rescission  or  cancellation,  673. 
deed  by  attorney  in  fact,  335. 
corporation,  332. 
trustee  in  bankruptcy,  384. 
defined,  1. 

descent,  741. 

discharge  in  bankruptcy,  385._ 

distinguished  from  examinations,  4. 

divorce  and  alimony,  676. 

duty  to  furnish,  irrespective  of  agreement,  26. 

ejectment,  668. 

equitable  proceedings,  666. 

estates  of  title  where  records  are  destroyed  29. 

examination  and  opinion  of  title,  745-773. 

execution  sale,  616. 

filing,  on  application  for  registry  of  title,  952. 

foreclosure  in  equity,  674. 
of  mortgage,  444. 

forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  637. 

fermal  parts,   163. 

general  requisites,  5. 

injunction,  667. 

interpretation  of  contract  for  abstract,  6. 

judgment,  568. 

language  of  synopsis  of  instruments,  167. 

lease,  406. 

legislative  grant,  188. 

lien,  519. 

mortgage  and  assignment,  440. 

mortgage  of  homestead,  431; 

mortgagee's  deed,   358. 

notation  of  appearance.  663. 

of  verdict  or  findings  of  jury,  665. 

notice  of  lis  pendens,  550. 

object,  3. 


INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.^ 

K&STRACTS— Continued.^ 
official  certificate,  505. 
origin  and  history,  2. 
partition.  670. 
party  wall  agreement,  507. 
patents,  230. 

period  for  which  title  may  be  shown,  8. 
plat  and  subdivision,  242. 
power  of  attorney,  336. 
printed   copy,   750. 
private  entry,  198. 
probate  proceedings,  494, 

sales,  603. 
proof  of  probate  of  will,  489,  490. 

publication,   617. 
property  therein,  30. 
purchase-money  mortgage,  430. 
quitclaim  deeds,  302. 
receipt  from  land  office,  195. 

registration  of  title  under  Torrens  System,  950-962. 
release  of  mortgage,  443. 
report  of  master  in  chancery,  664. 
revocation  of  power  of  attorney,  2>i7. 
satisfaction  of  judgment,  573. 
sheriff's  deed,  351 

should  designate  nature  and  kind  of  conveyance,  264. 
showing  good  title,  7. 
showing  of  mortgages,  520. 
special  assessments,  647. 
specific  performance,  666. 
sufficiency  between  vendor  and  vendee,  6. 
tax  deed,  643. 
tax  liens,  632. 
tax  sale,  636. 
title  bond,  400. 
trust  deeds.  441. 
trustee's  deeds,  357. 
use  in  foreign  countries,  2. 
vacation  of  plats,  243. 

property,  501. 
warranty  deeds,  300. 
who  may  make.  12. 
wills,  488,  489. 

ACCRETION, 

title  by.  92. 

elements,  103. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 

deeds,  283-285. 

corporate  deeds,  330. 

in  different  states,  780-830. 
essential  to  record  of  assignment,  438. 
examination  in  abstract,  755. 
married  women.  324. 
necessity  of  statute  in  New  Mexico,  811. 
prerequisite  to  recording,  120. 
omitted  may  be  legalized  in  Alabama,  780. 
requisites,  284. 


1019 


1020  INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ACQUISITION  OF  TITLE, 
abandonment,  108. 
accretion  and  alluvion,  103. 
adverse  possession,  92. 
condemnation,  110. 
confirmation,  elements,  106. 
confiscation,  112. 
consanguinity  and  affinity,  89. 
dedication,  elements,   lO.S. 
descent  and  inheritance.  86,  87,  88. 
descent  and  purchase,  85. 
devise,  96. 

eminent  domain,  109. 
escheat,   111. 
estoppel,  97-100. 
fact  of  death,  90. 
fact  of  intestacy,  91. 
forfeiture,  113. 
occupanc}-,  107. 
official  grants,  94. 
prescription  and  limitation,  102. 
public  grants,  95. 
purchase,  classified,  92. 
relation,  101. 
riparian  lands,  104. 

ACTIONS, 

See  Attachment;  Ejectment;  Evidence;  Execution;  Judgments;  Juris- 
diction; Lis  Pendens;  Parties;  Pleading;  Process;  and  Like  Titles. 

against  abstracter  for  damages,  accrual,  23. 

for  negligence,  15. 
commenced  by  process,  658. 
foreclosure  of  mechanics'  liens,  538. 
judgments,  560. 

jurisdiction  of  specific  actions,  656. 
lis  pendens,  546. 
local,  656. 

parties  to  real  actions  to  furnish  abstract,  28. 
pleading  in  action  against  abstracter,  24. 
to  quiet  title,  defined,  669. 

jurisdiction,  656. 
transitory,  656. 

ACTS  OF  CONGRESS, 

source  of  title,  181.  ^ 

ADMINISTRATION, 

of  estate,  necessary,  705. 

ADMINISTRATORS,  ; 

See  Executors.  i 

i 

application  of  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  to  sales,  364.  ^ 

deeds,  361. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756.  ' 

sales  in  abstract,  764. 
jurisdiction  of  action  to  set  aside  sale,  656. 


INDEX 


1021 


[References  arc  to  Scctions.l 

ADMINISTRATORS— CoHfiJiwrd. 

limitation  of  rights  upon  death  of  intestate,  723. 
proof  of  death  of  intestate,  739. 
with  will  annexed,  deed,  361. 

ADOPTED  CHILDREN, 

adults  adopted  as  heirs  in  Pennsylvania,  872. 

heirs,  718. 

included  in  word  "issue,"  712. 

inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 

ADULTERY,  .  ,  ^    •      c     a    r- 

legacies  to  one  living  in  adultery  with  testator  void  in   boutu  Car- 
olina, 932. 

ADVANCEMENTS, 

deductions  in  various  states,  835-884. 

effect  in  construction  of  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 

essential  characteristics,  Til. 

ADVERSE  POSSESSION, 

acquisition  of  title  adverse  to  registered  owner,  951. 
affecting  title  to  property,  687. 

under  deed,  314. 
affidavits,  509. 

elements  in  general,  685-700. 
evidence,  687. 

general  considerations,  685. 
title  by,  92. 

ADVERTISEMENT, 

execution  sale,  616. 

AFFIDAVITS. 

affecting  title,  509. 

attachment,  553. 

inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

marriage  to  prove  birth  and  legitimacy  of  children,  740. 

service  of  process,  662. 

proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

required  as  proof  of  deed  in  South  Carolina,  820. 

AFFINITY, 

computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 
defined,  89. 

AFTER-ACQUIRED  PROPERTY, 
construction  of  mortgage,  432. 
mortgage,  432. 

subject  to  judgment  lien.  566. 
transfer  by  will,  460. 


AGE, 


capacity  to  bequeath  personalty  in  various  states,  890-942. 

devise  lands  in  various  states,  890-942. 
witnesses  to  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 


1022 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

AGREEMENT, 

tender  of  abstract  after  expiration  of  agreed  time,  32. 
to  furnish  abstract,  extension  of  time,  25. 
interpretation,  25. 

ALABAMA. 

statutes  of  descent,  835. 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  890. 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  780. 

ALASKA, 

statutes  of  descent,  836. 

execution  of  wills,  891. 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  781. 

ALDERMEN. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Penn.sylvania,  818. 

ALIENATION, 

conditions  against,  in  wills,  478. 
perpetuities,  482. 
restrictions  upon,  47. 
title  by,  92. 

ALIENS, 

acquisition  of  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

to  public  lands,  183. 
capacity  to  make  will,  457. 

to  take  under  will,  458. 
incapacity  to  take  under  devise  in  New  York,  922. 
inheritance  by  and  through,  732. 

of  lands  in  Alaska,  836. 

of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 

ALIMONY, 

in  divorce  proceedings  affecting  title,  676. 

ALLUVIUM, 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  103, 

ALTER.A.TION, 

effect  to  revoke  will,  486. 

AMBASSADOR, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Connecticut,  786. 
Illinois.  793. 
Iowa,  795. 
Louisiana,  798. 
Massachusetts,  801. 
Mississippi,  804. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
South  Carolina,  820. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Tennessee,  822. 
Utah,  824. 
Virginia,  826. 


INDEX  1023 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

AMERICAN  METHODS, 

distinguished  from  English,  4. 

ANCESTORS, 

ancestral  estate  defined,  708. 

defined,  707. 

included  in  next  of  kin,  729. 

proof  of  death,  739. 

seisin  essential  to  estate  by  inheritance,  709. 

ANCIENT  DEEDS. 

presumption  of  genuineness,  289. 

AUXILIARY  PROBATE, 
wills,  493. 

ANNUITIES, 

devise,  charged  with  payment,  473. 

ANTENUPTIAL  AGREEMENT, 
affecting  title,  676. 

APPEAL, 

from  decree  in  proceeding  to  register  title,  957. 

APPEARANCE, 

without  service  of  process,  663. 

APPRAISEMENT, 

affecting  validity  of  execution  sale,  611,  613. 

APPROVAL, 

ordinances,  502. 

AREAS, 

computation  of  land  areas  and  distances.  250. 

ARIZONA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  892. 
descent,  837. 
execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  782. 

ARKANSAS, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  893. 
descent,  838. 
execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  783. 

ARMY  OFFICERS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

Rhode  Island,  819. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

ASCENDANTS, 

brothers  and  sisters  in  collateral  line,  728. 
computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 
inheritance  from  intestate,   731. 


1024 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ASSESSMENT  ROLL. 

description  of  land,  634,  635. 

ASSESSMENTS. 

municipal  as  liens,  527. 

not  within  covenant  against  incumbrances,  632. 

taxes,  634. 

ASSIGNEE, 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 


ASSIGNMENTS. 

as  transfer  of  title.  370. 
can  not  be  amended,  375. 
certificate  of  execution  sale,  622. 

purchase  at  tax  sale,  641. 
construction,  operation  and  effect,  375. 
contract  for  conveyances.  397. 

conveyances  as  equitable  mortgage,  417. 
deed  must  be  recorded,  119. 
defined,  370. 

dower  affecting  title,  675. 
equitable  assignment  of  mortgage,  439. 
formal  requisites,  373. 
leases,  408. 

mechanics'  liens,  537,   538. 
pre-emption  rights,   198. 
property  or  estate  included,  375. 
purchase-money  notes  must  be  recorded,  119. 
requisites  and  effect,  374-376. 
title  of  assignee,  374. 
validity,  372. 

imrecorded  contract  for  sale  of  land  not  necessary  to  be  recorded,  119. 
voluntary  for  benefit  of  creditors,  371. 
what  law  governs,  376. 

ATTACHMENT, 
bond,  553. 
defined,  552. 

effect  upon  property,  553. 
essentials  of  affidavit,  553. 

jurisdiction  to  enter  orders  with  reference  to  property,  552. 
levy.  553. 

liabilitv  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 
lien,  517,  523. 
priority  of  lien  with  reference  to  mechanics'  liens,  535. 

other  liens,  552. 
proceedings  to  procure,  553. 
property  affected,  552. 
record,  133. 

service  of  process  by  publication,  661. 
writ,  553. 

ATTESTATION, 
deeds,  282. 
formal  part  of  deed,  260. 


I 


fe 


INDEX  1025 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
ATTORNEYS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Delaware  by  attorney,  787. 
acknowledgment  of  deed  in  New  Jersey,  8-^0. 
conveyances  by  attorney  in  fact,  335. 
duties  in  examination  of  wills,  486. 

AUDITOR, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Indiana,  794. 
Iowa,  795. 

AUTHENTICATION, 

See  Certificates. 

of  deed  by  officer  without  seal  required  in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

of  deed  executed  in  Guam,  Samoa,  or  Canal  Zone,  788. 

of  deed  executed  without  the  state  accredited  in  Georgia,  790. 

of  official  acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Arkansas,  783. 

in  Delaware.  787. 

in  Idaho,  792. 

in  Iowa,  795. 

in  Kansas,  796. 

.in  Louisiana,  798. 

in  Maine,  799. 

in  Maryland,  800. 

in  Massachusetts,  801. 

in  Minnesota,  80.3. 

in  Montana,  806. 

in  New  Jersey,  810. 

in  New  York,  812. 

in  North  Carolina,  813. 

in  North  Dakota,  814. 

in  Oklahoma,  816. 

in  Pennsylvania,  818. 
of  official  acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Illinois,  793. 

in  Massachusetts,  911. 

in  Mississippi,  914. 

in  North  Dakota,  924. 

in  Ohio,  925. 

in  Philippine  Islands,  929. 

in  Tennessee,  934. 

in  Vermont,  937. 

in  Wisconsin,  941. 

in  Wyoming,  830. 
of  will  proved  without  the  state  of  Connecticut,  896. 

B 

BANK  DEPOSITS, 

form  of  will.  487. 

BANKRUPTCY, 

abstracting,  383. 

appointment  of  trustee,  382. 

deed  of  trustee,  384. 

discharge,  385. 

effect  of  adjudication,  381. 

judicial  sales,  590. 

jurisdiction  and  procedure  prior  to  adjudication,  378. 

laws  governing,  377. 

65 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1026  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

BANKRVPTCY— Continued. 
meeting  of  creditors,  382. 
nature  of  proceedings.  378. 
petition,  process,  etc..  380. 
procedure  after  adjudication,  382. 
provisions  and  effect,  377-385. 
sale  by  trustee,  382. 
voluntary  and  involuntary.  379. 
who  may  be  declared  voluntary  or  involuntary  bankrupt,  379. 

BASTARDS, 

See  Illegitimate  Children. 

BENEFICIARIES, 

capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 

forfeiture  of  devise  when  acting  as  witness,  891. 

BILL, 

See  Equity  ;  Pleading. 

in  equity  for  redemption  of  mortgages,  672.  • 

BIRTH, 

affidavits  of  fact,  509. 

effect  to  revoke  will,  486,  720. 

posthumous  children  right  to  inherit,  72L 

pretermitted  children,  right  to  inherit  under  will,  720. 

proof  of  birth  or  legitimacy  of  children,  740. 

subsequent  to  execution  of  will  as  revocation,  890-942. 

BLINDNESS, 

grantor  making  three  witnesses  necessary  in  Louisiana,  796. 

BOND, 

abstracters,  14. 

attachment,  553. 

judicial  sale  in  probate  court,  602. 

jurisdiction  of  action  to  enforce,  656. 

purchase  bond  for  land,  656. 
officers  creating  lien,  528. 
support  of  mortgagee  not  necessary  to  be  recorded,  119. 

BOND  FOR  DEED, 

See  Contract  for  Conveyances. 
interest  of  vendor  subject  to  descent,  722. 

BOND  FOR  TITLE, 

writings  assigning  it  not  necessary  to  be  recorded,  119. 

BOOKS  OF  ORIGINAL  ENTRIES, 
kept  in  abstract  office,  148.  . 

BOUNDARIES, 

control  description  of  premises  in  mortgage,  423. 

in  deeds,  269. 

priority  over  description,  272. 


I 


INDEX  1027 

[References  are  to  Sections.} 

BOUNTY  LAND  CLAIMS, 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 

BROKER, 

contract  to  furnish  abstract,  27. 

BROTHERS, 

in  collateral  line  of  kindred,  728. 

inheritance  of  property  in  different  states,  835-884. 

BUILDINGS, 

title  acquired  by  adverse  possession,  693. 

C 

CALIFORNIA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  894. 
descent,  839. 
execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  784. 

CALLS, 

priority,  272. 

CANAL  ZONE,  .  . 

deeds  acknowledged  therein  accredited  in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

CANCELLATION, 

effect  to  revoke  will,  486. 
requirements  of  decree,  673. 

CANON  LAW, 

determining  degrees  of  heirs  in  Georgia,  845. 

CANONS  OF  DESCENT, 

distinguished  from  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

CAPACITY, 

to  make  will,  457. 

laws  of  various  states,  890-942. 
to  take  under  will,  458. 

CAVEAT  EMPTOR, 

applied  to  judicial  deed  on  execution  sale,  364. 
purchaser  at  tax  sale,  639. 
sales  under  decrees  of  probate  court,  60L 

CERTIFICATE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  other  county  in  Indiana,  794. 

deed  under  seal  in  Florida,  789. 
assignment  of  certificate  of  sale  on  execution.  622. 
authority  of  magistrate  in  execution  of  deed  in  Connecticut,  786. 
clerk  of  court  authenticating  official  acknowledgment  in  North  Caro- 
lina, 813. 
conclusiveness  on  registry  of  title,  958. 
evidence  of  registration  of  title,  954. 
examination  of  abstracter's  certificate,  722. 
nature  of  official,  505 


1028 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

CERTIFICATE— Continued. 

official  acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Arizona,  782. 

Colorado,  785. 

Illinois,  793. 

New  York,  812. 

Vermont,  825. 

Wisconsin,  829. 
official  acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 

Alaska,  781. 

Arkansas,  783. 

Delaware,  787. 

Georgia,  790. 

Idaho,  792. 

Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kansas,  796. 

Kentucky,  797. 

Michigan,  802. 

Montana,  806. 

Nevada,  808. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Texas,  823. 

Utah,  824. 

Wyoming,  830. 
purchase  at  execution  sale,  621. 

judicial  sale,  598. 

tax  sale,  641. 
record  of  certificate  of  title,  959. 
registration  of  title  under  Torrens  System,  950-962. 
release  of  dower  in  South  Carolina.  820. 
requirements  in  conveyance  of  properay  in  Florida,  789. 
sale  at  execution  or  foreclosure  sale  must  be  recorded,  119. 
satisfaction  of  judgment,  573. 

secretary   of    state    authenticating   official   acknowledgment   in    Massa- 
chusetts, 801. 

authenticating  unsealed  instruments  in  Illinois,  793. 

official  acknowledgment  in  Minnesota,  803. 

CERTIFICATE  OF  SALE, 

title  acquired  thereby,  185. 

CHANCELLOR, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 
Delaware,  787. 
District  of  Columbia,  788. 
Mississippi,  804. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
Virginia,  826. 

CHARGE  D'AFFAIRS. 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
California,  784. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Florida,  789. 
Idaho,  792. 
Indiana,  794. 


INDEX  1029 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

CHARGE  D'AFFAIRS— CoMfniM^d. 
Iowa,  795. 
Louisiana,  798. 
Massachusetts,  801. 
Minnesota,  803. 
Montana,  806. 
Nebraska,  807. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  Mexico,  811. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Oregon,  817. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Texas,  823. 
Vermont,  825. 
Virginia,  826. 
Washington,  827. 
West  Virginia,  828. 
Wisconsin,  829. 

CHARGES, 

support  in  will,  473. 

CHARITABLE  ASSOCIATIONS, 

devise  limited  in  California,  894. 
Georgia,  900. 
New  York,  922. 
Ohio,  925. 

CHARITIES, 

designation  as  beneficiaries  in  wills,  481. 

CHARTERS, 

inclusion  of  municipal  in  abstract,  500. 

CHIEF  MAGISTRATE, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 
Colorado,  785. 
Delaware,  787, 
New  Jersey,  810. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Illinois,  793. 
Mississippi,  804. 
Missouri,  805. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  York,  812. 
Washington,  827. 
West  Virginia,  828. 

CHILDREN, 

birth  after  execution  of  will  as  revocation  in  various  states,  890-942. 

brothers  and  sisters  in  collateral  line  of  inheritance,  728. 

illegitimate  as  heirs,  719. 

inheritance  of  property  in  dififerent  states,  835-884. 

natural  children  as  forced  heirs,  715. 

omission  from  will  results  in  intestacy  in  Alaska,  891. 


1030  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

CHILDREN— Contiuucd. 

posthumous,  right  to  inherit,  721. 
proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy,  740. 
rights  of  pretermitted  children.  720. 
what  included  as  descendants,  717-721. 

CHINESE, 

nonresident  prohibited  from  right  of  inheritance  in  Nevada,  862. 

CHURCHES, 

mechanics'  liens,  536. 

CITIES, 

See  Municipal  Corporations. 

CITY  CLERK, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Kansas,  796. 
Minnesota,  803. 

CITY  RECORDER, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Minnesota,  803. 
New  York.  812. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 

CIVIL  DEATH, 
defined,  706. 
effect  upon  title  by  descent,  706. 

CIVIL  LAW, 

application  to  wills  in  Louisiana,  908. 

computation  of  degrees  of  kindred,  836. 

heirs,  714. 

inheritance  by  one  causing  death  of  intestate,  733. 

method  of  computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

rules  of  descent,  88. 

CLERKS  OF  COURTS, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 
Alaska,  781. 
Arizona,  781. 
Arkansas,  783. 
'California,  784. 
Connecticut,  786. 
District  of  Columbia,  788. 
Florida,  789. 
Georgia,  790. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana,  794. 
Iowa.  795. 
Kansas,  796. 

Kentucky.  797.  -J 

Louisiana,  798.  •  . 

Maine,  799. 
Michigan,  802. 
Minnesota,  803. 
Mississippi,  804. 
Missouri,  805. 


I 


INDEX  1031 

[References  are  to  Sections.} 

CLERKS  OF  COURTS— Continued. 

Montana,  806. 

Nebraska.  807. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  Mexico,  811. 

New  York.  812. 

North  Carolina,  813. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Oklahoma,  816. 

South  Carolina,  820. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Texas,  823. 

Utah,  824. 

Virginia,  826. 

Washington,  827. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

Wyoming,  830. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  North  Dakota,  814. 

Oklahoma,  816. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Utah,  824. 

/ 
CODICILS, 

See  Wills. 

eflfect  to  revoke  will.  486. 
included  in  term  "will",  455. 
probate,  491. 

COLLATERAL  HEIRS, 

computing  degrees  of  kindred.  726. 

inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 

COLLEGES, 

mechanics'  liens,  536. 

COLORADO, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  895. 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  785. 
statutes  of  descent,  840. 

COLOR  OF  TITLE. 

adverse  occupant  holding  under,  687. 

defined,  73. 

what  constitutes,  688. 

COMMERCIAL  AGENTS, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  78L 
Alabama,  780. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Delaware,  787. 
Florida,  789. 
Illinois,  793. 
Louisiana,  798. 


1032  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

COMMERCIAL  AGKl^TS—Contmucd. 
Minnesota,  803. 
Nebraska,  807. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
Ohio,  815. 
Pennsylvania.  818. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
Texas,  823. 
Virginia,  826. 
Washington,  827. 
West  Virginia,  828. 

COMMISSIONERS, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 

Alaska,  781. 

Arizona,  781. 

California,  784. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Delaware,  787. 

Idaho,  792. 

Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kansas,  796. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Montana,  806. 

New  Hampshire,  809. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Rhode  Island,  819. 

South  Carolina,  820. 

South  Dakota,  821. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 

California,  784. 

Florida,  789. 

Hawaii,  791. 

Idaho,  792. 

Louisiana,  798. 

Maine,  799. 

Massachusetts,  SOL 

Minnesota,  803. 

Mississippi,  804. 

Montana,  806. 

Nebraska,  807. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Mexico,  811. 

New  York,  812. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Oregon,  817. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Texas,  823. 
deed  by,  353.  _ 

to  assess  benefits  and  damages  in  condemnation  proceedings,  077. 
to  eflfect  partition,  670. 

COMMISSIONERS  IN  CHANCERY, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Virginia,  826. 
foreign  deed  in  Pennsylvania,  818. 


INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

COMMISSIONERS  OF  DEEDS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Illinois,  793. 

Kentucky,  797. 

Missouri,  805. 

Nebraska,  807. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  Mexico,  811. 

New  York,  812. 

Oklahoma,  816. 

Oregon,  817. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Texas,  823. 

Utah,  824. 

Washington,  827. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

Wyoming,  830. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deeds  accredited  in  Maryland,  800. 

Michigan,  802. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Utah,  824. 

Vermont.  825. 
use  of  seal  in  acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Maine,  799. 

COMMON  FORM, 

probate  of  will,  491. 

COMMON  LAW, 

adopted  children,  718. 

canon  of  descent,  87. 

exclusion  of  lineal  ascendants,  731. 

heirs,  714. 

inheritance  of  aliens,  732. 

method  of  computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

COMMUNITY  PROPERTY, 

controlled  by  husband  in  Nevada,  808. 

conveyance  in  California,  784. 

conveyance  of  husband  or  wife  in  Idaho,  792. 

mechanics'  liens,  536. 

what  included  in  Washington,  827. 

COMPETENCY, 

witnesses  to  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 

COMPILATION, 

abbreviations  used.  172. 

abstracters'  notes.  168. 

abstracts,  160-174. 

arrangement  of  abstract,  165. 

caption  of  abstract,  164. 

executing  an  instrument  for  reference,  169. 


1033 


1034  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.'\ 

COMPILATION— Co)ifni«rrf. 

following  irregular  instrument,  170. 

formal  parts  of  abstract,  163. 

form  of  abstracters'  certificate,  174. 

introductory  remarks,  160. 

preliminary  sketcb  of  chain,  162. 

scope  and  extent  of  examination,  161. 

showing  mistakes  made  in  transcribing  instrument,  171. 

synopsis  of  instruments  and  proceedings,  166,  167. 

COMPLAINT. 

registration  of  title,  952. 

CONCEALMENT, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

CONCLUSION,  ^ 

formal  part  of  deed,  260.  ■ 

CONDEMNATION,  t 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  110.  ^ 

proceedings  afifecting  title,  677. 

CONDITIONAL  DEVISES, 
liens,  526. 

CONDITIONAL  ESTATES, 
defined  and  classified,  41. 

CONDITIONAL  FEES, 

at  common  law  defined  and  construed,  44. 
not  subject  to  descent,  722. 

CONDITIONAL  LIMITATIONS, 

in  wills,  475. 

words  essential  to  creation,  475. 

CONDITIONS, 

against  alienation  in  wills,  478. 

conveyances  with  restrictive  conditions,  313. 

devise  on  conditions  precedent  or  subsequent,  474. 

formal  part  of  deed,  260. 

in  deed,  construction,  297. 

in  mortgages,  426. 

precedent  and  subsequent  in  deeds,  276. 

repugnant  or  void  in  wills,  461,  462. 

restraining  marriage  in  wills,  477. 

CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT,  J 

affidavits  of  performance,  509. 
devises,  474, 

CONDITIONS  SUBSEQUENT, 

affidavits  of  performance,  509. 

devises,  474. 

restraint  of  alienation  in  wills,  478. 


'i! 


INDEX  1035 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
CONFIRMATION, 

common-law  deeds  of  confirmation,  307. 
effect  to  cure  defects  in  judicial  sales,  597. 
judicial  sales,  591,  596,  597. 

CONFIRMATION  ACTS, 
by  United  States,  189. 

CONFISCATION, 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  112. 

CONFLICTING  DESCRIPTIONS, 
property  in  wills,  460. 

CONGRESS, 

power  to  dispose  of  public  lands,  184. 
power  to  make  direct  grants  of  lands,  186. 

CONNECTICUT, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  896. 
descent,  841. 
execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  786. 

CONSANGUINITY, 

computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 
defined,  89. 
next  of  kin,  729. 

CONSENT, 

husband  or  wife  to  devise  or  bequest  of  the  other  in  Colorado,  895. 

CONSIDERATION, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 
agreement  to  devise  real  estate,  401. 
deeds,  266. 

CONSTRUCTION, 

See  Wills. 

designation  of  devisee  in  will,  481. 

devisees  in  wills,  481. 

erroneous  and  conflicting  descriptions  in  wills,  460. 

repugnant  clauses,  291. 

provisions  and  conditions  in  wills,  461. 
wills,  459-482. 

words  and  phrases  in  wills,  466. 
words  in  will  passing  real  estate,  467.     , 

CONSTRUCTIVE  SERVICE, 

See  Service;  Process. 

afifecting  decree,  576. 
Alabama,  780. 

CONSULAR  OFFICERS, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
California,  784. 
Colorado,  785. 


1036  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

CONSULAR  OFFICERS— Con^MMfd. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Delaware,  787. 
District  of  Columbia,  788. 
Florida,  789. 
Hawaii.  791. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana.  794. 
Iowa,  795. 
Kansas,  796. 
Kentucky,  797. 
Louisiana.  798. 
Maine,  799. 
Maryland,  800. 
Massachusetts,  SOL 
Minnesota,  803. 
Mississippi.  804. 
Missouri,  805. 
Montana,  806. 
Nebra.ska.  807. 
Nevada,  808. 
New  Hampshire,  809. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  Mexico,  811. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Ohio.  815. 
Oklahoma,  816. 
Oregon,  817. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
South  Carolina,  820. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Tennessee,  822. 
Texas,  823. 
Utah,  824. 
Vermont,  825. 
Virginia,  826. 
Washington,  827. 
West  Virginia,  828. 
Wisconsin,  829. 
Wyoming,  830. 

CONTEST, 

foreign  will  in  Oregon,  927. 

right  to  contest  not  subject  to  descent,  722. 

CONTRACTS, 

action  against  abstracter  founded  on,  15,  16. 

basis  of  mechanics'  lien,  533.    ■ 

broker  to  furnish  abstract,  27. 

good  title,  interpretation,  7. 

necessary  to  establish  a  mechanics'  lien,  534. 

to  deliver  abstract  merged  in  deed  and  mortgage,  33. 


INDEX  1037 


[References  are  to  Sections.^ 

CONTRACTS  FOR  CONVEYANCES, 
abstracting,  396. 
agreement  as  to  title,  398. 

to  devise  real  estate,  401. 
assignment,  397. 
construction  and  validity,  395. 
forfeiture,  399. 
formal  requisites,  393. 

jurisdiction  of  action  for  specific  performance,  656. 
land  contract  and  bond  for  deed,  390. 
merger  with  deed,  390. 
mortgage  of  after-acquired  property,  432. 
registration,  394. 

relation  of  vendor  and  vendee,  391. 
requisites  and  affect,  390-401. 
suit  for  specific  performance,  671. 
title  bond,  400. 
title  of  vendor  and  vendee,  392. 

CONTRACTS  FOR  SALE, 

actions  to  set  aside,  lis  pendens,  546. 

delivery  of  abstract  while  executory,  31. 

enforceable  by  specific  performance,  671. 

examination  in  abstract,  767. 

interest  of  vendor  subject  to  descent,  722. 

must  be  recorded,  119. 

property  in  abstract  under  contract  and  after  rescission,  30. 

CONVERSION, 

equitable  conversion  of  property  devised,  484. 

CONVEYANCES, 

See  Deeds  ;  Mortgages. 

acknowledgment  by  married  women,  324. 

between  husband  and  wife,  323. 

by  attorney  in  fact,  335. 

by  charitable  or  religious  corporations,  2>2>Z. 

by  married  women,  322. 

by  municipal  corporations,  501-505. 

by  private  corporations,  332. 

by  public  and  quasi-public  corporations,  331. 

creating  estates  in  common  and  in  joint  tenancy,  326. 

easement  affecting  title,  506. 

for  sole  and  separate  use  of  married  women,  320. 

in  trust,  338. 

material  or  operative  parts  should  appear  in  abstracts,  5. 

of  an  expectancy,  334. 

of  registered  land,  951. 

powers  of  attorney,  336. 

primed  by  judgment  lien,  565. 

release  of  dov»'er,  325. 

requiring  new  certificate  of  registry  of  title,  957. 

special  classes  of  private  conveyance,  320-341. 

testamentary   trusts   distinguished,   356, 

to  and  by  partnerships,  328. 


1038 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.^ 

CONVEYANCES— Co»/iHMfrf. 
to  husband  and  wife,  321. 
to  private  corporations,  329. 
voluntary  partition,  327. 

CONVICT, 

capacity  to  make  will,  457. 

CORPORATION  COURT, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Virginia,  826. 

CORPORATIONS. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Montana,  806. 

foreign  deed  accredited  in  Mississippi,  804. 

instrument  in  Maryland,  800. 

instrument  in  Michigan,  802. 

instrument  in  Minnesota,  803. 
authentication  of  conveyance  of  property  in  Florida,  789. 
capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 
conversances  by  charitable  or  religious  corporations,  iZZ. 

private  corporations,  332. 
conveyances  by  public  and  quasi-public  corporations,  331. 
conveyances  to,  329. 

designation  as  beneficiaries  in  wills,  481. 
incapacity  to  take  under  devise  in  New  York,  922. 
inclusion  of  charter  in  abstract,  500._ 
may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 
name  and  description,  329. 
right  to  acquire  title  to  public  lands,  183. 
signature  to  deed,  280. 

COTENANTS, 

title  by  adverse  possession  between,  696. 

COUNTY  AUDITOR, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Minnesota,  803. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Ohio.  815. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Washington,  827. 


COUNTY  CLERK, 


See  Clerks  of  Court. 


acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Oklahoma,  816. 
Utah,  824. 
Vermont,  825. 
Wyoming,  830. 

COUNTY  COMMISSIONERS. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Minnesota,  803. 

COUNTY  COURT. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Wisconsin,  829. 


% 


INDEX  1039 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

COUNTY  RECORDER, 

See  Recorder  or  Deeds. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Arizona,  781. 
California,  784. 
Utah,  824. 

COUNTY  SURVEYOR, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Ohio,  815. 

COURSES  AND  DISTANCES, 

priority  over  description,  272. 

COURTS, 

See  Judicial  Sales. 

jurisdiction  of  bankruptcy  proceedings,  378. 

to  hear  and  determine  suits  concerning  real  estate,  650. 

COURT  COMMISSIONERS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Minnesota,  803. 
Wisconsin,  829. 

COURTS  OF  RECORD, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  by  clerk  of  court  in  Alabama,  780. 
Alaska,  781. 
Arizona,  781. 
Arkansas,  783. 
California,  784. 
Colorado,  785. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Delaware,  787. 
District  of  Columbia,  788. 
Florida,  789. 
Georgia,  790. 
Hawaii,  791. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana,  794. 
Iowa,  795. 
Kansas,  796. 
Kentucky,  797. 
Maine,  799. 
Maryland,  800. 
Michigan,  802. 
Minnesota,  803. 
Mississippi,  804. 
Missouri,  805. 
Montana,  806. 
New  Mexico,  811. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Ohio,  815. 
Oregon,  817. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
South  Carolina,  820. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Tennessee,  822. 
Texas,  823. 
Virginia,  826. 


1040  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

COURTS  OF  RKCORD— Continued. 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Illinois,  793. 
Colorado,  785. 
Idaho,  792. 
Michigan,  802. 
Mississippi,  804. 
Missouri,  805. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  York,  812. 
Oklahoma,  816. 

COVENANTS, 

against  incumbrances  include  taxes,  526,  527.  A 

availability  to  purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  593.  ^ 

available  under  judicial  sale,  592,  593. 

clauses  construed  as  covenants  rather  than  as  conditions,  297. 

conveyances  with  restrictive  covenants,  313. 

formal  parts  of  deed,  260. 

general  and  special  in  mortgage,  425,  426. 

in  joint  deed  does  not  bind  wife  in  Nebraska,  807. 

in  leases,  407,  408. 

may  be  enforced  by  injunction,  667. 

nonclaim  equivalent  to  special  covenant  of  warranty,  303. 

not  implied  from  recitals,  273. 

party-wall  agreement  affecting  title,  507. 

taxes  as  incumbrances,  632. 

title,  in  deeds,  278,  279. 

CREDITOR, 

competency  as  witness  to  will  in  Vermont,  937. 

CROPS, 

jurisdiction  of  action  for  destruction,  656. 

CURATIVE  LAWS, 

See  Legalizing  Acts. 

CURTESY, 

abolished  in  Connecticut,  786. 

Maine,  799. 

Ohio,  815. 
bar  of  curtesy  by  joinder  in  deed  in  Oregon,  817. 
charge  upon  estates  of  inheritance  in  various  states,  835-884. 
defined  and  construed,  64. 
in  what  states  right  exists,  64. 
may  not  be  devised  in  Alaska,  891. 
release  by  conveyance  in  Massachusetts,  801. 
release  by  joinder  in  conveyance  in  New  Hampshire,  809. 
right  which  can  not  be  disinherited,  715,  716. 
transfer  by  deed  in  Arkansas,  783. 
when  husband  is  entitled,  64. 
when  husband's  right  may  -be  excluded,  64. 


INDEX  1041 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

D 

DAMAGES, 

action  against  abstracter  for  negligence,  15,  16,  18. 
compensatory,  awarded  in  equity  action  for  injunction,  667. 
liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  or  neglect,  16. 
when  right  of  action  against  abstracter  accrues,  23. 

DATE, 

subscription  of  witnesses  to  deed  in  Arkansas,  783. 

DEATH, 

affidavit  to  establish,  509. 

effect  of  death  of  party  pending  judgment,  570. 

effect  to  lapse  devise,  483. 

establishing  fact,  90. 

gifts  over  on  death  of  beneficiary  m  will,  476. 

judgment  plaintiff  or  defendant  pending  execution  sale,  618. 

proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

terminating  power  of  attorney,  337. 

terminating  trust,  341. 

vests  title  in  heirs  instanter,  723. 

DEBTS, 

affecting  title  to  real  estate  of  decedent,  705. 

charge  upon  estate  of  decedent  in  various  states,  835-884. 

decedent  creating  lien,  524. 

devise,  charged  with  payment,  473. 

inheritance  liable  for  debts  of  decedent,  736. 

right  of  administrator  to  sell  land  for  debts,  723. 

DECEDENTS. 

debts  creating  lien,  524. 

judgment  against,  571. 

proceedings  for  sale  in  probate  courts,  602. 

DECREES, 

See  Judgments. 
abstracting,  579. 
assignment  of  dower,  675. 
classification,  574. 
conclusiveness,  575. 
conformity  to  pleadings,  578. 
defined,  560. 
distinctions,  560. 

divorce  proceedings  affecting  title,  676. 
effect,  561. 
effect  of  decree  in  the  absence  of  personal  service,  576. 

misnomer  of  parties,  580-582. 
entry,  578. 

evidence  of  descent  in  abstract,  741. 
extraterritorial  operation,  584. 
finality,  574. 

foreclosure  of  mortgage  in  equity,  447. 
foreclosure  without  provision  for  deficiency,  575. 
foreign  judgment  and  decree,  584. 
form,  578. 

66 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1042  INDEX 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

DECREES— Continued. 

foundation  of  title  registry,  954. 
jurisdiction  dependent  on  service,  576. 
liens,  577. 

necessity  of  findings,  578. 
operation  and  effect,  575. 

decrees  of  probate  courts,  583. 
probate  of  wills,  492. 
proof  of  heirship,  738. 
relief  dependent  on  prayer,  575. 
rescission  and  cancellation,  673. 
sheriff's  deed  in  execution  of  decree,  352. 
signing,  578. 
title  and  incumbrances,  957. 

DEDICATION, 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  105. 
deeds  of  dedication,  317. 
examination  in  abstract,  760. 
maps  or  plats,  244. 

DEED  OF  TRUST, 

See  Mortgages. 

assignment,  436,  437. 

DEEDS, 

See  Ancient  Deeds;  Conveyances;  Taxation. 

absolute  deed,  when  considered  mortgage,  419. 

acknowledgment  by  corporation,  330. 

acknowledgment  of  sheriff's  deed,  349. 

actions  to  set  aside,  lis  pendens,  546. 

administrator  with  the  will  annexed,  361. 

affecting  title  adversely,  686. 

application  of  lis  pendens  to  set  aside,  546. 

assignment,  309. 

at  common  law,  305. 

by  administrator,  360. 

by  guardian,  362. 

by  masters,  commissioners  and  referees,  353. 

classification,  295-318. 

common-law  deed  of  assignment,  309. 

confirmation,  307. 

consideration,  266. 

construction,  297. 

sheriff's  deed,  350,  351. 
conveyance  of  land  in  the  adverse  possession  of  another,  314. 
conveyances  to  take  effect  in  future,  311. 
conveyances  with  restrictive  conditions  and  covenants,  313. 
conveying  base,  qualified  and  conditional  estates,  312. 
creating  resulting  trusts,  318. 
creation  of  fee-simple  estates,  45. 
date,  265. 

declaration  of  trust,  339. 
dedicatory,  317. 

description  of  deed  in  mortgage,  424. 
descriptions  and  boundaries,  269. 


INDEX  1043 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

DEEDS — Continued. 

examination  of  deed  executed  under  power  of  attorney  in  abstract,  759. 

official  deeds  in  abstract,  756. 
feoffment,  gift,  grant,  exchange  and  partition,  305. 
fiduciaries  purchasing  at  their  own  sales,  363. 
formal  parts  enumerated  and  described,  258. 
form  of  deeds  of  surrender,  308. 
fraudulent  conveyances,  315. 
indentures,  defined,  296. 
mortgagee's  deed  under  power  of  sale,  358. 
of  defeasance,  310. 
of  executor,  359. 
of  sheriff,  350-352. 
of  surrender,  308. 
of  trustee  in  bankruptcy,  384. 
operative  words,  267. 
original  and  derivative  defined,  305. 
poll,  defined,  296. 

power  and  duties  of  trustee  to  make,  354. 
power  of  sale  in  deed  of  trust,  442. 
private  deeds,  examination  in  abstract,  754. 
quitclaim,  defined  and  requisites,  295,  301. 
recitals  in  deeds  by  officials,  346. 
release.  306. 

release,  surrender,  confirmation,  assignment  and  defeasance,  305. 
requisites,  93. 

sheriff's  deed  on  execution  sale,  347. 

statutes  of  different  states  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledg- 
ment, 780-830. 
statutory  forms,  304. 
subject  to  incumbrance,  316. 
tax  deeds,  642-644. 
title  by,  92. 
trust  deeds,  441. 
validity,  298. 
void  and  voidable,  298. 
warranty  defined,  and  requisites,  295,  299. 
will  distinguished,  453. 
with  special  warranties,  303. 
words  of  inheritance,  268. 

DEFEASANCE, 

common-law  deed  of  defeasance,  310. 

DEFECTS, 

cure  by  judicial  sale,  591. 

DEGREES, 

computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

according  to  civil  law  in  Alabama,  835. 

DELAWARE, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  897. 

statutes  of  descent,  842. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  787. 

DELIVERY, 

abstract,  31. 
deeds,  286. 


1044  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
DEPUTIES, 

See  Recorder  of  Deeds. 

t 
acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Colorado,  785. 

Florida.  789. 

Idaho,  792. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kentucky,  797. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Mississippi,  804. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812 

Tennessee,  822 

Virginia,  826. 

Washington,  827. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  California,  784. 

Minnesota,  803. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Texas,  823. 

Utah,  824. 

DESCENDANTS, 

brothers  and  sisters  in  collateral  lines,  728. 
children  and  children's  children,  717. 
common-law  canon,  87. 

DESCENT  AND  DISTRIBUTION, 

computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

descendants  entitled  to  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 

included  in  next  of  kin,  729. 

included  in  word  issue,  712. 

what  included,  713. 
estates  of  minors  unmarried,  727. 
examination  in  abstract,  766. 
general  consideration  of  title  by  descent,  705. 
inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 
laws  determining  interest  subject  to  descent,  722. 
lines  of  descent  defined,  725. 
mode  of  acquisition  of  title,  85,  86,  88. 
next  of  kin  defined,  729. 

omission  from  will  results  in  intestacy  in  Alaska,  891. 
proof  of  heirship,  738. 
property  subject  to  descent,  722. 
regulation  by  statutes,  732. 
rules  of  descent  under  civil  law,  88. 
statutes  governing,  724. 
statutes  governing  heirs,  714. 
statutes  of  descent  in  various  states,  835-884. 
title  by  descent,  705-741. 

DESCRIPTION, 

construed,  272. 

devisees  in  wills,  481. 

effect  of  false,  erroneous  and  conflicting  descriptions  in  wills,  461. 

in  contract  for  conveyances,  393. 

in  deed,  269-272. 

_  general  description,  constructive  notice,  129. 
land  in  assessment  roll,  635. 


INDEX 


1045 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

DESCRIPTION— Continued. 

must  be  accurate  in  abstract,  5. 

parties  and  premises  in  mortgage,  422-424. 

referred  to  in  maps  or  plats,  241. 
DESERT  LANDS, 

entries  as  source  of  title,  204. 

DEVISES, 

See  Wills. 

constituting  estate  subject  to  inheritance  in  various  states,  835-884. 
descent  of  estate  on  death  of  devisee  before  testator,  734. 
liens,  525. 
title  by,  92. 

DISCHARGE, 

judgments,  573. 
mortgage,  429. 

DISCOVERY, 

proclamation  of,  source  of  title,  181. 

DISINHERITANCE, 

causes  in  Louisiana,  908. 
children  in  Porto  Rico,  930. 
prohibited  in  some  states,  715. 

DISTRIBUTIVE  GIFTS, 
in  wills,  471. 

DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  898 

statutes  of  descent,  843. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  <8i 

DIVORCE, 

abstracting  action  for  divorce  and  alimony,  676. 
aflfecting  title,  676. 

DOCKETS, 

judgments,  567. 

necessary  to  make  judgment  a  lien,  562. 

DOMICIL, 

determining  heritable  status  of  child  and  father,  719. 
law,  governing  wills,  456. 
testator  determining  probate,  491. 

DONATIONS, 

by  congress,  source  of  title,  202. 

DOWER, 

abolished  in  Connecticut,  786. 

Iowa,  795. 

Maine,  799. 
adverse  possession  acquired,  693. 
affected  by  vendors'  lien,  530. 
assignment  affecting  title,  675. 


I 


1046  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

DOWER— Continued.  ^  s 

bar  by  joint  deed  in  Missou'*!,  805.  *' 

New  Hampshire,  809.  ? 

Oregon,  817. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Rhode  Island,  819. 

Tennessee,  822.  i 

bar  of  right  by  conveyance  of  property  in  Arkansas,  783.  ^ 

Georgia,  790.  f 

Hawaii,  791.  - 

Kentucky,  797. 

Maryland,  800.  j 

Massachusetts,  801.  Ik 

Michigan,  802.  f 

Minnesota,  803. 

Montana,  806. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 
charge  upon  estate  of  decedent  in  various  states,  835-884. 
construed  and  defined,  65. 

conveyance  by  joint  deed  in  North  Carolina,  813. 
effect  of  execution  sale,  620. 

form  of  relinquishment  on  conveyance  of  property  in  Florida,  789. 
how  barred  or  forfeited,  65. 
in  what  states  exists,  65. 
lien,  521. 

may  not  be  devised  in  Alaska,  891. 
release,  325. 

release  by  acknowledgment  on  conveyance  in  South  Carolina,  820. 
release  by  married  women  in  conveyance  in  Alabama,  780. 

District  of  Columbia,  788. 

Illinois,  793. 
right  which  can  not  be  disinherited,  715,  716. 
to  what  estates  attached,  65. 
what  constitutes  in  Alabama,  835. 

DRUNKARDS, 

examination  of  sales  thereby  in  abstract,  764. 

DURESS,  ... 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

DUE  PROCESS, 

Torrens  System  of  title  registration,  962. 

DWELLING  HOUSE, 

included  in  homestead  in  California,  784. 


EASEMENTS. 

acquired  by  adverse  possession,  693. 
affecting  title,  506. 
defined  and  construed,  61. 


INDEX  1047 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

EASEMENTS— Continued. 

distinguished  from  licenses,  61. 

profits  a  prendre,  61. 

servitude,  506. 
grant  must  be  recorded,  119. 
inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 
words  of  creation,  506. 

EDUCATION, 

provision  by  testamentary  trust,  480. 

EDUCATIONAL  ASSOCIATIONS, 

devise  thereto  limited  in  Georgia,  900. 

EJECTMENT, 

abstracting,  668. 

defined,  668. 

form  of  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  445. 

judgment,  668. 

production  of  abstracts  in  actions  therefor,  28. 

right  of  action  descends  to  heir  and  not  to  administrator,  723. 

ELECTION, 

lawrs  to  govern  construction  of  will  in  New  York,  922. 
survivor  to  take  under  will  of  deceased  spouse  in  Ohio,  925. 
to  take  dower  bars  inheritance  in  Georgia,  845. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN, 

abstracting  condemnation  proceedings,  677. 
acquisition  of  title,  elements,  109. 
assessment  of  benefits  and  damages,  677. 
condemnation  proceedings  affecting  title,  677. 

ENGLISH  LANGUAGE, 

sufficient  authentication  of  acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited 

in  Indiana,  794. 

ENGLISH  METHODS, 

distinguished  from  American,  4. 

ENGRAVING, 

use  in  will,  487. 

ENTRIES, 

transfer  of  public  lands,  182,  191. 

ENTRY, 

land  subject  thereto,  193. 
statements  included,  194. 

ENTRY  AND  POSSESSION, 

after  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  444. 

EQUALITY, 

taxes,  631. 

EQUITABLE  CONVERSION, 
under  wills,  484. 


1048  INDEX 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

EQUITABLE  ESTATES. 

defined  and  classified,  41. 
judgment  liens.  566. 
mechanics'  liens,  536. 

EQUITABLE  LIENS, 

creation  by  agreement.  516. 

possession  as  an  essential,  516. 

priority  with  reference  to  judgment  liens,  565. 

resulting  trusts,  532. 

EQUITABLE  TITLE, 
defined,  74. 
should  appear  in  abstract,  5. 

EQUITY, 

See  Judicial  Sales. 

abstracting  equitable  proceedings,  666. 

adequacy  of  legal  remedy,  651. 

application  for  registration  of  equitable  interest,  952. 

construction  of  assignment  of  mortgage,  439. 

construction  of  mortgage  of  after-acquired  property,  432. 

construction  of  wills,  678. 

conversion  or  constructive  alteration  of  property  devised,  484. 

decrees,  560. 

equitable  liens,  516. 

foreclosure  of  mortgage,  447,  674. 

jurisdiction  to  quiet  title.  669. 

suits  concerning  real  estate,  651. 
power  to  decree  specific  performance,  671. 
record  of  equitable  proceedings  as  notice,  657. 
redemption  of  mortgage  by  bill  in  equity,  672. 

EQUITY  OF  REDEMPTION, 

interest  subject  to  descent,  722. 

ERRONEOUS  DESCRIPTIONS, 
property  in  wills,  460. 

ESCHEAT, 

acquisition  of  title,  111. 

property  in  Alaska,  836. 

property  in  various  states  in  the  absence  of  kindred,  835-884. 

title  by,  92. 

ESCROW, 

interest  of  vendor  subject  to  descent,  722. 

ESTATES, 

See  Remainders. 

acquisition  by  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  444. 

allodial  titles,  72. 

ancestral  estate  defined,  708. 

at  sufferance,  41,  52,  71. 

at  will,  41.  51,  71. 

base  fee,  41. 


• 


4ii- 


^ 


INDEX  1049 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ESTATES — Continued. 

by  entirety,  created  by  deed  to  husband  and  wife,  321. 

capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 

classification,  41. 

construction  of  estate  created  by  will,  459. 

contingent  uses,  71. 

conventional  life  estates,  41. 

created  by  conveyances  and  trusts,  338. 

curtesy,  41,  71. 

deeds  conveying  base,  qualified  and  conditional  estates,  312. 

defined,  40. 

determinable  fee,  41. 

distinguished  from  powers,  60. 

doctrine  of  survivorship  contrary  to  public  policy,  326. 

dower,  41,  71. 

during  coverture,  71. 

equitable,  41. 

executory  devises,  71. 

fee  conditional,  41. 

fee  simple,  41,  71. 

fee  tail,  41,  71. 

nature  of,  48. 
for  years,  41,  71. 

nature  of,  50. 
freehold,  41,  71. 
from  year  to  year,  41,  71. 

nature,  53. 
future,  71. 
homestead,  41. 

in  common,  conveyances  creating,  326. 
in  expectancy,  41. 

release  of  expectant  share  to  ancestor,  735. 

subject  of  contract,  735. 
in  joint  tenancy,  conveyances  creating,  326. 
in  possession,  41. 
in  severalty,  71. 
joint,  71. 
joint  tenancy,  71. 
legal,  41. 

legal  and  equitable,  nature,  57. 
legal  life  estates,  41. 
less  than  freehold,  71. 
liability  to  judgment  lien,  566. 
life  estates,  41,  71. 

limited  by  habendum  clause  in  deed,  274. 
modified  fees,  41. 
present,  71. 
pur  autre  vie,  41,  71. 
qualified  fee,  41. 

registration  of  legal  and  equitable  estates,  952. 
remainders,  71. 
reservations,  71. 
shifting  uses,  71. 

subject  to  adverse  possession,  693. 
subject  to  mechanics'  liens,  536. 
tenancy  in  common,  71. 
tenancy  in  coparcenary,  71. 


1050  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

ESTATES— Continued. 

tenancy  in  entirety,  71. 

tenancy  in  tail,  after  possibility  of  issue  extinct,  41,  71. 

upon  condition,  41. 

nature,  54. 
upon  conditional  limitation,  41. 

nature,  56. 
upon  limitation,  41. 

nature,  55. 

ESTATES  OF  INHERITANCE, 
defined  and  classified,  41. 

ESTOPPEL, 

by  deed,  effect,  99. 

recitals,  99. 

who  are  bound,  99. 
decrees,  575. 
in  pais,  municipality,  100. 

requisites,  100. 

who  may  be  bound,  100. 
married  women  by  deed  without  covenants,  322. 
mortgagor  subsequently  acquiring  title,  427. 
requisites  of  estoppel  by  deed,  99. 
requisites  of  estoppel  by  record,  98. 
title  by,  92. 

requisites,  97. 

EVIDENCE, 

birth  or  legitimacy  of  children,  740. 
maps  and  plats  as  evidence,  240. 
payment  of  mortgage,  429. 
proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

heirship,  738. 

of  title  under  execution  sale,  623. 

title  under  judicial  sale,  599. 
public  records  as  evidence  of  title,  118. 
service  of  process,  662. 
signature  of  grantor  in  Illinois,  793. 
title,  78. 
title  by  adverse  possession,  700. 

tax  deeds,  644. 
title  not  registered  under  Torrens  System,  954. 
unrecorded  affecting  title,  510. 
where  records  are  destroyed,  29. 

EXAMINATION, 

abstract,  745-773. 

abstract  should  begin  at  original  sources,  749. 

distinguished  from  abstract,  4. 

scope  and  extent,  161. 

separate  examination  not  reqiured  in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

Maine,  799. 

Maryland,  800. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Mississippi.  804. 

Missouri,  805. 


INDEX  1051 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

EXAUmATJO'^— Continued. 

Nebraska.  807. 

New  Mexico,  811. 

Ohio,  815. 

Oregon,  817. 

Texas,  823. 

Vermont,  825. 

Virginia,  826. 
separate  examination  of  wife  in  New  Jersey,  810. 

North  Carolina,  813. 

South  Carolina.  820. 

Tennessee,  822. 
time  must  be  given  for  examination  of  abstract,  35. 
verdict  of  jury  in  action  of  title,  665. 

EXAMINERS, 

perusal  of  abstract  and  opinion  of  title,  745-773. 

EXCEPTIONS, 

in  deeds,  275. 

EXECUTION, 

See  Execution  Sales  ;  Judicial  Sales. 

against  estate  of  decedent  for  debts,  736. 

as  lien,  522. 

deed  in  proper  form  prerequisite  to  recording,  120. 

deeds  in  different  states.  780-830. 

effect  upon  title  to  land  in  Michigan,  802. 

form  of  will  in  New  York.  922. 

patents  or  grants  from  government,  752. 

sales  contrasted  with  judicial  sales,  590. 

sheriff's   deed  thereon.  347. 

title  thereunder.  612.  613. 

writ,  levy  and  return.  614,  615. 

EXECUTION  SALES, 

application  of  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor,  364. 

assignment  of  officers'  certificate,  622. 

certificate  of  purchase,  621. 

deed  as  essential  to  pass  title,  621. 

deed  to  heirs  of  purchaser,  622. 

defined  and  distinguished,  610. 

effect  of  death  of  judgment  plaintiff  or  defendant  before  execution,  618. 

effect  of  irregularities,  611. 

effect  of  irregularities  in  appraisement,  611. 

effect  of  want  of  title  by  execution  defendant,  611. 

effect  on  dower  rights,  620. 

essentials  of  writ,  614. 

exemption  of  real  estate,  619. 

functions  of  cfHoer  making  sale,  610. 

levy  and  return  of  execution,  615. 

necessity  of  conveyance  to  purchaser,  613. 

necessity  of  strict  compliance  with  law,  610. 

notice  of  sale,  616. 

place  of  sale,  611. 

proof  of  publication  of  notice,  617. 

proof  of  title,  623. 


1052  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

EXECUTION  SALKS— Continued. 

status  pending  expiration  of  time  for  redemption,  613. 

validity  and  effect,  611. 

when  title  vests  in  purchaser,  613. 

writ,  614. 

EXECUTORS. 

apphcation  of  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  to  dealings,  364. 

deeds  by.  359. 

devises  to,  480. 

examination  of  deed  by,  in  abstract,  756. 

examination  of  sales  thereby  in  abstract,  764. 

trustees,  480. 

EXEMPTION, 

homestead,  conveyance  in  Colorado,  785. 

homestead,  from  execution  or  forced  sale  in  Idaho,  792. 

homestead  from  mortgage  foreclosure  in  Kentucky,  797. 

homestead  property  in  Louisiana,  798. 

of  homestead  from  judicial  sale  in  Iowa,  795. 

real  estate  from  execution,  619. 

real  estate  from  judgments,  572. 

taxation,  631. 

EXPECTANCY, 

conveyances,  invalid,  334. 
estates  defined  and  classified,  41. 


FALSE  DESCRIPTIONS, 
property  in  wills,  460. 

FEDERAL  COURTS. 

application  of  state  lis  pendens  statutes,  550. 
duration  of  lien  of  judgments,  564. 
lien  of  judgments,  563. 

FEE  SIMPLE, 

estate  created  by  will,  46. 

estate   passed   by  omission  of  words  "heirs  and  assigns"   from  will, 

915-520. 
estate  defined  and  construed,  41,  42. 
limitations  and  restrictions  in  transfers,  47. 

FEES, 

registry  under  Torrens  System,  957. 

FEE  TAIL, 

estate  defined,  48. 

FEUDAL  SYSTEM, 

affecting  mortgage  of  land,  415. 
allodial  titles,  72. 
military  service,  87. 

FIDUCIARIES, 

purchasing  at  their  own  sales,  363. 


INDEX  1053 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
FILING, 

account  as  essential  to  validity  of  mechanics'  lien,  538. 

FINDINGS, 

basis  of  decrees,  578. 

FIRE  INSURANCE, 

plaintiff  in  action  on  policy  can  not  be  required  to  furnish  abstract,  28. 

FIXTURES, 

right  of  purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  593. 

FLORIDA, 

statutes,  governing  execution  of  wills,  899. 
of  descent,  844. 
pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  789. 

FLORIDA  DONATION  ACT, 
source  of  title,  202. 


FORCED  HEIRS, 

in  Porto  Rico,  930. 


See  Heirs. 


FORECLOSURE, 

by  entry  and  possession.  444,  445. 

requisites,  445. 
by  equitable  suit,  447,  674. 
by  power  of  sale,  446. 
essentials  of  decree,  578. 

examination  of  sale  thereunder  in  abstract,  76L 
extra-state  jurisdiction,  655. 
jurisdiction,  654,  656. 
mechanics'  liens,  538. 
service  of  process  by  publication,  661. 

FOREIGN  DEEDS, 

full  faith  and  credit,  in  Alaska,  781. 
in  Arizona,  782. 
in  Arkansas.  783. 
in  California,  784. 
in  Colorado,  785. 
in  Connecticut,  786. 
in  Delaware,  787. 
in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 
in  Florida,  789. 
in  Idaho,  792. 
in  Illinois,  793. 
in  Iowa,  795. 
in  Kansas,  796. 
in  Maine,  799. 
in  Maryland,  800. 
in  Massachusetts,  801. 
in  Michigan,  802. 
in  Minnesota,  803. 
in  Mississippi,  804. 
in  Missouri,  805. 
in  Montana,  806. 


1054 


INDEX 


[Refcrcficcs  arc  to  Sections.] 

FOREIGN  DEEDS— Conthmcd. 
in  Nebraska,  807. 
in  Nevada,  808. 
in  New  Jersey,  810. 
in  New  Mexico,  811. 
in  North  Dakota,  814. 
in  Ohio,  815. 
in  Rhode  Island,  819. 

FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS,     • 
liens,  584. 

FOREIGN  WILLS, 

accredited  in  various  states,  890-942. 

probate.  493. 

transcript  of  probate,  493. 

FORFEITURE, 

acquisition  of  title,  92,  113. 
collection  of  taxes,  637. 
contract  for  conveyances,  399. 

FORMS, 

abstracting  decrees,  579. 
acknowledgment  of  deeds,  285. 
action  for  divorce  and  alimony,  676. 
affidavits,  509. 
attachment,  553. 
bankruptcy  preceding,  383. 
certificate,  of  abstracter,  174. 

of  entry  on  foreclosure,  444. 

of  proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

of  sale  on  execution,  621. 

of  tax  sale,  641. 
condemnation  proceedings,  677. 
contract  for  conveyance,  396. 
declaration  of  trusts,  339. 
decree,  578. 
deeds,  administrator's  360. 

by  attorney  in  fact,  335. 

by  corporation,  332. 

commissioners,  353. 

of  surrender,  308. 

of  trustee  in  bankruptcy,  384. 

statutory  form,  304. 

trust,  441. 

trustees,  357. 

warranty,  299,  300. 
discharge  in  bankruptcy,  385. 
execution  sale,  616. 

forfeiture  for  nonpayment  of  taxes,  637. 
general  index,  131. 
index  of  judgments,  153. 
index  of  tax  sales,  152. 
instrument  number  index,  149. 
judgments,  568. 
leases.  406. 
legislative  grant,  188. 


INDEX  1055 

[References  are  to  Sections.l 

FORMS— Continued. 

mortgage  and  assignment,  440. 

notice  of  lis  pendens,  550. 

official  certificate,  505. 

original  entries,  148. 

partition  deeds,  327. 

partitions,  670. 

party-wall  agreement  affecting  title,  507. 

patents,  230. 

plat  and  subdivision,  242. 

powers  of  attorney,  336. 

probate  of  will,  490. 

probate  sales,  603. 

proof  of  publication,  617. 

receipt  of  local  land  office,  195. 

release  of  dower,  325. 

release  of  mortgage,  443. 

re-record,  288. 

revocation  of  power  of  attorney,  337. 

satisfaction  of  judgment,  573. 

sheriff's  deed,  351. 

special  assessments,  647. 

statement  for  grant  for  internal  improvement,  211. 

of  private  entry,  194. 

of  town-site  entry,  216. 
suit  for  specific  performances,  666. 
tax  deed,  643. 
tax  sale,  636. 
title  bond,  400. 
tract  index,  150. 
vacation  of  plat,  243. 
vacation  of  streets,  501. 
wills,  487,  490. 

FRANCHISE, 

subject  to  descent,  722. 

FRAUD, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

jurisdiction  to  cancel  mortgage  for  fraud,  656. 

FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCES, 
what  constitutes,  315. 

FREE  FROM  INCUMBRANCES, 
requisites  of  title,  6. 

FREEHOLD  ESTATES, 

defined  and  classified,  41. 

FRENCH  GRANTS, 

source  of  title,  214. 

FULL  FAITH  AND  CREDIT, 

foreign  deeds  in  various  states,  781-819. 

foreign  judgments  and  decrees,  584. 

given  to  defective  acknowledgment  after  registry  in  Arizona,  782. 


1056  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

FURTHER  ASSURANCE. 

covenant  of,  in  jJeed,  278. 

FUTURE  ESTATES.  f 

common-law  estates  in  futuro,  311. 


GENERAL  LAND  OFFICE, 

right  of  officers,  clerks  and  employes  to  acquire  title  to  public  lands,  183. 

GEORGIA. 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  900. 

statutes  of  descent,  845. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  790. 

GIFTS. 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

constituting  advancement.  737. 

constituting  estate  subject  to  inheritance  in  various  states,  835-884. 

construction  of  gifts  created  by  will,  459. 

deed  of  must  be  recorded,  119. 

dependent  on  death  of  beneficiary,  476. 

descent  of  estate  to  beneficiary  dying  before  testator,  734. 

disposition  of  gifts  by  will  at  death  of  donee  in  various  states,  890-942. 

to  trustees  by  will,  463. 

use  of  words  of  general  description  in  wills,  460. 

use,  possession,  rents,  profits  and  income  under  will,  470. 

GOOD  FAITH. 

in  entry  of  adverse  possession,  687. 

GOOD  TITLE  OF  RECORD, 
requisites,  6. 

GRAMMATICAL  CONSTRUCTION, 

wills,  487. 

GRANDCHILDREN, 

inclusion  as  children,  717. 

GRANTEE, 

at  tax  sale,  caveat  emptor.  639. 
description  of  corporations,  329. 
name  and  description  in  deed,  263. 
of  purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  title,  594. 

GRANTOR, 

liens,  530. 

name  and  description  in  deed,  262. 

GRANTS. 

abstracting  legislative  grants.- 188. 
abstract  should  contain  full  summary.  5. 
acquisition  of  profits  a  prendre  by  grant,  63. 
by  king  of  England,  source  of  title,  181. 
direct  legislative  grants  by  congress,  186,  187. 


INDEX  1057 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

GRANTS— Continued. 

form  for  abstracting,  188. 
official  by  state  or  federal  officers,  94. 
public,  from  state  or  federal  government,  95. 
title  by,  92. 

deeds  acknowledged  therein  accredited  in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

GUARDIAN, 

deed  by,  362. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 

examination  of  sales  thereby  in  abstract,  764. 

GUARDIAN  AD  LITEM,  . 

appointment  for  incapacitated  parties,  571. 

H 

HABENDUM, 

can  not  defeat  premises  in  deeds,  274. 
formal  part  of  deed,  260. 
office,  in  creating  estates,  45. 

in  creating  conditional  estate,  312. 

HALF-BLOOD.  ,^  , ,     ^  _^ 

inheritance  by  collaterals  of  the  half-blood,  708. 
inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 
kindred,  730. 

HAWAII,  ^     .„     ^^, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  901.  r  j     j     'rni 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  /yi. 

HEIRS, 

See  Half-Blood. 

declaration   by  decedent   properly   acknowledged   constituting  heir   in 

Arkansas,  838. 
effect  of  use  of  word  in  will,  464,  465. 
entitled  to  inherit  property  in  different  states,  835-884. 
father  as  heir  of  legitimate  child,  719. 
forced  heirs,  715. 

parties  to  sales  of  decedent's  property,  602. 
proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy,  740. 
proof  of  heirship,  738. 
survivor  and  spouse,  716. 
use  of  word  to  create  estate,  45,  46,  48. 
what  included,  714. 

HOMESTEAD, 

bar  bv  conveyance  of  property  in  Ohio,  815. 

bar  of  homestead  right  by  joint  deed  in  New  Hampshire,  809. 

conveyance  by  deed  in  Arkansas,  783. 

conveyance  by  husband  and  wife  in  Georgia,  790. 

in  Idaho,  792. 

in  Iowa,  795. 

67— Thomp.  Abstr. 


1058  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

UOUESTEA'D— Continued. 

in  Kansas,  796. 

in  Minnesota,  803. 

in  Mississippi,  804. 

in  Missouri,  805. 

in  Montana,  806. 

in  New  Jersey,  810. 

in  Nortli  Carolina.  813. 

in  North  Dakota,  814. 

in  Oklahoma,  816. 

in  South  Carolina,  820. 

in  South  Dakota,  821. 

in  Tennessee,  822. 

in  Texas,  823. 

in  Utah,  824. 
conveyance  in  Arizona,  782. 

in  California,  784. 

in  Colorado,  785. 

in  Florida,  789. 

in  Nebraska,  807. 
conveyance  must  be  joint  in  Vermont,  825. 

in  Virginia,  826. 

in  Washington,  827. 

in  Wisconsin,  829. 

in  Wyoming,  830. 
conveyance  or  incumbrance  in  Nebraska,  807. 

in  Nevada,  808. 

in  New  Mexico,  811. 
decreed  as  alimony  in  divorce  proceedings,  676. 
defined  and  construed,  66. 
essentials  of  conveyance  in  Alabama,  780. 
estates  on  which  homestead  exemptions  may  be  claimed,66. 
exemption,  572. 

in  Louisiana,  798. 
force  of  statutes  creating  homesteads,  66. 
includes  dwelling  house  and  appurtenances  in  Kentucky,  797. 
land  and  dwelling  house  thereon  in  California,  784. 
method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
mortgage,  431. 

persons  who  may  claim  homestead,  66. 
release  by  conveyance  of  property  in  Illinois,  793. 

joinder  in  conveyance  in  Massachusetts,  801. 
release  of  waiver  in  conveyance  of  property  in  Kentucky,  797. 
requirements,  200. 
source  of  title.  200,  201. 
validity  of  conveyance  in  Michigan,  802. 
waiver  by  conveyance  in  Louisiana,  798. 

HOMICIDE, 

inheritance  by  person  causing  death  of  intestate,  733. 
in  Indiana,  848. 

HOTCHPOT, 

advancements  to  heir  must  be  brought  in  hotchpot,  849,  854,  856,  859, 
869,  874,  875,  876,  880,  882. 


INDEX  1059 

[References  are  to  Sections."] 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, 

See  Married  Women. 

adoption  of  child  by  one  without  consent  of  the  other,  718. 
capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 
conveyances  between,  323. 

in  New  Hampshire,  809. 

in  New  York,  812. 

in  North  Dakota,  814. 

in  Utah,  824. 
conveyance  to,  estates  by  entireties,  321. 
estate  of  intestate  wife  not  liable  for  husband's  debts,  736. 
heirs  of  each  other,  716. 
inheritance  as  next  of  kin,  729. 
joinder  in  conveyance  of  property  in  Alabama,  780. 

in  Alaska,  781. 

in  Arizona,  782. 

in  Arkansas,  783. 

in  California,  784. 

in  Colorado,  785. 

in  Connecticut,  786. 

in  Delaware,  787. 

in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

in  Florida,  789. 

in  Georgia,  790. 

in  Hawaii,  791. 

in  Idaho,  792. 

in  Illinois,  793. 

in   Indiana,  794. 

in  Iowa,  795. 

in  Kentucky,  797, 

in  Maryland,  800. 

in  Michigan,  802. 

in  Minnesota,  803. 

in  Missouri,  805. 

in  Montana,  806. 

in  New  Jersey,  810. 

in  New  Mexico,  811. 

in  New  York,  812. 

in  North  Carolina,  813. 

in  Oklahoma,  816. 

in  Oregon,  817. 

in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

in  Texas,  823. 

in  Vermont,  825. 

in  Virginia,  826. 

in  Washington,  827. 

in  West  Virginia,  828. 

in  Wyoming,  830. 
not  descendants  of  each  other,  713. 

property   may  be   conveyed    without   joinder   of    the   other   in    South 
Dakota,  821. 

I 

IDAHO, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  792. 

governing  execution  of  wills,  902. 
statutes  of  descent,  846. 


1060  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
IDEM  SONANS. 

in  decree,  580-582. 

ILLEGITIMATE  CHILDREN. 

capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 

heirs,  719. 

inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 

right  to  inherit  from  legitimate  brothers  and  sisters,  719. 

ILLINOIS, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  793. 

execution  of  wills,  903. 
statutes  of  descent,  847. 

IMPOSSIBLE   CONDITIONS, 
effect  in  wills,  462. 

IMPRISONMENT, 

affecting  descent,  706. 

INCOME, 

transfer  by  will,  470. 

INCUMBRANCES, 

See  Liens  ;  Mortgages. 

assessment  and  levy  of  tax,  632. 

certificate  under  Torrens  System,  957. 

conveyances  subject  to,  316. 

covenant  against,  in  deeds,  278. 

easements,  61. 

examination  in  abstract,  770. 

liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 

registered  land  under  Torrens  System,  951. 

restriction  on  use  constituting,  277. 

should  appear  in  abstract,  5.  }j^ 

INDEX, 

as  part  of  record,  132. 

bondsmen,  528. 

form  of  tract  index,  150. 

general  index  of  records,  requirements  and  form,  131. 

instrument  numbers,   149. 

instruments  deemed  recorded  when  noted  in  index,  131. 

irregular  conveyances,   151. 

judgment,  134,  153,  567. 

as  essential  to  lien,  522. 
miscellaneous  index  and  reference  books,  154. 
tax  sales,  152. 

tract  index  of  abstracter,  145,  150. 
INDIANA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  794. 

execution  of  wills,  904. 
statutes  of  descent,  848. 

INDIANS, 

acknowledgment  of   deeds  by  agent  or   superintendent  accredited   in 
South  Dakota,  821. 


INDEX  1061 

[References  are  to  Sections.^ 

INDORSEMENTS, 

form  of  will,  487. 

INFANTS, 

capacity  to  make  will,  457, 

examination  of  sales  in  abstract,  764. 

judgments  against,  571. 

judicial  sale  of  property,  590. 

may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

personal  service  of  process  upon,  660. 

setting  aside  judgment  after  attaining  majority,  571. 

INHERITANCE, 

See  Descent  and  DisTRreuxioN. 

advancements,  737. 

by  adopted  children,  718. 

by  and  through  aliens,  732. 

by  heir  through  murderer,  723. 

by  parents  of  intestate,  731. 

by  person  causing  death  of  intestate,  7ZZ. 

computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

devolution  of  real  property  on  death  of  ancestor,  723. 

estate  of  devisee  dying  before  testator,  734. 

estates  of  minors  not  married,  727. 

forced  heirs,  715. 

from  ancestors,  707. 

illegitimate  from  legitimate  children,  719. 

issue  defined,  712. 

kindred  of  the  half-blood,  730. 

laws  determining  title  by  descent,  86. 

liability  for  debts  of  decedent,  736. 

lines  of  descent  defined,  725. 

next  of  kin  defined,  729. 

per  stirpes  and  per  capita,  710. 

pretermitted  children,  720. 

proof  of  heirship,  738. 

release  of  expectant  share  to  ancestor,  735. 

statutes  governing  descent  of  property,  724. 

taken  by  representatives,  711. 

title  by  descent,  705-741. 

words  of,  in  deed,  268. 

INITIALS, 

effect  of  omission  in  judgment  or  decree,  581. 

INJUNCTIONS, 
defined,  667. 

INSANE  PERSONS, 

examination  of  sales  thereby  in  abstracts,  764. 

husband  or  wife  affecting  form  of  conveyance  in  Arkansas,  783. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Delaware,  787. 
judgment  against,  571. 
judicial  sale  of  property,  590. 

INSANITY,    _ 

terminating  power  of  attorney,  2Z7. 


1062  INDEX 

[References  arc  to  Sections.} 
INSOLVENCY, 

laws  governing,  377. 

INSTRUMENT  NUMBERS, 
form  of  index,  149. 

inserted  in  books  of  original  entries,  149. 
separate  index  should  be  kept,  149. 

INSTRUMENTS, 

affecting  title  adversely,  686. 

description  in  operative  part  should  appear  in  abstract,  5. 

required  to  be  recorded,  118,  119. 

rescission  and  cancellation,  affecting  title,  673.  1. 

INSURANCE, 
of  title,  79. 

i; 

INTENT,  * 

consideration  in  construction  of  wills  as  to  description  of  property,  460. 
determining  construction  of  wills,  459. 
equitable  liens,  516. 

shown  by  operative  words  of  will,  463.  t. 

testator  as  to  devisee,  481.  * 

INTEREST,  I 

in  property  transferred  by  wills  in  various  states,  890-942.  ; 

synonymous  with  estate,  40. 
subject  to  descent,  722. 
vendee's  lien,  531. 

INTERNAL  IMPROVEMENT  GRANTS, 
method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of  titles,  210. 

INTESTACY, 

advancements,  737. 

descent  of  estate  by  death  of  devisee  before  testator,  734. 

establishment  of  fact,  91. 

inheritance  by  parents,  731. 

result   of   incapacity   of    devisee   to    hold    property   in    various    states, 

890-942. 
right  of  posthumous  children,  721. 

IOWA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  795. 

execution  of  wills,  905. 
statutes  of  descent,  849. 

IRREGULAR  CONVEYANCES, 
index,  151 

ISSUE, 

"child  of  the  body",  712. 
substitution  for  heirs,  48. 
what  included  in  the  term,  712. 


INDEX  1063 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

J 
JOINDER, 

See  Husband  and  Wife. 

of  husband  in  deed  by  wife,  322. 

JOINT  ESTATES, 

defined  and  classified,  41. 

JOINT  OWNERS, 

title  by  adverse  possession  between,  696. 

•  JOINT  TENANCY, 

action  of  partition,  670. 

JOINTURE, 

acceptance,  bar  of  dower  in  Michigan,  802. 

New  York,  812. 

Oregon,  817. 
bar  of  interest  by  descent  in  husband's  land  in  Maine,  799. 

JUDGES, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 
Alaska,  781. 
Arkansas,  783. 
California,  784. 
Colorado,  785. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Delaware,  787. 
District  of  Columbia,  788. 
Florida,  789. 
Georgia,  790. 
Hawaii,  791. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana,  794. 
Iowa,  795. 
Kansas.  796. 
Kentucky,  797. 
Maryland,  800. 
Michigan,  802. 
Minnesota,  803. 
Mississippi,  804. 
Missouri,  805. 
Montana,  806. 
Nebraska,  807. 
Nevada,  808. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  Mexico,  811. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Ohio,  815. 
Oklahoma.  816. 
Oregon,  817. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 


1064  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sectwns.'\ 

JUDGES— CoH/i;!»r(/. 

South  Dakota,  821. 
Texas,  823. 
Utah,  824. 
Vermont,  825. 
Virginia,  826. 
Washington,  827. 
Wisconsin,  829. 
Wyoming,  830. 
acknowledgment  of   foreign   deeds  accredited  in   District  of   Colum- 
bia, 788.  '■ 
Illinois,  793.                                                                                                          i 
Nevada.  808. 
North  Dakota,  814. 

South  Dakota,  821.  ■ 

Utah,  824.  i_ 

JUDGMENTS,  f  " 

See  Decrees. 
abstracting,  569. 
against  deceased  party,  570. 
against  infants  and  insane  persons,  571. 
annulment  by  infant  party  attaining  majority,  571. 
as  lien,  522. 

assignment  of  dower,  675. 
collateral  attack  on  judgment  for  taxes,  646. 
conformity  to  issues,  561. 
defined,  560. 

docketing  as  essential  to  lien,  522. 
docketing,  recording  and  indexing,  567.  . 
duration  of  lien,  564. 
effect,  561. 

examination  of  liens  in  abstract,  768. 
exemptions  of  real  estate,  571. 
finality,  561. 
for  taxes,  646. 

foreign  judgments  and  decrees,  584. 
formal  requisites,  568. 
form  of  index,  153. 
in  attachment,  553. 
index,  153. 

judgment  records,  134. 
issuance  of  execution  as  essential  to  lien,  562. 
jurisdiction  to  vacate,  656. 
liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 
lien  of  federal  court  judgments,  563. 
liens,  562. 

priority  of  lien  with  reference  to  mechanics'  lien,  535. 
property  covered  by  lien,  562. 
property  or  interest  liable  to  lien,  566. 
rank  and  priority  of  liens,  565. 
record  constructive  notice,  580-582. 
satisfaction  and  discharge,  573.' 
statutory  liens,  517. 
territorial  extent  of  lien,  563. 
transcripts  to  other  counties  for  purposes  of  lien,  563. 


II 


INDEX  1065 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
JUDICIAL  PROCEEDINGS, 

See  Execution.    ■ 
abstract  should  contain  full  summary,  5. 

JUDICIAL  SALES, 

application  of  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor,  364. 

certificate  of  purchase,  598. 

defined  and  distinguished,  590. 

distinguished  from  execution  sales,  590. 

effect  of  confirmation,  59L 

effect  to  discharge  liens,  593. 

effect  to  transfer  land,  590. 

examination  in  abstract,  762. 

not  within  statute  of  frauds,  595. 

order  confirming,  596,  597. 

presumptions  pertaining  to,  600. 

proceedings  for  possession  on  confirmation,  598. 

proof  of  title,  599. 

purchasers'  title,  592. 

refusal  to  complete  purchase,  595. 

registered  land,  951. 

resale  for  failure  of  purchaser  to  comply  with  bid,  595. 

right  of  bidder  to  withdraw  bid,  595. 

right  of  grantee  of  purchaser,  594. 

right  to  possession  on  confirmation,  597. 

rights  conferred  by  acceptance  of  bid,  595. 

rights  of  purchaser,  593. 

title  to  fixtures,  593. 

under  orders  and  decrees  of  probate  court,  601,  602. 

validity  and  effect,  591. 

JURISDICTION. 

action  for  assignment  of  dower,  675. 

affecting  validity  of  execution  sale,  611,  613. 

appearance  without  process,  663. 

bankruptcy  courts,  378. 

extra  state  jurisdiction,  655. 

in  rem  and  in  personam,  652. 

lands  in  another  state,  655. 

local  actions,  656. 

necessitjr  that  record  show  fact,  653. 

not  conferred  by  consent  of  parties,  650. 

notice  as  basis.  652. 

particular  actions,  656. 

particular  actions  affecting  real  estate,  656. 

probate  courts,  653. 

probate  of  wills,  491. 

foreign  wills,  493. 
suit  for  foreclosure  of  mortgage  in  equity,  674. 
to  hear  and  determine  cases  affecting  real  estate,  650-656. 
transitory  actions,  656. 

JURY, 

submission  of  equitable  action  involving  legal  issues,  665. 

to  assess  benefits  and  damages  in  condemnation  proceedings,  677. 

trial  on  registration  of  title,  952. 


1066  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

JUSTICES  OF  THE  PEACE, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 

Arizona,  781. 

Arkansas,  783. 

California,  784. 

Colorado,  785. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Delaware,  787. 

District  of  Columbia,  788. 

Florida,  789. 

Georgia,  790, 

Idaho,  792. 

Illinois,  793. 

Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kansas,  796. 

Maryland,  800. 

Maine,  799. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Michigan,  802. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Mississippi,  804. 

Missouri,  805. 

Montana,  806. 

Nebraska,  807. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Hampshire,  809, 

New  Mexico,  811. 

New  York,  812. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Oklahoma,  816. 

Oregon,  817. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Rhode  Island,  819, 

Vermont,  825. 

Virginia,  826. 

Washington,  827. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

Wyoming,  830. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Connecticut,  786. 

Massachusetts,  801. 
duration  of  lien  of  judgments,  564. 
lien  of  judgments,  562,  564. 


K 

KANSAS, 

statutes  of  descent,  850. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  796. 
execution  of  wills,  906. 

KENTUCKY, 

statutes  of  descent,  851. 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  797. 
governing  execution  of  wills,  907. 


INDEX  1067 

[References  are  to  Sectiotis.] 
KINDRED, 

brothers  and  sisters  in  collateral  line,  728. 

canon  of  descent  distinguished  from  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

computing  degree,  726. 

half-blood,  730. 

inheritance  from  ancestor,  708. 

next  of  kin  defined,  729. 

KNOWLEDGE, 

constituting  notice,  127. 


LACHES, 

loss  of  exemption  from  execution,  619. 

LAND, 

See  Real  Property. 

ascertainment  of  quantity,  250-257. 

conveyance  or  incumbrance  of  registered  land.  959. 

joinder  in  application  for  registration  under  Torrens  System,  951. 

LAND  CERTIFICATE, 

assignment  not  necessary  to  be  recorded,  119. 

LAND  CONTRACTS, 

See  Contracts  for  Conveyances. 

LAND  DEPARTMENT, 

authority  as  to  entry  of  public  lands,  191. 
power  to  dispose  of  public  lands,  184. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT, 

See  Leases. 

LANDLORD'S  LIEN, 

priorities  with  reference  to  attachments,  552. 

LAND  WARRANTS, 

interest  of  intestate  therein  subject  to  descent,  722. 
source  of  title,  203. 

LANGUAGE, 
wills,  487. 

LAPSED  DEVISE. 

inclusion  in  residuary  devise,  485. 

LEAD  PENCIL. 

use  in  writing  will,  487. 

LEASEHOLD  ESTATES, 

mortgage  and  assignment  thereof  must  be  recorded,  119. 


1068  INDEX 

[References  arc  tc  Sections.] 
LEASES, 

affected  by  mechanics'  liens,  536.  ^ 

assignments,  408. 

covenants,  407. 

defined  and  distinguished,  405. 

estates  liable  to  judgment  lien,  566. 

formal  parts,  406. 

inclusion  in  abstract,  529. 

leases  as  liens,  529. 

mechanics'  liens,  536. 

tenant  as  purchaser  at  tax  sale,  638. 

unexpired  term  not  subject  to  descent,  722. 

whether  liens,  529. 

LEGACIES, 

devise,  charged  with  payment,  473. 
lapse,  483. 

by  death  of  devisee,  483, 

LEGAL  DISABILITY, 

title  of  persons  thereunder  may  not  be  acquired  adversely,  697. 

LEGAL  ESTATES, 

defined  and  classified,  41. 

LEGAL  HEIRS, 

who  were  heirs  of  deceased  owner  under  foreign  administration  not 
necessary  to  appear  in  abstract,  5. 

LEGALIZING  ACTS, 

acknowledgment  before  clerks  legalized  in  Michigan,  802. 
acknowledgment  of  corporations  by  interested  officer  validated  in  North 

Carolina,  813. 
acknowledgment  of  deed  in  New  York,  812. 

Oklahoma,  816. 
acknowledgments  of  notary  in  Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

North  Dakota,  814. 
certificates  of  justice  of  the  peace  validated  in  North  Carolina,  813. 
conveyances  without  witnesses  validated  in  Washington,  827. 
deed  in  Alabama,  780. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Delaware,  787. 
deeds  acknowledged  before  registrar  of  deeds  validated  in  Wiscon- 
sin, 829. 
defective  assessment,  634. 
validating,  irregularities,  289 
unsealed  instruments  validated  in  Wisconsin,  829 

LEGAL  TITLE, 

defined,  74. 

LEGISLATIVE  ENACTMENTS, 
inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

LETTERS, 

affecting  title,  508. 
'nclusion  in  abstract,  500. 
probate  as  wills,  487. 


1069 


[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

LEVY, 

attachment,  553. 

execution,  615. 

local  assessments,  647. 

LEX  REI  SITAE,  ... 

affecting  validity  of  execution  sale,  611,  tU. 
-overning  descent  and  distribution,  7^4. 
governing  devise  of  real  property,  4bb. 
furisdktion  of  suits  concerning  real  estate,  650-654. 

LIABILITY,  •  r.r. 

of  abstracter  for  negligence,  15-ZU. 
public  officers  searching  titles,  Zl. 

LICENSES,         ^  ,    ^- 

defined  and  construed,  bZ. 
distinguished  from  easements,  61. 

LIENS.  . 

abstracting,  519. 
action  to  enforce.  656. 
arising  under  devises.  526. 

under  trusts,  532. 
assignment  of  mechanics  liens,  53/,  i)3». 
attachment,  523. 
decedents'  debts,  523. 
decrees,  577. 

defined  and  classified,  515. 
discharge  by  judicial  sale,  5v3. 
dower  right,  521. 
duration  of  judgment  lien,  564. 
enforcement  of  mechanics  hens,  538. 

S.fo?  property  subiec,  to  „,echanics-  liens   536^ 
formal  requisites  ol  judgments  to  operate  as  hens,  568. 

foWefof  TudgmtnUiefas  purchaser  a.  tax  sale,  638. 

r„  ^re?diS;"s"o"r;?iieMitle  under  Torrens  System,  956. 
judgment,  562. 

i"ud|rnls^"dtenrnr,rpon-'doeketing,  indexing  and  recording.  567. 
judgments  for  taxes,  646. 

iSityof  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 

mechanics',  533. 

mortgage  520. 

municipal  taxes.  520,  5^/. 

official  bonds,  528.  _  - 

of  record  should  appear  m  abstract,  5. 

operation  and  effect,  518. 

persons  bound,  518. 

priority  of  attachment  hens,  55^. 

prioritv  of  mechanics'  liens,  535. 

nroperty  covered  by  judgment,  bbl. 

propertv  or  interest  liable  to  judgment  lien,  566. 

rank  and  priority  of  judgment  hens,  565. 


1070  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.} 

LIENS — Continued. 

statutory,  517.  526,  528. 
subcontractor's  mechanics'  lien,  534. 
taxes,  632. 

territorial  extent  of  judgment  lien,  563. 
vendee's  lien  for  purchase-money,  531. 
when  equitable  lien  arises,  516. 

LIFE  ESTATES, 

charge  upon  estate  of  inheritance  in  various  states,  835-884. 
conveyance  by  married  women  without  husbands  joining  in  New  Jer- 
sey, 810. 
interest  of  grantor  subject  to  descent,  722. 
judgment  liens,  566. 
nature,  49. 
with  power  of  disposition  devised  by  will,  472. 

LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS, 

conditional  in  wills,  475. 

effect  on  adverse  possession,  699. 

statute  does  not  run  against  government,  752. 

words  essential  to  conditional,  475. 

words  of  purchase  and  limitations  in  wills,  464. 

LINES  OF  DESCENT, 

defined,  725. 

LIS  PENDENS, 

attachment,  553. 

commencement  and  duration,  547. 

doctrine  explained,  545. 

effect  of  dismissal  of  action,  547. 

elements  necessary,  548. 

persons  charged  with  notice,  551. 

proceedings  to  which  doctrine  applies,  546. 

recording,  133. 

requisites  of  valid  notice,  550. 

statutory  provisions  for  record,  549. 

LITHOGRAPHY, 

use  in  will,  487. 

LOCAL  ACTIONS. 

jurisdiction,  656. 

LOCAL  ASSESSMENTS, 

collection  by  summary  methods,  647. 
distinguished  from  taxes,  647. 
liens  and  enforcement,  647. 

LOCAL  IMPROVEMENTS, 

assessments  as  liens,  527. 

LOCAL  LAND  OFFICE, 
form  of  receipt,  195. 
receipt  from  receiver  evidence  of  title,  195. 

LOST  INSTRUMENTS, 

certificates  of  registration  of  title,  959. 


I 


INDEX  1071 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
LOUISIANA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  798. 

execution  of  wills,  908. 
statutes  of  descent,  852. 

LOUISIANA  PURCHASE, 
sources  of  title,  214. 

M 

MAGISTRATE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

Vermont,  825. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Massachusetts,  801. 

MAGNA  CHARTA, 

provisions  as  to  dower,  65. 

MAINE, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  799. 

wills,  909. 
statutes  of  descent,  853. 

MAPS, 

dedication  by  maps  or  plats,  244. 
examination  of  dedications  in  abstracts,  760. 
required  to  be  recorded  in  some  states,  119. 

MARITIME  WILLS, 

in  Porto  Rico,  930. 

witnesses  of  wills  not  required  of  mariners  at  sea,  890-942. 

MARK, 

attestation  of  witness  by  mark  in  Georgia,  900. 

signature  of  deeds,  280. 

signature  of  will  by  mark  in  Pennsylvania,  928. 

MARKETABLE  TITLE, 
defined,  77. 
must  appear  in  abstract,  6. 

MARRIAGE, 

affidavits  to  establish,  508. 

certificates  as  proof  of  birth  and  legitimacy  of  children,  740. 

conditions  in  wills  restraining  marriage,  477. 

division  of  property  in  suit  to  annul,  676. 

effect  to  revoke  will,  486. 

heirs  at  common  law  includes  only  those  born  in  lawful  wedlock,  714. 

issue  of  marriage  declared  null  shall  be  legitimate,  883. 

legitimatizing  children,  719. 

merged  interests  of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee,  428. 

subsequent  to  execution  of  will  as  revocation,  890-942. 

Alaska,  891. 
terminating  power  of  attorney,  337. 

MARRIAGE  CONTRACT, 

limiting  estate  by  inheritance  in  Nevada,  862. 
Oklahoma,  870. 


1072  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
MARRIED  WOMEN, 

See  Community  Property;  Husband  and  Wife, 

adverse  possession  acquired  of  property  thereof,  693. 

acknowledgment  by,  324. 

acknowledgment  of  deed,  284. 

capacity  to  dispose  of  estate  by  will  in  various  states,  890-942. 

capacity  to  make  will,  457. 

capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 

conveyances  by,  322, 

Alabama,  780. 

Arizona,  782. 

Arkansas,  783. 

California,  784. 

Colorado,  785. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Delaware,  787. 

District  of  Columbia,  788. 

Florida.  789. 

Hawaii,  791. 

Idaho,  792. 

Illinois,  793. 

Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kansas,  796.  x  i 

Kentucky.  797.  f  v* 

Louisiana,  798. 

Maine,  799. 

Maryland,  800. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Michigan,  802. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Mississippi,  804. 

Montana.  806. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Hampshire,  809. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Oklahoma,  816. 

Oregon,  817. 

Rhode  Island,  819. 

South  Carolina,  820. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Utah,  824. 

Wisconsin,  829. 
conveyances  for  sole  and  separate  use,  320. 
devises  to  separate  use,  479. 
dower  rights  as  liens,  521. 
effect  of  execution  sale  on  dower  rights,  620. 
liability  on  covenants  in  joint  deed,  322. 
lis  pendens  affecting  debt  of  separate  estate,  546. 
may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694,  697. 
may  convey  property  without  husband's  consent  in  South  Dakota,  821. 


I 


INDEX  1073 

[References  arc  to  Sections.} 
MARYLAND, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  800. 

execution  of  wills,  910. 
statutes  of  descent,  854. 

MASSACHUSETTS, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  801. 

execution  of  wills,  911. 
statutes  of  descent,  855. 

MASTER  IN  CHANCERY, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Illinois,  793. 

Michigan,  802. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

Vermont,  825. 

Wisconsin,  829. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Michigan,  802. 

New  Jersey,  810. 
deed  by,  353. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 
report,  664. 

MATTER  IN  PAIS, 

examination  in  abstracts,  771. 

MAYOR. 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 

Colorado,  785. 

Delaware,  787. 

Illinois,  893. 

Indiana,  794. 

Kansas,  796. 

Mississippi,  804. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812. 

North  Carolina,  813. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Rhode  Island,  819. 

South  Dakota.  821. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Illinois,  793. 

Mississippi,  804. 

Missouri,  805. 

New  Jersey.  810. 

New  York.  812. 

Washington,  827. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

MEASUREMENTS. 

computation  of  land  areas  and  distances,  250. 
effect  of  use  of  words  "more  or  less,"  257. 
tables  of  measures  and  abbreviations,  251. 

MECHANICS'  LIENS, 

See  Liens. 

analogy  to  mortgages,  533. 
assertion  and  enforcement,  538. 
assignment,  537. 

68 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1074  INDEX 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

MECHANICS'  UF.NS— Continued. 
contract  as  basis,  533. 
estates  or  property  subject,  536. 
examination  in  abstract,  769. 
lapse,  538. 
priorities,  535. 

priorities  with  reference  to  attachments,  552. 
statutory,  517. 

MEMBER  OF  LEGISLATURE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Indiana,  794. 
Minnesota,  803. 

MEMORANDA, 

affecting  title,  508. 
inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

MERGER, 

contract  for  conveyances  and  deed,  390. 

contract  to  deliver  abstract  in  deed  and  mortgage,  33. 

interests  in  mortgage,  428. 

equitable  and  legal  estate  united  subject  to  descent,  722. 

MEXICAN  GRANTS, 

source  of  title,  214. 

MICHIGAN, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  802, 

execution  of  wills,  912. 
statutes  of  descent,  856. 

MILITARY  WILLS, 

in  Porto  Rico,  930. 

MINERAL  LAND  GRANTS, 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 

MINING  CLAIMS, 

interest  of  locater  subject  to  descent,  722. 

MINISTERS, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
California,  784. 
Connecticut,  786. 
Florida,  789. 
Hawaii,  791. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana.  794. 
Iowa,  795. 
Kentucky,  797. 
Louisiana,  798. 
Maine,  799. 
Maryland,  800. 
Massachusetts,  80L 
Minnesota,  803. 
Mississippi,  804. 


INDEX  1075 

[References  are  to  Sections.l 

MINISTERS— Confmwcif. 
Missouri,  805. 
Montana,  806. 
Nevada,  808. 
New  Hampshire,  809. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  Mexico,  811. 
North  Carolina,  813. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Rhode  Island,  819. 
South  Carolina,  820. 
South  Dakota,  821. 
Tennessee,  822. 
Texas,  823. 
Utah,  824. 
Vermont,  825. 

MINISTERS  EXTRAORDINARY, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781, 
Nebraska,  807. 
New  York,  812. 
Oregon,  817. 
Wisconsin,  829. 

MINISTERS  PLENIPOTENTIARY, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
Nebraska,  807. 
New  York,  812. 
Oregon,  817. 
Pennsylvania,  818. 
Virginia,  826. 
Washington,  827. 
West  Virginia,  828. 
Wisconsin,  829. 

MINISTERS  RESIDENT, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
Nebraska.  807. 
New  York,  812. 
Oregon,  817. 
Virginia,  826. 
Wisconsin,  829. 

MINNESOTA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  803. 

execution  of  wills,  913. 
statutes  of  descent,  857. 

MINORS, 

See  Infants. 

capacity  of  married  women  though  minor  to  execute  will  in  Florida, 

899. 
descent  of  estates,  727. 

MISNOMER, 

devisees  in  wills,  481. 

effect  in  judgments  or  decrees,  580. 

in  summons,  waived  by  appearance,  663. 


1076  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.'] 

MISREPRESENTATION, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

MISSISSIPPI,  ,    ^  r    ,      J      on.1 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  oU4. 

execution  of  wills,  914. 
statutes  of  descent,  858. 

MISSOURI,  ^  ^     ^     „.. 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  805. 

execution  of  wills,  915. 
statutes  of  descent,  859. 

MISSOURI  DONATION  ACT, 
source  of  title,  202. 

MISTAKE, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

in  instruments  affecting  title  adversely,  686. 

MODIFIED  FEES, 

defined  and  construed,  43. 

MONTANA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  806. 

execution  of  wills,  916. 
statutes  of  descent,  860. 

MONUMENTS, 

prevail  over  description,  272.  ^ 

MORTGAGES, 

absolute  deed  considered,  419. 

abstracting  mortgage  and  assignment,  440. 

actions  to  set  aside  foreclosure,  lis  pendens,  546. 

after-acquired  property,  432. 

assignment,  436,  437. 

assignment  and  extensions  must  be  recorded,  119. 

deed  under  power  of  sale,  358. 

definition,  origin  and  nature,  415. 

description  of  debt  secured  or  obligation  to  be  performed,  424. 

description  of  parties,  422. 

description  of  premises,  423. 

distinguished  from  other  transactions,  418. 

constituting  waiver  of  vendors'  lien,  530. 

conveyances  subject  to,  316. 

correction  of  errors  in  record,  435. 

covenants,  425,  426. 

effect  of  feudal  system,  415. 

equitable,  417. 

equitable  assignments,  439, 

equity  of  redemption,  420. 

essentials  of  decree  of  foreclosure,  578. 

estoppel  of  mortgagor  subsequently  acquiring  title,  427. 

examination  of  abstract,  757. 

extra  state  foreclosure,  655. 

foreclosure  by  entry  and  possession,  444. 


INDEX  1077 


[References  are  to  Sections.} 

MORTGAGES— Continued. 

foreclosure  in  equity,  447,  674. 

foreclosure  by  power  of  sale,  446. 

foreclosure  by  writ  of  entry,  445. 

formal  requisites,  421. 

homestead,  431. 

judicial  sales  under  foreclosure,  590. 

jurisdiction  of  actions  to  foreclose  or  cancel,  656. 

jurisdiction  of  foreclosure,  654. 

legal  and  equitable  theory,  416. 

hability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 

Hens,  520. 

merger  of  interest,  428. 

notice  of  unrecorded  mortgage,  535. 

parties  as  purchasers  at  tax  sale,  638. 

payment  or  discharge,  429. 

power  of  sale  contained  therein,  442. 

precedence  with  reference  to  mechanics'  liens,  535. 

primed  by  judgment  lien,  565. 

priority  of  purchase-money  mortgage,  430. 

purchase  money,  430. 

record  of  certificate  of  entry  on  foreclosure,  444. 

redemption  by  bill  in  equity,  672. 

registration,  433. 

registration  of  assignments,  438. 

release  of  record,  443. 

termination  of  lien,  520. 

who  may  enter  satisfaction,  443. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS, 

adverse  title  against,  698. 

approval  and  publication  of  ordinances,  502. 

may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

operations  and  effect  of  ordinances,  503. 

ordinances  affecting  title,  501. 

power  to  levy  taxes,  630. 

resolutions  affecting  title,  504. 

seals  on  conveyances,  504. 

taxes  constituting  lien,  527. 

without  inherent  power  to  tax,  630. 

MUNIMENTS  OF  TITLE, 

examination  in  abstracts,  748. 
tax  deeds,  636. 
wills,  678. 

MURDER, 

capacity  of  murderer  of  testator  to  take  under  will,  458. 

MUTILATION, 

effect  to  revoke  will,  486. 

MUTUAL  WILLS, 

validitv  in  California,  894. 
Georgia,  900. 
Porto  Rico,  930. 

MYSTIC  TESTAMENT, 
in  Louisiana,  908. 


1078  INDEX 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

N 

NAMES, 

abstract  must  show  everything  pertaining  to  names  aflFecting  title,  5. 

corporation  as  grantee,  329. 

devisees  in  wills,  481. 

effect  of  error  or  omission  of  middle  name  or  initial  in  judgment,  581. 

essentials  in  deed,  261-263. 

parties  in  decree,  580-582. 

I 

NATURALIZATION, 

affecting  inheritance  from  aliens,  732. 

NEBRASKA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  917. 

statutes  of  descent,  861. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  807. 

NEGROES. 

children  of  negro  legitimated,  867. 

NEVADA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  918. 

statutes  of  descent,  862. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  808. 

NEW  ENGLAND  ABSTRACTS, 

form  followed  by  English  abstracters,  166. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  919. 

statutes  of  descent,  863. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  809. 

NEW  JERSEY, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  920. 

statutes  of  descent,  864. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  810. 

NEW  MEXICO, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  921. 

statutes  of  descent,  865. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  BIL 

NEW  MEXICO  DONATION  ACT, 
source  of  title,  202. 

NEW  YORK, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  922. 

statutes  of  descent,  866. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  812. 

NEXT  OF  KIN, 
defined.  729. 

inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 
not  included  in  descendant,  713. 


INDEX  1079 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 
NONRESIDENT, 

acquisition  of  title,  by  adverse  possession,  694. 
by  descent  in  Iowa,  849. 
Montana,  860. 

NORTH  CAROLINA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  923. 

statutes  of  descent,  867. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  813. 

NORTH  CAROLINA  GRANTS, 
source  of  title,  202. 

NORTH  DAKOTA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  924. 

statutes  of  descent,  868. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  814. 

NORTHWEST  TERRITORY, 
source  of  title,  180,  181,  202. 

NOTARY  PUBLIC, 

acknowledgment  after  expiration  of  commission  legalized  in  Indiana. 

794. 
acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 
in  Alaska,  781. 
in  Arizona.  782. 
in  Arkansas,  783. 
in  California,  784. 
in  Colorado,  785. 
in  Connecticut,  786. 
in  Delaware.  787, 
in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 
in  Florida,  789. 
in  Georgia,  790. 
in  Hawaii,  791. 
in  Idaho.  792. 
in  Illinois,  793. 
in  Indiana,  794. 
in  Iowa,  795. 
in  Kansas,  796. 
in  Kentucky,  797. 
in  Louisiana,  798. 
in  Maine,  799. 
in  Maryland.  800. 
in  Massachusetts,  801. 
in  Michigan,  802. 
in  Minnesota,  803. 
in  Mississippi,  804. 
in  Missouri,  805. 
in  Montana.  806. 
in  Nebraska.  807. 
in  Nevada,  808. 
in  New  Hampshire,  809. 
in  New  Mexico,  811. 
in  New  York,  812. 
in  North  Carolina,  813. 
in  North  Dakota,  814. 


1080  INDEX    ■ 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

NOTARY  PVBUC—Contimccd. 

in  Ohio.  815.  | 

in  Oklahoma,  816.  * 

in  Oregon,  817.  i 

in  Pennsylvania,  818.  ^ 

in  Rhode  Island,  819. 
in  South  CaroHna,  820. 
in  South  Dakota,  821. 
in  Tennessee,  822. 

in  Texas,  823.  ^ 

in  Utah,  824. 
in  Vermont,  825. 
in  Virginia,  826. 
in  Washington,  827. 
in  West  Virginia,  828. 
in  Wisconsin,  829. 
in  Wyoming,  830. 
acknowledgrnent  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 
in  California,  784. 
in  Connecticut,  786. 
in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 
in  Florida,  789. 
in  Idaho,  792. 
in  Illinois,  793. 
in  Massachusetts,  801. 
in  Maryland,  800. 
in  Michigan,  802. 
in  Minnesota,  803. 
in  Missouri,  805. 
in  Nebraska,  807. 
in  Nevada.  808. 
in  New  Mexico,  811. 
in  New  Jersey,  810. 
in  North  Dakota,  814. 
in  Oregon.  817. 
in  South  Dakota,  821. 
in  Tennessee,  822. 
in  Texas,  823. 
in  Utah.  824. 
in  Washington,  827. 
in  Wisconsin,  829. 

NOTES, 

inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

NOTICE, 

actual,  127. 

in  second  degree,  127. 
application  for  order  of  sale  in  probate  court,  602. 
application  for  registry  of  title.  952. 

under  Torrens  system,  956. 
basis  of  jurisdiction,  652. 
constructive,  129. 

not  affected  by  destruction  of  records,  138, 

of  contents  of  judgments,  580. 
doctrine  defined,  126. 
effect  of  record  of  conveyance  duly  made,  125-129. 


INDEX  1081 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

1<!0T1CE— Continued. 

essential  of  mechanics'  lien,  538. 
.    filing  for  record  as  notice,  118. 
implied,  128. 

of  assignment  of  mortgage,  438. 
of  attachment.  553. 
of  authority  of  trustee,  338. 
of  equitable  proceedings,  657. 
of  execution  sale,  616. 
of  lis  pendens,  545,  549,  550. 
of  purchaser  under  state  patents,  753. 
persons  charged  with  notice  of  lis  pendens,  551. 
possession,  692. 

of  mortgaged  property,  434. 
probate  of  foreign  wills,  493. 
proceedings  for  registration  of  title,  962. 
proof  of  publication  and  notice,  617. 
purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  592. 
record  of  mortgage  constituting,  433. 
registration  of  transaction  as  notice,  951. 
to  agent,  128. 
to  corporation,  128. 
to  husband  or  wife,  128. 
to  partnership,  128. 
unrecorded  mortgages,  127,  535. 
when  lis  pendens  operative,  547. 

NUNCUPATIVE  WILLS, 

by  public  act  and  private  signature  in  Louisiana,  908. 
in  various  states,  890-942. 

NUISANCES, 

municipal  lien  for  removal,  527. 

O 
OCCUPANCY, 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  92,  107. 

OFFICERS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Delaware,  787. 

bond  creating  lien,  528. 

in  military  service  may  acknowledge  deeds  accredited  in  Illinois,  793. 

OFFICIAL  BONDS, 
lien,  528. 
necessity  of  filing,  528. 

OFFICIAL  CERTIFICATE, 
defined,  505. 
inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

OFFICIAL  CONVEYANCES, 

transfers  constituting,  345-364. 

OHIO, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  925, 

statutes  of  descent,  869. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  815. 


1082 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  Sections.} 

OKLAHOMA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  926. 

statutes  of  descent,  870. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  816. 

OLOGRAPHIC  TESTAMENT, 
in  Louisiana,  908. 

OLOGRAPHIC  WILLS, 

in  various  state,  890-942. 

OPEN  TESTAMENT, 
in  Louisiana,  908. 

OPERATIVE  WORDS, 

of  deed  described,  267. 

of  will,  463. 

priority,  in  deed,  273. 

OPINIONS, 

as  to  legal  effect  of  instruments  not  necessary  to  appear  in  abstract,  5. 

of  title  by  examiner,  773. 

ORDERS, 

confirmation  of  judicial  sales,  596. 

ORDINANCE  OF  1787, 
source  of  title,  181. 

ORDINANCES, 

approval  and  publication,  502. 
essentials  to  validity,  501. 
inclusion  in  abstract,  501. 

OREGON, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  927. 

statutes  of  descent,  871. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  817. 

OREGON  DONATION  ACT, 
source  of  title,  202. 


ORIGINAL  WRIT, 


See  Process,  658. 


PARCHMENT, 

deed  may  be  written  upon  in  Alabama,  780. 

PARENTS, 

inheritance,  estate  of  intestate,  731. 

property  in  different  states,  835-884. 

PARISH  RECORDER, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Louisiana,  798. 


INDEX  1083 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

PAROL  EVIDENCE. 

inadmissible  to  remove  cloud  from  title,  6. 

PARTIES, 

description  in  mortgage,  422. 

hearing  on  application  for  registration  under  Torrens  system,  956. 

lis  pendens  as  notice,  551. 

names  and  description  in  deed,  261. 

proceedings  for  sale  in  probate  court,  602. 

guardians  ad  litem,  571. 

registration  of  title,  952. 

suit  for  rescission  or  cancellation,  673, 

to  foreclose  suit,  674. 

PARTITION, 

elements  of  action  for,  670. 

judicial  sale  to  effectuate,  590. 

jurisdiction  where  land  in  other  counties,  654. 

voluntary  partition  deeds,  327. 

PARTNERSHIPS. 

conveyances  to  and  by.  328. 

interest  of  deceased  therein  subject  to  descent,  722. 

right  to  acquire  title  to  public  lands,  183. 

PARTY  WALLS, 

agreements  affecting  title,  507. 

inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

record,  507. 
contracts  must  be  recorded,  119. 

PATENTS, 

construction,  operation  and  effect,  226-228. 
defined  and  requisites,  220-222. 
delivery,  acceptance  and  recording,  223. 
effect.  182.  185. 

from  federal  government,  form  and  effect,  752. 
from  government  source  of  title.  181. 
from  king  of  England,  source  of  title,  181. 
from  state  government.  753. 
issued  after  death  of  claimant.  225. 
rescission,  cancellation  and  correction,  229. 
source  of  title,  220-230. 
validity,  224. 

PAYMENT, 

indebtedness  to  principal,  defeat  of  sub-contractors'  lien,  534. 
of  mortgage,  429. 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  928. 

statutes  of  descent,  872. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  818. 

PER  CAPITA, 

distribution  of  estate  by  inheritance.  710,  717. 
inheritance  of  property  in  various  states,  835-884. 


1084  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
PERPETUITIES. 

created  by  wills,  482.  % 

PERSONS,  ^ 

capacUy  to  execute  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 

capacity  to  hold  under  wills  in  various  states,  890-942.  ^ 

devisee  in  will,  how  named,  481.  f 

who  may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

PERSONAL  PROPERTY, 

interest  transferred  by  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 
subject  to  descent,  722. 


PERSONAL  SERVICE, 
aflfecting  decree,  576. 


See  Service. 


PER  STIRPES, 

descent  of  real  property  ifi  Alabama,  835. 
distribution  of  estate  by  inheritance,  710,  717. 
inheritance  of  next  of  kin  in  certain  states,  729. 

PETITION, 

judicial  sales  in  probate  courts,  602. 

PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  929. 

PLATS, 

dedication  by  maps  or  plats,  244. 

examination  of  dedications  in  abstracts,  760. 

of  public  lands,  235-244. 

of  subdivisions,  239-244. 

required  to  be  recorded  in  some  states,  119. 

vacation,  243. 

PLEADING, 

in  action  of  partition,  670. 

POLICE  JUSTICE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Mississippi,  804. 
in  Wisconsin,  829. 

POLICE  POWER, 

municipality  in  levy  of  taxes,  631. 

PORTO  RICO, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  930. 

POSSESSION, 

actual,  necessary  to  afifect  title,  689. 
adverse  to  owner,  685,  687. 
affecting  right  to  register  titles,  .952. 
constituting  notice,  affecting  title,  692. 
constructive,  may  affect  title,  690. 
estates  in  possession  defined  and  classified,  41. 
necessary  to  action  of  ejectment,  668. 
necessary  to  action  of  partition,  670. 


INDEX  1085 

[References  arc  to  Sections.] 

POSSESSION— Continued. 

necessary  in  ancestor  to  transmit  lands  by  inheritance,  707. 

of  mortgaged  property  as  notice,  434. 

plaintiff  in  action  therefore  can  not  be  required  to  furnish  abstract,  28. 

possessor  not  necessary  to  appear  in  abstract,  5. 

taking  possession  to  perfect  title,  691. 

transferred  by  will,  470. 

waiver  of  objection  to  title  by  taking  possession,  34. 

POSTHUMOUS  CHILDREN, 

birth  operating  as  revocation  of  will  in  various  states,  890-942. 
inheritance,  721,  728. 

in  various  states,  835-884. 

POWERS, 

defined,  construed  and  classified,  60. 
distinguished  from  estate,  60. 
distinguished  from  trust,  60. 

POWER  OF  ATTORNEY, 

conditions  operating  as  revocation,  337. 

effect  on  title,  500. 

examination  of  deed  executed  thereunder,  759. 

ratification  and  revocation,  337. 

registered  in  county  where  land  is  located,  124. 

revocation  must  be  recorded,  119. 

to  convey  land,  336. 

to  husband  or  wife  to  execute  deed  in  Oregon,  817, 

POWER  OF  SALE, 

contained  in  mortgage  or  deed  of  trust,  442. 
form  of  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  446. 

PRAYER, 

measure  of  relief  granted  by  decree,  575. 

PREAMBLE, 

omission  of  preamble  of  will  from  abstract,  489. 

PRECATORY  WORDS, 

effect  to  create  testamentary  trust,  480. 
in  wills,  463. 

PRE-EMPTION, 

contracts  and  conveyances  before  entry,  198. 
method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of  title,  196,  197. 

PREMISES. 

defined  and  construed,  45. 

formal  parts  of  deed,  260. 

priority  over  habendum  in  deeds,  274. 

PRESCRIPTION, 

acquisition  of  profits  a  prendre  by  prescription,  63. 

acquisition  of  title,  elements,  92,  102. 

acquisition  of  title  adverse  to  registered  owner,  951. 


1086  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

PRESIDENT  OF  COMMON  PLEAS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

PRESIDENT  OF  COUNTY  COURT, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  West  Virginia,  828. 

PRESUMPTION, 

compliance  with  law  in  making  execution  sale,  611. 

existence  of  vendors'  lien,  530. 

jurisdiction,  650. 

payment  of  mortgage,  429. 

pertaining  to  judicial  sale,  600. 

proper  execution  of  municipal  conveyance,  504. 

PRETERMITTED  CHILDREN, 
right  to  inherit,  720. 

PRIME  MERIDIANS, 
located,  236. 

PRINCIPAL  AND  AGENT, 

agent  as  purchaser  at  tax  sale,  638. 

PRINTING, 

of  wills,  487. 

requirement  of  deed  in  Alabama,  780. 

PRIORITY, 

attachment  liens,  552. 

judgment  liens,  565. 

jurisdiction  of  action  to  declare  a  prior  lien,  656. 

liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show  prior  deeds,  17. 

mechanics'  liens,  535. 

purchase-money  mortgage,  430. 

PRIVATE  LAND  CLAIMS, 
source  of  title,  214. 

PRIVILEGES, 

easements  and  servitudes,  506. 

PROBATE, 

abstracting,  494. 

actions  to  set  aside,  lis  pendens,  546. 

decree,  492,  583. 

effect  as  notice  of  liens,  525. 

effect  on  title,  492. 

effect  on  will,  486. 

ex  parte  probate,  492. 

foreign  probate.  584. 

foreign  wills,  493. 

jurisdiction,  491. 

meaning  of  term,  491. 

necessity,  491. 

proof  of  probate  of  will  in  abstract,  489. 

steps  in  proceeding,  493. 

wills,  491. 

in  various  states,  890-942. 

not  required  by  common  law,  491. 


INDEX  1087 

[References  are  to  Seciions.\ 

PROBATE  COURTS, 

jurisdiction  of  partition  of  land  in  other  counties,  654. 
jurisdiction  of  suits  concerning  real  estate,  653. 
operation  and  effect  of  decree,  583. 
presumption  pertaining  to  judicial  sale,  600. 
sales  under  orders  and  decrees  thereof,  601. 

PROCEDURE, 

attachment,  553. 

judicial  sales  in  probate  courts,  602. 

PROCESS, 

affidavits  for  publication,  576. 

constructive  service,  576. 

defined,  658. 

effect  of  appearance  wfithout  process,  663. 

effect  of  misnomer,  659. 

form  and  purpose  of  summons,  659. 

return  and  proof  of  service,  662. 

service,  660,  661. 

in  proceedings  for  registration  of  title,  962. 
style  and  contents,  659. 

summons  used  in  place  of  original  writ  and  subpcEna,  658. 
validity  of  decree  dependent  upon  service,  576. 
w^aiver  by  appearance,  671. 

PROFITS, 

transferred  by  will,  470. 

PROFITS  A  PRENDRE, 

defined  and  construed,  63. 
distinguished  from  easement,  61. 

PROOF, 

See  Evidence. 

of  birth  or  legitimacy  of  children,  740. 
of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 
of  heirship,  738. 
service  of  process,  662. 

PROPERTY, 

right  of,  created  by  lien,  518. 
subject  to  descent,  722. 
subject  to  mechanics'  liens,  536. 
subject  to  taxation,  631. 

PROTHONOTARY, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  West  Virginia,  828. 

PROVOST, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  New  York,  812. 

PUBLICATION. 

notice  of  execution  sale,  616. 
of  process,  661. 
ordinance,  502. 
proof  in  execution  sales,  617. 


1088  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

PUBLIC  HIGHWAY  GRANTS, 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of  title,  213. 

PUBLIC  LANDS, 

acts  of  congress  grading  prices,  199. 

ceded  to  confederation,  source  of  title,  180. 

interest  in  settlement  claims  subject  to  descent,  722. 

methods  of  transfer  under  government  land  laws,  182. 

receivers'  receipt  not  necessary  in  abstract,  751. 

source  of  title,  180. 

subject  to  private  entry,  193. 

who  may  acquire  title  to,  183. 

PUBLIC  LAND  OFFICE, 

certificate  of  receiver  source  of  title,  181. 

PUBLIC  OFFICER, 

liability  for  searching  titles,  21. 

PUBLIC  POLICY, 

conditions  in  wills  against  alienation,  478. 
gifts  in  restraint  of  marriage,  477. 
void  conditions  in  wills,  462. 

PUBLIC  PROPERTY, 

mechanics'  liens,  536. 

PUBLIC  RECORDS, 

abstractors  use  thereof,  137. 

books  in  which  instruments  must  be  recorded,  121. 

constitute  notice,  118. 

defined  and  requirements,  115. 

delivery  to  proper  officer  deemed  record,  117. 

effect  of  record  duly  made,  125. 

effect  of  recording  instrument  not  required  to  be  recorded,  118. 

filing  deemed  record,  117. 

general  index,  131. 

as  part  of  record,  132. 
index  of  judgment  records,  134. 
instruments  which  may  be  recorded,  119. 
loss  or  destruction,  138. 
object  of  recording  acts,  118. 
of  attachment  and  lis  pendens,  133. 
officer  to  receive  instrument  for  recording,  116. 
official  tract  index,  130. 
of  tax  deeds,  135. 
place  of  recording,  124. 
power  of  attorney  must  be  registered  in  county  where  land  is  located, 

124. 
proper  execution  and  acknowledgment  prerequisite,  120. 
style  of  office  under  which  recording  was  done,  116. 
time  allowed  for  recording  deed  and  other  instruments,  123. 
time  of  recording,  122. 
what  constitutes  recording,  117. 
who  may  record  deed,  119. 

PUBLIC  SALE, 

transfer  by,  190. 

public  lands,  182. 


INDEX  1089 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


PURCHASE, 

mode  of  acquiring  title,  85. 

title  by  purchase  classified,  92. 

words  of  purchase  and  limitation  in  wills,  464, 

PURCHASE-MONEY, 
liens,  516,  530. 

created  by  contract,  530. 
vendees'  implied  lien,  531. 

PURCHASER, 

of  land  adversely  held,  692. 
rights  at  judicial  sale,  593. 

refusal  to  complete  purchase,  595. 
title  under  judicial  sale,  592. 

Q 

QUIA  EMPTOR, 

affecting  transfer  of  land,  415. 

QUIET  ENJOYMENT, 

covenant  of,  in  deed,  278. 

QUIETING  TITLE, 

jurisdiction  of  action,  656. 

service  of  process  by  publication,  661. 

QUITCLAIM, 

may  create  fee  simple  estates,  45. 


R 

RAILROAD  GRANTS, 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of  title,  212. 

RAILROADS, 

acquisition  of  adverse  title  to  right  of  way,  693. 

RATIFICATION, 

of  conveyance  must  be  recorded,  119. 
of  power  of  attorney,  337. 

REAL  ESTATE, 

actions  and  proceedings  affecting  titles,  650-678. 

afifected  by  judgment  or  decree  of  foreign  court,  584. 

doctrine  of  lis  pendens  affecting  actions  and  suits,  546. 

estates  defined  and  distinguished,  40. 

exemption  from  judgments,  572. 

interest  transferred  by  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 

location  determining  jurisdiction  of  suits  concerning,  650-656. 

probate  procedure  to  sell,  602. 

sale  for  taxes,  646. 

subject  to  descent,  722. 

in  various  states,  835-884. 
words  used  to  pass,  in  wills,  467. 

69 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1090  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
RECEIVER  OF  LAND  OFFICE, 

See  Local  Land  Office. 
RECEIPTS, 

affecting  title,  508. 

RECEIVERS, 

in  bankruptcy,  382. 

RECITALS, 

in  deeds,  273. 

in  deeds  by  officials,  346. 

by  sheriffs,  347,  348. 
priority,  in  deeds,  273. 

RECORDER, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Colorado,  785. 
in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 
in  Idaho,  792. 
in  Indiana,  794. 
in  Rhode  Island,  819. 
in  West  Virginia,  828. 

RECORDING  INSTRUMENTS, 

deed  in  English  language  admitted  to  record  in  Indiana,  794. 

RECORDS, 

abstract  should  contain  full  summary,  5. 

abstracts  where  records  destroyed,  29. 

correcting  errors  and  re-record,  288. 

correction  of  errors  in  record  of  mortgage,  435. 

judgment,  567. 

of  assignment  of  mortgages,  438. 

of  certificate  of  entry  on  foreclosure,  444. 

of  contract  for  conveyances,  394. 

of  equitable  proceedings  as  notice,  657. 

of  mortgages,  433. 

of  official  bonds,  528. 

of  vendors'  lien,  530. 

of  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 

party  wall  agreements,  507. 

priority  of  record,  287. 

proof  of  death  of  ancestor,  739. 

proof  of  heirship,  738. 

registration  and  certificate  of  title,  969. 

release  of  mortgage,  443. 

statutory  provisions  concerning  lis  pendens,  549. 

vendee's  lien,  531. 

REDEMPTION, 

from  tax  sale,  640. 
of  mortgages,  420. 

REDDENDUM, 

formal  part  of  deed,  260. 


INDEX  1091 

[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

REFEREES, 

See  Master  in  Chancery. 

appointment  and  jurisdiction,  664. 
deed  by,  353. 
verdict,  665. 

REGISTER  IN  CHANCERY, 

acknowledgment  of  deeds  in  Alabama,  780. 

REGISTER  OF  DEEDS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Kansas,  796. 

in  Minnesota,  803. 

in  New  Jersey,  810. 

in  North  Dakota,  814. 

in  Pennsylvania,  818. 

in  South  Dakota,  821. 
acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  North  Dakota,  814. 

in  South  Dakota,  821. 

REGISTER  OF  LAND  OFFICE, 

See  Local  Land  Office. 

REGISTER  OF  PROBATE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Vermont,  825. 

REGISTRAR, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Illinois,  893. 
title  under  Torrens  system,  954. 

REGISTRATION, 

See  Public  Records. 

adverse  possession  of  registered  land,  960. 
conclusiveness  of  certificate  of  registration  of  title,  958. 
constitutionality  of  laws  for  registration  under  Torrens  system,  962. 
general  principles  of  registration  of  title,  954. 
notice  of  application  under  Torrens  system,  956. 
of  deed,  287,  288. 

in  Alabama,  780. 
of  title  under  Torrens  system,  950-962. 
purpose  and  advantage,  953. 

subsequent  conveyances  appearing  on  registry,  959. 
withdrawal  of  land  from  registration,  952. 

RELATION, 

effect  upon  deeds  or  title,  101. 

RELEASE, 

common-law  deed  of  release,  306. 

examination  of  deed  of  release  in  abstract,  758. 

inclusion  in  abstracts,  500. 

of  dower  form,  325. 

of  instrument  by  partner  must  be  recorded,  119. 

of  mortgage  of  record,  443. 

RELIGIOUS  SOCIETIES, 

devises  thereto  limited  in  Georgia,  900. 
in    New  York,  922. 


1092  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
REMAINDER,  .  ^  _. 

adverse  title  against  remaindermen,  Wb. 
elements  of  estate,  468.  _  ^  noo 

interest  of  remaindermen  subject  to  descent,  /^£. 

RENTS, 

transferred  by  will,  470. 

REPRESENTATION,  ,  .  ,     .,  -^^  7,, 

distribution  of  estate  of  inheritance,  /iU,  /li. 
in  various  states,  835-884. 

REPUGNANCY, 

construction  in  wills,  461. 
in  deed,  construction,  291. 
property  in  wills,  460. 

RESCISSION,  _ 

requirements  of  decree,  673. 

RESERVATIONS, 
in  deeds,  275. 
operation,  506. 
vendor's  liens,  530. 

RESIDENCE,  ,      ^  .        oci 

applicant  for  registration  under  Torrens  system,  951. 

RESIDUARY  DEVISES, 

creation  and  scope,  485. 

RESOLUTION, 

municipal,  inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 
nature  and  effect,  504. 

RESTRAINT  OF  MARRIAGE, 
devises,  477, 

RESTRICTIONS, 

use  of  land  in  deeds,  277. 

RESULTING  TRUSTS, 

See  Trusts. 

RETURN, 

execution  sale,  615. 
service  of  process,  662. 

REVERSION, 

adverse  title  against  reversioner,  695. 

interest  of  reversioner  sul)ject  to  descent.  722. 

of  gift  to  donor  on  default  of  issue  of  donee,  848. 

REVIEW, 

proceedings  for  registration  of  title,  962. 


i- 


INDEX  1^^^ 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

REVIVAL,  .    ,,.        .„ 

lapsed  mechanics  hens,  ioo. 

REVOCATION,  .     . 

e-overned  by  lex  rei  sitae,  430.  .  _-_ 

fmplied  by  birth  of  children  after  execution  of  will,  720. 
of  power  of  attorney,  337. 
of  trusts,  340. 
of  wills,  486. 

RHODE  ISLAND,  .  .        q«- 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  yji. 

Salu'tes  "plSg'tf  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  819. 

RIGHTS  OF  WAY, 
creation,  506. 

'right  TO  CONVEY, 

covenant  of,  in  deed,  27». 

RIPARIAN  LANDS, 

acquisition  of  title,  104. 

ROOT  OF  TITLE,       „      ,       .       ,     o 
examination  should  refer  thereto,  S. 

RULE  IN  SHELLEY'S  CASE, 
application.  465,  466. 
applies  to  devise  of  lands  m  Kansas,  906. 
execution  of  devise,  456. 


^^^^^'        See  Execution  Sales  ;  Judicial  Sales  ;  Tax  Sales. 

equitable  conversion,  484.  *     7ai  7^ 

examination  of  official  sales  in  abstracts,  761-764. 
method  of  transfer  of  pubhc  lands,  1»/.  . 

mortgaged  property  considered  equitable  assignment,  439. 
tax  sales,  636. 

^^^^deeds  acknowledged  therein  accredited  in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 

qualification  of  testator  in  various  states,  890-942. 

SATISFACTION, 

judgments,  573. 

SATISFACTION  OF  MORTGAGE, 

See  Release. 


SCHOOL  CERTIFICATES,    ^  ^    ,^. 
mortgages  must  be  recorded,  liy. 


1094  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.} 

SCHOOL  LAND  GRANTS, 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of  title,  208,  209. 

SCRIP, 

location  certificates  as  source  of  title,  203. 

SEALS, 

abolished  in  New  Mexico  except  for  corporations,  SIL 
conveyances  executed  under  seal  in  some  states  entitled  to  public  rec- 
ord, 120. 
deeds,  281. 

Alaska,  781. 

Arizona,  782. 

Connecticut,  786. 

Florida,  789. 

Georgia,  790. 

Hawaii.  791. 

Idaho,  792. 

Illinois,  793. 

Indiana,  794. 

Iowa,  795. 

Kansas,  796. 

Maine,  799. 

Maryland,  800. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Michigan,  802. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Missouri,  805. 

Montana,  806. 

Nevada.  808. 

New  Hampshire,  809. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812. 

North  Carolina,  813. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Oklahoma.  816. 

Oregon,  817. 

Pennsylvania,  818.  * 

Rhode  Island.  819. 

South   Carolina,  820. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Vermont,  825. 

Virginia.  826. 

Washington.  827. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin.  829. 
indication  in  abstract,  6. 
municipality  on  conveyances,  504. 

necessary  to  authorize  conveyance  by  attorney  in  fact,  335. 
not  required  in  Mississippi  except  for  corporations,  804. 
not  required  to  deed  in  Alabama,  780. 
on  conveyance  of  land  in   Illinois,  893. 
on  conveyances  by  private  corporation,  332. 
on  conveyances  by  public  corporation,  332. 
of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Alaska,  781. 

Louisiana,  798. 
Nebraska,  807. 


INDEX  1095 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

SEALS — Continued. 

private  abolished  except  for  corporations  in  Missouri,  805. 

Ohio,  815. 

Minnesota,  803. 

Nebraska,  807. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Texas,  823. 

Wyoming,  830. 
private  seal  not  required  in  North  Dakota,  814. 

Utah,  824. 
validation  of  unsealed  deed  in  Connecticut,  786. 

Illinois,  793. 
what  constitutes  in  Oregon,  817. 

Virginia,  826. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

SEALED  INSTRUMENTS, 

distinction  between  sealed  and  unsealed  instruments  abolished  in  Ore- 
gon, 817. 

California.  784. 
Idaho,  792. 
prima  facie  in  Alabama,  780. 
when  required,  93. 

SECRETARY  OF  LEGATION, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deeds  accredited  in  District  of  Columbia, 
788 

'  Illinois,  793. 
Iowa,  795. 
Kentucky,  797. 
Louisiana.  798. 
Mississippi,  804. 
New  York,  812. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Washington,  827. 

SECRETARY  OF  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS, 

acknowledgment  of  foreign  deed  accredited  in  Kentucky,  797. 

SECRETARY  OF  STATE, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Kentucky,  797. 

SECTIONS, 

laying  off  townships  into  sections,  237. 

SEISIN, 

ancestor  essential  to  estate  by  inheritance,  709. 
covenant,  in  deeds,  278,  279. 

SENATORS. 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Rhode  Island,  819. 

SERVICE, 

process,  660-662. 
publication  in  newspapers,  661. 
return  and  proof,  662. 
substituted  service,  660. 


1096  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
SERVITUDES, 

affecting  title,  506. 

distinguished  from  easements,  500. 

inclusion  in  abstract,  500. 

SEVERALTY, 

estates  defined  and  classified,  41. 

SHELLEY'S  CASE, 

See  Rule  in  Shelley's  Case. 

SHERIFFS, 

See  Execution  Sales. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 

SIGNATURE, 

contract  for  conveyances,  393. 

deeds,  280. 

mortgage  of  homestead,  431. 

SISTERS, 

in  collateral  line  of  kindred,  728. 

inheritance  of  property  in  different  states,  835-884 

SLATE, 

validity  of  will  written  upon,  487. 

SOLEMN  FORM. 

probate  of  will,  49L 

SOLDIERS, 

provisions  requiring  witnesses  of  wills  do  not  apply  to  soldiers  in  serv- 
ice, 890-942. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  820. 

execution  of  wills,  932. 
statutes  of  descent,  874. 

SOUTH  DAKOTA, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  821. 

execution  of  wills,  933. 
statutes  of  descent,  875. 

SPANISH  GRANTS, 

source  of  title,  214. 

SPECIAL  APPEARANCE, 

does  not  waive  jurisdiction,  663. 

SPECIAL  ASSESSMENTS, 

distinguished  from  taxes,  647. 

liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 

not  taxes,  630. 

SPECIAL  COMMISSIONERS, 

See  Commissioners. 


INDEX  1097 

[References  are  to  Scctions.'\ 

SPECIFIC  DEVISES, 
lapse,  483. 

SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCE, 
action  for,  defined,  671. 
application  of  lis  pendens,  546. 

contract  of  sale  of  real  estate,  reference  to  master,  664. 
form  of  abstract,  666. 
jurisdiction,  656. 

jurisdiction  of  actions  to  enforce,  656, 
mandatory  injunction  issued,  667. 

SPENDTHRIFTS, 

examination  of  sales  thereby  in  abstracts,  764. 
trusts  provided  for  in  Arizona,  892. 

STATES, 

abolition  of  survivorship,  326. 

adoption  of  Torrens  system,  950. 

adverse  title  against,  698. 

disposal  of  state  lands,  185. 

in  which  after-acquired  property  is  subject  to  judgment  lien,  566. 

in  which  common-law  doctrine  of  mortgages  exists,  416. 

in  which  common-law  doctrine  of  mortgages  has  been  abrogated,  416. 

i.i  which  foreclosure  of  mortgage  is  effected  by  entry,  444. 

in  which  foreclosure  of  mortgage  is  efltected  by  writ  of  entry,  445. 

in  which  joint  tenancies  do  not  exist,  2i26. 

may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

methods  of  computing  degrees  of  kindred,  726. 

when  state  acquires  title  to  public  lands,  184. 

where  trial  by  jury  required  for  registration  of  title,  952. 

STATUTES. 

constitutionality  of  acts  establishing  Torrens  system,  962. 

controlling  execution  of  wills,  705. 

eflfect  of  foreign  probate  decree,  584. 

creating  tax  liens,  632,  6i2i. 

descent  and  distribution,  717. 

descent  in  various  states,  835-884. 

determining  duration  of  judgment  lien,  564. 

determining  liability  of  decedent's  estate  to  debts,  602. 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  780-830. 

governing  descent  of  property,  724. 

governing  rights  of  pretermitted  children,  720. 

legitimation  of  children,  719. 

lien  created,  517. 

making  tax  deeds  evidence  of  title,  644,  645. 

may  determine  capacity  to  make  will,  457. 

prescribing  form  and  statute  for  tax  deed,  643. 

provisions  concerning  judgments  against  infant,  571. 

providing  for  condemnation  proceedings,  677. 

provisions  for  service  by  publication.  661. 

registration  of  title  under  Torrens  system,  950-952. 

STATUTES  OF  DESCENT, 

inheritance  of  kindred  of  the  half-blood,  730. 


1098  INDEX 


[References  arc  to  Sections.\ 

STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS, 

affecting  contract  for  conveyances,  393. 
provisions  for  signature,  280. 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS, 

afifecting  judgment  for  taxes,  646. 

STATUTE  OF  USES, 

affecting  common-law  deeds  in  future,  311. 
affecting  deeds,  305. 

STATUTORY  LIENS, 

debts  of  decedent,  524. 

defined,  515. 

divestiture  by  legislature,  517. 

dower  rights,  521. 

judgments,  522,  562. 

lis  pendens,  546-551. 

mechanics'  liens,  533. 

municipal  taxes,  527. 

necessity  of  strict  compliance  with  statute,  517. 

sub  contractors,  534. 

taxes,  526. 

STREETS, 

local  assessments  as  liens,  527. 
ordinances  affecting,  501. 

STRICT  CONSTRUCTION, 

statutes  creating  liens,  517. 

SUBCONTRACTORS'  LIENS, 

defeat  by  payment  to  principal  contractor,  534. 
statutory,  534. 

SUBDIVISIONS, 

public  lands,  238-244. 
townships  and  sections,  237,  238. 
plats,  239-242. 

SUBPOENA, 

See  Process. 
SUBSCRIPTION, 

distinguished  from  signature  in  deeds,  280. 

SUBSTITUTED  SERVICE, 

See  Service. 
SUIT  IN  EQUITY, 

decree,  561. 

doctrine  of  lis  pendens,  546. 

SUMMONS, 

See  Process. 
SUPPORT. 

condition  subsequent  in  will,  474. 
devise,  charged  with  payment,  473. 
effect  of  recommendation  in  will,  473. 
provision  by  testamentary  trust,  480. 


INDEX  1099 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
SURRENDER. 

common-law  deed  of  surrender,  JU8. 

SURROGATE,  .     ^„.     .     „^_ 

acknowledgment  of  deed  m  Ilhnois,  «yj. 
New  Jersey,  810. 
New  York,  812. 

SURVEYOR'S  FIELD  NOTES, 
conclusiveness,  147. 
in  public  land  office,  147. 

SURVEYS,  ^    .  ,      .^. 

boundary  survey  source  of  title,  lei. 
historical  summary,  235. 
laying  off  land  into  townships,  236. 
public  land,  235-244. 
townships  into  sections,  237. 
subdividing  sections,  238. 

SURVIVOR,  ,  .    ,,.    .    .     .... 

acknowledgment  of  deed  m  Mississippi,  804. 
dower  and  curtesy  abolished  in  Connecticut,  786. 

Maine,  799. 
inheritance  of  property  in  different  states.  835-884. 
right  in  decedent's  property  in  lieu  of  dower  and  curtesy,  799. 
right  of  descent  to  property  in  Nebraska,  807. 
right  of  curtesy  upon  death  of  wife  in  Arkansas,  783.  _ 
right  of  husband  in  property  of  wife  in  lieu  of  curtesy  in  Kentucky,  /y/. 
rights  regulated  by  statutes,  716. 

right  to  decedent's  property  in  Ohio,  815.  _ 

right  to  fee  simple  title  to  one-third  in  lieu  of  dower  in  Iowa,  /Vi).      _ 
right  to  fee  simple  title  of  one-half  of  decedent's  property  in  Connecti- 
cut, 786.  ,.       .     ,,.  . 
right  to  property  incumbered  with  purchase-money  lien  in  Minnesota, 

803 
right  to  property  of  deceased  husband  or  wife  in  Utah,  824. 
spouse  as  heir,  716. 

SURVIVORSHIP, 

doctrine  declared  contrary  to  public  policy,  ddb. 

SWAMP  LAND  GRANTS  , ,.  ,  ,  .^^ 
method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  18^. 
source  of  title,  207. 

SYNOPSIS,  .,    ^^^ 

form  of  probate  of  will,  490. 


TABLES 

of  measures  and  abbreviations,  251. 

TACKING,  .  ,     ^^^ 

possession  to  affect  title,  691. 


1100  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
TAXES, 

assessment,  634. 

assessment  roll,  634,  635. 

assignment  of  certificates  of  purchase,  641. 

collateral  attack  on  judgment,  646. 

collection  hv  forfeiture,  637. 

deed,  642-644. 

abstracting,  643. 

evidence  and  support  of  title,  644. 

requirements  and  formal  parts,  642,  643. 

when  indexed  is  deemed  recorded,  135. 
defined,  630. 
equality,  630. 
exemptions,  631. 

form  of  forfeiture  for  nonpayment,  637. 
incumbrance  within  covenant  against  incumbrances,  526. 
judgment  for  taxes,  646. 
legislation  to  strengthen  tax  titles,  645. 
liens,  526,  632. 

statutory,  517. 
merger  of  lien  in  judgment,  646. 
of  abstract  books,  36. 

payment  of  taxes  evidence  of  adverse  possession,  700. 
power  of  municipal  corporations  to  impose,  631. 
priority  of  lien,  633. 
property  subject,  631. 

right  to  fruits — pending  redemption  from  tax  sale,  640. 
sales,  see  Tax  Sale. 

superiority  of  taxes  over  local  assessments,  527. 
tax  not  a  debt  in  ordinary  meaning  of  term,  630. 
tax  titles,  633. 

TAX  SALE, 

certificate  of  purchase,  641. 

examination  in  abstract,  763. 

index,  152. 

index  form,  152. 

liability  of  abstracter  for  failure  to  show,  17. 

persons   who  may  redeem,  640. 

redemption,  640. 

requisites,  636. 

rights  of  purchaser,  638,  639. 

strict  compliance  with  law  in  tax  sales,  636. 

title  of  purchaser,  639. 

who  may  be  purchaser,  638. 

TAX  TITLES. 

defined,  633. 

TECHNICAL  TERMS, 

controlled  by  intention  of  parties,  290. 
in  creation  of  trusts,  338,  339. 
value,  290. 

TENANTS, 

in  common  requisites  of  deed  to  create  fee  simple  estates,  45. 

TENDER, 

of  abstract  after  expiration  of  agreed  time,  32. 


INDEX  1101 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 
TENENDUM, 

formal  part  of  deed,  260. 

TENNESSEE, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  934. 

statutes  of  descent,  876. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  822. 

TERRITORIES, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  accredited  in  Colorado,  785. 
in  Arkansas,  783. 
in  Connecticut,  786. 
in  District  of  Columbia,  788. 
in  Delaware,  787. 
in  Idaho,  792. 
in  Illinois,  893. 
in  Montana,  806. 
in    New  York,  812. 


TESTAMENTS, 


See  Wills. 


TESTAMENTARY  TRUSTS, 

creation  and  essentials,  480. 

TESTIMONIUM  CLAUSE, 
formal  part  of  deed,  260. 

TEXAS, 

statutes  governing  execution  of  wills,  935. 

statutes  of  descent,  877. 

statutes  pertaining  to  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  823. 

TIMBER  CULTURE  CLAIMS. 

method  of  transfer  of  public  lands,  182. 
source  of   title,  206. 

TIMBER  LANDS, 

private  purchase  as  source  of  title,  205. 

TIME, 

duration  of  judgment  lien,  564. 

duration  of  lis  pendens,  547. 

filing  notice  of  mechanic's  liens,  538. 

fractions  of  days  in  filing  instruments  for  record,  8. 

must  be  given  in  which  to  examine  abstract,  35. 

of  adverse  possession  affecting  title,  687,  699. 

of  redemption  from  tax  sale,  640. 

publication  of  process  in  newspaper,  661. 

when  title  vests  in  purchaser  at  execution  sale,  613. 

TITLE, 

acquired  by  wills,  450,  451. 

adverse  possession  of  registered  land,  960. 

affected  by  action  of  partition,  670. 

affected  by  action  to  quiet,  669. 

affected  by  affidavits,  509. 

affected  by  assignment  of  dower,  675. 


1102  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

TITLE — Continued. 

affected  by  construction  of  will,  678, 

affected  by  divorce  proceedings,  676. 

affected  by  ejectment,  668. 

affected  by  foreclosure  of  mortgage  in  equity,  674. 

affected  by  injunctions,  667. 

affected  by  letters,  receipts  and  memoranda,  508. 

affected  by  municipal  ordinances,  501. 

affected  by  official   certificate,   505. 

affected  by  redemption  by  bill  in  equity,  672. 

affected  l)y  report  of  master  in  chancery,  664. 

affected  by  rescission  or  cancellation  of  instruments,  672. 

affected  by  servitude,  506. 

affected  by  suit  for  specific  performance,  671. 

affected  by  unrecorded  evidence,  510. 

allodial,  72. 

bad,  defective,  imperfect  and  doubtful,  76. 

by  abandonment,  92. 

by  accretion,  92. 

by  adverse  possession,  92. 

by  alienation,  92. 

by  deed  of  grant,  92. 

by  descent,  705-741. 

by  descent  based  on  laws  of  inheritance,  86. 

by  devise,  92. 

by  escheat,  92. 

by  estopel,  92. 

by  forfeiture,  92. 

by  grant  for  internal  improvement,  210. 

by  grants  for  public  highways,  213. 

by  guardians'  deed,  362. 

by  land  grants  to  railroad,  212. 

by  legislative  grant,  186-189. 

by  occupancy,  92. 

by  prescription,  92. 

by  private  deed,  93. 

by  private  entry,  191,  192, 

by  public  sale,  190. 

by  purchase  other  than  alienation,  92. 

by  school  land  grants,  208,  209. 

by  swamp  land  grants.  207. 

by  town  site  entry,  215,  216. 

by  trustee's  deed,  357. 

certificate  of  purchase  at  tax  sale,  641. 

color  of  title,  73. 

complete,  perfect,  good  and  clear,  74. 

condemnation  proceedings  affecting.  677. 

conditions  amounting  to  adverse  title,  685-700. 

conveyance  by  ordinance,  503. 

defined  and  distinguished,  70. 

derived  from  aliens,  732. 

desert  land  entries  as  source,  204. 

devolution  of  real  property  to  heirs,  723. 

donations  by  Congress,  202. 

easement  affecting  title,  506. 

effect  of  error  in  registration,  287. 

estates  to  which  title  relates,  71. 


t 


INDEX  llO-^ 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

TITLE— Continued.  ,  ,  ■  •        ao-7 

estoppel  of  mortgagor  subsequently  acquiring,  A^/. 

evidences,  78.  .        ,      n^  4.        nc/t 

evidence  of  title  not  registered  under  Torrens  system,  954. 
examination  of  abstract  and  opinion  of  title,  /45-//^. 
executor  as  devisee,  480. 

execution  sale  as  dependent  on  validity  of  levy,  Oli). 
feudal,  72. 
French  grants,  214. 
homestead  and  tree  grants,  200,  201. 
inceptive  stages,  180. 
in  contract  for  conveyances,  398. 
insurance,  79. 

land  warrants  and  scrip,  203. 
legal  and  equitable,  74. 
Louisiana  Purchase,  214. 
marketable,  77. 
Mexico  grants,  214 

miscellaneous  instruments  attecting,  i)UU-5iU. 
mortgagee,  520. 

of  assignee,  374.  .    ,.  .  ,      ,     rn/i 

of  grantee  of  purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  594. 

on  discharge  in  bankruptcy,  385.  .  ,       ,      <  ♦  •      „t. 

operative   parts   of   conveyances   showing   title   should   appear   in   ab- 
stract, 5.  . 

party-wall  agreement  affecting,  507. 
passed  by  Congress,  184. 

passed  by  state,  185. 

priority  of  record,  287.  .   oi/i 

private  land  claims  prior  to  formation  of  government,  Z14. 

private  purchase  of  timber  and  stone  lands,  205. 

proof  of  title  by  descent,  738. 

proof  of,  under  judicial  sale,  599. 
under  execution  sale,  623. 

purpose  and  advantages  of  title  registration,  953. 

registration  under  Torrens  system,  950-962. 

Spanish  grants,  214. 

support  of  action  in  ejectment,  668. 

tax  deeds  as  evidence,  644,  645. 

tax  title,  633. 

timber  culture  claims,  206. 

to  public  lands  by  pre-emption,  196,  197. 

transfer  by  assignment,  370. 

trustees  conveyance  of  legal  title,  355. 

under  execution  sale,  612,  613. 

under  judicial  sale,  592. 

under  mortgage,  416.  tt  •    j  Ci  ..       iq9 

under  various  transfers  from  United  btates,  i»^. 

waiver  of  objection  to  title  by  taking  possession,  34. 

who  may  acquire  title  to  public  lands,  183. 

TITLE  BOND,  ^^^ 

form  of  contract  for  conveyances,  400. 
must  be  recorded,  119. 

TORRENS  SYSTEM, 

adoption  in  England,  2.  . 

advantages  of  title  registration,  953. 


1104  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

TORRENS  SYSTEM— Continued. 

appearance  of  subsequent  conveyances  under  registration,  959. 

bulletin  of  Federal  farm  loan  bureau,  958. 

conclusiveness  of  certificate  of  registry,  958. 

constitutionality  of  acts,  962. 

decree  and  certificate  of  title  under  Torrens  system,  957. 

due  process  of  law  in  registration,  962. 

general  principles  of  registration  of  title,  954. 

general  provisions,  950-962. 

notice  and  hearing  of  application  for  registration,  956. 

procedure  for  registration  of  title,  955. 

record  of  registration  and  certificate  of  title,  959, 

registration  of  title  and  not  evidence  of  title,  954. 

withdrawal  of  land  from  registration,  952. 

TORT, 

remedy  against  abstracter  for  negligence,  15. 

TOWN  CLERKS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Connecticut,  786. 
in  Rhode  Island,  819. 
in  Vermont,  825. 

TOWNSHIPS, 

surveying  lands  into  townships,  236. 

TOWN  SITE  ENTRY, 

source  of  title,  215,  216. 

TRACT  BOOKS, 

in  Public  Land  office,  146. 

TRACT  INDEXES, 

of  instruments  affecting  particular  tracts,  130. 

TRACTS. 

to  find  area  of  irregularly  shaped  tracts,  256. 

TRANSCRIPTS, 

judgments  to  create  lien  in  other  counties,  563. 

TRANSITORY  ACTIONS, 
jurisdiction,  656. 

TRANSFERS, 

conditions  in  wills  in  restraint  of  alienation,  478. 
fee  simple  estates,  limitations  and  restrictions,  47. 
material  or  operative  parts  should  appear  in  abstracts,  5. 
methods  of  transfer  under  government  land  laws,  182. 
of  land  by  judicial  sale,  590. 
of  property  by  will,  see  Wills. 

TRAPEZOID, 

to  find  area,  254. 

TRAPEZIUM, 

to  find  area,  255. 


INDEX  1 105 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 


TREATY  OF  PEACE, 

with  England  source  of  title,  181. 
with  Indians  source  of  title,  181. 

TRESPASS, 

adverse  possession  not  affecting  title,  687. 
jurisdiction,  656. 

TRESPASS  AND  EJECTMENT, 

form  of  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  445. 

TRIANGLE, 

to  find  area,  253. 

TRUST  DEEDS, 

examination  of  abstract,  757. 

form,  441. 

requisites  and  construction,  441. 

TRUSTEE. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 
power  to  make  conveyances,  354-357. 

TRUSTEE  IN  BANKRUPTCY. 

examination  of  deed  in  abstract,  756. 

TRUSTS, 

actions  to  set  aside,  lis  pendens,  546. 

conveyances  in  trust,  338. 

created  by  conveyance,  338. 

created  by  devisee,  480. 

death,  resignation  or  removal  of  trustee,  341. 

declaration  of  trusts  in  deeds,  339. 

deeds  creating,  318. 

defined,  construed  and  classified,  59. 

devises  in  trust  for  married  women,  479. 

distinguished  from  powers,  60. 

equitable  liens,  516. 

evidence  to  establish,  508. 

implied  testamentary,  480. 

jurisdiction  of  action  to  declare,  656. 

lapsing  by  death  of  trustee,  483. 

lien  arising  under,  532. 

lien  from  misapplication  of  trust  funds,  532. 

necessity  of  writing  to  create,  508. 

purchase-money  lien,  530. 

revocation,  340. 

testamentary  trusts  distinguished,  356. 

title  by  adverse  possession,  693. 

TYPEWRITING, 

use  in  writing  will,  487. 
in  Ohio,  925. 
in  Pennsylvania,  928. 
in  South  Carolina,  932. 


70 — Thomp.  Abstr. 


1106  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

U 

UNDUE  INFLUENCE, 

affecting  validity  of  deeds,  298. 

UNIFORMITY, 
taxes,  631. 

UNITED  STATES, 

adverse  title  against,  698. 

land  belonging  to  United  States  as  source  of  title,  180. 

may  acquire  title  by  adverse  possession,  694. 

UNITED  STATES  COMMISSIONERS, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Florida,  789. 
Illinois,  793. 
Minnesota,  803. 
North  Dakota,  814. 
Wisconsin,  829. 
Wyoming,  830. 

UNRECORDED  EVIDENCE, 
abstracting,  510. 

USE, 

defined  and  construed,  58. 
transferred  by  will,  470. 

USER, 

personal  right  to  use  land  not  subject  to  descent,  722. 

UTAH, 

execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  824. 

of  wills.  936. 
statutes  of  descent,  878. 

V 

VACATION, 

by  municipal  ordinance,  501. 

effect  of  vacation  of  street  or  alley,  503. 

VENDEE, 

equitable  liens,  516. 

implied  lien  for  purchase-money,  531. 

right  of  property  in  abstract  until  sale  is  consummated,  30. 

VENDOR. 

equitable  liens,  516. 

right  of  property  in  abstract  until  sale  is  consummated,  30. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER  ACT  OF  1874, 
period  of  title,  8. 

VENDORS'  LIEN, 

actions  to  set  aside,  lis  pendens,  546. 

characteristics,  530. 

foreclosure,  530. 

interest  on  purchase-money,  531. 

jurisdiction  to  enforce,  656. 

waiver,  530. 


INDEX  ^  ^^^ 

[References  are  to  Sections.'] 

VERDICT,  ^  _, 

special  judge  or  referee,  005. 

^^^^sSful's  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  825. 
execution  of  wijls,  937. 
statutes  of  descent,  879. 

^^^^sSutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  826. 
wills,  938. 
statutes  of  descent,  880. 

VITAL  STATISTICS, 
recording,  136. 

VOID  CONDITIONS, 
in  wills,  462. 

VOID  DEVISES,  . 

inclusion  in  residuary  devise,  4»b. 

W 

WAIVER,  ,  ,-. 

defective  process  by  appearance,  6/1. 

homestead  rights  by  husband  or  wife,  793.  , 

jurisdiction  by  appearance,  663. 

must  be  recorded,  119.  .     ^^       tt  i  •       mo 

provisions  of  will  by  survivor  in  New  Hampshire,  919. 

vendors*  Hen,  530. 

WARRANTY. 

covenant  in  deeds,  z/o.         _ 
deeds  with  special  warranties,  3U«5. 
formal  part  of  deed,  260. 
title  under  judicial  sale,  592. 

'^'''"™uS°go;erning  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  827. 
execution  of  wills,  939. 
statutes  of  descent,  881. 

WASTE,  ,         ,        r       71^ 

liabilty  of  estate  of  decedent  therefor,  736.  .   . 

right  of  action  descends  to  heirs  and  not  to  administrator,  723. 

WATER  RATES, 
liens,  527. 

WATER  RIGHTS,  . 

acquired  by  adverse  possession,  W6. 

'''^'^strnte°™lt;„ing  execution  and  acknowledgment  ot  deeds,  828. 

execution  of  wills,  940. 
statutes  of  descent,  882. 


1108  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Seclions.] 

WIDOWS  QUARANTINE, 
defined,  67. 

forfeiture  for  remarriage,  67. 
states  in  whicli  it  still  exists,  67. 
substitutes  therefor,  67. 

WILLS, 

abstract  should  contain  full  summary,  5. 

abstracting,  488,  489. 

agreement  to  devise  real  estate,  401. 

alteration  and  addition,  487. 

alternative,  454. 

appointing  executor  only,  454. 

attachment  of  papers  referred  to,  487. 

capacity  to  make,  457. 

capacity  to  take  under  will,  458. 

codicils,  requisites  and  construction,  455. 

conditional  limitations,  475. 

conditions  against  alienation,  478. 

conditions  restraining  marriage,  477. 

construction,  459. 

construction  affecting  title,  678. 

contingent,  454. 

creation  of  fee  simple  estate,  46. 

creation  of  perpetuities,  482. 

definitions,  bequeath,  452. 

bequest,  452. 

codicil,  452. 

devise,  452. 

devisee,  452. 

devisor,  452. 

last  will  and  testament,  452. 

legacy,  452. 

legatee,  452. 

testament,  452. 

testator,  452. 

wills,  452. 
designation  of  devisee,  481. 

devise,  charged  with  payment  of  debts,  legacies  and  support,  473. 
devise  of  life  estate  with  power  of  disposition,  472. 
devises  in  trust,  480.  ^ 

devises,  requisites  and  construction,  454.  L 

devise,  separate  use  of  married  women,  479.  \ 

devise  to  executors,  480. 
devise  to  a  class,  471. 

devise  on  conditions  precedent  or  subsequent,  474. 
distinguishing  characteristics,  453. 
effect  during  life  of  testator,  453. 

effect  of  birth  of  child  after  execution  in  Illinois,  847. 
effect  of  probate,  486.  492. 

entitled  to  probate,  491.  r 

equitable  conversion,  484. 
equitable  lien  created,  516. 

essential  of  conformity  to  statutory  requirements,  487. 
estates  in  remainder,  468. 
examination  in  abstracts,  765. 

executory  devise  distinguished  from  remainder,  469. 
executory  devises,  469. 


INDEX  1 ^^^ 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

"^'"-^iteTrlTf us,  conflicting  and  repugnant  descriptions,  «0. 

forms  and  language,  487. 

lifT/ol  u'se'^'post^sslon.  rents,  profits  and  income,  470. 

lifS  oier  ok'death  of  beneficiary  on  death  without  issue,  476. 

ineflFectual  will  operating  as  mtestacy,  7U5. 

intestate  defined,  705. 

joint  and  mutual.  454. 

lapsed  devises,  482.        _ 

liens  arising  under  devises,  bZb. 

mystic,  454. 

nuncupative,  454. 

olographic,  454. 

operation  and  effect  of  probate,  58J. 

operative  at  the  direction  of  another,  454. 

operative  words,  463. 

precatory  words,  463. 

probate,  491. 

probate  of  foreign  wills,  493.       _ 

repugnant  provisions  and  conditions,  461. 

required  to  be  recorded  in  some  states,  UV. 

residuary  devises,  485. 

revocation,  486.  ,    ,  .,  ,  ,         .-n   yon 

rights  of  pretermitted  children  under  will,  /ZU. 

separate  for  different  jurisdictions,  454. 

signed  and  attested,  454. 

testamentary  and  contractual  in  form,  48/. 

title  acquired  by  will,  450,  451. 

written,  454. 

words  and  phrases  "interpreted  ,  466. 

words  of  purchase  and  hmitations,  464. 

words  passing  real  estate,  467. 

"^'^^S^'governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds.  829. 

execution  of  will,  941. 
statutes  of  descent,  883. 

WITNESSES,  .  ^  ^      QonoA? 

attestation  of  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 
attestation  of  deed  m  Alaska,  /81. 
Arkansas,  783. 
Cahfornia,  784. 
Colorado,  785. 
Florida,  789. 
Georgia,  790. 
Hawaii,  791. 
Idaho,  792. 
Illinois,  793. 
Indiana,  794. 
Kentucky,  797. 

Louisiana,  798. 

Maine.  799. 

Maryland.  800. 

Massachusetts,  801. 

Michigan,  802. 

Minnesota,  803. 


1110  INDEX 

[References  are  to  Sections.] 

WITNESSES— Co«//««rrf. 

Mississippi,  804. 

Missouri,  805. 

Montana,  806. 

Nebraska.  807. 

Nevada,  808. 

New  Hampshire,  809. 

New  Jersey,  810. 

New  York,  812. 

Nortli  Carolina,  813. 

North  Dakota,  814. 

Ohio,  815. 

Oregon,  817. 

Pennsylvania,  818. 

Rhode  Island.  819. 

South  Carolina,  820. 

South  Dakota,  821. 

Tennessee,  822. 

Texas,  823. 

Utah.  824. 

Vermont,  825. 

Virginia.  826. 

West  Virginia,  828. 

Wisconsin,  829. 

Wyoming,  830. 
beneficiaries  as  witness  forfeits  devise,  891. 
capacity  of  attesting  witness  to  take  under  will,  458. 
competency  of  creditor  in  Illinois,  903. 
conveyances  by  married  women  in  Alabama,  780. 
foreign  deed  accredited  in  Arizona,  782. 
no  witness  required  to  deed  in  Oklahoma,  816. 
wills,  487. 

WOMEN, 

acknowledgment  of  deed  in  Maine,  799. 

WORDS  AND  PHRASES, 
"about."  257. 

"all  my  worldly  goods,"  467. 
"ancestors,"  707. 

"and  all  the  bulidings  thereon,"  290. 
"and  his  heirs,"  274. 
"apart,"  324. 

"appurtenances,"  290,  467. 
"assign  and  convey,"  290. 
"bargain  and  sell,"  290. 
"bequeath,"  452. 
"bequest,"  452. 
"blood  of  the  ancestor,"  730. 
"brothers,"  466. 

"brothers  and  sisters,"  730.  \ 

"children,"  466.  f 

"civil  death,"  706.  -  ^' 

"codicil,"  452. 
"conventional,"  41. 
"cousins,"  466. 
"descend  to  them,"  466. 
"descendants,"  466. 


INDEX 


nil 


[References  are  to  Sections.\ 

WORDS  AND  VYLRAS^S— Continued. 
"devise,"  452. 
"devisee,"  452. 
"devisor,"  452. 
"due  process  of  law,"  962. 
"during  her  natural  life,"  466. 
effect  of  omission  of  "heirs  and  assigns,"  from  will  in  Missouri,  915, 

920. 
'effects,"  467. 

"equally  to  be  divided,"  466. 
"estate,"  40,  467. 
"farm,"  467. 
"freehold,"  467. 
"have  granted,"  290. 
"heirs,"  225,  465,  466. 
"heirs  at  law,"  466. 
"heirs  of  his  body,"  465. 
'hereditaments,"  467. 
"homeplace,"  467. 
'homestead,"  467. 
"house,"  467. 
"husband,"  466. 
'in  addition  to,"  290. 
'intestate,"  705. 
'issue,"  466,  712. 
'jurisdiction,"  650. 
"lands,"  467. 
'legacy,"  452. 
'legal,"  41. 

'legal  representatives,"  225. 
'legatee,"  452. 
'limit,"  274. 
'limitation,"  55. 
'makeover  and  affirm,"  299. 
'makeover  and  grant,"  299. 
'more  or  less,"  257,  290. 
'niece,"  466. 
'nephew,"  466. 
'next  of  blood,"  730. 
'next  of  kin,"  466,  729. 
of  the  blood,"  730. 
of  the  use  of  timber,"  290. 
'offspring,"  466. 
precatory,"  59. 
'premises,"  45,  467. 
'profits  and  benefits,"  470. 
'property,"  467. 
'real  estate,"  467. 
'release  and  assign."  299. 
remise,  release  and  quitclaim,"  299. 
'representatives,"  466. 
'sell  or  sign  over,"  290. 
'share  equally  with,"  466. 
sisters,"  466. 
survivor,"  466. 
tenements,"  467. 
testament,"  452. 
testator,"  452. 


I 


1112  INDEX 

^1 


[References  are  to  Sections.] 

WORDS  AND  PHRASES— Continued. 

"the  power  to  liear  and  determine,"  650. 

"title,"  70. 

"to  and  from,"  290. 

"widow,"  466. 

"wife,"  466. 

"will,"  452. 

WRITING, 

express  or  direct  trusts,  508. 
requirement  of  deed  in  Alabama,  780. 
required  of  wills  in  various  states,  890-942. 
wills,  487. 

WRIT  OF  ENTRY, 

foreclosure  of  mortgage,  445. 


WRIT  OF  SUMMONS, 

WRITS, 

attachment,  553. 
execution,  614. 


See  Process. 


WYOMING, 

statutes  governing  execution  and  acknowledgment  of  deeds,  830. 

execution  of  wills,  942. 
statutes  of  descent,  884. 


Whole  number  of  pages  in  this  volume,  1194. 


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